

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training  
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

**ALBERT ASHTON LAKELAND, JR.**

*Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy*  
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## INTERVIEW

*Q: Today is July 27, 1992. This is an interview with Albert Ashton Lakeland, Jr., who is best known as Pete Lakeland. This is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and I am Charles Stuart Kennedy. Pete, I wonder if you could tell me a bit about your background-where were you born and educated, etc.?*

LAKELAND: I was born in Baldwin, New York on September 10, 1929. I graduated from Lawrenceville school and Princeton and did a Masters degree at Columbia before I came into the Foreign Service.

*Q: What were you studying at Princeton?*

LAKELAND: I was an English major at Princeton and was in the Department of English and Comparative Literature at Columbia where I did my Masters degree. I took the Foreign Service exam while I was in graduate school because I decided that I did not want to get a PhD and become a college professor of English. Partly because Mark Van Doren said, "Look, it is much better to go out and see the world." I was then married and had a little child, so I figured I would not be able to see the world on private funds but might be able to do it on public funds.

My brother, who is about seven years older than I, Bill Lakeland, was already in the Foreign Service.

*Q: So the Foreign Service was not an unknown quantity.*

LAKELAND: Right. I had a brother in it, although I didn't see much of him after he went off to World War II. I knew of the Foreign Service so it obviously came to mind.

I entered the Foreign Service...perhaps I was singled out from the very beginning to have an out-of-the-ordinary career. When I was sworn in, normally people go to the Foreign Service Institute to take basic officer training, however, I was taken from swearing in to a job. I was staff assistant to the Under Secretary for Mutual Security Affairs.

*Q: Who was that?*

LAKELAND: I have forgotten because a week later he left and Bob Branes came into the position.

So I was plunked down at a desk with absolutely no instructions, no introduction to a boss who was about to leave. It had been a Personnel goof. A Foreign Service Officer...I guess about a class four officer...who had been assigned to that job had come down with polio in Manila.

After I had been in that job three or four months, doctors said that he would come on duty in a wheelchair.

For once the Service felt that it owed me something. They said, "we will promise you an overseas assignment." One was lucky to get an overseas assignment immediately after entering the Service. So I knew that I was going to get an overseas assignment, and went up to see the Personnel Officer in NEA and told him that I was here and knew that I was going to get in three months an overseas assignment. Did he have any ideas or suggestions? Well, he came up with a post as consular officer in Bombay, which turned out to be a very choice assignment for a brand new FSO-6...shortly to become a FSO-7.

I went to Bombay and...

*Q: This was 1956?*

LAKELAND: Yes, 1956. I entered in March, 1956 and after a very short time filling in and then FSI, I went in the beginning of September 1956. I was a consular officer there, which was a great assignment for a brand new officer. I was totally unprepared in the sense of being trained for what I had to do. Except for one thing. They did give at FSI a very useful course in visa work. I remember a guy named Mr. Aeurbach.

*Q: Yes, Frank Aeurbach. I remember him well.*

LAKELAND: Well, you probably had him too. Other than that the training was really nothing.

Anyway, that was a job that is now being done by four officers, including a senior officer. We were in an old rented building and the consular office was separated from the rest of the Consulate. I was up there all by myself with a staff of four Indian locals and did actually half of the consular work for India, because Bombay was the main area. I had some very interesting and somewhat amusing experiences.

*Q: Could you tell some of them?*

LAKELAND: Yes. As you know Bombay is a major port. The United States had just begun a gigantic push to get PL 480 wheat into India. We had at one time over 40 American ships waiting to get into the harbor, much less in the harbor. All the berths were tied up with grain ships, but we had such a backlog. There were obviously going to be some seamen with problems.

There were two that I particularly remember. There was a fight on a ship between the first cook and the second cook and the first cook ended up slicing up the second cook and putting him on the stove and cooking him or whatever. Fortunately, for me, the captain notified the Indian police, which he really should have. They came and arrested this guy and put him in jail. The next day they came and told me. The ship was owned by Isbrandtsen who then was a non-union line. They were very aggressive.

*Q: Very tough. They were going into China when we were telling people not to go into China. It was a very hard-nosed outfit.*

LAKELAND: Anyway, the crucial thing came when the ship was ready to depart and there was a hearing set. It cost something like \$2000 an hour for ships and there was a delay for this trial. Isbrandtsen raised hell with the Department as to why I hadn't asserted jurisdiction? Under the old regulations the consul can assert jurisdiction provided the local authorities had not taken jurisdiction. Well, I didn't even know that I could have. Their captain had called in the Indians before I was informed.

The ship is waiting to go and they are having a felony trial before the chief magistrate in Bombay. They out on the guy and he is all cut up and there are witnesses, etc. Then they call the accused and asked how he pleaded. He said, "Not guilty." So the prosecutor and the magistrate look at me and I say, "What do you mean, not guilty? Look at the man, he is all carved up." He said, "I am not guilty and plead not guilty." So the magistrate says, "Take this away and get something better." So they come over to me and say, "Tell that man to plead guilty." I said, "I am here as an observer and can't tell him to plead guilty to this kind of thing." They go on and say, "You have to do something, you are the American Consul." I say, "Vice Consul." This goes on and on so I finally say, "Well, look, if the matter is not adjudicated here, it can then be pressed in a Coast Guard court back in New York and you probably would be better off that way. At least you could probably get the charges...." The captain didn't know anything about that, but it turned out to be true.

They did some huddling and agreed to withdraw the charges. They called the accused back up and the magistrate then says, "Now, are you sorry that you stabbed that man and almost killed him?" "Well, I guess so." "All right, take this man..." And the ship gets out of there.

Another incident, there was an American seaman who died in a brothel in Bombay. There is what they call the cages there. He was Hispanic. Apparently his widow had a lawyer who thought she was going to get a big deal out of this and raised all kinds of stuff. When the notice of death went back there hadn't been an autopsy report. This lawyer was raising hell with the Department. The Department, of course, got scared and began bombarding me with telegrams. We kind of soft peddled it.

It ended up that he got the police report and the certificate of death and it was stated very graphically...so and so died in brothel number 44. The prostitute said that he was feeling ill and went for his pill. Apparently he was 70 years old and had a heart condition and died in anticipation.

One other interesting thing that I thought was pretty ingenious. Air India was seeking to open an office in New York. We had just had a breakthrough with an agreement with Air India landing rights. India had never signed a treaty trader treaty with us so they were unable to get a visa for their manager to go open this office. It was beginning to cause some difficulty. Their headquarters were in Bombay but they had been trying for this visa up at the Embassy and had been formally refused. To make a long story short, the man, himself, had been born in Kashmir. One parent had been born in what subsequently became Pakistan and one parent had been born in what subsequently became India. There was a loop hole, the Asia Pacific Triangle Corps. In the old days 100 visas were reserved for parents born in two or more separate court areas. The quota was under subscribed. I issued him the visa and became a hero. There was consternation in Delhi and cheers in Washington that we had found a solution to this problem through the partition of India.

I started learning Hindi while I was there, sort of in my own. I was ordered back for area language training. When I got there, there were only three students and two instructors. One was Pakistani and one was an Indian. With three students and two instructors they sort of had no choice but to split us up into two groups. Since I had already served in India and perhaps had a leg up, I ended up having private instruction. I finished, actually, both the Indian and Urdu material about three months before the course ended. Partly because I thought it wasn't really adequate. How could you have a course where a student could exhaust the material in less than the time, much less two courses.

I did a research paper. The head of FSI language school thought this was a big thing so he offered me a choice. I could either go the second year out at Berkeley for a year of area studies, which was normally the deal, or a special deal. He offered me three and a half months of detached duty in India with per diem and more or less unlimited travel funds with a job promised in the political section in the Embassy. So naturally I chose...

*Q: Before we go to that I would like to go back to Bombay. What was the political situation as you saw it in Bombay and what were the American interests?*

LAKELAND: I went there in September 1956 and United States relations with India were tense, to say the least. Beginning in 1957, something of a breakthrough occurred because the United States more or less decided to bail out the Indian second five-year plan. That was not entirely altruistic. A big part of it was PL 480 wheat which we wanted to get out of our granaries. So relations which had been quite tense, particularly...

*Q: Kashmir problem and the non-align movement when Dulles was feeling that if you are not with us you are against us.*

LAKELAND: Yes. What happened after Stalin died was that the Soviets made a big move towards India. Bulganin and Khrushchev came to India, struck an arms deal, and did all kinds of stuff. The Indians seemed to be moving close to the Russians. In fact they did move close to the Russians. Nehru, you know, was very prickly towards the United States. He did not like to be part of our global strategy. So it was sort of the height of the cold war period and India was, at that time, regarded as a key battleground between democracy and communism.

The Kashmir issue was very, very emotional in India. It is really very raw ethnic... sort of like Serb and Croatian feeling.

So that was the political situation. The United States was respected and somewhat feared, but not really beloved.

Oh, one other little thing. My first brush with the CIA occurred there. As consular officer I got to know a major Indian mathematician, who was really a world class mathematician. He had happened to have done graduate work at Princeton where I went as an undergraduate. When I got him a visa he sort of befriended me. I suppose because of the

old school tie, I was not a mathematician. He was a very interesting fellow. He also was interested in politics. I got to know him socially fairly well. Then he became the secretary of an Indian delegation which was the first non-bloc delegation that toured the major scientific institutions in the Soviet Union.

I mentioned this to the CIA chief and they wanted to interview this guy. I said that that was up to him. I said that I was not going to bring him to them, So they gave me a long list and asked if I would ask him these questions. So over lunch one day I started to ask him all these questions. Finally he said, "What is all this about? Who did you get this from? Did you get this from your CIA?" I said, "Yes, they asked me to ask you." He said, "Well, give it to me and I will fill it out, but I don't want to do it here." He did it and I think later they were able to establish some kind of relationship with him. They pressed hard. That was my first wake-up experience with the Agency.

Bombay was something of a bastion of the opposition within India. It was more pro-business, pro-American. I wouldn't say it was an anti-Communist bastion, but the men who more or less could challenge Nehru were centered in Bombay.

*Q: What was your impression as a consular officer in dealing with the Indian bureaucracy? I have never served in India but it has always struck me as being a very officious, difficult group of people to work with.*

LAKELAND: Actually, that was not my experience at all in India, mainly I suppose because I really had minimal and rather routine contacts with the Indian bureaucracy. We would get police clearances and things like that. A few incidents with the port people. As vice consul in the consular office I really had no problems with the Indians.

One other thing that happened, an American who worked for TWA got caught smuggling 44 pounds of gold into India, confessed and got sent to jail. I did go up and visit him in jail one time, but there was no problem there. Indian jails in those days were relatively decent places because almost all of the leading Indian politicians had served a lot of time in jail. So their jails were fairly spruced up in those days. Not places where you wanted to spend your vacations, but they weren't filthy, with poor food, etc.

No, I had no problems with bureaucrats in Bombay. There were a lot of very wealthy young businessmen who had studied in the United States who loved to invite Americans to parties. In fact it was a great place for a young officer in terms of being wined and dined by rich Indians.

After my language training I went up to Delhi and ended up spending a lot of that time in UP, Uttar Pradesh, the biggest state in India. It was the home state of Nehru. It was the political...sort of like the combination of New York and California, politically, of India. And it was also the center of the Hindi speaking belt, not all of India speaks Hindi. I spent most of my three and a half months up there.

*Q: What a wonderful way of learning. Sounds enlightened.*

LAKELAND: Well, it was and they never seemed to have repeated it. I would spend my day getting up and reading the Hindi newspapers, going down to the coffee house where I met journalists and politicians. I made excellent contacts that really stood me in great state later on. So many of the senior ministers from the central government had come from there or later came from there. Then I would go to a Hindi movie at night. I really got so that I was one of the few Americans who was pretty good in Hindi.

In Delhi, almost all of the Indians who Americans deal with speak English. When they don't want Americans knowing what they are talking about they speak Hindi. For conducting your business, Hindi is not a necessity, particularly to people who deal with the Foreign Office. But as I discovered, it is a tremendous asset because you get all of the asides and all of the by play whenever they don't want the Americans to know what they are talking about. Also their English makes much more sense if you know Hindi because they are frequently translating into English rather than speaking it.

My language background led to one very interesting and amusing assignment. I was the Hindi interpreter for Lyndon Johnson when he made his...

*Q: He was Vice President.*

LAKELAND: He was Vice President. He made his famous world tour through there. I discovered later that he had been a bear on Foreign Service interpreters. Two of them had been tossed out. One in Thailand, I think, and one in Vietnam. It was an amazing experience. The man was a colossus of energy and determined with an agenda of his own. He came there with a 707 plus a 707 load of American journalists. I was thrust into this job.

What would happen is, we had this sort of motorcade and he would be in the first car with Ambassador Galbraith. Then there would be a security car and then myself and then Lady Bird and Mrs. Galbraith. Wherever Johnson saw what he thought was a crowd he would jump out and start talking. Well, in India there is almost a crowd everywhere. I would have to leap out and try to catch up and listen to what he was saying. He would talk until he reached a point and then would stop. I then had to ad hoc translate for him. It wasn't technical translating so I was able to handle that part, I guess, pretty well.

