Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR SHELDON J. KRYS

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
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INTERVIEW

[Note: This interview was not edited by Ambassador Krys]

Q: Today is August 18, 1994. This is an interview with Ambassador Sheldon J. Krys. It is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and I am Charles Stuart Kennedy. Sheldon and I are old friends. Can we start with your background? Tell us something about your family, your parents, when and where you were born, where you grew up? We want to get an idea where the people come from that we are interviewing.

KRYS: I grew up here in Washington. I was born in New York City. My mother's parents were from New York. I spent from age six onward in either Maryland or Washington, DC.

Q: You were born in 1934?

KRYS: Yes, right. We came here just as the war years began and of course Washington was a small town.

Q: What was your father doing?

KRYS: My father was a builder. He had apprenticed with his father and so on for generations. They were cabinet makers. Even though they were cabinet makers they were all builders, for three generations at any rate.

Q: I think that was very much carpenter gothic and the whole thing.

KRYS: That's exactly right. During the Depression years, things were terrible for us and I remember my mother always told a story that on one of my earliest birthdays, he spent his entire salary of eight dollars a week to buy me a tricycle, so this was always a big thing. I think it fashioned his thinking about what I should do. I think he was quite torn between having me come into what became a fairly successful business here in Washington and fearing that somewhere in the back of his mind there may be another depression and this was not the way to go. I went to the University of Maryland and lived at home and life had improved considerably after the war, not that we were deprived. As you probably remember, you didn't know you were poor; you just lived like everybody else. There was food on the table.

Q: This was it. I sometimes go back to the houses I lived in in California and I look at those little houses and I think they were really very nice. Now I think that's for the other folk but then I was the other folk.

KRYS: We were the other folk as well and my father did it on his own with his own two hands literally. I have always been very proud of what he's done and tried this sort of thing in summers but it wasn't necessarily my life. He was a terrible teacher because he knew how to get things done and he was a very definite type-A. My lagging behind was not his great idea. At any rate, I went off to the University of Maryland because I was going to follow a wish of my parents to become a doctor, which was the wish of every parent. I majored in starting up the radio station at Maryland University. As soon as I got out of school, I went to South Dakota and started in radio.

Q: When one majors in starting up a radio program, what type of courses does one take?

KRYS: I ended up as an English major but I was still seeing myself as a pre-med student which was absurd. It was just as the Korean War was coming to an end and Maryland University, which was a very large university, really wasn't prepared for the influx of veterans so they didn't have microphones in large rooms. I had a chemistry professor and he taught a course which was known as Dewey's mystery hour because no one really understood anything he was saying. It was in an amphitheater and he spoke with his back to the student body and he filled the blackboard with equations, as this was organic chemistry. Then as he put the last equation down, he picked up the eraser, never turned to the students, and erased the board so we never knew anything. His great claim to fame apparently was that he helped to invent detergents, so he was going to stay on the faculty forever.

Anyway, in the summer of '55, I went off to South Dakota and started in radio having exaggerated my experience. I actually started in radio in Washington when I was in high school.

Q: Where did you go to high school?

KRYS: I went to Coolidge High School which is in northwest Washington. One of my classmates was a kid by the name of Ron Nessen and Ron and I had similar ambitions. I actually got the program on WOL which at that time was located on Dupont Circle and did "What's Happening with Teenage Washington." Ron Nessen later was Gerry Ford's press secretary. I think he went to American with Willard Scott and Ed Walker. We were part of the intercollegiate broadcasting network here in Washington. When he got out of school he went off to West Virginia, (he never talks about this) and he was known as Ron Harold and then later he was known as Old Hickory because he had a country music formatted station. I went to Rapid City, South Dakota.

Q: How did that come about?

KRYS: The owner of the station was in town learning to build a television station, and he went to *Radio and Television Magazine* which was an industry magazine that has want ads. I had placed a want ad in which I had spoken of this extraordinary experience in news broadcasting. I went out as a news broadcaster. He actually drove me out there. He was a man who had been a coal miner and a coal miner's son and created two radio stations with his own hands. I joined part of a large network which consisted of two stations, one in Rapid City and the other in Deadwood. These were sister stations. I was big stuff.

I became really enamored of a program that I did, and we traveled around three or four states in which it was carried. It was a children's show. It taught me a great deal about what goes on in this country that we in the East would never understand, and that was the plight of the Native Americans as they are now known, the Maglala and the Sioux Indians. I had a partner and he and I would go into the supermarkets in all of these little towns on Saturday mornings, where we did this children's show. As many as 500 or 600 children, or as few as 50 children, would turn out, depending on the size of the town. Most of them came because we had a sponsor called Foremost Foods which was a dairy that sold ice cream and milk, and we gave ice cream and milk to the children. That's probably why they came because it was an awful program. This is my life story, isn't it, Stu?

Q: Yes, but I think this is very important because we are trying to figure out where somebody comes from.

KRYS: Actually, I'll show you how I came into government in a sort of a left handed way. At the end of 1956, instead of doing the morning news where I started, I was doing the evening news. I actually started doing editorials which was unheard of and was

controversial even in a small town. A man came in and said he'd heard me on the air and he would like me to manage his campaign for Congress. Now in 1956 I was 22 years of age. It was probably about that time that I needed to think about moving on, although I thought it was to another radio station or television. I managed his campaign, he was a Democrat, and we lost by only 3,000 votes. In those days South Dakota had two districts and the second district is where we ran and lost but in losing, my name had been sent back to the Democratic National Committee in Washington. I returned to Washington because I could no longer go back on the air in South Dakota, having shown my political prejudice. In those days, you did not do that, especially if you were in news.

It came about that three years later the man who had been state treasurer in South Dakota became the assistant treasurer of the National Committee. When John Kennedy was going to run for office, I was asked if I would handle part of the campaign. By then I had a public relations and advertising agency here in Washington. I went to work ultimately for John Kennedy and that is how I came into government for three years. I came into government in 1961 to see what I could do for my country and I never left.

Q: When you were involved with the Kennedy apparatus, what aspect were you dealing with in this campaign?

KRYS: I was in charge of going into every state where the Democratic Party did not support the ticket. You can just imagine where that was - where there was very strong anti-Catholic sentiment.

Q: The South.

KRYS: Well, not just the South. Southern Illinois, for instance, and California, parts of Ohio. Not that much in the South because while there was opposition, it was kind of united opposition and you didn't have a split within the Democratic Party. I was the director of special projects and it was really to get together with people in places like Omaha Nebraska, just about wherever he lost was where I went. I worked for Byron White who was head of Citizens for Kennedy and Johnson. When the President won, as you can imagine, anyone who had worked for him was the key factor in the victory. The margin was so narrow that everyone was responsible for victory. That was a line that Bobby Kennedy actually used and this was his organization. I came into government as the director for public affairs.

In the time between working for Kennedy and leaving South Dakota I, among other things, had started a public relations and advertising agency. What I was doing was packaging television shows here in Washington independently which meant mostly on WTGG. It was the only non-funded station. It was called the Dumont network and is now Metro Media. It was channel five.

Q: It's now Fox.

KRYS: Yes, that's right.

Q: My son works for Fox.

KRYS: In those days, it was in the basement of the Raleigh Hotel and it was the Dumont Network. I had been directing one of the few shows that was a forerunner to Larry King. When did you come to Washington?

Q: I came to Washington in '55, but I was overseas from then on pretty much.

KRYS: In '57, I produced and directed a radio show which was a talk show. It was done from a restaurant. It was the number one show in Washington and it was called *The Steve Allison Show*. It was late night talk. The restaurant was next door to the National Theater, and so anyone you can imagine who was in Washington, it was my job to go and get them on the air for nothing. You can't imagine the parade of people that came through.

At any rate, in '61, I came into government as the director of public affairs for the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. The job there was to set up a public affairs office which this small independent agency did not have. I was asked by a friend if I was interested in coming over to State and I said "Yes, but I've really got to get back to my own business" which because it was so small, really was not going to survive much longer and as it turned out it didn't. I came in to State in '62 and didn't take the exam until maybe five years later.

Q: When you came into State, how did you get in then?

KRYS: I was an FSR, a Foreign Service Reserve officer. That was a limited appointment. I was working in educational cultural exchange on the volunteer visitor program.

Q: At that point, it was within State and was not with USIA.

KRYS: That's right. I had very fond hopes and some thought that a commitment had been made that I would be Edward R. Murrow's special assistant. Instead, it went to a man by the name of Tom Sorensen who was a USIA officer and the brother of Ted Sorensen.

Q: What were you doing? Could you describe first how Luke Battle operated at that time in that job and then what the bureau was doing and what you were doing at that time?

KRYS: I'll try to. It's a fast 32 years ago now. You had a substantial number of civil servants who I think had been USIA officers at some point and had come back and sort of settled into many of these jobs. It ran one of the most dynamic programs as I think those of us who have seen the program in action more recently under the aegis of USIA would still agree. This is the exchange of visitors. If you can go back to that setting in the early '60s, Africa was emerging, and I suspect just about every person who ultimately became a leader came here on either a Leader Grant or a Specialist Grant. The Specialist Grants I think went up to six months and them grantee would work somewhere. The Leader

Grants were up to 90 days and very dependent not only on programming such as Meridian House might provide, but also on the hospitality around the country of people who either had some interest in the country from which they came, or shared professional interests. The program was tailor-made for each Leader grantee.

To sum up most succinctly what I did, I was a poor man's chief of protocol. While Angier Biddle Duke would go out to meet a head of state at 2:00 in the morning, I would also be out there at 2:00 in the morning to meet the head of an emerging union somewhere. I would greet them, brief them on what the program was, take them to their hotel and make sure that the programming suited what the grantee expected, within bounds. You had a full range from the least sophisticated, truly people who had come from countries that didn't have a long-standing tradition of what an exchange program might be, to very sophisticated leaders, people who ultimately went on to become prime ministers in their own country. I did that for about a year and a half.

When John Kennedy was assassinated in November of '63, I thought I would leave government. It really was at that point that I had gone to talk to Tom Stern and said I was thinking of leaving. I was thinking of other things but if I were to stay on, I thought a very nice way for me to finish out my brief tenure as a non-commissioned Foreign Service Reserve officer, would be to go to a place like Florence as consul general. I watched Tom Stern just about come off his chair. I must tell you that Tom was very kind and understanding. He really understood how ignorant I was. He said "No, no that is for old men. That is not for someone as dynamic as you. Now let me tell you..."

What happened was I had blundered into something rather wonderful. The then deputy Under Secretary for Management, Bill Crockett, wanted to start up a program on how to manage your mission. You know this goes around more frequently than every generation as we see now, reinventing government. Crockett really was farsighted, and he had some very dynamic people around them. Foremost among them was Tom, I think. He wanted to put five officers into the field and see if there could be a programmatic approach to the management of resources and policy, familiar phrases. What was brought about was something called CCPS, comprehensive country programming system.

I was to go out to do that if I were to accept the offer of going out at all, but it was a rather unstructured approach. I was to go to London, which of course was quite a bit of bait, to be the embassy's management officer without line responsibilities and look at how a very complex mission operates, try to see where there was duplication and where there were ways of doing things better but working within the existing structure without the authority of being a supervisor. Part of that plan in the back of Tom's mind was that he would come to London as the administrative counselor and we would then work together. That didn't happen. He went off to Bonn instead.

Q: When did you go?

KRYS: I went to London in January of 1965.

Q: And you stayed there until '69?

KRYS: Until the end of '69. I stayed there for three months short of five years. There was a reason for that. After a year, I was asked by David Bruce if I would be his special assistant. He was the ambassador, and he was the one who fought very hard for me to join the Foreign Service. He urged me to go back and take the examination. The first time I took the examination, I was not accepted. I took it a second time maybe two years later and was. The system was not too keen on bringing people in from the outside. At that time I was an R-4. I wasn't coming in at some exalted level and clearly money was not the issue. That really began a very different chapter in my life.

Q: When you went out to London, I think you would be as welcome as an outbreak of smallpox or something like that because there is nothing worse than somebody who comes in and isn't going to take any work off anybody's shoulders. You are going to create more work for them just to support you, and then you are nosing around, asking, "Why are you doing this?" Was there any preparation before you went out? What were you going to be doing? Did you have any thoughts in mind or any instructions? How did it work out?

KRYS: Some of this is, I guess, lost in time but I think part of my approach may have spared me. Whether I was smarter than I believe I was or whether it was an instinct, I don't know. First by way of preparation, I took what was then called the administrative officers course and the budget and fiscal course. I qualified as a budget and fiscal officer because what I looked into was what that is all about. For me not to have had the basics would have put me at the mercy of everyone. When I went out, there was someone who could probably draw more fire for this incursion than I. A first tour Foreign Service officer was named the CCPS coordinator and was placed in the executive suite. He knew more than anyone at that embassy according to him so when he tried to impose CCPS and sat David Bruce down to tell him the right way to run his bloody mission, I think I was home free.

Q: I was offered the job in Belgrade at that time. I took one look at the thing and said, "That sounds very interesting, but I think somebody else might want to do it."

KRYS: I was very lucky. Findlay Burns was the administrative counselor and Findlay was an extraordinary mentor. He's Findlay Burns. There are all sorts of ways of approaching things, and Findlay had his own distinct way of approaching them. For me he was a very quiet mentor who gave me an enormous amount of responsibility even though I didn't have line responsibility.

I'll give you an example or two. Housing was at a premium, and he said I want you to go out and find apartments. It wasn't that long after austerity in London, and there were very few buildings that we Americans thought were suitable. A prerequisite was central heating, and that was not necessarily something you were going to find. I ended up leasing, and I think we've ultimately bought the building on a road called Abbey Road which was next door to the Beatles' studio. I found this new apartment building and he

was behind me but I was doing the negotiations. I learned a good deal.

When I got out there I did something else, too. Rather than sitting next door to the head of the section, the administrative counselor, I asked if I could work in each of the segments of administration and consular work. I placed myself under the wing, if there was a wing, of the senior local employee in each of those sections rather than the American. If you have an embassy with people as gifted as the Foreign Service nationals were in London, almost every one of whom started at age 15, you have a great deal to learn from them and that was the relationship. It was quite fortunate that I did that. I learned so much and I wasn't going in there to tell them anything, I was going in there to have them tell me. That worked extremely well.

I did a very few months as the embassy's budget and fiscal officer because Harry McKeem moved up to be sort of a deputy to Findlay Burns, and then I was asked to work for David Bruce as one of his two special assistants.

Q: Back to this management thing. Did you see anything endemically good or ill in it? This was your first look at this because you were only there for a year or so and here was a large embassy. Did you see any major problems with how it was run or maybe how the Foreign Service runs missions?

KRYS: I probably took a businessman's approach to what I was doing. If you have five people selling the product and you only have one customer for the product, you either change some aspects of what you are doing or you start eliminating the number of organizations. I'll give you an example. We had three libraries in the embassy in London which I combined into one library. You had the USIA library, the Commercial library and the embassy's library. There was only a limited amount of space ultimately even in this new and rather controversial building that Ero Saarinen had designed for us on Grosvenor Square. It met enormous resistance, but the idea of having three non-co-located libraries made no sense to anyone, so we had one library which had a Commercial portion to it, and a USIA portion to it, and it all fit into one space. Obviously that is something you look at very carefully.

In the consular section (when I got there, I had already been in London seven, eight, or nine months and still had an idea of how the embassy ran) there was no communication within the section. People were so partitioned off from one another that it was an endless grind to move paper along. By moving people in a non-threatening way because they weren't going to lose their jobs, they were going to be able to talk to each other without getting up and walking across a large room just to move a piece of paper, that too worked.

I wasn't sophisticated enough really to say "this is how the new embassy should look" and that really wasn't my idea. If you could do portions of an embassy and make them work a bit better, ultimately the embassy itself was going to be a better organization. But I didn't reach for the divine, to determine how well the front office communicates with the consular section. The truth of the matter was, the front office didn't communicate and

felt no particular need to. You had people of good quality with responsibility given to them. Only in the absence of performance, so that something was very wrong, [was there a need to communicate]. That is not a bad approach as you and I know.

Q: As a professional consular officer, the less communication you have, the better. What is the point of troubling them? Besides, it gives you more responsibility, which is better. You don't want to load people down with your problems.

KRYS: It is interesting [in terms of] the development of young officers; these were crucibles for these people and you saw it happen. You saw good supervisors and you saw supervisors who weren't nearly as good. From what I was doing, that wasn't going to change. All I could do was observe that.

Q: You were sent out as an experiment. Did you have any feel how this thing worked with Crockett? Tom Stern did a long interview with Bill Crockett, but one of the things that I gather from him was that he was full of ideas and these ideas would bubble up and then he would go on to other things. There wasn't a lot of follow-through, mainly because there were so many ideas. Some were good, some were bad. They were tested out, but the follow-through was a major problem.

KRYS: I think the idea of management interns or any sort of interns is a very good idea. It doesn't work in our Foreign Service, sadly. If I may skip a number of years, when I was working in MMO as the principal deputy in management operations, we managed, Bill DuPree mostly and I to a lesser degree, to get FTE (full-time equivalents) in some substantial quantity when the trend was going in the other direction. We had Secretary Shultz's support. After we got these positions, we couldn't give embassies political and economic officers and labor officers on central complement. They would rather have a GSO who was going to do a little more of the polishing and the administrative work. Maybe they needed both but many of the embassies, many of the ambassadors, were not thinking about the future of the Foreign Service and to a sad degree I don't think we can recapture that opportunity the way things are today. [But] let's not jump that far ahead.

In this particular time frame, I think that Bill Crockett had extraordinarily good ideas. He had too many of them, I agree. I think where he suffered was, he had the wrong vehicle. The comprehensive country programming system dealt in the abstract. For example, in one of the consulates in England, you had a non-career consul general who claimed to be working 90 hours a week because any time he picked up a magazine, that was considered professional study time. We both know that wasn't happening. So when these charts were created as to what people were doing, we put them to rest in London but at a cost because we also took cuts on an experimental basis in a follow-on experiment called EROP, the executive review of programs. Incidentally, I may be the granddaddy of all of the acronyms having to do with policy and programming experiments.

But CCPS really wasn't for the State Department. It was much too elaborate and, like too many of the programs, it was applied across the board to all embassies and that is foolish. You really want to go after places that have resources that might be saved. As you know,

in small places, at best, it would be a limited return. CCPS was so elaborate that it didn't work. Crockett gave it up. He went to PPBS, which was then being used by the Defense Department. Chris Argess wrote a book about CCPS, the experiment in [the] State Department.

You need the dynamism of a Bill Crockett and a Bill Macomber and a few others. You also need the good will that they had for the Foreign Service. There was no meanspiritedness in what they were doing. Crockett came from within the Service, Macomber had experience within the service. Both of them really I think strove to build upon what existed rather than an attitude which said that much more (or at least as much) can be done with much less. [They did] not force the Service to define it's mission, which really does take us to today, and if there is an opportunity, we'll talk about that later.

Q: Could you talk a little about Findlay Burns' operation? He was somebody who was around quite a bit and, as you said, he had his own way of doing things. This is your first overseas experience. How did he run things?

KRYS: May I start with an anecdote about Findlay?

Q: Sure.

KRYS: Findlay and Martha lived in an elegant house, the administrative counselor's house, in London. My wife and I arrived in London in January of '65. My wife at that time was expecting twins, although she had been told be every physician it was one child but she was fairly certain on this point. We were invited by Findlay's secretary to come to a reception, our first social occasion in London. We turned up at the door and it was rather quiet. We rang the doorbell and the door was answered. Findlay and Martha were dressing [for] dinner because the date had been switched to the next night and we had not been advised by Findlay's secretary. I guess we were somewhere further down on the list. Findlay and Martha could not have been more gracious. I sent flowers the next day - Martha has never forgotten that - but more importantly, we were mortified. Martha called and asked Doris "After everyone leaves tonight, why don't you stay for supper so we'll have an opportunity to get acquainted?"

There's an enormous lesson which is so infrequently taught within the Foreign Service. Diplomacy as a skill can also be practiced within the Service and not necessarily [just] on host country nationals or non-Americans. They put us at ease and made us understand that, yes, a mistake had been made. It wasn't your mistake and even if it was your mistake, it doesn't matter; come and stay and have dinner. He was a very, very senior officer. As you know, he went on to become ambassador to Jordan from that position in London, and was taking a very young officer and showing a different side from what goes on in the office.

Findlay had enormous style and it was very much the old school of the Foreign Service: precise language and a high level of expectation of his officers, but also a high level of expectation of the personal and professional conduct of the people at a mission. He chose

young officers and gave them responsibility very early on and sat back. [His] style was to be the supreme director rather than the hands-on everyday manager. Having said that, no detail went unnoticed, but look at the individuals he had around him. Among them when I was there [were] Tom Tracey; Joe Meresman, who is no longer alive; and David Passage. There were five or six young officers, and I'll count myself in that group [whom] Findlay taught things to. He taught you by letting you explain what the situation was, what you felt was the best solution, and then he would comment on that. I must tell you [I didn't have] the style that Findlay had. When I have mentored young officers either working for me or those who have come to talk to me, the first thing I have done is listen to them because they do have to tell you a little bit about their approach and then you make your judgment as to their ability, their intellectual capacity, and how they see themselves within the Service.

Q: You moved to David Bruce as special assistant.

KRYS: I became an IROG, international relations officer general, which is a political officer.

Q: What did David Bruce's special assistant do?

KRYS: He had two special assistants. You were the miniature version, a mini, mini version of a national security council staff. What you saw, too, was that the front office, the ambassador and the DCM saw the papers that they should see, [that you] became involved in things that they may not otherwise have become involved with, [that their] schedules were kept. You have to remember that London at that time probably was [our] largest mission. The rivalry may have been between [it] and Bonn at that time. It was a very large mission with an unheard of number of attached agencies. Today of course twice the number would not be unheard of but there were almost 30 attached agencies. There was an extraordinary calendar for the ambassador, for the ambassador's wife, the DCM and the DCM's wife.

Q: Who was the DCM at that time?

KRYS: A very interesting man, Phil Kaiser. Phil was a rarity as well in that he didn't come from the professional service. He came from the Department of Labor where he had been at age 32 an Assistant Secretary for International Affairs. He was a college professor, a Rhodes scholar, and just prior to coming to London, was ambassador to Senegal and Mauritania. He wanted to come to London because at that time the Wilson government was in power and, although he had known both sides of the aisle, he had gone to Oxford with most of the leadership. Again he was a very substantive type of DCM. Findlay really ran the management side of the operation.

Al Wells was just leaving as I was coming in and Bob Skiff and I were in the front office. With David Bruce you became involved with things that were highly sensitive, requiring discretion. He managed to have you do things without asking you to do them. You just wanted to do things to ensure that the office ran smoothly. He was an individual who did

not demand and therefore it would have been unthinkable for special assistants to usurp the power of the staff. He wouldn't have stood for it and you wouldn't have thought of doing it. So if your political counselor wanted to do something, it was really between the political counselor and the ambassador. You might have your [own] views and if they were solicited, you might express them, or if you felt strongly he would want to hear them, but you did not become the super-political counselor.

Q: Sometimes this happens, often with a political ambassador who develops a coterie around him who almost cuts out the line officers. It can happen.

KRYS: Not with David Bruce. David Bruce was a remarkable man both in style and in substance. He had the ear of the President and he knew when to use it. He was sought out by the White House rather than the other way around. I came to know him fairly late in life. I don't know if you know that David Bruce started as a Foreign Service officer back in 1926.

Q: Yes.

KRYS: And then he married Ailsa Mellon and went to London in the job that I was in through his father-in-law as private secretary to Andrew Mellon. So he had a soft spot and I believe he had a level of expectation that you better live up to.

Q: We're jumping around a bit here, but there have been times when you've had a DCM who's extremely well connected or a political counselor who has these connections such as Philip Kaiser had, particularly on the labor side. There is this sort of labor mafia that the American and British labor movement had. Many coming out of the American labor movement had this close relationship, Sam Berger was an example. Did this cause any problem between Philip Kaiser and David Bruce?

KRYS: No. I think that they knew where the boundaries were for one another. Witness the fact that Phil Kaiser was there over five years and David Bruce was there eight years, the longest tenure as far as I know. I don't think that would have lasted [otherwise]. I think Phil was quite aware that there were some things that were really the ambassador's, and there were things that the ambassador would look to him to do. You also had to think about that entire mission. There were very few people there at a senior level who weren't connected with some large body. Armstrong was the minister for economic affairs. Bill Brewbeck was the political counselor and he was very well connected to the Kennedy administration, and so on. Phil Kaiser has written his autobiography and I think one of the things he cited was the number of people with whom he served at that time who went on to become ambassadors and it was practically the roster of the embassy in London. Maybe that is wrong for the Foreign Service. Maybe the good people should really be distributed, if you can recognize them, with a greater view to where they are needed but in truth I think the system operates about the same way today.

Q: How were relations with the British at that time and with the Wilson government?

KRYS: Vietnam was clearly a cloud throughout that period. David Bruce was quite involved. I had considered that this had never been declassified, but it has been. There was a very special operation which involved attempting to have the bombing stopped in the North and a deal was going to be struck at a time that the Russian leaders were in London. The British were going to be part of this, and it came apart.

Clearly the British public on the left was opposed to what we were doing. The embassy was pretty well stormed one night when we were there. The relationship though was still viewed as *the* special relationship. Harold Wilson in those years I think tried to seek a different course for us with regard to Vietnam still, but there was not a strain that you would find in a nation where the leadership would overtly display to the United States its feelings in ways that resulted in diplomats not having access. That was never a question of that.

In the operation that involved the cease fire, it was one of the most restricted bits of communication between Washington and the embassy. When I talk about David Bruce giving young people responsibilities, I would be the one who would come in at three in the morning because only three of us in the embassy, the head of the communications section, the ambassador, and myself, could see some of the things. Three in the morning of course was the usual time for Washington to dispatch something to the prime minister for immediate delivery. I will long remember my knees absolutely shaking. I called the ambassador at home, and he said why don't you do a summary of it and deliver that to the prime minister. We'll give him the full text tomorrow, but you get him the summary. I sat down and did the summary and literally thought my god if I mess this up, democracy as we know it will have ended. At this point (this must have been about 1967), he felt that he had sufficient confidence in me to do this, more confidence than I had in myself at this particular moment. This was something called Operation Marigold.

Q: Obviously this wasn't your direct responsibility, but you were certainly seeing how the ambassador and others were dealing with it. The Labour government had this left-wing group that seemed to spend all of its time linking hands and singing the Red Banner Forever, the Red Flag Forever. They were doctrinaire socialists who by any standard were basically almost communists - at least from the outside it seemed like that. What was the feeling about the Labour Party and particularly the left wing of the Labour Party?

KRYS: I suspect, to put this in context, the Labour Party as a governing body had as much difficulty with that left wing as the United States possibly could have and because Wilson's majority was so slim, they were kept in line for fear of losing control of the government and probably compromised far more than they wanted to. Nonetheless we had violent demonstrations. There was very strong sentiment against the United States but in the everyday dealings you were dealing much more with the center of the Labour Party than with the left wing. A better person to talk to would be someone like Tom Burn who was the labor attaché during those years, and maybe Mike Pister who was the youth officer because they saw much more of that element. Ours was more of an idyllic relationship because we were dealing with people who had a responsibility for governing.

We talk about security. I'll tell you how different life was [then]. I had a pass to the Foreign Office because of my position. You had night clerks, young Foreign Service officers, who lived upstairs, and those were the people that I would, of course, bring these notes to. I would then sit and we would sweat together to see how we were going to make sure that it got through the permanent secretary and so on, to the prime minister, at the right time... when to wake him up at 3:00 in the morning and when to wait until 8:00 in the morning. I remember going into what would be the Operations Center with all of these communications coming in worldwide and it meant nothing [that I was] an American; I had the same pass as a Foreign Office official. Can you imagine someone walking into [our] Operations Center? It was very, very different in those days.

Q: How did we view the demonstrations against the embassy? I might add for the historical record that the present President of the United States, William Clinton, took part in some of those.

KRYS: One really was violent and it was on a Sunday night. As you know you have to ask permission to demonstrate in England; even the baddies have to do that. The only time that we had anything occur against the embassy was to the windows along the consular side of the embassy, which was on Upper Grosvenor Street; [they] were shot out by some Basque terrorists one night. This led me to become inappropriately heroic several days later when there was a CODEL in my office en route to the Paris Air Show. My office window was just above the entrance to the consular section and a car went up Upper Grosvenor Street and backfired and I threw all of them to the floor. I'm trying to remember this one poor congressman from Chicago who was about as round as he was high and I just knocked him over like a bowling pin. They said "It's all right, Son. It's all right. We understand you're trying to protect us." I knocked them flat.

One night there was a very violent demonstration and the ambassador and I came into the embassy. We were on an upper floor and we watched the demonstration. It was serious. Obviously we carried out our policy. We felt very strongly about it, but I don't think there were any Americans who didn't want to see it end. This particular one got out of hand, and a policeman was killed, I think. He was kicked in the head, and there was a photograph taken just at that moment, as a matter of fact. But in England when things are even at their most violent, there is a certain civility about it. The people didn't come armed with weapons. The real danger was to the horses because they would drive the pickets into the horses. There were many [times] during working [hours] when we would have part of the mounted police behind the embassy and a busload or two of protesters. You're right, you had a lot of American students there at the London School of Economics at that time. There were a number of places that would have been called hotbeds of anti-Vietnam sentiment.

Q: Did you find Vietnam in the social life there much of a problem?

KRYS: I think perhaps I was naive. I really didn't see it on the part of the British.

Q: They weren't coming at you about Vietnam all the time?

KRYS: No, because I think what we probably had by way of friends and contacts in those years were people who were more conservative. You know there is such a difference there. There is certainly a recognition of economic and [social] class in England that doesn't exist here, so we were not in the coal mines where you might have one view, [different than that of] someone in a different strata. It isn't a matter of snobbism; it's just the way it was. You didn't meet people who were [lower class], or you just didn't socialize or come in contact with them.

Q: Vietnam was a major thing. Were there any other issues that were absorbing the ambassador and in which you got involved?

KRYS: East of Suez towards the end.

Q: Which means what?

KRYS: There was a declaration that beyond a certain date, in effect, England would begin to withdraw from traditional places where they [had] felt a strategic interest - i.e., Yemen.

Q: Malaysia.

KRYS: Yes, but particularly within the Middle East domain. You began to see an immediate change in how the British were treated; they wanted to drive them out and to make sure that they accelerated or at least stayed on the schedule. The question was what sort of vacuum would that [create] for the West. Again, it was always the East-West dynamic. When you say involved, again I was not a line officer.

Q: Yes, I understand, but you were the fly on the wall.

KRYS: That's right, from the perspective of seeing everything that left the embassy of major importance. Clearly there was a real shift of attention to what will [happen] in that part of the world if England isn't flying its flag there. Not necessarily an imperial flag but a flag that dealt with the military strength of a Western nation that we considered correctly, our closest ally, and what did it mean for us. There were certain areas, again in the Middle East, where even if we had chosen, it was seen to be the domain of Great Britain militarily and some of that still remains, for instance, in Cyprus. Once the announcement was made that there were going to be substantial slashes in defense and in presence, we began to think about what our role would be.

Q: Were you getting from the British any feeling that if they got out, all of a sudden we were going to have to assume more of a responsibility in, say, the Persian Gulf? Was there either resentment or saying "Hey, fellows, it's your problem now, not ours?"

KRYS: It was not as boldly put as that, but I think a very strong argument could be made

that clearly the conservative leadership felt that this was a serious mistake. Our role was to report, and the reports clearly were that there was a dynamic shift in the political-military aspect of our presence in that area where England would no longer be. I think it was reflected in how we (and here I don't have proof at hand) began to look at our military bases in a place like Libya differently. I would suspect that the relationship with Saudi Arabia took on a different aspect as well. There were lots of things that played out. This was done, not because there was necessarily an anti-military wave sweeping the country, but on the basis of finance, on economic need. The consequences were much more direct than you might see from a similar declaration by the United States.

Q: Were you there essentially during the Johnson administration?

KRYS: No. I had agreed to stay on six months into Walter Annenberg's tenure so I was his special assistant for six months.

Q: Here is quite a different man, very much a self-made man, quite different from David Bruce and with a somewhat cloudy reputation. How did he come to be there?

KRYS: Let me leave his reputation to the side because having been a special assistant, as I would speak of David Bruce only in a certain context, I would do the same thing with Walter Annenberg. Walter Annenberg came there under very difficult circumstances and of course it had much more to do with what occurred here in the United States than anything to do with Walter Annenberg himself. His counterpart, the British ambassador here, prior to Richard Nixon's election had somehow become involved in our politics as you may remember. I think he had been the editor and chief of a leftist magazine. I can't remember if it was the *Spectator* and the *New Statesman*. I should remember that but I don't. At any rate, he was hardly welcomed in Washington when Nixon went into office. Walter Annenberg may have been the single largest constant support of Richard Nixon and so he was named ambassador.

There was a tremendous amount of press. There were interviews with Mrs. Annenberg and some quotes that were carried in the London press which dealt with such things as the short comings within the residence, neglect and so on. All the things that in an ambassadorial seminar today we tell new ambassadors to remember: that there is someone out there [listening] and even if you think you are dealing with people who are going to quote you accurately, just don't get involved in this sort of thing. I think there was a little touch of anti-Semitism involved in all of this. Walter Annenberg just came into a hail storm of critical press coverage for the first six months, the months that I was there, and it was not very much fun. He was cast in a very dubious light.

You should know that Walter Annenberg does have a speech impediment, he has a stammer, and one of the most memorable and unhappy moments in the early tenure of Walter Annenberg involved a film [called] "The Year in the Life of the Queen." To be included in that was Walter Annenberg's presentation of credentials; that had never been filmed before. Annenberg and I went to Buckingham Palace without the Queen being present. There was a walk-through as to how it was going to be done, and he did

everything the way he was supposed to. However, the film used a clip which dealt with something that I suspect he had memorized, and it was [in] very stilted language, dealing with the house being redone in response to something that the queen had asked and it was found to be very amusing. It was splashed [everywhere]; BBC carried this, too.

They also juxtapositioned [it against] a reception at Buckingham Palace. They showed the presentation of credentials and then they showed the queen and Prince Philip at the annual reception in Buckingham Palace looking through the doors where all of the embassies are lined up and the Queen says "He's not there." Philip says, "Who's not there" and she says, "The American ambassador." Actually, it was David Bruce and it was very near the end of his stay in London. Since he had been in London for eight years, the American embassy was about the third in precedence so you had to walk all the way through Buckingham Palace, which was filled with diplomatic entities. He had been having a farewell dinner with the chief of protocol, the Duke of Norfolk, and he couldn't get through in time so there you had the Queen saying, "He's not there. He's late" but they showed it after the presentation and they never showed that it was really David Bruce rather than Annenberg.

They played these little games and it was a very, very difficult time for him. He had a very different style. The embassy residence was changed dramatically. David Bruce had been in London essentially off and on since 1941. He had been head of the OSS for Europe and so his style was just very, very different. Regents Park [the residence] looked very different. The Annenbergs came in and spent an enormous amount of their own money and made it into a showcase, a showcase in their style. The government benefited by having a building redone and redecorated, but it was totally different in style and the contrast was pointed out as something [at which] the British looked down their noses at that particular time. He was there a very long time. He ended up giving an enormous amount to the country and was knighted at the end and left with great prestige and dignity, but it took a very long time. I was there at the worst possible time, six of the months of greatest unhappiness.

Q: One of the things that is always difficult is the British media, TV and all. One, there is a leftward bias to the bright young things who are doing it, plus the fact, as you say, they may be anti-Semitic, but even more, they enjoy tweaking Uncle Sam's tail.

KRYS: It was great sport. That's exactly right and it was a nasty piece of business.

Q: Nasty is the right word.

KRYS: Yes, it was.

Q: Obviously Annenberg lasted this out and sort of won them over.

KRYS: As I said, it was a very unhappy period.

Q: Were the special assistants there acting as a buffer and explaining that this, too, shall

pass, or could you look at it that way in those days?

KRYS: It was very hard to look at it that way. I think I became part of [the] old group and when you do change, the lesson for the special assistant is, really don't stay on, move on, because you are part of something that [is past]. It was a very hard transition for me, and it was time for me to leave. I know he felt that, and I know I felt it. There is no explaining [it], and I certainly didn't try to make those kinds of excuses, but I was clearly very much identified with the previous administration even in his eyes, not at the outset and far less so with Mrs. Annenberg. Of course they were there a long time, and it did work out for them.

Q: Obviously, Bruce had been around a long time and had become one of the grand old men of the Foreign Service and then to have a new man with a lot of money coming in, although it has to be expected, did you find that the embassy was a little bit hostile or not? How did they respond to it?

KRYS: I think most of the transition took place after I left six months [later]. There was a change of two DCMs [during] my [tour]. I think there was much more front office direction. One or two of our colleagues in the Foreign Service saw there was a golden ring and sought to grasp it. It was just a very different style and I'm really not the best one to comment. I was part of the old style, and there is a lesson.

Q: Really, in a way, it's to move on.

KRYS: Absolutely. I had agreed and both ambassadors asked if I would stay six months and I stayed six months literally to the day. He had brought a special assistant with him, a socialite from Philadelphia, who was not to have a substantive role but that increasingly changed as you can imagine.

Q: Were you able to see on the substantive side any difference in style in dealing with the British between the late Johnson and very early Nixon administrations?

KRYS: No. I think it took place in a more gradual manner between the two countries than within the leadership of the mission. You have to go back to the fact that there were really very few major outstanding issues between the two countries. When Richard Nixon came in, he talked about having come in with a plan. The plan was to erase what would have been the most serious irritants in the relationship, but between the two countries, there were very few. To this day there are very few outstanding issues.

Q: Outside of the basic blip of Suez in '56.

KRYS: That's right and now at this point we were into the end of '69 so it was 13 years later. While there may have been a burr under their saddle, it was a well worn burr.

Q: From London where did you go?

KRYS: I came back to the Bureau of Latin American Affairs because by then Findlay Burns had gone to the Bureau of Latin American Affairs and anyone with whom he worked and whom he wanted, he brought in. He was Deputy Assistant Secretary for Management. It was a title that hadn't existed before him and may have gone to Fred Chapin after him but that was the end of it and the reason was ARA has such a major aid component to it. Findlay brought me back and I became a deputy to Joan Clark who was head of personnel. Personnel at that time was decentralized. She moved on within a few months to EUR and I succeeded her. Brandon Grove was brought in as a post management officer, and he later went on to do Panama negotiations. There were a whole series of people who were all brought into management jobs because Findlay didn't care what job we were going into, he wanted us in the bureau. So ARA suddenly had a gloss of EUR about it.

