# The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
## Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

**AMBASSADOR EDWARD MARKS**

*Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy*

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INTERVIEW

Q: Today is August 12, 1996. This is an interview with Ambassador Edward Marks being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies, and I am Charles Stuart Kennedy. To begin this, can you tell me when and where you were born and a bit about your family?

MARKS: My parents were both immigrants from Eastern Europe; my mother was born in Russia and my father in a part of Poland now included within current Russian borders. They immigrated separately to the United States as children or teenagers, my father via Canada. They met in the U.S. I was born in Chicago but my family moved almost immediately, within six or eight months, to Detroit where I grew up.

Q: When were you born in Chicago?

MARKS: April 22, 1934.

Q: I think it is interesting how people get here. As teenagers getting out of Poland and Russia is not the easiest thing in the world. How did they get out?

MARKS: They were part of family migrations but like many of my generation I really do not know much about it. By and large, first generation Americans of my type were not very interested in family history and didn't hear or ask much about it. It is the second or third generation that gets ethnic and harks back to its roots. Basically my parents immigrated just before the First World War. My father went first to Canada, where many members of his family still live, and from there he came to the United States, probably illegally; he was always a little vague about that. My mother came directly to New York. This would have been just before the First World War when there was still relatively open immigration. Congress did not close open immigration down until just after the First World War.

Q: What type of business was your father in?

MARKS: He was in the grocery store, food market business.

Q: Now you’re growing up, we are talking 1934 which is high depression time. Can you talk about that period when you were growing up in Detroit?

MARKS: Without trying to invent memories of childhood that I don’t really have, you are quite right. I was a child of the depression which did not mean, I think for most of us, any real hardship that I can remember. My younger sister and I were really infants and I
premise we had enough to eat. By the time we came to any age of having much memories, the war was on and the depression in essence was over. But, we were children of the depression in the sense that there were attitudes that we all absorbed about work, about money, about being cautious and about the importance of security. I think all those things marked the generation born in the thirties in a general sense rather than any personal memory or sense of deprivation. I would have been five or six when the war started and 12 when it ended. Therefore my first real memories were of the war period; much of it the sort of stuff one saw in the movies in the sense that may of my memories are of events we read about, heard about, talked about, and saw in the movies rather than of personal experience.

Q: Was your father still in the grocery business?

MARKS: Yes, he spent most of his adult life in it, until he more or less forcibly retired through a combination of lack of any significant success and age, twenty years ago. My parents moved to California the year I graduated from high school: 1952.

Q: So, you went through high school in Detroit. Did you get any taste of foreign affairs at high school?

MARKS: There was the war, of course, and the post-war period with the beginning of the Cold War when the whole subject of the world we were going to live in was very much a part of the educational process. Now, we have to say not only did I grow up in Detroit but I grew up in a segment of Detroit. Being Jewish I was part of that community and grew up in almost a completely Jewish environment. The fact is until I graduated high school; I essentially lived in an American Jewish immigrant world, the new world version of the ghetto. It was a community that enthusiastically copied all the forms and standards of broader American society - with a slight guttural accent although that was dying out with the second generation. Besides the people I met working in my father's fruit stand or stores, teachers, and a very small number of non-Jews in school, I never knew anybody but Jews until I graduated from high school. The almost 100% Jewish student body schools I attended are worth studying. Especially as they parallel, I am certain, similar schools of those or earlier days inhabited by Italians, Irish, etc. In a sense we went to separate but equal schools - although the resemblance to racial segregated schools should probably not be pushed too far.

Interestingly, nonetheless, we all felt profoundly American.

Q: Did you get any feel in Detroit about the great exodus from the South of the blacks to Detroit?

MARKS: We did without knowing it. There were the great race riots in 1943 or 44 which I only vaguely remember. We heard about it and there was great of talk and emotion. There is a memory, I don't know if it is real or acquired, of somebody appearing in the neighborhood with his head bandaged and blood flowing after having been caught up in the riots. I can't swear if that is a real memory or acquired, but the riots were certainly a major event. But the sense of the black migration North I don't think we were aware of it as an
event or phenomena. We were aware of the growing prosperity of the Jewish community, of its integration into the broader United States, and the great rush of this community from immigrant status into the professional classes. Those of my generation were almost all going to university, even the girls although the general comment about them (and often made by them) was that the degree being sought was that of Mrs.

We were aware of the increasing prosperity of the United States. As to foreign affairs, the older population was focused on the question of Israel, while many of the younger were interested in foreign affairs in general. The Korean War was on, which certainly received a great deal of attention (if only because of the importance of student deferments), and my particular group of friends were very international minded - if only because of our interest in the "Lost Generation" literature of the pre-war period.

Q: Various immigrant groups, particularly the Asian, the Jewish and the Greek ones, have placed particular emphasis, particularly in the United States, on education. Did you feel strong pressure to go out and get educated?

MARKS: It was more than a question of pressure, it was an assumption, by parents and by the general community. Yes, the pressure in a sense was enormous but we did not perceive of it as pressure. Respect for education was widely prevalent in Jewish communities: good students were not on the outside, were not what are now called "nerds". Conversely, interest in and prestige arising out of athletics were largely absent. Our football and baseball teams were notorious bad; we were almost proud of their incompetence. We had a mixture, you see, between old world attitudes of our parents and grandparents, and some new American attitudes which everyone was adopting to one degree or another.

Q: I assumed there was some amount of pride about the great baseball player, Hank Greenberg, though, wasn't there?

MARKS: Oh, yes, and he was a Detroit Tiger as well. And if you went back twenty years before there were the Jewish fighters. The interest and pride in these athletes was evident despite the attitude I mentioned previously. It was a combination of emotions, I suppose, common in most minority groups - remember the Negro (now Black) community pride in Joe Louis.

Q: Billy Kahn, etc.

MARKS: Yes. They were before my time but you heard about them. You get contradictory attitudes, of course. And then, of course, remember there was the whole history of the establishment of Israel in the late 1940s which was affecting attitudes enormously with the sudden emergence of Jews as a warrior race.

Q: This was really 1948 when this happened.

MARKS: Yes, I would have been in the ninth grade.
Q: I think it is important to look at this in any way we can because the Jewish community in Israel has been in constant threat since that time in American foreign policy. What was your perspective at that time of this?

MARKS: Support at that time was, of course, rather unthinking, just automatic. What I wasn't aware of, because I didn't come from an intellectual or political background, was that Zionism was not a universally favored concept among Jews and the establishment of the state of Israel was not assumed to be universally desirable by everybody in the Jewish community. The success of Israel certainly was not assumed. I can remember to my undying embarrassment, and I wonder if it hasn't somewhat affected my reporting ability and views of the world, presenting a serious and very pompous report to my social studies class, in which I stated quite conclusively that the state of Israel could not possibly win a war. It must have been the eighth or ninth grade. It was based largely, I think, on Time magazine. However, my audience nodded gravely and the teacher gave me a good grade. Of course it turned out to be utterly wrong.

Q: Since you were the first generation in your family, did you run across that great dividing line between parents and children...you were an American kid and they were old Europeans?

MARKS: Yes, especially when I discovered that I was not a very family person in any case. I am not very tribal, to use words I picked up later in another context. Yet my parents were not very Old Country in my eyes, as I had no real sense of knowledge of what Old Country meant. They spoke with accents but not exceptionally strong. It was more a question of their rather limited perspective on themselves and the world. The first generation of immigrants, you understand, were marked more by that than anything else. Their world was still that of the Jewish community, of ghetto if you will.

Q: You moved to California in 1952?

MARKS: No my parents did. I graduated from high school and they moved to California as part of the great migration West of the 1950s. I didn’t want to go to California for all sorts of reasons so I stayed and went to Wayne University for freshman year. Primarily, I think, I sensed that this was my chance to break from home. The next year I transferred to the University of Michigan to join my high school friends and finished there.

Q: What areas were you taking?

MARKS: A standard undergraduate bachelor of arts in political science.

Q: We are talking about 1952-56. Did you have any feeling towards foreign affairs, the world?

MARKS: Yes, I did. Foreign affairs had been a favorite subject in my life growing up among my friends, in my community, partially because of my surroundings, partially because of Europe, partially because my particular group of friends were interested in these
sorts of things. We would go to a diner or delicatessen and sit around with coffee and cigarettes and while solving the problems of the world in the traditional manner of teenagers. We were a fairly bright and reasonably intellectual group more interested in foreign affairs than most of our peers.

At university I did political science and went into that more and more. By then political science meant international affairs, not American domestic politics. However even by the time I was a senior I had no specific plans, except I knew I did not want medical or dental schools or into any of the other professions young Jewish boys of my era were aiming for. (We all knew Jews could not become engineers. This was not true anymore, but we did not know that. Besides, I couldn't handle a slide ruler if my life depended on it.) So, I was quite vague about my plans, but I knew I wanted to get out, not return or rather stay, in the Jewish community. I wanted to do something international, possibly with an international firm. So, in a vague undifferentiated way I was thinking of a career and a life in international affairs.

Q: Was military service looming for you?

MARKS: Yes, we all assumed we would be doing it. I joined ROTC my first year, but I didn't stay in it for a number of reasons. Now, I realize they were silly or uninformed reasons and I wish I had stayed in. Attitude and background played a large role, the traditional Jewish attitude towards military is very anti. (This is before the Israeli warrior became a modern icon). It was not something people like us did. Later I wished I had finished ROTC because it would have been an experience of that wider world which in fact I wished to join.

Q: Did you know anything about the Foreign Service?

MARKS: No, not really. My joining the Foreign Service was purely serendipitous. It was the beginning of my senior year and I can remember it very clearly. I was in the bathroom of my fraternity house, getting ready for a party when a fraternity brother classmate came in and said he had just signed up for the Foreign Service exam. I said, "What is that?" He merely shrugged and I thought okay; all you had to do was send in your name and get the card. So, I did. Of course, this shows how passive I was with respect to my lifetime career - I merely responded to instructions...show up here, answer these questions, etc. If my fraternity bother had not shown up at that particular moment, I might never have known about the exam. Of course, after I did sign up for the exam, a somewhat older and more sophisticated fraternity brother from the East Coast said that I didn't have a chance against the old boys network and asked why was I even pretending to have a chance. He did not realize that in 1955 and 1956 everything was changing for the Foreign Service.

Q: Yes, we represent a whole new generation in the Foreign Service. Now there are some whippersnappers coming up now representing a new, new generation, I think.

MARKS: This is true, 1956 was the great change over period from the original Foreign Service. I took the exam in December, 1955. By the way, my fraternity friend did not make it.
Q: But you passed.

MARKS: Yes.

Q: Could you talk a little about the oral exam? The type of questions and how it hit you.

MARKS: It is a bit of a blur in my memory. I took it in Cincinnati, traveling by train from Ann Arbor. There were three FSOs [Foreign Service officers], whose names I cannot remember. It was the classic examination of that period, mid-1950s to sometime into the 1960s. There were a series of questions...I had been primed that they would be some deliberately embarrassing question but the only one which could be so classified was about my brief service in the U.S. Postal Service (part-time during my freshman year; I was fired for tardiness and such). What I do remember was a number of questions on subjects I had studied in school and some stuff I had not, were not on my college transcript. I remember one other thing. They asked me about the Missouri compromise of 1845, which I was able to answer then (but probably could not now). I wasn't very far launched into my answer when they stopped because it was clear I knew about it and they really were not very interested in the substance of my reply.

Q: Well, they were probing your strengths and weaknesses and how you handled them.

MARKS: That is exactly right. That is the impression I had...questions about things I should have known about and things I would not. I had been given one bit of advice by somebody, I can't remember who, which was not to be afraid to say you do not know and avoid any attempt to bluff because you are outnumbered. This was very good advice and advice I have always repeated to candidates afterward. The examiners are older, have had more training and experience, and you are outnumbered. Your chances of getting away with anything are unlikely. In fact, later I had an interesting experience which confirmed this approach. When I returned to the Department after my military service in early 1959, I had a few weeks before I was to join an A-100 class and I was put to work sorting documents in Personnel and I ran across the memorandum of my interview (which you are not supposed to see), and the key phrase obviously was "Mr. Marks did not attempt to bluff when he did not know the answer" remark. So I had been given a key bit of good advice and had had enough sense to obey it.

Q: When did you enter the Foreign Service?

MARKS: October 1956. Six weeks later I left for my army service. The Draft Board had moved as rapidly as the Foreign Service.

Q: How long were you in the A-100 class?

MARKS: About six weeks. I was there about two weeks when my draft notice arrived. I was stupid not to have gone to my Draft Board in Los Angeles when I got the word I would be joining the FS. My bet is I probably could have gotten out of the army.
Q: Let’s talk about your army experience first and then come back and talk about both your A-100 courses.

MARKS: Six weeks in Washington at the Foreign Service Institute, and then I left. My leaving was an event in my A-100 class which decided to give me a going away party, in the basement of the Old Europe Restaurant.

Q: That is on Wisconsin Avenue.
MARKS: Yes, still there. You must remember 1956 in Washington. You could not carry a drink from one table to another; strictly against the law. Anyways, we were all down there, drinking beer and getting fairly raucous. We had more than one table so we were going back and forth although the owners and the waiters kept telling us to stop. We did not. We started signing German songs and some of us actually knew the words. We sang, of course, "Lili Marlene," "Deutschland Uber Alles," and even tried to sing "Hoerst Wessel Lied" - even though few of us knew any of the words. Then the police came and expelled us from the restaurant. Most of us hadn't a clue as to what we were doing and singing.

Q: "Horst Wessel Lied" being the SS storm trooper song.
MARKS: Yes, very nasty.

Q: Did anybody ask what a nice Jewish kid like you...?
MARKS: Well, most of us didn’t recognize the song and didn't know the words. The police showed up and we were expelled from the Old Europe. We wandered through the streets and ended up at somebody's apartment where we drank a little bit more, etc. It ended up about 3 in the morning, or maybe even later. It was a Thursday night, so Friday morning several of us were very late for class. This was the old FSI located where the diplomatic entrance of the State Department now is. I didn't make to class at all in the morning, and neither did the class president.

After lunch, we were sitting in the class, and I remember the door opened and one of the school secretaries looked and around the room and pointed at me and the class chairman. We were called out and taken to the office of a very august person, a Foreign Service Inspector. He said, "All right, what happened?" We blinked. He then explained that the Department had a received a call from the gentleman who owns the Old Europe saying that a group of young diplomats had behaved badly last night, singing Nazi songs. The restaurant owner had had to call the police to have the group expelled. The caller wanted the Department to know that he was a German Jewish refugee from the thirties and that he was prepared to go to the newspapers with the story. He wanted to know what the Department was going to do about it, the Inspector said. The Inspector then showed us the morning New York Times. On the front page in the bottom was a little article headed "State Department Aide Criticizes Orthodox Jews." (One of the Arabist types had given a speech up in New York somewhere, and apparently insulted his Jewish audience in some way.) Well, My classmate and I described our evening to the Inspector, as best we could
remember, and I have always remembered his reaction. In the first place he accepted our story without comment, in other words took our word for our innocence, merely commenting in essence that we had been stupid, of course. He said, "All right, you go down and talk to the man about it. Explain it, do what you can, but don't crawl.

We, of course, crawled all over the place. We went to the restaurant and the owner met us, would not shake hands, but invited us to sit down. We then apologized and tried to explain. I made sure he knew I was Jewish and we crawled more than a little bit, making an apology that in fact he certainly deserved.

We had not only behaved badly, but also stupidly. We were no longer private citizens. It was a very interesting lesson. A crowd of junior diplomats had been expelled from a restaurant for not only behaving badly but for singing anti-Semitic songs. The fact that some of them were Jewish was besides the point.

The owner accepted our apologizes and said we could come back again, shook hands, and that was the end of it. It was a very formative lesson. When I returned to FSI [Foreign Service Institute] two years, from my army service, the FSI Registrar, Mrs. Edrie Way-

Q: Yes.
MARKS: -clearly remembered me. Her face lit up and she said, "Well, how are you? Welcome back." For a brief while, I was a notable figure.

Q: What did you do in the army?

MARKS: I was a company clerk, and spent all my time in Fort Jackson, South Carolina, where I had basic training followed by advanced infantry training which was a severe shock to this city bred Jewish boy. In fact, however, during advanced infantry training I was picked up by the company sergeants and officers and made a company clerk, which often happened in the army of that time, Today many do not remember that for about 20 years the American army had one of the most educated junior clerical corps of any army in the world, almost all college graduates.

Q: When I was consul general in Saigon in 1969 I had a corporal seconded to me from the army as a clerk doing passport work, who was getting a masters in English at Harvard.

MARKS: After the 16 weeks of training was over, I remained in my advanced infantry training company as company clerk for the next 18 months until my two years were over; I never served in another army base. One romanticizes one's youth of course, but it was a period not without some growth and maturing experience.

Q: Well, I think our generation particularly benefitted a great deal from the military experience. As an enlisted man I spent four years in the barracks having just graduated from Williams College and I developed a great respect for the sergeant majors of the world. These were gods and they were very competent and I never lost the respect.
MARKS: I agree. Remember I told you about my background which was still a somewhat segregated world, even in the wider world of Ann Arbor. So, for me the Army was an exposure to all sorts of "others" - Southerners, blacks, to regular army sergeants, to non-Jews in general. Among those I met or interacted with was a young Second Lieutenant who was a prototype of Lieutenant Calley of later Vietnam notoriety, while another was a tall, leathery, 30-year Regular Army First Sergeant from the hills of Tennessee whose reaction to Eisenhower's order to send the troops in Little Rock to enforce school integration was unequivocally yes - he was a Regular and Regulars obey orders. Yes, that experience was not without great value in all sorts of ways.

Q: I think in our subsequent careers it showed because we gained a certain respect for lots of classes of Americans that I don't think the person who goes through the educational system becomes a diplomat and that is it, gets.

MARKS: Quite right. There were a lot of boring times in the Army I have forgotten, but I did learn some things about myself and the world that I remember with gratitude. It was an interesting two years in its way. Also, there was an unusual aspect which I had not expected, in that while in the Army as a conscript you are free in a very unique way. You have no responsibilities other than to show up in the morning and do the menial task you have been given. It might have been different for officers, although I do not have those impressions from friends. But, there were no other pressures - from family or friends or the society in general. For two years this was what you were going to do, with no choice. So you were free in a curious way: showing up in the morning, did whatever you had to do during the day, and free in the evenings far away from home and career. Maybe we should have worked on furthering our minds and souls in some fashion, but most of us merely drifted and chased youthful pleasures.

Q: I look back and think I really could have picked philosophy or another language or something like that. But I had the pleasure of occupying both Japan and Germany and discovered sex during my four years.

Back to the A-100 course. What was your impression of the officers who were coming in at that time, where did they come from and how did they see their future?

MARKS: In my first class, in September 1956, I always remember how very young I was. I was 22, just out of the University of Michigan, had spent 4 months working as a management intern at Prudential Insurance Company in Los Angeles. But, other than that, I had had a very narrow background in the Jewish community of Detroit - almost a dictionary definition of provincial. At the University of Michigan - a great university which gave me a lot and maybe all I could handle at that time - I barely scratched the surface. And, then, all of a sudden I come to Washington to join the diplomatic service. I was gratified, enormously pleased, and quite unquestioning and uncritical. I had left home for good, and wished to, and it was obviously the best of all possible worlds. I had been elected into the Club and couldn't have been happier.

I was the second youngest in my class, only a few months older than the youngest. There
were many who were ten years older, had been in the Second World War, had doctoral degrees, real adults in other words. I was enormously impressed by them, but cannot say I gained much in the way of specific impressions during those few brief weeks of my first A-100 course.

Q: You were coming out of the second A-100 course in 1959. Things are certainly high Cold War. Latin America was in some turmoil, we had some real problems there. As you came out of the class what did you want to do?

MARKS: I was very pleased to be in the Foreign Service in what was clearly an important historical moment. I wanted to play a role in history, one of the motivations that is common among so many FSOs [Foreign Service officers]. I wanted to be a participant in history.

Q: How did you see the role of the United States in the world?

MARKS: Pretty much the way it was being portrayed officially. With much help of others we had won the Second World War, a good war, and a moral war. I pretty much accepted the standard, basic explanation and description of the Cold War. I do not believe I ever became a very jingoistic Cold Warrior, but that role was what we were there for. We had defeated the evil of Nazi Germany, and while the Soviet Union did not appear to be evil in quite the same way, it was a totalitarian regime which posed a threat to us and the democratic West. I suppose my attitude was generally consistent with that of the American democratic "left" which is common to my background and attitude. There was great pride in the United States and a world view which combined Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson lots of optimism. I felt very comfortable with the Kennedy perspective, without the emotionalism, exaggeration, and self-praise that came to characterize "Camelot" and post-Camelot.

Q: You weren’t caught up in the pro-communist side that a lot of the intellectual Jewish community seemed to get caught up in.

MARKS: That was more an East Coast phenomena then Mid-West and it was more 1930s than 1940s and 50s. Also it was not really so much pro-Communist as Left intellectual in the European sense. By the time you get to the post-war period in prospering communities outside of New York the traditional political activism of integrated or Jews had become a fervent Democratic loyalty. FDR was the icon - to use a modern phrase.

I accepted our rightness and definition of wrongness in the Cold War, but I always saw the Soviet Union as much as a national competitor as an intellectual evil opponent. I never was a Cold Warrior in the ideological sense.

Q: You were seeing the Soviet Union as Russia in a way.

MARKS: To a very large degree, yes. Very much. I have always had strong instincts for the realist school, Morgenthau and crowd if you will. I felt that my country represented far more progressive and constructive historical trends than the other side did, by far.
Q: *What were you looking at?*

MARKS: I do not remember exactly what I put down in my first bid list but I believe there was a lot of Asia on it. I probably put down Europe, but I didn't have any particular qualifications and it was popular among my more impressive classmates. Also, I think I was looking for a little more adventure.