He stayed there three days. He wanted to go down to visit the Taj Mahal, but they needed sort of a cover for it since he had all of these press people. They cooked up a visit to what I called, an underdeveloped and overdeveloped village. One village was kept poor and nothing had been done for it. Then they had a village that showed off their community development projects. It was in late April and on our way between the underdeveloped village and overdeveloped village...it was 117 degrees in the shade that day and we were driving along this great cloud of dust and Johns saw an Indian walking past this well. He decided to stop the music. So a giant party surrounded this Indian peasant. There were



Indian security and officials and Indian and American journalists and 6 foot 4 Lyndon Johnson and me standing next to him sort of bellowing at this poor Indian.

It turned out to be quite a comic situation. This guy was just taking a shortcut and it wasn't his place at all. This well was one of these Persian wells where they use bullocks and run down a rope and drag up giant skins of water, but it wasn't in use that day. So Johnson went into his routine about how when he was a boy in west Texas he used to have to water the cows. He got a bucket and got it down into this thing. He is saying how much water cows drink on a hot day. This guy says, "Cows don't drink a lot of water." Johnson couldn't understand it and the Indians are trying to keep a straight face and I am trying to keep a straight face. I said, "Well, the Indian cows aren't as thirsty as American cows." Then Johnson would say, "Well, it is still a lot of hard work doing that." The guy says, "It really isn't, the bullocks do all the work." So I am doing my best, faking it and Johnson finally says to this guy, "Now, you, the typical Indian man on the street, I want to bring a personal message from you to President Kennedy. What in your personal opinion is the best thing the United States could do for India?" So I translate this. No reply. I ask again. And he says, "I am just a little guy. I don't even know who President Kennedy is." Finally I harangued him into saying that he would like to have electricity in his village. Johnson had been making this oration about rural electrification program having been successful under the New Deal. So I said, "Yes, if America could only help to bring electricity to the village." At that point Johnson decided he had better quit while he was ahead. He beamed with great satisfaction and off we went to the overdeveloped village.

Indian people in general tend to affect a very, very meek exterior, especially when dealing in their official capacity. There was this woman in the village who was head of the development program there. She is giving her long spiel in a very restrained whisper and round about way. Johnson is getting very itchy. He wanted to get back to the plane and back to Delhi and have a beer. She is in her spiel and Johnson is getting really restless. Finally he said, they had some handicrafts on display, "Bird, don't you think that rug would look good in front of our fireplace?" "Yes Lyndon," she said. "Lakeland, buy that rug." The rug is not for sale, it was just on display. I asked how much they would take for it. He said, "You have money, you pay them." So I buy this thing and the woman starts her spiel again. Johnson says, "How about the other one?" Bird said that that would look good too. So he tells me to buy it and then tell the woman that we had to go. So I buy the toe rugs and off we go back to Delhi.

When Johnson was leaving, his secret service detail came up to me and said, "The Vice President would like to see you." I thought, "Oh, shit," because he was rather skeptical of the Foreign Service. But he patted me on the back and said something. I guess I was supposed to be very pleased. Later on Galbraith called me in and said, "You made a big hit with the Vice President." I said, "What did he say?" He said, "Galbraith, I don't know what your man Lakeland was telling those Indians, but they sure did like it."

In Delhi I was a political officer. We really hadn't had anybody who had a relish for going in what the Indians call the Mofussi, which means out of Delhi. I covered first north India

and did a lot of traveling and got to know a lot of Indian politicians, most of whom were my father's age, very senior politicians. It was like dealing with virgin territory. If you were a young officer in Paris you would never be able to get near these people. You wouldn't even get to their private secretaries. But governors of states and their ministers, the chairmen of the Congress and the opposition parties, I got to know all of these people quite well. They were very flattered that somebody from the American Embassy was interested in them. In their minds, because they are very status conscience, they decided that I was the third man at the Embassy. There was the Ambassador, then there was a First Secretary and then a Second Secretary. I was the Second Secretary. So that is how they reconciled relations with me.

Later I became head of the internal reporting for all of India. We had the India-China war in 1962. That was a really major event where China and India actually went to war and India turned to us for military assistance. It then led to the 1965 India-Pakistan war. There was a great change in America's relationship with India and the role of Americans in India. It really crested at that time. It later disintegrated back down to where it had been or worse, but that was sort of the plateau of Indo-US relations.

While I was in India, I served under three Ambassadors, all of whom were eminent men, political appointees. Ellsworth Bunker, John Kenneth Galbraith and Chester Bowles. I found that of them, only Galbraith was interested in Indian politics. He believed that he could win over Krishna Menon.

*Q: He was Minister of Defense wasn't he?*

LAKELAND: He originally became famous or infamous as the Indian representative at the United Nations where he clashed with the United States.

*Q: He was the symbol of everything America disliked about India for some time. It still rankles with a lot of people.*

LAKELAND: Yes, he had a gift for vituperation and nastiness. He was a brilliant man. A considerable gift to the English language. A great maneuverer and intriguer. He was called to become Defense Minister by Nehru. Galbraith thought that because the Kennedys had come in and there was a new era and they had some mutual friends in the left wing of the Labor Party, he could work with Menon. But that did not work out at all.

But generally speaking, not only did our eminent political ambassadors but our Foreign Service people really spent a lot of time in India without even leaving the United States if you ask me. Now I don't know which is right. Whether Foreign Service people should just be Americans in a foreign country representing their country, thinking like their country, interested in really reflecting Washington and the United States, or the degree to which they should seek to get a much more fundamental grasp of the country that they are in. Especially a country as different as India. India is totally different. It is a completely separate civilization. Independent of Western civilization. There are only three or four in

the world that still exist. Chinese, Indian and maybe Islam culture. Its own music, its own morality, its own philosophy, its own way of looking at things. Totally different society.

Our politics have really failed in India. We got very little for our effort and our money out of India. Our goals in India tended to be somewhat fatuous. There was a misconception that India was about to turn communist. There was also...I remember Ellsworth Bunker, who was a great gentleman and a fine man and devoted public servant, had real blinders in dealing with India and with Nehru. When he saw Nehru he saw a graduate of Harrow ad Cambridge, a gentleman, and very much believing that underneath it all here was a western gentleman who would be with the US in the heart of his soul. He was only nasty to us because he had to be, which was not true in my view.

Nehru was a dedicated more or less Marxist. He was basically Marxist in his thinking. He was a democrat bet he never had his democratic principles challenged because the peculiar political circumstances allowed him to operate as a democrat without a threat to his autocratic power. He was not friendly to the United States. He really believed that the Soviet Union was a more natural friend of India than the United States. And certainly his daughter, Indira Gandhi believed that.

The United States in 1957 made a fundamental decision to bankroll India's five year plans feeling that the alternative would be a communist revolution. I think that in retrospect that turned out to be a real mistake for India and the United States. It was really a Brezhnevian kind of regime. The kind of Romanian, Eastern European, Yugoslavia, and Soviet state economy which sort of guarantees poverty. India was not a communist society, but it was a statist society and its economy was real socialist/Marxist oriented. All the commanding heights of the economy were to be in the hands of the government. All the steel mills,. The trading, the oil, the aircraft, etc. If you look at the economic progress of India, where it was say in 1950 and where it is today, compared to many Asian countries...India had a larger GNP than Japan in 1950. Per capita GNP was greater in India than in Korea in those days. India really got off on a wrong path and I think, particularly in retrospect, although I tended to feel that way when I was an officer there, we should not have bought into subsidizing this big public sector which was really a way of maintaining the status quo, controlling the country. They eventually preempted the business community through this licensing monopoly system that they had. If you gave enough money to the Congress Party and hired enough relatives and the right Ministers and civil servants you were guaranteed a monopoly business position. So the Indian business private sector never made the contribution that it is capable of making. Indians are very capable businessmen. But India has lagged economically.

*Q: Well, within the Embassy were there any voices saying let's stay out? What was the alternative for example?*

LAKELAND: The alternative was to tell the Indians that if they want major assistance it would have to be channeled through the private sector. Now if you think you don't need it and can stay in power without it, more power to you. But why should we have subsidized

a left wing socialist economy which was gouging us on almost every issue in the world, merely because there was an implied threat that they might go communist unless we did it?

*Q: Was there any sort of division within the economic section or the political section while you were there about wither India and what American policy was?*

LAKELAND: Not that I was aware of. Occasionally you would get some peeps out of AID, occasionally out of the Commerce people, hut generally the word was that it was a five year plan. The Indians seem to have fairly impressive senior civil servants. Our officials who were dealing with the top level of the Indian civil servants tended to be impressed with what they were saying. "Well, we have to do this, once we let up, once you have control it leads to more control, to more control, more control." There was a tremendous reluctance to say, "Wait a minute, once you accept the first control then all the others follow." The Indians screamed that it would be imperialistic if we interfered in domestic affairs.

When Kennedy came in there was a feeling that the United States can work with these third world socialist countries. Galbraith certainly went there with that view. That there is nothing wrong with building third world democratic socialism. And it was not really challenged. In fact, the only real challenge came in sort of muted ways. The only way that this became attacked was when the India-China crisis reached a head. Nehru and Menon were very reluctant to give up the idea of third world solidarity. The Nationalist view and the anti-Chinese view then sort of became the pro-American view were more the Indian right wing, which had been very strong at the time of independence. In fact it dominated. Nehru really became Prime Minister almost by accident. These guys had a chance to challenge Nehru and Menon in 1962 and to some extent they did challenge and forced Krishna Menon out of office. Every once in a while there is a faint movement towards free enterprise and then it generally goes back into this socialist bureaucracy which is maybe 1 percent gain in the standard of living. I think the overall conditions in India consist of a lot of acute problems which haven't been addressed.

*Q: You were saying that the Americans who went there sort of remained Americans and didn't get out to see the people, but at the same time...again I am talking as a retired Foreign Service Officer who never served in India...one had the feeling that people who went to India got sort of absorbed by the Indian and pretty soon became ardent proponents of whatever happened to be going. The disease is called localitis. And India, to me, has always been one of the prime examples, but, again, only from a far.*

LAKELAND: I think certainly the Americans who served in India tended to take the side of India vis-à-vis Pakistan and vice versa, the Americans in Pakistan took the Pakistani side of that issue. And I think that the American Embassy people tended to deal with the elite of the Indian bureaucracy, who were very plausible people. Once you buy into...there are certain premises that we run the country but we have to run it this way, otherwise it would get out of control or otherwise the poor people wouldn't be heard. They had

plausible things that were never vigorously challenged. And I guess Foreign Service officers aren't there to vigorously challenge the assumptions of a government. It was a vested interest in the relations. There tended to be a corps of old India hands who had their contacts with the experts and could intermeditate with the Indian establishment. But I don't think that was who they were intermediating with. A Delhi elite establishment included many who had been educated abroad, but were left wing socialist in their economic feeling. Indians managed to establish the fact that because the United States favored Pakistan we tended to treat India in an imperialist way and that India had to defy us because we were arming its deadly enemy and that is why it was friendly with Russia. That view was rarely, if ever, challenged. Sometimes in Washington it was challenged, but I never knew it to be challenged in Delhi. Not vigorously.

Chester Bowles had a vision that India was like the United States in the 1820s. There was a populist school and a federalist school. He constantly was trying to...whether we were going to have Jackson or an Adams. He is a marvelous man, Chester Bowles, but he had such a crazy view of what was going on in India because the analogy couldn't have been less apt in my own view.

Another kind of amusing thing was the Jacqueline Kennedy visit. Jackie Kennedy's sister, Lee Radziwill, lived in London with her husband, Prince Radziwill. The Maharajah and Maharani of Jodhpur, great international jet setters, spent summers in London. They invited Lee and Jackie Kennedy to see them in India. It turned out that it couldn't be just a visit, it got into a state visit. It escalated up... Nehru made a decision that Jackie Kennedy would be given the exact same protocol treatment as Queen Elizabeth had been given when she visited India. So this thing really got escalated into a really big deal. Instead of going only to Jodhpur it became a national tour. But there was a three-day tour in Jodhpur.

I was assigned control officer for the Jodhpur stop which was divided into a day and a half official visit and a day and a half private visit. To complicate matters the Jodhpur family were the leaders of the Indian opposition. The Maharani of Jodhpur was the Parliamentary leader of the largest opposition party in Parliament and had out polled Nehru in the 1962 elections. For the first time Nehru didn't get the highest plurality in India.

To further muddy the waters, when Queen Elizabeth had visited Jodhpur six months or so before, to sort of stick their finger in the eye of the government, the Maharajah of Jodhpur staged a feudal ceremony which was the direct feudal relationship between the Maharajah and the Queen. He had excluded also the public from this thing and then held another reception to which he invited his friends and sold tickets.

So the powers that be were very, very furious ...well, let me put it this way, it was a very touchy visit. We had endless negotiations about every step and minute of what would take place during that visit.