Q: I raise this question almost every time I can about ARA, particularly among the regional bureaus. For some reason, when I ask people who dealt with various things, where does ARA rank or where do the bureaus rank, usually it was EUR as the first (I'm talking about effectiveness and getting things done) and then usually NEA, EA, AF came next, but ARA is always at the end. Can you talk about this? We're talking about '69 to '74 period when you were with ARA.

KRYS: First of all, it is very hard to talk about NEA and EUR and which one is better because they are so different. In my own evaluation, I would probably put NEA at the top of the list, given the number of people they have and the dedication of the people in difficult circumstances.

I think if ARA has earned the reputation that you say exists in the Foreign Service, or has existed in the past, it was [because of its] unwillingness to take new people in and an unwillingness on the part of those already in ARA to serve elsewhere in the world. This meant that you had one officer (this is not apocryphal) who had served in ARA all his career, had taken a vacation in Paris, and sent a postcard back. He wrote to another colleague and said, "Paris is wonderful. It is the Buenos Aires of Europe." So that was the mind set. You had people who went from one ARA post to another. You really did not have a willingness to expand horizons and to bring a different type of leadership into the post, except maybe at the very top as ambassadors. This was one of the reasons Findlay sought people from outside the bureau. It is also, you may remember, one of the reasons, at least the perception of not bringing new people in, that GLOP came in.

Q: Global outlook under Henry Kissinger.

KRYS: That's right. I think it was Findlay who said we too often manage by spasm rather than by looking down the road. It is spasmodic reaction and so you take the extreme and then you have to come back to something else. That's not to denigrate the officers in ARA, it's to say the general outlook was one that did not permit innovative thinking. It had to be brought in later and I think it was brought in.

Actually one of the most successful (I guess because I had a hand in doing this, I feel this

way) policy and resource programs which came out of Macomber's diplomacy for the '70s was implemented in ARA with some success. It was PARA, Policy Analysis and Resource Application. But it, too, sort of went the way of most of these programs. I think that perception was because people served all of their lives in ARA and were not generally known to the rest of the Foreign Service.

Q: I think this is a real problem. Why don't we stop at this point? I'll put something on the end of the tape that essentially we will be talking a little more about ARA, how you were received there, and then we will go on from there.

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Today is the July 31, 1995. Sheldon, we've just gotten you into ARA and we talked a bit about ARA's sort of parochial outlook. You were some of the new blood that was brought in. How were you received by ARA?

KRYS: I think quite well. The Foreign Service has a tradition of a lot of movement. Besides, the job I was doing was non-threatening to any policy. I was in the executive directorate even though I had just come from a non-management, non-administrative job in London. I may have mentioned that Findlay Burns brought in a group of people, placed them all in the executive directorate, and then moved them to other jobs.

Q: Who was Findlay Burns and how did he operate?

KRYS: Findlay was a political officer who came into the Foreign Service right after the war in 1946 or he may have even come in a bit earlier. I don't think he was in the military. He had gone through the normal rotation as a Foreign Service officer generalist, had served primarily in European Affairs up to the point where after London he went off to be ambassador to Jordan. After that it was a tumultuous time in the Middle East in the latter part of the '60s after the '67 war, and he came back to Latin American Affairs in a purely management job. He had been the administrative counselor in London which was an unusual position for him. Nonetheless, after his ambassadorship he came back and again pursued a management position as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for management. It was at that level, rather than executive director, because ARA at that time combined AID and State under one Assistant Secretary, Charlie Myers in that instance. He came back in early '69 or maybe even earlier.

Q: Just about the time that you came.

KRYS: I came in at the end of '69 and he was ensconced by then. He brought in people like Brandon Grove, Bob Funseth, Joan Clark, and myself. Primarily people who had all served in European Affairs. Each of us had a different role and ultimately ended up in still another role.

Q: What was your assignment and to whom did you report when you arrived there?

KRYS: In ARA I reported to Findlay but I reported in a straight line of command to Joan Clark, who was head of Personnel. Personnel at that time was decentralized. As you know, the personnel positions were power positions in some way and ARA was looking to draw more people in (this was before GLOP) from other regions in a decentralized mode. The people on the assignments side within the bureaus had a lot to say. Some of our contemporaries were for instance Dick Murphy who was the head of personnel for NEA. Joan then moved over and became deputy executive director in EUR, I think in '70, a number of months after I arrived. I moved up and took her job. It was at that point that personnel began to look towards centralization.

Q: That had just gone through. I came in in '67. The big push was, "We are going to centralize. We are going to have everything. We are going to trace everybody's career up through the upper ranks. We are going to recruit just what we need and have complete control of careers."

KRYS: It all has a very familiar ring. I think they brought in one person to do career development for each of the regions or maybe one for a number of regions, I can't even recall. I remember being counseled, it was sort of a separate thing, and then the assignment boards went ahead and did their thing anyway.

It was about that time that the first step towards centralization was taking place, in about 1970. Cleo Noel was in central personnel. I have the impression that Bob Brewster may have come in about that time as well. The assignments meetings took on a different character in that there was a larger role, but not a predominate role, played by [the] central system in an effort to ensure more fairness in parceling out the better assignments to the better posts. I think you know that in those years better had no real definition on the same scale that it does today, in that if you were an Africanist, the better posts just were better because of the opportunities they presented to the officer rather than the living conditions.

Q: I think everybody was looking towards positions of authority. In other words, toward more power or being in an interesting or exciting place because these tended to get you moved up and also gave a lot more psychic satisfaction.

KRYS: I'm not sure. I think it is a point looking back (and probably more reflection than just in this conversation), but it seems to me the emphasis was far less on that on [getting promoted] compared [to] today. It was extraordinarily different. It was far less in that the satisfaction was in the job and in the development and perhaps learning another language, rounding out the experience in a particular region of expertise. The promotions I think really came from the job done as viewed by the bureau and you had much more sense that if you were great as an Africanist, you were going to get an African embassy at some point. You didn't have to go on to be political counselor or DCM somewhere in another region like Europe to get that kind of job. NEA is a case in point. When a number of the nations in the Middle East became embassies, you had one FSO-4 [under] our old system who was promoted to three but had been named as an ambassador before that.

Q: That was Bob Paganelli, wasn't it?

KRYS: Exactly. I think even Joe Twinam was a three when he was made ambassador.

Q: What were the pressures on you when you were in the assignment position?

KRYS: Let me tell you as I view them. I'm not sure what they would have been in a different world as I reflect on them. It was to make sure that there was a good blend of personalities in an embassy and I think I learned this from Joan Clark. You can have a superb officer and that person can get eaten alive by an ambassador whose personality really was going to clash with the officer's. I know that is very unscientific, but if you were dealing with a very finite group of individuals, you knew a lot about them. A good personnel officer really read those files, really understood each individual, or almost every individual. You made sure that the person had the skills, and the language and could get there on a timely basis. A lot of what we were doing was ensuring that you didn't have gaps, ensuring that someone who went out there was ready to go to work because they knew something about the area [as well as] ensuring that the chief of mission was going to accept this individual because the chief of mission had a lot to say about assignments. You worked with larger posts if you thought you had officers who may not have been up to the higher levels. They could absorb people in different sections a lot better than the smaller posts where it was vital.

Q: You had ARA, didn't you?

KRYS: I had ARA under the decentralized [system].

Q: What were some of the posts where you say they absorbed? I know I can't tell you how many people (far too many people; it got embarrassing) I had slightly earlier on sent to the consular section in London who had drinking problems or family problems or something like that, only because the embassy was big and there wasn't a language problem. Did you have ARA places where...

KRYS: I had one big place and you tried not to overload it.

Q: Mexico?

KRYS: Mexico, yes. There was a difference in Mexico. Ralph Bribble was the executive counselor, actually number three in the embassy. Ralph and I worked very, very closely. Two of us, by the way, came out of [the regional] bureaus and stayed in the new system on the second floor. Howie Schaffer, who was in NEA, and I, who was in ARA, were kept in the system. We tried to get away, but we were in Personnel for a very long time, almost four and a half years. It's a very wearing job as you know. When we went to a more centralized system, we took on the domestic [and substantive] bureaus. I had CA in ARA and a number of others. I think I had SS and a few other places.

At any rate, one of the major problems in Mexico as far as staffing was concerned was

that you began to have resident officers along the border. They became very much a part of the culture in which they were working and less a part of the culture of the United States because they literally would be there 10 or 12 years. Also, you really didn't have enough movement for a lot of the younger officers who should have gone into those jobs. I managed to work through the system to move people out of Juarez, Tijuana, Nogales, [but] it just went on and on, [as] we had a bunch of them along the border.

We got down to one officer in Tijuana who had been there a very, very long time and I hope he is not readily identifiable. He wanted to stay there. He actually lived on the American side near San Diego. We were down to this last officer and I had vowed to roust him out. We really were going to have a complete turnover over a period of time, since I was there a long time. It was an ample opportunity for other assignments. The long and the short of it is, we finally got an assignment for this person and about the time he was to move, in came a letter from the then senator from California, Tunney, who spoke about his constituent's major concern. This individual, whose mother had a heart condition which if she were to move to an altitude [of] 120 feet higher or lower would [kill her]. If we chose to move this individual, that would be the case for his dependent mother. So we left him there. I lost.

Q: Did you have problems with the old boy network fighting you, everybody wanting to get so-and-so, or to keep so-and-so, or something like that?

KRYS: Yes, but I think that was part of the give and take in those days. If the individual could do the job, and it really wasn't a monopoly of a small number of officers [over] the more desirable posts, it wasn't something that was really that frowned upon. There was movement in and out of the bureau at that point. It became much greater with GLOP, as you will recall.

Q: GLOP didn't take place when you were there?

KRYS: That was later.

Q: Personnel is always interesting to somebody. Did you ever find yourself almost trading things, saying, "I won't fight this one if you give me this?"

KRYS: Yes. Let's be honest about this. Yes, there was some of that. The big thing was not to injure somebody through this kind of trading. Just because you said I'll give you this, didn't mean that the individual who was on the other end of that bargain didn't get something good, it may just not have been that particular post.

Q: What was the attitude towards the placement of women officers in Latin America?

KRYS: That was not a problem. It was certainly not a problem that I perceived in my time. In fact, I made the first tandem assignment in the Foreign Service, at least knowingly a tandem assignment. There had been a few before. Melissa Wells and her husband comes to mind in London in my time [there]. Al Wells was there and she came

in just as he was retiring which is a story unto itself. It was the Tiptons, John and Mary Ann Tipton. John I think died last year or thereabouts. It was knowingly a tandem assignment and a lot of things fell into place, or at least were questioned and were bargained over with regard to allowances, shipments and that sort of thing as a result of the Tipton assignment.

Q: Were there any posts in Latin America that gave particular problems during your watch either because staffing, living conditions, or events?

KRYS: What comes to mind immediately is Uruguay at the time of the Tupamaro. It was very hard. We really didn't keep families at [the] post in the late '60s or early '70s. We are now into the early '70s in this time frame. I remember the effect it had. I went down there and visited every Latin American post with the exception of Paraguay. There was a problem there and I can't remember what it was, why I didn't go there, if it was a problem getting in and out or a problem with the regime. Montevideo once was a glorious city. You couldn't go anywhere without machine guns all around you. Lights would go out and people would think the worse was about to happen. It was really under siege. Garbage was in the streets, it was a tough time.

I remember the effect on one family. He's now an ambassador in Latin America. His children were down there, and he told me about them drawing a picture at the request of the school teacher who asked them to draw their family, as small children are asked to do. The child drew mother, father, sibling, and someone lying by the door with a machine gun, and themselves. That was just part of the family picture. It was very rough in those days.

Q: Did you have problems getting people to go there?

KRYS: No. I think the Foreign Service has really been consistent in that. To my recollection, even in the worst of times in the Middle East when I was the executive director, we staffed our positions; people volunteered. Some had personal circumstances which made it attractive. I think that was less of a factor back in the '60s and '70s. People went; life was hard.

Q: During this time, did you feel the Vietnam draft problem? I'm talking about Foreign Service people being yanked out to go to Vietnam. Was this something that happened?

KRYS: I guess I was in Personnel when Fred Z. Brown was in charge of that. I think there was a sense [of opposition] among the younger officers, and some resigned. Yes, I think it was a presence that was felt. If you were dealing in Latin American affairs, you probably felt it less. I didn't see the direct impact in that people would say let me get to Latin America to get away from Vietnam. It was a very stringent program as you recall.

Q: You mentioned in our previous interview that you got involved in the PARA program. Could you explain what PARA was and what your involvement was?

KRYS: PARA was policy analysis and resource allocation. I may have mentioned that I got started in the very first of the programs, something called CCPS, comprehensive country planning system, when I was in London. The then deputy Under Secretary for Management, Bill Crockett, had sent out people to various posts as special assistants to the ambassador. In a way, I was moved in to take over part of that as well as being a more general special assistant to David Bruce. CCPS was a program that had all the right ideas and was absolutely unworkable. We had a consul general in one of the posts who worked 90 hour weeks because every time that individual picked up a magazine, that was counted as CCPS learning hours or something of that nature.

Then we did something that we probably shouldn't have, we did a voluntary follow-on to CCPS called EROP which was executive review of program. I think it is one of the few things that really got David Bruce angry in that as a result of EROP where we gave up positions from all different sections, the only people who actually left were State Department people, very few [from other agencies].

PARA came about when I served on [the] "Diplomacy for the '70s" [group]. Actually, Hewlett and I created PARA which was meant to be a follow-on on a pilot basis to link policy and resources together. Part of the problem with any one of these programs was that, almost immediately, management wanted universal application. One of the things that I think Ashley and I argued about was that there are some posts where it really didn't make any sense to have the program. For the sake of universality, very often programs went under. A tiny post, at best would reduce or reshape so little, why put them through the exercise? Why not deal with the exercise where it really mattered? PARA came into being and I think we tried it only in ARA to start with, essentially because Ashley and I were in ARA at that time.

It led to other management attempts up to the present time, some with more success than others. PARA had a virtue of being policy directed, initiated in Washington, rather than the post initiating or formulating what they thought should be the policy when they may not have had a regional outlook. That led to things like HASP and GASP and all sorts of other programs, which was hemispheric analysis and global analysis and so on. Everybody had an acronym worth having. Anyway that is what PARA was.

Q: Every time we come up with a new one of these things, I think the system takes one look without really thinking about it as, "Oh, my god, not another one." The support you get is not exactly wholehearted.

KRYS: I agree with that. Part of the track record has been very poor, and maybe it is a vicious cycle. If people supported it more, perhaps these exercises would fare better, but they really have to be seen somewhere along the line as having a reward system. I don't mean monetary, but if you do something well, then somehow there [should be a form of] recognition. I would build in something else (this is a more recent view), and that is, if you are really going to talk about a zero based budgeting look at what a post is doing, you really ought to start by justifying the reason for the post. If you can't do that extremely well and not just parrot back what the presets are, then you ought to think about whether

the post should be there at all. Now we are speaking prospectively and I do have strong feelings about that.

Q: Let's go back into that period. At that time, AID and State were melded together only in ARA. Was that part of your business, too?

KRYS: I think we were much more aware of the role that AID played in a post because of the unification but we didn't get into AID's personnel system. I do remember, though, a number of AID people becoming consuls general as a result of a need for their talent. Donor Lyon comes to mind in Brazil where he was CG of an enormous post, I think it was Recife, that was receiving massive amounts of AID money so he was the CG. I guess there was more awareness of how the two agencies made up the staff of a particular post.

Q: Looking at this from your perspective, did you see a problem with having a superfluity of political ambassadors of minor talent, particularly in the Caribbean Islands or places like that?

KRYS: That's called "leading the witness" here.

Q: Yes, I know it's leading the witness. Was it a problem? It has been from time to time and other times it hasn't.

KRYS: I guess my answer is colored by my perspective. Good talent is good talent if it isn't excessive. In other words, you can't destroy the career service by having such a large number. I think in ARA we had probably examples of some of the worst and some of the best. The bad ones really stood out because they made headlines. The very good ones were just accepted as being very good officers from outside the Foreign Service. There were some notable individuals. What they did and how they were viewed rather speaks for itself, and I'd leave it at that.

Q: Did you have problems when there was an ambassador, and it could be a career ambassador, too, who was either particularly inept or particularly difficult to deal with and you had to sit back with your fellow personnel people and try to figure out how to deal with this?

KRYS: Yes, and the real key there involved the officers with whom these ambassadors worked. Two come to mind. You had to be very careful that people going to those posts knew that there was a system behind them, and as you know, we have not always had a flawless record in supporting our people. One in particular really got mauled by the ambassador. He was head of the political section and the system I think could be proud. He was actually [given] an AFSA award, the Harriman award. Is that the one for reporting?

Q: I think so.

KRYS: It was an award for his reporting which was at great odds with the chief of

mission's reporting on Somoza, just to define it for you. That saved him. It helped to save his career, but he had problems even later on because those things stick around.

Q: It's a very important element within the Foreign Service that you do have people who are supposed to give the United States of America their very best, including calling things as they see them as objectively as they can. Sometimes, that's a problem if they do, but sometimes you have ambassadors or others who are committed to a cause and don't like to see this.

KRYS: This was really a case where there was such a different view of the Somoza regime by the chief of mission [from that of] the head of his political section. The very fact that the political section chief was rewarded and openly commended was a real message as to how we felt about objective reporting back here.

Q: Was there a convergence of views here in Washington, saying, "We know this," or did you have problems?

KRYS: No, there were no problems. I don't remember the problems. Perhaps they have melted away with time but I don't remember them. I think this was really an instance where the kind of reporting we were receiving from the section mattered.

Q: Just to get into this a bit more, you're in personnel and part of your responsibility is to see that career development works. In other words the efficiency report, the record, doesn't hurt somebody who is doing well. Is the desk coming and saying, "This guy or woman is really doing a fine job and there is this conflict, help us protect him or her?"

KRYS: You got it from a number of sources. The way it very often came to light is if the individual felt himself or herself to be imperiled for what they were doing. Then you really sort of stuck your ear to the ground. Even though we were more centralized in the later portion of my assignment in personnel, we were still very close to the bureau. We had come out of the bureau, we would still go to their staff meetings with the executive director and we really made sure we knew what was going on at post. Very often we would hear that someone was in difficulty and it was not her or his fault. You had to make sure that you rallied the troops a little bit. I would like to think that is still being done today but I'm not sure how the system would plug in.

Q: You were there during the Rogers period weren't you, or Kissinger's?

KRYS: Kissinger's toward the end of it.

Q: With either Kissinger or Rogers, did you have any feel while you were there about how they viewed Latin America?

KRYS: Kissinger made it very apparent, that's the famous story. I can't really place that, whether I'd just left. I left to go to Serbian language training at the end of '73. Kissinger really spoke about Latin America as an inbred group of officers and brought about the

global experience, GLOB, as a result of that. I didn't have the sense at my level that I knew what was [happening] on the seventh floor other than as I heard it from Bob Brewster or many of the people on the sixth floor. The answer I guess is no, not really. You really heard it on an individual basis that someone wasn't working out or someone was working out extremely well.

By George, we really read the files. We would make a lot of assignments on each of the assignment days, but [we] really knew where people had been and one of the ways you could win your fight was to say this is the right position for a next job for someone because they have done this, this, and this. They have [written], they want to do this, this, and this. Their supervisors have repeatedly said that this is the time for them to go off and get a year of training. Well, let's do that. It was less scientific perhaps than it is today but it was certainly much more [humane]. You knew the players because they came back and they spoke to you. They knew that you were involved with their assignments so they came back and spent 15 minutes and had a chat with you.

Q: You left there after a remarkably long stay and you took Serbian language training. What brought that about?

KRYS: I was going to Yugoslavia as administrative counselor. It wasn't a language designated position. I met with Mac Toon when he was back and Ambassador Toon was a quiet, somewhat dour individual, some would say, although I saw a very different side of him. He had a nice sense of humor and openness. He really wasn't sure that the job was open but he was back. At any rate, I interviewed and he said, "Sure the job is yours but why do you want to do administration?" I said, "That's where I find myself here and this is what I want to do." I worked it [out] with the European bureau that I was not going to go someplace where I didn't understand what the people were saying around me. I didn't take the full 10 months, but I was given five months of Serbo-Croatian training and got a two-two after five months.

Q: Did you take it in the garage?

KRYS: No, the garage was earlier. We were already in this building here in Rosslyn. I took it from a changing guard of Serbian teachers, and that guard has been changed again in recent years. It was a tough experience. I was the oldest one in my class.

Q: Did you get any feel from your Serbian teachers about Serbia and the Serbia mentality?

KRYS: Certainly when you got there, you were able to put it in better perspective, but it was quite clear you were dealing with loyalists. The regime had been extremely repressive under Marshall Tito who [made certain] that there was going to be [only] one line. It wasn't going to be Moscow's line, but it sure as heck wasn't going to be the West's either. In a way you learned about the mentality that existed after the Second World War, but also between the First and Second World War because that is part of the mentality. Some things just don't die, they just go on. We spoke Serbian very much like

people who lived in Belgrade but we had a '30s flavor because some [of our teachers] had come before the war and some just after the war.

Q: I don't know if you had the same teachers I had. I had Yankovitch and Papovitch.

KRYS: No, I had the next generation. Papovitch's tape was the tape we used. [His speech was a] rattle, it was military, just a mile a minute and it was very much a type [from] between the wars, kind of metallic. I had Father Milosevic for part of that and Mrs. Hanniher who was a new teacher who had been at the embassy in Belgrade so that was a little bit after the war. But we had one class with Papovitch.

Q: You got out to Yugoslavia in 1974.

KRYS: Right.

Q: What was the situation in Yugoslavia as you saw it at that time?

KRYS: It was really on a little bit of an upsurge. There was a little more cooperation with the West, somewhat less concern with the East at that time. By Eastern European standards, clearly by Iron Curtain standards, you were in the lap of luxury with the availability of domestic goods. Nonetheless you saw enough people around and enough people were in the embassy itself working for us who'd suffered dramatically at the hands of this particular regime for perceived cooperation. We had a number of people who were sent off to lead mines for a while because either they worked for the American government or they were seen at one point to have been too close to the Germans. That generation was still there.

It would have been very hard not to have felt very comfortable. We felt very comfortable in Belgrade. We were close to the Foreign Service nationals. They still come to see us when they come to the United States. Lots has changed, lots of things had changed since the business, this massacre ongoing now. We didn't have a variety of vegetables, but we had vegetables. The tomatoes came from Bulgaria at the right time. The cucumbers... You went to the zelenvanuts at the right time and bought your 50 different kinds of peppers.

The embassy became very close-knit following a visit of President Ford and Kissinger. It hadn't been that close-knit before. We rebuilt the consular section. We did a number of things that brought the embassy closer together. We moved the consular section into the building adjoining the chancery rather than in the basement.

Q: In the basement where I spent five years.

KRYS: So that was a real change. It became one mission.

Q: How did you find working with the Yugoslavs? As administrative officer more than anyone else, you're up against the bureaucracy, everything you can think about.

KRYS: I probably had as many problems with our own bureaucracy as I did with theirs. I think it was unusual that I was able to work in Serbo-Croatian and that made a difference particularly near the end of the tour. I didn't find it that difficult to work with the Serbs.

Q: Did you find that security problems - spying and this sort of thing - was much of a problem?

KRYS: It was a constant thing to be concerned with. I fired a Foreign Service national the first week on the job [who] was obviously a plant. As you well remember, unlike the rest of the Iron Curtain Soviet missions, you could hire directly. We also knew that those people that we hired were really under pressure to cooperate. This individual in our view was not only part of the UDBA, the secret police, but he was also harassing the employees on the job. My predecessor in the day or so that we had as an overlap said, "You can't fire anybody around here, you better make sure you're very careful about it." I took a very different view right away because he harassed one of the employees to the point where he emptied her purse of money and [told her], "If you don't like it, lump it" in coarser terms than that. He was on a week's holiday the first week I was there and it was a problem left on my desk. I had his pass removed and I immediately went to the ambassador who said, "Of course, that is fine. It's not a problem." That was a good example to the Serbs.

We also took an attitude that it was up to us to guard our classified information. If people were under pressure, we understood that and they could say whatever they wanted to say so that they didn't find themselves [under] constant threat. I had a number of people who came to me and said "My child is going to be expelled from school because I am not cooperating." The attitude was "Tell them what you know because you shouldn't know anything that somehow endangers U.S. national security." That made life a lot easier. As you remember, the FSNs could not go above the second floor without an escort and we had [other] measures in place. [Against] electronic [penetration], we took countermeasures, and about six months a bug was discovered in one of the guest houses at one of the residences.

Q: You sort of assume that everything is bugged. In fact, we'd sometimes use the telephone to pass on messages. When Zagreb would call and say they're having a consular problem I'd say, "I'll ask the ambassador to talk to Marshall Tito about that."

KRYS: You really bring to mind a great story but I'll have to remember who was [involved]. I think it was Don Tice who was head of the political section. Marshall Tito hadn't been seen for a while and there were intelligence estimates galore about his imminent demise. He of course survived, I left and he went on. But he hadn't been seen for a long time and I think Don Tice had received a telephone call and it may have been from Dusko Dodor who has gotten some [criticism], bad press, unwarranted in my view.

Q: He was a reporter for...

KRYS: At that point he was with the Washington Post. Dusko [phoned], and Tice [about Tito]. Don said, "Yes, there is some concern that Tito hadn't been seen for a while." Don left the office 15 minutes later to go to a reception. At the head of the receiving line was someone from the Foreign Office who said, "Oh, Don, how very nice to see you. I saw President Tito just 15 minutes ago and he looks wonderful." It was a direct response to the intercepted phone call. Those were the games that were played on all sides.

Q: Speaking about security, one of the more difficult problems dealing with locals was people coming to the embassy to seek asylum because it was fairly open, whereas most of the rest of the Iron Curtain was not, and it was run by locals. Our local employee Foreign Service nationals would be the first point of contact. Did this present a problem or not?

KRYS: It's funny that you mention that. The first point of contact going into the building was the Marine guard and in the consular section it was a Marine guard by the time that I left. We had made two posts because of the [section] now [separated]. It was my very last day, and we were packing out, when a Russian tried to defect. There may have been others, but I wasn't aware of them, and I didn't know about them because it wasn't in the cards for me to know. There were others who took care of it. There wasn't a mad stream of people who had something to give to the United States. There were easier ways of getting out of Yugoslavia, as you know.

Q: You had two ambassadors while you were there, right?

KRYS: Larry Silverman for the last six or eight months.

Q: You were there from '74 to '76?

KRYS: Right.

Q: Could you talk a bit about how these two ambassadors, Toon and Silverman, operated and your impression of their effectiveness in that setting?

KRYS: You couldn't have had more contrasting styles and probably more contrasting backgrounds. Mac Toon was in government service probably from the moment he got out of the university, [first in the] military and then in the Foreign Service, I think directly. Larry Silverman had a political background and had a reputation for being very aggressive and very forward looking. His time in Yugoslavia was clearly just a way station for something else. He remained very interested in foreign affairs. He expressed himself very openly about not having the highest regard for the Foreign Service. He was rather tumultuous. He fired the DCM after he was there for a [short] time, and sought to move his special assistant that came with him up to a de facto DCM position. There was turmoil, but he was very bright. His wife was very caring about the mission. Very, very different styles.

In terms of effectiveness, I guess one of the more telling times was after I left so I am not

going to get into that too much. It involved a Yugoslav who had become an American citizen and went back and was arrested for spying. I think he was arrested for taking photographs at a sugar mill or something of that nature. The embassy took a very aggressive stance, and the Yugoslavs reacted predictably, sentencing him to seven years, saying, "You're not going to mess with our judiciary," whatever that might have been at that particular time. It took a while to back [the government down] from that position.

I guess, if you are part of the Service, you are more comfortable and understand more clearly the objectives of someone who behaves in a leadership role as a Foreign Service officer would. [It is different] if you are looking at it as someone who comes in and says over the next three years, or two years, or [one] year, or whatever it might be, these are my goals. He had clashes within the Department. He had clashes within the embassy and in the end I don't know how it came out because I left. I worked quite closely with him. I expressed how I felt, and there were things he disagreed with. He was the ambassador and as chief of mission you had to respect that. But I made it clear, for instance, that I would not report to a special assistant, and didn't, but my tour was coming to a conclusion. Some had felt very strongly and wanted to get away more quickly.

Q: When you get in a clash which became well known within the Foreign Service - there are a few of these, but this one really stuck out - how did you work it? As administrative officer, your task is really to bring everything together and to make it work. How did you handle it? I'm trying to get a feel for how one deals with this sort of situation.

KRYS: Essentially you are dealing with your peers both in terms of age and experience. So [you become] a place for them to come, if you will open the door and if people feel that there is trust there. There was trust. Three or four people from the embassy came and [told me] what [they] wanted to do; it really meant getting out of the post. [I] talked more about mission, and more about getting the job done there and trying to create buffers between the individual and the front office. That is the job of the DCM, but if there isn't a DCM then either someone [else] does it or it doesn't happen. Some careers can get hurt that way.

There was one individual who felt very strongly and saw this as a cause that he wanted to carry forward. It was buffered somewhat with a small compromise, I'm sure there is always compromise. It was a very difficult time at post. I'd have to think back to that moment for the months that it went on as to how we really handled it. His friends in the section - he was in the political section and his friends in the economic section - tried to find a way to make the mission go forward. I think that is one of the things that is not always understood. When you are overseas in an embassy, you are part of a whole. That whole doesn't encompass everything in the world; it is that embassy at that time which is in the forefront. You're there for a purpose and you try to make it work even under adverse internal circumstances.

Q: How well were you supported back in the European Bureau at the desk during this time?

KRYS: As you know, we are so bifurcated within a particular bureau between an executive directorate and a country directorate or Deputy Assistant Secretary, I didn't really have a great sense for that. Also this is prior to the time that it became well known. This was more at the opening months of the ambassador's assignment. You have to look at it from the ambassador's perspective, too. He had shorter term goals.

Q: What was his problem with the Foreign Service and how things were operating as you saw it?

KRYS: [That it was] not as responsive to his individual concerns and needs on the same priority basis that he had.

Q: Can you think of any particular areas?

KRYS: It was really within the bilateral relationship that I'm speaking of. Were we sufficiently tough with the Yugoslavs? You were there, so you know there is an ebb and flow. There are times that there really is cooperation and there are times when] you think that they are facing East more than they should. I think that was part of it and I think that was probably the essence of it.

Q: Often the idea was at that time, are you tough to communists or did you work with them.

KRYS: Remember, that did surface more or less in different ways over the 40 years of the Cold War.

Q: Yes. Romania was another place when Thunderburk was there.

KRYS: That was later on.

Q: Yes, but it is the same operative way of dealing with things. I think the Foreign Service tends to be, accommodating is a bad word but at least...

KRYS: Accommodating is the wrong term. It's really, how do you sell your policy in the most effective manner and sometimes that means that you go in and you don't bang on the table but you say this is what we're trying to do.

Q: It's a different perspective. A political appointee comes in for a relatively short time and wants to make his case and sometimes he is right.

KRYS: Larry Silverman went on to be a circuit court judge in the federal court system. That's very high and he is often mentioned [as] a possibility for the Supreme Court. He is a man of talents, but I'm not sure that diplomatic life was the one that he would place at the top of his accomplishments.

Q: I was thinking we might stop at this point and we'll pick it up next time after you left

Belgrade in '76 and you went into the inspection service, is that right?

KRYS: No, I went to the War College. You mustn't give away the best and most enjoyable year of my professional life.

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Q: Today is November 19, 1996. Let's get to the best year of your life.

KRYS: The best year of my life, it has a certain ring to it. I'm just wondering whether we might not make a film of it. I had an extraordinarily enjoyable year at the War College but I never really met anyone who viewed it any other way. All of the clichés are true. The people you meet are lifelong contacts and I still have contact with them. It was interesting, truly, to see that purpose served. You had a better view of what the military thought and found that most Foreign Service officers were more apt to go crashing through gates than our military colleagues were. You probably found that at the senior seminar.

Q: There is a story that when people start out in one of these War Colleges, they have war games, and it's usually the diplomats that are dropping bombs a lot faster than the military and the military is always going for diplomacy. I guess then you come to realize on both sides that diplomacy isn't always the answer and you find that force isn't always the answer. It is a learning process.

KRYS: I came out of the War College at a time, in 1977, when frankly the personnel system hadn't thought about senior training very much and I'm not sure if any of us had onward assignments. In my class among those [from] the Foreign Service were people like Tom Niles and Bill Clark. None of us had onward assignments. I had hoped possibly to go to SS/EX, the secretariat for executive management, because as you know I was involved more in management than in anything else. That wasn't to be and I was recruited by Bob Sayre and Yost to go into the Inspection Corps.

Q: Go back to the War College a bit. What was your impression of the military service from these aspiring generals and admirals, at that particular time because this was still a little after Vietnam and the military service had gone through a very difficult time?

KRYS: My contemporaries had gone through the Vietnam War. I was going to say some were [in the] Korean [War] but none really were, only one and he was in the reserves and was the oldest in our class. Their focus was far more on the Fulda Gap and containing [Russia] than it was on Asia. I was promoted at the War College and it equated at least on paper to flag rank when we went on [the class] trip to the Far East. We went to Korea and a number of the officers who had fought in the Vietnam War but not in the Korean War had [later] served in Korea.

We met with Singlaub, who was literally on the last few days of his assignment. He was wild eyed. President Carter was suggesting complete withdrawal from Korea and

Singlaub just couldn't have been more accusative, he couldn't have been more outspoken and he couldn't have been more wild-eyed quite frankly. He made his views known, as you'll recall, and when he came back to the United States, he [again] made his views known. We sat with him and that was most interesting. I don't think you heard as much talk about defined missions as you've heard in the last 10 years but clearly that was on their minds. The abandonment of the investment in Korea was not popular in the military, but nobody was really talking about it too loudly except Singlaub. As it turned out, the President backed away from it and did not remove our troops.

Q: I might add that I was newly arrived as consul general in Seoul at that time. Everyone felt it was gross stupidity to try to take the Second Division out and perhaps more, but we were thinking, "Fine, the President has made these pronouncements. How do you get around it?" This is what we all did, including the President after a while. Singlaub I guess was rather straightforward; if you say this, you mean this, therefore you are wrong, and I am going to tell everybody that.

KRYS: Yes, except he was still in uniform and the commander-in-chief had spoken. While we were sort of in-house with him, I think it transcended that. Be that as it may, that was his view and he strongly held it and he strongly expressed it. You must have been there. Tom Stern was DCM.

Q: Yes.

KRYS: We were there at that time. That was in the early spring of '77.

Q: What was your impression of how the military viewed the work of the State Department? These were people getting ready to take a larger role in international affairs.

KRYS: I think there was enormous respect, to be perfectly honest with you. Among other things, in the class and I am sure this is [true in] class after class, the earlier part of the curriculum really tended to speak in terms of foreign policy rather than military strategic initiatives or thinking. We [FSOs] were ahead of the class. As you can imagine, as the year went on, we fell either further behind or at least we had [parity].

Q: I'm told that you often acted sort of as a resource during this period.

KRYS: Absolutely and later on those in the military became a resource [for] the rest of us. I'm not sure they understood the workings of the State Department, probably to the same degree that we didn't understand the workings of the Pentagon. What we came to understand more and more was the importance of the unofficial channel; that we could take them through certain processes that weren't on paper and they would do the same for us. Since we were up first, we established ourselves. I found mutual respect there. It's hard to know, even in looking back, whether you have somehow gilded the lily or seen it through more of a rosy image than actually existed, but my impression was extraordinarily positive [for] both sides.

Q: You left in '77 and went into the Inspection Corps. You were in the Inspection Corps from when to when?

KRYS: From the late summer of '77 until January of '79, just under a-year-and-a-half. Then I went to the Middle East/South Asian Bureau.

Q: The Inspection Corps has gone through several metamorphoses. What was the Inspection Corps doing at the time that you were doing this?

KRYS: It was far less concerned with the audit process and the waste, fraud, and mismanagement that has come to the surface and has received emphases that exceeded anyone's expectations. It was much more concerned with whether our missions abroad understood the policies of the United States and were translating those policies effectively and efficiently in the host country. My last inspection at the end of 1978 was to go into China just before [establishment] of a [full] diplomatic mission, and it was to see how our policies were being laid out there and how we could plan for it.

In the more normal course of events, I inspected almost all of the countries in Western Africa. Again it was to talk about, "This is what the Department of Commerce thinks you're doing out here. What do you think you are doing? This is what the State Department sees as [the] five primary goals for our mission here. Can you articulate those" without telling them what they are.

We still had the administrative side with hundreds of recommendations which helped to kill the process. There were audits, and there were audits in depth if we found real mismanagement. The idea [was not to] spend an inordinate amount of time on whether locks should be of [one] configuration or [another or] the administrative functions, or the consular functions. We guarded against fraud and waste and mismanagement in the handling of money, but we didn't delve into hotline kinds of tips that you sent groups of inspectors out on. It was much more a program oriented inspection.

Q : *Let's talk about West Africa to begin with. I have always felt that at some of our West African posts, the major function is to keep the flag flying because in some places, particularly those that had been French colonies, we had not moved aggressively to exert our influence. How did you find this?*

KRYS: It varied. It really depended on the importance of the post within the region but now I suspect I'm beginning to reflect my later thinking. I'm not a universalist [certain that] we must have a mission in every country with an ambassador. If you are talking about a place like Nigeria, we had major interests, particularly in the oil producing times in the heyday of Nigeria and the influence it exerted. In Francophone countries, if you're speaking of the Côte d'Ivoire, again, we did have some interests there. France's domination of the Francophone countries remained, unlike the British. I think it was more than flying the flag. How much more I don't know.

There were places that I led in the inspection in a couple of the smaller countries, one Francophone and one Anglophone. I certainly would have closed one down and recommended that. There was simply no reason to have it. Our budget in the country on a given year was larger than the gross national product of that year for that country, so there was no reason to be there, except, as you point out, to fly the flag.

It was mixed and [we had] some positive influence. If I were to tell you one of the major influences that I [identify], it would reveal a very early bias. If you could identify leadership and bring [it] to the United States, for instance, or become more involved with [it], leadership that in some democratic form would come to the fore in later years. That is a major thing because it does have an influence beyond the borders of that particular country. I think we did some good on that.

I think the Peace Corps held out an image that was extremely important. Those were years that Peace Corps members were told to keep their distance from the embassies. They didn't. It was too hard to do that, and there was no real reason. It was a political decision that was made back here. Some of the projects Peace Corps projects were remarkably good, particularly the school building projects where a young man or young woman would go out into the field and over a period of time would really create a school and a small garden and children would learn something. That's a real positive [gain].

Q: What about AID?