Q: *Europe seemed a little bit staid.*

MARKS: Yes, probably.

Q: *My first post was Frankfurt and I had served there in the military and, although it was a nice place, I wanted a little more adventure.*

MARKS: I do remember that when the phone rang and the personnel officer told me about my first assignment - Nairobi - I blurted out "Don't you people read preference reports?" But fundamentally I was not unhappy about the choice and off I went to Nairobi.

Q: *Did you go into Cultural Affairs first?*

MARKS: Yes, I came back from the army and they put me into the old CU [Cultural Affairs] bureau.

Q: *How long were you there?*

MARKS: Almost two years.

Q: *This would have 1959-60. What were you doing?*

MARKS: I was the Far East program officer in the International Visitors Program, arranging two to four month programs for official visitors in what was called the specialist category; that is, middle grade professionals. It was not a prestigious assignment - for brand-new junior FSOs in those days only the biographic intelligence section of INR [Bureau of Intelligence and Research] was less so - but it proved to be interesting and even enjoyable. I met a lot of foreigners, arranged programs for them around the U.S. I actually enjoyed the work. I had my first Foreign Service boss, who I enormously respected, Reid Bird. He had a beautiful and charming wife whom I had a crush on and two charming little daughters I babysat for. I have always remembered him with enormous fondness. He was a gentleman, a nice man, a serious professional, and a good boss whose style I attempted to follow when I had a chance.

Q: *Did you have any feel in Cultural Affairs who we were pushing in Asia?*

MARKS: No, we were not doing that, at least not in any obvious way. Remember cultural affairs in the Department was shared by Civil Servants, USIA [United States Information
Agencies] officers and State Department FSOs - differences which were much sharper 40 years ago. The Bureau was very interesting as it lay across this divide. The tension between the GS [General Services or Civil Service] and FS [Foreign Service] types was very palatable. Junior officers, like myself, wandered into the Bureau essentially innocent of the world of bureaucratic warfare.

The civil service cultural affairs people were trying to create and maintain a clear and conscious non-political approach. They saw themselves as cultural diplomats unsullied by political concerns. However, those selected by our embassies for the program were serious middle career professionals who showed promise of future distinction. So while we were not overtly selecting political leaders, we were looking for the next generation of leaders - an obviously political objective even if many of the invitees were cultural types. For instance, we invited painters (I still have a painting on my wall done by a young painter from Malaysia), architects (a Sri Lanka architect who I saw again 30 years later when I went back to Sri Lanka who much influenced the whole architectural scene in Sri Lanka), women (a woman leader from Turkey), etc. It was actually a sophisticated program and in retrospect probably better than we realized.

**Q:** Were you getting reports from people after their trips about how they felt about it?

MARKS: Yes, but they would be fairly practical, usually complimentary about the program and the arrangements - a sort of thank-you note. But, I think we did run a good program, long enough to provide a meaningful experience of the United States. We had generous travel funds so they could travel to at least three or four parts of the country. We would try to get them to both coasts, urban and rural areas, and short stays with families. There were also serious contacts with people in their own professions and with shared interests. We often managed lots of time with academics, sometimes as long as a week at a time.

**Q:** Was it difficult to get people to receive these visitors?

MARKS: Not at all, we had very little trouble. There was - and probably still is - an extensive network of individual volunteers and private organizations all over the United States of people delighted and desirous of meeting and receiving into their homes foreign visitors to the U.S. There appeared to be two motivations. First there were the professionals, architects, painters, doctors, lawyers, etc. who were delighted to meet their counterparts from around the world. Then there were those who just wanted to be hospitable to foreigners, and wanted the experience of meeting them and the opportunity of entertaining them as Americans. So we had no shortage of contacts and hosts at all.

We sketched out a tentative program for each visitor before they left their home, but then when they arrived in the U.S. we would keep them in Washington for a few days to go over their itinerary again to sure it met their desires. We often completely redesigned their programs with their participation. It was, to use a current phrase, a customer friendly program.

**Q:** It sounds also like a very good experience for you to understand American society.
MARKS: Yes. We would sit down daily with foreign visitors and work our way through finding out what they really wanted to do and see. For instance, a visitor might say they had always wanted to go to New Orleans and listen to jazz and so we would arrange that.

Q: This is the beginning of the civil rights movement in the South.

MARKS: Everybody forgets the great period of social change in the United States was the fifties, not the sixties. The sixties kids think they re-invented America, but they do not appreciate how much of it happened in the fifties.

Q: How did you work this? Here we were going through a national catharsis, or whatever you want to call it, particularly in the South. It wasn't easy, in many ways it was the best and the worst face of the United States. What were your instructions and instincts and how did it work?

MARKS: Remember, I was dealing with Asians, not Africans. My colleagues who dealt with Africans had a much more difficult time, no question about it. But some of our Asian friends are reasonably dark and exotic looking.

Q: Would this include India?

MARKS: Yes. The instructions were really very civilized and enlightened. Our job was to try to show the country as best we can, but our objective was to provide a meaningful experience for our visitors. If they wanted to look at the race problems, we would help them do it. If they wanted to go south we would agree, but discuss frankly the situation and the problems. (Pointing out, only partially joking, that an exotic hat or turban could identify a visitor as a foreigner and not a "Negro"). But in essence, we would talk quite frankly and arrange any trip the visitor wanted. It was not a cover up program, and I felt very strongly that the vast majority of our visitors appreciated our openness and candor. I suppose we essentially felt that overall we had a lot to be proud of and did not have to hide the warts. I certainly never received any instructions to keep our visitors away from anything.

Q: When you finished this you had a very good look at the United States, probably better than most Foreign Service Officers have.

MARKS: We did not get to travel too much ourselves, but we were in contact with people all over the country.

Q: No, but at least understanding parts of the United States. Then you got this telephone call saying you were going to Nairobi. This, of course, again was high Africa. The Kennedy Administration was just coming in. Everybody was thinking Africa. I remember I put in for Africa and ended up in Saudi Arabia instead. But this as considered where things are.

MARKS: I was not unhappy once I got over that first reaction. You are quite right; it was to be high adventure.
Q: You were in Nairobi from when to when?

MARKS: I got there just between Christmas and New Years of 1960 and left just before New Years' Eve of 1962.

Q: What were you doing?

MARKS: I was a junior economic/commercial officer, in a two officer economic/commercial section.

Q: Can you describe the embassy at that time?

MARKS: Nairobi was a consulate general as Kenya did not get its independence until after I left, in 1963. To me of course it was all so new. Although not an embassy, it was a reasonable size post for Africa for those days. There was the Consul General, of course, a Deputy Principal Officer, two officers in the economic/commercial section, one or two in the consular section, a CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] section of about 3 people, a labor/political officer, and of course an Administrative Officer and a communications section (actually two; one State and one CIA). There were also USIS [United State Information Service] and USAID [United States Agency for International Development] Missions. About a dozen American officers plus American staff, but it was very high profile. Interestingly, both the senior economic officers during my assignment were women, FSOs who dated back to World War II. We had had the post there for over thirty years and Kenya and Nairobi were well known and even glamorous places - what with Hemingway and the movies and all. Nairobi was quite a city in those days, really a glorious place, the major city between Cairo and the Cape and everyone was there, consulates, airlines, banks, journalists, etc. The whole eastern side of the continent was covered or serviced by governments or companies out of Nairobi.

Q: This is where the phrase, Are you married or are you from Kenya arose?

MARKS: That dates back from the thirties, the white settlers’ days. It was still very much a white settler country, although it was actually the end of the line.

Q: This was the time of the winds of change with Kenyatta.

MARKS: The phrase was actually coined by a British official, the Prime Minister I believe. Kenyatta was incarcerated when I arrived and was released just before I left.

Q: What had happened to the Mau Mau uprising?

MARKS: The Mau Mau rebellion had been essentially crushed several years earlier, by 1958. There were still Mau Mau hiding in the Abadare Forest and, of course, lots of them in jail. There was still some nervousness among the British, but basically the rebellion had been over for a couple of years.
Although independence - or the “Winds of Change” as a British Prime Minister characterized it - was clearly imminent, Kenya was still very much a British colony with only whites in Government House and young officers of Her Majesty's Guards regiments available for parties. As I mentioned, there were still over 30,000 Europeans (that meant Europeans, Americans, South Africans, Latins, and I believe even Japanese) in the country, plus well over 300,000 Asians, largely descendants of laborers imported from the Indian sub-continent in the early days of the colony. But the core of the society were the 1,500 or so white settlers who owned the farms or ranches. They were unusual for many reasons, but the most important was that they were - by and large - from a social class "at home" equal if not superior to the officials who served in Government House which is, I believe a unique situation in the colonial world where officials always looked down on the lower class merchants and farmers of the private sector. It was this class of white settlers who created the image of romantic Kenya mentioned so often in English novels of the ‘30s. They used to say, vis-a-vis the white settlers of Rhodesia that "Kenya was settled by the officers mess, Rhodesia by other ranks." This class consciousness, this arrogance of the English country gentry class, it should be noted, was picked up by Black Kenyans who persisted after independence in wearing Saville Row suits while their peers around Africa experimented with various forms of "authentic" African garments. I remember several years later running across a Nairobi paper showing Tom Mboya and several other worthies of the government wearing dark suits and bowlers hats to the annual Nairobi agricultural fair - always a very posh and social event.

Anyway, I had a new British sports car and wore a dinner jacket there as much as I have at any post I have ever been in. The best nightclub in Nairobi, the Equator Club, required black tie on Saturday night, unless, of course, you were brought by your white hunter. I was present the night the Equator Club was integrated when Tom Mboya showed up with a party of black Kenyans. It had obviously been arranged with the manager, Ron Partridge, and the members of the party were all in black tie or appropriate female equivalent.

There was also a huge Asian community of over 300,000 in the country - mostly from the Subcontinent. I was struck by how the society resembled eastern Europe of the last century. There was a defined aristocracy (all whites), an "outcast elite" (Asians playing the role of the Jews of Eastern Europe), and the great mass of peasants (all black Africans).

There was a large consular corps, with about 40 career consular missions. Many international people, including a remarkably large number of Japanese. There were many restaurants of different cuisines, and a very active social whirl. All in all, Nairobi was a very cosmopolitan as well as attractive city, much more than one would have expected of an African colonial city of about 350,000. Being the last days of the Raj combined with the expectation of African independence gave it a certain heightened air.

Q: Were you under any particular instructions or limited in your contacts as you went about your work?

MARKS: No, in no way except for the social restrictions still extant among the British, but
that was beginning to break down. Being an economic/commercial officer I focused essentially on the white and the Asian communities. The Asians were basically the middle class, owning or running most of the small to medium size businesses, while white people were either farmers, professional, or employees of large companies, - in addition of course to providing the officer or official level of the government and the security forces.

Q: *When you say Asian, you mean?*

MARKS: Indian and Pakistani largely, although they all - or rather their ancestors - had come from what was then the India of the British Empire. They had been imported as laborers on the railway at the end of the 19th century, and had prospered as a merchant and petit fonctionnaire class, with the second third generations also reaching for professional status. Among them were some very serious industrialists like the Madovanis of Uganda.

Q: *What were American commercial interests and what did you do?*

MARKS: First of all there were the transportation companies, TWA and Lykes Lines, as Mombasa and Nairobi were regional entrepots. Kenya was a major exporter of coffee and tea, and there was the beginning of the tourist industry. The Consulate General had been in operation for many years and had always done a certain amount of low-key commercial work. With independence looming in Kenya and in Africa in general, there was a growing interest in market penetration with the expectation that the colonial restrictions and Imperial preferences would [be abolished]. You will remember that there was a great deal of enthusiasm and optimism about the future of Africa in those days. In reality there were some openings; I remember the Dymo man came through with his new invention for labeling and packaging equipment. He did well. There was a small American business community resident in Nairobi, but basically it was very much traditional marketing within the British colonial situation. Of course, we did macro-economic reporting as well, and the interest in that grew as independence approached.

Q: *I was the commercial officer in Dhahran just about this time, a slight overlap, and I had never done this before and was rather wide-eyed. But in retrospect, I found American business wasn't very good at this market penetration, particularly small businesses. They had their headquarters up in Brussels or Geneva and maybe somebody would show up. We put out trade opportunities and never heard a word. You very seldom got anybody down there.*

MARKS: Yes, I had much the same experience. Nairobi was a little bit better because it was the major commercial and financial entrepot for half of Africa. If you were on-site anywhere in the eastern half of Africa at all, and that included Central Africa and the eastern Congo, you were bound to be in Nairobi: consulates, banks, airlines, shipping companies, distributors.

Q: *What was the feeling in the business community about the end of British rule and independence?*
MARKS: There was a whole spectrum of attitudes. The traditional Brits and some other long-time European residents were opposed but becoming resigned (although they predicted chaos and catastrophe). Others, newer types like the Japanese, were saying, "Well this may open up things, let's see how it goes. There may be new opportunities here." By and large, the foreigners who favored "Africa for the Africans" were not in the business community, and that included American businessmen.

Q: What was the situation in Tanzania?

MARKS: Similar in many respects but with some differences as Tanganyika, as it was then called, was not actually a British colony but a League of Nations mandate. The British "claim", if you wish, therefore was not as clear-cut. Also, while there were very few British settlers of the Kenya type, and they did not have the social prominence and economic weight as in Kenya. We had a separate consulate general in Dar Es Salaam. The U.S. interest in Tanzania was based on the same perspectives as in Kenya and Uganda, indeed in all of Africa, with two particular twists: because it was part of the East African Community (EAC - a British experiment in regionalization), and third because of the prominence of Julius Nyerere, everyone's favorite African liberation leader of the time.

In the Consulate General in Nairobi, we were reporting on the East African Community as well as Kenyan national affairs; particularly communications, transportation, and of course the future of regionalism. Much of the agriculture and industry in fact was regional: tea, coffee, and light industry developed by Asian industrialists in Uganda for instance. This was in addition to the regional commercial, transportation, and communication business. But as there were US consular posts at Kampala and Dar Es Salaam, we in Nairobi had to be a little careful about crossing turf lines. However as the headquarters of the EAC was physically located in Nairobi we spent a good team of time on it, asking weather it survive, would it not grow? In the end it did not survive independence very long. There have been some efforts recently to revive it but there is very little chance. It was an interesting innovation by the British but it was too late in many respects, and the new emerging African political class saw it as a colonial relic. Nyerere broke it up as soon as he could. A pity.

Q: Was Nyerere a name by then?

MARKS: Very much so, clearly destined to be the leader of and independent Tanganyika and a major voice in the African independence movement.

Q: Did you the feeling that the consulate general was making any approach to people like Tom Mboya and trying to position itself?

MARKS: More than the feeling; it was what we were doing. Mboya and others were being solicited by us, as well as others. By the time I arrived we had, as a government and a diplomatic post, pretty much aligned ourselves on the side of African independence.

Q: This was the time of Kennedy and we were making quite an effort to reach out to the
emerging African community.

MARKS: Definitely. That policy was well launched before I got there and before the arrival earlier that year of the Consul General.

Q: Who was he?

MARKS: Richard Freund. One of the first things he did after his arrival was to remove the white/black signs from the restrooms on our two floors of an office building. We were definitely and openly trying to reach out to Africans. The Agency was clearly cultivating them and probably had Mboya on their payroll by then.

Q: By Agency you mean the CIA.

MARKS: Yes. The Consulate General had by then long desegregated our social invitations. We had especially opened up to the Asian community, which had formed a separate segregated social element by itself not too many years. The Asians were extremely important part of society; numbering about 400,000 in a count of about 6 million, they constituted the largest part of what were the small and medium sized business community, and the lower ranks of the civil service and security services. They were increasingly important among the professional groups such as lawyers and doctors. One interesting political experiment was the attempt to form a multi-racial political party committed to independence, called the Zebra Party. Although obviously well received by "progressive Europeans" it never really got off the ground.

Q: How did you find Freund? He was your first leader overseas.

MARKS: He was an interesting and competent officer, but introverted and ungenerous. He was fairly young for his rank and position and had entered the Foreign Service as a Wristonee.

Q: Which means someone who had come into the Foreign Service from the Civil Service.

MARKS: Yes, about eight or nine years before coming to Nairobi. He had obviously had a very successful career as a civil servant after the war, had transferred to State as a GS-15 [Government Service rank 15, a pay grade], and quickly moved to the old FSO-1 [the equivalent Foreign Service officer pay grade] just prior to being appointed CG [consul general] in Nairobi. At 44 or 45 he was sent out to be Consul General in one of the major African countries with independence likely to occur on his watch. He had the diplomatic equivalent of a marshal's baton in his knapsack.

He was a big, good looking man, who wore beautiful, transatlantic cut suits from England.

As for me, I was bright eyed and bushy tailed and as innocent as could be. In the end he was not very satisfied with me; there were several incidents which in retrospective are not particularly complimentary to me but reveal his lack of generosity and leadership qualities as well. What is most pertinent, I think, to this oral history is that he did not perform the
leadership mentoring role to the puppy dog of a junior officer that I was. My faults and shortcomings were largely due to my youth and inexperience and he did not make the effort which I think was required by his rank and position. It may have been a question of personality as anything else. He was not a warm or sympathetic man, which is not a criticism but an observation. He was very ambitious, and a snob, carefully hiding his own American immigrant antecedents (second generation German Jewish I would guess) under his suits, his rank, and his Swedish aristocratic (second) wife. (She was actually quite a nice lady, but much under his thumb). He was not popular with most of his staff but I did not realize how unpopular until later.

Although very bright, Freund really lacked good judgment. For instance, he got into competition and then a quarrel with the head of the newly opened office of the African-American Institute, a well-know American non-governmental organization [NGO]. This man was quite well-known in American and African political circles, having been heavily involved in the pro-independence activities of the 1950s, and had opened up the office in Nairobi in order to be on the ground as independence approached. It was the AAI which organized the so-called Kennedy student airlift from Kenya - a hundred students who traveled by special charter to go to U.S. universities. Freund somehow got himself into competition with this man (whose name I have forgotten), to the point that Freund formally ordered his staff not to appear at the opening ceremony of the AAI office. This was crazy and a scandal, as well as professionally suicidal for Freund as the AAI was very tight with the Kennedy Administration. I don't fault Freund for having differences of opinion with the AAI or with the Administration for that matter, but how do you allow yourself to get into a public debate with another American (especially a prominent one) and then forbid the American official staff to show up at the inauguration of the local office of a prominent pro-African American NGO? By the way, none of us could figure out any substantive basis for the quarrel. Needless to say, Freund lost that fight and was withdrawn from Nairobi shortly thereafter. He never got his embassy, a development which was discussed with pleasure by several of his staff whenever they ran into each other over the years. The ambition and desire of becoming an ambassador is normal and natural in the Foreign Service, but Freund's lust was excessive and his failure seemed to be the judgement of a just God - or so some of us thought. He flew back to Washington to become a special assistant on arms control or something and retired a few years later.

It was all the result of bad judgement, arising out of personality traits. There was little of a substantive or policy nature involved. That is what I mean by bad judgment. Of course, it was all happening above my level, but Freund ruined himself. As for me, he did me some harm, although I am quite sure some of his comments about my performance in Nairobi were valid. I don't fault him on that, but I maintain he failed in his responsibility as a senior officer, and the Post's Principal Officer, to make an effort to train and direct me. I was the most junior officer at Post, and on my first foreign tour. He obviously did not see that he had any responsibility in that respect.

Q: You left there in 1962?

Q: Where to?

MARKS: To Nuevo Laredo, for my sins.
Q: You were there from when to when?

Q: What did you think about that assignment?

MARKS: I was appalled, terribly upset. I hadn't joined the Foreign Service to go to the American border. Mexico City would have been a delight, but the Texas border? And I was assigned as a consular officer which certainly did not please or interest me, although that was not the worst aspect of the assignment as in those days we all assumed we would do a consular tour or two. It was the combination of consular work and Nuevo Laredo. I couldn't get out of it, as the personnel people were unsympathetic, claiming that recent practice in changing assignments to meet officers’ complaints had resulted in a stern directive from the Director General that no assignments will be changed, period. That may have been fiction but I was young enough and believed it. So, I went off to Nuevo Laredo with my new bride.

Q: Where did you meet your wife?

MARKS: Nairobi, she was from Tehran and had been visiting friends in Kenya. After I returned to Washington for Spanish language training, she came and we were married here, got her expeditious naturalization in less than thirty days (in those days spouses of FSOs had to be American citizens), and got in my little British convertible and drove to Nuevo Laredo.

As it turned out, Nuevo Laredo was not an absolutely terrible experience. In a small post, three officers and one FS Staff, you are free of the worse threat of consular work which is pure, undiluted visa line work. While I was the sole "visa officer" and stood on the visa line most of the day, I took all types of applications including immigrant visas. I also did protection and welfare and some administrative work. Actually all three of us shared the whole range of tasks. We did some, although very little, reporting. The principal officer was a very, very knowledgeable consular officer, Harvey Cash. You may know him.

Q: He is one of the top people in the consular trade. You couldn't have had a better professional.

MARKS: And a very nice man to boot. So, doing a variety of consular work, I hate to admit, was not without interest. And, I learned as do all Foreign Service Officers fairly shortly, that your best stories are consular stories.