Anyway it sort of went. I am going to tell a sort of out of school tale. At the end of this three-day visit...it was the last stop outside of Delhi, and that ended just at sundown. There was a dinner at the Embassy that night, which was the biggest social event of the Embassy. All the officers who had been control officers were invited to the dinner even if you were only a second secretary. To get a ticket to this dinner was the biggest thing not only in the American community hut in Delhi and I had a place. I was very much looking forward to it.

There was this elaborate departure ceremony from Jodhpur with an elephant and all this sort of stuff. Just as I was about to board the plane, 6 foot 8 inch John Kenneth Galbraith claps me on the shoulder and says, "Pete, come here." He says, "You are staying here." I said, "Why?" He says, "Because your job in the morning is to get Lee Radziwill back to Delhi." I said, "How am I going to do that?" "We are sending down a special plane for her. She is going to stay over with the Maharajah and the Maharani. The plane is going to be there at 8:00 to take off. I want you to have her at the airport at 8:00 tomorrow morning." And off he went, and off everybody went. Here I had to stay in Jodhpur to collect Lee Radziwill.

So I went over there the next morning, I guess around 7:30. They were having breakfast hut there was no sign of Lee Radziwill. They offered me breakfast. I said, "Well, you know we are supposed to catch this plane." The Indians were sending in a bomber! No sign of Lee Radziwill. About 8:00 this door opens and out walks Lee Radziwill arm in arm with an Italian journalist. She said, "Oh, by the way, Luigi is going back to Delhi with us." I said, "Oh, I think I can arrange it with the Indians." But I knew there would be a manifest for this Indian bomber and I didn't know if I could just add a name to it or not. But it all sorted out.

*Q: What was your impression of Ambassador Galbraith and how he operated?*

LAKELAND: I think he was probably the most effective of the three or even though in some ways the most misguided, if you will. He fought hard for the United States to finance one of these, what has turned out to a white elephant, public steel mills, and lost. But he presided over the change. India and China got into a war and there was a great flood of goodwill and the United States really rode high. They asked us for military assistance and all kinds of things. He was a sharp man and he was interested in my reports on what is going on in India, who is doing what to whom, etc. There is so much that is personal in India. It goes hack so many years when they were in jail together, or when factional fights in 1937 turned out to have been...very, very formative in India politics. I would write these things and he would love them. None of the others were interested in this sort of stuff. He also had a famous DCM. I don't know whether you ever knew Benson Ellison Lane Timmons III.

*Q: I know of him.*

LAKELAND: One of the most extraordinary Foreign Service Officers I have ever known. He was the bete noire of the Administrative part of the US Foreign Service. He was a man of enormous energy and a man of tremendous organization and detail and control. He left the running of the Embassy to Lane Timmons. Now under Timmons and Galbraith, partly because of the war, Delhi sent more telegrams than any other Embassy in the world at that time. More than London, more than Paris, more than Bonn, more than Tokyo, etc.

Timmons had a particular management style. He had an inner core of officers that were very much in his confidence and he really collected, almost as a personal staff around him. I had the good fortune to be one of them. My relationships in working were great. However, more than half were sort of in the outer circle. They were given sort of a hard time. The administrative section was always too little and too late with everything. Timmons was there from 7:00 in the morning and he read everything that had come in during the night. Then he would go down there and hang over the code clerks as they were decoding more cables as they came in. He would have all these cables and anybody who came into the Embassy, I guess we started about 8:30, he would see somebody coming in and no sooner were they at their desk than he was on the phone saying, "What are you going to do about such and such." The guy hadn't even seen the telegram. But that was his style.

Delhi was a very social place. You always went to two or three cocktails parties, a dinner or two. But every night before he went to bed he dropped by the Embassy and read again. So he was up on everything. And for a junior officer, I was still a second secretary, to be one of the favored few was very heady experience. Galbraith also had his favorites which more or less overlapped, but not entirely. I happened to have the good luck to be also one of his fair-haired boys. So I was within a fairly small magic circle. So to me it was a time when you could get things done and get the attention of the top people there. I could approach the Ambassador directly and certainly could approach Timmons directly. This didn't always sit too well with our counselors as I found out later from my efficiency reports.

My view...I went to some length to explain it, because from the perspective of some other people who served there they would have had quite a different view and quite a different experience. But I found that it was a liberating, very energetic, can-do kind of experience. Galbraith would send a cable to Washington on almost anything at any time.

I made a contact with a very large number of senior politicians who were not approached...Nehru was his own Foreign Minister and most of the cabinet officers, if they dealt with anybody it was the head of AID and usually they dealt with bureaucrats. I got to know a lot of these men quite well just because no other American, I suppose, ever talked to them. I would mainly go to talk to them about politics. I used to go and visit cabinet members in their office mainly to talk about politics. I also got to know a group of people who controlled the executive committee of the Congress Parliamentary Party. The Congress Parliamentary Party selects the Prime Minister. These people had a number of grievances. They tended to be anti-Nehru people. People who had lost out or who Nehru had allowed to be pushed out. This was the niche they found. some of them were Cabinet

ministers too. They tended to be a more conservative group, anti-Communist and very intensely anti-Krishna Menon group. These people used to consult me all the time. They asked me really seriously whether I thought the United States was going to give arms to Krishna Menon. I told them that I really doubted that the United States would give arms while Menon was still the Defense Minister. I didn't think the United States would have any hesitancy but I didn't think they would be inclined to provide our arch enemy with the means for his political salvation.

*Q: We are talking about after the Chinese Indian war had started.*

LAKELAND: Right. It had started. So this was taken, I later learned, as an official signal. They confronted Nehru when Parliament was reopening. They met with Nehru in the morning and demanded Krishna Menon's resignation. They said that among other things they had learned that the United States was not going to give any assistance while Menon is there. And Nehru fudged and tried to have Menon as Minister of State for Defense Production. And they weren't having that. So two of them went back to see Nehru again just before Parliament opened and said to him - they told me and I think it leaked out in the press later confirming it - that perhaps he didn't understand that we are not going to have him as Defense Minister in any Prime Minister's cabinet. And so, they gave him an ultimatum...get rid of Menon or he challenged for the Prime Ministership. And Nehru backed out. He announced when Parliament opened his acceptance of Menon's resignation as Defense Minister.

I later found out reading Galbraith memories of his years in India, that...

*Q: Called "Ambassador's Journal."*

LAKELAND: Yes. ...that he had been engaged in this private fierce war in Washington with the Pentagon and insisted that we not hold up military assistance for Menon's resignation. And had eventually carried the day, but fortunately the timing was such that Nehru announced Menon's resignation hours or days...I think it was the next day that the United States announced this massive military assistance to India.

You realize that here am I playing with history a little... I wasn't flying totally blind, at least in my own view. Timmons had asked me about this question. Obviously there had been some "EYES ONLY" or "NODIS" traffic going back and forth. He said, "What do you think about this?" And I said, "I think very strongly that it should be this way because of all our friends, etc." He said, "Look, you ought to write a memo to the Ambassador explaining the political situation here in India and what its implications would be in giving arms." So I wrote a memo laying it out very clearly that we should not do it...you know, recommending it very strongly. Timmons took it and gave it to the Ambassador and I never heard anything more. Then the Indians asked me. All this is going on in fairly tight time frame.



The Ambassador took my recommendations generally on political things, but in this case it turned out that he hadn't. But I had not been informed that he had made the other decision. But I had been asked for my recommendation, had put it in and had gotten no reply, either affirmative or negative. And when asked, I said that I don't think the United States will be doing this. This stiffen these guys and they confronted Nehru and that was the thing that pushed Menon out of office.

The United States decided to turn this thing into a great effort to solve the Kashmir dispute, which turned out to be a mistake. Harriman came out to crack heads and force the Indians and Pakistani to settle.

*Q: Harriman was Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs.*

LAKELAND: He was then Under Secretary Political/Military Affairs. Anyway, that operation turned out to be a big fiasco. I experienced the kind of amusing thing that happens to Foreign Service officers from time to time where the high and the mighty get their comeuppance when they step on the toes of a Foreign Service officer. I was given the job of taking Harriman over to Parliament to meet Nehru. He was having these big discussions with Nehru. We got into the Ambassador's limousine. Now in India they drive on the British side. I used to go to Parliament almost everyday and knew that when cars come in there they are going to open the door on the left hand side and there is little room to open a door on the right hand side. So I got around and sat in the right hand side going there.

Mr. Harriman took great umbrage about this. He asked me what I thought I was doing sitting in the place of honor. I tried to explain to him that when we arrive at Parliament you really want to be on the left hand side because of the way you enter. He said, "Don't argue with me young man. This is the flag seat. You get over there and I don't want to hear another word about it." I said, "Okay." He was in a terrible mood about something and he just wouldn't listen.

Well we drive up in this narrow space and this Indian in his full guard uniform opens the door and I am sitting there. Nehru is holding out his hand and I step aside and Harriman is across the way sitting there stony faced. He didn't know what to do. It would have been very difficult for him to slide across because of the big bump in the floor. So he is sort of sitting there stony faced waiting for somebody to open the door. Finally somebody comes in and gets his door partly opened. He gets out and is standing there on the other side of the car looking very uncomfortable and flustered. He comes around behind the car and I am standing aside there and he just shot me a dirty look. He never said a word about my being right or anything like that. He was blaming the whole thing on me. But I must say that I took a certain pleasure in the event.

*Q: We have to find our pleasures where we can.*

LAKELAND: One of the things from my personal memories...Nehru was getting old and starting to get ill. His political reputation had been considerably eroded by the China-India war. He had been first of all against military expenditures. He wanted the military established to be very small. India didn't need a defense establishment, the Chinese were to be trusted, the Americans were to be trusted, etc. So a great subject of interest and speculation over the years was after Nehru who?

So a lot of my last year in India was exploring this idea. I came up with the idea that a relatively...an Indian politician who was not well known to the Western world at all and not featured in the foreign press at all, Lal Bahadur Shastri was really the logical choice. You give all the dynamics of the left and the right and they could agree on him. So I went around and talked to a lot of Indian senior politicians about this. They loved to talk about their politics with any American. I said, "What do you think? Do you think that Shastri...I think when it comes down to it that he is the logical choice." So I made the prediction that he would be the one. When Nehru did die, relatively shortly after that, it was a big coup that I had discovered who the next Prime Minister was.

I'm also convinced in my own mind that I simulated a lot of the thinking among the Indians that "Yes this is a solution." Unfortunately Shastri only lived for about a year and a half.

*Q: He died in Tashkent.*

LAKELAND: Yes, in Tashkent. Anyway, after Delhi I was summoned back to the India Desk office.

*Q: This was in 1963.*

LAKELAND: Right, September 1963.

*Q: You went to the India Desk where you served from 1963-65. What did the India Desk officer do in those days?*

LAKELAND: Those were my two by far most frustrating years in the Foreign Service. To me it was the Foreign Service at its worst. I am speaking subjectively.

*Q: That is what these interviews are about.*

LAKELAND: Remember what I said about how things were really great for me personally as a relatively young officer, class 4 officer there in Delhi and particularly under Galbraith and Timmons. I am dealing with cabinet ministers and heads of the party. I knew the heads of all the parties. Within the Embassy the chain of command was not oppressive, direct access to either the Ambassador and the DCM was available.

I found that the SOA (in the NEA Bureau there were three divisions, one was called South Asia (SOA) and included India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Bangladesh, Nepal, Afghanistan) was really a very bureaucratic operation. I had the unfortunate, I guess it was the reverse of my good fortune in Delhi...my immediate superior was a man who excelled at all the routine skills of the Foreign Service. And I really think lacked the non routine. But he was a very good bureaucrat for organizing and producing routine work and decision consensus clearance, etc. He was somewhat resistant to new ideas. Anything that upset the consensus. There was bound to be some...you know I am used to wheeling and dealing in high policy and whatever. I felt my talents tended to be much under used. Essentially, it turned into something of a two year battle where I was more or less pitted against the rest of the office and bureau because I had become convinced that India and Pakistan were on collision to go to war. And that this would really deep six more than a decade of US policy and umpteen billion dollars that had been poured into both countries, particularly India, to ward off such an event. I was convinced that this was going to happen because a number of things had been set in motion by the India-China war. There was a consensus that India and Pakistan always pulled back from the brink. This was a dogma. It was the word and India and Pakistan would go to the brink of war but would pull back. A large part of my experience was interpreting events and saying, "We are going to a war."

*Q: What were some of the things that brought this about?*

LAKELAND: Well, India decided to try to consolidate its hold in Kashmir beyond the status quo anti. Nehru had had a sort of puppet thug in there and his regime collapsed and they had to take more direct control. The more India decided to more directly integrate Kashmir into India then it had been previously, that set the Pakistanis going. In addition to which India was massively arming. The theory was that India now needed an army not only big enough to check Pakistan, but equally to check China. The Paks saw this as "we know who this army is going to fight and it is not going to be China. But before the Indians can really get going...this is our last chance. The Indians are trying to foreclose anything new on Kashmir. They are going to go beyond even what there previous "aggression" was and fully integrated constitutionally in India. And they are going to have this great big military buildup which is going to end up sitting on our heads." The Paks felt that it is now or never for them. The Indian military, smarting from their rather humiliating defeat by the Chinese were kind of spoiling for a fight with the Paks.