KRYS: I almost said "by contrast." The AID mission very often was trying to do almost the identical thing at much greater cost. I think in some instances the pipeline was so clogged, so slow, and so overwhelmed with personnel, that there were revisions that took place in recent years that were needed back then as well.

Q: In some of my interviews, I've had people say that they have come across the fact that an AID budget might be cut in half but the personnel remains the same and it's almost impossible to cut it down. There do seem to be too many people dealing with it.

KRYS: You saw instances where the AID program had been removed from the country and you still had personnel and money flowing into it to take care of the clogged pipeline we were talking about. There is no question that AID had to look at itself in a different light and it took a generation for it to do so.

Q: What about China? What was your impression of our presence in China and what we were about at that time?

KRYS: We were fairly hunkered down, and it was a small besieged office at that time, but it was going to be an embassy. Perhaps I can relate an anecdote. My primary focus was on the management and stability of management in light of something that was about to occur. It was very closely held that we were going to have formal recognition and establish a mission. We had to go to the seventh floor to read cables that were being held there with regard to how quickly this would move along.

Q: Somebody might not be aware of it, but at the time you were doing this, the Carter administration was in, but it was a major political step to recognize the People's Republic of China. This would mean that something would have to happen with Taiwan.

KRYS: We left the day of formal recognition and went in with a very small inspection team. What we were looking at was not the present organization but how the [future] organization would function, what would be its goals, how would you reconcile the work in Hong Kong with the work in the PRC. We did inspect Hong Kong going in and then left part of the team in Hong Kong and a few of us went in to the People's Republic of China. It was a major political step that had to be massaged back here.

The last few days I can't tell you about because I was in China, but the transformation in China was extraordinary over the short period of time that we were there. We are talking a week or 10 days [when] a number of things happened. Suddenly everyone had a little book to teach them how to speak English, everyone. I mean, wherever you looked the ubiquitous red book, Mao's little book of sayings, suddenly was supplanted by these learn-to-speak English books and they were everywhere. There was a television show that taught you how to speak English. Going with some of the embassy people out into the street, [we ran into] a group of schoolchildren, and I love children, so I said, "Hello." [One embassy person] said, "Don't expect them to say anything because the teachers are going to have them turn their backs on you." To the contrary. The response was there and you could just see day by day there was this major change.

One of the more frivolous major changes while I was there was the International Club, which had been a favorite of Zhou En-lai's. [It] decided to have a dance the Saturday after we arrived. Allegedly it was the hottest ticket within the diplomatic community to try to get to go to the dance. I was told to meet with the manager of the club and he could take care of me. Literally it was a matter of pennies, maybe it was $10. He had to meet me under the stairs as a real favor. Part of the allure that I must have held for him was that we had arrived just as two cabinet officers had come in in succession. One was the Secretary of Agriculture and we had dinner the first night at the Great Hall of the People as part of that. The second one was the Secretary of Energy, or whatever the equivalent was in those days. Here we were being wined and dined and the [Chinese] thought we were in their entourage.

The long and the short of it all was we had tickets to go to the big dance. We went with the American delegation. It was on this floor where apparently they had held dances in the past, but there was no food, and there [were no] alcoholic beverages except for those brought in by every embassy's group. They must have had four 78 discs that they played over and over, the most lively of which was the Blue Danube Waltz. The following week, the French had decided that they were going to take control of this disc jockey and they had smuggled in music from Hair if I'm not mistaken or Jesus Christ Superstar, one of the two.

Q: These were very avant-garde sort of anti-establishment American musicals.

KRYS: Absolutely. The second week was a very different scene because they brought in the right kind of music. If you could look behind one of these screens that restaurants have to shield dirty dish trays, you could see the disc jockey just jumping up and down and dancing behind that.

It was an extraordinary transformation. You began to see in Beijing in that one week people who were no long wearing Mao jackets. [During] the dinner that I mentioned attending the first night, I was at a table with a Chinese host who spoke English extremely well. As I discovered, she not only read the *Readers Digest,* for which I raised an eyebrow, but having said that, she also read the State Department's *Newsletter* (now *State Magazine*). She read that without fail and she had a long series of questions about who's gone where and what they were doing. I was falling over; I couldn't believe it; and, of course, I was pleading ignorance at every turn because some of the names were names I wasn't familiar with, but she was.

One of the people off to my right was a gentleman who as the evening progressed began to speak English and not use the translator. His English was impeccable. He did it with real concern. I don't know who else was at the table that he had to be concerned about. I said, "Where did you learn your English?" He said, "I graduated from Stanford in 1936." He was a scientist. He was very careful.

Even in the period of that week, people started to get rid of the Mao jackets and started to wear a little color. I wasn't permitted to go to Shanghai, although I was originally given permission. You had to have permission to travel. At the end of the inspection I wanted to go out to a couple of the cities to see them. At the last moment, of course, there was a complication and therefore I couldn't go, but I was told they had already moved to more colorful dress in Shanghai. Every day there was something new that showed.

The last one of all was when I arrived at the airport, flying China Air out to Hong Kong. I said to one of our fellow inspectors, "Let's see how far this has really gone." I presented a GTR [government travel request] for excess baggage because we had all our papers with us. I thought this would be a show-stopper. They took it to the back somewhere and came back and said "Oh, yes, that is perfectly fine." I'm sure they hadn't the slightest idea what it was, but there wasn't any big problem.

Q: Obviously, you were talking to our embassy officers. Was this turnaround which you saw just using the American recognition and people were saying, "Okay, if they are doing this now, we can loosen up?"

KRYS: You mean the people in the street?

Q: The people in the street, yes.

KRYS: No. It was definitely a government policy, predicated I'm sure on a belief that the recognition would mean something, but I think it was greater than that. I think it reflected

more the internal leadership transition and power struggle, with at least a view towards what the West would consider a more normal environment, not just the United States. I think it really reflected this transitional period.

Q: What were you getting from our embassy officers at that time. We knew recognition was right around the corner or had already been announced. These were officers who had been hunkered down as you say. Did they see "whither China" from their point of view at that time?

KRYS: I think they were born and bred with "whither China." You have to remember that the background of many of our officers, Chinese language officers, was that their parents were missionaries. They had had a long deep history and abiding love for China. There was enormous disappointment. Some who had spent their entire Foreign Service careers hoping to go into China had gone past that point and were not going to go into China. Stape Roy was there as the DCM at that time and his background, his family, is China, and they were there. I think what they were trying to do at that time was obviously not only to assess where we wanted to go but where China itself was going. I don't think what emerged from that was a clear vector because the entire question of long-term leadership had not been resolved within China itself. If you remember, this was a transitional time in China within the leadership, and whether it would pass smoothly or how it would go was a big question.

There was also on the part of our mission an enormous concern just to get by through the day. Things were very, very difficult. Housing was very poor, badly tended to. Our mission staff of Foreign Service nationals one day could have 15 employees and the next day, 75. It was really controlled by a man whose name was Colonel Lew. Colonel Lew had served at the British embassy for 20 some odd years and allegedly led the march that burned them out in the '60s. He was now working for us. He was one FSN that I wanted to talk to. I can assure you that I went to him because I knew that was where the real power was, in his office. He was really quite remarkable. The punch line to this conversation on China was [that] it was all the fault of the Gang of Four. We had just gone past that and everything was being laid at their doorstep.

My last conversation with Colonel Lew was rather interesting. As you know, I had worked for Ambassador Bruce. Ambassador Bruce had been envoy to China earlier and was enormously respected for all the obvious reasons. I had brought word to the FSNs through Colonel Lew in a conversation, that he had died. I found that rather interesting that they didn't know that, somehow they didn't or at least he said they didn't know it. He pointed out to me that a rose had been named after Mrs. Bruce. As I was leaving, we had this final conversation. The gist of my conversation was you can't continue to [control] FSNs. They had something similar to the Russian system. One day, we [bring] in a number and train them and then you take them out of our embassy and put them into Third World embassies [all] at our cost. It isn't the cost that bothers us. It is that you don't really have trained budget people, general services people, and so on. That has to change; it was going to be serious. He agreed. In the very last conversation with him, he wanted to present me with a small gift and something to take back to Mrs. Bruce. It was a

little soy jar. I said, "I have nothing to give you and I'm embarrassed to take this." He said, "You abhor it." I said, "No, I think it is a very nice little jar." He said, "Treat it as though it's a feather. It has no weight or any great substance." It was charming. It was almost Confucian. He said, "The real problem with China today," and you could tell he was a man near the end of his career, "is if people work, they get paid, and if they don't work, they get paid." That was the problem that he saw. Even if they regularly staffed our mission, [we should] not have high expectations because there is no incentive to do well in the context of our embassy. Perhaps I interpreted it as a much larger thing. Am I evading your point?

Q: No, you're not evading my point at all. What did you see as the needs within, say, the next decade as far as locating additional posts. Traditionally, we've had posts all over the place but in China, we only had Beijing.

KRYS: We only had Beijing. We were negotiating and had permission to open in Shanghai. There was real turmoil within the State Department, too, and I was I guess very hard line to the degree that I had a voice. We used to be one of the largest property owners in Shanghai, and it was all taken away from us. We just let that go by. This is an earlier period, this was with Nixon in the White House when he wanted to go forward with the visit. We abrogated our rights to all of this property. We had Shanghai to open, as you know, and of course we had Canton, and that was open.

We visited Canton; we had gone [there] from Hong Kong. Beijing and Canton were the two places. Canton was a major commercial area then, [with] senior trade shows and so on. Just parenthetically, we took a train from Hong Kong to Beijing which was a very interesting experience in and of itself. There was a foreigners car. It was great to see the countryside. Canton was very interesting. Our people were living in a hotel, and they continued to both live and work in that hotel for 10 years or so.

We were talking about where else to be in China. Clearly, commerce had to be very much at the heart of this. But I think the overriding political concern at that time was the breaking apart of what we had believed for so many years had been a monolithic [connection] between the Soviet Union and communist China. It was clear at that time that there was real concern within China about the big bear. There had been skirmishes along the border and one of the ways to drive a wedge was to start moving closer to the PRC as a lever against the Soviet Union. That clearly was one of our objectives at that time, at least as I understood it.

Q: Were we talking about something up in Manchuria or Derian or whatever?

KRYS: It was outside the scope of the inspection. You mean as far as establishing a post?

Q: Yes.

KRYS: No. I'm thinking Chengdu was as far as we have ever gotten and that was much more recent, in the rust belt up north.

Q: Did you get any concerns from our officers at that time in China, that China might at some point begin to fragment?

KRYS: No. I don't think there was enough light to see that sort of thing at that time. Where were you at that point? Were you still in Korea?

Q: I was in Korea until '79, from '76 to '79.

KRYS: So you were there [in East Asia].

Q: Yes, but we weren't getting anything out of China.

KRYS: Everything was very close hold.

Q: Did you talk to people from say the British or French embassies?

KRYS: We did, but, as you know, in many missions where you are hunkered down, they speak so frequently that it begins to sound like one voice. Everybody has the same blurb.

Q: When I was in Yugoslavia, that happened.

KRYS: We had the same experience when we were in Yugoslavia; you [just] spoke to your colleagues.

Q: So there weren't odd points of view for the most part.

KRYS: I think in Yugoslavia in our time the greatest divergence of view was when Tito was going to die.

Q: Basically, your two major inspections were...

KRYS: The first inspection was a very abbreviated one. I was lent to an inspection that was about to take place and it was historic. A woman by the name of Francis Knight had retired from the passport office.

Q: She had been there almost 30 years.

KRYS: She was the passport office.

Q: Before that, for another 30 years, it was Ruth something or other.

KRYS: But it was a closed shop, literally. It was like going into a house that had the shutters pulled for 40 years. The Department became very brave and decided it was going to inspect the day after she left. They pulled together a team and I was on it straight out of the War College for just a couple of weeks. Literally, we found people standing over

ironing boards pressing the photographs into passports as they had for the last 30 years, and cobwebs, at least we saw cobwebs.

I then went to Tokyo for my first inspection and that was fascinating. It was an extraordinary inspection, but it was not of any great moment politically, it was just an insight as to how a large mission operates. It was an education for the inspectors as well and it is one that stays with you forever. I did discover how strong a Foreign Service national staff could possibly be and how it could really run an embassy, which it did, and all of the emoluments that go with a booming economy for those who were on the inside of a mission. It was in grand contrast to any other inspection I did. I'm not sure we went away beloved. Our team leader was extremely strong, and he chose me to go to the next inspection.

Q: Who was your team leader?

KRYS: Terry Arnold. Have you done an oral history with Terry?

Q: No.

KRYS: Terry is another one of these people that you have to say is extremely outspoken.

Q: Where does he hang out now?

KRYS: He's down in the Shenandoah, and he used to do some things with counter-terrorism. We left backing out the door on a few inspections so that we wouldn't get shot in the back.

Q: Did you find yourself on these inspections doing what sometimes happens and that is looking at the relations of particularly the junior officers with the more senior ones and trying to either repair damage or point out where there seems to be conflicts?

KRYS: We did a good deal of that and in those days we wrote efficiency reports on, I believe, untenured officers and of course on the ambassador which was a private letter. I think at that point we were doing officers who were about to go over the senior threshold. [It's] my recollection that we did that.

We met with the Foreign Service nationals separately [and] again sometimes some of the officers were not wild about that. In Japan it was fascinating to me. As you know, they were strongly organized, and it didn't matter how much we threw the conversation open for discussion on the floor, only one person spoke on every issue for every person. We would welcome other views, and we got the one view.

We always looked at the relationship between and among the agencies. In Japan we were most interested in the overlap of function and it was substantial.

Q: I would imagine on the commercial side for example.

KRYS: No, almost across the board.

Q: Was there any reason why?

KRYS: Japan is a place that you want to have your agency's flag flying. That's just human nature. It was the most important place in Asia, so you did have an awful lot of overlap, but each agency felt that their particular overlap was the right overlap. You don't change that much. You make your recommendations, you point out certain things. Some things get changed and others don't. We had a very strong ambassador, Mike Mansfield.

Q: You moved to become executive director of NEA.

KRYS: Yes.

Q: Which was at an extremely crucial time. This is where you put everything you learned to great use. You made quite a name for yourself in this. You were there from when to when?

KRYS: From January of 1979 until June 15, 1983.

Q: Of course, '79 was an interesting year for NEA, wasn't it?

KRYS: It was dreadful. It really was. The position had been vacant for a while and I won't get into the management aspects of it because I think you manage many bureaus approximately the same way when things are okay. Things went very sour the 14th of February, exactly a month after I came on to the job. Two things occurred the same day. The first was our embassy in Tehran was taken hostage; Bill Sullivan was our ambassador at that time. That same day Spike Dubbs was in effect kidnaped. If you had to make a bet, you would have thought the real horror was going to be in Tehran and things would work out [in Kabul]. Spike Dubbs was murdered and our [Tehran] embassy was released within 24 hours. The man who worked the release was named Yazdi and was the foreign minister.

I was very involved in bringing Spike Dubbs' remains home and arranging his funeral. His funeral occurred on the snowiest day for that one particular day in the history of Washington, DC, and it was a terrible thing. I became part of an evidentiary chain so I had to be with his body as it came. His young widow, his second wife, Mary Ann Dubbs, was a remarkable individual, and it really marked I guess the beginning of finding myself involved with remarkable family members and survivors of real tragedy. In her case, as you may remember, she entered the Foreign Service later on and actually worked for me for a brief period of time before she went to Mexico. Getting ahead of the sad story, she came down with leukemia within a very short time after she had gone to Mexico City and came home. After heroic efforts to save her through chemotherapy, experimental and otherwise, she died.

Our people were freed in Tehran. That marked the beginning of a false sense that played itself out in November in the same year when they were taken hostage. The appeals were again made to Yazdi, but circumstances had changed so dramatically that there were 72 hostages taken, not all in one day. I don't know if you realized that some people walked away from the embassy. The people in the consular section walked away and some went to stay with the Canadian ambassador. Actually his number two was the real hero there, I think. Others were picked up. Some turned left and some turned right and the ones that turned in the direction that sought safety in the Canadian mission were safe, and the others became part of the hostages, including one of the two who were not employed by the mission. But that is really getting ahead of the story.

Q: I would like to move back to Spike Dubbs' assassination. What were you getting when this happened? You say "murder." From your investigation into what happened, who was behind it?

KRYS: Do you want a personal view?

Q: Yes.

KRYS: I'm not sure how much of this has been released or is classified.

Q: We've had several accounts from people who were there.

KRYS: His car was stopped and he ultimately ended up in a hotel room. Tony Quainton was head of counter-terrorism and was in charge. He was back and forth on an open line to Kabul. The DCM was Bruce Flatten, I think, on the other end of the line and the question was whether the rooms should be rushed or not. He was being held in a chair in this hotel room. If you want my personal view, it was the Russians that killed him.

Q: I talked to Bruce and his impression was that a KGB officer went in and there were two shots.

KRYS: They fired a .22 which is an assassins gun and they fired them right into his skull. I think that we had appealed to the Russians, the Germans, and to others who were there at that time, but particularly to the Russians. Had they wanted it otherwise, I think that Spike Dubbs would not have been murdered. But how do you prove something like this?

Q: Yes, do you prove something like this? But were there any theories about why this happened because this doesn't really advance any particular cause?

KRYS: He was a Sovietologist, and he had served in that part of the world. I don't know. The question I suppose foremost in my mind is who made the decision and what level, rather than was the decision made. Without going into too many details, I think there is sufficient reason to believe that at that time, the KGB saw to it that Spike Dubbs did not leave that room alive. Those who were witnesses on the Afghan side, Afghans who were allegedly the perpetrators, met very unfortunate deaths, I think almost immediately,

before they [could get] out of the hotel. Did Bruce confirm that, because now we're going on my memory?

Q: Yes, I think so, or else they disappeared or something.

KRYS: They disappeared, but some of the eyewitnesses were actually done away with right away.

Q: Was there a decision, and were you involved in it, to keep going in Afghanistan as far as our mission went or what were we going to do?

KRYS:. This took place at the end of February and I went out to Tehran and Afghanistan in one trip in April. Tehran was a two or three fold mission. Allen Wendt was supposed to have gone as DCM to Tehran and I think Walt Cutler was supposed to have gone as ambassador from Kinshasa. Allen accompanied me when we went out and I had arranged for [someone but] I can't recall whether [he] came out of Cairo or wherever it was, but we pulled together a management team to see how we could strengthen our mission.

There was a major tussle going on, starting with the taking of the embassy in February as to how much we should draw down Tehran. I was very hard line. I did not subscribe to the theory [that] our people there [were safe]. This was beyond my portfolio. I certainly didn't feel that the issuance of student visas was really the way to get to the heart of Khomeini but someone felt quite strongly in the other direction and we drew down the embassy substantially. As we got nearer to November, there was a real fight, sometimes almost physical, about putting more people back in there.

The thought in April was to take the consulate, which had been off the compound (the compound was I think 23 or 26 acres in the heart of Tehran) and to bring it onto the compound. That was something that we accomplished, and we put it into what had been the sprawling officers club, compound, and warehouse. I saw to it that we began shipping massive amounts of alcohol. You had a lot of former military, and they had access to this, so it was stock for a very large consumer demand. We ended up selling everything to other countries and shipping it out of Iran and paying off all of the creditors. We moved the consulate onto the compound and we fairly fortified a mission that was under siege.

There was a man who was on the compound who was Iranian, in April, who thought he was running the place and he was pretty close to running [it]. During my time, we saw to it that the American flag started flying again, [so] we were [showing] the flag. It was a very tense time. This man was known as the Butcher of Gum, the same city that Khomeini came from. I'm trying to recall his name.

Q: I understand that there were people who were working or were somewhat working for the Iranians who were sort of lounging around the offices.

KRYS: These were political forces. You had two forces. You had what was the air force backed force and then you had this other force, [both] on the compound. At one point,

they were shooting at each other across the compound. I recall staying at someone's house just on the edge of the compound and there was a lot of firing and we were under our beds to avoid stray bullets. The long and the short of it is, we were firing our FSNs in substantial number; they were rioting outside the gate, (this is April mind you) and the embassy was being drawn down. We had a chargé d'affaires at the time. But it was still a large embassy and we reduced it substantially to the number that ultimately were taken hostage. Actually it [got] lower than that [but] junior officers and their accompanying spouses went back in.

Q: I've interviewed some of the people who have been involved, such as Bruce Laingen and Ann Swift. Some, particularly Ann Swift, have mentioned the fact that, although they didn't subscribe to it, there was the feeling that maybe things were on the upturn and that we could do business with them. We are talking about moving into the late summer/early fall of '79.

KRYS: That was the view that was expressed from the embassy.

Q: How was that viewed back in Washington?

KRYS: It depends [on] whom you talked to. I did not subscribe to that, based on what I saw, but again you have to realize I'd become idealistic on something other than what was in my management portfolio, but if I am dealing in human resources, I felt very strongly that we should not be sending people there. Kicking and screaming, we let a few go back in to issue visas, all of whom ended up as hostages. Ann Swift is an extraordinarily good officer. Hal Saunders, Ann, and Carl Clement were on the phone as the embassy was falling. I don't know if Ann related that or not.

Q: What was the rationale for keeping the consular section open and doing business as before?

KRYS: This was a way to normalize the relationship, and we were issuing student visas essentially. You will need someone else to tell you.

Q: Was it said that this is what we wanted? Obviously, you weren't in a position to change policy, but did you pick up in NEA that there was a sort of a split between those who said "We've got to be careful" and those who said "This is just a blip in our relations and things will get better?"

KRYS: Yes, I think there was. There were very well intended people on both sides of that issue and one officer in particular felt very strongly that things were on the upswing. In fact he was just returning from Tehran when the embassy fell. To the very end, it was a very strongly held view that he had and he was wrong.

Q: At a later time, I want to come to the rest of the Middle East, but let's stick to Iran for now. At a certain point, dealing with any crisis means the person who is executive secretary has got to deal with them. The theory goes out the window. What do you do

with resources, people, communications and all of that? Were you or anybody on your staff beginning to say, "Okay, if all hell breaks loose, we ought to have this and that," getting ready for it?

KRYS: All hell broke loose within days and I became involved to the point where my deputy had to run more and more [of] the care and sustenance of the bureau and the posts overseas. I was more and more devoted to those posts that were affected by this tragedy. You have to remember that within a very short period of time, a number of things happened. We were burned out of Tripoli, and we were burned out of our embassy in Islamabad. We feared an enormous upheaval in the Gulf states because it was alleged by Radio Tehran that an incident that was taking place at Mecca, the burning of tires and so on at the holy sites, was American provoked and the Russians, I think, repeated that fairly widely. There was real concern in Damascus, Beirut, and in a number of other countries. We evacuated over a thousand people on airlifts within a very short period of time. A number of those who [had been] held hostage, 13, were released within about 10 days. I met all of the hostages that returned before they came to the United States, all 72 of them including the Canadians.

You are dealing with an incident that had no historical precedent, at least not for the United States in recent times. An embassy had not been taken hostage probably since the Iranians took the Russians hostage perhaps 90 years before. That was very different. It was very hard to prepare. It was hard to formulate words to send overseas that were not alarming, yet at the same time you had chiefs of mission in many countries in the Middle East who thought this didn't affect them and they strongly resented the idea...

Q: Yes, I picked this up from some, particularly in the Gulf states.

KRYS: Yes, and some of them laid it at my doorstep that we were evacuating them, as if the executive director is really going to do that. I clearly believe that they should have been evacuated because you didn't know what was going to happen next. Even in a place like Tripoli, it had to be a direct order from the seventh floor which within hours proved to be correct. I don't know if you know that our people literally fled out the back of the mission in Tripoli as the front of it was being set [on] fire. It wasn't our building, it was a rented building and we never thought that the Libyans who had treated any visitor well, would ever do this. It was burnt out and we just got away.

The mission leadership in many of the posts felt we're not evacuating Saudi Arabia, why were we evacuating Bahrain or Oman? Some of them were very bitter and some of their spouses were extremely bitter. As you know, in posts where we didn't close the mission, we evacuated dependents. In one instance in particular, the wife of an ambassador decided to go back come hell or high water and she really had to be ordered out or he was going to come out. We put it on a very personal level.

Q: The Carter administration has felt that it collapsed because of the Iranian takeover. What were you getting at your level from the White House?

KRYS: You'd have to tell me what aspect because, as you can imagine, there were a lot of different levels.

Q: Let's say one where you were intimately involved, which was with the families of the hostages.

KRYS: We took a very calculated risk in deciding to bring the families into this and to not put them at arms length, as had been done in other crises. We actually headquartered them in a room just off the Operations Center. That was a very calculated risk, and it was a [decision] that was taken early on. What it was meant to show was, we're not going to forget about the hostages there. It was a very different circumstance [from] one found later on where people who were told not to be in a country decided to stay. These were people who were in a war zone, and they had not signed up for that. This was supported by Cy Vance's wife, by Ben Reed's wife, by Harry Barnes' wife. They came in and helped to man telephones. From that group, we set up what we called the Family Liaison Action Group.

We were in constant touch with the White House, and if you talk about levels, they kind of disappeared. There was a triumvirate of Hal Saunders, Peter Constable and I [working on] one aspect and, of course, Henry Precht was in the Operations Center on a constant basis. We were there all the time. We lived, we slept, in the State Department for 444 days or longer, if you take that earlier period.

The White House decided it, too, wanted to support the families and so we began meetings at which the President appeared. What happened, as you know, is, the President treated this to the exclusion of many other things if not all other things and became [a] prisoner of the Rose Garden. This was not a necessary follow-on to dealing with the hostage crisis in the way that we did. It is the way he approached it. He really wanted to get those people out and he felt very, very deeply about it, but other things started to go by the way. I saw a good deal of the President.

As for what was going on politically, an awful lot was going on. I think you'd have to talk to others [about] all of the various contacts with Panamanians, with Iranians, with people from the academic world, and so on. All of these things were going on at the same time and our approach was [to] push on every door that you can think of to see which one will open and lead to something. I have not revealed it anywhere else and I don't think it's been talked about, but I was talking to the embassy almost every day for weeks and weeks. They had not disconnected the telephones.

Q: Who were you talking to?

KRYS: Those who were holding the hostages. Some of them spoke English. I and other had arranged, because of the fear of a lot of people, because the press early on was also calling on late night talk shows with hostage holders, phones were finally cut off to Tehran. We were concerned about a number of people. I don't know if you had been told elsewhere, we never said who was being held hostage because we didn't know what

names some of them might be using. We didn't want to identify the numbers and as you may remember there were the Canadian six.

Q: You may want to explain who were the Canadian six.

KRYS: These were the people who turned in a different direction when they left the consulate. The consular section by the way never fell. I don't know if you are aware of that or not. This is in the category of dumb accomplishments. If you recall I said we moved the consular section onto the compound in order to make it safer. Well we made it very safe. These rioters couldn't get in. The building was separate from the chancery but on the compound. It began to rain and these people who were banging on the doors and shouting for those inside to give up left because it was raining very hard. Then they opened the doors including Lopez I think who was head of the Marines at that point. He wasn't head of the Marines but he was part of that group at the consulate. They made their way away then they were taken hostage or they sought help elsewhere.

Without going through too much of who took them in and who didn't, the Canadians did end up taking them in. The six were divided and stayed in two different Canadian diplomats homes. When they came out, they came out when the Canadian embassy closed down and this was something that I think Peter Tarnoff who was then the executive secretary of the State Department had negotiated with the Canadians. I don't know if that has ever been confirmed, but I think that's the case. Rather than risk danger to the lives of the Canadians, if it got out [they had] six Americans, [we had to act]. What had happened was a Canadian news[man] had stumbled onto the fact there were Americans being helped by the Canadians and he was going to release this news story. Apparently other newspapers had it but they held it. So they came out in disguise and I met them somewhere and we came home together.

Q: How did you "bury" the Canadian six?

KRYS: This was part of not revealing who was there that we were missing.

Q: What did you do with these people? People within the Foreign Service knew they had been assigned to Iran.

KRYS: We had arranged for them to go to a military base, possibly in Florida, and the more we thought about what we could do and couldn't do, the more we realized that wasn't a secret we could keep. First of all, we couldn't keep the fact from their relatives that they were okay. Secondly just before they came out, this one man from, I think, the State of Oregon came back and was blabbing that there were Americans loose in the city. He was interviewed by the press. He was also interviewed by someone else before he got to the press. We flew him to Washington to have a chat with him, and we urged him in very strong terms not to jeopardize the lives of the Americans. That didn't stop him. He went on one of the late night shows and said that. It had no reaction that there were Americans loose but it was getting too hot. Then we didn't have to go through all of that because the Canadians closed [their mission] and our people came out with them so there

was no danger. They were greeted in the State Department lobby. After they got back all of our plans about hiding them on a military base [were useless]. You have to think about those things.

Q: You do. You were sort of cutting new ground. There was no precedent for this.

KRYS: In my capacity on the front line of that, I had to have the support of the Under Secretary for Management. The deputy secretary, Warren Christopher at that time, was extraordinary and there were no lines of bureaucracy that you couldn't cross. You just had to be sure that you did it the right way. We arranged to have mail brought in to the hostages. You have to remember that visiting clergymen were there. I scanned every inch of film that came out of Tehran. At one point the hostage takers were selling the film to BBC and others. At the end, I was the person who recognized what they looked like in captivity when they came out, all of them including those that I had never met before. I was also dealing with 250 some odd members of their families literally on a daily basis. We had regional meetings around the country after we had them just in Washington, so it would be less difficult for family members to travel. We would talk about what was going on and what our hopes were.

Because I knew what they looked like, I came within an inch of going on that ill fated rescue mission, which I abhor the thought of. By then as you recall, the 13 had come out, Richard Kweed had come out, and the Canadian six had come out and we were down to 52, 50 of whom were direct employees of the government. One was Bill Keyho, who had gone back from Pakistan, where he was superintendent of schools. He had been superintendent of schools in Iran, and he went back to get the school records of his children who went to school there, they were American. He had been told things were picking up, sure, come on back; then he was taken hostage. Then there was a man who just died recently who was in the consular section.

Q: He was a retired consular Foreign Service officer who had been brought back to issue visas, I think.

KRYS: He died rather recently, too. It was Bob Ode. He was on the payroll. We had a very interesting cast of characters of all descriptions. Mr. Plotkin was the gentleman who we couldn't figure out where [he] had come from. [His] passport only revealed a man who according to the passport application was a Mary Kay Cosmetics salesman. If you could think of anything worse, put the names and the occupation together.

Q: A Jewish name in cosmetics?

KRYS: That really gave us many sleepless nights. It turned out he wasn't a Mary Kay salesman, but it became a story unto itself. The first few days were really very turbulent because we thought there was a chance... I don't know if you remember the son of Justice Clark, the former attorney general, Ramsey Clark, along with a psychiatrist and others were to go [to Tehran] because he had had contact with Khomeini, I guess in the Paris days. The plane was held in Turkey and they never got in. There were all sorts of things

back and forth that just didn't happen. A lot of contacts, a lot of false hopes, extraordinary moments of terror and hope. It was a real roller coaster ride for the families as well and we kept them informed as best we could.

Q: I imagine that you were all trying to figure out the motivation or the political dynamics of these kidnappers vis-à-vis the Khomeini regime. What were you getting initially and then as things developed?

KRYS: No, we had a living voice there. If you've talked to Bruce Laingen, Bruce was in the ministry and had these huge ballroom kind of surroundings, so we had three at the ministry and they were talking to whatever remained of the ministry. Certain things stayed the same. For instance, the banking community in Iran stayed pretty much intact. Therefore, the deal at the end really revolved to a very large degree [on] the return of frozen assets, reparations to be made, and [related matters].

Because Yazdi and Brzezinski were photographed, I think, in Rabat just before this happened, when he came back he was no longer able to free the embassy as he had on the earlier occasion in February, and that was the end of it. He was seen as being part of the American scene and like almost every revolution, heads had to go and there were a number of heads that went on [almost] daily. There were some sleazeballs on that other side, too. People who would talk to us as though they could do things, and they couldn't.

Let's go back to the push every door aspect of it. Religious leaders were involved [from] other denominations, other sects, of the same sect of Islam and so on. Political moves were made all over Europe and elsewhere. The banking community we [already] talked about. I don't know everything because I was doing other things. David Newsom and I went off to Frankfurt, and I think April Glaspie was brought over because there were women coming out. We were in Frankfurt because earlier the head of the medical division and I had gone to Frankfurt, to Wiesbaden, to set up a medical protocol. It was a very important medical protocol. I believe there were 13 or 18 psychiatrists working together from different agencies, military and so on. The protocol that was set up was no experiment for when the hostages come back. Let's not do anything but ensure that they are well. The Wiesbaden arrangement has been the arrangement until just recently when I think they closed the air force hospital but that is where all hostages from the Middle East were sent subsequently, and so [now] all go there. There is a dedicated wing.

I was doing other things but Dave Newsom and I were in Frankfurt when we were patched into our embassy in Islamabad as it was burning. People were trapped in the communications section and they broke out through the roof. A young Marine lost his life and a young Navy man lost his life and a number of Pakistanis were killed in this thing. They torched a brand new embassy and thank God there was a very brave guard at the International School who stopped the rioters from going in there or our children could have been endangered.

Again you suddenly had to look at something you never had before. Whoever thought about dependents of Americans being attacked? That's what led to the evacuation

because we thought it was better to take the heat of people coming back. Our evacuation procedures for dependents still leaves a great deal to be desired to this day and it was far worse then. From this whole turmoil grew FLO, the Family Liaison Office, because there was a need to deal with a lot of that and we thought it was better to have people taking pot shots at us back here than to have one American dependent dragged through a street.

Q: As you dealt with this, were you getting conflicting ideas of why they were taking the hostages?

KRYS: I think it was seen as a fundamentalist move. At first it was seen as a group of students that could be brought under control. Later, of course, it was not seen as that at all because if they were a group of students, they were trained. What they were doing with the hostages was what people who are trained to handle hostages do: lots of movement, great uncertainty, blindfolds, total dependence, constant themes being [thrown] at them, and so on. It was a fairly experienced group, and we laid it at the doorstep of those who controlled them. The real problem was to find who controlled them and what levers would move the controllers. It became a theme that a legislature would have to act and that there were moderate voices. This ran in cycles. There were signs that certain things were going to happen, and then they didn't. That went on and on until the negotiations involving the Algerians more.

There were peaks and valleys there, I can assure you, and as you know some of those peaks and valleys were reviewed [to see] whether some deal had been cut or not to hold them until after the election. I might just add that I was very intimately involved beyond the logistics. I don't think there was anything that would indicate a deal had been made to hold them one moment longer than they should have been.

Q: Part of this was that the Republicans, before Ronald Reagan came in, and William Casey were alleged to have said, "Hold them until after the election." Can you talk a bit about the reaction of the families of the hostages and how you dealt with them? They've got to blame somebody and anger has to be focused and I would imagine you would be the focus.

KRYS: This really needs a check by somebody else. Let me give it to you as I saw it. Early on, there was some anger [in] a few families. You have to remember, right from the word go, the families became involved in this. [Our] fear was that someone in the Op Center would get [a] flash [message] (and there were a number of these that came in that were absolutely false) that hostages had been killed and would shout this. In the very next room, you had the spouses, or a mother, of the people held in captivity. What we didn't want to do was to draw some line between the administration and the families. Rightly or wrongly, we decided that we were not going to have a repetition of Vietnam's family group. The military and all of the other agencies really had to sit down together and we began doing that very early. I became the principal contact with the families of all agencies and that really meant having with me most times some representation from other agencies and talking about what was going on.

Two families spoke out. One was the mother of a young Marine who was actually in Tehran the day that the helicopters went in to try the rescue. The other was the wife of the public affairs officer. She changed dramatically because she was not in Washington or if she was, she hadn't come in to how things were being done, and [hadn't] become a participant. There was no outcry. The wife of one Foreign Service officer very late in the game was very heavily quoted by the press and perhaps she could have [said things] a little differently.

Q: They wanted to get somebody who was speaking out against things.

KRYS: Or giving them particular insights. She actually went on public record out in California, and she wasn't supported as it turned out by her own community. Nothing is perfect and we were dealing with a lot of different people from across America in almost any circumstance that you can imagine and that was somewhere caught up in those 250 some odd people. I don't really remember being the subject of anyone's anger. I think that the bureaucracy was the subject of anger on the part of some of the dependents, [but] even that was limited. I have never had an experience with so many people who behaved so nobly as the families of the hostages, never. It changed me somewhat, I hope for the better, and I came to realize how many different ways you can approach things. The whole idea was to make each of the people involved aware of what they could do or not do under these horrible circumstances and we wanted to support whichever way they [decided].

There was the wife of one military officer who decided never to come to any of the meetings. You have to remember the meetings were called by the families themselves. They met among themselves and they met with us more officially. The Secretary of State was involved and Warren Christopher was enormously involved. When Cy Vance left, Muskie was involved. He traveled out to San Francisco. The whole idea was why have a division. You have a greater stake in this than we do but we want to make it happen right. Forget about the Rose Garden aspect of it.

I still have contact with a substantial number of those people. I never felt their animosity. If I saw it, I would understand it, to be perfectly honest with you, not to sound too much like a Pollyanna. I don't know how they could have behaved in a way that would have been more supportive of the people who were in Tehran. I just don't know how.

Q: Very early on the decision was made to freeze Iranian assets which in many ways seemed to be the key later on, but at the time it was somewhat controversial. You didn't want to upset these people. What was your feeling about that?

KRYS: I think it was absolutely the right thing to do, and it was one of the levers that was clearly understood. The United States was not alone in that. The Bank of England had a part in it and other banks as well. The American banking community at the very highest level were working out the terms based on what their exposures were, what they were going to give back, and what we were going to hold in reserve.

As you probably know, there was a fund that was set up, in effect [to pay] small claims. The idea of the hostages suing was very controversial. I had very strong feelings about compensation for the hostages, which we'll save for the next session, if you like, if you will remind me. I don't know if you know that at one time Congress wanted to pass legislation that I helped revise and pass, along with the family liaison group. [It was] called the Hostage Relief Act [and] was based on the Soldiers and Sailors Act of 1942. We'll get into that. That's an interesting aspect if you want to pursue more on the hostages and their families.

Q: Why don't we stop at this point? I want to put at the end where we want to pick up. We will talk about hostage compensation and the various legal things in which you were involved. Then we will come back to the return of the hostages, how they were received, and what the thinking was, as it had really changed. There had been the idea that if you were a hostage, it was your fault. We'll talk about the attitude and what you were getting there. We'll finish up on the hostage crisis and then I would like to talk about the other problems of NEA and dealing with Islamabad and Tripoli, the threat to our embassies. Then there is always the Arab-Israeli conflict.

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Today is December 12, 1996. We have quite a menu before us. Let's talk about the hostage compensation first and then we'll talk about the other aspects.