Q: Could you give me some of the consular stories that you had?
MARKS: Stories. Most of the stories evolved around the peculiar atmosphere of the border. For instance, I have participated in what is almost an old locker room joke. I freed a man from a brothel. As you know, Mexican border towns all have brothels, usually clustered in what is called the Zona Rosa, or red zone. One day we received a call from one of the madames who ran one of the brothels in town. She had an American there who was not well, and who had run out of money. She was taking care of him but he had run up a very big bill and we had to do something about it. So, Harvey Cash, giggling and laughing, sent me down to sort it out. The madame was a nice enough Mexican lady. She explained the situation and took me to a room where my American citizen, a man in his late 30s or early 40s, was lying, apparently sound asleep in bed. He had shown up in the establishment about three days earlier, already reasonably drunk and had spent a couple of days buying drinks and girls and paying everyone's bill. After about two days of this, the madame thought she better get some more cash in hand, but it now appeared that he had run out. By then he was practically comatose as well, so she cleaned him up and put him in a bedroom. She was taking care of him, keeping him clean, feeding him, and allowing him one drink a day so he would come down gradually. I got his papers and his name and she presented me with a bill of $600 or $700, which was a lot of money in those days (1969).

I called his family, somewhere in the South, and discovered that he was the scion of a wealthy family who had managed this sort of adventure several times before. This particular time he had disappeared about a month or so before with $30 - 40,000 and had just been in a tremendous toot all through Mexico before hitting Nuevo Laredo on his way back home, broke. I negotiated with the madame and got the price down a little bit, notified the family of the amount, paid the bill, and transported him in the consulate car to the railway station where I put him on a train heading home to his family. By then he was sober if not in absolutely good shape.

Imagine, being held prisoner in a brothel.

One of the things you learned to understand on the border was the real cultural gap between you as an official and the applicant; in this case the poor Mexican who was trying to get across, who was just trying to move from one place to another because of his family or a job. What we now call economic refugees. To him you, as the consular officer, are this foreigner - this rich and powerful Gringo - talking about ideas that make the doctrine of the Trinity seem like ABC, specifically the concept of a bonafide non-immigrant. To the applicant, you are talking gibberish. It was not a language problem, in fact my Spanish became quite good. As we all know, trying to explain the concept of the bone-fide non-immigrant in English is almost as difficult. What I learned was that the consular officer and the applicant were often two different worlds in conflict. In that situation, where the applicant is essentially seeking to change his life, he or she would speak to the incomprehensible official world (which we represented) in any way that would work. Was that really lying? In our sense, yes, of course. However to that type of applicant, we are merely arbitrary officials who need to be placated because we hold the key to passage across the border. What is it you want to know? Whatever it is he will tell you. They don't care because your criteria are not about anything that has any validity or reality to them. What is important is to get across the border. All in all, it was a very interesting exposure to
cross-cultural interaction.

Q: It is one of the hardest ideas I find, as a supervising consular officer, to try to explain to the young officers. This is not a personal affront and don't get your panties in a twist because somebody lies to you. You are an impediment to what they want to do and they don't understand what you want and are just trying to get through to you. One of the hard things is that some consular officers take this as a personal affront.

MARKS: Yes, and then just think of the person in question as a liar of low morals, and therefore ineligible for a visa. But there were also other types of cultural interaction. I remember a couple who appeared in the Consulate one day to apply for a visitor’s visa. They represented a very different class of Mexican, very upper class. We usually did not see Mexicans of the aristocracy if you will in the visa line as the local people of class all had permanent visitor’s cards, and those from the Mexican interior generally applied for visas in their neighborhood consulate or at the Embassy. Actually they were not a couple, rather a man in his thirties and his mother. I was fascinated to note she spoke to him in the "tu" form while he used the [formal “you”] "usted" form with her.

Q: This is the familiar and the non-familiar.

MARKS: Yes, this man spoke to his mother with the formal "usted" form, which was the old-fashioned manner.

Q: What is the entry place for Nuevo Laredo?

MARKS: Laredo, Texas, and then straight up the highway to San Antonio.

Q: That has one of the biggest Air Force bases in the world.

MARKS: There were many in Texas at that time, and we had one just outside Laredo. It was a training base for jet pilots, including foreign students from allied countries. In fact, there were some students from Iran there at the time, and as my wife was from Tehran we got together with them which resulted in a picture and a long article in the Laredo newspaper.

However in my visa work, one section of the Immigration and Naturalization Act was Section 212 (a)12, that relating to immoral background or intentions. Well, here we were at the Texas-Mexican border, where prostitution is a legal industry, and a good number of the customers come from the U.S. Young boys from all over Texas hop in a car on Friday night and roar down to Mexico to spend some time in the bars and brothels of Mexico. Needless to say, that crowd also includes many of the servicemen stationed at the numerous military bases in Texas. Men, women, girls, and boys and everything being the way it is, some of them go on to more permanent relationships including marriage. So, we had a constant series of applications for immigrant visas by Mexican spouses of American citizen husbands. At this point Section 212 (a) 12 often reared its head.
Now Mexican prostitutes are registered by the local authorities, and inspected by public health officials so we at the Consulate (and I think at other consulates along the border) had a quick rule of thumb. We assumed that the Mexican spouse of a Mexican-American would not fall under Section 212 (a) 12: Mexican-Americans did not go down to Mexico to marry whores. However, an Anglo-American with a new Mexican wife was a different story (unless she and he are obviously of a certain class and background). Checking on the obvious cases, and they really were obvious, produced a positive identification nine times out of ten, and so the applicant was ineligible for a visa. Even though the applicant was the legitimate wife of an American citizen, the law said "'tis a pity but she's a whore."

That would usually not be the end of the story, though. The actual visa interview would take place in the visa officer's office that is my private office away from the visa line. As the applicant is being interviewed the husband, usually present, waits outside in the waiting room. The visa officer interviews the applicant, after having already identified her as a "working girl," and attempts to get her to admit it. If she refuses, the visa is refused and it is up to her to explain to her husband why. However if the applicant will admit the charge, her husband can then apply for a waiver from the INS, on the grounds she has reformed. The INS would almost always grant the waiver, but take about six months to process it. At that point, the applicant can be given her immigrant visa.

So, you can see how this series of events could be fairly traumatic for a new, young, innocent FSO, at least those faraway days. Getting a woman to admit she is a prostitute, then having to go out and tell her husband, or having her go out and having him immediately wishing to discuss it with you. Remember, this was the early sixties, before the sexual revolution. The whole process was a very real introduction into life.

I have all sorts of stories about this process over a two year period as people reacted to in different ways. I particularly remember two. The first case was half-done when I arrived at post: a young lady who had been interviewed, found ineligible on 212 (a) 12 grounds, and was now about to receive her INS waiver and visa. An unusual aspect of the case was that her Air Force officer, a lieutenant: almost invariably the spouses of this type of applicant were enlisted men or the civilian equivalent. Then I saw the girl, and I almost fell off my chair. She was beautiful and elegant, well dressed in the style of that time and place in linen summer frock, high heels and handbag. Her English was fluent and correct with an attractive Mexican accent, and could have passed easily as the daughter of one of Nuevo Laredo's best families. Yet she was only 18 or 19 and had spent the last six years working in the cribs up and down the border. She had innate class and taste and was obviously brighter than her husband. She broke down in tears when I gave her the visa. I often wonder what became of her.

Another case was a real tear-jerker, involving a horny-handed construction contractor from Galveston. In fact he was quite well-to-do but a real diamond in the rough. He had met his lady love in one of the towns along the border. She was not beautiful, not elegant, not young (around 40) and had about 7 kids in tow from at least three fathers. He knew exactly who and what she was and he had fallen in love. He wanted to take care of her and the children but she could not get an American immigration visa, even with an INS waiver, because Mexican law would not permit her to take the children out of the country without permission from the father, or rather fathers. This was not possible as she was not even sure
who they were, much less where to find them. She was therefore stuck in Nuevo Laredo
where her American husband (they had gotten married) had set her up in a nice house,
although he had already built a house for them in Galveston. He came down every weekend
in his Cadillac and tried to get her through the Mexican system. We in the Consulate were
rooting for them and were prepared to process the visas but could not do so without
passports for the children which they could not get. (I do not remember why, but we could
not get a passport waiver.) It was just ghastly.

In fact, we kept hinting to him that he ought to get the visa for his wife and then slip the
kids across some night, but he would not. He insisted on doing it legally, and therefore
remained trapped. It was almost a soap opera, but with real people. It was unresolved when
I left Nuevo Laredo.

Another story involved rescuing a guy who thought he was Jesus Christ from jail and
driving him through the city, across the bridge to Laredo on the American side and to the
railroad station. All the time he was leaning out the window shouting about how he would
bring about the coming of the Messiah. All consular officers have stories like that.

Q: I imagine jail visiting was part of your job. What was our impression of how the system
worked at that time?

MARKS: The Mexican system?

Q: Yes.

MARKS: Not too bad because we were right on the border and American visitors were
important to local commerce. By and large the Mexicans didn't make a lot of trouble for
Americans, especially the kids, who got into trouble. The Mexican police would grab and
book them for a quick fine and then let them go. We didn't have any long-term American
prisoners in jail there and the few who did turn up we were able to get out fairly easily.

I only had one tricky situation in my two years in Nuevo Laredo. In involved a tourist of the
type who does not usually get into trouble on the border - a doctor, lawyer or something
who had been involved in a car accident. This sort of incident was usually sorted out
quickly and rarely involved the Consulate. However this particular individual had gotten
very aggressive with the police and others and they had tossed him into jail. He was very
unhappy. I could have gotten him out right away, on his promise not to leave town until the
accident charges were sorted out the next day, probably to include a fine. I could see by the
look in his face and by what he said that he had no intention of keeping that promise which
would have left me left holding the bag. The Mexican authorities would clearly have
settled for a fine, they had not real desire to keep him in jail, but the American was very
much into that indignant American mode: "Who do they think they are? They can't put me
in jail; I am an American citizen, etc." I kept trying to explain that he was not in the United
States, but he had trouble seeing the logic of this.

Essentially we did not have a lot of trouble with the police and American citizens because
we were not deep in the Mexican interior. The cops in this town on the border, who I knew pretty well, were not looking to make trouble for American citizens. They wanted to milk them a little bit, but tourism was the industry of the town.

Q: Ed, you started talking again about your first overseas tour; which was where? Nairobi?

Some of the things that you wanted to talk about was the importance of a first tour in setting a mold in a way and the other one was women supervisors in an antediluvian time when women weren't in positions of supervision as much as later. Then you had some other remarks.

MARKS: Let me return back to those days of yesteryear, to quote a phrase. Nairobi was my first overseas tour and the first overseas post is very important, particularly in those days when so very few of us had had much overseas experience - unless it had been in military service. The sort of travel which is now so common among young people, since the 1960s, just was not widely available then. My military service did not take me overseas. So, to get on an airplane for Nairobi was a very exciting event for me, especially as it involved stops in London and Paris - also thrilling experiences for me.

I was authorized a stop in London for consultations at our embassy and at the Foreign Office; standard stuff, but exhilarating for me. I stopped in Paris to see Paris, and to see a good friend of mine who had been one of our little crowd in Washington and who was now assigned on his first tour in Paris. He was living in an almost stereotypical little hotel on the Left Bank, etc. He was a very attractive person and a bright officer who we considered a likely "water walker." (Two years later on my return from Nairobi I ran into him in Georgetown and discovered he had resigned from the Service. When I asked him why, he looked at me curiously and said, "Well, you know, I am in love with Paul, and it is too much of strain to live that way." Paul was another one of our group, not in the Foreign Service. None of us had realized that they were gay. How naive we all were.)

From Paris I traveled on via the old TWA [Trans-World Airways] route into East Africa and Nairobi. Although our post in Nairobi was a Consulate General, in many ways it was an embassy. Although London was technically the supervising embassy, Kenya was heading towards independence and the post interacted directly with the African Bureau in the State Department. The nominal supervising authority, the ambassador in London, really had very little to do with us.

Let me describe a little bit about the country before I talk about the post because they are related. Kenya was an interesting place. It was a British colony. Like many colonies it had very much a three-tiered society. On top were the "Europeans," which meant whites, and which included Americans and Japanese. Next came the "Asians" which essentially meant the people from the Indian Sub-Continent. They constituted what the I believe sociologists call the outcast elite, who ran the shops, filled most of the middle and lower grade civil servant positions including police middle ranks whose children (the second and third generations born in East Africa ) were increasingly into professional fields; law, medicine, etc. And then at the bottom, of course, the "Africans" who filled the role of the peasantry in what was essentially a feudal society.
As a young diplomat I belonged automatically to the upper level, not only because I was white and therefore by definition a European, Japanese diplomats also belonged. But there was another aspect of Kenyan society which was extremely interesting, and which had a lot of implications later. Kenya was a rather unusual colony described by a rather snotty saying: “Kenya was settled by officer’s mess, Rhodesia by other ranks.” I don't know of any other colony anywhere else in the world where the settler class, those not belong to the official class, was of a higher social standing in the home country than those in Government House. A good number of the settlers were of what the English call County, or landed gentry, if not actually aristocrats. The book and movie Out of Africa is about them.

In every other European colony, not just the British, colonial officials (including the military and police) were the social elite, and by and large looked down on commercial and other private sector people. Kenya was the reverse. The settlers, especially the pre-World War II settlers, looked down on the essentially middle class officials. So, it was black tie and polo in the country estates and Muthaiga Club. All other Europeans of those who were not part s emulated them and copied their attitudes. You can get a feel for this attitude in many English novels of the ‘30s and ‘40s, writers like Anthony Powell, where there are constant references to Kenya and the people who go back and forth (often with someone else’s spouse. Another popular Kenya settler phrase was "Are you married or do you live in Kenya?").

Nairobi was also the major city between Cairo and the Cape and a relatively sophisticated, cosmopolitan community. Apart from its upper class settlers, there was a large consular corps, regional banks, airlines, etc, all servicing the whole Eastern coast of the continent with direct contacts with India and Pakistan. This is where the airlines stopped and shifted their crews so there were lots of young and beautiful stewardesses from all over the world there. It was a very cosmopolitan, busy, prosperous city. Also, delightful and charming as hell. This meant, of course, that it had lots of social opportunities and pitfalls for a young bachelor consular officer.

It is important to know that all of this atmosphere had very serious implications for the development and style of the emerging Kenyan African political class. Today they still look down disdainfully at their neighbors Dar es Salaam, for instance. They never developed a masculine national costume in Kenya, although they did for women. The men still wear dark English cut suits. The Africans picked up their style from the settlers class which makes Kenya different from almost every other colony in Africa.

As for myself, I had a little white British sports car and my black tie dinner jacket, the first one I ever had, and which I wore more in Kenya anywhere else in my career. As a bachelor I led a very active social life. All very exhilarating and interesting of course, and a bit dangerous because of the temptation to participate in the last days of the British Raj rather than the imminent political changes.

Which role is better and more right in the long run is an interesting professional question. What is the role of a diplomat? Are we supposed to be change agents? There are obviously two schools of thought on the question and my assignment in Nairobi put it to me, although
I was not fully conscious of it. I have wrestled with the question ever since, as have most of us in our generation in the Foreign Service. I generally followed the more conservative route there, which may have adversely affected my career as "change agents" have been fashionable during the past thirty years or so, I was never a true believer, if you will, in the social welfare school of diplomacy.

_Q: Back to who your role models are._

MARKS: The first overseas post is very important. I had some interesting people in the post. It was not big but there was a reasonably senior officer as Consul General, an FSO-3 (now FSO-1) as Deputy Principal Officer who certainly appeared awesome to me, and a labor/political officer who wasn't all that senior but could talk of his participation in World War II. However no one there became a role model for me; the Consul General could have, but did not.

However I did learn more about the public role played by all diplomats, even junior ones, which is an important lesson from one's first post. You suddenly realize you are not a private person anymore as what you do and not do has implications because it is noticed and talked about, not because of one's own virtue or importance but because of being a public official.

_Q: You already learned that to some extent at the Old Europe where you and your cohorts got roaring drunk._

MARKS: Yes, yes. You learn that at home and now I learned it abroad as well. It leads to at least two qualities of the professional diplomat. One is a somewhat exaggerated sense of personal value and importance. No question about it. But, also a definite conservatism. A little tale I would tell people at home outside the Foreign Service about why we are so conservative and why we speak so circumspectly. I would say, "Look, think of the situation where you are the most junior Vice Consul or Third Secretary at the American embassy in Paris, where any possible contribution you can make to the welfare and interests of the United States really very marginal. There is not much you can do that is going to change the world. On the other hand, you could cause an immense stink and difficulty for your country by commenting publicly that the minister for defense sleeps with little boys, even though everybody knows it to be true. The fact that an American official should give voice to that comment could cause a scandal."

_Q: Absolutely._

MARKS: So one learns circumspection and caution. It comes with the profession. I learned this in Nairobi because it was a time of change in the politics of the country, as colonialism was coming to an end independence was on its way...the British Prime Minister, I believe, used the phrase, "winds of change" in 1960 or so. When I arrived there, Kenyatta was still under detention by the British, and the Governor General speaking on the radio as late as 1961 referred to Kenyatta as a leader into darkness and death. Within about one year, Kenyatta was released from detention and assumed the leadership of the party that would
take Kenya into independence. There was still tremendous bitterness in the white community because of the Mau Mau and the Governor was obviously still influenced by them although political attitudes in London had already changed.

It was a period of tremendous change. The American government was changing too, because Kennedy had just been elected and the new Administration was clearly pro-independence and anti-colonial. It was then that I first met the phenomenon that later became clearer and clearer as I continued to serve in Africa. Certainly in the sixties and seventies and probably even today, Americans and Europeans interested in Africa were almost by definition liberal or progressive in American political terms, or Left in European. Idealism and enthusiasm were rampant and common among those foreigners living in, passing through, or thinking about Africa. The belief in the "Winds of Change" and the imminent demise of colonialism was unquestioned in that period.

The Kennedy Administration took over and in one dramatic initiative organized a planeload of young Kenyans right out of secondary school, put them on an airplane and sent them to American universities. The "Kennedy Airlift" was a dramatic signal of American sympathy for African independence. I haven't any idea what happened to those students, but it certainly was a dramatic move and probably a constructive move. It did provide a quick influx of people who came back four years later, only a couple of years after independence.

It was in that environment that I was a junior officer in my first tour. The glamour of Kenya, the glamour of the people in a gorgeous country, as anybody who has been there will know. We had a good and interesting life, with houses and beautiful cars and travel into the bush on weekends and lounging around the Stanley Hotel Thorn Tree and Long Bar in between. Also important was the youthful character of the foreign community, with lots of young people from all over the world. For instance, there was the interesting phenomenon, probably gone now, of the Australian and New Zealand youth migration. I don't know if you are familiar with it.

Q: I know the Australians and New Zealanders all have a year off almost and it seems they traveled all over the place.

MARKS: Young Australians and New Zealanders just after leaving school, high school or college, would do exactly that. They would leave Australia, heading more or less for London. There was one route which from Australia to South Africa, then up the East African coast, and eventually end up in London. The objective was London, as the center of the British Empire where they would not need visas, passports, or work permits. They all had had some connections there could get jobs to live on, which was usual. So, there was a constant stream of attractive Australians threading their way up the African continent. Some them stayed along the route, with jobs or marriages or other relationships, some of them ended up in London where they would either spend a year or so or settle permanently.

So, Nairobi was really a very social and attractive place and very nice for a junior diplomat. One was caught between the last days of the Raj and all its splendor, glory and excitement
and a lot of fun, while underneath a massive change about to occur as Kenya and other African countries were about to achieve independence. I certainly enjoyed it enormously, and only wish in retrospective I had been a little more serious and a little less fun seeking. Ah, well.

Remember, all this hadn't been going on for very long. It has always been pointed out that Kenyatta was a young boy when the British first arrived. There is a famous novel by Elspeth Huxley called "Red Strangers." The red strangers were the Europeans who first arrived in Kenya in any significant numbers in the 1890s and 1900s. One could still meet Richard Mainzterhaggen, a legendary figure of the pre-World War I hunting and fishing safari days, at the bar at the Muthaiga Club.

Q: Sort of the great white hunter type?

MARKS: No, more of that English gentry adventuring class I mentioned earlier. He was a British Army officer, one of whose wartime adventures is central to a recent movie about the Australian light horsemen in the Palestine campaign of the first World War. He wrote the classic pre-World War I hunting book on Kenya. The amount of slaughtered game he records is incredible: 15 antelope, 5 bucks, 3 lions, innumerable birds of various kinds, etc - day after day. He was still sitting around the Muthaiga Club in the early sixties.

Q: You were mentioning women supervisors.

MARKS: Yes, I was the junior economic/commercial officer and I had two women supervisors in succession. They were both good officers as well as nice people. Both had the sort of background that you would have expected of most women officers of that period. Both were quite well educated but had had to work themselves up from the secretarial ranks after World War II. I have forgotten the details of their careers, assuming I ever really knew much being a fairly self-satisfied young man, but they had clearly run across the glass ceiling to some degree. How much of that was due to the fact that they came in sort of sideways and how much of that reflects the way women were treated in those days, I don't know.

The Department was not, of course, a full opportunity employer for women in those days, but, as I pointed out rather aggressively some years later in a sensitivity session when it was politically correct to attack existing organizations such as State for their alleged insensitivity, we were nevertheless better than almost anybody else around. After all there were women FSOs in the Service in the thirties. Maybe only a few, but try to find a women officer in a bank or the military or anywhere else at all at that time. My entering class of the Foreign Service in 1956 had seven women out of 35 officers. All but one or two left later for reasons which did reflect our lack of fair treatment, specifically the single status requirement but nevertheless seven in a class of 35 in 1956 was a percentage which could not have been found in any other institution in the United States at the time. So, I would say our record was not equal but it was quite progressive compared to other institutions.

Anyway, my two lady bosses were nice people, good bosses and I learned from both of
At that time a young lady from Smith or Vassar would often take a job as a Foreign Service secretary. In fact, we were used to having Foreign Service secretaries as our intellectual equals. One of my secretaries later became the wife of a Secretary of State, Marlene Heinemann, who became Marlene Eagleburger.