So you have some very important new elements in the situation. It just, to me, added up that the Paks were going to push it beyond where the Indians would take it and the Indians were going to push it beyond where the Paks were going to take it and there was going to be a war.

Sort of fighting that bureaucratic battle was really quite an unpleasant experience, because it wasn't appreciated at all. In fact...I couldn't get out of the job, when my two years were up they didn't want to let me go even though I am in constant battle. I had to find my own replacement, find my own next job.

I finally left on August 15, 1965. I hadn't gotten my efficiency report in July when they normally are done. On my last day I got my efficiency report. I will never forget something in it. There was the usual stuff and then "However, Mr. Lakeland's usefulness to the office and the bureau over the past year has been very constrained by his instance upon pressing the warning bell of the dangers of a Pakistan/India war thereby making the achievement of a bureaucratic consensus more difficult." I was a naughty boy.

About five days later the war broke out. After it was all over, and the promotions came out, I didn't get promoted. So I went to the Boards and asked them what happened. "Well, you were judged in the middle of your class." At that point I thought, "Look, I am willing to say that if you stick out your neck and you are wrong you are going to get your head cut off, that is fair enough. But when you stick out your neck and you are right and you get your head cut off, I don't like it." So at that point I made up my mind that I was going to start looking for something else. That is why when I got an offer from Senator Javits a couple of years later I took it. It turned out to be the greatest thing I ever did. But that experience really soured me on the Foreign Service. It is not fun fighting with your superiors and trying to make it an argument of substance. I found those years very frustrating and most of the work was very routine, low level kind of work.

Another anomaly, I was also placed in a very difficult situation. I was still at the Embassy when Bowles came back, but I left a couple of months after he came back and took over. He had formed an impression of me that I had been one of his fair-haired boys because he was told by people that I knew a lot about India and that I got along with Indians very well. Actually I had a very different view of India from him.

He had a very romanticized view. He and his wife used to walk around in saris and this kind of stuff. So he and the Bureau and also the office had major differences of opinion. He wanted this big new thing. He abolished the political and economic sections combining them into a political/economic section. He did all kinds of stuff and he really thought that we were dealing with the Indian populace and we had better do this, that and the other thing. He made an enemy of the head of the Congress Party, who was the king maker. He took him on because he didn't like the bosses....

He and Phil Talbot, who was Assistant Secretary of State, and the general bureaucracy were on different wavelengths. He had just been Under Secretary of State and believed himself to be very much a Washington political figure who had been right about Vietnam and had been ousted. So he used to come back to Washington almost every two months or so. I was designated to be his special assistant while he was back.

It put me into a very difficult position because he regarded me as his trusted agent and the bureau regarded me as their spy to tell them what he is doing because he is operating on his own. We are going around to see everybody...going to see Rusk, Ball and McNamara, Orville Freeman of Agriculture and Carl Rowen, head of USIA. He is wheeling and dealing for India and I am his special, trusted assistant. He is a very open man and when I

go back everybody asks me what he said. I was in a major dilemma. I could not satisfy either side in this situation.

But I did get to go in Washington to a lot of very interesting and high level meetings and experiences...I was used to that kind of stuff in Delhi, but as a desk officer you never got it. He would come into town and he and I would go to see Dean Rusk and talk not only about India but about everything. George Ball and McNamara, the whole smear. It was interesting. He had a rosy view of India's political situation and, of course, did not believe there was going to be a war, and if there was a war it would be totally Pakistan's fault. I had a different view of that and was saying a different view of it back in Washington. Because I had been a good political officer in Delhi one of the ways they figured they could sort of use me...because I didn't fit too conveniently in the slot I was in, they assigned me to the job of politically second guessing the Embassy's political reporting. Reinterpreting what was going on because they didn't have confidence in the Embassy's political reporting. The negative would be politically reported and the stuff that was positive would be overblown.

So I had a rather miserable two years there on the Desk. I had one experience which is typical of Foreign Service officers, more mainstream. I was the notetaker whenever the Indian Ambassador came in to see the Secretary of State or the Under Secretary. Just before the India-Pakistan war there had been some skirmishing and the Paks sort of made a deal with the Chinese that the Chinese would rattle their saber to pin the Indian divisions down in the east so they couldn't be transferred to build up against the Paks. The Chinese dully rattled their sabers saying that if India invaded Pakistan we will move in the east.

B.K. Nehru, who was Nehru's cousin and the Ambassador, came in to see Rusk to make an extraordinary request which never really surfaced in history. Knowing the way the Indians talk and knowing the thing, you know, and the Indians leave and you come around the corner and it is there. So I am sitting there writing just as fast as I could write trying to get every single word because I knew B.K. Nehru was coming in to ask the United States for a security guarantee that we would intervene militarily if China resumed hostilities with India.

Now this is something the Indians said they would never do. They would take military assistance but they had begun to get snotty, they didn't really need it. They had gone way back again to being arms length...we'll do you a favor and on our terms take some military assistance. Here they came in asking us to come in and chase the Chinese out if they come back in again. I was very sensitive to what he was leading up to and I am literally writing as fast as I can in order to get every single word. So when he is finished there is sort of a pause. I look up and Secretary Rusk says to me, "Did you get that down?" I felt like saying, "What the hell do you think I have been doing scribbling, getting writers cramp?" He was a little surprised by the request and to have a notetaker there at an historic moment.

So the United States did issue a muted warning and did send a carrier into the Bay of Bengal, but it all sort of faded away. But that incident never got into the history books.

*Q: I heard reference to it some other time, at least at a later date there was talk about a sort of assumption on the part of some Americans and some Indians that there was an agreement.*

LAKELAND: Yes. And the government of India officially denied it and we said nothing. There was an Indian who later on had access to this and surfaced it in a way on a trip to the United States that raised some great interest and the Indian press went wild over it and the Indian government absolutely denied it and we never said a word.

But I was there. I came back down and they all wanted to know what happened. I said, "Wait, let me write the telegram." So it went out as a "NODIS IMMEDIATE" to Delhi. Then Nick Veliotis, who was a political/military officer in Delhi, never saw the telegram. The DCM later asked him, "What are we going to do about this?" And he said, "What about what?" He finally, with great difficulty, got to read the cable. I guess they held it in the front office. Being a notetaker you can be there at interesting times.

From there I went to another very interesting assignment. Well, to get off the Desk, this is a very interesting thing because it supposedly is out of Foreign Service experience. My tour of duty is up. It is time for me to move on. I ask what is up and get a job offer in another Bureau. They say, "Well, we are not going to release you until we get a replacement for you satisfactory to us." I said, "What does this mean? Personnel assign officers. They have guys in Delhi. I know two guys in Delhi who are perfectly capable of handling this job." "No," they vetoed all the NEA Personnel nominations. Now this is ridiculous. This is a crummy little Desk Officer job. And we had been fighting for two years anyway. And I was really kind of desperate to get out of that place.

Now there was an Indian analyst over in CIA who was well liked and well regarded. I asked whether they would take Herb Hagerty. They said, "Oh, yeah, Herb we would take," not thinking anything would come of this. So I persuaded him to resign from the Agency and come over and become a desk officer. He got a Reserve appointment and later became an FSO and took my place. That was the only way I could get out of that damn job.

*Q: Just out of curiosity, what was behind this? They gave you an efficiency report that stabbed you in the back, so why hang on.?*

LAKELAND: I don't know.

*Q: Who was next in line above you?*

LAKELAND: Dave Snyder. Anyway, it was Carol Laise who didn't want to let me go. Those two years, getting in and getting out were the worse two years in my life.

Then I went to the Far East Bureau. I was two years there. The first year I was senior staff assistant and then special assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State, Bill Bundy. I arrived there just as this enormous military build up in Vietnam took place and had a real bird's eye view of that whole escalation and operation which was quite historically fascinating, interesting and exhilarating. But ultimately really quite worrisome and depressing as to how the system worked or didn't work.

*Q: Bundy was really in charge of Vietnam. The rest of East Asia was for the most part parceled off to other people wasn't it?*

LAKELAND: Not the rest of it. Me was officer in charge of Vietnam for the war. He had amazing contacts. When I got up there he had come from the Pentagon where he had been ISA, Assistant Secretary for Intelligence, and had personal relations with McNamara. His brother was National Security Adviser, George Bundy. So he operated at a very high level and occasionally stepped on Mr. Rusk's toes by presuming a little more than an Assistant Secretary should presume.

He left certain things to others, particularly the whole Indonesian aborted revolution and a number of other things. He took great interest in the China question and a fair amount of interest in the Japan question. But Vietnam and China were definitely his bailiwicks. He was a very, very intelligent and very, very energetic man. But he was trapped into a very flawed policy which he was one of the creators of and ...

*Q: Well, what was the atmosphere? This is a particularly interesting time because later on things weren't going well, but at this point, 1965-67, what was the atmosphere that you were feeling?*

LAKELAND: It was a Service exposed to enormous political and other pressures from above to the books, really is what you would have to say. There was to be no questioning of policy. There was to be no questioning of how things were going. If you are not on the team get off. We don't want people who support the policy passively. We want cheer leaders, we want gung-ho, we want Peace Corps types. It was terrible. All the guys who really knew something about Vietnam either got canned or took the fastest route they could to get out of there. Certainly there was no political analysis of Pentagon strategy or Pentagon claims, of political victories or second guessing CIA's strategies or whatever.

Unfortunately I wasn't the author of this, The State Department's strategy in dealing bureaucratically with the Pentagon is one of preempted capitulation. The officers who knew best and had questions were really very pointedly discouraged from raising any questions or increasing the analysis or asking if we should be making any other plans, etc. It went so far...it was the Chinese who were the bad guys who were feeding the hard-line in Hanoi. Dean Rusk by that time...this was a dowdy little Syngman Rhee democracy government in South Vietnam defending this foreign invasion. He always talked about foreign invasion. They just got hunkered down more and more in their own little slogans and hallow little policy that closed in on itself that everything was going well.

It was very discouraging and its impact on the Service and the Service's response to it was very poor. Nobody stood up for independence of Foreign Service officers.

Now, fortunately, I was totally in a staff position so I was not involved in the substantive battle. I had a very, very privileged and interesting vantage point because everything came across Bundy's desk. It was a chore of a job, it was six days a week, ten hours a day kind of a job. People always operating just at the point of almost hysterical fatigue. People's nerves had frayed ends, terrible fatigue, totally impatience with reconsidering anything that had been worked out bureaucratically, etc.

I got a very good insight into what was driving bureaucratically policy in Vietnam. You really had almost a mutual check kiting system. The Pentagon would make sort of baloney claims...body counts and all that kind of stuff, villages that had been pacified. And then the Embassy and the cooped Foreign Service officers would take that statement at its face value and then kite it into political offense, the tied is turning politically, the population is turning, etc. They were just kiting back and forth nonsense.

The Pentagon knew that what it was saying wasn't true, and the State Department in its heart of hearts knew what it was saying wasn't true. But if the Pentagon said it had pacified all those villages and that is true, well so are the political consequences of it. The bureaucracy in the Service was not allowed to and certainly not invited to perform an independent expertise function. You know, alternative planning, questioning what is going on. Certainly the State Department was told in no uncertain terms don't question. What the Pentagon says it is doing or wants to do, don't question and don't question what CIA wants to do. There were some hard fights between CIA and the Pentagon. Particularly over pacification. But from my involvement, the State Department was an innocent bystander in that battle.

*Q: You weren't having sort of young officers, like you did in India, coming back and saying they had gone to these places and things just are working?*

LAKELAND: It would never get out of the Embassy. It wasn't coming back in reports. Guys who knew it, and there were a lot of guys who traveled and talked, would come back and talk about it among themselves. There was a cadre of young officers who knew a lot of this was bull shit.

The military guys were thrown into a political/military role. For them the political part had nothing to do with their military career. They were there to show progress. And by Christ if they pacified a district you could bet that within 18 months there would have been marvelous progress in pacifying that district. If they had been there to train the Vietnamese and the Vietnamese were to eliminate corruption, etc., you could be damn sure that in 18 months corruption had been wiped out and discipline and professionalism had been installed. There was to be no second guessing of this stuff at all.



I personally, because I saw everything that came in from the highest classifications...Bundy was a omnivorous reader and wanted to see almost everything that was worthwhile. I literally saw everything that came into the Bureau. So I got a very interesting personal education in Chinese, Japanese, Korean affairs which served me in considerable good stead in my sort of next incarnation.