KRYS: The hostages had been in captivity for some time. The House of Representatives was very keen to ensure that there was adequate compensation, both for the families while people were in captivity [and] more importantly it was felt that a million dollars should be set aside for each of the hostage families upon their return. This would be paid out of Iranian funds. The family liaison action group president, Katherine Keo, and Louisa Kennedy and perhaps one or two others testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

At issue was how [to] ensure two things. One [was] that the families could be taken care of while the hostages were in captivity and two [was] the form of compensation upon their return. The idea of a million dollars compensation [concerned] the family group, [which] felt that this could be a very serious impediment to an expeditious release of the hostages. They therefore said they would leave it to the good will of the Congress and the executive upon the return of the hostages as to [the] form and amount of compensation.

In addition, I think we spoke very briefly last time about the Hostage Relief Act. The Hostage Relief Act started on the Hill in Dante Fascell's committee. In truth it started in the Department of State. I found a good model with some assistance from the office of personnel; I can't remember his name. He was a lawyer attached to PER who helped draft the language. The key person throughout all of this [was] Ben Reed. As Under Secretary of State for Management, he could not have been more supportive in almost every activity involved in the safe return of the hostages and [in] assuring that people who came out on evacuation were treated appropriately. When I say "appropriately," no matter what

we did, it was a far cry from being handled as well as we would have liked. There were too many things that were not in place to ensure that, [so] it was hardship for everybody involved with evacuation. Most particularly those who came out of areas [who] resented the thought of coming out, [but] we'll get back to that.

With regard to compensation, the model that we chose was the Soldiers and Sailors Relief Act 1947, because the people in captivity under the existing rules, regulations, and laws of the United States and the State Department, had absolutely no standing while they were in captivity. They weren't on leave, they weren't on duty, [and] they weren't to be compensated because they were in limbo. More difficult, not all of those in Iran had executed a power of attorney and for a while we were paying the families. I would hate to think what the Inspector General would have done to us today. Some of the situations were very tangled with divorces, separations, and so on. We were giving them access to funds and credit unions and other [sources]. Our rule of thumb was if it seemed reasonableness, we would follow it. You couldn't have families just sitting out there (and they were scattered around the country as well as in the Washington area) without [any] way [to] pay their bills. That was a real prospect for many.

The Hostage Relief Act which had a sunset clause, expired some time after the return of the hostages, but it contained all sorts of things. We put into [it] retraining of those who came out who wanted to start other careers. The most important aspects involved the health care for both the returned individual and the members of the family, with "family member" being very broadly defined. Bear in mind, we are talking about all categories of people from the Marine guards on up to the chargé d'affaires. If an uncle was like a father to one of the hostages, if he had a mental problem of some sort that needed tending to as a result of his pride and joy being held in captivity, the uncle would be given medical treatment and be compensated accordingly. It was quite broad. In the event of death - I don't remember all of the details - I think we provided for the education of children. It was quite all encompassing. It did not draw criticism because it wasn't excessive but it was as broadly defined as possible.

Q: The initiative was coming from where, from both within the bureaucracy and elsewhere?

KRYS: I think probably NEA, certainly my office. I was very involved in carrying it over to OMB. Without question, Warren Christopher would support anything that made sense. I'm not sure what level of detail we took to him, but it came [from] within the Department of State and of course had the support of other agencies that had representatives in captivity. There was resistance at Treasury because we had put into the Act ([and] were practicing) that the salary of the people in captivity would be tax free. I had a real Donny Brook at an OMB meeting where Treasury was present. I just said, "Fine, if that's how Treasury feels about this." They were worried about [the] precedent. I said, "That's terrific. I intend to leave this meeting and talk to *The Washington Post* as soon as I walk out of this door. You'll then make your own case and we'll make our case." As it turned out, Treasury came out with a ruling that said it was okay and that ample precedent had somehow been created before.

Q: I was in the Korean War and...

KRYS: Of course there was ample precedent but again you know you are dealing with a new generation of the bureaucracy that had to learn its history [again]. We had done our homework. We really had a bill that wasn't going to embarrass the people held in captivity [by] making them look like they wanted to cash in. There were some individuals, as you would have in any group, who felt that they really should cash in. If you will recall, in the agreement between Iran and the United States, people held in captivity were precluded from suing the government of Iran, and it stood up through the appellate level of the judiciary [after] it was challenged in a number of [cases].

Q: What was the role of Congress in this?

KRYS: They were terribly supportive. They really wanted a document. Again it was in Dante Fascell's committee and on both sides of the aisle. Of course, Dante Fascell's was very strong on this, and there was a fervor in the nation. We were an outraged nation and we were a very restrained nation. If you wanted to paint in some of the background, we had Iranian students demonstrating in front of the White House and in front of the State Department. Why our people didn't walk out of that building and just beat the bloody hell out of [them] is beyond me. I was prepared to lead the charge, I can tell you.

The first time I really saw the skills of Warren Christopher with regard to law, I remember meeting him getting into his car leaving the White House. At this point I think he was acting secretary. He was rushing over to a district court to seek an injunction to stop the Iranian students from demonstrating in front of the White House en masse. Our fear was that if the inevitable riot occurred, [and] we were sure it would, and they had these scenes of Iranian students being beaten bloody, we [feared] the effect it would have on the people being held in captivity in Iran. He was brilliant. I just picked him up and said, "This is what is happening." The judge was a judge who had a reputation for liberal leaning and we won the injunction. The injunction was [issued] and there was no demonstration, which we thought at that point really would have been disastrous.

Emotions [ran] very, very high and they were very high on the Hill so there was no real resistance. I remember Congressman Leach of Iowa who was one of the ranking Republican members on the committee asking, "Are you sure this is what you want?" We spoke during the hearing. He came over to me and we just sat and talked for a little bit. Everybody really wanted to do the right thing.

Q: You mentioned this before. Were you keeping in mind that you wanted to make sure this was fair and didn't look like a reward that could have a reverse effect of saying they were doing nothing there and they got a million dollars?

KRYS: That's right. That was probably more in my mind than in the mind of the people who were pushing for this and in the mind of others who considered this. The spotlight wasn't on me, clearly. The spotlight was on the families and the hostages. With regard to

what support I had, I was the government's representative to the families of all the agencies. It is a very long bureaucratic story as to how you get other agencies, particularly the Department of Defense [DOD] which was very suspicious of having any group formed because they remembered the Vietnam days. We didn't have that kind of group with the families. We talked about bringing them into the Department of State and making them part of this, but it was an all-agency thing.

I had people attached to me from the various agencies and we worked very closely together. Each of the agencies, particularly DOD, had very strong family liaison officers. The military is prepared for this sort of thing and the civilian government is not. We had to scramble around to make sure that we did have an underpinning for the families which ultimately would become the underpinning [for] the returned [captives]. We were forming things as we went along. These were 20 hour days. My family became known as the 53rd hostage family by the family liaison action group. They would get flowers and all the other things, and [be] invited to the meetings because my family didn't see me for almost 450 days. As you remember, it was 444 days of captivity.

Q: When did it dawn on you that the hostages were getting close to being released? Did you have a plan for what you were going to do?

KRYS: You have to go back; it almost starts at the beginning. We put some things in place because within the first 10 days, some hostages were released. There were 72 captives originally. Then [all] of the African-Americans and all of the women were supposed to be released. It didn't turn out that way. They released those that they felt had no information or [were no] use to them. They kept women and one African-American communicator in captivity with all the others, so it was kind of a false promise.

I went over with Gerry Korsack after the first group had been released and we picked them up in Copenhagen and in Paris, two different groups. Of course, it was fascinating. One of the secretaries that was released, I [had been] on the phone with after the embassy had fallen. She was a USIA secretary, and she was hiding in a bathroom as they came crashing in, and I really heard her being taken captive. We heard the embassy being taken. I met her in Paris as she came down the ramp. They had decided that one of the secretaries [from USIA] had a passport and she would go to the embassy. They had no idea what [had gone] on in the world because they [had been] held in isolation. They were blindfolded; they were kept incommunicado; and they were kept in fairly terrible conditions right from the word go.

Knowing that some were going to come out with a promise that others would come out, Korsack and I went to the hospital in Wiesbaden because we decided that was the best hospital. Gerry began to form a medical team. More importantly, he formed a medical protocol and the protocol was terribly important. [It was] followed as far as I know right through the time that this whole wing of a hospital served as a refuge for all hostages that came out subsequent to the Iran crisis. A portion of that floor is dedicated to the hostages. The protocols were set up [so that] there was no experimentation on the returned hostages. What you really were going to find out is what attention they needed, not a series of all

sorts of physical and psychological testing. [Only] one psychological test was permitted, and this was [under] an interagency agreement that stood up pretty well.

Q: What was the reasoning behind not to have testing?

KRYS: The people who were coming out wanted to be reunited with their families and that is a very interesting point in and of itself. The families were not permitted to go to Wiesbaden but one or two did. I think there was a team ultimately of 17 psychiatrists from different agencies and there was one psychologist who was kicked off the team. He was a civilian who gave this long press interview just a week before the 52 came back, and he was kicked off the team.

What was behind it was that [we] didn't want these people to feel they were wonderful guinea pigs. Who else had been held under these circumstances that you could then test? What can I [usefully] tell our people the next time they are taken hostage? We didn't want any of that, but we did want a cooling off period. It was objected to roundly, [but] held up right through the Carter administration when at the end the former hostages were taken to West Point rather than directly here to Washington. The families joined them at West Point away from the press [in] what was an extraordinarily exuberant greeting.

Another group came out and they, too, went to Wiesbaden, and that was the Canadian people who were held in captivity. That is a story unto itself. Some of it has been shown on television. The Canadians did a program that was incomplete. I remained very close to four of those people who were in the Canadian six.

Q: Let's continue this and then we'll talk about the Canadian six.

KRYS: Sure. You were asking about when the planning began? There were a number of plans. The Canadian six came to mind because that created a different kind of plan. It was felt that if [they] were revealed, [there would be trouble]. Did we touch on this last time?

Q: Yes, I think we did.

KRYS: Yes, we did talk about it because I remember that someone that came out of Tehran talked about people being held in captivity. But we were going to put the Canadian six down in Florida at one of the military bases down there and it just became terribly impractical. How do you keep it from the families that the people are well? You certainly would not tell the families that their sons or daughters were free, and then how do you keep that quiet? Ultimately, they came through Wiesbaden and then back to the United States. One of the most joyous moments was their return because they had been in captivity for a while and had come out under real danger. The Canadians were extraordinary in what they brought off, including closing down their mission to get [our people] out. I will never forget the greeting they received at the Department of State. It was just remarkable, and it was a foretaste as to what would happen when the 52 ultimately came out.

After that, Richard Queen came out. He had multiple sclerosis. All the while, planning was going on as to what we would do when the large group came out. The closer we got to the day, there were a number of indications that they were going to come out earlier than they did. This led to some speculation on the part of Gary Sick and others. It didn't start with Gary Sick but on the part of others that there had been some sort of deal cooked [up] by Casey. I don't subscribe to it and I think we mentioned that earlier.

Q: Casey being?

KRYS: The head of the CIA, Bill Casey.

Q: The head of the CIA designate really.

KRYS: At that point he was one of the major campaign figures in Ronald Reagan's campaign. Plans had been made and one of the plans was to bring the returned hostages to the military hospital near Andrews to have them closer. Ultimately that was changed. I really didn't play much of a part in this particular last minute switch because I think by then I had already left for Frankfurt and then on to Algeria. It was decided the best thing would be to land in upstate New York at Stewart Air Force Base and then drive to West Point where the people would spend 24 hours or so united with their families. Then everyone would fly into Andrews Air Force Base for an official greeting and the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, would welcome them at the White House. I think we spent three days in Wiesbaden prior to that. The planning was quite well set by then. It didn't happen as we got near the end, it happened almost from the time the first people got out.

Q: Was there a component of bringing people up to date in Wiesbaden?

KRYS: That's a good question. This is what I was involved in with the doctors. We had a tape made by George Washington University, on contract. [It] was an endless loop of tape that played in the lounge area, the common area at the Wiesbaden hospital. It started with their captivity and showed what was going on through the period of time, in the news, during the 444 days of their captivity. We had arranged with *Time* and *Newsweek* magazines not only to have magazines out there [covering] that period of time but they were [also] to be sent to the homes of each of the individuals. We had a welcome back and debriefing ceremony which told them what it is going to be like when they got back to the United States because they had no sense of the impact of their captivity on the American public. So the answer is, yes, there were briefing sessions.

One of the more interesting moments revolved around the fact that President Carter, who was no longer President because the previous day his successor was sworn in, flew out to Wiesbaden to meet with the hostages. I don't know how much that was spread around. I don't think that was in the public eye.

Q: I don't think so. I was in Italy at the time. I knew he went there, but it was melded into all sorts of other things.

KRYS: Have we talked about the Algerian role in all of this?

Q: Not really, so why don't we talk about that?

KRYS: Yes, we ought to do that. Let me just finish this off. President Carter flew out along with Cy Vance. Warren Christopher and Hal Saunders of course had been in Algiers. I flew to Algiers to complete the cycle of picking them all up and bringing them back from the Frankfurt base. That photograph [is] with Hal Saunders, the chargé d'affaires, and myself coming away from the aircraft in a driven rain.

There were two airplanes sent by the Algerians. Because there was some fear that the Iranians might shoot down the aircraft, [one] was a decoy. One landed for refueling in Turkey and one in Greece. Of course, by the time it got to Greece, there was no secret and all of Europe saw the planes landing, they were told, and so on. You probably saw it in Italy. They landed in Algiers, and it was one of the more frightening moments for me. As we took off in these two aircraft to fly to Frankfurt, I realized that I hadn't really done a nose count and I thought, "Oh, my god, what if we left one!" I was radioing between the two aircraft.

Going back to the role Algeria played, we had maintained contact with Bruce Laingen all through the crisis until about two weeks before he was thrown into a jail cell along with the two others who were with him. We had had indications that this was going to happen. Cots were prepared. The whole deal was how do you transit from captivity, and it was a very, very rough period of time. After the raid failed, the hostages were dispersed and they were treated in the worst possible way a hostage can be treated and that is by being moved. They were blindfolded each time they were moved. They were thrown around in trucks and so on and so forth. They were dispersed because the raid took place when they had been assembled at the chancery. They were then dispersed so no further raids would take place in a rescue attempt.

The Algerians came into the picture, and they were *the* most serious effort we had. We had help from other countries really dealing with the hostage situation as a hostage situation. The Algerians undertook negotiations and helped in a number of different ways. The key in all of this ultimately was how the financial arrangements were going to be carried out. We had frozen all the assets of the Iranians and a large section of it was in the Bank of England. This I didn't see myself, but you had all of the leading bankers figuring out what portions of the money they would forego or how they would work out the unfreezing of the assets and still protect their own interests. There was a lot of give and take.

There were a lot of negotiations on the seventh floor of the State Department prior to the release and the final document which listed each bank's monetary interest [and] was typed up by Warren Christopher's secretary. You had David Rockefeller on down involved here, these megabankers. Christopher's secretary discovered that the figures didn't add up. She discovered that when she was typing it up, so they had to redo the final

document.

It's a long story, but part involves the release. When the aircraft bearing the American hostages had cleared Iranian air space, frozen assets would be transferred. It was very important that this Algerian plane had cleared Iranian air space. We did not have a clear indication of that at a point where we were going to transfer the money. I was on the telephone with Warren Christopher in Algiers and at the other end was I think Jerry Bremer in SS saying we are going to transfer the money. At that moment, I was to launch the two planes to Algiers to pick them up, but we did not have a clear indication that the hostages had left Iran. I stopped the launching of the aircraft and, in effect, that stopped the money being transferred.

I have a chart of the positions of the small number of psychiatrists who were getting on the airplane on this huge overhead chart at the base in Frankfurt which said dep sec def clears aircraft for launch, and I stopped it. So they wrote a little box on there and it says, Krys clears aircraft for launch with a check and then they checked it. They gave that to me as a souvenir that I really acted on my own at that point and [had] not cleared that aircraft to be launched and therefore the money wasn't transferred until we really had word that that aircraft had cleared. We had lots of ways of knowing when an aircraft had cleared a certain area. The money was transferred and the aircraft from Frankfurt were launched. It was that little moment of tying together two things.

Q: When you were working on this at the very last, were there any problems with other countries, or particularly with individuals trying to get into the act?

KRYS: Most of them were really very reluctant to get into it because of all sorts of implications, particularly in Europe, where it mattered. You had the Islam identification in some areas and they were real concerns. We were going to go back and talk about what occurred in the immediate aftermath of the taking of the hostages in Iran. You have to remember that within a matter of days, both Tripoli and Islamabad saw mobs storming and burning us out. The one in Islamabad, the demonstrations in Beirut and I think to a lesser degree in Damascus but in Damascus there was such an iron hand in charge that nothing came of it. They were primarily triggered by broadcasts, and I don't think the Russians were very helpful in this, [reporting] that infidels had stormed Mecca. There was a Shiite demonstration where they burned rubber tires and some people were killed there. That just inflamed that area and that's what caused the Secretary to remove about 1,000 people [from] the region.

Countries were very, very loath to get themselves too caught up in this. A couple of countries were approached and tried to do some things. The Swiss ambassador here in Washington and his colleague in Tehran were very helpful. As you may remember, we negotiated with the Swiss to represent us in Tehran, and there was an interesting bureaucratic by-play on that. We were very concerned that the language of the protecting power arrangement with Switzerland avoid some of the pitfalls that we fell into when we made a similar arrangement [for] Havana. As you may recall, during your vast consular experience, we got caught up in Havana where we were taking the possessions of

American citizens [and] safekeeping them in the embassy. [There were] a number of other chores that [we undertook] but didn't want and we're paying for it to this very day. We avoided a lot of that [in Tehran]. I had a number of very good sessions with the Swiss exactly as to what they were to do on our behalf. They were extraordinary. They were very professional. They have an entire section of their Foreign Ministry devoted to protecting powers arrangements. There were other special arrangements with regard to reporting administratively and on consular matters in particular. I won't get into too much of that because I really don't know how much of that is [of interest].

Q: Can we talk about what you did and your feelings and perceptions as you got involved in going in to pick up the hostages? Was there a concern, for example, that this was a trap?

KRYS: You mean ultimately?

Q: Yes.

KRYS: I don't think it was ever seen as a trap. I think the Algerians were much too sensitive to what was going on in Tehran. This was an evolution. There were lots of false starts, starting with the Ramsey Clark mission. I'm sure I mentioned earlier it was felt in the Department of State and I'm sure elsewhere, that you just kept pushing on doors until something would work.

The intelligence factor was the single largest void in everything that we were doing. Hal Saunders I think had asked me, and I think he's put it in a compilation of viewpoints which is up there on the bookshelf, what was the single most difficult thing about what we were dealing with in Tehran? It was the lack of information. You would have thought that some assets would still have been available to us that could talk about what was going on while these people were held captive. It was mostly anecdotal. The cook that had cooked for them came out. It was a household employee who went to Thailand. Part of what I was doing was making sure that these people were taken care of, too. We paid off the debt [of] a Foreign Service national employee for what he had done because his pension was gone, everything was gone. We found a way of doing that and also found out as much as we could about how many people there were, where they were, and what their conditions were.

Then there was the press that was [coming] in from other countries. I viewed every inch of film that came out. If you will recall, we had a number of ministers who had gone in, [as well as] a number of foreign officials, and through [them] we began to be able to identify unnamed hostages in the background. This led to a concern about one hostage that we really didn't see for a very long time, Michael Metrinko, who was a consular officer in Tehran. I grew very close to his family. He was called "the missing hostage" for a while and I finally saw him for 30 seconds on one tape around the Christmas before they came out. His own parents didn't recognize him. Anyway, I'm drifting.

Q: We have set it up and now the Algerians said, "We've got a deal", I guess?

KRYS: That was a little remote from me. That was Hal Saunders and Warren Christopher in Algeria because they were in Algiers.

Q: What did you do because we want to focus on you?

KRYS: My end of it was the preparation for the return of the hostages. How do you assemble the people without raising false hopes on the part of the families? Get the doctors involved and ensure that we had everything set up in Wiesbaden working with the hospital and the support of the mission there. Have the support back in Washington that would be necessary when the hostages returned. Where do you have your airplanes? Where are they going to go when they are released? How are they going to come out? We didn't [yet] know about the Algerians actually sending the aircraft in. We had to be prepared to pick them up in Pakistan, which we thought was one possibility, or somewhere in Europe which we thought was another possibility. We had to have military aircraft that could accommodate different situations because we didn't know what we were dealing with. It is a long, long list that I really hadn't thought about since 1981. We had to be prepared to do whatever was necessary.

My [deal] with the military had to [be that] whatever we needed, we could get. If [we] needed Nightingales - DC-9s that are equipped [with] stretchers - we [could] get them. [We had] to give [them] 48 hours notice or 72 hours, and [whatever]. In Frankfurt we had them on an alert basis to go on a moment's notice. A moment's notice really meant 11 or 12 hours and that is the sort of notice we had. We had had different kinds of aircraft. If they were really going to [go] into Algeria, then [we] needed a shorter range aircraft. If they were going into Pakistan, [we] needed aircraft that could accommodate wounded people and could fly that far and bring them back. Then [we had to decide to] were to take them. All of those plans were there and my job was to create those plans and coordinate [them] and work [them] on a constant basis.

I also stayed in touch with the families and told them what was going on to the degree that we knew it, without raising false hopes. Again this was a constant thing. We had meetings with the families, we had meetings with those who worked out of the Operations Center. Near the end, they moved out of the Operations Center, they wanted a little bit of distance. They established an office in Washington for the family liaison group, but they maintained the office in the conference room at the Op Center as well.

Q: As all of this went on, I can see the Department of Defense saying, "This is all very nice, but sometimes we have thousands of people who are prisoners of war and you are handcrafting this beautiful thing, but we can't duplicate this in any way and we don't want to set a precedent." Did you find any of that?

KRYS: If I did, it must have been very early on. You are going to have to bear with me, and I almost wish I had some of the people with whom I worked [here] because obviously I'm using the first person and that is wrong. There were a lot of people doing this. I was going all the time, and I can't even tell you this was one piece of a whole

ongoing thing. I was sleeping in the office and it was that sort of thing. I would have to think and define a little bit better and maybe we'll do this portion again.

Very early on we made the point, and we made the point when it came to compensation later on because it was relevant, that these were not prisoners of war. These people did not go to represent their nation as soldiers, and therefore you don't have a precedent with which you have to deal. If you have another situation involving hostage taking, then you have that precedent to concern yourself with. They weren't POWs. Even the military who had to conduct themselves in an appropriate manner had not gone there as armed combatants. They just found themselves in that situation. That was very important. We had to deal with the Marines on that basis. They were seconded to the United States State Department. They were always Marines but they were no longer Marines under arms in Tehran and therefore not POWs. The ironic twist to all of this is when the compensation finally came through, they were treated as POWs and compensated on the basis of the compensation given to POWs in Vietnam on a daily basis, plus cost of living increase for that amount. Not a million dollars.

Q: Let's talk about the last couple of days. What did you do? Were you in Wiesbaden?

KRYS: I was in Frankfurt in the control center at the airport because I could have radio contact and telephone contact. I couldn't do that at the hospital. The doctors were at the hospital. We had flown in a medical team. The psychiatrists that were involved in this [each] began working with two or three families before the hostages ever came out and then [he] became the psychiatrist as needed for the returned hostages. So there was a link established with each family and then the hostage family member. They did meet with the returned personnel in Wiesbaden for initial interviews to tie the family back together. It is a very interesting thing about hostages coming back.

I do want to mention something else. We talked about people who were held as POWs, how they become blamed and their military careers generally don't do all that well when they come back. One of the things that I managed to do with Personnel is to insert in the record for the promotion panels that this individual [was] held in captivity and there were no performance evaluations for this period of time. You should evaluate the file and in effect take that and say this is the way the individual's performance has been. Almost every individual was promoted and that was true, I think, for all of the agencies involved. It was a real change because one of the things that I and others feared was, they would be rated as prisoners: were you a good hostage? That was the last thing that we wanted. It mattered enormously to the people that came back because they, too, feared a stigmatization [for] having been taken hostage.

There is a sharp break [in] the different [treatment given] the people who came out very early, that first group we spoke of, and those that were in captivity for 444 days. The people that came back early were not feted in any way and they weren't really treated as returning heroes because we feared the consequence of what would transpire in Iran for having treated these people in a very public manner.

Q: Was this explained to them?

KRYS: Oh, yes, but it is very hard psychologically, very, very hard. They never really felt part of that larger group to the degree that they didn't wonder why they were released. It was a psychological toll, why they were released and others were kept. This is survivors mentality. You see it in airplane crashes. We didn't deal with it adequately because I don't know how we could have except the assignment process was good [to] them.

The meeting at Wiesbaden with President Carter was an extraordinarily emotional moment and I don't know how well that has been described. I don't think it has been described in any great detail anywhere. I had worked with Hamilton Jordan during the crisis because at times I'd drive him out to Dulles airport in my car and put him on the front end of an airplane to take him to Europe for negotiations. Ham Jordan's book is a fairly good diary. The Carter administration as you know was enormously caught up in the crisis and ultimately caught up to the degree that it had to be a major factor in his defeat. He flew out overnight, and I was asked to meet with him, having already met with the returned group and spent some time with them.

We had set up banks of telephones so as soon as the people got to the hospital they could all make telephone calls anywhere in the world that they wanted to. Of course they all called home. They had already had their contact with the outside world. Hours later, the former President arrived. I was to brief him and I said, "There are going to be three questions that they are going to ask you." I gave him the three questions and, of course, the two most important ones were: why did you let the Shah into the United States and if you were going to let the Shah into the United States, why didn't you get us out? I told him the questions in order and he was shocked. I was very blunt about it: they were angry at him.

He went into this packed large room, sort of this common area where everyone was sitting. It was he [and] Jordan, and I think Vice President Mondale was there. Carter was such a central figure and he started talking to them and telling them why he did what he did. While there was still some hostility at the end of this, he did this in the most remarkably moving way. Everyone realized that, right or wrong, whether they agreed with him or not, he had done everything that he felt he humanly could and had given himself so completely to their cause that he really washed away the animosity. It was remarkable, and there wasn't a dry eye in the house; I think [that's] a very apt way of putting it. It really was an extraordinarily moving period of maybe an hour-and-a-half or two hours.

Q: What about the questions that came?

KRYS: They were exactly those questions, in that order. The third one revolved around the raid. Everyone knew that the casualties would have been enormous, and they would have been. At a minimum, a third of the people sitting in that room would have been killed in my view, and in the view of most others. President Carter felt this would have

been the rescue mission that worked. I doubt it. There were very strongly put questions.

Q: Did you find when you were meeting the hostages when they came, you getting the personnel issues? In other words, they'd say, "Okay, this is great, but what is going to happen to me?"

KRYS: Did you see the return in [Libya], because they filmed [that]? It was a huge room in Algiers and we were sitting around the edges of the room. A man who is now dead (he was killed in an airplane crash) who was, I think, the foreign minister of Algeria, Ben Yahia, spoke to the group. I was sort of going around identifying with people that I knew.

I [had known] very few of the hostages [before] but when they got off the airplane, if there was one moment of real, my god, it's finally happened, I recognized them and greeted them by name and introduced them at the door to Warren Christopher. It was terribly emotional. You know Warren Christopher is not an overly emotional individual but we were all in tears. It was also rather funny at the same time in the sense that I would introduce someone by [his] full name. They didn't look the same as when they went in, I never met them, and I would just say who they were to Christopher and in some instances what they did. They looked at me and said, "Who the hell are you?" They couldn't figure out how I knew who they were. This went on for all of them that came off the airplane, every single one of them.

When we got into the room, the first thing we told them was that we were going to [take them] to Wiesbaden for a period of time to really let them come back to reality. There were all sorts of concerns. [For] people who [have been] blindfolded and told when they can go to the bathroom or have to ask permission, as they were, the fear was that they have to start to live their own lives again. This psychologist that I mentioned earlier who was dismissed [told] the wives [they] should expect their husbands to put a towel over their eyes and ask if they can go to the bathroom. We got rid of him. He was a very well known psychologist, but he was a goner.

What we didn't want was [to] bring the family together under pressure because their families had begun to live different lives over the period of 444 days. It was really longer than 444 days because this was a non-family post, a non-accompanied post, so they had been away for even longer. The first reaction was, "Like hell, we're getting on the airplane [for home]. If we have to stop for a bigger plane in Frankfurt, fine, but we are going home." This may be difficult for some of the family members and one or two family members in particular to realize, but by the time we were in Wiesbaden, most of them wanted even another day or so there because they began to see that they were returning to something [changed]. We also had to advise them that their families had been doing different things during this period of time because getting mail delivered was very, very poor and was very heavily censored. Coming back into a different society really mattered. Yes, there were personnel questions. There were a lot of money questions. There was some bad news to tell, a death in the family here and there, too.

Q: Yes, including somebody's son was murdered, wasn't it?

KRYS: I think that happened afterwards. He was murdered afterwards. One or two individuals, their wives had become prominent figures. There had to be a reconciliation to the fact that some of them would come back to marriages that were difficult before they left and they weren't going to be particularly better, as we discovered later. There were follow-on meetings. The medical divisions of all of the agencies were extraordinarily good. That is not for me to say - it's more for the people who were involved to say - but every effort really was made.

There was the cooling off period and that was the moment of contention. A lot really had to do with the family concerns, and financial concerns, as well as career. A lot had to do with [the] need to physically recover. They had been through hell. Some of them had been beaten, and some had hurt themselves exercising. One thing you discover is that people in captivity go through certain periods where they do different things. Some exercise too hard. One or two people really had exercised so vigorously that they had major foot problems.

There was a lot of hostility obviously directed both towards our leadership [which] it was felt should not have let them get into that situation and of course to their captors. The hostages were held in different groupings over different periods of time, and they had formed nicknames for their captors. There were, of course, intelligence debriefings on a one-on-one basis. The different agencies began to treat the returned people differently, in keeping with the traditions of their own organizations. The Marines sent tailors over so they came off the airplane looking like Marines. There were different cultural things. Most, I think, wanted the reunion to occur without the concerns that men away from their wives over a long period of time [would feel] as to how they would come together.

Q: Did you have a problem with the press?

KRYS: The press wasn't allowed onto the base. They stayed on the perimeter. Pierre Salinger sat in a huge stretch limo outside the gates for a few days. Some got interviews because some of the people wanted to give interviews so they drifted over to the gate and gave interviews. No, not really because it was handled this way. It was handled in the way that even the most aggressive person in the press had to realize that unless [he was] going to break into a military base, [he was] not going to get that interview. Many of the people in the media, however, had [set up] the families to be their conduits. Some quite appropriately, and some less [so].

Q: Was their any effort made to either subdue or to instigate feeling towards Iran and Iranians? In diplomacy, we always try to smooth out...

KRYS: When the earlier groups came out, we did sit down and say, "Look, think about the people still in captivity." You'll remember you had three separate groups of people set free and there was a concern then, and they were very sensitive to those concerns. When the 52 came out, I was never around anybody who suggested toning it down, but their emphasis wasn't on that either. You have to remember when I said some dealt with

the press inappropriately, that was a small number. Most of the families had press ties in their [own] communities and so when Johnny came home and the yellow ribbon was taken off the tree, that was a great moment and the press was very friendly with the family because the press had been by there. One or two characters had the press living in their homes and that was slightly inappropriate on the part of the press. It was major networks that wanted to make sure they caught every moment of it.

There were all sorts of offers and there were lots of wonderful gifts. America just went berserk. I will never, ever forget driving from Stewart Air Force Base to West Point. Every inch on the road through [the] countryside was filled with people waving. Every age, every group; it was just extraordinary; it was unbelievable.

Q: Were they ready for that?

KRYS: I think so. Because we had tried to make them ready in Wiesbaden, but more importantly it was America pouring out love and you are always ready for that. From Andrews Air Force Base to the White House, it was just remarkable. There were funny moments: Mickey Mouse doing an obscene gesture for the Ayatollah, big signs of that along the road. I think they were ready for that. A number of things were given to them that were just terrific. Some received lifetime passes to major league baseball teams if they had one in their area. They were invited to the World Series. Each of them was a personality. Some wanted to be more of a personality than others, and others really just wanted to go back to a different way of life. I suspect for a while it was intense because you had helicopters with press and so on when they came back. But that is fairly normal. Leading up to that, there were things that were not so right.

Q: How about the reception by the President and the State Department?

KRYS: You know, we went from Andrews Air Force Base to the White House. I was on the bus with Vice President Bush. I flew in from Stewart Air Force Base 15 minutes ahead of the group returning with their families to Washington. Vice President Bush was the official greeter. Tip O'Neill was there; Haig was there. Andrews Air Force Base was just extraordinary. I was reunited with my family at Andrews Air Force Base, and they went back on the bus with us.

On the way to the White House, Vice President Bush's aide said, "You really know all these people." I had introduced them again coming off with their families. I said, "Yes." He said, "When we get to the White House, would you mind just going up, there is going to be a microphone near the podium," and it was almost like football players entering a stadium, as the people went onto this huge platform erected outside the White House where the President would officially greet each one of the them. That's [pointing] a picture of Bill Keogh. The wife is Katherine Keogh. He was the educator who was a hostage and, unfortunately, died a few years later of Lou Gehrig's disease. At any rate, I took the book with the names of each, and the city and states from which they each had come and I was in the background sort of saying like "number 81," and I read off their names. I never got recognition for it, but there you are; I suspect that the returned

hostages got the recognition. They all were standing there and you can see that each of them was recognized and greeted by the President. There was an enormous reception inside the White House. The president, Mrs. Reagan, and the Bush's walked through and just greeted everybody. It was a lovely reception, it was jam packed. I did get recognition then by the President at that moment and that was very touching because by then the emotions on the part of all of us were just very near the surface.

I think after that those of us from the State Department drove to the Department in buses and everybody was outside. It was a similar thing to when the Canadian six came back except a far larger number of people and it was just sheer joy, there is just no other way of saying it. America was just happy to the point where emotions didn't have to be restrained, and I'm becoming emotional just thinking about that era. Do you want to leave it there?

Q: Why don't we leave it there? We've talked this entire time concerning the hostages. When we pick it up next time, we will talk about the reintegration of the hostages. I think this is an important aspect.

KRYS: Yes, and there was a formula, so let's not forget that.

Q: We'll talk about the formula for the reintegration of the hostages and their families and how we brought them back. Then we'll talk about other things that were happening in the Middle East. I'll mention once again the attacks on our embassies and also Israeli-Arab-Palestinian relations that impacted you and all of us during this time.

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Today is March 4, 1997. To finish up the Iran hostage discussion, could you tell me as much as you want about the reintegration of the former hostages into the Foreign Service? This would include their families.

KRYS: Perhaps it's not really good to take a measure of pride, but I do about certain aspects of the planning for the return of the hostages. Let's start with something very fundamental. That is the way former hostages, traditionally prisoners of war, have been regarded by their colleagues upon their return and reintegration into the service. Traditionally they have not fared well. You'd find that out if you'd speak to a number of officers in our Foreign Service who at one time or another found themselves in a hostage situation, whether it was as a prisoner, perhaps in Zaire, or the Congo, or if you are talking about Bill Stokes, who was taken hostage in China and held almost incommunicado for a substantial period of time. When they came back, their careers really didn't benefit in any way, which was fair perhaps based on their talents, but many of them felt they had been damaged by the experience, let alone getting an even break.

One of the things that I think I was instrumental in bringing about was the method by which the performance jackets of everyone in the foreign affairs community, and I think everyone in government, were handled. For performance boards where there are peer

evaluations, [as in the] military and the Foreign Service, a note was put in there which said this person is being held hostage in Iran and for the rating period you should judge this individual's performance based on [that], I can't remember exactly the wording but the formulation was, you should look at their past reports and assume [they] had done at least [as] well. A number were promoted on that basis. There is an emotional appeal there when you say this person was held hostage in Iran. At least for 444 days if they were near promotion when they went into captivity, it took into account that this was a voluntary post and maybe they weren't the most sterling individuals in terms of performance, and maybe they were. They were at least not held back in that time frame. That was one thing.

There was another reason for that type of statement and one which I know we articulated, but I'm not sure that we put in writing and that was that their performance as hostages was not to be judged [the same as] performance as officers. That was really very important because you don't know what the people went through when they were in captivity; in truth that story has really never come out. Many of them were transported over 100 different times after the aborted rescue attempt. They were jostled about, knocked about. There was a terrible van accident where the back of the van just unbuckled, they were bounced around, and they went off the road and overturned. My memory has dimmed somewhat and I'm not sure if one or two of their captors were killed; I'm not sure of that but I have that lingering impression.

The other thing that I played a part in, and there was a fight on this not within the legislature but there was a fight within the executive, and that was the Hostage Relief Act. This talked about the reintegration of the individuals and the treatment of their families during the time of captivity and the way the families would be treated when the hostages returned. Did we talk about this?

Q: Yes.

KRYS: It was a sunset piece of legislation.

Q: Sunset meaning what?

KRYS: Meaning that after a period it expired as legislation so that it wasn't on the books as legislation for all time to come. I do believe that some aspects of it have been carried forward. I think when we spoke of it last, and it's been some time, we spoke of it being based on the Soldiers and Sailors Act of 1941. That was legislation which at least permitted us, for instance, to give the paychecks to the spouses if there hadn't been a power of attorney in place. That was a real problem. Frankly we were paying them anyway because how else would they live while these people were overseas?

The other aspect of that was a retraining clause. If an individual, let's say if it was a communicator and this was an actual case, wanted to come back and retrain and become an officer in some other discipline within the Foreign Service or wanted to leave the Foreign Service, a years training was provided. Care for the families. Medical care was

very, very important, particularly dealing with emotional stress. There were cases of emotional stress both on the part of the returned hostages and on the part of the families. The definition of family was very important. We made it as broad as possible so that if an uncle really was like a father to an individual, that uncle was eligible for medical care.

There was great concern about what the costs were going to be. To my knowledge, and it's not my certain knowledge because I haven't pursued it over the intervening years, this has not cost the government a lot. It has meant a great deal that there was real security for the families and that the people who came back by and large were able to pick up the threads of their lives. I feel that they had not been disadvantaged while they were in captivity, or at least an attempt was made not to disadvantage them, and also that they had some period of respite.

As executive director at NEA, one of the things I did working with the director general and with [the] other bureaus, was [to] set aside a number of positions. Bear in mind that we closed the embassy in Tehran and rather than dissipate those positions, we held them in reserve. For an individual who came back after some period of recovery, I had a very strong [prejudice] against sending them to another post where there was danger. We placed positions in posts around the world which more or less gave the returned hostage in the Foreign Service a say. It gave them an opportunity to, let's say, go to Paris as an economic officer where there might not have been an opening. An extra position was put in Paris and the person could go there. To go as a consular officer to London, let's say, a position was provided, and then when an opening occurred the position was withdrawn and the individual went into the [open] job. In some cases, people really couldn't go overseas because of health, and positions were placed around the Department and they went into those. There wasn't the strain of finding a job as soon as they were back on their feet.