MARKS: I think you are absolutely right. These two women were easily my intellectual and educational equals and I learned from them. On the other hand, because of their background, they couldn't provide a certain sort of guidance and role model that might have been more useful for me as a male officer. Not because of their feelings, but because of the system and the way they were in this system. These were women in their mid-forties and O-4s in rank, current O-2s. If I had had instead a rising young O-4 in his early or middle thirties, I would have had a better mentor and role model. This is neither good nor bad, just the way it was.

There were a couple of themes in Nairobi which continued to be part of my career for quite awhile. One was the ambience of a colonial society and how they are structured and run; it turned out I spent a lot of time in either colonial or immediately post-colonial societies. And how that experience helps determine the sort of independent country which follows. This was a period of great enthusiasm and idealism about African independence - liberal as I said on the political side and basically socialist on the economic side. Even Americans found themselves approving the new state-run societies. Kenya's unique colonial heritage of upper class settler attitudes meant that Kenya never really became very socialist, at least as compared with its African neighbors. It has its own problems but it didn't really make those management or governance mistakes. I have always argued that Kenya avoided those particular problems because of the social heritage of the settler class and Lord Delamere. (Lady Delamere still lives in Kenya, on an enormous estate).

Q: One question about this. As a young bachelor, were Asian girls and African girls not beyond the pale as far as your social life?

MARKS: African girls certainly were, although I went to parties where all races were present; but this was among the more raffish young journalist crowd. I thought it was not something for me to do, at least with respect to Africans. However, there was definitely a change occurring with respect to Asians, depending on which social group we are talking about. One group of contacts and friends did include Asians and, in fact, I had a relationship with an Asian girl for a little while. But, again, it was kind of tricky and I did it a little on the side rather than completely openly. In a sense the color line was being crossed but slowly, moving from European (white) to Asians first. However, let me emphasize that official receptions and other events given by officers of the Consulate General were all multi-racial. Those who had experience in Africa in those days will remember the almost frantic search to find Africans to invite. My own conservatism obviously had something to do with my behavior in my personal life. I do not claim to have been a pioneer.

So, there were for me a lot of lessons I took from my Kenya assignment. The role of seniors in molding the experience of a junior officer at his first tour, I think, can be very significant. I learned some things on my own, and some from my bosses and colleagues. My
experience and development could have gone various other ways if people had made an effort but I was pretty left to myself. There was no effective, significant guidance from anybody. Whether that is good or bad in my case is open to question. I don't know. There were sins of omission and commission in this situation. Seniors ought to be aware that a young officer showing up for his first post presents a rare opportunity. I think seniors ought to be more aware of this. Many are, but I am just emphasizing the importance of the opportunity.

Q: You left there when?


Q: Where to?

MARKS: Back to Washington via Tehran to go on to Nuevo Laredo. I say via Tehran because I stopped there to see the family of my fiancée. As I mentioned before, I tried to get out of the assignment to Nuevo Laredo by saying I had grown up as a boy in a town on the Canadian border and didn't join the Foreign Service to go back to the American border. You can imagine how successful that line of argument was. Nothing else worked either so, off I went.

Q: We discussed this, didn’t we?

MARKS: Yes, in much detail. The point being that for all its lack of ego gratification to substantive political and economic officers, consular service provides many of the average FSOs best stories, as I mentioned last time. It was an interesting professional experience in a way, which I didn't mention last time. Nuevo Laredo is the newer town, the older Laredo is on the American side. At the end of the Mexican War the border of the two countries was set at the Rio Grande and the town of Laredo, Mexico became Laredo, Texas. Many Mexicans of Laredo did not want to be Americans and so moved across the border and found the new town of Nuevo Laredo. So, the American town is the original. But the two cities get along very well, and claimed to have the best relationship along the whole American-Mexican border. Unlike most American border towns of the era, Laredo had a significant Mexican component in its professional and upper classes, and many families - and most especially the so-called best families - had both Anglo and Mexican backgrounds with members living on both sides of the border. I was told this was quite unusual for the border. Elsewhere along the border there were much sharper social and economic distinctions between Anglos and Mexicans.

Consequently, the two cities got along very well with many families having members living on both sides, in fact both cities shared the same moto: "Los Dos Laredos" [Spanish: “The Two Laredos”] and used it all the time. It was an interesting insight a mixed Anglo/Mexican community, a situation which has become much more prevalent now on the Mexican/American border, and has spread (some) to places like Los Angeles, which I think is the second largest Mexican city in the world after Mexico City.
The other interesting aspect of serving on the national border was vivid manifestation of DeGaulle's famous observation about foreign affairs and geography, a not unimportant lesson for a young diplomat I realized that however we got along with Mexico at any given time, the essence of foreign policy towards that country was the elemental and unchanging fact of geographical proximity. We share a border, we share a continent, we are neighbors and nothing is going to change that. That fact is often overlooked by all by people who sometimes scream and yell about our policy to Mexico. The geographical fact makes Mexico a fundamentally different foreign policy question for us than South Africa or even Japan, and that was true even before the population movements which are changing the nature of the relationship to an internal one in some respects. I began to learn that lesson in Nuevo Laredo.

Q: When did you leave Nuevo Laredo?

MARKS: I left in July or August, 1965.

Q: Where did you go then?

MARKS: Luanda, Angola.

Q: How did this come about? Had Africa whetted your appetite or was it just Personnel?

MARKS: I have to admit that I have gone with the flow a lot. I cannot remember exactly how Africa came up, although I believe I put some African posts on my preference report. My first notice was that I was being assigned to Lourenco Marques, Mozambique. I went back to Washington to do a language transition course from Spanish to Portuguese. My Spanish had gotten rather good in Mexico, to be perfectly honest, the transition into Portuguese and Lourenco Marques sounded very interesting.

Q: Your wife was from where?

MARKS: From Iran. I met her in Nairobi at a classic cocktail party. I started the transition course and one day went to the Desk to do some background reading when I ran across a document in the files that said my next assignment was being changed from Lourenco Marques to Luanda. I was rather furious about this as nobody had told me; nobody was bothering to tell me. This made me rather irritated with the personnel system and with the desk officer, who I had thought was a friend, but who had kept the change a secret from me, for reasons I never did understand. In the end, however, off we went to Luanda which turned out to be interesting in its own way.

Q: You were there from when to when?

MARKS: From August 1963 to August 1964. It was a two year assignment broken after about 11 months by a direct transfer to Zambia.

Q: What was the situation in Luanda?
MARKS: Here I was again, back to a European colony in Africa. Luanda was an old fashioned Foreign Service consulate, in a very old fashioned colonial situation where the metropole was still unwilling to accept that the winds of change were blowing; even though the other colonial powers had by now all packed their bags and left. Portuguese officials were quite aware of the situation, but repeated constantly the unofficial position which was that they were the first into Africa, and would be the last out. They had another motto: "Us, us alone." I learned a lot about the Portuguese in Luanda. They are a very interesting and stubborn people. I have become very fond of them.

Angola was a very classic settler colony, and was very much cut off from the wider world, as was the Portugal of the era itself. The only Portuguese sign of recognition that the world was changing was the retitling of Angola as an "overseas province." Remember this was the Portugal of Salazar. There were only a couple of Portuguese airline flights a week that into Luanda airport direct from Lisbon. In fact, one of the favorite and very social events of the week was to go out to the airport when the plane was coming in or going out to say hello and goodbye to friends. Often after a party we would jump into a car and head for the airport.

It was a lovely town, all pink red-tiled roofs and Mediterranean looking; some of it quite old, from the 18th century and even earlier, the Portuguese had been there since the 1500s. There was marvelous old fort right in the center of town, overlooking the ocean. Luanda is located on a little bay with magnificent beaches on both bay side and ocean side and excellent local seafood.

The Portuguese had their own view of history which was very Portuguese centered. At that point, they had no intention in any way, shape, matter or form to give way to the "Winds of Change", because this was not a colony but an overseas province and every inhabitant was a Portuguese citizen. The permanent population, that is those other then military, police, or officials on tours, was made of three groups: Africans, Mestizos, and those originally from the metropole - all of whom were, as I noted, Portuguese citizens. Despite this legal situation, Angola was obviously a classic settler colony. There were 500,000 residents of Portuguese origin (some there many generations) in among a total population 5 or 6 million. But that figure included quite a few mestizos as well as Africans who constituted the majority. The Portuguese pride themselves on not being racist, although in fact it was only a relatively short time since they had extended citizenship to all residents and eliminated the distinction between "indigene and "civilizado." However, they were clearly free of the more obvious and extreme racial attitudes of most European colonials. Did you ever hear that tacky but very Portuguese "witticism:" "God made the white man, the Devil made the black man, and the Portuguese made the mestizo."

It was in Luanda that I began to develop my view that there was not much difference between the various European colonies in Africa. The British always claimed that they were the only ones who know how to properly run and develop a colony, while the French said the same thing. Both the English and the French - officials, academics, journalists, and colonists themselves - all also held the opinion that the Belgians, on the other hand, were
In Angola most senior people in the government and in the commercial and professional classes were "white" Portuguese, but there were also significant numbers of mestizos and a few token Africans. The peasant class was essentially African, but the working class in the cities and small towns also included "white" Portuguese as well as mestizos and Africans. For instance there were Portuguese cab drivers in Luanda. The racial question was blurred and just not as clear as it had been, for instance, in Kenya.

And the Portuguese are stubborn. The story that illustrated to me their stubbornness was an incident in the global war between the Portuguese and the Dutch in the early 17th century. The Dutch tried to take over the Portuguese global empire, global because it included holdings in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. A Dutch fleet took Luanda from the Portuguese in 1610, but the defeated garrison did not surrender but instead retreated into the hinterland. The Dutch followed them and there was a series of little skirmishes until finally the Portuguese, with some native allies, finally held at a place called Massangena, about 110 miles inland from the coast. They built a fortress and a church, a really elegant structure which is still standing. They held out and waited for relief, these 60 or 70 Portuguese in the middle of Africa in 1610, and relief did come - eight years later. Now, I call that stubborn. Given that history, I could understand - without necessarily agreeing with - the boasts the Portuguese officials and colons would repeat in those days, rejecting the "Winds of Change" and them anti-colonial attacks they were receiving from many quarters: "Us, Us Alone!" and "We were the first in Africa, we will be the last to leave!"

Our little consulate general had three American officers and one American staff and was relatively cut off from the world. Telegrams were transmitted through the international telegraph system. We used to obtain our classified pouches by making our own courier runs to Kinshasa, and surface pouches were received via American flag freighter. We would actually seal the outgoing pouches and carry them down to the port and hand them over to an officer of an American flag freighter. Really very old fashioned, and very much fun. In fact, Luanda was for me a living representation of a conversation I had listened to a few years previous. Three or four young officers were sitting around the old DACOR [Diplomatic and Consular Officers Retired] house about four years before our first tour. We were listening to an about to retire FSO who went into the old litany that about how soft the Service was now. His theme song was “When I was a vice consul in Tegucigalpa in 1932…” Well, Luanda was my Tegucigalpa.

Q: Could you talk a little bit about who were the officers there and how they dealt with the government?

MARKS: The Consul General, Harvey Summ, was an officer with a good amount of Brazilian and Latin American experience. His wife was Brazilian and he spoke excellent
Portuguese. He was a good, experienced substantive officer in his middle forties. His number two was almost as old; a sardonic, sarcastic, and experienced officer who retired shortly after leaving Luanda a year later. He was probably pushed out by time in grade. But he also had excellent Portuguese and was a good contact officer as well as a good drafter. So, I was with two colleagues who I liked and respected. Neither of them were stars and even the CG did not go much further in his career. But they were solid, responsible, intelligent professionals who [were well-grounded in the basic work] of diplomacy. They didn’t have much Paris or London, but a lot of Africa and Latin America. They were good officers. Good to work with and good to work for and I learned a lot from both of them. They helped me with drafting, which needed work, and they helped me learn context. My primary work responsibilities were administrative and consular, but they encouraged me to try my hand at political and economic [reporting].

We were operating with a Portuguese colonial administration which was quite willing to deal with us, at least on consular and commercial questions. Although we technically came under the authority of Embassy Lisbon, as Angola even in Portuguese terms was an "overseas province," in fact we operated as an independent post reporting directly the African Bureau.

Now, to back up a bit. A rebellion against Portuguese rule had broken out in 1960. It was one of the first armed rebellions in Africa, as a matter of fact. By the time I arrived in Angola in mid-1965 the Portuguese had the situation pretty much under control. The remaining rebels were up in the north or across the border in the Congo but could not threaten much. The rebellion had been pretty bloody during the first year and there had been a period lasting until early 1961 when the situation looked very dangerous for continued colonial rule.

When the rebellion broke out the Portuguese had very few troops in the country and they almost panicked and broke. But after a crucial incident in a northern town, where the civilian residents fought and won a battle against the insurgents, Salazar decided to hold firm and rushed troops to Angola. By the time I got there in mid-1965 the armed rebellion had been essentially defeated. Holden Roberto was the best known leader of rebels but he was physically out of the country, mostly in Zaire, and armed insurgents no longer posed a threat. Anyone could travel in safety, pretty much anywhere you wanted in the country.

At that time, the Portuguese had approximately 50,000 troops in Angola and the security situation well under control. Interestingly, they also had about 50,000 troops in Guinea-Bissau-Bissau (Portuguese West Africa), a much smaller country where they were losing an independence war. I later served there and we can talk about that situation in more detail later. But in Angola in the middle sixties it was quiet, and the sunbathing and food were excellent. The economy was starting to boom and the Portuguese were in firm control with no sense of being seriously threatened, unlike Mozambique and especially Guinea-Bissau.

This was the situation we were trying to monitor, and we had to report that the winds of change were not yet blowing in Angola. Remember this was the period when only the
Portuguese, the South Africans, and the Rhodesians were holding out against African independence.

As I noted earlier, Luanda was an independent post, as was Nairobi, reporting directly to the African Bureau. But, in fact, it was a smaller and less prestigious post than Nairobi, and faced a different and more demanding attitude in Lisbon than had existed in London. This was partially due to the character of the ambassador in Lisbon, a very conservative retired admiral, Admiral Anderson. He was focused on NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and Portugal's membership in it. He was supportive of the Portuguese government’s attitude towards its "overseas provinces," and the arguments as to why they should not be subject to the "Winds of Change." His attitude, reflecting it must be said, the general viewpoint of the European bureau and the military security-NATO crowd, impacted on our policy towards Angola which was much more ambiguous about independence in Angola than it had been elsewhere in Africa. We in the Consulate-General were pretty much imbued with the African Bureau attitude but we had to watch our step vis-a-vis Embassy Lisbon.

Q: You had that, but you also had an African Bureau and sort of a spirit of the times which was very American seeing independence everywhere and this was a good thing. In a way you had the pragmatists saying who cares about that we have NATO to worry about and Portugal boils down to the Azores which is American geography with Portugal. But at the same time there was the feeling in America that all of Africa should be free.

MARKS: There was that conflict. Also, communications were not very good in those days so we were cut off from the world in a manner much different from today: no TV [television], CNN [Cable News Network], e-mail, or even direct telegraphic traffic. In addition, South Africa had a very big presence in Angola. Angola was part of the Southern African holdout region. And remember for a long time our relations with South Africa were mixed.

Q: Oh, yes.

MARKS: So with the dual pressures arising from our military interest in Lisbon and the South African economic and political involvement, we were a bit out of sync with the "Winds of Change." Actually few in Washington cared very much about Angola and we just did not feel or sense the African Bureau pressure about independence which I had noticed, certainly, in Nairobi a few years earlier. We at Post certainly thought independence would eventually come, tried to maintain establish contacts outside of the official and colonial communities, and tried to report on the evolving situation - but at that time the evolution was certainly moving very slowly.

One amusing story illustrates this whole question. Our deputy principal officer spoke excellent Portuguese and did a lot of political contact work. He had been in Angola about four years by this time and knew many of people up and down the social scale. One friend he knew quite well was Ernesto Lara, a member of a very important local family, one of whom later became vice president after independence. The family was mestizo, large, and
prosperous. They were also very nationalist and anti-Portuguese. Ernesto, called Tio Ernesto by everyone, had been involved in the various anti-government activities at one time or another but was now back in Angola. Actually he was a bit of a drunkard and the Portuguese authorities had obviously decided he was not really much of a threat. He fulminated a lot but didn't appear to do much concretely. The time had now come when Bob Flenner, our DPO [deputy principal officer], was due for transfer. Tio Ernesto dropped by to see Bob one day, at the Consulate General, and we - Tio Ernesto, Bob, and myself - were sitting in Bob's office chatting. Bob mentioned that his time had come and he was being transferred. Tio Ernesto became quite exercised and said, "No, you can't leave us. You know us, you understand Angola, you sympathize with us, and you can not leave us. I am going to send a cable to President Johnson saying that you cannot go, you must stay here because you understand us and we need you." Bob made the usual polite remarks and Tio Ernesto asked if he could use the telephone to send a telegram to Washington.

Bob, in his usual relaxed and quietly humorous manner, replied, "Okay, if you want to, be my guest." Tio Ernesto then dialed a number and the ensuing conversation went something like this. "Ola, Joao, this is Ernesto. I want to send a telegram through to Washington to the American President about our good friend Bob Flenner who they want to send away from Angola. I don't want him to go and I want that telegram to go through and I want you to make sure it isn't stopped. Okay?" Tio Ernesto then hung up and explained. "That was Captain So-and-So, the secret police who handles my case. I want to make sure that my telegram to President Johnson is sent. He then picked up the phone again and called the telegraph office and dictated a cable to ask President Johnson to keep Bob Flenner, American Consul, in Angola because he is understanding and sympathetic to the people of Angola."

We laughed and Tio Ernesto wandered off, weaving his way down the corridor. But damned if two or three week later a request didn't come from the Department to provide a reply to the telegram, which the White House had bucked over to the State Department for action.

Essentially, we assumed that independence was coming, even if the possibility did not look promising at the moment. We tried to make contacts across racial and political lines as best we could, and we had reasonably success. The Portuguese did not run a right political or social ship, and we reported how the Portuguese were handling the economy and political developments. Basically they were standing pat, thinking (or hoping) that they could ride out the storm. We didn't think so, but we also felt that the change would not occur soon and would actually not happen in Angola. The Portuguese were too solidly implanted, with close to a half million pure Portuguese and mestizo residents, many of them with several generations of residence in Angola. A greater danger to Lisbon's rule was a Rhodesian type independence by the local elite. I felt at the time, and later wrote a memo on the subject, that the change would occur in Lisbon when there would be a post-Salazar government (possibly revolution) which would cast off the "overseas provinces." And that is exactly what happened. Up to the time of the revolution in Lisbon, Portuguese control in Angola was not effectively challenged.
Q: Were you getting good reporting? We had not sent our best people to Portugal which showed up particularly when there was the revolution. It was sort of a restful place to put somebody like a former admiral, etc. Did you have any feel for what was happening in Portugal?

MARKS: No, if I remember correctly we didn't get much that was useful to us. What we got was focused on NATO concerns. As I noted, when I was in Luanda the ambassador in Lisbon was a retired and quite conservative retired admiral who was primarily concerned with the Azores and NATO.

We didn't get many visitors in Luanda in those days. It was a very out-of-the-way place, but really quite charming in its own way. It must have been the way many posts were in the twenties and thirties. The National War College group came through for a three or four day visit, which was good fun. We took them into the country a bit, to see the big power plant at Massangena. One very interesting day there was a briefing on the military situation by the Portuguese military. It was a full, classic military briefing maps and all. As the visit control officer I was with them and sat in the back row. The Portuguese military described the war from the beginning and explained where it was now. The Portuguese not having heard about service unification, there were - in sequence- separate army, then air force and finally the navy briefing. It had been largely an army war so the army did all the charts and had young captains with pointers indicating items on various charts, as they described how they had won the war.

Then the air force did the same sort of briefing with the message being pretty much how they had won it, air power and mobility being the real key factors. And then the navy gave its best. They clearly couldn't claim they had really won the war but they concentrated on themselves nevertheless. As we were leaving I heard two of the NWC students commenting that it "was a pretty good briefing. Just the way they do it at Leavenworth. All these guys must be Leavenworth trained." The NWC students thought it was super briefing and gave the Portuguese high marks for the quality of the briefing. There was little or no comment about political aspects or about the implications of guerrilla war, and no reference to Vietnam.

Q: Were there any events during your time there? Were you under restraints not to preach independence?

MARKS: No, we were not under policy restraints or instructions, but the situation was such that we didn't preach independence, although we made no effort to hide the general U.S. support for the "Winds of Change." This occasionally produced private discussions about Portuguese policies, but the Portuguese themselves were actually fairly relaxed and spent their time trying to convince us that they were good "colonials" and/or that Angola was not really a colony but an integral part of the Metropole. As I said the general tone was that this would change in due course and that independence was in the future.

But there was another consideration which complicated the situation. There were close to 500,000 Portuguese settlers in Angola; some had been settled there for generations. There was also an important mestizo community, some of whom were quite prominent and allied
with the Portuguese "white" settlers. Lisbon not only had to worry about an African independence movement; it had to watch out for a Rhodesian style "UDI" [Unilateral Declaration of Independence] with the local whites taking over control and declaring itself independent à la Southern Rhodesia. There was a great deal of interest in that option among the local whites, and I think it could have become a very real possibility if the African rebellion in 1960-61 had not required Lisbon to send a large number of metropolitan troops to Angola. By the time that the Rhodesians had set the example, 50,000 Portuguese soldiers in Angola made it no longer a realistic possibility for the local whites.