One little anecdote I want to mention. Because of all this fetish about leaks and particularly this business about leaks on the Hill...while I was Bundy's special assistant, the White House sent...Bill Moyers sent somebody over who was a biographer who was doing unauthorized biography of Henry Cabot Lodge, who had just come back from his second tour as Ambassador in Vietnam. His Vietnam experience was something the guy wanted. Moyers told this guy he should go over to Bill Bundy who would let him read Lodge's cables. So this guy got passed on down to me with instructions to pick out a selection. Every Monday there used to be an "EYES ONLY" from the Ambassador to the President of his personal assessment of the political situation and whatever else about Vietnam - "TOP SECRET" "NODIS" "IMMEDIATE." I said, "Well, what do I do? Just give him the file?" He said, "Well, just go through and pick out about a couple dozen of these things that seem to be representative of his reporting and give them to him. If he wants to make copies, give him copies." The guy wants them all, so I make copies of 24, "TOP SECRET" "NODIS" telegrams to the President and give them to this guy. Later on I found a remainder volume in a bookstore of this guy's biography in which he is quoting verbatim from these cables. Now this is the Executive Branch that is complaining about leaks to the press and leaks on the Hill!

*Q: Was there anything else we should cover there?*

LAKELAND: No, I think that is more than enough on my years in the Foreign Service.

*Q: So, we are now talking about your whole new career.*

LAKELAND: I would just like to go back for a couple of minutes to sum up. I have some observations of the Foreign Service and my life in it. Some positive and negative things which were occurred not only while I was in there, but I also had a very interesting perspective on the Foreign Service while I worked up on the Hill. Both because I traveled a great deal about four times a year and I also dealt with the Department from the Hill. I have a lot of thoughts which I am going to try to boil down.

I learned some very valuable things in the Foreign Service. I think the best Foreign Service officers are able to do a task better than anybody else. That is what I would call the task of really accurately reflecting a conversation with somebody in an openly or covertly adversarial position. All foreigners to a certain extent are in adversarial position. It was summed up to me once by one of my bosses early on, about it being very important to report what the other person said rather than what you thought he meant, or worse of all, what you wished or wanted him to say.

I also learned that a really good Foreign Service officer reports facts and substance and then labels his comment. You should not intersperse comment throughout a report. When you analyze you let a free play of what the positions are on both sides. If it is an analysis or a conversation, the comments should be labeled as comment. It is more effective that way at the end. I think I learned that, I tried to learn that. I did a great deal of interviewing my last years in Delhi when I dealt with a lot of people who were really far above my rank. I became very conscious to remember exactly what it was that they said. Sometimes when I would reread my notes I realized that the conversation was important but not for the reasons I first thought it was when I was doing it.

Another thing that I might comment on and generalize. I remember one time Galbraith said that the Foreign Service officers that he had met and served with, particularly in India, as a whole were the most intelligent and best educated group of, then, men, that he had ever been associated with. But that they were miserably used. He was obviously comparing them to the Harvard faculty where he had been. It was very high praise. He had very high praise for the basic intelligence, education and integrity, etc. of Foreign Service officers, but thought that ultimately their product and contribution was very disappointing.

And I think that I come to that same conclusion. I have many Foreign Service friends and I think after the initial period, most, not all, Foreign Service officers tend to shrink rather than grow. I think the Foreign Service is a strange institution where the whole is less than the sum of the parts. That the individual officers taken as individuals tend to add up to more than the Service taken as a whole and the role it plays. How much of this is the fault of the Service...

*Q: Kissinger is supposed to have made that remark too. That whole is less than the sum of its parts.*

LAKELAND: Well, I think so. You deal with a lot of people in the Foreign Service who are, I think, sort of trained after a while-maybe after ten years - to be reticent, don't rock the boat, don't stick your neck out, don't step on toes, it really isn't appreciated, it really isn't your role. There is a cushy, interesting life in the Foreign Service, but it requires a tremendous amount of conformity. For that I blame the officers for allowing that culture to flourish and dominate. There are other cultural, political and historical reasons why the Foreign Service, I think, hasn't been utilized like say the British Foreign Service was traditionally utilized ' where they had a major say in shaping the whole well being of Britain. Japanese senior diplomats are much more powerful than our diplomats.

I felt at the time, and then since, that about ten or so years in the Foreign Service could be a great experience, unmatched if you are interested in Foreign Affairs. But after ten years, the second ten years were more apt to be a shrinking experience rather than a growing and expanding experience. That is where they really bang down any nails that are sticking up. Sometimes, if they survive the second ten years, they can have extraordinary careers. Larry Eagleburger is one. Frank Carlucci is another one.

But again, as you mentioned before we started taping, usually it is somebody who gets a patron outside the system, although sometimes in the system. To really escape the black hole of the second decade you really have to be swept up into the entourage of a powerful figure who gives you your head and utilizes everything you can give him and more. That is what stretches you.

That is sort of a good lead into my second career because it had a lot of relationship and continuity to my first career. In the spring of 1967, out of the blue I got a job offer...well, somebody asked me if I would be interested in interviewing with Senator Javits who was looking for a new staff member with a good foreign affairs background. As I said earlier I was ready to go. My next onward assignment presumably would be doing in the Philippines something I had done five years earlier in India, internal reporting, and that did not seem like much of an onward, growth and challenge job.

So I went over and met Javits' administrative assistant and then Senator Javits. I think it was 20 days after I first went over...I had resigned from the Foreign Service and was working for a very extraordinary man, powerful US Senator. But I had to make a decision quickly. I think it was maybe 20 days...for a Foreign Service officer to give up his security blanket... But I did it and never looked back. It was the greatest thing that ever really happened to me professionally and to some extent personally.

I went from the Foreign Service to the Hill. I was hired as an executive assistant and foreign affairs and security adviser to a senior senator who was unique in himself. He was a legend in the Senate. A man of almost demonic energy and an extraordinary mind, a mind which was interested in everything. Fortunately for me he was most interested in foreign affairs. But that didn't mean that he didn't do everything else, he did. We formed a very close personal working relationship. He was a man who never held you back. He was always encouraging you and asking you and demanding you to do more. You couldn't overwhelm him with information, initiatives, advise, etc.

It was a very liberating experience for me and an extremely enticing and to me congenial atmosphere. Totally non bureaucratic. He and I did things. We did things on the run. We did all kinds of things together. He, unlike some Senators whose ego gets in the way and keep their staffs in place....there were some of the big names who never became president because they couldn't stand to have staff who treated them sort of frankly. Javits was the opposite. In fact, he once said to me, "I don't want anybody on my staff who doesn't know more about his subject than I know." That is an extraordinary admittance. He said, "Because he is no good to me. If I know more than he, why do I want him around?" That was his attitude. But he had great confidence that whatever you threw at him, he could size it up. His background had been as a trial lawyer. Before he was elected to the Senator he was attorney general of New York state. I always likened our relationship to that of a barrister and a solicitor in the English system where the solicitor prepares the case and the barrister argued it. And he liked that. He wanted you to do everything that a staff person could do and only give him what a Senator must do. And there were a lot of things that

only a Senator could do and a lot of staff things that a Senator shouldn't have to do. So we had a great division of labor. I was there from May 1967 until February or March of 1981.

Senator Javits was a man of unlimited energy and unlimited interest. So the whole world was of interest to him. We were heavily involved in the Indochina war question, the congressional struggle to limit the war out of which grew the War Powers Act, which I will come back to. The China question. He was a delegate when the Chinese representation reached its peak. We dealt with Japan on trade and political issues. We passed a law, the US-Japan Friendship Act, which was our initiative. The Middle East, of course, with Senator Javits being sort of the primary American spokesman for the Jewish community. We were very involved in Middle Eastern questions. We traveled around there. Javits was very, very interested in Europe and NATO, We went at least twice a year. He was very active and prominent in the NATO Parliamentary Organization. We got into arms controlled issues. US-Soviet relations through arms controlled issues, and the Soviet Jewry issue. He was very interested in economic development issues.

So, you name it. He was anxious to get into it. He was one of the most influential members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and if not, cumulatively, I think he was the most influential, because he was interested in everything, and a man of brilliance and great forcefulness who learned, and learned and learned, traveled and traveled and traveled.

That was an incredible 14 year experience with Senator Javits. Most of that time I was on his personal staff. In 1978, a change took place. The Republicans decided that they were going to do something that had never been done before, which was to insist upon a splitting of the Senator Foreign Relations Committee staff into majority and minority. There had always been a unified, non-partisan staff, which had advantages and drawbacks. But there was always the option under the rules to have a Senate minority staff and when the Republicans decided to do that, I was selected as the first minority staff director of the Senator Foreign Relations Committee.

Most of my work earlier had been really not as a Committee staff member, but I had a couple of years as a Committee staffer in a position of direction in planning the work on some big things including the SALT II Treaty and some other bills. So I had a range of involvement, and interest and experience, again, that I think...I don't know anybody else who had that range of involvement and experience.

Now the limitation was that I was always a Hill staffer. You can have a tremendous amount of influence, in fact the old saying on the Hill is that a staffer can get almost anything done as long as he doesn't claim any credit for it. And that was true. Javits was very highly respected by all the Secretaries of State that served while we were up there and met with them frequently. I was generally present at these meetings but not always. Frequently I was in part of the conversation. Something I never could have done as a Foreign Service officer.

I did a lot of legislative drafting, some are routine laws and some are innovative laws. That was a period when there was a struggle between the Executive and Legislative branches over foreign affairs. Before that, ever since World War II, there had been complete dominance of the Executive branch in foreign affairs. The consensus broke down, fell apart and became very embittered over the Vietnam war. First under Johnson over his covert way of handling it and then under Nixon and Kissinger and their way which was almost even more confrontational.

What I felt was the extraordinary nature of my experience and my good luck of hooking up with Senator Javits. That was a man for the ages. He was just extraordinary. Very brusque, abrupt. We had a very close relationship but neither of us ever tried to make it into a personal palsy-walsy relationship. He treated me with the great personal respect. When we would go abroad to visit a foreign minister or a prime minister, he would introduce me as his colleague, instead of my assistant. That's the kind of man he was.

I came over there in early 1967 and the controversy over Vietnam was really beginning to become the center of the agenda. Now I had come from a privileged position. I had been special assistant to Bill Bundy and had as much as a Foreign Service officer of my rank could have, a bird's eye view of the internal dynamics of running the war so far as the State Department was concern. So I had sort of a leg up on a lot of people.

About the same time I came up there to work for Senator Javits, another guy, Bill Miller, who had also been a Foreign Service officer, came up to work for Senator Cooper. I always felt that we really started a new profession which was foreign affairs professional on Capitol Hill. We had both been Foreign Service Officers. He had been an Iranian expert and had worked in the Secretariat before he came over. He had been staff assistant to the head of the Interdepartmental Regional Group. So he had access to a lot of key bureaucratic stuff. Our bosses worked close together and we worked close together. We became very close friends and good colleagues. We found that we were providing a new level of staff support, a new type of staff support, an input and strategic advise and tactical advise. We were gradually joined by some others.

We really tended to change the balance in terms of expertise and influence. Sometimes we were in a position to let our bosses know things that the people who were speaking for the Administration which were at a high level were unaware of...working level bureaucratic facts, opinions or background that had never gotten up to them. So the Foreign Service background and the immediate experiences were very pertinent and immediately put to use.

*Q: Were you able to sustain that plug in to the Foreign Service system? Were you able to call people and keep in touch with them or did that dissipate over the years?*

LAKELAND: In Washington it tended to dissipate because Foreign Service officers in Washington tended...I am not trying to sound high and mighty here, but at the level I was able to operate at on the Hill, I was more or less at the assistant secretary or above level of

the kinds of problems we were dealing with. The level of problems, level of communication, etc. And your country experts and your career officers it was something of a mismatch and they were muzzled anyway.

When we traveled overseas, hardly anywhere we went there wasn't a key officer, frequently our control officer or the DCM or the political counselor or the ambassador, whom I didn't know or had run into somewhere in the Foreign Service. And in overseas travel, and we did an enormous amount of overseas travel, that helped a lot. Javits used to be amazed. He would say, "You know, you know every damn top sergeant there is in the world." Well, you just run across guys almost at every embassy. I had gotten to know a tremendous number of guys in the Far East Bureau and the NEA Bureau. And in Delhi, where I had been for a long time, an enormous number of people had paraded in and out because it was a hot spot during those years. Many of these people went on to be ambassadors, etc.

So the Foreign Service personal connection carried over very much in our travels. Much less so in Washington, because I had a freedom to say or do or challenge and the officers really didn't. In the Foreign Service you feed up but they never feed back down.

One of the real tasks was speech writing. Senator Javits loved to make speeches. My experience in the Foreign Service of doing a lot of writing, reporting and analysis, made the adjustment easy for me. I found speech writing was an easy task. Some people find it very difficult. I was fortunate enough that I could turn out a speech sometimes even on an hour's notice. So I did a lot of speech writing. It was such uninteresting difference in process, there were no clearances. I would write a speech for Senator Javits, he would go over it and send it back for my approval of his changes. Ninety percent of what I did on the first draft was approved. And that was in the Congressional Record or a committee report. It was very much quick action on the run. You really may only have a chance to do one draft but you are not going to have to clear it with a lot of people. To do your job right you had to have a lot of responsibility because you weren't being cleared or checked by other people. You could get away with stuff. But I tried very hard, and I think my Foreign Service experience helped me, to act as though it would have to clear again with other people.