Q: Were there any particular problems as you worked through this with the people as far as the reintegration.

KRYS: Yes, some did have [them, but] I won't get into names.

Q: No, I don't want to know the names, but the type of things.

KRYS: You have to remember that some had truly horrific experiences as they saw them and as they were, in truth, and people react differently. Some really did have problems that took a longer time to deal with. Some had very serious problems in captivity and some had [faced] life threatening situations. In terms of reintegration, recently in the latter part of January we had another get together at the home of the Algerian ambassador. There weren't many of the returned hostages there but there were some, and there were a lot of the people who worked with the Algerian government as they represented us in the final phase of the release of the hostages. Most of the people who returned that I've met with over the years put that experience behind them. Some did enjoy the press and you'd see their names occasionally, but most have gone back to their [normal] lives. I think most of their lives turned out pretty much as one might have expected if there hadn't been

the Iran crisis, some better and some worse.

Q: Let's move from Iran then. Something may come up and we can go back to it.

In '79, particularly towards the end, all hell was breaking loose all over the place. What about in the Gulf area?

KRYS: The Gulf situation was special and I think we've spoken of it. The Islamic world went up in flames, instigated by both the Iranians, and we believe, the Soviets. I know we've spoken of this to some degree and I know there was enormous resentment on the part of the people who were evacuated out of the Gulf. Remember, we sent a couple of 747s around gathering people up and some bear endless animosity to this day as a result of that. They were wrong not because they were wrong about whether they should have been evacuated. They were wrong in not realizing that if you are sitting in Washington, you do have a different perspective and you do have a different kind of responsibility. In individual cases, they were probably right with regard to the evacuation, but that's the way it is.

Q: Let's talk about the broader situation. You were in NEA from when to when?

KRYS: From January of '79 to the summer of '83.

Q: That is a good solid tour there. From your perspective, how much impact did the perennial Arab-Israeli dynamics play on things?

KRYS: That's a hard question, because it is broadly framed. If you were in the NEA bureau, that was the focal point of all that was done... I was going to say "all that was done on the Near Eastern side," but it also [affected] on South Asian policy. There was a very strong argument to be made that South Asia was shortchanged with regard to the amount and level of attention paid to it during that period, perhaps to the point where it was broken away, a move which I think was not the right move but that is a different story. In fact, one of the charges to me by Hal Saunders when I came into the bureau was [to] make sure we pay enough management attention, and I was really part of a triumvirate in that bureau because management and policy can't be separate. Administration is seen as one of the lesser chores, as consular work is. I must say to Hal's credit, he did not see it that way and clearly neither did Peter Constable, so management and policy really had to be tied together. Maybe that is a sop to my ego. I'm not sure.

Q: Obviously, it has to be.

KRYS: It does but it seldom is. So it was a question of let's pay attention to what is going on in South Asia but you can't get away from the fact that the Arab-Israeli matter hung over every aspect of policy the bureau dealt with. I came in just as Camp David had been completed, and here was a bright opening, and it was an unexpected opening. To see the way the bureau moved forward, you had two forces at work at the same time. There were traditionalists within the bureau and they represented what is stereotyped as the Arabist

view. There were others within the bureau who were clearly Arabists but really saw that you can't deal in isolation with [just] one aspect of a policy. It has to be broader than that. There were realities that had to be dealt with. Then you had the other side of it, those who were involved in Israeli affairs who clearly saw it as an opportunity at last to move in a new direction which would sustain the borders of Israel. But it was [also] seen as being at the cost of other aspects of the U.S. Arab relationship.

Everyday management activities really meant ensuring that quality officers were well distributed throughout the bureau and that there was full recognition where the priorities were to be placed. [This meant] ensuring that there weren't gaps, ensuring that you had the right kind of officer. When I say the right kind, I mean an individual who had experience, had language and so forth, or [that] we were training a sufficient number. One of the things that we dealt with was the breadth of quality Arabic-speaking officers, quality in the sense that they spoke the language well, going out to the field. We had superb officers with both the language and the background and then [we] had a [decline] to very few [such] officers. One of the things was to ensure that we fed the machine properly.

What was the pull within the bureau? I think it was rather clear you had strong ambassadors in the field [who] worked a bureau. Sam Lewis knew how to work the bureaucracy, work the bureau, and make his points known. He had very strong opposition in other bureaus. You saw it all the time and it wasn't a question that you dealt with any differently in management [than] you did in reporting; you just had to deal with it. You need to define that question a little bit better for me though.

Q: Let's talk about the relationship between the embassies. Sam Lewis, for example, was very strong and was there, I guess, the entire time that you were there, wasn't he?

KRYS: I'm pretty sure he was there the entire time. I think Bill Brown succeeded him but that may have been near the end.

Q: Did you find that because of his longevity, strength, and also obvious political clout, did you ever have the feeling that for the resources, you were dealing with, Sam was maybe using Congress or anyone else to come back and say we need more communicators or we need this or that?

KRYS: You are really getting almost on personal levels. Sam and I were often at swords points.

Q: We had a very long interview with Sam, but this is for the historical record.

KRYS: Sam was not one who accepted no very easily and he came back and took very strong exception to a decision I had made with regard to resources for his post. Quite frankly he had very bad information with regard to the level. We sent an administrative counselor out there whom Sam thought I didn't favor. Here we're getting into a [personal] level and we may cut this out later, but he chose the individual and, quite frankly, the

individual took draconian measures at this particular time. He cut off long distance and he did all sorts of things. Sam came back with a bill of particulars in my office and it was a very stormy session [about] how I had cut this and destroyed his policy making ability. I told him where I thought he was wrong, [and] he told me where he thought he was right. I said fine and he thought I had really cut off the post on what he thought was a petty level. I asked him to go back and look at the figures again and I gave him what we, the bureau, had provided him.

Every strong ambassador with whom I've dealt over the years came back and fought for [his] resources. That was the overlooked aspect of successful stewardship; if you are going to have policy, you have to have resources to enable you to carry out that policy. Good ambassadors realized it, and ambassadors who really only wanted to deal with substance and leave the rest to their DCMs, admin people and consular people, they didn't succeed nearly as well because they didn't come back and make the case. Sam was extremely good at that. I don't think he was disproportionately favored, however, except among other things we had a security profile that we had to concern ourselves with and we had more than two missions. We had Jerusalem and Tel Aviv so there was always that little dichotomy which Brandon and others might get into, but that was also true of our ambassadors in Egypt and in a very different way of a non-career ambassador in Saudi Arabia. These were the big posts that said, "We're out here and you're not going to flimflam us and tell us what we are getting. We know what we're getting, we know what we need and by god you've got to come up with it." Sometimes we did and sometimes we didn't.

Q: What about Israel? Every four years, there is a race for President in our country and in New York every candidate makes a vow to move the embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. This promise has been made for at least 40 years, I suppose, and has never have been carried out. Do we have a plan in case, all of a sudden, it happens?

KRYS: When I was there, we were looking for a new embassy site because the old site [was] just dreadful. I think the Israelis saw it [as] in their interest to just not be able to find a good site for us. I left as a failure on that score but perhaps not a failure in everyone's eyes. I went out there and we scoured Tel Aviv going place after place. I think I was still in NEA and it might even have been when I was Assistant Secretary for Administration, and we just couldn't find the right place. The answer was we had not selected the site in Jerusalem when I left.

Q: How about Jerusalem? Was there any problem having a post in Jerusalem, which is almost by definition at odds with the embassy in Tel Aviv and they report separately? Did you find that a problem?

KRYS: No, I didn't and I think, whether there was a problem between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv depended on the strength and outlook of the incumbents to reach some accommodation. As you well recall, there were incidents where congressional delegations would get one briefing in Jerusalem with regard to Israel and its outlook and then [they'd] get a very different one in Tel Aviv. I think there were real efforts made to make that less

of a problem between the incumbents, [but they had] very mixed success. You did have an ear to what was then considered the West Bank and the Palestinian cause in Jerusalem and whenever I would travel there, if I were to meet with individuals in Israel, I would also meet with individuals of approximately the same rank, in East Jerusalem. I'm not talking about [the] PLO obviously. Without getting into classified matters, clearly the government couldn't be deaf to what was going on around it and so while there were prohibitions, I think clearly there were also ears that if they weren't the first ear it was the second ear. I think very often there were [cases] where there was a first ear as well.

Q: Did you find that, as in the old Foreign Service, you're the administrative officer, so you just sort of take care as executive officer? Did you find in order to deal with the Arab-Israeli issue, you'd have to get out, look around, and get as knowledgeable about what was happening and also what you would see coming into NEA on this horrendous issue?

KRYS: I'm not sure I had to. I think I valued myself perhaps too highly and therefore really wanted to. I wouldn't [want to become] an administrator who dealt with people and money in a vacuum or at least not fully understanding where we were sending the people, why we were spending the money, and what the policy was that motivated that. I was not really part of that as an active participant in the Arab-Israeli toing and froing. It really was more in support, and therefore the role that I could play as opposed to the [point of] view that I could take or the information that I could arm myself with, were really two different matters. Hal did not sit down with me and say, "Now what are we going to do about the Arab-Israeli crisis?" On the other hand, if I were not to know at least where our policies were intending to take us, I couldn't be prepared for how we should provide the resources and [find] the right people and talk with others about who might do [a] particular job at a key moment. I took that upon myself because I thought that was part of my responsibility. It was really more in terms of backstopping on an informed basis than forming and shaping policy. I wasn't looked to for that, and it would have been inappropriate for me to have pursued that.

Q: What about putting people into this area when you have these two more or less diametrically opposed camps, the Arab and Israeli capitals? Many Americans within the Foreign Service have very strong ideas on policy there. Did you find it was difficult, at least from your point of view, to get people who would go to these various places and give what American policy really called for, a cold clear eye about what was happening?

KRYS: Let me tell you about an approach to that. Let's take the vast majority of the officers as opposed to those that you might say were pure Arabists or pure, what do you call someone who clearly favors the Israel point of view?

Q: Israelists, or I don't know.

KRYS: Whatever it is. In the vast middle area, my goal and the goal of the bureau was to ensure that we had a sufficient number of people, and you can look through the roster, [and see] who served in both parts. You had someone who served as DCM in Tel Aviv

becoming an ambassador in Oman and being able to carry a perspective from one side to the other. [They avoided] the accusation of how the hell would you know because you've never had this kind of an experience. There were a substantial number of officers who spoke Arabic, latter spoke Hebrew, or didn't speak Hebrew but were Arabists who served in Tel Aviv or Jerusalem and therefore could more readily be identified as having a clear-eyed view that factors in their experience. I don't think any of us have a perfectly clear-eyed view. We [develop] certain beliefs and prejudices that [we] carry with [us]. The real goal is to [expose] them so that [an officer] is balanced at the end of the day. There were a substantial number of officers who fell into that category.

Q: This is essentially a relatively new development, isn't it? Up to a point, you either served in an Arab country or in Israel. The feeling was, they would not be acceptable having served in Israel and going back to an Arab country.

KRYS: I think that's a more recent phenomena. Someone who served in the Middle East and an Arabist serving in Israel was not a problem. It was the other side of that coin. In some countries it was more pronounced than others. I remember meeting with the chief of protocol for Kuwait on the boycott. He was very clear about how the Kuwaitis felt, but at the same time they were looking to us to be their shield even in those years. U.S. policy with regard to the Arab boycott was an anathema. People's visa applications had to state religion. I carried two passports, as did anyone traveling in that region. You carried one that you went in and out of Israel with, and then you had the other one that you went to the rest of the world on.

It was a one-way street in one [respect]. [But] it was a two-way street with regard to the distress that must have been felt [by] someone who had spent 15 years in Arab countries and then suddenly came to Israel. I'm sure that that was the case. That was a more recent phenomenon where there was a two-way exchange, but I go back to Nick Veliotes. Nick served in Tel Aviv and then went on to Oman. I'm not sure if he had an Arab country before that, but there were a number of others that had gone across the border.

Q: Did you get involved in the Camp David process and the peacekeeping business?

KRYS: I was involved in a later aspect of it. I came into the bureau just as the Camp David accords had been reached. I came in in January of '79 and I think Camp David was the latter part of '78. I was involved in setting up the Sinai field mission, both drawing up the necessary legislation, the staffing and working with one of my predecessors several times removed, Ray Hunt, who, as you know, was assassinated. Ray and I and a number of others established the Sinai field mission and that was part of where we were going with Egypt and the peace accords. That certainly was hanging over the bureau: how do you forward those accords reached in Camp David? In my time it was a very slow process.

Q: Did you have problems getting people for those jobs or were you recruiting for them?

KRYS: We actually set up an office because it had to be separately funded. I don't think

there were real problems because people were seconded to the Sinai field mission and they had benefits that were different. They didn't lose their status within the Foreign Service. The question would have always been quality. Whenever you have one of these situations where there are inducements, very often you will attract individuals who feel this is a way either to further their career beyond where they were and they were good officers, but in many instances you also had officers who said I really can't get a job [where I want], so I'll take this [other] position. We worked very closely with assignments.

Q: I noticed this when I was in Vietnam. Turning then to another area of difficulty, including having an embassy blown up, let's talk about Lebanon.

KRYS: Dear, dear Lebanon. I was in and out of Lebanon probably every three or four months right through the worst times. I was often at odds in the latter stages of my career with regard to leadership in Lebanon because I held a very strong view. With regard to Lebanon, I was in the latter part of my career when I was both in diplomatic security and prior to that in administration but also in the executive directorate in NEA. I felt very strongly that if you had a mission where the embassy personnel couldn't leave a bunker, you really shouldn't have a mission in place. I was in Lebanon within 24 hours both times our embassies were blown [up] and saw the horror of what that was, particularly the second one. The first one was more dramatic to look at and that was when the embassy that had been in a hotel building was blown and Oklahoma City looked a lot like that. It was horrible with a tremendous loss of life.

The second one in theory should never have happened. When that was blown up, I got there maybe 15 hours later. In a way, it was more ghastly because it didn't look that bad until you went inside. What had happened was the glass, all of the front of the building, had imploded and it cut people to shreds; that was beyond what I'll describe here. Security should have taken care of it [but] it didn't. I am not blaming security, I'm blaming a number of factors. It really shouldn't have happened. That car should never have gotten that close to the embassy.

Q: Also exploding glass and that type of situation, you don't need to have that. There is plastic and there are all sorts of things.

KRYS: This was meant to be a temporary measure. It was way off the road; there was supposed to have been a barrier in place but there wasn't, and so on. It's a long story.

Anyway, through the years, a number of ambassadors came back and told me what they thought of me for yanking them out of there and closing down their missions and that they were perfectly safe. There was a time when I was in security where we fired the vast majority of the guards because there was nothing for them to guard. We had hundreds of guards and we didn't know who most of them were. We were hiring by confessional. We would hire a sufficient number of Maronites, a sufficient number of Shiites, a sufficient number of Christians. Maybe if you'd hired a smaller number and balanced them it might have been all right.

Lebanon at that time was such a bizarre place. I remember driving from the residence when we were still in the city across the green line and driving through the port area. You drive through a building where it was unbelievable. We would have crash cars; behind that would be the lead car; behind that would be the ambassador's vehicle; [and] behind that would [be] chase cars; all bristling with M-16s handled by American security people whose lives were on the line all the time. We had a few ambassadors - one ambassador was particularly - brave but he risked the lives of people around him. Of course, we lost a friend there a long time ago, [Frank] Meloy. It was an indescribable situation. I saw nothing to rival it until I went to Somalia near the very end of my career on a special mission, and that was even worse.

Q: We'll stick right now to the time you were in NEA. Were there debates about closing the mission?

KRYS: Never on a permanent basis. There was even a debate at one point, after the embassy had been blown up, [about] finishing the embassy that we had started which was to accommodate hundreds of AID people. It was in the worst part of town, the PLO portion of West Beirut. It was an extraordinary idea because the skeleton of the building was still there, but we put it to rest.

Q: What was the rationale for doing it? Was it a bureaucratic momentum?

KRYS: We needed a place to go and we could fortify this building. It was just nonsense but these things come and go, and you never know who's pushing that sort of thing.

Q: What was the effect on NEA, from your perspective, of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the movement up to and bombardment of Beirut?

KRYS: I was out of the bureau by the time we were lobbing small Volkswagens into Lebanon (that was the size of the shell off the battleships). It was a command decision on the seventh floor of the Department and I think everyone was aghast. It was just inexplicable that we were firing into a city, or into a countryside, no matter what. I was in Beirut with one of the House committees, and we were dressed in flak jackets and took a ride around in an armored personnel carrier. I think to many of us, you could see the attitude on the part of our own troops and on the part of our own military leadership that this was a time bomb which ultimately blew up. I don't know what was in the Israelis' minds when they did that. [They] had to know that they were too far from home and too surrounded by enemies for it to work out.

Q: When we put the Marines in the first and second times, did you get involved in that?

KRYS: No. That's where you get [into] an area [where] I wouldn't have had any input.

Q: Did you have any problems getting personnel to go to Lebanon?

KRYS: It was a volunteer post and it was a drawndown post. I'm trying to think whether there were problems. We had problems getting people out of Lebanon more than we had trouble getting [them in. That] says an awful lot for dedication of [the] service. Some were there long after they were operating at about 20 percent efficiency, having lived through the blowing up of the embassy; they didn't want to come out. Some of them went back in, and one went back as an ambassador. He was one of the strongest advocates of "don't lower the flag." It didn't matter that the flag was in tatters and his life and his wife's life were in danger. The tragedy was so overwhelming after those two buildings were blown [up], the losses there, particularly in the first one with regard to American losses and in the second instance with regard to Lebanese losses, that that is what stands out in my mind, not the personnel problems.

Q: What about the alternate of setting up the equivalent of an embassy in exile in Cyprus?

KRYS: I was very involved, by the way, in getting the PLO out. We couldn't find the money to get them out, [so] I worked out a formula which involved borrowing five million dollars. (I have to figure out whether the statue of limitations has expired here.) Actually it was done by one of our allies who provided bridge funding as a loan because the most important thing was getting them out. I was very unhappy with some of the terms about how they got out. Cyprus is very sensitive on the issue of PLO coming over [there] so I won't get into too much of that. But they came out with some materiel that they shouldn't have come out with, and I was really upset about that. We did call on an ally because there was a funding mechanism. It was nothing illegal because this was reported, but we were short something like five million dollars at a critical moment. As long as George Shultz remembered this, he used to call me the five million dollar man because we borrowed the money, and we paid it back. There was a separate mechanism set up for funding this.

Q: As far as our mission in Lebanon, were we...?

KRYS: I don't remember ever setting it up. It was de facto. It was an administrative support mission out of Cyprus and mostly it was to pay the local employees. Do you have a specific thought in mind?

Q: I was wondering whether it was said, "Okay, we've got a hell of a situation here; we're going to haul out; we're going to set up something in Cyprus and perhaps fly in from time to time?"

KRYS: We did. We did out of Larnaca, and I flew in a number of times. But we never really said that the embassy was now in Larnaca, [or] at least I don't remember that. We did set up there, and there may be a period of time that our mission staff in total was there but it was always meant to be transitory. Among other things, that would have played hell with the Cypriots and their relationships.

Q: Another one of those easy little problems like the Northern Irish and the Arab-Israeli

conflicts. The easy ones to solve.

KRYS: Absolutely, in that same category. There was some [questioning] at one time about why we were in Beirut and another time [about] why weren't we in Beirut. I'd have to go back and really look at some notes on this before I sounded really foolish.

Q: Hopping over to another problem, Iran and Iraq were in a major war. We were completely out of Iran, but we had an embassy in Iraq at the time, didn't we?

KRYS: I'm trying to remember the time frame now on this. Do you remember the years because I have the feeling I had been in Trinidad by then?

Q: Iraq invaded Iran shortly after the hostage crisis, or maybe it was a little later.

KRYS: I went to Baghdad when Bill Eagleton was the chargé d'affaires but I don't think I was in NEA at that time.

Q: It may be, I'm not sure.

KRYS: We had a crotchety old building which was a security nightmare. There was an Iraqi caretaker in the building. In theory, we were still under the Belgian flag, so I don't think we had an embassy in my time. I went there to negotiate a return of some of our property which was a hoot.

Q: Was there anything to get back?

KRYS: Nothing that I think we could have gotten back from Baghdad. Have you been there?

Q: No.

KRYS: It's really one of the great cities of the world to look at. At least it was then, but I don't know that it is now. There is an extraordinary mixture of antiquity and modernity - rather tasteful modern buildings. If you ever talk to Ed Peck, he has his own views on a number of issues that may occur to you, and he had a very extraordinary experience in his own view there. He was chargé as well. It was a tiny mission.

Q: How about Pakistan?

KRYS: We got very lucky in Pakistan. You will remember that our new building was torched and we lost lives, both American and Pakistani. This was when the radios throughout the Middle East were blaring that we had invaded Mecca when actually it was probably Iranians who had set tires afire in a mosque in Mecca. They burned us out. How we got lucky was [that] a guard at the American School shut out a group which had made its way to the school. We don't really know what would have happened to our children if they had gotten in there. It was that kind of touch-and-go situation. The guard literally

slammed the gate in their faces, and I suspect faced them down somehow. It was the first time that one of our schools had really faced a danger, and it alerted us to the fact that nothing was sacrosanct any longer.

You know what's happening [here]: I'm blending the time I was in NEA and the time later when I would go back to some of these places. Pakistan is one of those areas where money is funneled in to support little imams, money from very well known entrenched countries, and these imams are working against those very establishments, looking for insurrection and reinstitution of purists, Islamic fundamentalists or extremist states. Pakistan, to me, would still be very high on my list of major concerns as to what could happen. There have been demonstrations, and we've suffered deaths there. We lost a Marine, a warrant officer in 1979 or 1980. I was with Dave Newsom in Germany, and we had just picked [up] the first of the released hostages, the dozen that had been released, and we were in direct communication through the Ops Center when the embassy was on fire and our people were in the communications center and broke out through the roof and came down that way.

Q: Did we draw down Pakistan after that?

KRYS: Yes. We evacuated all of the dependents and those that were not considered essential at that time. It was probably the one evacuation that I would point to where there was no disagreement because they had seen what had happened. That same plane went to the Gulf states and picked up others. I think one of the absolute central factors there was Ambassador Art Hummel's wife, who was extraordinary. She kept the community together and explained what was happening. Dave Field's wife was a nurse and actually cradled the dead Marine and, rather than panic the people in the building (here I'm going back now to the time of the fire itself), she more or less made it look like she was still administrating to the Marine so that people wouldn't think God knows what comes next. She was tremendous on the plane.

Mrs. Hummel kept the community together [in] contrast [to] others who really felt that the Department of State didn't care about what had happened. When families got back here, there was substantial chaos and enormous resentment but there was a difference: they had seen first hand what we feared could happen elsewhere. The Department of State and the government was not prepared to deal with the evacuation of people, and it is not yet fully where it should be with regard to handling [evacuees]. What do you do with children in school and so on? It was hellish.

I came into the tail end of the first evacuation of Tehran. In 1978 we evacuated the post, or drew it down. Each agency treated its people differently and there were comparisons. I went to a meeting in the Department just as I [came] on board in early '79 and they were practically throwing bricks at us. Ben Reed was the Under Secretary. We had to do an awful lot. People couldn't get into storage without paying to get in to get their winter clothing out, and here it was January of '79. We had an awful lot of things and the real creation of the Family Liaison Office took place at that time. It was embryonic, and it came into a place of its own.

Q: What about Afghanistan?

KRYS: I went to Afghanistan right on the heels of the assassination of Spike Dubbs. That was a very different situation. First of all, if you served in Kabul, you were rough and ready. You had gone to a place where you understood that there were very few comforts of life. It was a very hostile environment there. As you may remember, this was in February of '79 when Spike Dubbs was kidnaped, and the embassy in Tehran fell on the same day. I had been on the job three or four weeks and I went to the Ops Center. Tony Quainton was head of counterterrorism, and he was running the show in the Ops Center. We were on line with the embassy in Kabul. If you had to make a bet you would have thought there was going to be real bloodshed in Tehran and Spike Dubbs would be released. It turned out that our people were released in Tehran because Yazdi, the foreign minister, intervened successfully. We may have touched on this earlier. Spike was assassinated in captivity. When I got there, we had had one psychiatrist who had been there earlier and I think did more to upset people. Did we cover this at all?

Q: I'm not sure but let's go through this again.

KRYS: Then we had Elmore Rigamer, who was there and was terrific with the families. They had lost a father figure. Spike Dubbs was really beloved, and you could see the effect that he had on a drawn-down mission in a very hostile environment. The Russians were hated but they were in control. There was one berserk Afghani leader after another. They'd assassinate and put someone else in. When I called the man who I think was the so-called foreign minister, he had a submachine gun pointed at me on his desk as we spoke. In my honor, they had taken a Marine captive that night for allegedly tearing down the Afghani flag, which he probably did in a moment of, shall we say, celebration. I think his name was Amani, and he later became prime minister. He was crazy as a bed bug, a total wacko. The mission was really behind fortified walls there but they really served a purpose. The immediate threat to them was judged to be a low enough level that we should continue.

Q: When you say the mission served a purpose, what do you mean?

KRYS: We didn't have many eyes in that part of the world anymore. Iran was rapidly moving away from us. Our embassy was held captive on our compound in Tehran itself and the Russians were getting in deeper and deeper. We had a good ally in Germany there, and the mission was really not under threat. The major threat might have been trying to unseat the government because our compound was next to the official radio [station] and when the shells would come in, they weren't that accurate. There were real reasons to be there.

Q: We're about ready to end this session. I'd like to pick up something of your feeling about what was emanating within NEA.

KRYS: You're taking me somewhere Stu and I keep trying to figure out where I'm

supposed to go.

Q: These are things that occur to me as we go. We've got Afghanistan with crazies running it; Iran, which has moved way out of our orbit; Lebanon, which is blowing up; and mobs are in Pakistan. By the time you were ready to leave NEA in '83, was there any feeling that we're losing the whole area or somebody is going to take it over or it's just going to be vacuum. What were you getting?

KRYS: No, I think we had turned the corner by '83. Things really had taken on a better perspective. Let's tackle that the next time. I think we had turned the corner, but if you're looking at '79, '80, '81, wow.

Q: It was sort of a discouraging time.

KRYS: The very thought of having people in captivity and having Iranian demonstrators outside of the State Department [was infuriating]. Why we didn't flood out into the street and beat the hell out of them is beyond me, [but] we were worried about the lives of the hostages.

Q: We've really covered the horizon of the Near East during this '79 to '83 period and we've talked about how it was up through '79, '80, which was a very discouraging period, but you felt we'd turned the corner by '83. We'll pick up next time on why you felt we'd turned the corner.

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Today is July 14, 1997. We have gone around the area and when you arrived in '79, it was not a good time and then it got worse. By '83, let's stick to NEA and your outlook and what you were gathering from your colleagues, why were things beginning to look up?

KRYS: We had behind us at that point the return of the hostages and a greater understanding of the dynamics in the region. [Those were] some new elements, [like helpful] tensions between those that we considered the lesser of two evils [or with] the one side that we favored perhaps a bit more. I guess it was almost "stop banging your head on the wall" syndrome. It felt very good to get away from some of the more dangerous aspects. I think the peace accords process again had some chance of [success].

Q: When you talk of peace accords, what do you refer to?

KRYS: The Arab-Israeli situation. There were greater threats within the region from one dimension than the other and some of it was still in [on] embryonic form. Fundamentalism wasn't really defined outside Iran. Iraq at that point was seen as a counterbalance. In South Asia, I'd have to really dredge [up] some of the memories of the Indo-Pakistan situation which I think was quiescent at that point. I just think we were more on an [even keel]. I'd really have to [my] review notes to see whether there wasn't

dynamite in the region too.

Q: Even though many of us were not wild supporters of Ronald Reagan when he came in, he did add a certain element of "America is a strong, proud nation and it will do what was necessary."

KRYS: I think you've cued me very well. Part of what we had seen was, particularly from the time of the hostage taking through the end of the Carter administration, a President locked in the Rose Garden [who] then in an attempt to get away from that, discarded things that mattered to him in an attempt to run against President Reagan. When Reagan came in, he was a dynamic voice, and he started off with a great celebration, as though it was an enormous victory in recovering the hostages. That's taking us back really to the end of January of 1981, but things progressed on a different level. He was a dynamic voice and if he was an actor portraying a role, he portrayed it with such enormous enthusiasm that he swayed the country, and he began to sway the world.

You also saw a different dynamic among our allies. I think Margaret Thatcher at that point, Ronald Reagan, and a few others, saw themselves as strong people in a strong situation irrespective of what the underlying facts may have been. There was a different spirit in the country and I think that came across in foreign affairs to a very large degree. After a brief period [under] Alexander Haig, [we got] George Shultz, a man who cared about the Department of State. That affected the morale of the Foreign Service particularly as seen at headquarters in Washington, DC. There were real changes.

It was for me the end of four-and-a-half years of what was truly the most extraordinary period of my career in terms of growth, challenge, and opportunity to perform. From a personal point of view, after four and a half years, [I left] a bureau, in terms of management, in a very different mode and in much better shape. It was truly acknowledged as a well run bureau. It has always had the reputation for [that], but [it was] expanded in terms of the importance of the Middle East, how the missions were being run and the people we brought into the bureau, the performance of those people and their visibility. I went off to management operations as principal deputy director of MMO.

Q: Before we leave the Near Eastern bureau, how did you feel about the proposal to split off the Near East Bureau in two, the traditional Near Eastern component and South Asia, which includes India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal...

KRYS: What it consists of today wasn't considered seriously [then]. One congressman felt very strongly about that and was a great proponent of putting South Asia on its own feet. I think I may have said this earlier, one of the charges I had early on was to ensure that the South Asian portion of the bureau received more attention than it had before my time. It was something Hal Saunders was very concerned with. Peter Constable came in as principal deputy, and he was a South Asian hand. It was a matter of seeing to it that both [greater] attention and resources were directed toward South Asia. Needless to [say], it was still a Middle East bureau, but more attention was paid to South Asia. [The split]

wasn't considered a serious proposal.

Q: Was it more bureaucratic than anything else or it just caused more problems by having another bureau in the system, or was it the South Asian hands wanting to hang on?

KRYS: I think it really came from the outside. The gentleman who was supposed to have gone to India and didn't, was really the very strong [advocate].

Q: We're talking about Steven Solarz.

KRYS: Yes.

Q: Whom I'm interviewing, by the way.

KRYS: Oh, really? Steve felt very strongly, and he was an expert. He spent an awful lot of time in India and, as you know, at one time, he was tagged to go to India. He was a driving force in that and a case could be made. On the other side of that, the Department was trying to do away with the numbers. If you remember, there was the reduction in how many deputy assistant secretaries you could have and so there was a drive in the other direction bureaucratically. I think it worked very well if you wanted to be a bureaucrat and say, "Look, at a time when you're trying to cut back on these things, this is not the time to create a bureau that doesn't need stand-alone attention." I think that when it came out of the White House, the moment had arrived and I think that was it, that South Asia was established as a separate bureau.

Q: That was when?

KRYS: This was in the first term of this [Clinton] administration.

Q: So we're talking about the '90s. In 1983 you're off to management operations?

KRYS: Yes, over the objections of personnel.

Q: You were there from when to when?

KRYS: A very short period of time. I was there from I think '83 to '84.

Q: How did this come about and why was personnel griping?

KRYS: There were a few people, good friends of ours today, who really felt that I was an administrative type and that if I really wanted to make a transition, I ought to go to the senior seminar and without that, how could I possibly aspire to anything else. I was assigned to the senior seminar. Mind you, I had graduated from the National War College in '77, and this is now '83, so I said "No, I don't think that's for me." I wanted [to go] somewhere else, and I'd rather be carrying a little bit different load, though I'm sure it

would be wonderful to go to the senior seminar. Tugging and pulling, I went to MMO as ultimately the deputy (almost instantly) to Will DuPree. Bob Miller was just moving out of it and I replaced Free Matthews.

Q: All of whom I've interviewed at one point or another. Could you tell me what MMO did in the Department and then what were your concerns?

KRYS: MMO really served as a major staff arm for the Under Secretary of State for Management, who was Richard Kennedy when I came in. Dick Kennedy was there for a brief period of time.

Actually I was supposed to have headed up security. I've forgotten all of this. For one solid day, I was the deputy Assistant Secretary for the Office of Security and had been appointed to that by Dick Kennedy. It was paneled by Joan Clark and then it was realized that Ronald Reagan had promised that job to the former head of the state troopers of the state of California. On Friday, I had a stream of security officers who came by to say that this was probably the best thing that had ever happened to them and by Monday there wasn't anyone in sight when they rescinded the assignment. They rescinded the assignment as though it never [existed].

What happened at that point was the head of the state troopers came in, took one look at what it was and what the pay was and said, "The hell with this, I'll go back to California. This isn't what I want to do." That was the end of that. There was this terribly long period of time where Bob Sayer sort of was and sort of wasn't, and sat down there. I've forgotten this fellow's name who was a security officer and was holding the fort but he really had no clout on the seventh floor. It went on, and on, and on until security became Diplomatic Security under Bob Lannon. It had a different life under the Inman Panel's recommendations.

I was that for a brief weekend [and] then I went to MMO. There was a change. Dick Kennedy left and a man came in for about a year or so. He was a businessman [from] Chicago and I can't remember his name. It is dreadful that senility is overcoming [me]. Anyway, he was the Under Secretary. I went in as MMO and did a few interesting things over and above the usual run of MMO [activities]. MMO's function at that time was to safeguard, to a very large degree, the balance between Foreign Service officers and various other communities overseas so that there was a balance, and an understanding of who's doing what overseas. This was a process that has been overtaken by NSDD-38, an executive order. It worked quite well until we overdid it in the Department. Does this ring any bells with you?

Q: Oh, yes.

KRYS: Glen Nays in effect ran this program. The program required the clearance of adding individuals from another agency to a post and within the various communities there were certain limitations. Without getting into too [much detail], certain communities could not exceed a given percentage worldwide.

Q: We're talking about people from various agencies including the Department of Defense, CIA, and everything else but in many ways probably this is where the rubber hits the road as far as real diplomacy. It is not between the Arabs and the Jews, it is between the State Department, the Pentagon, CIA, Treasury and all that.

KRYS: And it came to a grinding halt. Quite frankly, it has been attributed to one action on the part of Secretary Haig. He was still on the job when I first went to MMO, [but] we'll have to verify that. Secretary Haig had a situation where the Navy wanted to put a second attaché into Stockholm and the Department said, "No." His counterpart, I guess it was Weinberger at that point, was perfectly prepared to raise that matter at the next breakfast that they had once a week. Haig said he would be damned if he was going to waste his time talking about some god damn assistant naval attaché in Stockholm and they could have it if they wanted it. That has always been pointed to by those who were involved as the end of the ability of the Department of State to stop the other agencies from putting people in.

What happened was a real change in the way it was managed. Instead of being managed through the central control of Washington, the responsibility was put on the chief of mission to decline or accept additional personnel. It was then to be backed by the Secretary of State and ultimately to be taken, which is the NSDD-38 process today, to the national security advisor who'd take it to the President for the final decision, which is rubbish of course. Who is really going to take this all the way up to the President except a very strong Secretary of State, or strong Secretary of Defense, or strong head of an intelligence services, who is willing to take it to the President in an extreme situation probably over a broad number of such occasions. That was the end of that kind of control for the Department of State.

One of the things that Will DuPree and I worked on, and I must say through the assistance of the secretary, was the acquisition of more full-time equivalents which took the place of personnel slots in those years. FTE came into being. Will and I got this extraordinary number of additional FTE [full-time equivalent] for the Department.

Q: Could you explain what FTE is?

KRYS: It means that a full-time equivalent, instead of talking about personnel numbers, you talked about 40 hour tranches. A full-time equivalent would be either 40 hours which could occupy the time of one individual or 10 individuals working 40 hours over a given period of time or 2,010 hours over a given year. So you went to that kind of equivalency rather than a personnel number. It was another way for the bureaucracy to confuse the rank and file, among other things. It exists today. By now I think if everyone has caught on to FTE, it's probably time to move back to something [else], but that's the way it is.

We got the support of OMB, which as you know [controlled] whether we could go to Congress, and we came back with an extraordinary number, 1,000 FTE, over and above the limits that had been set for the Department of State. We decided these would be

broken out in a number of different ways. When I say we, I mean not our level but the Under Secretary, the Secretary and others. These would be broken out in a number of different ways. One of the things that we were hoping to do was to offset the enormous [and growing] number of people engaged in consular work and augment those positions at embassies with new political officers and new economic officers who would go out to the field without cost to the post. These would be gimmies. We would go out to the various ambassadors and say "We'd like to send you a political officer to be trained." What we got back was "Send me an assistant GSO."

Then there were those in the Department who decided this was a perfect time for spouses to go on the payroll. Before we knew it we had dissipated 1,000 FTE one way or another without any significant gain in reporting [or other] capabilities of the Foreign Service. I think this was a major mistake and an opportunity that we had which I don't think will be repeated in the foreseeable future. We added numbers, but we really didn't add to the substantive capabilities, the reporting capabilities. The drain continued from the reporting into security into consular work and into administrative support because that became the backbone operation.

Q: What were the pressures on you during this operation? Who was coming at you and saying do this, do that?

KRYS: I would say that it came out of the Under Secretary's office. We still had a very good process that was stumbling to a halt. Each year the Under Secretary for Management and the Under Secretary for Political Affairs would hold a huge meeting [at] pre-budget allocation time. This meeting was an inter-bureau meeting where each of the bureaus [had] already submitted their requests for personnel and money. It would go to the management operations office, and be massaged in conjunction with the office of finance. Recommendations would [then] be made to the Under Secretary.

The Under Secretary for Political Affairs the last time it ever happened was Larry Eagleburger and Ron Spiers, and perhaps other Under Secretaries would sit in. The bureaus would make their appeals [in defense] of the budgets that they submitted to the office of finance and to MMO. The discussions would go along the line of, how much money would you want to give to the Marshall Islands? How much would you go back to [the Department of the] Interior [for] and then where would you reallocate? Would you grant more positions to EUR than you've granted because you haven't fully understood the problems they face in emerging situations and so on. We were part of the preparations for that meeting, and it had some substance. Long was the Under Secretary for Political Affairs and attended those meetings. He didn't send special assistants. We were tasked by the Under Secretary for Management and were self-motivated as well. We were the management operation arm of the Under Secretary's office.