The U.S. overall official tone was also muted because of our relations with South Africa and our security relations with Lisbon. Therefore, as diplomats do, we accommodated ourselves to the local situation. We certainly didn't defend the Portuguese position and we talked quite openly about changes occurring all over Africa. And we certainly tried to extend our contacts beyond the official community, including the opposition. But, it was a limited involvement because there weren't many of them around, except, if you will, the Portuguese version of "parlor pinks," who were in fact even invited to Governor General's house for official parties and could socialize with us. We obviously weren't meeting any African militants in the bush. We were on the leading edge locally, but not certainly over it.

Q: How did the events in the Congo, which is now Zaire, weigh on Luanda? You looked at Kenya and other places where the transition was made fairly well. The Congo was closer. Things went to hell in a basket, which would serve much more as a role model. How did that affect Luanda?

MARKS: Congolese (Zaire) independence In 1960-61 had been pretty nasty, and later got even worse. In 1965 and 66, commercial planes were still flying between Luanda and Kinshasa. For the Portuguese, the Belgian Congo was an example of what not to do. They interpreted that recent history as confirmation that they were right to stay and continue to impart civilization over a period of time. They felt they were better at the civilizing mission because they were devoid of the racial hang-ups which the other European colonizers suffered from. They had been in Africa longer, they understood it, they were a mixed racial society themselves and therefore they would be able to build a society in Angola which could survive. At least this was the line they were taking, interpreting the problems in the Congo as confirmation for their policy.

The other side of the Portuguese situation was close ties to the South African. In fact, the Portuguese disliked the South Africans enormously, especially the Afrikaners. The South Africans reciprocated... You can imagine the attitudes towards those "funny little Mediterraneans, mostly interbred with Africans as well." But, given developments and geography, they were now allies and partners. On the one hand, the Portuguese felt the Belgian reaction, the way they had managed the Congo and then scuttled and left, was a bad example, while on the other hand, they felt the South Africans weren't doing it right either because of their racial bias. They claimed that they had the right balance between the Belgian and the South African colonial policies and practices.

Q: Were you all getting any emanations from Kinshasa about what was happening there?
What was your mind set on this?

MARKS: We saw some of the reporting on Congo-Kinshasa developments, and we occasionally had visitors from the Embassy come down to Luanda (usually carrying a diplomatic pouch) or on R & R [rest and relaxation] who would bring us some news. But essentially we were just watching the Congo like everybody else. Remember communications were much more limited in those days, and even the international press arrived days late. Also, there was little fighting in Angola. In a sense, we were in a bit of a trough then, in the Congo as well as in Angola.

Q: Did oil come into play while you were there?

MARKS: No. There was talk about oil and a certain amount of exploration, but it hadn’t begun to be exploited. There was certainly interest, especially in Cabina where development and some exploitation was underway. Copper was a more pressing question. A new copper development was underway, with American participation. Angola is an extraordinarily rich country, with continental agriculture in the highlands, tropical agriculture on the coast, major coffee plantations, some of the world's best off shore fishing grounds, diamonds, oil, and superb natural ports.

Q: Were the Portuguese doing much with it at the time?

MARKS: Yes, although development was limited by Portugal's poverty and the government’s reluctance to open development to outsiders. They didn't really allow a lot of foreign investment. Later they did, and there was an economic boom in Angola in the late sixties and early 1970s, just prior to the revolution in Lisbon. Q: I take it from both the Portuguese attitude and the way they had control that there was no Soviet threat there.

MARKS: No, not at all. This is still the era of the Salazar regime which was very anti-Soviet, and fervently anti-Communist. They would, of course, wrap that attitude into their opposition to the African independence movements, calling them Communist inspired. There was no Soviet consulate or any other sort of representation.

A funny place Angola, as Portugal itself was not an open, democratic society. In one sense you had equality of treatment. The political environment, the role of the political police, and limitations on discussion and behavior in Luanda was no worse than it was in Portugal itself. So you didn't have that bit of hypocrisy found in the French and British colonies with democracy at home and autocracy in the colony. Angolans and Portuguese were equal before the law and political power.

I don't know if you are familiar with Portugal, but one of the great amusing aspects of Portuguese society under Salazar was the passion for anti-Salazar jokes, common among government and military officials as well as political opponents and outlaws. Everybody told anti-Salazar jokes. Travelers returning from Lisbon would be expected to bring back the latest such jokes. I was quite friendly with an air force lieutenant colonel who swore
that his mother had been Salazar's secretary for many years and had, as one of her jobs, the responsibility for keeping up to date Salazar's own "joke book" on anti-Salazar jokes. Salazar ran an autocracy with a Portuguese style.

Now that I think of it, there were three other officers at the consulate general, not two. We had a CIA officer. He, of course, would not admit that he was from the agency, although it was well known around town, certainly in the consular community. A standing joke among the consular corps was the observable fact that only two consular officers in Luanda had their own "personal" Land Rovers. One was our "Vice Consul for Visas". The other one was a South African vice consul who used to do his weekend gardening in what looked suspiciously like fatigue pants and army boots. We all assumed he was South African military intelligence, and some years later I was amused to see a newspaper report of his appointment as Chief of Staff of the South African Army.

Q: It was the same in Saigon. The CIA people all had guards in front of their houses who were Hmong, quite different than Vietnamese, and they all had the same kind of car, too.

MARKS: Anyway, our man was there to do what the agency is supposed to do, make contact with the other side. But it was such a tight community, and I believe he was under instructions not to take chances (or at least he so implied) that he was very circumspect that I think we did better opposition contacts than he did. Some years later, a South African diplomat who I had known in Nairobi told me that when he visited Luanda after I had left, he discovered that it was accepted knowledge that the American CIA person in the American ConGen was Ed Marks. I took that as a professional compliment, as well as naïveté on the part of these so-clever observers.

Q: Did you have the feeling now that you were becoming an Africanist within the Service? Was this sort of a calling? How did you and your wife feel about this?

MARKS: Yes, I did feel I was becoming one. For the next ten years I continued in African affairs, even though I did spend a tour in Brussels, and I was quite comfortable with it. The posts were small and it was a time of great excitement and change. The work was interesting and seemed to be a high priority activity. Now, I was fooling myself to some degree as we all were. What we used to tell each other, particularly when we ran across colleagues who had been in Europe in the big posts, doing the traditional diplomatic stuff of junior and middle grade officers, was that it was better to be a big fish in a small pool than a small fish in a big pond. We used to point out that while important events were happening there, the place is crawling with people and our peers were sitting down in the bottom of whatever section they were in so "don't tell me you are doing anything serious up there, my dear friend."

So we told ourselves, with some degree of validity I think, that we were more actively involved, that as there were fewer of us we were individually doing more interesting, more substantive work. And, I still think there is something to that perspective.

Although I did become an Africanist by definition, spending most of my early career in
African affairs, I did not become an enthusiast or ideologue so to speak. I was interested in Africa but I never became an African "groupie" to use a later term. Some of my colleagues did. For instance, later when I was Kenya desk officer, I remember a long discussion with a colleague who was the Guinea-Conakry desk officer. Along with others he would almost become "more Papist than the Pope" and I remember his fervent defense of Sekou Toure arguing that Sekou Toure was only doing was necessary in order to recreate a new African society. Now Sekou was a bloody tyrant, up to his armpits in blood, a thug. And yet, all the liberals of those days would go through contortions to defend Sekou and other tyrants in Africa just because they were African. The political groupies from the West especially focused on Julius Nyerere, who was their ideal African leader...modest, calm, educated. Actually in retrospect Nyerere does look pretty good but he was nevertheless a statist in terms of approach to governance and his legacy is mixed.

Q: He particularly enthralled the Swedes, Scandinavians, and socialists.

MARKS: And almost every American journalist, academic, or anyone else interested in Africa. I was just contrary enough to argue that Kenyatta was an interesting and important leader. Most other observers dismissed him as an old fashioned tribal and a capitalist who doesn't understand Africa's future. I would still argue that he left a better legacy than he is generally given credit for.

Q: You know there is a certain parallel to this to the twenties and thirties with the Soviet Union with the intellectual community. Here were some real tyrants, Lenin and Stalin, really nasty people. Yet, somehow or another you had apologies going on and in this case the right was right.

MARKS: Yes, "no enemies on the left." This was a legacy of the thirties when many people thought they had to make a choice between Fascism and Communist. If you were anti-Fascist you had to join the left, and for awhile the Communists owned that phrase and that turf. There were only a few clear-sighted, objective people like Orwell who was able to see both sides. Most people chose and went one way or another.

You had that phenomena in spades in Africa. Remember that almost all of the new African leaders were educated in Europe although some had gone to the United States. Now if you were an African student in London, Paris, Brussels or the United States, where would you find a welcome? Large ly in the world of the academic left. An African student in an American university wouldn’t end up in the fraternity crowd, but rather among the Bohemians. The same thing happened in Europe where they learned their politics and economics from the European academic Left - which, by the way, is why I have always thought the Indian Brahman class was and is so anti-American. They learned their politics and world view in Oxbridge [contraction for Oxford and Cambridge Universities] and the London School of Economics, that part of the English academic community which was not only left economically and politically, but also fervently anti-American. And the same thing is true of those who came from Africa. That perspective was reinforced by the left-liberal attitudes of those who went to Africa in the sixties and seventies, those I call the African groupies. They kept encouraging the Africans in their European learned statist, centralized governance approach. All sorts of people, especially Americans, who wouldn't
recommend socialism for their own country, nevertheless encouraged it for newly independent African countries.

Q: Yes, because it fit the African tribal...

MARKS: Also because of the then current economic development theory. In those days, even anti-communists would feel they had to admit that despite its horrible political record, the Soviets had done an impressive job of industrializing and modernizing the Russian economy. Only later did we learn that the Soviet success was a facade.

Q: Yes, since 1990 or so, we learned of the disaster that the Soviet economy was. I have often thought that the most poisoned chalice you might have was that which the British and French socialists passed on to the Africans.

MARKS: There is another aspect of Africa which I had not noticed or appreciated in Kenya but began to see in Angola and Zambia, which was that colonial societies in Africa were basically socialist or state-run economies. Therefore when the Africans took over at independence, they were not about to change it now that they owned it. If you were the new political leadership, why would you break up an economic system which the guys you just replaced ran very comfortably? Both the intellectual perspective you [gained] at Oxford or the London School of Economics, and your own instinctive desire to maintain control led to espousing socialism which allowed you to maintain the old colonial, state-managed economic system which was now called progressive socialism.

Q: Was there anything else we should cover in Angola before we move on?

MARKS: One thing I cannot resist quoting, a very cynical but funny remark by old, senior colleague, Dean Brown, who visited us as a Foreign Service inspector. Over drinks one day, he laid out what he called the two rules on folk culture. Rule 1: All folk culture is interesting for 20 minutes. Rule 2: All folk culture lasts longer than 20 minutes.

Q: Where did you go after Angola?

MARKS: I had only been in Luanda for about 11 months when I given a direct transfer to Lusaka, Zambia to replace Hank Cohen who had been the regional labor and economic officer for the Central African Federation. As the Federation had broken up, with the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the white settlers in Southern Rhodesia, the job was being changed into a one country - Zambia - economic officer.

That occurred in August, 1966, when, in fact, I was acting as the ConGen's communications officer, that is, code clerk. The ConGen had communicators, one male State Department communicator and one female CIA communicator. They were both young and unattached and were soon shacking up together. One day in July the CG called me into his office. He was jumping up and laughing himself silly. Between roars of laughter, he said, "Our two communicators have to get married and they can't wait to get married here in Luanda because there is a six-month waiting list and they cannot wait six months as she is pregnant. So they are going to go to South Africa and get married there."
This had been cleared with both headquarters but it would leave us without our classified telegraphic capability. At that time in history, we were using the five letter group system. That is, the cables went through the commercial telegraph system after we had run them through our code machines to put them into code, then into a second five letter group system. We did the same process in reverse for incoming classified messages. As our two communicators would be gone for several weeks I was given a quick course in how to run the code machine. For three days I filled the floor of the code room with telegraphic tape as I couldn't decode a message to save my life, until I discovered that the major problem was the irregular electrical system in town. I discovered that if I waited until lunchtime, when everybody in town went off to lunch, the electrical current stabilized and the code machines worked.

The second message I broke, after I figured that out how to do it, was a cable from the Department to the CG stating that Hank Cohen was going to have to leave his job in Lusaka as the Federation had broken up, and they needed a quick replacement. Hank had recommended me and the Bureau wanted to know what the CG thought about it. Since I was doing the coding and decoding I became part of the decision process and I thought it was a good idea as Luanda, though lovely, was a little boring. So the CG said okay to the proposition and I left Luanda about a month later.

Q: Without the labor title.

MARKS: Yes, I did labor work as well, of course, but the job description no longer included regional reporting responsibilities or concerned only labor questions. I was directly replacing Hank, but the job was somewhat different.

Q: You were there from 1966-69. You said the Federation was breaking up, what was that?

MARKS: The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was a British colonial creation, very similar to the East African Community in East Africa. After setting up the East Africa Community (Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda) the British created the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, composed of Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This had been done, I think, in the late thirties. There were three very different countries or colonies. Northern Rhodesia, later to become Zambia, was an administrative colony, with few settlers. It was rich because of the copper mines. Nyasaland, now Malawi, was the smallest country, heavily populated around the lake, and with good agriculture. Rhodesia was the richest with a large European settler community of about 600,000 at the time they struck for white-controlled independence. Rhodesia had been given internal self-government back in the twenties and actually had its own governmental structure, including military and police.

So, there was a very large group of white settlers which was long accustomed to internal self-government. With the movement towards independence and majority, that is African rule in the sixties, the African leaders in Nyasaland and Zambia were not interested in retaining the Federation, as it was evident that the Rhodesian whites had no intention of
permitting majority rule. Also, although most of the wealth the wealth was created in Northern Rhodesia (the cooper mines), Southern Rhodesia lived off of it, or so the Africans thought. As the Zambians use to put it, the Federation was like a cow where the mouth was in Northern Rhodesia with the copper mines, but the stomach was in Southern Rhodesia. The African leaders in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were pushing for independence and a breakup of the Federation. By 1964 or so, that had occurred and Southern Rhodesia's white dominated government under Ian Smith went for what they called a unilateral declaration of independence, claiming to base it on the United States model. The British government did not accept that, which produced the UDI crisis which went on for some years. It was in the middle of that development that I was transferred from Angola to Zambia, a year or so after Zambian independence.

Q: What was the situation at that time?

MARKS: I was directly transferred as second secretary, economic/commercial officer. Our embassy in Lusaka was a smallish new post having been in business only a couple of years. Nevertheless there was a lovely new chancery. Ambassador Robert Good was a political appointee, a youngish professor of political science in his early forties and very much a Kennedy man. He was an enthusiast for African independence and human rights. Our DCM [deputy chief of mission], Bill Edmondson, was a career FSO, who later became ambassador to South Africa among other jobs. He became a close friend and was the epitome of the solid professional. He and Bob Good made a good team.

I was the only economic/commercial officer and, in fact, the only full time State Department reporting officer. In addition, there was a consular officer, good sized AID and USIA missions - for that size embassy - and the Agency, of course. Zambia was an interesting place at that time. It was a large country geographically but not very heavily populated. It was not quite a settler colony, although there were European farmers and a fairly important commercial farming sector, and yet not quite a purely administrative colony. The major element in the economy were the two copper companies, British-owned although both had important South African involvement in finance and management.

At that time, Zambia was one of the three most important copper producing and exporting countries in the world, together with Zaire and Peru.

Geographically and because of its copper production, Zambia was an important component the Southern African railway net which covered most of central and all of southern Africa, and which extended from the east African ports of Mozambique and South Africa to the west African ports of Angola and Zaire. The breakup of the Federation and the reaction of many countries to the white settler declaration of independence by Southern Rhodesia created a serious problem for Zambia by isolating it in return, as its major rail and road links to the outside world ran through Rhodesia. At the same time, things became very bad in Zaire, still called Congo-Kinshasa at that time, so Zambia found its secondary links to the west were essentially cut off as well.
When I arrived in Lusaka, the country was in the midst of that problem. One of the ways in which it manifested itself was gas rationing; as a member of the diplomatic corps I got 10 gallons a month. The Zambia Government was pursing two goals: (1) opposition to Rhodesian UDI and (2) attempting to open up transportation links to the north through Tanzania. That situation engendered all sorts of projects and programs, some of which we got involved in. Most notable of those was the Tanzam Highway (the hard surfacing of the road to Dar Es Salaam) which the U.S., the UK and a few others were sponsoring as an alternative to the Chinese Tanzam railway project - which the West viewed as the Chinese Communists attempt to take over Africa. Remember, this was High Cold War Period.

Q: What were you getting about Kaunda and how do we view him at that time?

MARKS: Kaunda was one of Africa's new leaders and therefore almost by definition an admirable person and in those days deserving of our help, for political if not ideological reasons. He modeled himself on Nyerere; not a military figure but rather a leader espousing social democratic views. He was not an extreme African nationalist, but was obviously focused on fostering a modern life for his people. He had one interesting political characteristic, different from most African leaders. Zambia did not have a single dominant tribe; and its people had mostly had migrated to the Zambian plateau only in the last two or three hundred years. Somebody once commented that the losers of the regional tribal wars all ended up in Zambia. One of Kaunda's political cards was that he was not a member of any of these local tribes but came from people who lived in neighboring countries. As such, he had no tribal affiliation, and he certainly tried very hard to avoid tribal or ethnic politics.

Kaunda was one of the generation of African leaders later referred to as Africa's Big Men. In 1967 or so he followed Nyerere and Sekou Toure and some of the others by enunciating a formal philosophy. Kaunda called his Humanism which purported to be based on the needs of human beings. It was not a very rigorous doctrine, but it did include the sine qua non of all Third World political theory - the need for a command economic system for remedy the injustices of the colonial era and to produce economic development.

Actually, as I mentioned earlier, colonial economic systems were, by and large, command economies and the newly independent African governments were essentially just taking them over. They called themselves socialists and intended to keep the profits in the hands of the government and distribute them locally. The major economic activity in Zambia was the copper industry, which was privately owned. However that ownership was not widely spread, and was closely allied with the colonial government. The European owned farms were private, but the agricultural sector was closely managed by government marketing boards. There was a country economic policy, although not formally called that, which was determined and managed by the colonial authorities in very close cooperation with large companies.

So Kaunda introduced his "Humanism" and proceeded to implement it by nationalizing the whole economy, including the copper mines.

Interestingly he tried to extend his influence internationally by sponsoring the creation of
an international copper producers organization, to replicate what the oil producers had done. Soon after I arrived, Kaunda hosted a conference in Lusaka which included the world's major copper producing countries: Chile, Zaire, Peru but no Americans. Claiming that copper prices, along with other primary products, were being held down by monopolistic policies of the developed, rich West, they were there to create an international copper producer organization which would manage the production, marketing and pricing of copper for the benefit of the third world producers - just as the oil producers were doing. In the long run, this effort never worked out. Copper just did not appear to lend itself to this sort of approach, and then - too soon - Zambian and Zairian copper production began to decline due to management and investment problems. Copper prices went up and down, of course, over the course of years but not because of any influence of the cooper producers cooperative.

Kaunda was generally viewed as a humanitarian African leader, certainly an African nationalist but not as ideologically militant as, for instance, a Sékou Touré. Americans were particularly taken by him. Kwame Nkrumah had started out well but had finally alienated even some of his most fervent admirers with his extravagance (political and financial). Kenya's Jomo Kenyatta turned out to be too "old fashioned" in a sense, refusing to go along with the conventional political and economic wisdom of the Third World, to earn the admiration of the Western political "groupies." Nyerere was everyone's favorite but his persistent and cheerful espousal of socialism (albeit "African socialism") caused heartburn in some circles. Kaunda appeared to have all of Nyerere's good traits without the socialistic label; "humanism" sounded pretty good even if no-one could figure out exactly what it meant. Also, he was the guy out in front, opposed to the racist Rhodesian regime. All in all, he appeared to be the most promising African social democratic leaders on the scene.

Also a new political dividing line was appearing. Rhodesia, going independent as a white ruled country, was backed by South Africa and the Portuguese "overseas provinces of Angola and Mozambique, creating the southern racist redoubt. Facing it were the so-called "Front Line States": Zambia, Malawi, and Tanzania, with Zambia as the spearpoint. Although this was a very prominent position for Kaunda and Zambia, it was also a difficult one, especially in economic terms. With the cutting of the traditional transportation and communication links south, Kaunda had to find new access to the outside world in order to export his copper, and bring in necessary imports such as fuel and spare parts.

Much of this "conflict" took place in public discourse; there was a sort of war of words, and it was interesting to watch Kaunda perform. He had an interesting little trick which caused some of us to be slightly cynical. Often at an emotional point in a speech Kaunda would begin to get moist eyes, and he would pull a handkerchief out of the sleeve of his safari type jacket. Some Westerners cried with him while some just got a little cynical. But, this was a long time ago. He has since been kicked out of office in an election, and he was very far from being a bad man although his performance in office was mixed. His centralized command economic system was pretty much a failure, but he never became a serious tyrant. As I said, he was eventually removed from office by election - which is not that common a development in Africa.
Zambia, as I noted, was a newly independent ex-British colony. There was white (or as they said European) farmer and business community but the largest number of Europeans were in the copper companies. This meant that there was a large European technical and skilled worker class, unusual in Africa except for South Africa. Because of this group, the society had a little more openly racist tone than Kenya, which was bad enough.

**Q: How did you deal with that type of society?**

MARKS: Oh, it wasn't too difficult. The colonial social structure was still somewhat in evidence up north in the mining towns. But in the capital, in Lusaka, after all, independence had occurred, Africans were holding the ministerial positions, and era of racial distinctions and the local version of apartheid were over. Of course, in some back rooms and at some dinner parties racist remarks were passed but, basically the colonial social structure was dead, and the society was integrated. Much social life was among expatriates, mostly European despite persistent efforts to invite Africans. Essentially, racist attitudes were not a major problem. As I said, as an embassy we were reaching out actively to Africans, but it was not easy for a number of reasons. The Africans themselves had problems in mixing in the manner we were used to …lack of attitudes, lack of common background, etc. A lot of the intercourse was a bit forced, artificial and formal. I had less official contact with Africans than those on the political side as the economic/commercial officer. There just were not yet many black people in the commercial sector or even in the economic departments of the government. I did hire and was training an African commercial assistant and that was a bit of a breakthrough. He eventually went into private business, in fact, but I was still largely dealing with expatriates.