You don't want to just ride your own prejudices or what you think or wish something would be. You really have got to be your own conscience. I think in the long run that really made my career on the Hill, because, certainly with Senator Javits and in general, I know I built up a career of respect for my honesty, integrity, word and skill in not be subjective or emotional. I got to know a lot of other Senators and was consulted by a number of other Senators. So in a way, I guess those endless clearances and those endless queries...I didn't have to go through that. But because I tried to respect the part of that that is good it helped me a lot.

*Q: Well, you were learning a skill, you were being your own clearer.*

LAKELAND: Yes. And you know that takes discipline. And especially when you are in a fight. And we were in constant fights up there. Under Nixon and Kissinger there was just a very confrontational approach, unnecessarily confrontational. Johnson too. It became less so under Ford and less so under Carter. And it was grim. It wasn't even like a tough fight with dirty blows and then people laugh together afterwards kind of situation. It was grim.

All the initiatives on Vietnam...I was involved in all the legislation.

*Q: Where did Javits stand on the Vietnam? What was his development during the time you were there and what was your input?*

LAKELAND: Well, he had begun as a strong supporter. He had voted for the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and had supported the war. He was beginning to rethink his position about the time I got there and moved to become one of the leading critics of the war. We were not McGovernites by any means. Javits was an old fashion World War II patriot. The greatest days of his life was when he had become a Lt. Colonel in the Army. He was very proud of that. Very patriotic. He was not new left at all. Mansfield wasn't. Fulbright wasn't. Symington wasn't. These people had been real US cold warriors in 1945, 1950 and 1955, etc. That group is what gave so much credibility to the anti-war movement on the Hill. These were people who were not hippies, they were not the Woodstock generation at all. But we became one of the more prominent critics of the war.

I think what would draw attention to it, and I think I had a hand in this, is really informed criticism. Knowing what the administration's policy really was and why it was a mistake or wrong. What the contradictions were. What alternatives were. My experience helped me a lot. Javits was not a man you could fool. He didn't take nonsense arguments. He wanted very sound arguments. He was a man of great intellect and then a very persuasive speaker. Almost a sort of aggressive advocate kind of man. One of the first things up there was the big...after Tet....

*Q: This was the Tet offensive of 1968.*

LAKELAND: February 1968. We gave a speech right after that offensive and it got front page headlines on the New York Times, which politicians just love, I want to tell you. If something you write gets on the front page of the New York Times, you have a chit to cash in your pocket.

Out of the experience in Vietnam grew an effort to deal generically with this idea of undeclared wars. One of the major things that I was involved in was the War Powers Act. It has been much misunderstood. It was not a bill aimed at the Vietnam war, that is a canard. We specifically exempted the Vietnam war, it had no hearing on ongoing hostilities at the time. Parts of it involved deep research into Constitutional history and Constitutional intent. We fashioned some hearings that were really the first great inquest on Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution. What is the war power? Where does it lie? What is the intended interaction of President and Congress, and particularly the Senate? I

did a lot of research work on that. Because it was an undeveloped field, really a lot of conclusions, thoughts and arguments that were really our rediscovery and our initial advancement.

Anyway, this law evolved over a two or three year period. Our principal co-sponsor was Senator Stennis, who was chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. And he supported the war throughout.

*Q: Senator from Mississippi.*

LAKELAND: Yes.

He had grave misgivings but he felt that once you are in a war you didn't criticize it.

This bill eventually passed overwhelmingly in the Senate. A somewhat different exercise was going on in the House. The process was captured more or less by a pro-administration man, Congressman Zablocki, who was indebted to and greatly courted by the Nixon administration. He got control of the process in the House. Zablocki was one of a group of ardent Catholic legislators who had been sort of gathered together by Cardinal Spellman behind Diem in 1954-55. He was personally very committed to the war and was very anti-Communist. He was Polish-American and had gotten into this thing as a great supporter of Diem. Diem was a Catholic and the Catholic Church was very much lobbying for Diem and Cardinal Spellman was lobbying.

*Q: Cardinal Spellman of New York who was an extremely influential figure during the post-war period because of his ardent anti-communism and his prominence as Cardinal of New York. Zablocki was from?*

LAKELAND: Milwaukee.

Zablocki had been a committed supporter of the war from the Diem angle and he was greatly courted by the Nixon administration. In fact they would go and testify before Zablocki and refuse to come before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Traditionally the House Foreign Affairs Committee really had no peripheral role in the great debates, Senate advise, etc.

So they were on somewhat of a different course. Eventually the mood in the House changed and they suddenly moved almost to the left of where we were. So we went into conference and had to really rewrite the bill. This is something you can never say as a Foreign Service officer, but I can say of that law that every single word in it I either personally drafted or personally approved from some other submission.

I had this extraordinary experience of controlling a major piece of legislation which has not worked the way it was intended to work, but it is almost a piece of Constitutional legislation. That was a very, very interesting experience. It required you to think very deeply. And having served in the Executive Branch I think it had a big impact on the



way...you know we tried to structure the law as fairly as possible to respect the role and the position and the powers of the President but insisting that Congress play its role. Part of the problem was not only Executive user patient, if you want, it was Congressional default. Congress almost didn't want to assert its responsibilities and part of the law was to insist that Congress play its role. And this was enjoined by the Constitution. If you ever go through Article I, Section 8, you will be amazed at all the things that were given to Congress and not to the President in terms of making war.

That was a major struggle. Some of it was bitter. There were lots of personal attacks.

*Q: Where were these coming from?*

LAKELAND: The administration. Administration-inspired journalists, some administration-inspired academics. Although we carried the day in the national press...we were endorsed by almost all the newspapers...but there was a constant effort to undermine in personal ways. A lot of it were falsehoods, canards, knowing falsehoods and knowing canards. It was a very bitter battle and it never ended. It was a diehard group of the President's men in and out of the administration who to this day make an effort to savage the work of anybody connected with it, unrelentingly.

But it was in some ways, I think, the most important thing that I ever had a lot to do with. It was a very interesting educational experience. I certainly tried my best to do the best I could. Not the kind of thing that you would normally get a Foreign Service officer being able to do-to craft a really landmark piece of legislation.

*Q: What was the basic thrust of the War Powers Act?*

LAKELAND: What happens if there is no declaration of war? Does the United States only make war when there is no declaration of war? Well we have had lots of examples where wars were going on and they weren't. Can the President just make war on his own? To try to telescope things we came to the conclusion after a careful study of the Constitution and the Constitutional debates, the early legislative history, that it was intended that the President have an independent emergency authority. An authority to take defensive actions in an emergency to protect the United States. Particularly at that time when Congress was only in session a couple of months out of the year. Communications were different.

The President could repel sudden attacks, for instance. In fact, there was an explanation. The original draft of the Constitution said that Congress should make war. Then Madison, who was very much of a Congress-oriented guy, offered an amendment saying that Congress shall declare war. In his note of explanation he was leaving the President the power to repel sudden attacks.

There was other research into what was intended by the Commander-in-Chief designation at the time. Mainly it was to insure Federal authority over State authority because there

was no national army. What was anticipated was that the State militias would be called into national service. Well the governors were the commander-in-chief of the State militias and how then are you going to assert Federal control over the army if the branches are commanded by the governors. Well, make the President Commander-in-Chief when the militias are actually called into service. The President will be the agent of Congress when controlling this force.

It was really very clearly envisaged originally that the President would be the agent of the Congress in controlling the State forces so that they wouldn't be under the thumb of the individual governors. That really is the extent of it at the beginning.

What in essence the bill does is it says...okay, we originally said there are certain areas, emergency and defensive, where the President not only can but should take...you know if the United States is attacked, its citizens are attacked abroad, there is imminent involvement, he can take defensive action. Emergency action...sudden attacks. Lets define this so there won't be arguments.

We defined an emergency as a 60 day period. After 60 days it isn't a sudden attack any more, it isn't a sudden emergency. He then must come up and either get a declaration of war or other specific statutory authority because Congress had to make the decision to get into a full scale war as opposed to taking an emergency defensive action to protect American interests.

He can be authorized in advance to take action in some unforeseen circumstances. We have had writs. The Cuban situation was a predated check saying you can do almost anything you want in Cuba. I think the famous Tonkin Gulf Resolution was a predated authority, although the President said he was never using it, he was just using his own authority as Commander-in-Chief.

So in essence what we said was...you have an emergency period to attack; you should act in good faith; when you act you should report to Congress and tell them why you acted, how long you think it is going to last and, if it is going to last more than 60 days, you request authority to continue and implement your policy.

In my view, and finally the Bush administration, I think, came around to this view, it is a marvelous instrument for the President if it is used right. Because he almost never will be denied this authority if he comes up and makes his case, and if he has a decent case, Congress will give him almost anything he asks for. But the essence is that if he is going to act on his own, he has to act in a defensive nature...he can't invade Mexico for 60 days and then say that he wants a declaration of war. He has to be some protection of the United States which is' endangered by others. And you have 60 days. That is not unreasonable. We originally thought 30 days but decided that was too short so went to 60 days.

In essence it is a delineation and a methodology to bring the two together so that we don't need to have another struggle like Vietnam where the President is out on his own and the Congress is trying to cut off his legs after the troops are in the field. Now it has had a fairly profound affect in an indirect way. The law has been implemented once or twice in a rather perfunctory way. Presidents have been very reluctant to try to invoke it positively and use it affirmatively. But it does affect the thinking and planning in the administration. We know this from testimony. We know it from private conversations. All kinds of stuff.

So it was involvement in sort of the highest level of policy in foreign affairs I think you can get involved in, which is almost quasi constitutional. In some respects that was the highlight of my whole career and the many opportunities that I have been given by the US and the US government to be involved sort of as a fly on the wall, never as an out front principal. But that was one of the big things that I was heavily involved in. I appreciate the opportunity to be involved and tried to do my best. And I think I did a pretty good job at it.

I was also heavily involved in the arms control legislation and treaties. That all started right after I got up there in 1967. It started with the ABM system.

*Q: Anti Ballistic Missile System.*

LAKELAND: Right. The Pentagon wanted to be to deploy a defensive missile system at the Soviet Union. The whole question of whether this was to protect our missiles so that we could first strike the Russians. It was involved in an enormous theological argument that may be ending finally now. McNamara made at the last minute a cover-up compromise where he rejected the Pentagon's plan for the ABM system aimed at the Soviet Union. Instead he would have a system that was aimed at Chinese missiles, which would be an accidental firing or a firing of a country with a limited number of missiles, so that it could be handled by this system. There was a lot of question as to the efficacy of the system.

This didn't ring true. It didn't satisfy the Pentagon. It was fishy up on the Hill. The thing that happened is there was a major defection of the defense intellectuals. All these brilliant scientists who had designed these weapons for years...the atom bomb, all the missilery, etc...they were really sick of this and a large number of them didn't believe the system would work, they thought the choice was absurd. They voluntarily started coming up to the Hill. Or certainly at an invitation would come at the snap of the fingers. A few of us, Bill Miller, myself and a few others, began getting arguments, information, etc. from the United States experts in this field. The guys who actually design the weapons systems. They began telling us what was wrong with the system and why it shouldn't be approved.

It led to the Cooper-Church Amendment. Myself and Bill Miller were sitting on the floor one day when we said, "We ought to put in an amendment to do this." He said, "Do you

want to do it?" I said, "Well, Senator Javits isn't here, why don't you give it to Senator Cooper?" We scribbled an amendment and he gave it to Senator Cooper sitting on the floor of the Senate. Senator Cooper introduced it to prohibit the building of this system. That ultimately lost in a 50-50 tie vote broken by the Vice President. But it was the immediate catalyst to get the SALT I negotiations going.

Having accidentally jump started this...this is not a field of expertise of mine at all, hut we were somebody that experts could connect with and get presumably intelligent hearing. We were in almost from the start from the Congressional angle on the arms control business. And, of course, it had to be ratified by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. So from the Hill perspective I was quite actively involved in the SALT I negotiations.

The Foreign Relations Committee...having been a close observer and a party to that was very rudimentary. The hearings and coverage was unprecedented but quite rudimentary. Later on with SALT II came I was minority staff director of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Bill Miller was staff director of the Intelligence Committee and a much great cadre of expertise and professionals had been brought on board. The hearings on the SALT II treaty were very, very serious busy. You know, the treaty was never ratified. In fact it was never voted on by the Senate. I was the only person who attended every single hearing on the SALT II treaty that was conducted by the Foreign Relations Committee. It just happened that I was there. It was a very, very interesting exercise with great conundrums. The intentions of the Soviet Union, the intentions of the United States. How both can intend one thing and achieve the opposite thing. Then, of course, the colossal destructiveness of these weapons, the cost, etc. That was a very, very interesting involvement. And we did affect the substance of it. There were a lot of consultations, a lot of reaction as to whether the Hill would buy this or that. A lot of consultation under SALT II as the negotiation was going on by the Carter administration.