Q: Within our own Foreign Service, we keep batting about that the Department of State is just poorly managed. This is always the thing that we castigate ourselves with. You were at the guts of this, looking at it as an overall thing. What was your feeling about that period?

KRYS: I would like to take your statement on because I think it is an important statement inasmuch as it is heard so often. I would ask you, compared to what and to whom? If you are talking about those who would like to manage it better, I would say I think I agree. We could have been managed far more effectively, far more efficiently but it's not a perfect world. There are different demands, both on the people involved and on the resources. I can't think of any organization that is going to be terribly well managed unless you promise them that in, let's take an arbitrary figure of five years, you will have this resource at your disposal and you will be given an opportunity to show whether your programs work or [not].

Each year you are facing not only a congressional committee, you are facing a committee that isn't your committee. You are the smallest portion on the House side of a very large pot of money with very diverse constituent interests because, as you know, the State Department's money, or the function 150 account, really comes out of the money for Commerce, State, Justice, the courts, and the prisons. Each year you'd go up there and you'd be talking to two different committees. One committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, was interested in the policy aspect, in what it is you were going to do that reflected some of the concerns of the constituents within the body of that particular committee back home. In other words if the congressman from New York is concerned about possibly putting a passport office somewhere in New York, that plays a part in it, or if he has a very large ethnic group [among] his or her [constituents], that played a part. Fair enough, that is the way the game is played.

Let's come back to how the game is played and how the State Department doesn't play the game very well. You have the House Foreign Affairs Committee which says we think that the State Department (let's leave the whole function 150 alone for the moment and talk only about State Department) has done a reasonably good job here, here, and here. They should cut a little bit here, but we also think they should put more money here. We don't want to get down to the point where we earmark because in those days earmarking was [by] far the exception.

Q: Could you explain what that is?

KRYS: Earmarking in effect is a congressional mandate that says we are going to give you two million dollars and this is what you must use it for. It is normally two million dollars that comes out of something else because they've already set a mark as to how much you're going to get overall. There wasn't that much by way of earmarking. There were a few organizations - the Asia [Foundation], for instance - that would be earmarked money whether you wanted to give it or not and in a particular year you were going to put the money there. At any rate, the House Foreign Affairs Committee had its priorities and its prerogatives and it said this is where we are going to go.

When you went over to the House subcommittee on finance dealing with foreign affairs, their priorities didn't necessarily match those of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and there was real tension between the two committees. If you had overplayed your

presentation on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, you were likely to hear about it when you went to testify before the people with the money, the appropriations people. You had different individuals and for most of that period of time, or at least leading into the early ‘80s, you had a very strong chairman who mandated a particular course of action within [his] own committee. That began to change in the ‘70s when a committee chairman could be rolled by [his own] committee.

In the ‘70s and before that, if you had a very strong Assistant Secretary for Administration whose command and control was very broad, he could just trot on up to the Hill and make sure that he and the chairman of the subcommittee on appropriations and his staff really got together and understood what needed to be done. You could count on two percent above or below the mark that you hoped for. It was a done deal.

Q: This was the relationship with John Rooney in particular.

KRYS: John Rooney and John Thomas in that particular time and even after John Rooney, his successor. With the fall of the absolute iron fist of the committee chairman, you couldn’t make those kinds of deals and you didn’t really have the opportunity, at least my experience was, because there was an inadequate amount of time that you could spend with the chairmen to make your case unless you traveled with them, and I did a bit of traveling with them. Part of that was the OMB control over what each of the executive agencies could say.

All of this is by way of saying how do you know whether you have good management if you don’t have something that says for the next number of years this is how you will approach the problem. You have made your case, it has been accepted by minds other than yours, and you are going to pursue that for a period of time and the funding will be there. We sought to get multiple year funding, as have others, and I think [the most] anyone has ever gotten is a couple of years, which is better than one by some large measure.

Our relationship with the Hill has continuously eroded over the years. We don’t know how to play it well. I will give you an example. When I was in MMO, I was able to establish an office on the Hill for the State Department. The way we got up on the Hill where space is very, very limited, was, we established a language program for those who would like to take early morning language. We also put someone in there who could handle passport applications and perhaps get some visas. We were the tiniest little thing [compared] to what the Defense Department had been doing for years. I went off to M, then I went overseas and when I came back, I discovered [that], in an economy move, we had closed down the language office on the Hill. It is going to be a very long time before we have a presence on the Hill. What a stupid thing to do. It cost absolutely nothing to have an office on the Hill [and] to have a State Department presence there on a day in and day out basis, and we closed it down after I left. Goofy, absolutely goofy.

How do we manage ourselves better? Everybody is an expert on this now and there are symposia being held at Georgetown. I attended one two weeks ago. Having been

involved in management, (and you know I didn't start out that way, I was put into it, but I'm part of it) my own view is to forget about what the cost of anything is and not approach the Hill on the basis of saying this is what we need to make the State Department run. In my own view, you sell it programmatically. You say this is the program and this is what it costs to do that program. If they want to look down the line, they will see that there are management costs but those are not a raison d'être in and of themselves. Those costs, that's what the program is all about. Consular Affairs has been doing this for a very long time. They've done it extremely effectively, and they have gotten their budgets off the Hill.

We've talked about the cost of diplomacy or public diplomacy and so on, but we haven't convincingly taken that from the top to the bottom and introduced it over three years where you get rid of the idea, gee, the computer systems don't work in the State Department and we really need this amount of money. I went through that. When I was the Assistant Secretary for Information Management, we'll come to that, I had a plan to get rid of every piece of equipment that we were paying all these maintenance costs on over a period of seven years. It should have been done over five years because they were obsolete then. I couldn't get it out of OMB. I couldn't get it out of the Department really, because we began opening posts in the former Soviet Union and we took 17 percent of the budget for information management and we opened the posts. That was the end of that. They are still grappling with the same problem today.

I may have used this example earlier in our conversation, but if you walk into the bank, make a deposit, and walk out the door, if the teller turned around and used an abacus to total up how much money you put in and then used a crank handle adding machine to add it into the days totals, that doesn't matter to you one bit as long as your balance is right and as long as your money is available to you when you need it. When you are dealing with Congress, they shouldn't begin to care about communications, and the truth of the matter is, they don't. By and large, if you're sitting at your terminal and the information is getting back slowly, but getting back, and they don't see that information [or] reporting, they don't care about it. But if you were to tell them that you can't function in that country because you don't have the tools, then you've made some case to show that it's more efficient. [That] is a very [strong] case. I'd like to talk for just a brief moment about efficiency of automation. I'm a great user of this kind of communications.

Q: You're pointing towards the computer.

KRYS: My word processor machine is on-line and it's on-line with the entire office; it's linked within the office. What's happened here is our officers are sitting in front of those screens instead of going out and doing their business because they are doing their own reports. It isn't because they don't have the secretarial assistance they need; it's just that they have become accustomed to doing it from college onward. I'm not sure about efficiencies and it may be faster transmitting from your desk back, but what are they missing while they're sitting at their desks?

Q: The question has been raised often about how the advent of the computer age is

supposed to make things much more efficient and yet you spend more time caressing the system than you do going out and doing your regular work.

KRYS: My point exactly. Where it really matters is where your regular work really means getting out from behind your desk. There aren't good reporting officers who spend the bulk of their time sitting at their desks because that is a different environment.

Q: Were there any other things in the management operation that you think we should cover?

KRYS: I'd like to touch on a number of things that came to our attention. How do you properly use secretarial assistance and what is the role of a secretary? How do you transition from where we were to where we are? This was a serious morale problem. The whole question of working a personnel system, this was perhaps more something I was concerned with than the system overall. Career counseling in the Foreign Service in my view is nonexistent. It also sets up situations where you are really open to all sorts of claims in the litigious society.

Stu, one day you are sitting in London as the consul general and your career is not over but they bring you back and you are the counselor for consular officers at the senior level. First of all, the training you had in personnel counseling probably consists of a half day or maybe a day of orientation. Secondly, you are dealing with a situation where the closer you get to the end of your two year assignment in personnel, the more you are in competition with the people you are counseling. That's just a very bad idea.

Here you get into the Foreign Service culture. I am not going to have someone counseling me who is a civil servant, has never served overseas, and doesn't know what the hell we're all about. That is rubbish. If they are professionals, a doctor who has not served in Bujumbura can clearly understand the illnesses there. Maybe they don't feel it to the same degree but they are going to clearly understand the needs at post because they are intelligent people. But more importantly some will have a rational approach to overall counseling of individuals who need more counseling than just career assignments.

Q: And they've been there a long time. Personnel is usually considered a good assignment. It is probably the only bureaucracy anywhere where personnel is considered a good assignment because it helps you get on anywhere else; it's off to one side.

KRYS: What's inherent in what you just said is what I was saying earlier. It means that you can pick out an assignment you're not going to give someone else because you are going to take that assignment and that's not the way it should be.

Q: Absolutely. I speak as someone who served in Personnel as a counseling officer.

KRYS: [As] did I. When were you there?

Q: I was there '67-'68.

KRYS: I came in in ‘69. We did cover this I know. I couldn’t get out of it but I was there through three different systems. I enjoyed the assignment for the first two-and-a-half or three years.

Q: It’s fascinating, but it’s too fascinating because it’s part of favoritism within the Foreign Service, which makes it dangerous. What you really need is some sort of solid bureaucrat who’s going to do the best for the system and not allow favoritism.

KRYS: There was a time when you had a decentralized personnel system where a lot of the counseling was done by people who were not Foreign Service people. Joan Clark’s assistant, I can’t remember her name, had been in EUR for years and years and she really knew what every post needed. It requires counseling with knowledge.

Q: Back to the time that you were in management; was there any effort done to do anything about this or was this just a given?

KRYS: No, there was nothing done about it. There was talk. There was a lot of talk about how to work with secretaries. As an inspector in 1977 to the end of 1978 the thing that I saw, and I saw every time I went to a post, was secretaries who were unhappy, not unhappy because they were overworked, [but because] they didn’t feel that they had a specific sense of mission and purpose. It wasn’t well defined and they weren’t called on sufficiently. They just felt they were sitting there until 4:30 in the afternoon when someone came in with a report that they could have brought in two hours, four hours before that. Those were the things that we looked at. In other words, we worked across the board with personnel, with the office of finance, and with the other portions of management and acted as a liaison with the individual regional and functional bureaus.

What happened was I had a call from Ron Spiers in Pakistan. Ron and I go back to London days in the mid-’60s. He said this was his first phone call after having been advised by Secretary Shultz that based on his conversations with Ron when he was in Islamabad and all those ideas that Ron had put out [on] management improvement, he was making Ron Under Secretary. Ron wanted to know what job I wanted in his bureaucracy within reason. I think he was thinking of Assistant Secretary for Administration. I really thought that given the fact that he had not been involved in management, if he was agreeable, I would like to be his executive assistant and work with him and work with the others, which I did.

Q: You did that from when to when?

KRYS: From the beginning of ‘84 until the middle of ‘85 when I went off to Trinidad as ambassador.

Q: In this ‘84 to ‘85 period, Ronald Reagan had been reelected, so there wasn’t any particular administration change. George Shultz was still Secretary of State. How did Ron Spiers operate during this time?

KRYS: His method of operation changed as he was in the job a very long time. He felt very strongly that he was guardian of the Foreign Service. He was a product of the Foreign Service and one of his major concerns was the burgeoning number of non-careerists who were being appointed ambassador. He found a year or two after I left (not because of my leaving but because time had gone on and the situation had been exacerbated), that he and John Whitehead were at loggerheads. John Whitehead had been the deputy secretary of State.

Q: He was from outside and was a political appointee.

KRYS: Yes. An extraordinary man. A very fine individual with an extraordinary history both in business at Goldman Sachs and with charitable institutions [like] the [Boy] Scouts and with other things that he did. He came in as the deputy, replacing a colleague of George Shultz's from the University of Chicago who didn't do very well. Ron and he at first were able to divide the manner in which the Department would deal with the White House on appointments, but over a period of time it was very clear that Ron was pushing very hard and I think that was the first real bone of contention between the two and the situation worsened over a period.

Q: Were you there during part of the Whitehead period?

KRYS: Oh, yes, but it was at the very beginning of it, and this was not a real issue at that point. It became an issue later on.

Q: When Spiers came in, did he have an agenda?

KRYS: Yes. He started something called the management council and everyone you've interviewed was part of that management council. During that period of time it was Bill Harrop who was the inspector general for programs as it was called at the time, (it was a transition before Congress mandated someone from the outside), Steve Low was at FSI, and Bob Lamb was in A. I can go through them all. I also sat on the management council which I think probably raised a hackle or two. I was not an Assistant Secretary, obviously, but I was unusual. I guess the unusual thing was I would keep my mouth shut, but that's another story. The management council served to bring together the various elements of the management bureau where they were permitted to really talk across their own lines of jurisdiction, and that was very unusual. There wasn't a counterpart to that on the regional and functional sides outside of management.

We would go to the secretary's meeting and no one ever said, "Gee, what a lousy idea that is for policy in Europe at this moment." In the management council things were really brought before it, it was in Ron's office, and people talked about the issues that they themselves faced and what [faced] management overall. There would be an agenda, and there would really be some conversation about a particular problem. I think we met more than once a week, but it was certainly once a week. It was a free-for-all, and it was pretty good. It always remained within certain confines but people did speak their views.

If nothing else, if they didn't speak them there, they were exposed to something that if they felt threatened, they were going to follow up in one way or another. I thought it was a very good idea. At that time, you still had the overall meeting once a year that I described earlier with the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, and so on.

I think Ron's agenda was to ensure that people who ran missions were not only very good on policy, but [on] management. He also wanted to ensure that the Service had individuals across the board who, if you were a consular officer, there was no reason you couldn't aspire to be a DCM and an ambassador. It is one of the things that I played some small role in order to really see this come to fruition where people who were not political officers would be 90 percent of the ambassadors, you had to institutionalize it so that you started down the line where a consular officer came back and was a desk officer. I and Ron thought that if it didn't start there, what you would have is a passing phase. But if it did start at the bottom and people were brought along and demonstrated their talents, there was a really good chance it would be institutionalized and become a part of the system. I think to a very large degree that is true.

It has always been interesting if you ask chiefs of mission (and I would sit in when Ron met with every chief of mission) that came through there, both career and non-career would describe for instance that their consul general wrote a lot better than some of their political counselors wrote. They were surprised because there were very few opportunities for that to happen. The one thing that was absolutely clear to me and I think anyone else who has been involved in management, is that people coming in were drawn from the same pool. They were educated at essentially the [same] level, they had the same life experiences and if given the opportunity, they could develop and broaden that.

Personnel went through a number of permutations on how to handle this: whether there should be a cone system or [not]; how the targeting was done for recruitment. We discovered some interesting anomalies. The projections on attrition for each of the various cones always mandated a substantial intake of political officers compared to others which was interesting because they were always just right about on target. We only discovered that they painted the following years so that they couldn't possibly not be on target. In other words, if they said 75 political officers will be retiring across the board in various ways the next year, they [only] said that after the 75 or 73 had retired, so that they were right on target. We tried to work with a number. Some of those things go more slowly than others.

Ron, of course, had very broad interests on the political-military side of things and he really wanted to be a manager who [got] into all aspects of management. That was [a] real positive, [but] there was a real negative for him in some of that, too. Part of it also is that when you have that span of control, not everyone is as good as everyone else and you get let down, you get a little surprised. One of the seventh floor experiences that I think every person up there has found is that the material that comes up to the seventh floor is at times appalling, poorly put together. That is a real seventh floor special assistants experience. It also leads to things like SS becoming such a pain in the neck that nobody

can tolerate them because they start playing with words.

Q: SS being the executive secretariat.

KRYS: Yes. Substance gets lost and they worry about commas and run-on sentences. What drives that is that the secretary one time may see a piece of paper that really isn't very good and may say "What the hell are you sending this to me for? It's not ready." It is true. Material that very often comes up, too often, is just not put together as well as it should be, given the people putting it together.

Q: You're talking really not about what we would call substance but about...

KRYS: The ability to convey that substance, and that sways people.

Q: There's nothing like submitting a resume in which you misspell Philadelphia.

KRYS: That's exactly right. That's the only thing your eye catches, but that's human nature.

Q: In management, one of the problems is that it's a bureaucracy; this is the way we've always done it. It tends to continue on the present course, and it's difficult to turn it around. Did you find that with a new broom coming in, both with the Secretary of State, who was management inclined, and Ron Spiers, who was an old hand who had ideas, you were fighting a bureaucracy?

KRYS: I think so but you don't really see the tussle at the seventh floor as you might at the sixth and fifth floors because it is smoothed out by the time it gets there. When you are sitting as let's say acting Under Secretary that's one thing because you're not going to change anything but when you see the material coming to the Under Secretary, you realize that each of the various offices has its own constituency, its own bureaucracy. You can't have an Assistant Secretary for very long who's battling his own people constantly so there are accommodations before it ever gets up to the seventh floor. Sometimes the accommodation isn't acceptable and that is very hard on the Assistant Secretary. Particularly on the management side, those who have been in management for a long time are really good at being able to take a point of view and bring it to you in a way that you just can't see another course of action even if it is status quo. It just sounds so much better as it's been presented. There were a number of those kinds of operators.

Q: From this particular perspective, can you give an idea of your impression of the various bureaus, functional and regional? I don't mean necessarily ranking them, but ones that stood out and ones that didn't seem to be quite as strong.

KRYS: So much really depends on the focus on a particular part of the world or an aspect like counternarcotics. If the Assistant Secretary is doing a decent job, he or she becomes heroic because a decent job under some circumstances really seems heroic. What I can tell you [is] my own impression of some of the people involved and some of the bureaus.

EUR is the more suave, overstaffed, overfunded bureau. Thing are going to get done in a particular way, and it is going to have a different sheen and polish. It was the most polished bureau, and it did absorb a very large amount of money. Then again, it costs a lot to operate in Switzerland. NEA saw itself, and I thought appropriately (here you have a totally biased view) as being able to operate with less and not wanting to operate with more even when perhaps at times they should have sought more. You had different management styles.

In the African Bureau, management style was to pour resources into administrative support because the posts were so hard to live in. Sometimes it was overdone. I don't want to single them out, but there were rare instances where the concern for the quality of the individual's life had changed dramatically over the years and it [got] too high a priority and getting the work done wasn't as high a priority. Actually I saw that as an inspector. In one very large post where there were no generators except one coming from one of the communications centers, they had strung extension cords. Every house had electricity to make sure the refrigerators kept the food cold, and I understand that, but the embassy was down for weeks with one light and no electric typewriters except the ambassador's secretary's electric typewriter. Instead of just raising bloody hell and saying "Fly in an emergency generator for us," they kept going. This was a major post. It would drive me crazy. The other side of that is, life was terribly, terribly hard there.

What got lost in all of that [was the tradition of] Foreign Service officers going to live that kind of life because they wanted to concentrate on that part of the world where life was like that. We had one or two officers in NEA, and they were stars in other respects, who would take their leave in the country and travel into the desert somewhere and eat with Bedouin tribes. They were wonderful. They'd come back, and they really knew what was going on in the country. It was a very different existence.

I will give you one quick example because we are almost out of time for this one. Having served five years in England, we went to Yugoslavia and I went through Serbo-Croatian training. Did we discuss this once?

Q: I think we probably did, but I'm not sure about the point you're making.

KRYS: The language, the first class?

Q: No.

KRYS: You took Serbian?

Q: Oh, yes.

KRYS: I remember that one of the first lessons was in English; you go into the hotel room and you go into the bathroom and you say, "The toilet is dirty." "Depakio ya pria," I think was the phrase. Going from NEA to MMO, there were a few weeks and I asked if I could take a little French to brush up because I destroyed my French with my Serbian

and never really recovered it. I was so struck because this was the first time I'd taken French at FSI. The first lesson was a rendezvous with Joacquim in the courtyard of a hotel where you ask for the different foods. I thought, that tells me everything. That tells you where you are going when they teach you the essentials in the very first lessons of the language.

Q: I remember I went on a trip with Bill Dias. I think he was ambassador to the Netherlands. Bill at that time was a rather prissy bachelor. We were in a hotel in eastern Macedonia and I heard him scream, "There is a turd in my toilet."

KRYS: And you said "Yes?"

Q: We've got to stop at this point. Is there anything else we should cover during the period working as the executive secretary to management?

KRYS: May I give that a little bit of thought? I am going to prepare a little better for the next one because now as we get a little bit closer to the present it should come easier.

Q: We'll put this on here that we've talked on the management side about the various bureaus and how they responded, the problems of getting better counseling and some other aspects. We'll pick it up then.

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Today is March 23, 1998. Sheldon, you're in Management. Can I get the dates when you were in Management again?

KRYS: I was the principal deputy in MMO for a very brief period of time from '83 to '84. I left NEA/EX and the personnel system wanted to send me off to the senior seminar because otherwise I was threatened with being an administrative officer the rest of my days. You know what kind of hellish punishment that would be, considering, of course, that I had been an administrative officer once in my career. Despite that and because I had been to the War College so recently, I didn't think that the senior seminar was something I wanted to do. I was offered the job in MMO. I succeeded Free Matthews, Jr., in that job. Will DuPree was just moving in to head that up.

I think we did some very exciting things, [but] not all of the things that one might have achieved because of the brevity of that assignment. The exciting thing that we did is, in [the] face of a dramatically declining number of people that we were sending over, particularly into reporting jobs, Will and I drew up a package [and] with the backing of the Under Secretary for Management, we received 1,000, FTE, full-time equivalent positions. That is an extraordinary amount. I will tell you that is the highlight of it. When I say 1,000 I always have to go back and check because it seems so outlandishly large.

Q: How do you get 1,000? That's real employees then?

KRYS: That's full-time equivalent. You could have 4,000 employees out of that. I wonder if it was 100? I'll check the figures. The point was that our concept was that we would send first tour reporting officers, political, economic, commercial and others, out to the field at no cost to the post, because while our [total] numbers had not declined significantly, there had been a major shift in the direction of consular officers and a significant decline in reporting officers overseas. We were concerned that the *State Department officers* (and you can put that in italics and underline them) were not really keeping up with what we saw as the workload in '83.

We then canvassed all of our ambassadors worldwide and said we are willing to give you central complement like in the old days, officers to do reporting. We received replies, and on the order of 70 or 75 percent said, "No, what we really want are assistant GSOs and what we really want are people in administrative support." It absolutely destroyed the idea that we had in hand.

To compound that, we got into whether we shouldn't hire people locally, FSNs but Americans, into quasi professional positions in consular affairs and whether we shouldn't reward spouses who were working without pay and put them on the payroll, and on, and on, and on. It dissipated the positions, and they [were] somehow just lost. Have you done an interview with Will DuPree?

Q: Yes, I have.

KRYS: Does he talk about this?

Q: I can't remember.

KRYS: If you have it, if you can sort of tag where that is, let's compare notes on that. Will was one of those who frankly favored using the [positions], for instance, for unpaid spouses. That was sort of the highlight of my brief stint there.

We also saw something from the past which we're paying the price of now but in a way the Department was to blame. In those days, the control of all other agency positions resided within MMO, and we had a system that not only said how many of a particular agency or agencies would go overseas but where they would go. We micromanaged that to the point where [when] Al Haig was the Secretary of State, the question arose as to whether the State Department would permit an assistant naval attaché to go to Sweden and he was to take that up with the Secretary of Defense. Al Haig's reply was, "If you think I am going to waste my time with the Secretary of Defense to talk about an assistant naval attaché position, you're wrong." That was the end of that process. NSDD-38 really came into play and that's a failed system, as we all know.

Q: NSDD-38 meant what?

KRYS: NSDD-38 is the national security directive which defines how an ambassador can control the numbers, up or down, at his or her mission. While you had central control

before and you really had to fight the State Department, it now put the argument on the shoulders not only of the chief of mission but on the relevant Assistant Secretary to go and fight the battle with the head of the other agency. As you and I both know, assistant secretaries of State have a number of fish to fry with any given agency and if you have to rely on them, first of all you have to convince them of your argument and secondly you then have to have that person go forward and do battle. It doesn't work. It doesn't work now and it didn't work then.

Q: I'm ambassador to Sweden and I say, "No, I will not have an assistant naval attaché, period." What happens?

KRYS: In this case, what happened in those days was that the Department of Defense would appeal and say we have x number of positions to put around the world and this is where we choose to put them. The harder part really wasn't just fending off people but you were under a mandate over the intervening years to reduce your numbers and it was where you came to reduce your numbers that you had a bigger fight. That was a fight before this process failed, but it was an extraordinary fight. You really had to line up the State Department before you could cut a position. It flies right in the face of chief of mission's authority, as you know.

What you ended up doing was setting conditions for the addition of that person. You would say, "It's going to cost us an additional car and another FSN and you're going to have to fund this." Of course, for these major agencies like Commerce and Defense, being overseas was sort of the jewel in the crown and they were far more willing to provide this kind of support, as it amounted to a piddling sum against their budget. That's how you [got] these imbalances. Of course, not every ambassador feels the same way. One ambassador at a post will say this and then the next ambassador will say that bigger the better. This is the process that failed and there is still some notion as to how many are at a particular post which still resides in the management staff but it has no effect. It is a serious failure.

Q: Of course it is. Shall we move on?

KRYS: I can tell you how I moved on after such a brief period of time. When Ron Spiers was ambassador in Pakistan, I received a phone call. George Shultz had just gone out there and Ron had talked to him about things that could be improved in management. George Shultz did the natural thing and said, "Fine, you come back and be Under Secretary for Management."

He told me I was the first person he called and [asked], "What do you want to do, any job you want within reason." The job that I really wanted was to work as his executive assistant because quite frankly I thought I could do more [there]. He really did not have any experience in management other than managing the bureau and managing embassies. In terms of having been steeped in it as executive director for four and a half years, I went to the front office of M really for one year and that's how I ended up in that position working with someone I have the highest regard for. He proved his determination on

behalf of the Foreign Service perhaps to his own detriment at least within the context of onward assignment to another major post in his fight particularly with regard to the numbers of political appointees and to the posts to which they would go.

Q: Why don't we break this into a few things? First, could you talk about how Ron Spiers saw the job when he arrived? What year are we talking about?

KRYS: '84.

Q: Can you talk about how he came in? I assume you two talked and he set out a set of priorities. How did he go about that and how did he use you?

KRYS: From my perspective, there were those who thought that I was a little more up front than some of my predecessors, although I'm not sure that's true. I think each of the executive assistants in that job have played a role in the movement of paper, if not in the creation of ideas.

Ron's concept was to form a management council and that was really a major step forward. What he wanted was to bring back together the two major parts of this. You had two sides of an organization which did not really communicate and that would be M and P, the political side. Larry Eagleburger was P. The management council consisted of the assistant secretaries for those bureaus within M so you had the inspector general, Bill Harrop at that time, administration, finance, the Foreign Service Institute, the director general which is personnel among other things, and the medical division was part of that though it sort of stood alone at that moment. I've missed something here. At any rate, almost all of these bureaus with the exception of finance and administration were headed by political or economic officers who had come up through the ranks. The director general was Roy Atherton or, if not, is was Roy shortly thereafter.

Q: Was Barbara Watson back in?

KRYS: No. You've really jumped a few years there. It was after Barbara Watson's second return but before Betty Tempo.

Q: I think of Diego Asencio.

KRYS: It wasn't Diego at that moment. We'll fill that blank in. At any rate it was very interesting. We would have meetings where you really had a set agenda and of course I was brought to the meetings which consisted of the assistant secretaries, the Under Secretary and myself. There was a very free exchange of ideas on how to bring the policy side into every consideration when you dealt with management. [This was] as opposed to drawing up a budget and having what each of the regional bureaus would tell you and what some of the functional bureaus would tell you and then parse it through the office of finance.

In the past, there had been a meeting which was chaired by the Under Secretary for

Political Affairs and the Under Secretary for Management after the first cut of the budget. The assistant secretaries would come up and make their presentations as to the budget number they had been given, and you had to work it from there. Even with Larry, who, of course, had been involved in management, it was very hard to get him there. It was always hard to get the Under Secretary for Political Affairs but Larry was the best of the bunch and did attend these meetings. Decisions were made.

At that time, one of the major discussions was the negotiation in the South Pacific [on] how the islands might be subsidized. It involved questions of the Department of the Interior because of their status, whether the people can go on relief, what the settlement was, and there was negotiation [that went] on, and on. How did you fit that in our budget and how did you keep it out of our budget? So it wasn't just a budget matter, it was a political matter in negotiating with the islanders themselves and at the same time negotiating with other agencies around town and whether it was sensible to do that. Of course P and the regional assistant secretaries reporting to P, gave you a more consolidated view as to how you prioritized the amounts of money that might be available. Shifts of money did take place as a result of that.

You also had a more comprehensive view of what management was trying to do [by] those who were not involved in management. Perhaps it would have succeeded had it been carried into future years. With regard to our communications systems and a few other things that are being dealt with now, the present leadership can't believe that we are in the situation we are in. They ought to look back a few years. There were proposals made that weren't funded. That was a different era in management. Ron had a very difficult time.

Q: George Shultz by this time was Secretary. Looking back, he was probably the only real manager we've ever had. Did his hand show there?

KRYS: Absolutely. Obviously the assistant secretaries involved attended some of the secretary's meetings but it reached a point where Shultz met with us as a group, the M group, and listened to what management had to say in I think a more concentrated form than the secretary's meeting. The secretary's meetings tended to be around the table [with] three minutes or less per person. He was very interested, he was very knowledgeable, and he was extraordinarily supportive in one major regard; that was the creation of [the] Foreign Service Institute [building]. Without George Shultz this would not have happened.

He was an extraordinary manager. He really was an extraordinary leader. As you know he was rather stoic. Nonetheless, it was very clear where he wanted to go, [and] what his interests were. I came back as an Assistant Secretary under him after I left Trinidad as ambassador, and I think year by year he came to have an extraordinary appreciation (I think I've used extraordinary about six times in this sentence with regard to George Shultz) of the Foreign Service and what it does. His farewell is a scene to be remembered where the under secretaries and the assistant secretaries bade him farewell. That will come sequentially a little later.

He really took an interest, and he really acted on those interests. I drafted a letter, and I don't know if I have a copy or not but it's probably in the archives, where in arguing with OMB and the President when they were going to cut us so dramatically, said he would not oversee the demise of the Foreign Service. He single-handedly weighed in on that issue because he thought we were going down to numbers and to amounts of money with which we could not survive. That has not been done since Madeleine Albright came in.

Q: What was his role in the Foreign Service Institute, or, as we now call it, the National Foreign Affairs Training Center?

KRYS: There was a lot of politics. As you know, it was a former [military facility called] Arlington Hall, and there were plans to use the property in other ways. These ranged all the way from commercial development because of its proximity to Washington and its value because of its size, to ensuring that it became a more public facility with recreation grounds, bike paths, and this sort of thing. The congressman from that district, Frank Wolfe, was very, very interested and had a big hand in this. The question was whether [State was] going to get the property before it was handed over either for commercial or public use. Public use could have also meant low-rent housing because there was something in the law that said if government property wasn't used for some period, it could be made into publicly subsidized housing.

George Shultz just went to bat from word one. Steve Low and then Brandon Grove who doesn't get the credit he should in all of this, did a remarkable job in keeping the momentum and in keeping the political forces both informed and ultimately won over to the creation of what was in the eyes of the people on the appropriations committee a very expensive venture. It turned out to be, but only in relative terms, relative to that day, not to this day.

Q: Of course, we were paying rather extraordinary rent in Arlington Towers.

KRYS: The recovery rate, because I then became Assistant Secretary of State for administration toward the end of this period of time when I came back from Trinidad, was something like seven to 12 years, something very, very brief. Any good businessman would have jumped out of his skin for it.

Q: I am interested because our quarters are now in the new Foreign Service Institute but it shows the State Department attitude. Did you find much support within the other parts of State (I'm talking about the political side, P, and other bureaus and all) for the FSI? I have a personal prejudice that it's not a very educationally oriented organization.

KRYS: You've got proof of that by the amount of money that we spend and the amount of time that we permit our people for training. The answer is no, but the answer is possibly also that I wasn't aware of it. [Still] I have never in my 30 some odd years really heard a clamor for some great initiative which might benefit the future of the Foreign Service. If that's too harsh a statement, I would like to hear the counter-argument. It

really does disturb me, and it disturbs others who have been involved in some of these decisions and taken a lot of heat for it. I was not on the front line of this and others did take heat. There were proposals to do away with the project before it came to fruition because of the budget. I think that Secretary Baker came in to play at the end, but I'm not sure he was an enthusiastic supporter. I think he was a supporter.

Q: Were there any other initiatives during this year that you were involved that particularly strike you?

KRYS: Yes. I think one of the hallmarks of what Ron Spiers attempted to do is something that now has a heading. I don't think we looked at it at the time as having a heading. That was to improve the conditions of life of the Foreign Service. The budget was not as bad as it subsequently became, and there were a lot of steps taken. There were a lot of quiet sessions, working directly and then indirectly, for instance, to increase allowances. I can give you small examples, but everything of this nature is cumulative in effect and things weren't looked at, except in isolation. People would go to more difficult posts and were only allowed one consumable shipment in their [assignment]. It was increased to two consumable shipments because after a period of time, particularly if you went from an 18 month tour to a two year tour, which was not uncommon, the consumables were gone.

A pet peeve for those who go out as chief of mission was permitting first class arrival and first class departure. The first time you [went] into post you flew in first class and when you departed post on your final departure from post, it was first class. You know, to this day, this wrankles a lot of people. It wrankles those who no longer have it if they are chief of mission [while] in the front of the airplane is the foreign minister and the chief of protocol. Somehow someone has to accommodate you so you can walk up through the front of the airplane if you don't fly in at least business class and I think that is now permitted, but that was not permitted for a while.

There were a lot of other things of that nature. It was an increase [in] allowances generally. It was a very long and hard look at how allowances were determined equitably so that the taxpayer didn't feel cheated. For instance, when there was a dramatic change in costs or a dramatic change in the wages of FSNs, it should not take six months to become effective. Attempts were made to shorten that gap and not to overpay but also to treat particularly Foreign Service nationals more fairly. In personnel efforts were made to speed up that change when the prices went up. All of us have experienced the fact that when the cost of living went down, those allowances were slashed very quickly and when they went up it took a long time.

Q: Did you get any feel for the relationship between Spiers and Shultz?

KRYS: The relationship between Spiers and Shultz was very good. John Whitehead was the deputy secretary of State a little bit later into this period and the relationship there, I think, was not as good. There were I think serious differences between them and a lot of it had to do with who went to the White House to represent non-career appointments to

chief of mission positions.

Q: Did you get involved at all in the appointment process?

KRYS: No, no. It would have been highly inappropriate.

Q: What about the charges of discrimination regarding women, minorities, that sort of thing? Did that get up to you?

KRYS: Everything that went to the Under Secretary got to me, but I have a feeling it was in this period of time, and again we ought to check some records here, that a survey was made about sexual harassment in the State Department. You probably know, from the time of the McCarthy era onward, particularly the male gender of the Foreign Service carried a certain little mark that Uncle Joe left behind. I don't know who they engaged to make this study, and it may have been someone internally. They set it up so that if someone thought someone of the other gender was looking inappropriately at them, that constituted an act of sexual harassment. It was in the press. The State Department men in particular were really a bunch of lechers under this formula and we just changed our entire image from limp-wristed individuals to predators. Fortunately, I think neither of those two [stereotypes] is true, but it really did change and it really was funny the sort of hits that we were getting. The State Department was a bunch of bad guys.

Q: We're up to '84 now?

KRYS: Yes, we're up to '84. We're really in-between '84 and '85.

Q: Was there anything else we should cover?

KRYS: I'll tell you as a bookmark here and I think I may have mentioned it as we began the other day, I think I had continued to suffer from sort of a closed attitude, given the jobs that I had in the Foreign Service, where I think I am probably going to review our sessions together and insert a number of more bluntly put statements.

Q: I think so and also details or questions I didn't ask.

KRYS: Some of the things that I've said will trigger other things.

Q: What happened at the end of '84?

KRYS: I should back up. I don't know if I mentioned to you that shortly before I was to leave the NEA bureau, I was called and asked if I wanted to be considered as ambassador to the United Arab Emirates. I don't know if I said that to you.

Q: No, I can't recall that.

KRYS: For security purposes, given my situation with Iran and also, I think, the fact that

I was Jewish entered into it, it was felt that maybe that was just a little too close to Iran. I think [it was] less of the latter [and] more of the former which really disturbed me because having been to that post, I would have loved to have gone to UAE. I really don't think there was that much danger unless the Iranians really got strange, and it's possible. That offer was, I think, [in] recognition of the work with the hostage crisis for which I'd been amply rewarded both in the work and subsequently.

It was then proposed that I would be ambassador to Trinidad and Tobago. We're talking about 1981-82 or it could have even been a little later than that, because the post may not have opened, but it was early in the Reagan administration. The word came back there would be no career ambassadors in the Caribbean so that was the end of that. In 1985, my name was on the list, and I think I was the Department's candidate, to go to Iceland. The ambassador who had been the governor of the Virgin Islands and representative in the House, Melvin Evans, died. He had gone back to the Virgin Islands for one of his children's wedding and he died. As I learned subsequently, he had been quite ill even during his tenure as ambassador.

Q: This is in Iceland?

KRYS: No. This was the ambassador to Trinidad and Tobago. The man who went [instead of me]. By then [my name] was at the White House for Iceland and I think Iceland didn't go to a non-careerist, but it went to someone who had been very involved with White House work, and I was named ambassador to Trinidad and Tobago. [It seemed that] fate would have it that I would go to Trinidad and Tobago. I guess I was asked in January of '85. I prepared the papers and went through the clearance process in record time, in five weeks. My father had died in '84 when I was on a mission to Sri Lanka. We can talk about that if you want or I can put it in later now that I've said it. The mission [was] for Larry Eagleburger [and] P even though I was in M. I had hoped that before my mother moved to the West Coast to Portland, Oregon, [after] my father died (and she was alone in a big house here in Washington), she would be able to come to the swearing in. The long and the short of it is, I zipped right through my hearing and then I was [held up] on a list with, I think, 26 others while Melissa Wells fought her way to Mozambique.

Q: What was the problem with Melissa Wells?

KRYS: I don't know all of the problems, but after something like four or five months, we were finally freed, as I put it, when *The Washington Post* wrote an editorial "Free the State Department 27." My mother went to the West Coast and it was not good to bring her back, so that was the penalty there. I was sworn in without my mother and sister being present.

Q: Before we do that, you might as well get it chronologically. What were you doing in Sri Lanka?