Actually, Africans probably had as much of a problem as we did. They were only in their third or fourth year of taking over a society and government which had been completely in the hands of white expatriates (and some Indian middlemen). There was only a comparatively small group of Africans with education and experience commensurate with the responsibilities they were now assuming - and that is without including the problems associated with the Rhodesian situation.

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**Q: Today is September 13, 1996. Ed, do you want to start off?**

MARKS: When I arrived in Lusaka in the fall of 1966, it was the decade of the independent movement in Africa, but the first thrust of independence was over. The winds of change had passed, except in Southern Africa. Most of the continent was now composed of independent African states, including Zambia. So we were in the second stage of the decolonization experience where there were two basic challenges to be faced by the new governments. Being new, there were all the problems of now setting up African governments to run independent states. These governments now had to face the apartheid system in Southern Africa which affronted them morally and politically. This especially true for the so-called frontline states: Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia, Malawi, Botswana. Zambia and Tanzania were the key players, as Malawi and Botswana were in difficult geographic
situations vis-a-vis the white-ruled states, and Zaire was its usual self-serving self.

And, all of this was taking place in the wider context of the Cold War. While we were terribly enamored of the emancipation of African countries from colonial rule for its own sake, we could never forget that Africa was also one of the regions in which the Cold War competition as taking place. The Soviets were at that time aggressively involved in expanding their presence and influence in Africa, as were the Chinese. How to separate our concern for Africa from our concern for the so-called Communist threat is an interesting question; we did not spend a great deal of time on at the time. Most of us knew, of course, that the two were very intimately connected - although the civil rights movement in the U.S. and the resulting growth of interest in Africa by African Americans was becoming an increasingly important motivating factor in U.S. foreign policy in Africa.

This was also a period when the Non-Aligned Movement was becoming very prominent. So there was a three-sided political competition going on in Africa: The West, including the former colonial powers; the Communist Bloc; and the Non-Aligned. The situation became even more complicated as it became clear even to the most passionate Cold Warrior that the Chinese and Russians really were in competition with each other and that therefore the Communist Bloc was not really unified. The Chinese were at their height of their puritanical period the Chinese mission people in Lusaka ran around in their little Mao hats, waving their little red Mao books - a copy of which I still have. Lusaka, like many capital cities in the third World, was abuzz with these developments and we in the embassy had a sense of being in the front lines of American foreign policy amid great events of history.

Q: In a way it sounds like a great place for an Evelyn Waugh to write a comic novel about diplomatic life.

MARKS: He had already written those comic novels in the thirties Black Mischief and Scoop. With some adjustment for the passage of time, these books are still very pertinent. Nevertheless, there was that sense of being on the front line of the Cold War and of history in the making. I am not sure nowadays that we were not fooling ourselves; it is true that the ‘60s was an eventful historic period, but Africa may have been a marginal part of that story, but it was still invigorating at the time.

Q: Almost any Foreign Service officer interested in the area would go out with a certain sense of idealism. Did you find yourself coming up with a solid dose of reality?

MARKS: The short answer is yes, very much so. But I have to try to separate that reaction, which I acknowledge, from the fact that I never was a romantic or unrestrained idealist. I remember debates in Lusaka with those of a more idealist bent. They would argue that Nairobi and even smaller Lusaka were terrible places, corrupt big cities and that it was only in the country, in the villages, that you would find the real African. I thought that was a bunch of bull, that from what I could gather everyone the villages was trying to get into town. In retrospect, of course, the idealists were right from one perspective - that the traditional African could only be found in the village. However that observation was true of
all peoples, and in a sense it was a trivial observation. People change with events and developments, and of course the inhabitants of cities were different that the country folk. However I felt it was patronizing for outsiders to bemoan the loss of someone else's "traditional values."

Q: In a way you were running against a certain wave. I remember I was in INR covering Africa at the time. I never served in Africa. I remember there were real true believers and I was kind of looking and thought I would go to the Balkans instead. Could you talk about this in an attempt to capture the feelings of the time?

MARKS: I think you are quite right, there were a lot of what some of us called "true believers." By that was meant that, essentially, the type of Westerner, especially American, interested in Africa were pretty much on the liberal, or in European terms left, side of the political spectrum. Conservative folk were not, by and large, terribly interested in Africa. A baseline was the question of decolonization with conservatives more interested in the European metropolitan countries and their role in Europe and the Cold War than in their African colonies. Therefore such conservatives were sympathetic to the arguments about the benefits of the colonial experience, the time necessary to be able to handle independence, etc. While not overtly racist position they were, of course, just that. Liberals, on the other hand, assumed the right of Africans to become independent. Arguments were made about the threat of growing Communist influence if we in the West did not support the independence movement, but African sympathizers were really committed without the Cold War argument. Certainly I agreed with that position, thought it was self-evidently true.

But there was another position which went beyond the question of African independence. It was a version of Rousseauian utopianism about the concept of the "Noble Savage" - uncorrupted by modern civilization. Because Africans were uncorrupted they were better. Urbanization corrupted civilization. (No one ever put it quite so baldly of course). However since independence required government and an economy, the better choice was that of the Left, of some form of socialism. The Westerners who were interested in Africa, being of the Left themselves, therefore supported the command economy instincts of the new African leadership. There was a lot of back scratching going on; Western intellectuals supported African independence and in turn received African commitment to Leftist (or Liberal) policies. In some respects, Africa became the laboratory for European economic and social policies. Because of this relationship, new African governments were excused for all sorts of behavior which would never have been tolerated in Europe or the U.S. It was a patronizing attitude stemming from the view of Africans as "Noble Savages" maltreated by evil Europeans. There was a good deal of that attitude in the African Bureau and even more so among journalists and academics.

Q: I have the feeling that one, at least during Soapy Williams' time and somewhat thereafter, would almost have to pull one's punches when they were reporting from some of these places.

MARKS: Yes, to some degree although the reality of colonial policy and of the southern
European states plus the Civil Rights developments in the U.S. posed such clear-cut choices that it was not difficult. The shortfalls of African governance did not begin to become obvious until later. Certainly our ambassador in Lusaka was very much one of the true believers. Nevertheless, debate in the embassy was constant. While he was certainly a very big Kaunda fan, I do not remember any sense of being censored in any way. We had differences of view and interpretation, but there is nothing new about that, and the Ambassador was open to discussion and difference of opinion. Also, I have always prided myself on being a disciplined professional, not a free spirit. Ultimately the ambassador's signature at the bottom of the message and he has a right, within pretty broad limits, to determine what is said. I do not find that offensive. It was his post and as long as there was free and open debate within the mission, I had no complaint. In any case, I don’t remember any significant differences of opinion, only nuanced differences of tone.

Q: Let us turn to the economic developments that were going on there. First, the competition of the Soviets and the Chinese and the Chinese railway there, but also the Soviet reaction and how this was played out from our point of view.

MARKS: The political context was fairly clear at that point; the Central African Federation had broken up, its constituent parts were now independent countries although one was still white-rulled, and Zambia took on the so-called Front Line against apartheid southern Africa. From an economic perspective, Zambia sat in the center of what was that Southern African economic structure which was based on copper production and an elaborate railway system which crossed Zambia as it linked the east and west coasts of central and southern Africa. Together Zambia and Zaire probably produced about 40 percent of the world's copper. Actually they share the same copper deposit with the border of the two countries running right through the middle of the deposit. The transportation structure east and south was now cut because of Rhodesia and UDI, while the outlets east through Zaire and Angola were not reliable. Of course, Zambia's imports as well as its exports dependent on these route, so the cutting of these links created a form of de facto blockade for Zambia. The Zambians were faced with serious problems; how do they get their copper out now that their traditional transport links to the south were broken and the alternative links to the east were not very reliable, and how do they get necessary imports - especially fuel to run the modern economy including the cooper mines - in. (This was the period of the Simba rebellion in the Congo, and the attempted break-away of Katanga).

Meanwhile the Soviets were busy trying to cultivate the Africans by playing on the inevitable anti-colonial reactions of the new governments. The Chinese as well were present, trumpeting Mao's Great Leap Forward. At first we thought of them as part of the Russian-led Communist bloc but it became increasingly obvious that they were playing their own game in competition with the Soviets for influence. Whether or not the Chinese were allied with the Soviets, their activities in East and Central Africa really shook up the head offices of the Western powers. All of a sudden Chinese diplomats and technicians were all over Africa; they were going to build a railway from Dar Es Salaam to Zambia by the use of thousands of thousands of coolies (half of whom the more extreme observers said would be intelligence agents.)
Q: I remember seeing a cartoon about that time in the New Yorker showing two very obvious cannibals talking to each other. One was saying, "I like Chinese technicians, but the trouble is a half an hour later I am still hungry."

MARKS: Yes, there were a lot of those sorts of jokes at that time. In fact, an agreement was signed and work began. Nyerere of Tanzania loved this because it was so very Third World; the Chinese were playing a very big role in the Non-Aligned Movement. No one else was willing to build the railway, certainly no one in the West, and the next thing you knew hundreds and even thousands Chinese showed up in Dar-Es Salaam and started building a railway - the Tanzam Railway.

Well, the West got very excited. In addition to the ideological interest in supporting African independence, as I discussed earlier, which include the felt need to demonstrate one's bona fides in the anti-apartheid fight by supporting the front line states and especially Zambia, there was now the competition with the Communists - both varieties. Obviously different people on our side had different mixes of motivations, but these different concerns came together in a bundle which we could all accept. Africanists could concentrate on supporting Kaunda and his new government, anti-racists and idealists could fight against apartheid Rhodesia and South Africa, and Cold Warriors in the CIA and the Department of Defense could focus on stopping the Communist tide.

Before I arrived in Lusaka in 1966, the idea for a Western counter to the Chinese railway offer had been developed, the Tanzam Highway, that is Western financing and technical assistance to provide a hard tarmac surface for the excising by limited and undependable dirt road which ran from Da Es Salaam across Tanzania to Zambia. The West floated a lot of economic arguments that the Chinese railway was a bad idea, and argued that tarmacking the highway would be quicker and more cost efficient. When fully tarmacked, it could be used in all weather conditions to support a fleet of heavy trucks to bring in fuel and carry out copper. We pushed ahead with this idea.

Q: On the face of it, it seems to me a railroad is designed to do that, and bringing out ore in trucks strikes me not being a very efficient way of doing it.

MARKS: Possibly, but first you have to build the railway from scratch which is very expensive. Secondly, it would take a lot longer to do and the country was in serious difficulties at the moment. Therefore the argument we used was that the road could be significantly improved faster and cheaper. From our point of view, of course, the key point was that the road would be ours and could pre-empt the Chinese invasion." Clearly the politics of the Cold War was driving our interest.

Meanwhile, the country was being cut off from its supplies of fuel and unable to export its copper and was suffering. To help, the U.S. and the UK set up an airlift, cargo planes - mostly C-130s I believe - flying from the Zambian copperbelt to Dar Es Salaam and I believe, some to Kinshasa. They brought in rubber containers of fuel and flew out copper on pallets. Talk about expensive! There was also some stuff dribbling in and out through the Congo and Tanzania on the dirt road. None of this was very economical, but it
demonstrated political support for this brave and beleaguered African country facing up to the apartheid regime to the south. It was also very dramatic and I think we all got a charge out of it. The airlift went on for about a year, ending sometime in 1967.

**Q:** Were there any efforts made at this time to work with the Ian Smith regime? Sometimes you can have countries that are absolutely at loggerheads but deals are made.

MARKS: No, this was pretty much a black and white situation: good versus evil. Remember, the British government, our closest allies, had declared that the white Rhodesians were traitors and all the Black Africans were emotionally engaged. However, the British themselves were in touch with the rebel regime, in a series of tortuous and complicated constitutional conferences and diplomatic maneuverings in an effort to bring about a resolution of the problem by a negotiated return to legality. An interesting sideline to this was the reaction of some American conservatives who likened the Rhodesian situation to the American Declaration of Independence. George Kennan, for instance, wrote a number of articles doing this.

**Q:** George Kennan has always been an elitist. I used to work for him at one time in Belgrade and when I started this oral history program I asked him to endorse it and he said essentially, the only good oral history program is one where you interview the right people. In other words, a very carefully selected group of people.

MARKS: Yes, he was actually a defender of Ian Smith and the White Rhodesian move. As I said, the British were attempting to work out a negotiated independence for Rhodesia which would return them to British authority and to legality and then on to an independence agreement which would protect the African majority and give them a share of the government. Those meetings went on and on and never really came to anything.

**Q:** So, there was no contact.

MARKS: Western diplomats and officials were even prohibited by their governments from going to or through Rhodesia at all, even for mere transport or tourism. None of us at the embassy ever went into Rhodesia - we would go to the border and go as far as half-way across the bridge to look at the Livingstone Falls. There was no longer any significant trade across the border. The idea of building a hard surface road continued to be discussed among potential Western donors, focusing on how many kilometers each participant would build. The U.S. for quite a while did not actually commit itself to participating in this project, although the African Bureau was very enthusiastic. The problems were funds and a general lack of interest at home. We hadn't yet committed ourselves when Vice President Hubert Humphrey announced he was making a trip to Africa.

**Q:** When was this?

MARKS: I think in 1967. He announced a big trip to tour Africa and there was the usual fight over where he would go, which capitals he would visit. Certainly our ambassador, Robert Good, argued he must visit Zambia to show the U.S. flag in support of African
nationalism, show moral support for a front line state and opposition to apartheid, and demonstrate moral and political support for a moderate African leader. The decision was eventually made that he would stop in Lusaka, although it turned out to be only a four and a half hour airport stop. It wasn't much more than a touch and go, but it enabled the Vice President to drive into town, lunch with Kenneth Kaunda, and make a speech.

The next big question for Embassy Lusaka was what would the VP say and do while he was in Lusaka? Presidents and Vice Presidents do not like to make public appearances in foreign countries and not say something of news notice. I don't remember where the idea came from but someone came up with the brilliant bureaucratic suggestion that the VP could announce a U.S. government decision to finance a significant section of the Tanzam highway - three hundred kilometers I believe. All of a sudden the bureaucratic objections to the funding were overcome and the financing was approved. The Vice President duly arrived, made a press statement supporting African nationalism and independence and announcing our contribution to the Tanzam Highway as evidence of our commitment. From then we started referring to the highway - informally and in-house - as the Hubert Humphrey highway. I believe the Economist picked up that term (possibly from me as I was quite close to the Economist stringer in Lusaka) and used it.

Q: What was your impression of the highway at that time? Do you think it made sense?

MARKS: It made sense given the context we were in: competition with the Soviet Bloc and/or the Chinese for influence; supporting independence for majority-rule African governments; opposing apartheid principals of South Africa. If we were opposed to Rhodesian racist independence and Southern African apartheid as elements of U.S. foreign policy, then yes, it was justified. But these are political arguments, not economic development, and that brings us to the long-standing argument of whether economic aid funds are primarily political or developmental. The economic support of Zambia can be easily justified as the use of development money in support of American foreign policy and objectives as identified by the administration.

Most of the rest of our economic assistance programs in Zambia at the time, as in most other African countries, had a more obvious development character - education, agriculture, etc. The Tanzam Highway was more overtly political, but certainly one could raise the very pertinent short term question of how was this country going to survive if it couldn't import or export, and if it couldn't survive then long-term development concerns were irrelevant. In retrospect, I would describe much of our economic assistance at that time and in that place, as a form of trauma medicine - the economic equivalent to what goes in a hospital emergency center. Yes, it was very political but its purpose was to assist newly independent governments to take hold, to make the transition to independence. Long-term economic development concerns were and are important, but had to take second place for the moment. This sort of assistance could also justified as short term humanitarian assistance for a friendly country in extremis for reasons not its own fault. As the years went by our economic assistance continued to be largely politically motivated and we never did figure out an effective economic development policy in Africa - USAID experts notwithstanding.
Q: What were the Soviets doing at this time?

MARKS: Basically they were stomping around with small check books and soft words. They presented themselves as the alternative to the old colonial powers, expressed sympathy for the new regimes, offered an alternative development model, and some military training and academic scholarships. And, of course, lots of intelligence activities and subversion - or so our CIA colleagues kept telling us. Essentially the Soviets encouraged the Zambian instinct to participate in the Non-Aligned movement, which was pretty much anti-Western in orientation. It was difficult for some of us to figure out why the Soviets should, after all what were the connections to any Soviet national interest? But we put it down to the exhilaration of the global competition - even more than we were. As I said, their assistance in Zambia at least was little more than a small amount of economic assistance plus political support and hand holding.

Of course, our general policy towards them was very similar - a lot of tea and sympathy: for their independence, their aspirations, and for their opposition to the Rhodesians and South Africans. General political and rhetorical support plus and a certain amount of tea in the form economic assistance, scholarships and help with the Tanzania highway. Of course, our opposition to Rhodesian UDI was very important. I would characterize the Soviet policy as pretty much the same in approach, but the amount of tea they could provide was limited and the political assistance with the southern African situation much less - although their rhetoric more outspoken. On the other hand, their direct support to the South African independence movement - the ANC [African National Congress] - was greatly appreciated all over Africa.

Apart from their inability to be very generous in economic terms, their main problem was their inability to [provide] much concrete assistance in dealing with the Rhodesians and the South Africans - apart from covert assistance on a low level. It was felt by the Africans, I think rightfully, that it was only the West which eventually could help them the most. The British still had a relationship in Rhodesia, still claimed responsibility for Rhodesia, and had the levers and the entree that could help resolve the problems, and eventually did. The Soviets could not offer any of that and they were not in a position to offer serious financial or military assistance. We probably overplayed the Communist threat. However with the Chinese bustling up to the table with some chips - that is, the railway - we became doubly excited.

Q: How had this whole development worked by the time you left?

MARKS: I left Zambia at the end of 1969. By then, the airlift had been over for some time. Traffic was moving regularly in both directions over the Tanzam road - now hard-surfaced although it wasn't completely finished. The Tanzam railway was still under construction and had not yet reached Zambia. There were lots of stories about the Chinese work gangs operating in the African bush. The political situation in and with Rhodesia had not been resolved. Kaunda had begun extensive reform programs in both the political and economic sectors in an effort to restructure his country into an independent, African majority ruled
Kaunda had also formulated and enunciated a philosophy called Humanism which, as you might imagine, was long on general statements and very short on specifics, but it contained a lot about the right of the individual human being. At the same time he was moving more slowly towards a one party system, but in a gentle way. On the economic side he had moved much faster, nationalizing much of the economy. The copper companies, of course, but also much of the private sector. There is an interesting aspect to this development, which was not uncommon in Africa. However there was a very special role played by a local Greek businessman. To some degree the local Greek community played "outcast elite" role of the small merchant; the role played by Indians in East Africa and the Lebanese in West Africa. (I later discovered that the Greeks and a even more important a community Sephardic Jews from Rhodes had performed the same economic function in the Congo.)

One member of this community had been a supporter of Kaunda in the early days of the freedom struggle in the 1950s; lending Kaunda money, sympathy, and presumably advice. After independence this man became prominent as Kaunda's economic advisor although he did not hold a government position. It was under his guidance that Kaunda implemented a bureaucratization of the whole monetary economy: everything down to the Lusaka supermarkets was organized into a collection of bureaucratic bodies which were in turn integrated into a single national commercial company, government owned. This Greek merchant became the head of it. He appeared to be doing very well out of this arrangement personally, although we had not proof of it. Needless to say, the British expatriates were scathing about this man; his motivations, his honesty, and his alleged profits.

It was difficult to tell how well - or badly - things were going as the country was still operation on the momentum and investment of the colonial period. We could begin to see the beginning of disinvestment in the copper industry, and some nervousness among the commercial farmers (largely British or Boer) although their property had not yet been touched. Kaunda had high hopes for his international copper producers organization, hopes which later turned out to be illusory, but he was essentially focused on the struggle with white-ruled Rhodesia.

Q: What were we reporting?

MARKS: Our economic reporting, done largely by me, was quite neutral. Our political reporting was sympathetic to Kaunda and his government but not, I believe, uncritical despite my characterization of our ambassador as a very liberal supporter. After all, the policy of the United States government was to look with a favorable eye on these developments in Africa. I personally felt that there was an underlining stratum of patronization in that attitude; especially in the willingness to accept command or centralized economic theory and practice for these new countries although we would not do so for ourselves. But, to be fair, many of the development theorists were in support of the command economic approach to development as well; arguing that you needed to force-feed development under government planning and control. This was, after all, the period when the French were touting their program and centralized planning.
In a sense we were caught between two paradigms. One was the Cold War, and the consequent policy priority to the competition with the Soviets which led to currying favor with the newly independent countries. The other was the concern for economic development of the Third World (The South or The Poor Countries) and the conventional wisdom of most economists and development experts at the time that some form of centralized economic management was necessary.

With regard to the first consideration, some of us were more fervent Cold Warriors than others but by and large the USG was out there competing - President Kennedy's “do not ask what your country can do for you...” was in everyone's mind. Some of us, I will say, were less than fully enthusiastic about the virtue of centralized planning and nationalization that was all the rage and being undertaken by most newly independent governments. But the problem with opposing that view was that there no acceptable, reputable theory that would argue the contrary - that centralized planning and nationalization was poor development theory and practice. Since all of these new governments were fervently touting centralized planning opposition to that approach tended to place you in the pro-exploitative capitalist camp, i.e. the white settlers.