Another staff person who was on more or less the other side, who played an enormous role, bigger role than I or Bill played, who later went on to become even more famous, was Richard Pearl. He later became famous in the Defense Department in the Reagan administration. He started to work for Senator Jackson around the end of the SALT I period. Senator Jackson and Richard Pearl, as his number one staff idea guy, were proponents of the most suspicious and hardest line view. That the Soviet Union can be dealt with only by fighting it tooth and nail, every inch of the way. You cannot get anywhere with the Soviets by seeking compromise and conciliation and hoping that you can wean them to more moderation. Only confrontation will change the Soviet Union.

I must say that most establishment, middle of the road people were somewhat aghast at this and thought that this was sort of dangerous, dinosaur kind of thinking. But now, in retrospect, I think it turns out that they were right.

*Q: The other thing is what has that spending done to us as a society? We are beginning to feel some of that too.*

LAKELAND: Yes. We had to spend and we paid a heavy price for it. But there was a tendency under Nixon and Kissinger to find a modus vivendi with Brezhnev, accept the legitimate ties of the Brezhnev regime, work with it. We are not going to mess around with their internal system. Agree to the division of Europe. Work out a modus operandi and sweeten it with trade. In their own way the Carter people carried this a step farther. We have to strengthen reformists by making concessions. The way to strengthen the anti-Bolshevik group in the Soviet Union is to conciliate. We know now that was just the opposite. That allowed the hard-liners to say, "Look, we don't need to change these Americans are giving us what we want."

So I in a way want to take off my hat to Pearl and Scoop Jackson even though we were frequently if not generally on the opposite side of the arms control issues. Pearl was a very tough fighter.

*Q: Speaking of Richard Pearl, because he was an important figure also his mentor, Senator Jackson, what was your impression of what motivated that wing? Was it knee-jerk anti-communism?*

LAKELAND: Well, it turns out to be not knee-jerk anti-communism. People tried to portray it as that. Richard was convinced that the way you can crack the Soviets is by putting the pressure on them and confront them. They understand that and they are weaker underneath than we think they are. But they are more daring and more audacious than we want to admit. They will take every inch you give them. There is no such thing that you can satisfy them. They will push and push. And they will negotiate from had faith, etc. They are going to seek constant advantage. You cannot help the liberalizing forces in Russia by compromising with the hard-liners. You have to aim at getting rid of the communist system. You cannot make an accommodation with the communist system. They will succeed in transforming us into quasi communists rather than us transforming the communists into quasi democrats. It was a sophisticated argument and belief on the part of Pearl and Scoop Jackson.

Pearl was not above using lots of techniques of dubious morality. He was a very tough fighter. He believed in that and saw that that system could best be dealt with by...the only way they will understand is if they know we are not going to move and they know they cannot force us to retreat by raising the stakes. There is nothing that they can do, if we have the will, that we can't out match them, particularly in weaponry. And that the worse thing is to give up or hamstring our advantages that they respect...manufacturing of technological significance, geographical advantages in deployments, etc.

And that you must never...Cyrus Vance a great gentleman said we need to exercise self-restraint, we have to calm their fears, we don't do things that we could do, let's not develop that technology because it would be seen as provocative by the Soviets. That whole way, that gentlemanly, Eastern seaboard, Yale way of dealing with other gentlemen. That was the debate. Was that the way to handle them? No, these were mafia

type people and the only thing they understand is knife and claw and they will go right to the brink with you every time and if you blink, fine.

*Q: It is a debate looking back on my Foreign Service history where one had that fight in the early thirties with the Soviets. At that time Lloyd Henderson, Kelly, were saying that these were a band of gangs and you can't do this. And the Roosevelt administration came in and decided we were somehow or other going to deal with them and essentially moved most of our expels out of there. In the long run it really turns out that much of the intellectual, right thinking, well-meaning people were wrong.*

LAKELAND: And the tough son-of-a-hitches turned out to be right.

*Q: Were you involved with the Jackson-Vanic Bill?*

LAKELAND: Yes.

*Q: Because that was sort of a disaster wasn't it? Would you talk a little about your impression of Javits and your role on this piece of legislation?*

LAKELAND: Yes, sure. We were heavily involved in the so-called Jackson-Vanic Bill. In fact, in the Senate it was the Jackson-Javits-Ribicoff Bill. Vanic was in the House so it ultimately became the Jackson-Vanic Bill.

That was a Richard Pearl special. After the 1967 Egyptian-Israeli War (the Seven Day War)...Let me hack up a minute. I am an Episcopalian, if you will, from an old fashion WASP family. When I went to work for Senator Javits, who is very openly Jewish and the principal spokesman of the New York Jewish community, which is the largest and most influential, and very pro-Israel. One of the first things he said to me was, "Pete, you know, whatever we do in the Middle East, we are going to do from the perspective of the American interest." There was some questioning, some eyebrow raising on why he had hired an Episcopalian to be his foreign policy man.

*Q: Because within the Jewish community this was THE foreign policy.*

LAKELAND: Right. It was Israel right or wrong.

Now Senator Javits was very pro-Israel, but after 1967 a new generation began to take over the Jewish organizations. It was quite a different psychology. To some extent I think they were influenced by the militant blacks. They had a much more militant attitude on Jewish questions and believed in very aggressive lobbying, very aggressive assertion of Jewish interests. And in this case the Soviet Jewry issue. A new generation of Jewish organizations staff people decided to make this a major issue and a major element, a sort of test case of the political influence of the Jewish community. They had arrived in America and they had power and they weren't going to be shy about asserting it.

So there were staff people in New York in the Jewish community, in the National Council of Soviet Jewry, etc. who decided that they wanted to make a very, very aggressive, up front push on Soviet Jewry. Things up until that time had been handled much more politely on the Hill. Lobbying for Jewish issues was much more low keyed. Much less strident and aggressive.

These people found a great ally in Richard Pearl. I don't want to say that Richard Pearl didn't believe in the cause of Soviet Jewry, but I believe from very close firsthand observation ...I had a lot of very close dealings with him on this issue...that he really liked this issue primarily as a club to beat the Soviet Union with and to disrupt Kissinger's détente. This was a way to stop this drift into a condominium, a Nixon-Brezhnev condominium of the world where we are accepting the Soviets and their internal arrangements. I believe very much, based on personal experience, that Pearl throw himself into this fight because he saw it as a great instrument in a larger battle. As a tactical instrument to disrupt this movement which he thought was very wrong and very dangerous Nixon-Brezhnev rapprochement.

The Jackson-Vanic Amendment got going. It was attached to most-favored-nation legislation, which was the key to promoting US-Soviet trade. It was a big element in the emerging détente. For trade to take place you had to have a most-favored-nation treaty so that Soviet goods wouldn't have these enormous tariffs. Jackson-Vanic Amendment was attached to the legislation saying that non-market countries who didn't have more or less free emigration could not qualify for most-favored-nation treatment. It was a direct strike at Kissinger détente.

The legislation passed and the administration ultimately swallowed it. There were a lot of negotiations with the Soviets over numbers. You know, how many numbers would be enough. Pearl kept trying to up the numbers. I would sit in there and Jackson, Javits, Ribicoff, and usually Kissinger and Hal Saunders...

They wanted this enough so that they went fairly far in saying that informally they would allow 50,000 or whatever the numbers were. Then another amendment was thrown in covertly which was actually called the Stevenson Amendment. It was a side play by the Soviet Jewry group and very much abetted by Pearl. It put a limitation on the amount of Export-Import credits that could be financed by any one country. Now we were going to use this détente trade thing to give major Export-Import credits to the Soviets to finance their imports from America. This amendment was sort of snuck in and limited to no more than \$50 million for any one country...it might even have been less than that.

So after this great struggle to get the administration and the Soviets to more or less acquiesce to Jackson and Vanic, it was all for nothing because there was a limit on the amount of money. So that really collapsed the whole trade détente aid exercise.

*Q: I can understand Pearl wanting to shoot down the détente effort, but for the militant Jewish groups I would have thought their interest was in getting Jews into Israel.*

LAKELAND: Javits made the argument on the Senate floor that if you were for the Jackson-Vanic Bill you were against the Stevenson Amendment. But nobody would lift a hand. The Jewish groups did not lobby against this. I don't know why. I think to some extent they got snookered. But I guess they thought the Soviets had already given an informal commitment to allow a large number of Jews to emigrate and they would hold them to that. They were focused on that. They just couldn't bring themselves to focus on this other angle to it. The Soviets denounced Jackson-Vanic after a while.

*Q: It boiled down to far less emigration from the Soviet Union until much later. So in a way, Pearl got his point, but the Jews didn't get theirs.*

Mr. Lakeland: Well, his view also that there was no sense in letting them buy off...every year there is the price of a certain number of Jews for a certain amount of credit. He didn't want that to happen. You just have to keep pressing these guys. You don't make separate deals where they hold the cards and decided how many they are going to let out depending on how much money you are going to allow us this year. He wanted to pound them and he wanted emigration, but he didn't want the latter enough. I am trying to interpret his mind, I don't want to speak for him more than I can. But I was a very close observer and participant in there and that is my conclusion and observation on it.

Javits was very interested in the Middle East and a major figure, because Israel was very popular in Congress and that was due partly to Javits' credibility. Talking about his credibility, invite made no bones about the fact that he was Jewish, from New York and pro-Israel. Why did he have a lot of credibility and a lot of influence with his colleagues? I think it was because of the quality and manner in which he conducted himself. I told you that one of the first things he said to me was that whatever we do in the Middle East we do it in the context of American interests. Now sometimes they may have believed that it was more in the American interests than non-Jews might have believe. But he never believed that his role was as an agent of Israel at all. In fact he felt the Israelis were allies of America.

I was with him one time, maybe my first visit to Israel with him, and we were talking to Golda Meir. Golda Meir, who was Prime Minister, was criticizing something the American administration had done or not done and was dissatisfied with the American policy. He demurred and she said, "Oh, Jack, you are talking just like an American Senator." They had been personal friends for a number of years. She called him Jack and he called her Golda, whatever. She said that and he sort of straightened himself and said, "Madam Prime Minister, I am an American Senator and you and your people must never forget that." That made a real impression on me. It could have passed off very lightly but that was his attitude.

He had great credibility with other Senators. They would come up and ask him. Yes, we are very supportive of Israel hut we try to do it in a very honest and open way. A way that had an American interest in the Middle East behind it.



*Q: Let me ask you a question on this because this is so crucial in American foreign relations with Israel and the Arab world. What was your impression when issues were at stake how the State Department presented the arguments which were often saying there is more than just Israel out there?*

LAKELAND: I was going to address that question next anyway. I will give you the sort of personal angle to it.

I had gotten to know Joe Sisco when I was on the India Desk, the Kashmir issue. Joe was first the Deputy Assistant Secretary for IO [International Organizations] and then he was Assistant Secretary for IO. When Nixon's administration came in he was appointed Assistant Secretary for NEA. Now this division...my brother as you know was an Arabist. He was a core Arabist. They believe that the Arabs are 100 percent right. That Israel is a totally inappropriate, immoral, undeserving, intruder that has been manipulated by Zionists, that America is doing wrong, etc.

The Arabists who certainly controlled NEA, had a caricature view of Israel and the American Jewish community -in my view. Jewish groups had an equal caricature of the so-called Arabists in the State Department. They were anti-Semites, the people who wanted to keep Jews out of the United States during WWII. They fought the bombing of the concentration camps, they pooh-poohed the holocaust. There was a mutual feeling that the other side was not only wrong but they were devils, people whose bona fides were totally at question.

Senator Javits always liked to work with State and with the administration. Previously all of his staff people had been Jewish, which is one reason why I think he hired a non-Jew from the State Department. One of the first things that I did, because I knew Joe Sisco, was to set up a series of breakfasts where Joe Sisco and Senator Javits and myself would get together. We would discuss US-Israel relations in the Middle East. That did a lot too, I think, to help Javits get a much better insight into the dynamics of what is US policy and where the State Department was coming from. He was remarkably free of this paranoid feeling of the Arabists who are practically SS types who want to put the Jews back in the ovens. He didn't have that kind of complex at all. Joe Sisco soon discovered that Jacob Javits was one hell of a smart guy who had a lot of interesting and substantive things to say and was very influential and important up on the Hill. So they used to have breakfasts maybe every month.

It certainly led to a whole new relationship between our office and the NEA Bureau which really blossomed later when guys like Roy Atherton and others came in. Beginning with Joe Sisco there was a whole new attitude of...Look, don't ignore the Hill, work with them, lobby with them, testify. Let them know what we are trying to do. The State Department is not here arguing the case of the Arabs and Congress the case of Israel, this is the United States government and certainly there are rights and wrongs on both sides in the Middle East question.