KRYS: It was very interesting, for me anyway, [but] I'll let others be the judge of that. I

had a call from Larry Eagleburger one day and he said I know you're all finished with the Middle East. [Actually], from time to time, I wasn't because I would be sent into Beirut after the bombings even though I was already in M. He said the Israelis wanted to establish an interest section in the United States embassy in Colombo and the bureaucracy wasn't moving very quickly. He wanted to know if I would go there and negotiate it with the Sri Lankans.

I first went up to New York to the United Nations because their foreign minister was there. Bear in mind that the overriding concern for Sri Lanka was that [it] sells the vast majority of [its] tea to the Near East and [allowing an Israeli interests section] could threaten [its] market. I met with their foreign minister, then I went to Sri Lanka and negotiated with the host government for the establishment of an interest section in our embassy in Colombo for the Israelis.

While I was there, an American AID contract couple - mind you, I was only there less than a week - was kidnaped by Tamil rebels up near Kandy. I worked with the Sri Lankan minister of justice or interior, an extraordinarily bright young man, and together we negotiated [freeing] the couple within the week. So I had a doubleheader.

Q: As long as you were there, you were considered "Mister Hostage.

KRYS: Right. I can assure you that I played a very modest role because something went on there that probably would never happen again and will never happen again in that country. The tack that we took, based on what the minister thought, was right on. He actually shamed them into the release. The taking of a foreigner in this culture was at that time outside the line for all of them. I don't think today that would obtain. We negotiated their release without paying them. A well-known detective agency went out there and the guy just sat on his hands because there was nothing he could do.

This was in May of 1984 and I was to fly to Israel where the Israeli government was going to thank me for my efforts. I landed in Israel and Bill Brown who was the DCM met me at the airport. He said my father [was] taken extremely ill. As it turned out, my father died that next week. I got back on an airplane the following morning, and that was the end of that trip.

Q: I don't quite understand the politics of the interest section. What was in it for the United States to get involved in this?

KRYS: That's a very good question. I'm not sure I know what the answer is, except perhaps that we were pushing the idea of having Israel [represented] beyond its own sphere. I'm not sure if they ever established formal diplomatic relations after that or not. I think [there was more] in it for the Sri Lankan government than for the American government, so it was kind of a win-win situation. But I'm not sure if it ended up that way because I think there were other matters that I can't get into.

Q: Before we get to Trinidad, you mentioned you made a couple of trips to Beirut while

you were in M.

KRYS: The last bombing was while I was in M.

Q: Which bombing was that?

KRYS: This is the second embassy bombing. There were three bombings as you know: the embassy, the Marine barracks, and then the embassy when it had moved into what was supposed to have been a secure area.

Q: Was this when Bob Dylan was there?

KRYS: No, Bob was the first time. This was Reggie Bartholomew.

Q: You are making a gesture about Mr. Bartholomew and it's not complimentary.

KRYS: No it's not complimentary.

Q: A difficult person.

KRYS: A difficult person. It was a horror. I was there by that night [maybe] within [a] 12 hour period. The first one was terrible and I was there within 24 hours but the second one was in many ways even worse. We jumped on an airplane - Larry Eagleburger, the head of AID, and a USIA representative. We flew out there and witnessed what was in some ways a gorier scene than the first bombing. Gorier because the building that had been used as the embassy was down a small road and built into the side of the hill. When the bomb went through [where] the barrier [was supposed to be] and went off in front of the embassy, the shock wave not only went through the building, but then it came back out and people were shredded with the glass. Rooms were just gory beyond belief. All of the bodies hadn't even been recovered when I got there. I had known a number of the Foreign Service nationals from my years in NEA when I had gone there, including the man who acted as my bodyguard. [He] was killed at that one, too. I had been there for the first bombing, and I guess we must have touched on this.

Q: What were you there to do?

KRYS: Aid and comfort, to see whether some people should come out if they wanted to, and to make sure that whatever should be done when we got back to Washington got done. For instance, we arranged for a Foreign Service national who was blinded to go to the Philadelphia Eye Hospital with an escort. Things of this nature. Things that were not in the book, and people who were out there [couldn't because they] were in shock themselves.

Q: You really needed somebody who could say, "We will do this," and take it on and just get it done rather than going through why we can't do this sort of thing.

KRYS: Exactly that. Precisely that and that is the role that I played when I was in NEA/X as well. Today it would probably be almost impossible to do because of all sorts of rules, regulations, whistle blowers and all sorts of things.

Q: Were you involved in asking, "What the hell are we keeping an embassy there for?"

KRYS: Yes, but I was involved in that from the time that I was in NEA/X and then when I was in DS. I can tell you it was bitter and it became very personal on the part of some people, particularly when I was in DS and closed down Beirut where we had something like 300 and some odd bodyguards guarding about 11 people. I'll check those numbers. There was no purpose, [as] they couldn't get out of their bunkers.

Q: What was the rationale for staying?

KRYS: Support of the local government such as it was. This is a standard argument whenever you get into evacuations: what signal are we sending to the host country by way of confidence? My reply used to be, "What signal will you send when an American is taken, murdered in the streets, and his or her body dragged through the streets?" Of course, there was even an ambassador later on who took this very, very personally. I think he has gotten over it.

Q: We'll go back to Trinidad and Tobago.

KRYS: There were good times in Trinidad and Tobago.

Q: Before you went out to Trinidad, did you have anything that you were putting in your mental attaché case as far as what you wanted to do? What was the situation there and what were American interests?

KRYS: We had two major interests at the time of my arrival. One was that Trinidad and Tobago was a member of the United Nations Security Council and the other was, of course, we had major oil interests. If you look on one of those shelves over there, you'll see [that] in my time there, Amoco shipped the 500 millionth barrel of oil out. At one time, I am told, it shipped more oil on a daily basis to the United States than Saudi Arabia. It is not a tourist island. It sucks oil out of the same basin as Venezuela does because it is only 11 miles off the coast of Venezuela. It eschews tourism. The father of the country, Eric Williams, long ago decreed that service is servitude and since the per capita income in Trinidad rivals that of any developed nation in the world, there was no service. Tobago, which would be the tourist island when I left there, had something like 536 rooms available for tourism, but it has since changed. I think Madeleine Albright is going there in the next week or two. It was very different [then]. Oil was a major thing and the development of other business plus the fact that we sold Trinidad and Tobago all of its wheat.

Agriculture is very, very poor and difficult commodity locally grown and some of the traditional barriers were breaking down. The Indian population which when I arrived was

either on an equal footing or just slightly below the Afro-Trinidadian population, had traditionally been the farmers. That was breaking down. The Indian population was far more integrated [in] the cities but not with the other cultures. The population was about 44 percent African descent, [and] about 40 or 42 percent Indian descent. [The Indians] had come there as indentured servants after slavery had been abolished by the British in the 1840s. The rest was a mixture of Creole. There had been about two percent Chinese, and it was down to about one percent after a sort of black Muslim-style uprising years before. The population was changing.

Democracy was not changing; it was very solidly entrenched, but I wanted to see how we could move Trinidad and Tobago from what was essentially a parastatal economy to a more capitalist-style economy of private development.

Q: Why would the United States be interested in this change?

KRYS: Mainly because it wasn't helping the economy of Trinidad and Tobago very much. Trinidad and Tobago was a stabilizing force even though it disagreed with U.S. policy on many issues; it was adamantly opposed to the Grenada invasion for instance. Nonetheless, [the change] was in our interest, particularly at that time. Looking back, you see a much better picture today because of the number of countries that have gone away from parastatal economies; ultimately it weakens the state.

It is an oil fueled economy. During my tenure, the price of oil [was] at its highest, [and] per capita income was about $7,200 a year when I arrived. This made it the third highest per capita in the hemisphere (and it's fairly well distributed) after the United States and Canada, which says a great deal. Unfortunately because of the drop in oil prices it went down to $4,000 when I left, but it is still the third highest except for some of the offshore banking islands. The economy went through a difficult period of time.

The parastatal countries themselves saw they couldn't stay that way. In the heydays, they had built a steel refinery. That's brilliant but there is no iron ore, there so they were buying billet from Brazil and paying whatever Brazil wanted to charge for it. [That] was highly inefficient. The "tea kettle" oil refineries were just horribly inefficient. Amoco did not refine its petroleum, it shipped it out right out. You had Tesco just leaving there, and a big dispute. Texaco had diminished its holding. The reverse of all of that is true today, or mostly. Oil companies are going back in a big way. Gas has unlimited potential there. U.S. investment is much heavier, and I think I started the process.

Q: How does one start the process? You were the American ambassador in a state where at least Eric Williams had set the tone and was a very difficult person, particularly difficult towards the United States.

KRYS: He had a love-hate relationship with United States. First [I was] not dealing with Eric Williams. When I arrived, George Chambers was his successor. [He] wanted to follow in his footsteps, but the economy wasn't going well. They began to realize the excessive over-employment in these parastatal organizations was really becoming a drag.

Then for the first time in the history of the country, the ruling party lost an election. The man who had been deputy to Eric Williams was banished to Tobago from whence he had come because Eric Williams in his later stages of life certainly took care of those he thought were not going to be his friend. He was a lawyer, ANR Robinson was his name.

I called on him within the first two or three weeks of banishment in Tobago, and we established a rapport. What you really talk about is what's good for [their] country that is also good for our country. For instance, how do we hook up so that you have economic development? You are not going to get foreign investment in here if it is just going to go down a rat hole. Just look at what is going on in your own country. I am not going to tell you how to change this, but I'll make suggestions as to what sectors might benefit from privatization and the first one would be [the] oil refinery and [gas stations]. Privatization doesn't mean you are giving something to the Americans, it means you're going to sell something at a profit, or try to. Today the concept is everywhere. Privatize telecommunications and what do you get out of that? These things were unheard of back in 1985. That's how you start. You talk honestly and frankly. You also talk about an impending narcotics threat which fell substantially on deaf ears at that time. Trinidad and Tobago was a transshipment point and today it is a major problem for them. The crime rate has just gone up much higher than they ever anticipated.

You speak frankly, you speak honestly, you speak constantly, and you speak privately. The biggest thing that I had was I think access and a sense that people knew that what I told them was what I believed. Also when I made a demarche that dealt on principals that were absolutely contrary to what they could accommodate, I would state as I would in a report that I understand what their principals are. The question of apartheid comes to mind, [where I stated] the reasons [why] the Reagan policy is this on apartheid at this time.

Q: Why would there have been a problem with the Reagan position on apartheid with Trinidad and Tobago?

KRYS: Because of the approach that we took officially. We had our ambassador to the United Nations come down there to make [the] case himself. [For them], there was no [acceptable] policy short of full boycott and elimination of apartheid through whatever means necessary.

Q: Our policy being constructive engagement wasn't it?

KRYS: That's right. Ours was to ensure that we [can] continue to talk to the government of South Africa and move them in the direction that would eliminate apartheid. As you remember, Maggie Thatcher, the prime minister of England, had a rough session with the Commonwealth [at] that time.

Q: Did you have a lot of frank discussions about how to deal with South Africa? Was this on the agenda at formal and informal sessions with the people there?

KRYS: I don't want to get into formal sessions between our country and Trinidad and Tobago, even now; let others do that. The answer, of course, was yes, it was on the agenda, but it wasn't a constant lobbying on my part on behalf of the United States government. We were not [so] instructed, and it was not one of those areas where you can tell the leadership of a country that our principals must override your principals because it doesn't happen and it doesn't matter what is said back to you, it isn't going to happen.

Q: You were there from '85 to when?

KRYS: '88. I was there three years short two months.

Q: What about what was happening in Central America? Trinidad and Tobago was within earshot of what was happening there. How did that play out?

KRYS: I think there was distrust as to what our policy was in Central America and we didn't get the support in some areas like Panama, that we wanted. I think there was distrust. If you look at the makeup of the parties irrespective of party, the People's National Movement, which had been in power for 25 years, or Robinson's coalition that came into being, you have a social democratic government. When you represent the largest most powerful nation, particularly in that region, I think that's a [limit on expressing] what the interests of the Untied States are. Nonetheless you make the case and you do point out that just because you're large, you're dealing with someone that's bad and it's against your interests as well. It just may not seem that way at the moment but these are the reasons. Sometimes we won their support. Trinidad and Tobago particularly with regard to the United Nations, tended to abstain more than vote yes or no. In some instances, that was good enough for us and in some instances we expected them to support us.

Q: Was there any other country where there was more a meeting of the minds like Canada, or, I'm just trying to think of some other country?

KRYS: You mean between Trinidad and Tobago?

Q: Between Trinidad and Tobago where they would use somebody else to show that they weren't subordinate to the United States, was this a problem?

KRYS: You've framed a very interesting question which is so complex I would really almost want to take the issue and apply it against that. The Canadians had a much more benign presence in a place like Trinidad and Tobago than the United States. The Canadian high commission with whom I worked very closely had an awful lot to [offer] to the citizenry of Trinidad and Tobago. Their schools were much cheaper than ours, [and] their higher education system was certainly admired because the public school system both in the English and in the American sense in Trinidad and Tobago was very good. The literacy rate was about 97 percent. [That is] higher than in the United States. The Canadian high commissioner was certainly seen with a less prejudicial eye; nonetheless the American government is the power in the region. About 90 percent of the population

in Trinidad and Tobago has a relative in the United States. The big dishes in the back of the properties that people owned were tuned to American television.

Q: We're talking about antennae...

KRYS: Huge antennae and this is before cable really came into being and if they could catch the [signal] they did. They watched American television and Miami was the port of call. American schools were just very expensive. Nonetheless, those [who] could afford it sent their children to American schools and clearly the elite - there are no racial barriers here [in the U.S.] with regard to the elite - sent their children to Yale, Wellesley, Harvard, and Howard. Howard had a very strong influence in Trinidad and Tobago as you know. Eric Williams had been a tenured professor at Howard before he went back home and the Howard Alumni Association was very powerful. I of course went to their dinners and spoke each year at their dinners. They had a very, very good core of professional people who graduated from Howard, dentistry in particular. Coincidentally, my parent's neighbor across the street was the dean of the dental school, so I had sort of a natural hookup there; she's a remarkable woman to this day.

The joy of being an ambassador was even enhanced when you were in a country such as Trinidad and Tobago. I would lecture once a year at their college and as you know their university has campuses in Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and elsewhere. I could fly the flag going on to the campus and if not cheered, I was certainly not jeered or threatened in any way. I would speak to their political science faculty. It was an extraordinarily enjoyable experience.

Q: What about Cuba? Did Cuba in that time play any particular role?

KRYS: The United States, as you know, had a [definite] policy as to how you would react to your Cuban counterpart. Cuba had diplomatic relations with Trinidad and Tobago and the ambassador would come to call; he was not a resident. I once greeted him and he snubbed me so I thought I'd done my bit and that was the end of that.

Q: The Cold War is still going on, but things were beginning to change. Did that intrude on you at all?

KRYS: No. You asked about Cuba, and there was a point there. The man who is now prime minister had been one of the leaders of the opposition in the Labour Party. He had gone into the coalition with ANR Robinson and left the coalition. He had been head of the sugar workers union, Basdeo Panday, and today he is prime minister. He had a long history and was, I think, someone who thought very highly of Cuba and the labor movements there so that was a little point of contention. At one point before I left, he became foreign minister, and Minister Panday and I would have a few discussions. It wasn't heated, and it wasn't bitter because by then you know things had been laid out for a long time. It wasn't new policy towards Cuba and it wasn't really evolving policy.

I had a very strong relationship with the Papal Nuncio who was resident in Trinidad and

Tobago. We did some really good things together with regard to human rights, even in places like Cuba. There were times that he was a good source for exchanges because he traveled widely.

Q: This dioceses included Cuba?

KRYS: I don't think Cuba was his, but I could be wrong because he was certainly very knowledgeable. There were one or two issues that came up that really required humanitarian assistance, and we managed to work together on that. A very erudite man, truly a diplomat. He had served in Brussels in a similar capacity. The major religion in Trinidad and Tobago is not Church of England; it is Catholic.

Q: What about relations in the other countries? Were you getting any reflections from Venezuela? Did it play much of a role?

KRYS: Not a great deal. There was some reflection with regards to narcotic interdiction because that was where it was coming from. We were not very successful with that because row boats could come across at night and the Venezuelan government did not [then] have the most forthright and honest police forces that would stop that flow. In addition, there is a real antipathy between and among the English speaking nations in the region and the Spanish speaking nations, so Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago which had quite normal relations, wouldn't have warm relations considering it's 11 miles away.

Q: What about the Grenada invasion, which happened before you had arrived? I was wondering about the echo there. You might explain what the Grenada affair was for somebody who's reading this in the 25th century and then talk about how it was reflected when you were there.

KRYS: About two years before I went down there, there was the feeling that the Cuban presence had become larger than just assistance [in] building a [civilian] airport and that they were putting in a military base which would be a staging area for [activities in] Central America. You had the situation in Nicaragua at that time with the Sandinistas and other matters, and there were American medical school students who might be threatened by the Cuban presence and so on. We invaded Grenada, liberated the American medical school, rid the island of Cubans, [and] jailed the insurgent government that had been there. You should know that commerce, population exchange, and family ties between Grenada and Trinidad, in particular, are extraordinarily close, so there was enormous feeling that the United States was an aggressor and Trinidad and Tobago was very unhappy with the United States.

You asked what you can do as an ambassador. One of the examples of what you can do is, perhaps in hindsight with mixed results but I don't think so, I convinced the prime minister to go to the conference when President Reagan went to Grenada to meet with the heads of state in the region. George Chambers was one of the few leaders of the island nations who had taken the position that he had and he was not necessarily considered a joyous addition on the part of the Grenadians in particular and perhaps the other heads of

state. Nonetheless I convinced him to go, and I think it did him good, quite frankly, even in the time of the Reagan administration.

When I was there, the new prime minister, not George Chambers but his successor Robinson, went to the UN Security Council to speak. The foreign minister, Basdeo Panday, and I also went up there. I was fortunate enough to be invited with the foreign minister (the prime minister had gone back to Trinidad or out to the West Coast) aboard the Ford's yacht which was an annual event. George Shultz, the foreign minister at that time, [who is] the prime minister now, and I spent about 25 minutes onboard the yacht up on the deck. I'd like to tell you that brilliant exchanges were made, and there were enormous steps taken on behalf of democracy but the foreign minister really had not anticipated his role as foreign minister and I don't think he had a great deal that he either asked or brought forth during that conversation.

Q: What about tourism? You said that this was not encouraged, but what about Americans coming? Were there any consular problems or anything of this nature with tourism?

KRYS: [There were] very, very few tourists [who] came from the United States. There was a very small number in Port of Spain except during carnival. At carnival, there was this enormous influx of tourism and there were Americans, but they were Trinidadian-Americans for a very large part, [though] not completely. Crime was not a big problem in those days. People would go through the streets all night, but they were in huge bands which meant you marched, you sort of strutted behind the band. I did that one year. You started Sunday and ended Monday morning.

The tourists that went to Tobago went there by and large for the surfing because it was one of the great surfing areas. The real tourism came mostly from Italy. They would rent out a hotel year after year. There were some from Germany and from other parts of Europe. The change was dramatic. Tobago's tourism at that time, and this has changed, was severely handicapped because the runway was short and the Tobago side of the government kept it short so you had to land in Trinidad. Since there was not a non-stop into Tobago even from Barbados, tourism was handicapped. As I said there were very few rooms. That is changing.

Q: We're going to stop at this point. One question I have is that you were in Trinidad and Tobago during an interesting period as far as the administration in the United States went. Did you notice during the '85 to '88 period a change in interest or focus from your particularly perspective of the Reagan administration towards Trinidad and Tobago?

KRYS: That's fine. Remind me to talk about the Caribbean Basin Initiative.

Q: We'll talk about the Caribbean Basin Initiative and if there is anything else there.

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Today is May 18, 1998. Sheldon, I guess we will start with the question I asked you about whether you saw a change. When I asked about Trinidad and Tobago, I was really talking about the region.

KRYS: I saw more of an announcement of the change. There were changes made in the region. Most of the Eastern Caribbean states were really not put at any great advantage. The major beneficiaries of the Caribbean Basin Initiative were Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic. Puerto Rico benefited mightily on every barrel of rum exported out of the Caribbean because they received a portion of the tax on the rum, and I think in the Dominican Republic, it was more for its location and political purposes [than it] was a beneficiary.

Trinidad and Tobago is quite far from our shores. It is a couple of thousand miles from Florida. It is an oil state. An American company was the major driller, user, [and] exporter. Over the years, [it] got away from refining aspects. Texaco sold its refinery [to] the state, [so] the only refinery was a parastatal organization which had overemployment. [Thus] it was very hard for them to take advantage of the CBI. But even in the areas where they tried to take advantage of it, they were pretty much [ineffective] and so the answer was that a great deal of attention was paid to the Caribbean because of Grenada, but in different terms. Grenada received a massive amount of aid [based on] what it could absorb, [so it] really didn't do much.

Mind you, Trinidad and Tobago, when I arrived, had the third highest per capita income in the region. You had the United States, Canada, then Trinidad and Tobago, in that order. It was from oil, and it was a spillover, which is a lousy pun, of what happened with the '73 oil crisis. During my tenure, the price of oil came down dramatically and per capita income went from $7,000 plus to some $4,000. They were a first world nation really in the Eastern Caribbean which gave aid to some of its neighbors, Guyana most particularly, in the form of oil, and they cut off [that] aid during the time I was there.

For us it was a very important economic post. Amoco was shipping several hundred thousand barrels a day out of there even when I was there. At one time, many years ago, it exported more oil to the United States than Saudi Arabia. During my time, they were doing secondary drilling and recovery rather than new exploration, because the price of oil had fallen. Today it is booming, and there are many oil companies there. They have unmeasured amounts of gas. Tourism is still a very minor thing, and we touched on that very briefly earlier.

The long and the short of it, other than a conference in Florida once a year, I really had to fight to at least put them on the map with the Caribbean Basin Initiative, and they were a very tiny dot on the map. Part of the problem preceded my arrival. They had countervailing duties imposed on [their] steel. Because the country had so much money and fought so hard to avoid tourism (Eric Williams saw service as servitude), I mentioned earlier, they looked for industries. They went into steel refining, which is kind of crazy because they had no iron [ore and] they were dependent upon Brazil for billet, which they shipped in and then produced steel rods and things of that nature. Because they

subsidized the shipment of these products to the states (many of the companies were still parastatal), the [U.S.] company that sold them the refinery equipment went to Commerce and [got] countervailing duties imposed upon them, which is [not] a very friendly gesture. We tried to straighten that out and ultimately [we] more or less [succeeded].

Trinidad and Tobago is a major chocolate producer. None of it is sold in this country, [as] it is all sold to Switzerland. It is very good chocolate. It produces some coffee. It imports 95 percent of its food from us and my goal was to continue to do that. Wheat was 100 percent purchased from the United States, and there were real discussions as to whether they shouldn't bring in Canadian wheat. Frankly, it had less chaff in it. I don't know if it's of any interest but [in the U.S.] you are allowed to put chaff in wheat. X percent of chaff in wheat is permitted and apparently not the wheat growers but the Wheat Growers Association that sold it, added chaff to it.

Q: I've heard other times complaints that our wheat isn't that pure, so when it ends up in another country, there have been complaints.

KRYS: I had conversations with the Wheat Growers Association when they came down. I'm not sure it made any difference but in my tenure at least, they continued to buy wheat from the United States.

Q: What about Argentina? Was that a competitor because they are a wheat producer?

KRYS: Not really. Interestingly enough, there has always been some resentment in Trinidad and Tobago and I suspect other English speaking eastern Caribbean states, with regard to their Spanish-speaking neighbors. Relations between Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago were really very mixed and at times quite strained. There really was a separation between the English speaking Caribbean and the Spanish speaking Caribbean.

Q: Did you get any high level visits while you were there?

KRYS: I guess the highest level was a cabinet officer at that time and that was Dick Walters. Dick Walters came down, and as it turned out he traveled with an entourage. I don't know if you know Dick, but he is one of the most gregarious, charming people in the world. He came at carnival time, which is a very prolonged period; it is more than one day. It is a bigger carnival than Brazil or Rio because more people participate in it, rather than just a few naked bodies that are [the] most beautiful. This means you had no staff in your house among other things, and, of course, we invited Dick to stay with us.

My wife had put beside his bed a book by Divertoy which is [about] a Trinidadian family going back to the Creole Europe. Most of the people who came from Europe, if they weren't British, came from French speaking Europe, really from the islands off France rather than France itself. I'm not sure we heard a whoop, but we certainly heard something. It turns out that Dick Walters' mother was a Trinidadian, and she had left Trinidad when she was 15. It was an Irish family, and they had gone to Brooklyn, and Dick was born in Brooklyn. The Divertoy family and others were all family of his, and

this book was as though some divine hand had reached down. He knew these were all his cousins. Over the years he had stayed in touch but lost touch somewhere in the ‘50s. He knew many of the calypso songs but [they were] the songs of the ‘50s, the really old calypso songs.

Dick came down three times during [my tour]. He is wonderful company, and we always had a grand time with him. He always had business to conduct because particularly during the first year of my tenure, Trinidad and Tobago was a member of the United Nations Security Council. If we haven’t gone over that, my problem was getting them to vote yes occasionally. Generally they would have abstained and I didn’t change their mind very often, but there were instances where the vote mattered and even abstention was better than voting with the so-called non-aligned bloc, which they did. Dick had reasons to come down. [The] closest the President came was to Grenada and I think I mentioned getting George Chambers to go over there.

Q: You did. We’ve covered quite a bit of this. There may be something else, but maybe we can move on. You left there in 1988?

KRYS: In 1988. Actually, I came back in 1987 while I was ambassador and George Shultz asked me to come back to serve as executive secretary to the Lair Commission.

Q: Could you explain what that was?

KRYS: As you remember, in Moscow there was the Lonetree-Bracey affair. Two Marine guards allegedly permitted Soviet citizens, benign Soviet citizens, into the embassy and perhaps into the communications area.

Q: I think we covered this.

KRYS: I think we did too. I [went] back then [to Trinidad and Tobago], but in ‘88 I received a phone call to come back to be Assistant Secretary for Administration. Charlie Hill called me, and if we didn’t cover it I think I mentioned to him there were about six or eight people who I thought were better qualified for the job, but I came back. Then I got the next call and took up the portfolio of Assistant Secretary for Administration and Information Management.

Q: You did this from ‘88 to when?

KRYS: From ‘88 to ‘89, 13 months. Then there was a change in administration. In ‘89 I was the only named Assistant Secretary who was kept on by the Bush administration but in a new capacity.

Q: Let’s just take the ‘88 to ‘89 period when you took this job. It’s always confusing to any reader. I was in the Foreign Service for 30 years and I never understood the various jobs. You’ve got management and administration. Could you explain what your portfolio was as the Assistant Secretary for Administration and Information Systems and then we’ll

talk about the work?

KRYS: It was a global portfolio. I am one of those who finds administration and management synonymous, because you really don't have administration if you don't have management. There is more substance to it if you look at it in its broad sense because you get into a lot of things that we'll get to in a little while. The portfolio was enormous. It represented roughly 24 percent of the resources of the State Department. It encompassed all of information management which is the full life cycle of information from the time you created a document, a cable generally or a memorandum, to the time that it's been transmitted. That process is part of information management through the systems that you use, both encrypted systems and unclassified systems, through its storage and ultimate declassification and dissemination to the public upon request or in the foreign affairs series. It [includes] every communicator overseas and the systems that we have back in Washington, DC, and offsite as backup. It covers all of that.

The Assistant Secretary for Administration also had within the portfolio the Foreign Buildings Organization [FBO], which manages, repairs to some degree, acquires, and sells all diplomatic property overseas. The portfolio that ranges is estimated to [have a] true value from $10 billion to $20 billion. It is a separate appropriation. [Moreover], through the sale of a property, you are able to either build or dramatically repair another property rather than having the money go back to the treasury. [The funds are] kept within the FBO account.

It also includes the backstopping of all missions overseas through the deputy Assistant Secretary for Operations. [This includes] everything from the shipment of household effects to supplies. It contained the eighth floor in the portfolio and liaison with Blair House.

Q: The eighth floor being the reception room.

KRYS: The public area. Well, it's not that public but it is the representational area of the eighth floor. It is the representational area of the State Department which has been funded and changed under Clem Conger over the last 25 years using non-appropriated monies. It also included the backstopping of all of the embassies in terms of supplies, and maintaining our properties, including leasing, of State Department offices around the country. It [covers] every aspect. It included language services where interpreters come and hang their hats, and so on. It's a lot of people, and a lot of money.

Q: Why did you end up with this job sort of at the rope end of the administration? I'm wondering what had gone on before. Then can you talk about what you were told was your agenda and what your own personal agenda was.

KRYS: I'm not sure that I came in with a personal agenda and I probably was playing to my weakness as to what needed to be done most of all. What needed to be done was to modernize the computer system, the information systems that we had in the Department of State and to really bring it into, not to use the clichés of the 20th century but to bring it

into the later part of the 20th century. To train a cadre of people who were no longer those who perhaps had come out of the military and had served as pouch handlers, the courier service (the courier service is part of this as well). They were sort of at a different end of it rather than the communicators who were locked away using equipment that they had used when they were in the military. I wanted to make this something that [reflected] what the society was becoming.

Q: I think that for somebody looking at this in the future, I might explain that this was a time where there was an explosion in the information system that had not happened before as far as equipment and word processing.

KRYS: Yes, and it really, as I said, reflected the time. You had young officers coming in who had gone through high school and university, that tip end of that generation, using computers as you and I might have used a calculator when we were at their stage in life. They came in and were appalled by what they found. They had a right to be appalled.

We also had special problems that to this day have not been solved. Every cable, every telegram, and that is our means of communication called a cable, goes out in some form of classified communication. Even an unclassified cable travels over a closed circuit which in and of itself protects the information contained in the cable. What happens at the recipient end is another matter. If it is unclassified, you can throw it in the trash if you wish. Because of the nature of our communications and the way we guarded our system, and to the best of our knowledge it has never been penetrated because it is a closed system, when it travels, everything had to be in a domain that took it at the top secret and worked down from that.

You had a limited number of suppliers who could give you this kind of capability at the recipient end. It wasn't hard over the lines because essentially we use leased lines or satellite and just as you would make a telephone call, we lease a T-1 line which is a big pipe. Over that we send our messages worldwide to 256 places around the world. It travels over AT&T or Cable and Wireless as any other message. What is different is it is encrypted at one end and through the use of software at the other end, the code is broken and it comes out in plain text.

You need means to guard the recipient from electronic intrusion and what most people saw on their desks they found terribly distasteful. It was an old style Wang computer which was a guarded computer called Shielded, and it didn't radiate as much as every other kind of device. There are only a few companies that made that, but it meant we were spending two or three times [as much] for every one of those screens than if you had gone and bought it off the shelf at Computer City. There were different consideration.

To this day, there is not what is known as a sufficiently strong firewall between [material] encrypted at the top secret level and unclassified. People in the State Department can actually receive both unclassified from the outside of the State Department, and top secret messages from the inside because you cannot separate them sufficiently to be assured that

you are not compromising your classified material. Have I confused you more than when we started?

Q: No, but you are showing the complexity which is not apparent when somebody just says why don't you buy off the shelf.

KRYS: Well, they are saying it today. A new Under Secretary has come in and say exactly that. Among other things there was on the drawing board something called DOSTN which was going to be the Department of State Telecommunications Network. Without getting into who does what around the world, this would have been the State Department's own system looking into the future using what is known as non-proprietary equipment and built from the ground up. It would have cost about 250 million dollars. Had I to do it over again today, I would not have approached it the way my predecessors had set it up. I inherited something that had to be sold to Congress, and it was sailing fairly well until the Senate Intelligence Committee decided that it was redundant to our needs. Again I can't get into all of it but the long and the short of it was it was shot down.

What followed from that, not so much on the telecommunications side but on the information management side, I saw as my great challenge; it was to get rid of all of our old equipment, to modernize, to make it non-proprietary for word processors [and] for linked networks within the State Department and elsewhere, classified and unclassified. I laid out an eight year plan which never made it out of OMB. Actually it hardly made it out of the State Department. The monies that the controller's office and I had agreed could be set aside from the budget were used instead to [cover] some of our needs in the newly emerging former Soviet states. Information management took a 17 percent cut which has nothing to do with fat or even muscle; it is bone, gristle, and everything else and it died.

Q: It is interesting because essentially the guts of our business is communication. It is almost like cutting out bullets or cutting down on ammunition for the military. For us, it is how you get the stuff from hither to yon.

KRYS: I agree, but let me tell you I think we have traditionally gone about it in the wrong way and, of course, [usually] without the support of the Secretary of State. We had it with George Shultz in so many things but [not on] this. We had it in a number of other ways where the secretary personally intervened. I still think we have gone about it in the wrong way and now Secretary Albright is pursuing it successfully, so I'll be mum on how she's approaching it with her colleagues.

We should never talk administrative costs, and we should never talk about equipment costs when we go up on the Hill. The analogy I've used for the past 10 or 15 years is, if you went into a bank and they kept your account by using an abacus but you received your monthly statements on a timely basis and they were accurate, you couldn't care less if it was an abacus or a Cray computer. What you were interested in is the administrative support necessary for you to feel that the bank is handling your account properly. Traditionally we would go up to the Hill and separate all of these things into different

little pots and say we need 250 million dollars for a new program over the next five years. My god, when you're in tough times, there isn't anyone on the Hill that could see their way clear [to spending that] if you have a system that is working. It's not working well, it's working very poorly, and we're talking about telephones so obsolescent you couldn't even buy spare parts. Nonetheless, if you're talking about big money and tough times, they don't want to hear about it.

[Suppose] you went up there and said this is what it is going to cost to run our foreign affairs policies [and] carry out our policies overseas in the most efficient manner. Even if they asked you to break it out, if you can link what it takes for you to support your mission effectively with the effective implementation of policy and not permit it to be separated out, then you are coming much closer to the way business operates. When you receive a shareholders statement, I defy you to find in there what it costs for them to [operate] their computers effectively. They will tell you what it costs to rent something but that's about it.

Q: Were you trying to sell this?

KRYS: Oh, sure. I've been trying to sell it for many years and the answer is, it can't be sold that way unless you change an awful lot of things. Look, the State Department has many, many problems. It is the premier agency in terms of it being the most senior cabinet position. It is a department which despite this status, lacks two fundamental bases for it being far more successful in terms of funding and effective implementation. One is, it is a national security agency that does not have a designation of national security agency. It is treated like every other domestic agency so that when there is a cut at HUD or whatever it might be, we are on the same list because we are a domestic agency.

When Secretary Shultz was at State, before I went to Trinidad and was in Ron Spiers office (I may have mentioned this), we got very close. Bill Clark had gone from deputy secretary over to the National Security Council and we got very close to the designation. What we got back was [that] OMB was told by the White House to treat us as though we were a national security agency. We still should be designated a national security agency because that puts us in a very different posture.

The second thing that has been so damaging to us over the years is [that] we are the smallest, least expensive department, and treated with least empathy on the Hill by [the single] committee that handles Commerce, Justice, law enforcement, the court system, the prison system, and the State Department. We are way back in the pecking order. Whereas the Department of Commerce can take one kind of hit by that same committee when it goes to mark up its bills, we can't afford that kind of hit. We take [a hit of] one half of one percent [of our budget, which] is practically nothing in terms of real dollars, and it makes the difference between what you can and can't do. We don't have our own committee. Defense has a committee, intelligence has a committee. We are subject to referral to the intelligence committees [when] almost any senator desires [that]. Senator Hollings, for instance, very often sees a need to refer us to some review [by] the Senate Intelligence Committee.

Q: Other than the communications side, what other part of administration was your main focus?

KRYS: When I spoke about communications, we are talking about computers and information management generally. The other was the quality of life of our people overseas and that's very often reflected in housing, [and] in education (overseas schools were part of the portfolio). The quality of life has been going down for our people overseas. How we do things [for] our employees and how we administer ourselves has always been a concern. [My] real concern was that we had properties that were falling apart. People were living in properties that were no longer maintained as they should be but were being criticized nonetheless [as] lavish.

I traveled with Congressman Neil Smith a number of times and housing was his big thing. He thought it was a great idea if, let's say, a secretary living in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia really ought to have a one bedroom apartment because that is how it is in Arlington. Never mind that the secretary couldn't get into a car and go to a movie on her own.

I also wanted to see our administrative people and the post treated differently. It is a service organization and too many administrative officers either were not brought back to Washington for training or avoided being brought back because, quite frankly, they couldn't afford [it]. When I say administrative, I mean across the board: communicators, general services, and [so on]. As a result, very often they were so overly cautious that the post did not feel it had support. What it had was someone who could look up why you couldn't do something. I really wanted to change that. I met with all of the administrative officers who would come to my office. They all had an open invitation. The quality of life of our people really does bother me, and it is so petty when you deal with it on a case by case basis that it's very hard to make a real change.

We did make some changes when I was in Ron Spiers office as management. The concept of a chief of mission not flying into his or her post every time in first class is outrageous. It is looked [at] through the eyes of someone [with] a green eyeshade back here. You will have a chief of protocol on the 15th time that you fly in, or certainly someone from protocol out there to meet you and you are getting off the back of the airplane. Now with this administration for instance, people can't even upgrade their flights to first class because of the image. It's crazy.

Q: This was sort of the end of George Shultz's period, wasn't it?

KRYS: George Shultz left in 1989 so it was really the last year of his tenure as secretary. There was a real sea change. You had something that approached a hostile takeover from one Republican administration to the other.

Q: As I do these interviews, I never knew the gentleman, but in my mind Shultz ranks at the top of the secretaries of State both from a policy and from a management point of view. He is also a manager rather than being a lawyer or confidant of the President.

KRYS: He ranks the same way with me. I can't begin to tell you the admiration that I held for the man. Among other things, he knew his mind, but he also had an open mind and he changed a great deal when he came into the Department of State. The people who were serving at the policy level, the Assistant Secretary level and above, really came to love the man. I suspect it's a phrase he'd be very uncomfortable with.

Secretaries of State had morning meetings and generally they are very cut and dry. Each Assistant Secretary would read or talk about a minute and a half about his or her region and everybody would listen. There was no [give and take]. That still goes on today. After a while, I think Secretary Shultz wanted to have something that dealt with management [like the] council that Ron Spiers had created; he wanted to hear about management. He wanted to know what was going on, and it wasn't something that was a bothersome [part of] his agenda for that day. He really cared. It didn't mean he agreed with his assistant secretaries on every issue, but he certainly wanted to know what was on our plate, and he wanted it in a context that didn't get into you have a minute-and-a-half to bring some nugget to the table that particular day. You were part of the larger scheme but you also had a special place for him to listen to management.

There really was a change after that. As you know, Secretary Baker came in with a very focused agenda.

Q: We're talking about the changeover of January 20, 1989 when the Bush administration came in and James Baker became Secretary of State.