So, we tended to go along with African political attitudes a bit more than we probably should have done. But, I have a distinct memory that we did raise some of these concerns in our reporting. We were concerned, certainly, and discussed extensively the complex transition problems of a complicated industry like copper which is heavily dependent on Western technology and investment. The obvious key question was how to manage the transition so that it produced wealth for the new independent African country and its African population without killing the golden goose. Unfortunately, this is which is exactly what happened.

Nevertheless from our foreign policy perspective, at least in the short run, we as an Embassy and a government did not do too badly - if one accepts the legitimacy of the Cold War as a foreign policy priority and the tactical needs which arise from that assumption. We resisted Bloc expansionism reasonably successfully. You asked earlier whether the Tanzam highway was a good development program or good project and I still believe that it served both U.S. and Zambian needs of the time. Whether in the long run, and more particularly in terms of African development, we were successful I would have to note that the history of Africa in the past thirty years had been pretty depressing. On the other hand, I don't want to make the assumption what we did or did not do may have been the crucial determinant in that recent history. Africa may have followed the path it has followed regardless of what we did.

Q: Is there anything else we should cover in Lusaka?

MARKS: Well, there was the charming story about the visit to Zambia of Senator Brook, our black senator, from Massachusetts. A delightful gentleman, interested, of course, in Africa. In 1967 or 1968, an elaborate trip around Africa was arranged for him, heavily promoted by the Administration for obvious reasons. When he came to Zambia the Ambassador a big reception in the Senator's honor as part of his program. During that party,
a senior African minister commented to one of the Embassy staff that while the party was quite nice, he was interested in meeting our Negro senator. "Where is he, I don't see him." Despite repeated efforts to point out the Senator, who after all was not very dark, the Minister kept repeating "Where, where?" Looking right at a small group surrounding the Senator, the Minister said "Which one in the group? I don't see him." All in all, Senator Brook's success was modest, but it was a good PR effort. Again, this was the sort of thing being done at that time.

Finally you asked about my professional development in my Zambian tour. Lusaka was my first full time reporting job and, in fact, I was the only full time State Department reporting officer at post. I had excellent supervisors in the DCM and the Ambassador. Both were intelligent and open-minded but different in style and approach. The Ambassador a liberal arts academic while the DCM was a pure professional - balanced, solid, and a sympathetic supervisor. I was still having trouble with my drafting, not having been well trained in writing, and he did a lot of work with me. Being the only reporting officer and the head of a section I was involved in setting section priorities, developing contacts and getting information out of people. It was also my first exposure to a real country team, albeit a small one, as the Mission included the CIA, AID, and USIS. Professionally it was good solid professional work and good experience.

Q: You left there in 1969. Where did you go from there?

MARKS: To the FSI economic course. I had been an economic officer in Zambia and commercial officer in Nairobi, despite not having had any economic background or training. The prospect of economic training came up and I decided it seemed like a reasonably good way to go, so I went off to the six-month course.

Q: How did you find the course?

MARKS: Superb, although I was only an average student. I don't have much of a taste for mathematics, and my wife was seriously ill during the course which preoccupied me some. Nevertheless, I think it was an excellent course, both for the individuals who took it and for the Foreign Service. It was, and still is I believe, a model of adult education, offering individuals serious professional education while enabling the system to which they belong deal better with a changing world; in this case the increased role of economic matters in international affairs. It was a useful and innovative response to a problem arising from the general lack of economic expertise in the Foreign Service officer corps; most FSOs having come from political science or other humanities backgrounds.

The course was designed to provide the equivalent of 30 hours of an undergraduate major in economics. It was organized by FSI, using a properly qualified academic staff. Each class was composed of approximately 30 junior and mid-grade officers (FS0-6s and 5s mostly) with a few officers from other agencies such as the CIA. We had 6 hours or so of class a day, and heavy reading requirements. The program was serious, thorough and demanding. With two classes a year, the Department significantly increased the economic competence of the Foreign Service officer corps in a very few years. It was, and is,
generally considered one of the more successful professional education programs, and certainly the most successful in Foreign Service history. It continues to this day.

In my case, I used it to go on to obtain a Masters Degree in Economics from the University of Oklahoma (in an off-campus program, much of it done while I was in Brussels).

Q: Where did you go next?

Q: What was the situation in Kenya as you saw it then?
MARKS: It was now almost seven years after independence and Kenya was firmly established under the leadership of Jomo Kenyatta. General Mobutu had re-established some sort of law and order in the Congo which had been the horrible example of colonialism and independence gone wrong. The Front Line states were aggressively pursuing the crusade against apartheid. All over the continent the African leaders were formulating new programs and projects, and enunciating new visions for Africa and its peoples. Many observers were so sympathetic that some were even defending Sekou Toure because he had outlined a high-sounding vision of a authentic - emphasis on authentic - African society; the fact he was up to his arm pits in blood ignored or dismissed. This was still in the early days of independence and of high expectation for Africa, and we were all full of enthusiasm.

Kenya was a particularly interesting place as it was possibly the most economically developed country in Africa, at least in eastern Africa. Remember earlier I said that Nairobi was THE place in Africa. It had a rather extensive light industrial complex, major ports and airline facilities, and a relatively sophisticated financial community. Kenya had been the cornerstone, the center piece, of the East African Community which was now, unfortunately, coming apart under pressure from Tanzania's President Nyerere and Uganda's President Obote. They both resented this colonially established regional economic grouping which they charged benefited Kenya more than the others. The counter argument that it still benefited them was not sufficient to buy them off. They wanted out and Nyerere in particular really pushed. The East African Community was therefore being dismantled. It was a pity and we all knew it was a pity, but there wasn't much anyone could do about it.

Jomo Kenyatta, of course, was an ambiguous figure in African history and politics, at least to some observers. He had been, of course, a major African figure in the pre-independence period, dating back to the 1930s. Although never proven to be an active leader of the Mau Mau movement in Kenya, he was universally assumed to be the inspiration for it, and he could never quite shake Mau Mau's bloody and primitivist reputation. But he had another image problem, if you will, in terms of the post-independence African political world. He was just was not in the new style of African leader. He refused to adopt so-called authentic African dress, à la Nyerere's collarless bush shirt or even Mobutu's “Abacost.” He insisted on his English, pin striped, double breasted suits with a rose in the lapel. Kenyatta was clearly a classic tribal chieftain as well as a new leader and he made no attempt to disguise
this dual role. He did not use leftist vocabulary and phrasing which was so prevalent among Third World leaders of those days. As a side note, remember that President Mobutu of Zaire also never received acceptance among the politically correct partially because he also refused to use the fashionable political language of the time.

Kenyatta was therefore viewed with suspicion by many. Yes, he was an authentic African leader from an authentic African country, but the new Kenyan African leadership class keep running around in three piece suits and speaking suspiciously like capitalists, not the way proper Third World leaders. And soon there were charges of corruption among his family and associates - as if this wasn't going on in every other country. I distinctly remember a debate with a colleague, the desk officer for Guinea, who defended Sekou Toure as being more "authentically African" which justified behavior which otherwise would be open to criticism. Essentially the charge was that Kenyatta just wasn't an authentic African leader and that bothered a lot of people.

Conversely, this period was the height of what Ali Mazrui, the African political scientist, called Tanzaphilia or the Western passion for Julius Nyerere. He was viewed as the ideal new African leader while Kenyatta was seen as a somewhat embarrassing oddity. I think I have commented before that Kenyan Africans had adapted the old Kenyan white settler superiority attitude towards other colonies and now sneered at the Tanzanians, for instance, as country bumpkins.

So, that was the Kenya I was responsible for as desk officer. As Kenya's "style" was different from the rest of the newly independent African countries of the early seventies, Kenya was a little bit out of sync with the rest of the continent. On the other hand, it was prosperous although many sneered at that because Kenyatta's government allowed so many Europeans and Asians to remain. It was more or less at that period, I think, that the Ugandans began squeeze their Asian community, forcing many to emigrate. Nyerere was also beginning to squeeze his Asian community and the country's independent African coffee farmers as he went down the socialist road.

It is interesting to remember how so many of my colleagues in the African Bureau, as well as many academics and journalists, used to argue that the Kenyan situation was unstable, and there would be real violence. After all, Kenyatta was an old fashioned tribal leader; he and the Kikuyu were dominating everybody else, corruption was spreading, and the growing instability would soon produce a bloody civil war. Well, 30 or so years have passed and while Kenya has certainly deteriorated, especially under Kenyatta's successor, Kenya has still to suffer from breakdown, civil war, or rebellion - unlike almost every other African country. So much for political correctness. Certainly, Kenya did inherit a richer and more complex economy, and someone has remarked that there is an awful lot of ruin in a country.

Apart from the usual serious country desk stuff, we had a couple of fun things occur. For instance, soon after the moon shot we distributed pieces of moon rock to chiefs of state. Kenyatta refused to believe that the rock really came from the moon, and said so publicly. However, soon after we had a chance to make a believer out of him. NASA wanted to
launch a rocket from just off the Kenyan coast. The Kenyan Government agreed and NASA moved its launch team to the Kenya coast. On the desk we came up with the idea of naming the rocket the Uhurur (“Freedom” in Swahili) Rocket. It was interesting to discover resistance in the U.S. bureaucracy to this idea, but we eventually went ahead and, of course, received a great deal of publicity in Kenya.

Another off beat event arose from the annual need to note Kenyatta's birthday - greetings from our President and that sort of thing. One year our ambassador, I believe it was Robinson McIlvaine, wanted to do something special. We thought about it, and tried to come up with something extra personal and nice. The first idea I came up with was to try to find some accessories and spare parts for Kenyatta's cherished 1945 Hudson sedan. We did not succeed. Then I came up with what I thought was an equally good idea. Kenyatta was a rose fancier, and always wore one in his lapel. We knew he cultivated rose bushes in his country home so we approached to a large American horticultural firm and asked them to develop a new variety of rose to be called the Jomo Kenyatta rose. (Apparently they can do this quite easily) We sent him four bushes appropriately labeled and packed. It was a BIG success. Sometimes desk officers get to do that sort of thing; which is both fund and good diplomacy.

I was also the regional economic officer for AF/E. This was not a terribly onerous responsibility as the most important economic work involved economic development and USAID took care of that. Still it justified some field trips to the area, in addition to Kenya itself. I even got to the Seychelles, where we had a satellite tracking station. The Seychelles was not yet independent and still did not have an airport, although the British were building one. I flew to the Seychelles in the weekly PanAm charter seaplane flight from Mombasa. The service existed to support the tracking station, and since it only flew once a week all visits were of at least one week in duration. Not too hard to take as the Seychelles is a lovely place. The seaplane took off from the airport in Mombasa but landed on the water in the Seychelles. I cannot say I accomplished much during my visit there, but I did meet with the soon-to-be leaders of an independent country and stayed in the very dramatic house of an expatriate American. He had stopped in the Seychelles a few years before while on a round the world cruise with his family in his own sailing ship. He fell in the love with the islands, bought an old captain's house on the side of the mountain and a beach house on his own little bay, fixed the up (He was very rich.), and settled down. After a while, his wife and children left and returned to San Francisco but he stayed on, living out a modern version of the expatriate life in a South Seas paradise. Visitors like myself, fairly rare, were invited to stay with him. It was a fascinating experience.

Q: Did you notice any difference in the African Bureau work, arriving just as the Nixon Administration was coming in? Was there a sense of diminution of enthusiasm about Africa?

MARKS: No, I did not. There were obviously some shifts in emphasis, but I don't remember it being a major problem or significant development. We remained very interested in Africa, essentially I think, because after all President Nixon was a globalist, interested in foreign policy. While his interest in Africa per se may have been minimal, his
interest in the global competition with the Soviet Union was not.

Q: With this Tanzaphilia, with this prevalent image of Nyerere, were we trying at that time to do anything with him or were we pretty much going along with what he wanted?

MARKS: We were pretty much going along with him, after all he had quite a reputation and many supporters in the U.S. as well as in Africa. For instance, the U.S. had a relatively large economic aid program in Tanzania. As we all know AID has had a long, complicated, and tortured history - partially because we never could make up our minds about the relationship between economic assistance and foreign policy. Even when we talk just about economic development there is the question of what actually works in development. I cannot remember, to be honest, which particular phase of development practice and theory we were in at that point, AID and the USG having gone through several theories and phases. My vague memory is that in Tanzania we were focusing on education and technical training as we did not wish to support Nyerere's socialist programs. But Nyerere was popular, Tanzania was popular, and we did not wish to be left out or out of sorts with Africa's most popular leader so we avoided any effort change his approach. Also, remember that many thought his views were correct.

Q: Was there any sense of competition between freewheeling Kenya and socialist Tanzania?

MARKS: Very much so. That is one of the reasons that the East African Community broke up. And, my instinct was that most new African leaders and intellectuals as well as the majority of outside observers would have more or less sided with Tanzania as compared to Kenya. I distinctly remember policy debates about that. I recently reviewed some of my old EERs (officer efficiency reports) - a sobering experience in retirement. I was looking at one from that desk officer period and was amused to note that the rating officer, the Office Director, had seen fit to note as an example of my competence a memorandum in which, despite some obvious political tensions in the country and the wide spread view in the African Bureau that Kenya was about to fall apart, I argued the contrary. Obviously I turned out to be right. At that time I had a sense of being on the defensive about Kenya and Kenyatta as compared with Nyerere and others. Kenyatta, as an African leaders, was an anomaly at the time.

Q: How about Uganda at this time? Did you have it under your economic umbrella?

MARKS: Yes. Most African experts had chosen Uganda as the newly independent East African country with the brightest future. It did not have a white settler community and therefore the sort of problems which Kenya and some of the others faced problem. There was very large Asian community but they did not pose any political problems at the moment. They were later forced out - to the detriment of the country's economy but that was later. Uganda also had a relatively large number of educated people, after all the Makerere University had been in existence for quite some time. And, of course, there was existing aristocratic structure of the four kingdoms, and in Milton Obote a leader who seemed to be a sensible, intelligent, and very competent. However despite these apparent
advantages, it went all bad, really bad. But at that time it was generally conceded to be the most promising of the new countries. I have a recollection, however, that some of us were concerned that the breakup of the East African Community would hurt Uganda more than the others who direct access to the outside. Uganda was sitting up there in the center of the continent with all of its export, import, and communication lines running through Kenya.

It was while I was on the desk that a perception coalesced that Shakespeare's historical plays were a valid, literary discussion and portrayal of the politics of almost every African country in the immediate postcolonial period. I was struck by the similarity between the England of Shakespeare's historical plays and the contemporary politics in Africa. Shakespeare's England had a population of 4 or 5 million people, was composed essentially of three social classes (aristocracy, peasants, an urban population), and competition and tension between the king's men and the country based land-owners on the one hand and nationalist Protestants and Catholics on the other. Most new African countries were of approximately that size, and what with the new educated group, the urban population, and the traditional Africans of the villages you had three analogous classes. The English political conflicts were mirrored in Africa by those who wanted to create a centralized African government and traditional chieftains, and the nationalists and Communists. Underlying these characteristics was the intensely personal nature of politics taking place among a very small group of people: all of whom connected by blood or marriage, or knew each other in other intimate ways. And that sort of politics is what is found in both Shakespeare's plays and contemporary Africa. I eventually wrote a 45 page paper expanding on this theme which is still sitting in my files; as I could never find anyone who would print it.

In one sense this perception of mine proved accurate. Under Kenyatta Kenya became the hunting preserve of his family and tribe - the Kikuyu - and then later of a different monarchical leader and his tribal supporters. It continues to feed off of its colonial economic heritage but despite everything had so far avoided widespread internal strife. Uganda under Obote began to cleanse itself of its Asian population, and the crushed the feudal powers of the four kingdoms, and then fell into the hands of a local tyrant. From that depths it has begun to crawl its way back. Nyerere provided Tanzania with political stability and calm, but also slow economic stagnation. However he left power on his own, leaving behind a hopefully important precedent. I believe there has been some recent interest in reviving or recreating something like the old East African Community.

Q: You left the desk in 1971?

MARKS: Yes, to go to Brussels.

Q: You were there from when to when?

MARKS: Three years, from 1971 to 1974.

Q: What were you doing there?
MARKS: I was an economic officer, in an economic-commercial section of five officers headed by Ed Crowley as Counselor for Economic Affairs.

Q: Brussels has so many missions.

MARKS: Yes, in addition to the bilateral embassy, the American Embassy to the King of the Belgians, there was - and still is - the Mission to NATO and the Mission to the European Community [EC]. Embassy Brussels was a fairly quiet post, compared to the other two, much higher priority missions. We spent three years in Brussels, my first and only European assignment, which we loved. The work was all right but nothing exciting except the for OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] create global petroleum shortage of 1973-74. I learned that big European embassies are not terribly exciting professionally for most of the staff. I also learned that these large embassies operate on two levels: the overall embassy where most of the people are doing day-to-day tasks and a center core dealing with any hot subjects. The latter have most of the fun while the rest are doing regular 9 to 5 days, but with the privilege of living in Europe.

Q: And those other missions were booming I guess?

MARKS: NATO, of course, was the big shot mission, the high visibility and priority post. The Mission to the European Economic Commission, as it was called in those days, was still largely viewed as a technical post, but clearly had a bright future as the EEC itself went from strength to strength. Although the three U.S. diplomatic missions shared a single administrative section, there was contact between them. A few of us had personal contacts or friends at the other missions, and the administrative officers dealt with colleagues in all three missions, but by and large the three staffs went their own way. Each had a different host "audience" so to speak, and they had little to do with each other. Each mission pursued the usual diplomatic activities and contacts but the three communities - Belgian, NATO, EEC - lived completely separate lives.

Q: What was your main activity in Brussels?

MARKS: The section consisted of the counselor, two economic officers including myself, and two commercial officers. My reporting portfolio included the transportation, communication, and financial sectors, as well as current general economic reporting as directed. There were also the usual visitors to take care of, representation, and spot reporting on current developments. I spent a lot of time with the aviation industry and regulatory agencies, largely because of the OPEC petroleum crisis and the establishment of the American-sponsored international petroleum management organization. I was control officer for the American delegation to the conference which created that organization. A major subject my last year or so was the Belgian response to the oil crisis, which I later used as the basis of the thesis for my master's degree from the University of Nebraska. I had been worried about that thesis, wondering where I was going to find the time to do the research for my thesis, when a friend (and economic section colleague) dryly pointed out that I had in essence already written it in those long cables and airgrams on the Belgian response to the oil crisis. He was right, and it worked. I pulled several hundred pages of
reporting out of the files, cut out anything classified, wrote some bridging language, and - Voila - I had a master's thesis which was accepted. The Belgians had actually responded to the petroleum crisis rather well; the government took fairly modest buy sensible actions, and the private sector responded with its traditional pragmatism and good sense. However, it was interesting to note to what an increasing degree a country like Belgium was integrated into the regional and international economy. In essence, there was not - and could not be - a purely Belgian response to the economic challenge.

To return to my duties, we focused on three major topics: Belgian economic-social developments accompanying the Walloon-Flemish controversy; U.S. investment and trade; and the growing importance and implications of the European Common Market. The last subject was the primary responsibility of the U.S. Mission to the EC but we in the Embassy tried to monitor it from the Belgian perspective.

Q: Coming from Africa, did you see a Belgian mindset about Africa at this time?

MARKS: Not too much, at this point most Belgians had washed their hands of Africa and walked away. However there were obviously segments of Belgian society - economic and political - that were still interested, for instance Union Minière, the big copper company. They were still the processors for Zairian copper and had many continuing links and connections. There were many missionaries and academics who had specialized in African sociology and politics. The African Museum in Brussels was and still is a major museum on African anthropology with a collection gathered over a hundred years. Actually there were three groups in Belgium with very direct and specific interests in Zaire: first of all, a Zairian expatriate community, some who lived permanently in Belgium, some who go back and forth. Then there was the community of ex-colonials who had lived in Zaire and who retained strong feelings of either fondness or resentment towards their former home. And finally, there was a still sizeable white community in Zaire, mostly of Belgian citizenship. Adding them all up meant that Zairian affairs remained a major subject in Belgian public life. However it was a relatively minor part of my professional concerns, although a more important one for our political section which include one "African watcher."

Q: Did you see in your economic work conflict between the Flemish and the Walloons?

MARKS: Oh yes, the Belgians themselves called the "War of the Belgians." Belgium is a relatively recent nation-state, dating only from the early 1830s when they declared their independence from the Dutch where they had been put after the Napoleonic Wars. It is a merger of two peoples who speak a different language, although they have been intimately involved with each other for centuries especially in the long period when what is now Belgium, Holland, and parts of Northern France were called the "Low Countries" and ruled by the Spanish. The Flemish are Dutch, although might be equally accurate to say that the Dutch are Flemish, and the Walloons are essentially French. (There is also a small German speaking enclave, but it is really very small and does no play much of a political role.) It is a fascinating and complicated place especially as the Flemish are not really Dutch and the Walloons are not really French. In some ways there is a Belgian national character and they
know that. So they call it the "La Guerre des Belges" and they squabble among themselves although they have, so far, stopped short of splitting up. By the way, the apparent origin of this "La Guerre des Belges" provides a very long range perspective to history and to many contemporary problems. After all why do these two peoples speak such a distinctly different language? The answer lies way back in history, back to the days of the Roman Empire. The northern frontier of the Roman Empire ran along the Rhine River and over towards the coast where Belgium now lies. The Walloons therefore are the descendants of those Franks or other Teutonic tribes who were Romanized, while the Flemish, the Dutch, the Germans, and the others further north and west continue to speak modern versions of their ancestral languages. The "La Guerre des Belges" therefore is a modern-day legacy of the Roman Empire which leads to speculation about the permanence of history, an observation that has interesting implications for modern Africa, for instance.