There were really a lot of breakthroughs and I think to some extent they flowed from this initial connection I made between Javits and Sisco. Sisco told his people to go up on the Hill and talk to people and be open with them, we are all part of the United States government, etc.

This developed first in the Ford administration and equally or more so in the Carter administration, during the Camp David talks and others. There was a great deal of interchanging. It became accepted that if you want to have a showdown with Congress you are going to lose on Israel. Kissinger tried that. After the Yom Kippur War in 1973, Israel was not agreeing to some ceasefire disengagement, whatever, so he ordered a reassessment of policy to Israel. During the reassessment there would be no new arms shipments, which the Israelis were convinced they urgently needed. In other words he was just squeezing the Israelis, saying they were not going to get anything, ostensibly while this reassessment was taking place, but really until they caved in and did what he wanted.

Well, what happened was, this became a catalyst where 76 Senators sent a letter to the President telling him that they wanted a certain plane to be sent to Israel, and showing that they were prepared to legislate this sale and had more than enough votes to override a Presidential veto. That was the whole purpose of the exercise. Using this arms control as a negotiating ploy isn't going to work. We disagree with you on this and the Congress is united on this. We have 76 people saying that our intention is to do it.

Kissinger had to fold his tent and try different tactics. They eventually negotiated the Sinai Disengagement Agreement, the UN observers and then the Golan Heights Disengagement, which didn't get very far until the Carter administration had the Camp David agreement, a much more sweeping thing.

That exercise, I think, really changed the view in the State Department that there is no sense in confronting head on with Congress on an issue with as deep a division as Israel because you lose. You have to work, you have to persuade Congress. Now we always took the view...Now look, persuade us. Don't say you are not going to discuss this, or do that. Come on up and tell us what is your policy? So really after that there was much more of an openness out of necessity to deal with the Congress, particularly the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

That old division of the Arabists thinking the Israelis are devious Zionists, and the Israelis thinking that the Arabists are neo-SS types in the pay of Saudi Arabia, became much more ameliorated. Roy Atherton, who was originally an Arabist, himself, and later became Assistant Secretary of State during the Camp David Accords, was very highly respected. Roy learned to have an understanding and sympathy for Israel and the position of Israel. It was golden for him to have the trust of the Israelis and they did trust him. They would get a straight answer from him. They wouldn't always get what they wanted, but it was not this enemy, daggers drawn, don't talk, kind of situation.

So you really got into quite a different atmosphere up there. And Senator Javits and myself, as his adviser on this, had a lot of consultations at all levels on US policy, plus we traveled a great deal. We went not only to Israel but to Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, etc. Javits and Sadat sort of struck up a personal accord. When Sadat came to the United States he always had a chat with Javits. King Huessin, when he used to come here for his semi-annual checkups would send word through an ex-station chief who would call me and say that a Middle East friend is going to be in town this week and would he be interested in seeing my boss. He would be either checked in to Walter Reed or else he entered under another name.

So there was a lot of multi-lateral involvement in the Middle East question and it had gotten so that we had very good relations with the key American players and were open...we would go there and guys like Hermann Eilts in Cairo during the Sadat period. He did a superb job in my view. He was a superb ambassador. His briefings were so lucid. He was an Arabist in Cairo and could give the most lucid and convincing briefings and analysis and why Sadat thought this and that.

We went to Saudi Arabia a number of times, went to Syria and saw Assad once. So we had a lot of very interesting travels and experiences and at high level meetings met all the Israeli leaders many times...Golda Meir, Moshe Dayan, Yitzhak Rabin, Abba Eban, these are people who are extraordinary personalities in their own right. They were fascinating people who had led fascinating lives. If I had gone to Israel alone I would have never seen any of them.

But I went so many times with Senator Javits and was always just accepted. They talked totally freely in front of me. It was great. It was really a rich experience that very few people have. You know, put all these pieces together in different areas. So that was part of it. After Begin won in 1979, the whole atmosphere changed. The Begin government had a different approach to America; a different approach to American Jews; a different approach to what and who is a Jew; to Arabs, how do you deal with Arabs? But from the time I went up there just before the 1967 war up until really after the Camp David Accords it was a golden age of US-Israeli relations and I was privileged to have a privileged insight into a unique aspect of how this thing operated.

And I knew a lot of State Department Arabists who had been friends of my brother. Most of them thought I was a traitor.

*Q: How did Javits and Fulbright get along? Fulbright was the chairman for part of this period of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.*

LAKELAND: They got along beautifully. They agreed to disagree on the Middle East without being disagreeable. They could not agree on the Middle East. Fulbright had no sympathy for Israel. He felt Israel was in the wrong and disagreed with US policy. But he did it in a non-strident way.

I remember there were staff vibes when Javits came on to the Foreign Relations Committee shortly after I got up there. They felt he was going to disrupt the gentlemanly, scholarly, *modus vivendi*. Here is this aggressive New York Jew coming on my gentlemanly, scholarly Foreign Relations Committee. And it worked out the opposite. The two of them got along beautifully. Partly, Fulbright welcomed and appreciated and admired the energy and new angles that Javits brought to his stand on Vietnam and the whole question of the prerogatives of the Senate. The energy and the audacity. Because Fulbright and his staff people tended to be very diffident. Fulbright tended to believe that it wasn't really gentlemanly for Senators to delve too deeply or have staff people too prominent, etc. I remember Carl Marcy, who was Fulbright's long time chief of staff, told me that when he first worked for the Foreign Relations Committee, the big breakthrough was when they were allowed to do first drafts of committee reports and committee speeches. Of course they had to send them off for clearance to the State Department, but up until that time they were drafted by the State Department...the reports and speeches of all the Committee members and the chairman. So it was a long move when here comes a guy like Javits who has energy, *hutzpah*, and an energetic and aggressive staff person.

Intellectually they got along very, very well. They had a peculiar sort of odd couple relationship. They began even becoming social friends. I knew from Fulbright's staff that he was gritting his teeth at the prospect of Javits entering the *inter sanctum* of his committee, but it worked out beautifully. We would do these speeches and say things that Fulbright wished he said. Aggressively challenging the administration. He was very, very cooperative on the War Powers Act. He gave his full reign.

Javits was still a relatively...in terms of seniority he was the third ranking Republican, the minority. And yet Fulbright let us arrange the hearings...usually the minority doesn't have any hearings, it is all done by the majority. We did all the witness lists, I wasn't even on the Committee staff. I would do the reports. He was very, very cooperative. We had a good working relationship with Fulbright.

There was a lot of respect there between the two of them. Both were intelligent men, but coming from different very different angles.

*Q: Is there anything we haven't covered?*

LAKELAND: Let me just make a comment about some of the interesting Senator characters. I have mentioned Fulbright. There was Senator Mansfield, Senator Cooper, Hubert Humphrey. That was a privilege. After Hubert Humphrey lost his run for the Presidency, he came back and rejoined the Foreign Relations Committee. He and Javits got along absolutely famously. I was somewhat aghast because I thought Humphrey was too much of a left wing and goodie-goodie Democrat. Javits told me that Hubert said, "Come on, let's be partners in foreign affairs." He was pleased as punch about it. I said, "Oh, Humphrey is kind of discredited after his service with Lyndon Johnson. He is considered to be too doctrinaire. He never loved an underdeveloped country that he didn't

love. He never met a foreign leader who wasn't right." But Humphrey was another unique personality. He and Javits absolutely hit it off like two peas in a pod.

Humphrey was one of these human beings who so radiated life, vitality, was the most optimistic human being. Humphrey loved live and people. You couldn't keep him in a had mood. He would get angry and couldn't stay angry, he would break out into a smile and laugh. I was not on Humphrey's staff at all, but he was a member of the Committee and particularly after Fulbright left and Sparkman took over...Senator Sparkman by that time was really pretty old and tired and really Humphrey and Javits ran the Committee as a duumvirate, with Sparkman's blessing. They were on a lot of subcommittees together. Almost every legislative initiative was a Humphrey-Javits initiative. And it was a real privilege to see at very close range and sort of know behind the scenes Hubert Humphrey. I was not on his staff and did not work directly with him, hut I saw a lot of him. He was really an extraordinary human being. A very bright, energetic guy. He died tragically of cancer while he was still there.

One very amusing incident showing the worst side of the Hill...there was a hearing one time going on and it was during Sparkman's period. Somebody from the administration was testifying and it had gotten late, it was 1:00, whatever. Sparkman was there and Senator Case was there and Symington was there. These all were gentleman who were in their early or late 70s. Sparkman was in his late 70s. It was kind of a warm day anyway, this guy testifying...pretty soon it is clear that all three Senators are sound asleep. It was just totally clear that the three of them are absolutely sleeping. So the guy stops and looks at the Senators and says, "What do I do now that they are asleep?" "Well, just go on giving your statement, it is all being taken down." So this guy finishes his statement and a bell finally rings and they all wake up.

I guess that is enough for history on it. There are a couple of other things that happened, but... Getting to see Deng Xiaoping and Helmut Schmidt, those are two personalities that are quite fascinating that I got a chance to meet in very small circles. Javits and Helmut Schmidt became quite buddies.

*Q: He was the Chancellor of Germany.*

LAKELAND: Right. They found they were on the same wave length mentally. We used to go to Germany two or three times a year and had long talks with Helmut Schmidt, just the three of us in a room. I wasn't talking, I was just there. Some of the others, Willy Brandt and Kiesinger, and some of the others. Javits really was interested in German affairs and got along well with the Germans. England was his favorite country. Paris his favorite city. So we went many, many times to London and Paris. I remember one time I think I took 64 official trips while I was there. Went literally around the world twice.

*Q: What did this do to your marriage?*

LAKELAND: Actually, the day I resigned from the Foreign Service and the day I accepted the job from Senator Javits, was also the day I got divorced. So I was not married while I was up on the Hill. I had my two sons. If you are going to work for Senator Javits, you worked and maybe had an incidentally personal life. But the official life was so interesting and you had a sufficiency of so-called social life. There were so many teas, receptions, cocktail parties. The diplomatic community discovered that the Hill staff was more important than their desk officers, so I, used to get many more diplomatic invitations than I ever did when I worked in the State Department.

One got to see many times, Vance, Kissinger, Nixon up close. Get to talk to them a little.

*Q: What was Javits' impression of Kissinger?*

LAKELAND: He and Kissinger fenced a fair amount on policy, but they had a great respect for each other. Actually they developed a personal warmth and regard, they became friends.

*Q: I would have thought that they might not have.*

LAKELAND: Well, let me put it this way, Javits always had a much higher regard and a much fonder view of Kissinger than I did. They got along. In fact, a couple of years ago, there was a seminar up at Columbia Graduate School of International Affairs and they were doing a war powers conference, and they had Kissinger, Joe Biden, Louis Hanken, who supposedly is a great academic expert, and myself. We are speaking on war powers at this big conference and, of course, Javits is dead. I was really struck that Kissinger took so much time and went so much out of his way to speak so fondly and so warmly about his memory of Javits, his regards for him and his personal relationship with him. I realized that even though I could get Javits to battle with Kissinger, I could get him so that they disagreed, whenever he could, he would give Kissinger the benefit of the doubt, frequently to the chagrin of us staff people.

One thing I had a hand in which I think historically is significant. I am glad you brought up Kissinger because I think this is unrecorded and unknown and important. I know that I was the initial catalyst. When Nixon was on very much the down fall and it looked like he was going to be impeached...

*Q: After the Watergate business.*

LAKELAND: Right. After the hearings and whatever. The Presidency...Agnew had pleaded guilty...there was a tremendous, almost a shattering of the Presidency. I don't know if you were in the country at that time or not, but it was a very traumatic time in American history. The President of the United States was self-destructing in public view.

I wrote a memo to Senator Javits, which I still have a copy of, suggesting that he talk to Fulbright and to Humphrey and that the Foreign Relations Committee get together with

Kissinger and form a concerted effort to protect American foreign policy during this traumatic, crucial period. With Kissinger they would work out an effort to insulate the conduct of foreign policy from this great crisis of authority in the United States.

And it happened. It happened in a concerted way. They met with Kissinger and they worked it out and Kissinger almost divorced himself from Nixon. The Foreign Relations Committee which set the tone went to extraordinary efforts so that there would be no challenge to the conduct of American foreign policy, Kissinger is the instrument and the mouthpiece for America.

And this, I think, helped get us through a potentially very, very troublesome period, because there was the feeling that Executive Branch authority had been destroyed and around the world. And that Congress that was at loggerheads with Nixon and about to impeach him. That authority was shattered in the United States or ruptured. It could have led to some very dangerous adventures by the Soviet Union, Qadhafi, Saddam Hussein, etc.

I know that this memo was acted upon and there was an effort. I think that it made some difference. I don't know if the world would have been any different or not, but there was a real coming together...we are all in it together and we are going to try to protect the conduct of American foreign policy for the duration of this crisis. And I think it had some historical affect and maybe some historical significance. I don't know.

I will end on that note, it makes me sound good.

*Q: Thank you very much.*

*End of interview*