KRYS: He really came in with his own group of people, a very fixed agenda, a small number of issues with which he wanted to deal. There wasn't much communication at least with the Assistant Secretary, or even the Under Secretary, for Management. Ivan Selin came in with enormous experience, [but] not with the State Department. He had his real foibles but somehow when I look back I kind of long for Ivan when I look at some of the things that have occurred since then. It was very different. Yes, you went to the morning meetings but no, you really weren't part of it unless you got caught up in it somehow.

Q: In the first place, how long were you in during Secretary Baker's tenure?

KRYS: I served as Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security and the portfolio of information went there with me for three full years. I think I made it three years to the day. I asked to leave at the end of exactly three years.

Q: Can you talk about the initial feeling when Baker came in? There were these morning meetings, weren't there? You were still in Administration, weren't you?

KRYS: When he first came [in], yes. I stayed there until July or August of '89 then I immediately segued into the other [job].

Q: I think it is interesting to talk about this particular change in administration. How did it strike you?

KRYS: You had advance [notice], of course, because the people who were coming in to take positions beneath him started on a consultative basis. [Thus], you had some sense with Ivan Selin coming on the scene. I think what disturbed the building was that (and you didn't hear this from Secretary Shultz) Secretary Shultz [stayed] for the transition. He was waiting in his office to meet with James Baker, and it is my understanding that the meetings never took place. Shultz waited for a number of days and then he left. I think it was meant to be a signal that there was now a new regime, a new administration and while it was a handover within the same party, this was going to be a different time.

George Shultz came in, not a great friend of the State Department. He had been a cabinet officer [and] he had been at OMB. He left being an enormous admirer of the State Department and the Foreign Service. He really came to know people that he respected, that he admired and in a number of instances after he left the State Department, that he helped. I was not in that group obviously.

Q: Before we move on to the Baker, we were talking about the Foreign Service Institute. I've often heard that George Shultz played a key role and really took an interest. According to Steve Low, he would raise the subject at the management meeting, which tended to focus other people's attention, "How's it coming?" Was this true?

KRYS: Yes. Actually, he saved it. It wouldn't have happened without him. Steve started it, he was key. Brandon Grove has received less credit than he deserves for what he did. Without George Shultz there would have been no Foreign Service Institute. First of all, it was a stroke of genius to push hard enough to get that military piece of property which was excess property. It goes back to the days when Ron Spiers was Under Secretary. With Ron and the management council, you had a very good forum that I don't think has existed since then where all of the assistant secretaries came in and really discussed things. Sometimes it was to their own dismay when one of the colleagues would say, "That was a really stupid idea," or something of that nature, couched a little bit better than that. There was a team that dealt with all of the management issues, and I think we met three times a week.

Q: This was called the management council?

KRYS: It was called the management council [and was] composed of the assistant secretaries within the family of management: consular, administration, security, the Foreign Service Institute, the director general, the inspector general when it was Bill Harrop, and MMO which was management operations. I came out of MMO after I left the Near East/South Asian Bureau. George Shultz really bought into the idea. He saw it as an opportunity even in times of financial constraint, that if you didn't do it then it would never happen. Compare [it] to where the Foreign Service Institute had been from your time and mine [there]. We were in a basement in Rosslyn and we had a building in Rosslyn which had an elevator that got you there sometimes, etc., [and we moved] to a

campus that is really just extraordinary.

Those who saw it come into being realize that if George Shultz hadn't stayed with it and permitted his own organization to pursue Congress [and] the military, [to] make sure that it didn't go to some other cause, there would not have been a Foreign Service Institute. When Jim Baker came in, he had to be told about it, sold on it, and he too bought into it. It really came to pass because of two secretaries of State, but really an 80/20 relationship between George Shultz and Jim Baker. By the time Secretary Baker came on the scene, it was a question of how much you downsized it rather than whether you stop the process completely. And it was downsized.

Q: Can you make a comment about what your impression was during this period in administration of consular operations, when you were Assistant Secretary.

KRYS: When I was Assistant Secretary and Betty Camposi, for instance, was the head of consular?

Q: Yes.

KRYS: Betty Camposi came in with very little experience but she came in with very firm and fixed ideas. She had one or two ideas that were extremely good and if you talk about taking that office up into albeit her home state [New Hampshire] and putting the passport office up there, it made a world of sense. It was very hard for her deputies, however, to find a role with her. It went well, that was okay, but when it went less than well, her deputies bore the brunt of it. I don't think there was a very comfortable relationship there. I have one particular case in mind, but I'll let that person when he is does an oral history describe it.

Q: Who's that?

KRYS: Who do you think it is? I'll let Mary Ryan talk to you at some time in the future because no one had a clearer perspective of what it was like to be in that front office at that time.

Q: Was Consular Affairs a problem for you?

KRYS: No, it wouldn't have been for me. Consular Affairs is a problem really for the Foreign Service, if it doesn't pay appropriate attention to it. Now I'm putting on the hat that I'm wearing now with the ambassadorial seminar. When I talk to non-careerist and careerist alike, I urge them to once a week enter the embassy, not through the front smartly-dressed lobby, but through the consular section. It is very often an orphan of the embassy, and it is the face of the Foreign Service as far as Americans are concerned but also our foreign hosts.

Q: Why don't we stop at this point. We have talked a little bit about the Baker administration coming in but not much. If we could start at the time when the Baker

administration came in - the signals you were getting, and how Baker initially dealt with administrative matters and then move on to your next assignment. This would be '89.

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Today is August 18, 1998. The Baker administration came in and what were the signals?

KRYS: When the Baker administration came in, I was the Assistant Secretary for Administration. I had been appointed to that in April of 1988 and came into the job in January of '89. You asked about signals. As you may recall, the Under Secretary for Management was Ivan Selin who was a whiz kid in the MacNamara days at the Department of Defense. The whole feeling of administration when the Baker people came in was that the building was about the worst thing they had ever seen, it was user unfriendly, and why did people have to wear badges? It wasn't a very positive view.

Ivan Selin had been extraordinarily successful as a computer management advisory expert, having been one of the founders of the American Management Systems, AMS. There was a very thorough review as to what should be done and information management was a major issue. It was a problem for Ivan because, [because] his company had contracts with the Department of State in his previous incarnation, he had to keep something of an arms-length relationship. Information management was just burgeoning, [so] there was no question of its importance.

I was certainly not a techie. I knew how to turn on the computer and that was about it. We had someone in the service who had been brought back to be the deputy for information management [and] who was unsatisfied with the fact that he was not going to be an Assistant Secretary. He wanted complete autonomy and ultimately he left. He left in a huff and ended up being Ivan Selin's executive assistant and a constant not very constructive critic of what we were doing.

Funds, instead of flowing towards information management, continued to flow in other directions. It was a huge responsibility. The upshot of it was that [they didn't] bring in an Assistant Secretary whose strength was in information management to replace me as Assistant Secretary for Administration. [Instead], they brought in someone whose strength was in the Corps of Engineering, or the Seals, Art Ford who was a retired admiral. They moved information management from Administration to my new portfolio, Diplomatic Security, in 1989. The span of control was enormous. I had about 23 percent of both the resources in dollars and in human terms of personnel around the world. I had six deputy assistant secretaries of State.

This is by way of saying that management from the seventh floor view was really management as seen by Ivan Selin. The cadre that came in with Jim Baker really dealt with a very small number of substantive issues. The only interplay that I had with Secretary Baker on a sustained basis (mind you, it was a very cordial relationship) was at the time of the Gulf War near the end of the administration. He and I shared some moments at very critical times then for a variety of reasons. Management really was not a

front burner issue.

Q: Where did Ivan Selin fit in the Baker group? There was sort of a coterie around him. Did he fit in there?

KRYS: You'd have to ask Ivan. I don't think he felt he fit there. First of all, he had been a Democrat, [but] had gone in this campaign with President Bush and perhaps prior to that, with President Reagan, but he was certainly not part of the inner circle. The inner circle was very small. A lot of what Secretary Baker was interested in in management was very often conveyed through Margaret Tutwiler rather than through the Under Secretary. She was his special assistant for public affairs.

Q: And essentially she was the eyes and ears and arm.

KRYS: She was very close to the secretary and had been with him before and was a very, very loyal advocate of Secretary Baker. The relationship was one that clearly was defined in terms of what's good for the secretary [rather than] what's good for the Department of State, a role which she carried out very thoroughly and successfully.

Q: How long were you in information management as Assistant Secretary for Management during the Baker administration?

KRYS: I was there with the Baker administration from August of '89 until August of '92, the three years. It was three years to the day by my choosing. That's when Tony Quainton was brought back to take on that portfolio. It was shortly after that [when] information management was removed once more from the portfolio and put back into the Assistant Secretary for Administration, under him.

Q: What did your job encompass?

KRYS: As Assistant Secretary for Security?

Q: Yes.

KRYS: Protection of all of our missions and people overseas, protection of the missions in the United States of other embassies, protection of all of our buildings in the United States, the Department of State buildings and liaison with the intelligence community with regard to security. On the information management side, it was the start and end of all information management from the time a cable was created to the time it was declassified.

Q: It seems a very peculiar mating of jobs.

KRYS: Obviously, if you were to look at it [more], there was some justification for doing it. The whole question of security of information management was a key item. If you will recall in 1987, the question was, had the Russians gotten into our communications centers?

How secure was our communications in terms of speaking on the telephone? Even though the phone was secure, was the environment in which the conversation was taking place secure? It wasn't that strange but it clearly wasn't a marriage made in heaven.

Another agency was also involved and I won't get into that, but there was certainly a very strong feeling that perhaps another agency could do it better than we. While it wasn't their primary responsibility they were more than keen to take it on until such time as they thought it didn't serve their interests. Fortunately, the Department of State [did not] support the idea that if we didn't strengthen information management or telecommunications, we would have telecommunications at the whim of some other agency.

Monies were taken out of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and helped to open the posts [in] the new states emerging out of the Soviet Union, but communication was not our responsibility in those places. After a short period of time, when no money was put aside for it, telecommunications was pulled out as another agency's responsibilities and we then had to provide [funds]. It goes to show, if the old cliché has any value (it certainly applied here) that if you don't learn from history, you are bound to repeat mistakes. In the early '60s a very similar situation happened in Africa where we lost our telecommunications. It was unfortunate.

We tried to establish a separate and thoroughly 21st century form of telecommunications called DOSTN, the Department of State Telecommunications Network. It was a battle on the Hill which we lost and therefore the Department of State could [not] bring itself into the 21st century or [even] the latter part of the 20th century for that matter. Despite all the complaints that you hear, certain plans were in place which were never funded, never got out of the Office of Management and Budget, as far as the replacement of the old Wang equipment.

Q: Was the problem trying to cut down on money basically?

KRYS: There was no cutting down, because there was no money allocated; it was as simple as that. Over this past weekend, I looked at some of my old files, coincidentally with the horrors in Africa referring to the bombings in Tanzania and Kenya where our two embassies were blown up. I looked at my testimony in both hearings as Assistant Secretary and at my hearing for security. The latter was a very lengthy hearing, and in both instances the senator in the chair started by asking why our embassies had to look like fortresses and what could I do about changing that? In both instances I spoke about the safety of our personnel being paramount. Needless to say, it had very little effect on the funding of these matters.

The package contained a proposal which was clearly not going to meet all the needs of our embassies around the world, but the building needs were about three-and-a-half billion dollars and everyone just thought, gee, that's a terrific plan. It would have taken a [lot] more money than that to actually move London, Brussels, and Paris off the street. Parenthetically, setbacks are not the entire answer to the security of our buildings.

Nonetheless, we ended up with I think 800 million dollars worth of funding to cover the three-and-a-half billion dollars that was proposed by the Inman panel.

Q: Was the Inman panel before your time?

KRYS: Yes. The Inman panel was in '85 and '86. It created the Bureau of Diplomatic Security; they broke it away from the Assistant Secretary for Administration. I was the second Assistant Secretary for Security and Bob Lamb was the first.

Q: We are a week away from these horrendous bombings that were done apparently by Islamic fundamentalists...

KRYS: We don't know if it was they.

Q: We don't really know, but there are strong indications that they were done by people outside of East Africa and so one of the questions is whether it appears they were looking for softer targets. While you were there or before, did we have a sense of priorities of which embassies we have to work on and which ones we don't?

KRYS: Sure. What we did in my time was to establish standards based on different threats and then levels within each of those threats. You had an embassy that might be perfectly safe with regard to mob violence or electronic penetration. [However], based on the volatility of where the embassy was located and the inability perhaps of the local police and intelligence forces to give you some warning as to what might occur in the streets, it might be ripe for a terrorist to come in and blow [it] up. There are lots of ways to blow up an embassy. Right now we are still fighting all the old wars. Just think about a small airplane with a bomb and what you do about that.

Yes, we set up standards across the board. The levels were determined by an interagency group. Interagency group contained all the usual suspects: the State Department, FBI, CIA, and so on. Judgment was made and agreed upon. The standards were set on that basis and therefore money, if available, would flow to cure that kind of threat [or] get around [it].

Q: The Baker administration was trying very hard to show that it was watching money so that we opened up a whole series of posts in the former Soviet Union without asking for any additional funds.

KRYS: There was a reallocation of funds from within and 17 percent came out of the Bureau of Diplomat Security.

Q: This had an effect?

KRYS: Yes, I think you might say this had an effect. It had an effect on a whole variety of things, but the most tangible ones are those that you can see, either see or not see. Frankly, it is very hard if you are dealing in management. You are competing, let's say,

with whether [to] put more people in a particular post and support them with housing and the costs for a tandem [assignment], as opposed to a management desire to update communications equipment when you have all the equipment on the shelf. Look at the statistics on the telephones that we have around the world for which there are no parts because companies that manufacture those switchboards have long been out of business or [no longer make that model]. The only way these phone systems are kept going is through cannibalization of other old phone systems.

You have to remember that we've expanded quite rightly to reflect what's going on around the world. I think a lot of [the trouble] has to do with the way the Department of State has presented its budget. Over the past four years, they tried to do it differently. I hear that people are managing now on a fairly regular basis, and [yet] they still speak of the Department not even knowing what it needs by way of resources. I do wonder when I hear these individuals say it, what have they accomplished after four years [if] we still don't know what we're doing.

Q: During the period you were there, compared to parallel ones - the CIA and the military - how did our communications operation rank?

KRYS: First of all, you are actually comparing apples and oranges. The Department of State is not a national security agency, so you realize that in every domestic budgetary campaign to cut expenses, we're treated the same way HUD is or the Social Security Administration because we're seen as a domestic agency. National security agencies have other priorities and are exempt by and large from cutting five percent from [the total] budget. But you know we are living in the best of times right now and it's really taken the personality of a Secretary of State who is willing to go and fight for resources.

Q: You're talking about Madeleine Albright.

KRYS: Madeleine Albright. And it took George Shultz before her to actually bring about a change in the resource level. It has far less to do with the climate of whether the military is advancing or CIA is advancing, and much more to do with the strength of the individuals who are willing to [push]. I would say George Shultz fought harder within the executive to get our money request at least through the OMB process and Madeleine Albright has fought much harder not only in the executive but also up on the Hill and that's how resources flow. It takes confidence on the part of the President in the Secretary of State, and it takes determination and perseverance on the part of the Secretary of State.

In answer to your latter question, the military's needs [for] communications are so varied and so different [from] ours that I really can't make that comparison. They have tactical needs, a strategic need, and so on.

The [car] rental agency, Hertz, for a long time advertised [that we] were only number two and we try harder. What they didn't reveal is they were number two on the scale of number one being an elephant and number two being a mouse. They were not competitive in size. If we're number two, let's say, in the communications field, for a

very long time at least in terms of new, not necessarily more efficient, equipment, we lagged seriously and we still lag seriously.

What we do have, however, is a very specific need to ensure that whatever we communicate remains secure. Therefore, we're less user friendly in some instances than let's say an intelligence community where everything automatically is always seen to be classified. We need both to be secure classified and also a major need to be unclassified for so much of what we do. It's bothersome to the end user to see two screens on his or her desk and wonder why there can't be one. That's a little too convoluted.

Q: No, but it shows the dimensions of the problem.

KRYS: Right.

Q: What you're saying is, Baker was not somebody who was going to go into Congress and fight.

KRYS: I don't even know how it was brought to him because I don't know the commitment [with] Under Secretary Ivan Selin, who was not really a confidant of Jim Baker. When John Rodgers came along later, he was. John Rodgers had absolutely in my view a minimal regard for his surroundings and a maximum regard for his relationship with the Secretary of State. He'd worked for him literally from the time he was out of school. It was a very different commitment and had much more to do with carrying out whatever it was the Secretary wanted rather than building up an existing institution.

Q: You are pointing to something which I think is a major theme that runs throughout history. That is that, for the most part, our Secretaries of State and upper managements main interest is political and not in building up a structure, either the buildings, the communications, or the personnel.

KRYS: I think some had a greater commitment, and you can almost count [them] on one hand. I'm talking about the Under Secretaries for management and certainly George Shultz. I think George Shultz from my perspective during my tenure, and that's over 30 years, was a Secretary who really came in from a very different environment and left really feeling that he wanted to see a strengthened Foreign Service. He both believed in what they could do and was absolutely taken by the quality of the officer and the people that he had met during his long tenure. He had a basis of comparison. He had served as [a] cabinet officer elsewhere, as had Jim Baker. George Shultz came away feeling (he expressed openly in his farewell to the troops) that this was the best bunch that he had ever seen. His phrase, used more than once in my presence, was [that] the cream rises to the top, and this was the cream as far as he could see. He came away committed to the service, and he took actions to back that up.

With regard to Under Secretaries over the years, those who cared the most had more exposure to the foreign affairs community before they came into the job. They didn't see this as a four-year stint where you made your record. When we speak to new

ambassadors in the ambassadorial seminar, we really talk about being part of a marathon. Someone passes a baton to you and in your tenure you are going to reap the smiles and congratulations [whose basis was] really put in place by your predecessor. Hopefully when you pass on the baton, you [will] have put in place some things that your successor will benefit from. That's really what you need in management. You need a continuity, not necessarily achieved because you are career or non-career going into the job, but you need [them to ask] what do I want to see happen within the foreign affairs community over the next five to 10 years? Very few have really taken that view.

Q: Where did you see the major threat on the security side during the time you were there from '89 to '92?

KRYS: In my tenure, not a single American attached officially to an embassy was killed. [That] was 98 percent good fortune and two percent sheer genius. Well, maybe one percent somewhat genius. There was a lot of good luck, but it also meant a very strong commitment to instilling in the chief of mission the responsibility for being part of the security team and leading the security team. If you had a commitment to security from the top at an embassy, you stood a better chance of people really paying attention [and] conducting themselves so as to diminish the threats against them.

From my perspective the protection of life was more important than protection of the building. Nonetheless, in protecting the building, you protected the people. But [people's actions were also important]. Where you had personnel who stuck to a regime where they would leave the house at 8:40 in the morning, stop and pick up a croissant on the way in, and arrive at a certain place at a certain time, or an ambassador who played tennis every morning at 8:00 at a country club, you began to erode the most basic elements of security to avoid the routine [and] make [an attack] more difficult. [Still], you can't overcome a well-planned terrorist attack if you just make it more difficult for it to be successful. If it all rests on a security officer who's generally far down the line in the hierarchy of the mission and not have the support of the administrative people, the deputy chief of mission, and the constant vigilance of the ambassador, that's where you start to fail in security.

I can't tell you whether you can avoid certain things. We had some very near tragedies in my time. We had a Marine van that pulled out of the gate of a marine house with a changing of the guard in Santiago, Chile and a terrorist fired a rocket propelled grenade into the vehicle. It struck the engine of the vehicle and didn't go off. That's good fortune but it also [showed] that someone should have come out of that gate and seen what was on the street. I think you get the point. You can't avoid the RPG [rocket propelled grenade] coming at you, but you can make it more difficult if the individual can't stand around and wait for the gate to open. They know the gate is going to open at a particular moment. I guess my real concern was how [to] instill security as an overall effort on the part of an embassy. In addition to that, of course, we learn lessons. I described the fact that I was part of the Laird Commission and [got] a different insight into how Marines protect our embassies and how they are selected.

In addition to that, I had real concerns that we pay more attention to where we allow our people to live in the city. [If it is in] the cheapest housing or it's a very nice area of town, but [also] if it's an unsafe community, it's a real problem. In the face of severe budget cuts, I knew that we couldn't continue the guard programs in the same way we had. How do we replace that with physical security? Bear in mind, I'm not a professional security officer, but I think I know good advice when I hear it and I also have a sense of what an embassy can and should do, and I've supervised security people. So those were my real concerns: protection of life and how to be innovative and imaginative [and how to] draw the community into the security picture.

Q: Did you see the security threat from people to be more local like in Santiago, since the Soviet Union was out of the picture?

KRYS: They weren't really quite out of the picture, and we didn't know how much out of the picture even in '92.

Q: So you were keeping a watching brief on the Soviets?

KRYS: Yes. It was coming apart, and we were beginning to get certain indications [that] it had come apart in some ways. At that time, the department of the KGB dealing with the United States publicly announced it was not going out of business, but I was less concerned frankly with that aspect of it. [Despite] all the money they could have available, I was less concerned on a moment-to-moment basis with that aspect and much more concerned with my daily briefing on threats against our missions. You have to remember that every day a number of threats would come in against our people and against our embassies. How you evaluate that and what you do about that was really my day-to-day concern.

Q: I had a little glimpse of this when I went to Kyrgyzstan in the early '90s. These embassies that we were putting up all over in what had been the Soviet Union, something like 10 or 12, were put in little houses or apartments and security was absolutely nil. What was the concept behind these embassies?

KRYS: The original concept goes back actually to the time I was Assistant Secretary for Administration in the '88 to '89 timeframe. The Russians wanted to open a consulate in Chicago or San Francisco, I can't recall which, and in return we were going to open a consulate in Kiev. Needless to tell you, there were no buildings in Kiev (which was slightly radioactive at that particular time) that naturally fit the concept of an embassy. However, it was a regime that if trouble was going to occur and people were going to storm the building, it would be the Russians supporting it and therefore [building] setbacks and this sort of thing didn't matter. As you know, the embassy in Moscow is on a busy thoroughfare as well; it's a huge old building that was converted.

I went around with the mayor of Kiev and every time I would see a bookstore, a kienaga, I would say, "That would be a very good place." He said, "But it's all open, it's glass, you can look in and see." I said, "Exactly, that's the kind of consulate we run." He was

taken aback and finally he ended up showing us the Russian equivalent of the Red Cross which was a series of rabbit warrens. I said, "That really isn't what we want. It's bigger than what we want." We probably ended up going into one of those buildings, but the concept was, we were going to show democracy, we were going to have open embassies in a rather secure environment. Where you have that kind of totalitarian state, it is easy to rely on the host country protecting you and your protection really is the host country's protection outside the perimeter of the embassy.

In the places where we were opening embassies in newly emerging states, they didn't have anything like that unless you were going to take a government building. We ended up putting our people in houses and apartments and making an embassy out of that. That's not without precedent. We've done that in many other parts of the world. The big difference there is we still felt the threat of penetration was great and the only way you could truly overcome that [and] the easiest way was to make them unclassified posts. If you had something of real importance, you provided emergency communications in a tent within the building which you might then be able to use for communication. What was the need to have highly classified posts in these countries?

Q: Can you talk about your view of the Gulf War? This must have been déjà vu all over again.

KRYS: It was different. This [gave rise to] one of the more serious conversations one-on-one that I had with Secretary Baker. I then set out and went to the countries in the region where I thought we had a real problem [like] Pakistan. It was a rather elaborate itinerary with a day in a country meeting with the minister of interior saying, "You've got to protect our people." The phrase at that moment was when the balloon, or if the balloon goes up. It was deja vu in one sense but it wasn't in another. The last time that we had an areawide [worry about] our people was after the fact. That was after the hostage taking when the Iranians were inflaming the region with propaganda. It was claimed that we had violated Mecca, and we lost our embassy in Islamabad as a result of that. It went up in flames with loss of life, including two Americans and a number of Pakistanis who worked for us. The embassy in Tripoli was burnt to the ground, and attacks were made in other parts of the area. This [time] was before the event and my going out there was to say "Look, if something occurs, we want you to be ready" because there had been an incident in Pakistan involving the USIS library and there was a good deal of money going to small [groups] coming out of the Middle East. The most surprising reaction I had, without going into the actual meeting, was in Amman, Jordan because as you will recall at that time King Hussein was convinced that Saddam Hussein was going to do terrible things to American troops if we came in.

Q: We really are talking about when?

KRYS: Just before the Gulf War. Saddam Hussein was already in Kuwait, and we were building up our forces. We were telling Saddam Hussein what he had to do to avoid [war]. There was great feeling in the region, beyond Jordan. If you recall, the question was could Israel be kept out if it was attacked. There was a lot of feeling, but it was also a

time of very skillful diplomacy on the part of President Bush and Secretary Baker in forming the alliance. [They did] it very delicately. Larry Eagleburger, knowing the region as well as he did, played a major part. They did an extraordinary job in creating the coalition and working both multilaterally and bilaterally to build a coalition.

Nonetheless we were concerned in certain places. In Amman, Jordan the United States was building [a] new embassy which at that time [was] on the outskirts of town, and] has been referred to as Fort Apache. It was one of the few places where even after I left Jordan, I wasn't sure about the security of our people. In other places, I may have had some doubts, but the host country certainly was unequivocal in its stated desire to protect our people, irrespective of what happened. I had less of that assurance coming out of Jordan and as you know subsequent to the war, King Hussein reappraised his own stance and his own feelings as to the might of the leadership in Iraq and the rightness of the cause. It was quite a difference.

Q: When you left there, you didn't come away with the feeling that the Jordanian government and armed forces would necessarily keep our place from being attacked?

KRYS: They were stating in effect that they weren't sure if they could [protect us].

Q: It's a horrible admission.

KRYS: Yes, but they did, of course, and there weren't rioters in the street for the cause of Saddam Hussein. You know we took other appropriate measures with regard to numbers of people, how they went out, when they went out, and so on. I think the king really realized that he had lost an enormous amount of support in the region and subsequently he made those admissions publicly.

Q: What about what happened in Kuwait, the fact that Iraqi troops came into Kuwait and we had an embassy there? How did that effect you?

KRYS: We had an embassy and the embassy was essentially taken hostage. That is the wrong image if you think about how Tehran was taken hostage, as [Kuwait] was more encapsulated. We had constant communications. Our people were in the embassy on a day-to-day basis. There were supply problems and water problems but it was of a different nature. No one was hurt. The Kuwaitis really didn't go into the embassy and try to take it apart, and no one was dragged out. It was a different circumstance, but we were very concerned.

Q: Were you privy to the decision whether to keep the embassy open or not?

KRYS: I'm not sure what you mean by keeping the embassy open.

Q: In other words, we had the chance to evacuate our people there and we chose not to; I'm not sure.

KRYS: I'm not sure either. I certainly would have been privy to the decision, and I usually had come out on a very conservative side, but I think this was a night movement. You may recall there was the [question] about whether our chief of mission in Baghdad had made certain commitments [as] to what we would or would not do and this was an overnight strike. I don't really think that it was a decision that could have been made sufficiently far in advance to close our embassies.

Q: I'm thinking our people were in Kuwait surrounded by Iraqi troops.

KRYS: Right.

Q: There must have been a time to say let's ask Saddam Hussein to let them out, we're closing it down.

KRYS: I'm not sure we would have done that. It was much more likely that we were going to force Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait rather than lower the flag, but I would have to go back and review whatever material I have. I really don't remember that as part of it. We would have had to go in and ask for the sufferance of Saddam Hussein and that would have been a de facto recognition of certain circumstances that I don't think we were prepared to make. Our people were not under threat at that point. You have to remember a number of other things had occurred. We had people in Baghdad as well, so there really were other circumstances. I don't think that was a question, but I really will want to review notes.

Q: If you have a chance. At some point, we did take our people out of Kuwait before they were attacked, didn't we? Were they there during the attack when we came in?

KRYS: The embassy was closed out before we came in, but I don't think it was done on the sufferance of [Saddam]. I think there was an arrangement made but I really don't know. I was so busy doing other things that I don't really remember how that came about.

Q: When the Iraqis moved into Kuwait on August 1, 1990, did that come as a surprise that got you out there? The concentration of the State Department all of a sudden moved back to the Middle East.

KRYS: It was more of a process than an overnight situation, and I was aware for instance of an exchange of communications between the President and Saddam Hussein. He really was warned not to do this, and it was an extraordinary underestimation of the might of the American military by Saddam Hussein and not by the United States government. I don't think Colin Powell for a moment thought in terms of these thousands of body bags coming back. There was mention of what Saddam Hussein had done with the Kurds, with his own people, and with the Kuwaitis, and the possibility of what it would mean to the Saudis. In each instance, if you compared it to what you would face against the United States, there was no braggadocio there, they were just not on the same scale. The slaughter was about as expected [as] what we would be doing to the Iraqis. It certainly focused matters on the Middle East again.

Our ambassadors out there all had different views as to what we should do with regard to their own staffs and protection against chemical warfare and so on. They made their determinations based on what they saw as their threat level. That caused some real concern as to how to deal with it equitably and make sure that our people were safe. If you have all of the Israelis issued gas masks and protective clothing, or if you have the Marines being issued certain types of protective clothing in another country, and embassy personnel not receiving that, these were things we had to deal with on a case by case basis.

Q: I had a long interview with Chas Freeman.

KRYS: He's who comes to mind immediately.

Q: He was ambassador to Saudi Arabia, and there we had the problem of there being very strong reasons. We didn't want to take all of the Americans out of there, because they were helping to keep the oil fields going, which was vital. From what I understand, the problem was, you couldn't equip everyone including the Saudi populous, so the embassy felt rather uncomfortable, because they were not given the same treatment.

KRYS: I'd be interested in reading Chas' interview when you've written it up because I remember his very strong views at the time.

Q: Also I have the idea from other places that should we evacuate our people? There was great unhappiness in, I think, Muscat. They didn't see any reason to go, and they felt it would be insulting to the country to go.

KRYS: There was déjà vu. During the Iran crisis, there were some who were so bitterly opposed both to the policy and to those making the policy (I'm speaking of myself and a few others) that they were long in forgiving, if ever. But they were not sitting in Washington, and they were not looking at it from the perspective of what could be, including one post that was burned to the ground in Tripoli. There the chief of mission at the time (it wasn't an ambassadorial post; it was a chief of mission) literally was defying the orders of Washington. I may want to edit this later, but his country director and I almost got into a fist fight. He was ordered and as they were evacuating the building, it was broken into in the front and set aflame. The chief of mission, his wife, and others were literally going out the back door as the building was being put to the torch. That's how close it was when they got out of the country. He felt it would have been insulting, and it had never happened in this country before.

So you have a very different view. Some in the Gulf felt they were perfectly safe, and they may have been right, but the people in Pakistan when their embassy was burned to the ground and people were killed, had a greater understanding that it really could happen. We almost lost our American school at that time.

Q: Speaking of which, as one builds up the security of buildings, it still would strike me

that at a certain point terrorism could go after not necessarily the ambassador, who is pretty well protected, but a vice consul or the kids.

KRYS: Kids have been a different story, and that has always been nightmare. I can assure you that I did not, in three years, have a complete night of sleep for one reason or another when I was Assistant Secretary for Security. A nightmare really was, what if someone tried to attack a school bus? Here is one of the elements that is completely essential and that is human intelligence. You [need] an understanding that certain things are going on in a country which might lead you to take your children out of school that day or not have children [at post]. In Latin America where more threats come from than any other part of the world, again I would have heated discussions with our chiefs of mission who didn't want to see their children leave post. We could put armed guards with machine guns on the buses and take them to school. My own feeling, and [that of] others in the Department, was, if you have to protect your children every day with machine guns, they shouldn't be there and that really was the deal.

It goes down hard because the evacuation process is very painful. It is better than it used to be in terms of administrative handling, but it's still very hard. You're disrupting family life, you're disrupting school life and you [have to] determine how long people have to stay at a post. So there is a real fight not to leave and then there is a real fight to get back in. It has gotten better. My successors in management have done a better job, because they've learned from their predecessors as to what the disruption actually means.

Q: At the time you left in '92, did you feel that with the Gulf War and the change in what had been the Soviet Union, we were pretty much on top of things there?

KRYS: Are you talking about security?

Q: Yes.

KRYS: I suppose so, but you know it is really hard to say that. You continue to get requests for things that should be done in a mission when you don't have the money to do [them]. You know that the chief of mission has the ultimate responsibility, as did Pru Bushnell, our current ambassador to Kenya. She came in shortly before the bombing in Kenya, rightly. It's something we tell chiefs of mission: "You're responsible. Come in and say what the needs are." If you are sitting in the place where you have to say no, because the threat level doesn't sustain it or quite frankly you can only give them part of what they need because you believe the threat level does sustain it, you are in a very uncomfortable situation.

I can't say I would have felt on top of anything with regard to security. I didn't know what the next day was going to bring, and anyone involved in that doesn't know what the next day will bring; there were too many variables. I was dismayed [by] what was going on with the resources picture in the Department of State and what was going on with personnel. We were in serious decline and I couldn't see the bottom of it. It really has only been the last year or two that we started to bring in junior officers again and that's

the future of [the Service].

Q: Also you have all of these people in every part of the world sitting there plotting how to do nasty things to the United States.

KRYS: That's right, and you don't know from one day to the next. They could be plotting here in the United States. Every security measure that you take that is visible is seen as a sign either that you're lowering the flag, or that you're not strong enough, or you're not brave enough. On the other hand if you're not supplying certain security bits of equipment, it's seen that you don't care enough. It is a no-win situation.

Q: What happened in '92? Did you leave then?

KRYS: I left in August of '92, three years to the day. Tony Quainton came back to replace me. I went as a diplomat in residence at George Washington University.

Q: What did you do for that year?

KRYS: I had a marvelous time. Part of it was recruiting for a service that wasn't taking people, although three young women out of a group of five or six who were serious about going into the Foreign Service got into the Foreign Service taking the exam. I would give seminars on what the Foreign Service was and what the exam process was. I taught U.S. political science, U.S. foreign policy for a period covering 1946 to the present, the Cold War. I had wonderful guest speakers among my cadre. Bob Gallucci spoke when he was doing the negotiations. Mike Sterner spoke on part of the world. I had various people who had lived through the moments that they were describing, but the spine to what I was teaching really was the policy of containment. I enjoyed it enormously. I had very good students.

In addition to seminars I actually taught a class, although I could have chosen not to teach. I also did some work with them [and] the National Defense University on weekend simulations of war games and various scenarios. Not really war games but political situations like the Romanians threw out all the Hungarians and dammed the Danube River. I had a wonderful year, it was really a delight.

Q: Then you retired?

KRYS: I retired. During that time I went to Somalia at the request of the National Security Council. I led a team out to Somalia to advise the United Nations on how they might organize themselves a little differently. Jonathan Howe was the Secretary's representative out there, and he had a staff turnover rate of anywhere from two weeks to a month and then he'd have a new staff, so the training cycles were difficult. We issued a report while we were there and he implemented a few of the major ones and a few of the major ones weren't. This was before the tragedy out there.

Q: What was your impression of the UN operation and the interface of the Americans

with the UN out there?

KRYS: What a question. First of all, the interface was I'm sure anomalous in that Jonathan Howe was really bringing people from the United States to do a lot of things that probably UN careerists would do. The quality of the United Nations people ranged from really very good to really absolutely horrible. The structure and the chain of command there was quite unworkable. I never really understood the United Nations and then I realized after the experience, I understood [it] even less. You had a lot of people who reported to the people who were back in New York and derived their money and instructions from different offices in New York rather than the secretary's representative on the scene. You really didn't have a command structure in that sense, and you had money, but not necessarily allocated to the country.

Somalia was about the worst thing I had ever seen. There were thousands upon thousands of bodies just beneath the surface of the ground, and everyone would hear what would happen when the rains came. It was just awful. It was particularly awful when you realized that once you got out of Mogadishu and into the countryside, the country was self-sustaining and that these bandits were just isolated; they were still exporting meat while people were dying of famine in Mogadishu and elsewhere. It was really a terrible experience.

Q: What was your impression of Howe?

KRYS: I don't want to get into that. Jonathan Howe works 24 hours a day. I was there too short a time. I also remember when he was Assistant Secretary for Political Military Affairs, the joke used to be he would get in at midnight and leave one o'clock in the morning the following day or two days later. He was very, very hard working but [his] management style could and should have been different.

Q: Somalia and later on, Bosnia, left us with a very bitter taste about the UN in a crisis situation.

KRYS: As you know, I went to Bosnia after I retired, and they were very different situations. I had a stronger emotion with regard to the people in Bosnia, because I had served in Yugoslavia as you have. I had a stronger reaction to the horror of what I saw in Somalia because [it was] so widespread and the numbers were so vast. It was hard to see anything coming out of [it].

Q: You've continued to be called back for various things?

KRYS: For some things. I really wanted to make the psychological break and that's the reason I went as a diplomat in residence. There was some talk when I first left the Assistant Secretary for Security job that I would go to Yugoslavia as ambassador to succeed Warren Zimmerman, but then the country came apart so there was no Yugoslavia to go to, and the administration changed. Irrespective of those of us who served in career, and it doesn't matter what your political affiliation was when you came in, I came in with

Kennedy so there is no secret there. I think having been associated with presidential positions with two Republican administrations probably left its mark, so there really wasn't much for me to go to in the Department. A number of things were offered which were wonderful jobs, but I really didn't think it was something that I was going to make a unique contribution to and so I decided it was time to retire. I retired in February of '93.

Q: Since then, in your office now, what sort of things have you been involved with in the business world?

KRYS: This is a law firm and the law firm only takes on telecommunications clients. It has never really had an international side; it has been mostly radio and television and so it harkens back to my earliest days. Two of the senior partners were friends of mine, and I didn't come here until a number of months after I retired. I wanted to see what I wanted to do. I came here as a consultant for international affairs with the thought of growing some of their clients into the international scene and dealing with the U.S. government, [but] not [the] State Department. I deal with the State Department only on behalf of clients as any other business would as opposed to trying to sell them anything. I've had a few offers along that line from some of the telecommunications people and others and that's not been of any interest to me; I don't want to do that, even though I can deal in almost any area after being away this long.

What I do here is really look out for the interests of clients who are trying to establish themselves overseas. It has been four-and-a-half years that I've been here and a number of other law firms have referred clients to me. I've had clients in transportation, a cruise line company, an airliner, and telecommunications [and then] form the bulk of what I do. I go into places where either they have problems with proposed laws that the country is going to establish by way of privatization or want to be part of the private scene or are trying to make contacts there. It's fairly general but each client has a specific need.

End of interview