However the early 1970s was an especially interesting period because it was then that the hitherto Walloon political and economic predominance was being seriously challenged. The Flemish were starting their rise to their current and economic supremacy. For over two hundred years the Walloons had been the dominant partner in the Belgian family, at least partially because of the dominance of French culture, the political and social dominance of the Walloon aristocracy centered in Brussels and, most important, the early industrialization of Wallonia in the 19th century. Belgium was one of the first countries to participate in the industrial revolution, along with the English, and was a very prosperous and industrialized capitalist country in the 19th century, capitalizing on its large coal resources. Obsolete remains of that 19th century industrial plant could still be seen all over southern Belgium. So, for cultural, historical, social and financial reasons, the Walloons were the dominant partner and the Flemish were dismissed as provincial and somewhat dense farmers. I well remember a conversation after dinner at "Les Gaulois" (a prominent Belgian men's club, Francophone of course) when, over brandy, one Belgian commented reflectively that the mistake that had been made was the failure to "francophize" the Flemish population as the French government had done in French Flanders - in the 17th and 18th centuries!

However right after the Second World War, the situation began to change with the growth of the European Common Market and the expansion of new industry. Of particular note was the American automobile industry which moved into Europe, and located in areas where there was cheaper labor, and land. The Flemish part of Belgium was one of those locales, and by the time I was in Belgium most of the new and successful industrial activity was in Flanders and a new generation of well educated and prosperous Flemish were actively challenging the supremacy of their French-speaking compatriots. During my time in Belgium, the Francophones still had a slight political dominance but the relationship was clearly shifting towards the Flemish. Today it is the reverse, the Flemish now hold the economic and political high ground in a country which has gone far down the road of decentralization. In the early 1970s the political section of the Embassy was more involved in this issue than we were in the economic section as reorganization of the governmental structure along linguistic lines was a major item of political discourse, but we were all watching and commenting on the process.
Q: Who was ambassador when you were there?

MARKS: When I arrived it was John Eisenhower.

Q: How did he strike you, the son of the President?

MARKS: He was quite a nice man personally, but he was unfortunately under the influence of alcohol a large amount of the time. I do not know if he was just not up to the job, or just not interested. Obviously, he had been taken care of by the powers that be and sent off to Belgium to this nice job. His marriage was going badly and he was drinking an awful lot. He once made the comment to some of his professional colleagues that he didn't know why anybody wanted to be an ambassador as it was a boring job. Certainly he didn't work very hard and showed very little interest. He left Brussels about a month after I arrived, and returned to the family farm in Gettysburg where he began to write military modern military history, including about his father. He has since become a reasonably well known military historian.

Q: A nice man but in the wrong place at the wrong time. Who replaced him?

MARKS: A very different person, a conservative professor of political science from the University of Pennsylvania by the name of Robert Strausz-Hupé. What a contrast. He was, and still although very ancient now, an intelligent and interesting man with a lot of style. He was Austrian originally, a young man who found himself after the First World War a refugee from the Austro-Hungarian Empire where he had grown up. He immigrated to the United States and ended up a professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania. After he retired from academic life, he wrote a fascinating and revealing autobiography composed equally of self-puffery and honesty. In the book he essentially admits that he had at least partially became a conservative academic because there weren't many, most political science academics were liberal. He also pretty much admits that he had his first academic job Penn through his wife, an older, wealthy woman from the Philadelphia Main Line.

However after he retired from Penn, he began a diplomatic career under Republican administrations. First he went to Sri Lanka, then a few years later to Brussels to replace Eisenhower. Despite his age (He was in his early 70s at that time, I believe.), he was energetic, intelligent, and very knowledgeable about international affairs and, of course, about Europe. He was also an excellent linguist, to be expected from someone from the old Austro-Hungarian Empire and by and large a good ambassador, I think. When he left Brussels he went to Sweden and was replaced by Harvey [sic; actually Leonard] Firestone. Strausz-Hupé was the kind of ambassador that the Americans think they don't like: very formal. But he was also articulate, thoughtful and intelligent, and in fact interacted well with people, and not just Europeans. I didn't always agree with all of his views and opinions, but that is beside the point. After Brussels he continued for year as an American Ambassador: Sweden where he did very well in fact during a period where the Swedes were very upset with us about Vietnam; and then he returned to Brussels as the Ambassador to NATO.
Q: What about Firestone?

MARKS: When Strausz-Hupé left we were told we were going to get a man from the Firestone family.

Q: Harvey?

MARKS: Yes. It was really very funny. Prior to his arrival, we received information about him, including his curriculum vitae which was distributed to everyone in the Embassy. The first impression was really very impressive, but upon re-reading you realized all it really said was he was born, went to several schools, had BA from Yale where he was a fine polo player, and after graduation joined a company called Firestone as West Coast Vice President for Sales and had held that job until the present day.

Q: But with lots of clubs.

MARKS: Well, yes. Actually he was a nice man with a charming wife. I have an image in my mind that I will never forget. Our ambassador’s residence in Brussels is located on one side of the Parc Royale which fronts the King's formal palace. New ambassadors are picked up at their residence by a carriage and horses and an escort of cavalry for the presentation of their credentials. Dress is white tie and the whole ceremony is quite formal. The carriage and escort proceeds from the residence to the palace, which in the case of the American ambassador is only a distance of two blocks or so, for the ceremony. It is all very traditional and great fun to watch. Anyways, when Ambassador Firestone's presentation ceremony day came there is the picture of Mrs. Firestone with her Kodak camera running along by the side of the carriage and then cutting across the park to get pictures of his arrival at the palace. All very old shoe and down to earth American, done naturally and not for show. They were a nice couple and by all reports, I left soon after he arrived, was well liked by this staff. He used his money for a lot of entertaining, including the extensive entertaining of staff both American and local. I gather, however, that the was not very substantive.

We loved Brussels in every way. My wife is a Francophone and this was her first chance to live in a French speaking environment since we had been married. We had a lovely apartment in the center of the city, short walking distance to the Embassy, and from the beginning we felt very much at home in Belgium. Although the Belgians have a reputation for brusqueness, I soon discovered that that was just the Brussellois style - they treated foreigners just as they treated each other. We were able to tour a lot and of course the living in Belgium - the food, the European styles, was a great pleasure for me. It turned out to be my only European tour so the memory is particularly vivid. Although we never again served in Europe we were able to transit and vacation from time to time, and often returned to Brussels and always with pleasure and a sense of "coming home." This feeling was later reinforced when a number of friends from Zaire returned to live in Belgium so our trips back enable us to see old friend from two different posts.
Q: Okay, we will stop now and pick this up with you off to Lubumbashi.

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Today is September 26, 1996. Ed, you said you had something to supplement before we get to Lubumbashi.

MARKS: I just want to make a comment, which is not very original, but important for those days when I was in Zambia and later on the Kenya desk. The late sixties and early seventies was a time of high hopes for Africa. In terms of American involvement there was a fortuitous combination of two strains which enabled us to be very active. There was the anti-colonial idealism of the American liberals manifested in the Kennedy Administration reinforced by the imperatives of the Cold War. I think the two coming together enabled us to do two things. Liberals were able to pursue an anti-colonial policy against the perceived interests of our European friends because it was part of the anti-Soviet struggle or competition. If we had just pursued an anti-colonial policy we wouldn't have gotten the financial support of Congress to run those large AID programs and military assistance programs. If we had pursued a purely anti-Soviet, we would have been abandoning the competition in the newly independent countries of the Third World. It was a fortuitous mixture of these two themes which enabled us to be active in Africa. The two themes washed each other's hands, so to speak.

Q: Okay, how did the Lubumbashi assignment come about?

MARKS: I received a telephone call from Hank Cohen, who at then Director of Central African Affairs, who asked if I wanted to go to Lubumbashi as Principal Officer.

Q: Which was formerly Elisabethville.

MARKS: Yes. Elisabethville was the capital of the old Katanga province and both were renamed: Lubumbashi for the city and Shaba for the province. It is the southeastern part of Zaire, the farthest part of the country from the capital, lying on the great central African copper belt and bordering Zambia on the south and Angola on the west. Stretched along the Zairian/Zambian border were three or four Zairian copper towns paralleling the Zambian copper towns. I was, therefore, returning to the other side of the mirror which I had known when I was in Lusaka.

Q: You were in Lubumbashi from when to when?

MARKS: From 1974 to early 1976, about 18 months.

Q: What was your job?

MARKS: I was principal officer, the American Consul. We had a lovely little American consulate, with three FSOs, including myself, one USIS officer, one State Department secretary, and local employees. These were mostly Africans but included a couple of ethnic
Greek residents. The Consulate had been established in the 1930s, largely I suppose because of the copper mines but also because Elizabethville was the economic center of a large swath of Central Africa. The Consulate building was an old one-story colonial villa, located not far from the Gecamines headquarters.

Lubumbashi was a classic European colonial town, albeit becoming a bit rundown. Although established in the last century as a regional administrative and commercial center its primary virtue was as center of the Congolese, now Zairian, copper mining industry - one of the three or four largest in the world. This was the great source of the wealth of the old Belgian Congo and of the largest company in Belgium - Union Miniere. Lubumbashi, and its consort mining towns - Kolwezi, etc - had first of all a relatively large number of people who worked for the mining company. It was also the seat of provincial government, as well as the commercial and social center for eastern Zaire. At its height in the colonial period it had a European population of between 15,000 and 20,000. Even as late as 1974 when I showed up, 14 years after independence, there were still over 6,000 European residents, divided between those working for the mining company - now nationalized and called Gecamines - and the private sector of merchants and some professionals.

Lubumbashi was a well laid out little town with a commercial town center of restaurants and shops, European colonial residential neighborhoods, and a surrounding belt of African residential areas know as the Cite. Further out around the periphery were a series of farms which had been developed to feed the tastes of the colonial market, fresh produce, chickens, cheese, and even frog legs. The number of these farms had declined with the departure of the their European clientele, but two or three were still operating in my day. Of course, the new African elite had partially replaced the departing Europeans, but only partially in a commercial sense.

The city had been founded in the in the 1890s or so with the development of the cooper industry and the expansion of effective Belgian colonial administration to all parts of the Congo. The colonial or expatriate community had a number of basic components: Belgian officials including military and police; missionaries; copper industry executives and technicians; Belgian commercial and professional types; and two rather exotic communities of Greeks and Jews. The officials were gone of course by 1974 and the others had shrunk but were all still represented. Having come from Belgium I was amused to find that the Walloon-Flemish squabble had been carried into Africa during the colonial period, to the degree that there were Flemish and French speaking missionary establishments. However with the coming of independence this "gulf" had been bridged as the shrinking expatriate community closed ranks.

The Greek and Jewish communities were interesting relics of an earlier period. As a small country owning a very large colony the Belgians had encouraged outsiders to settle in the Congo as the commercial and professional middle class. Greeks and Sephardic Jews from Rhodes had responded and as the colonial period came to an end in the 1950s, each community numbered between 5,000 and 6,000. They each had had their own clubs and places of worship, although by the time I arrived only the Greek club was still in operation and the synagogue no longer had a full-time rabbi. While keeping aspects of their ethnic
background, they also adopted Belgian citizenship and other characteristics, especially French. It was these two communities which created the commercial sector of the eastern Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi. Most commercial firms had their headquarters, plants, and warehouses in Elizabethville (now Lubumbashi) and built distribution and sales networks radiating across central Africa. These two communities fulfilled the same roles economically that the Indians did in East Africa and the Lebanese in West Africa, although they were better accepted socially.

I found the Jewish community more interesting, maybe partially because I am Jewish but more I think because it was a more sophisticated group. It was a Sephardic community, built around five families whose progenitors had arrived in the Congo around the turn of the century. We are still friendly with many of them, and in fact attended a marriage in the community just last September in Paris. I met members of this community my first night in Lubumbashi, at a cocktail party arranged for me for my arrival. The next night I was invited to dinner by Aron Franco, an American businessman who was a longtime resident of Lubumbashi and a member of one of those five families I mentioned. Afterwards a few of us continued the evening by going to a little bar for a nightcap. Standing at the bar I heard two of the young men speaking to each other in Spanish. Using my Mexican Spanish I said something in we started chatting away in Spanish. It soon turned out they were actually speaking Ladino or late Medieval Spanish because the Jewish community of Zaire and Central Africa was a Sephardic community from Rhodes who continued to speak Ladino at home.

This, of course, was great fun to discover. Solly Benetar lived across the street from my residence and became one of our closest friends - it was his son's wedding we attended last year. Solly is the grandson of the first Rhodesian Jews, as a young man of 18 or 19, who had come to settle in Elizabethville. He had left Rhodes in about 1890, gone down to South Africa, heard about this new town being founded up in Central Africa, and walked up through the Rhodesias, and arrived here as the Belgian provincial the governor was laying out the town. He was given a some land which is now central Lubumbashi. He later brought out his brothers, and that was the beginning of the Jewish community in Central Africa, in Elizabethville in the province of Katanga. Over the years the Benetars and the others had prospered, the Benetars owned the largest textile factory in the Congo, and the children went to school in Belgium. Now all their property and business has been expropriated or destroyed, and the family members are living in Belgium or in the south of France.

Q: What was the situation during this 1974-76 period in Lubumbashi? I am not an Africanist, but there was this Shaba I and Shaba II business.

MARKS: Okay, let me run through that. First, I want to make a point which has probably been made by many of your interviewees over the years, which is to note the sheer professional and personal pleasure of being the principal officer of an American diplomatic or consular post. It doesn't matter where or when. The personal gratification of being a principal officer, however small the post, is very real. I have never enjoyed myself so much. To be alone, representing the United States with a couple of, in this case, congenial
colleagues, which I had there, was a marvelous, professionally satisfying experience and one of the dreams which impel many of us to join the Foreign Service. We were all quite young, I had just turned 40 and the others were in their late twenties. We were far away from the ambassador and the capital city, an communications in those days were primitive by today’s standards: air pouches, telegrams through the local system, and radio for emergency. I was there for 18 months, and did not want to leave.

Zaire was an interesting place which has always been somewhat out of sync with the rest of Africa, although cynics might say that the Congo (Zaire) was only out in front of the rest of Africa in its troubles and deterioration.

Zaire, the old Belgian Congo and now renamed Congo again, had collapsed in the Winds of Change in 1961-62 as a new Belgian socialist government responded to the new mood by reversing government policy and offering immediate independence. The Congolese had no choice but to accept although they had been demanding (and planning on) a more deliberate policy of decolonization over a period of years. Instead the process took six months and produced complete demoralization in the colonial administration, and did not provide time for the Congolese to sort out among themselves who would be in charge of the newly independent country. The resulting complete collapse led to the myth that the Belgians were the worst European colonists, while the other Europeans had done a "better" job. The British were given credit (mostly by themselves) as really knowing how to run a colony and how to bequeath functioning governmental systems. The French had followed a policy of cultural assimilation, at least for the educated, in an attempt to turn their subjects into Frenchmen. They claimed to have left behind an educated leadership class, and a viable cultural heritage as well as a functioning governmental system. These claims are been forgotten nowadays, because although the British and French colonies lasted a little longer, most of them disintegrated just as badly the Congo. The Belgian Congo, however, did it first and during the early heady days of independence and became the horrible example. In the terrible years of the sixties, the world read about army mutinies, the killing of Europeans, mercenaries, the Katanga Rebellion, Moise Tshombe and the murder of Lumumba, and the first United Nations peacekeeping operation. Then it culminated in the rise to power of once Corporal, then Colonel and later General Joseph-Desire Mobutu. With our support, he put down Tshombe and the Katanga secession, the Simba rebellion and the threat of Communist Chinese influence. By 1970, Mobutu was in power and had reestablished - more or less - law and order, installed a more or less a functioning government. While this achievement was often discounted by foreign observers, it was widely appreciated throughout Zairian society. The Congolese had had the unfortunate opportunity to experience Hobbesian chaos - catastrophe and anarchy - and they had hated it. Mobutu, by reinstating some sort of law and order, earned wide support among the population to the degree he had restored order. He received Western support, had of course the enormous revenues from copper in addition to foreign aid. He was launched on the process of putting the country back together again.

By 1973 he had done a fairly reasonable job. The U.S. was generally please with his performance, and supported him quite openly. He then began playing the role of an African leader by inventing his version of indigenous political culture which he called
"Zairianization." With this concept he was going to transfer the economic assets of the country, still largely in the hands of foreign, mainly Belgian, colonials into the hands of the citizens of the country and thereby make the Zairians masters of their economic fate.

Despite his bid for a role as a political thinker, Mobutu never used leftist ideological rhetoric like almost all other African leaders, maybe because as an enlisted soldier in the Force Publique he had not had the opportunity to mingle with "radical" society. Also his relationship with the U.S. precluded too much leftist rhetoric. Instead he used a perverted form of capitalist rhetoric, and appropriated all the commercial and industrial firms in the country and then gave them to Zairians. The big copper company was taken over in the name of the state, but everything else he gave to individual Zairians. Guess which Zairians he gave it to? His brother, his nephew, his generals and colonels, his regional governors, and their sons and wives and nephews. Everyone who was anyone had their hand in the pot. It was the most incredible redistribution of wealth you have ever seen. By fiat he handed over every private business entity - down to butcher shops, baker shops, dry cleaner establishments, and farms. Suddenly title of businesses and property went from Mr. Colon, the expatriate who had lived in the Congo for many years if not generations, Citizen Zaire. (Mobutu also eliminated the European Mr. and Mrs. honorifics and replaced them with Citoyen and Citoyenne. He also outlawed the European suit and replaced it with a tailored version of the Nehru jacket.)

How much the individual Zairian was directly related to how important you were in the system. The Governor of Shaba Province, for instance, picked up 30 or 40 companies. He suddenly owned two bakeries, three restaurants, four farms, one importing company, one automobile dealership, etc.

This reform was introduced in 1973, the year before I arrived in Lubumbashi. The chaos it produced was not surprising. First and foremost the new owners cleaned out the cash box. The second stage was evolving when I arrived in 1974, as people were adjusting to the situation. In many cases the establishment of partnerships between the new Zairian owner and the old foreign owner in an attempt to get the companies going again. Although some of the new Zairian owners were too greedy and stupid to do anything but loot their new property, others were smart enough to get the former expatriate owner back into the business, thereby creating a regular cash flow.

The net effect of this on the economy was obviously pretty bad. Although justified on the grounds of justice for the former exploited Africans of Zaire, in reality it was the blatant sort of corruption. The demoralizing affect on an already shaky political system was horrendous. Meanwhile the government was trying to nationalize the copper operations while the Belgian owner, Union Miniere, played a delaying game while continuing to operate it as best possible. But we could see the beginning of the decline, as the number of skilled technicians dropped, maintenance declined, and reinvestment disappeared. Like most governments running state economies, the failure comes in long term management. Today the Zairian copper industry is barely turning over, almost as bad as the Zambian industry. Two major world producers have pretty much disappeared from the world markets. In the early 1970s we were there watching the beginning of that process of
running down inherited industry.

That period was about the high point of Mobutu's prestige. Nevertheless there was already dissatisfaction with him, and about his corruption and arbitrariness. At that point he introduced a number of other nationalist concepts. As I said he got rid of Mr. and Mrs. replacing it with Citoyen and Citoyenne, and replaced the European suit with an invented Zairian national dress...for women a sort of flouncy African semi-Victorian long skirted dress plus a fabric turban; for the men a long-sleeved Nehru jacket suit. He renamed himself with a long name in Lingala, meaning - according to some - "the cock who covers all the hens in the village."

Living in Zaire in one sense became very funny. For instance, unlike East Africa, everyone was wearing little Nehru or safari jackets tailored in cotton or cotton-mixture, the Zairians were having their new suits tailored out of good English woolen material in Brussels or silks in Thailand. Also they were wearing them with French sleeve shirts and gold cuff links, and lovely silk squares in the pocket. It was something to see.

And, of course, there was the phenomenon I noticed previously, what I call the history lives phenomenon. You never get away completely from your history; it is absorbed and lives on. For instance, in Belgium, the northern frontier of the Roman Empire lives on in the language "war" between the Dutch Flemish and the French Walloons.

Q: Like in Yugoslavia, the Croats and Serbs. It is the Ottoman empire.

MARKS: Yes, so in southern Shaba Province there was a clear cultural divide between the African inhabitants and a their African neighbors a hundred miles down the road in the northern Zambian copperbelt. In Zambia the Africans spoke English, drank beer, ate terrible British food, including bangers and mash, and dressed badly. Just north of the Zambian-Zairian border a continental atmosphere prevailed with the men wearing suits tailored in Brussels, the women wore their African dress with European style, the language was French and even in the worst times one could get a decent meal with frog legs, nice wine, salmon, etc. Ethnically they were similar, but a serious cultural difference had been inherited from the colonial period, and survives.

Q: But, you are really talking about a very thin group, aren't you?

MARKS: Yes, as the case with most Third World countries and these are the people I dealt with. The new African elite or leadership class consisted of certain levels in the military and police, government officials, the people taking over the private sector, and a small class of academics, professionals and intellectuals. In addition there were some African Catholic clergy - including a Cardinal. Not really a part of the new elite but still important were the leaders of a Zairian syncretic religion called Kimbanguism, which had two or three million faithful.

One interesting, and generally forgotten, quality of the Belgian Congo was that it had the highest literacy rate in all of Africa. Belgian colonial policy had emphasized primary
education and had produced the most literate population of any African colony. Many of these products of the colonial education system were wiped out in the Simba Rebellion of the sixties. The Simba Rebellion was left, populist and nativist and followed the Shakespearean injunction to kill all the lawyers. For the Simbas this meant all educated i.e. literate people and until their rebellion ran its course it wiped out a good percentage of the African literate class; those who had been clerks, small merchants, clerks in the military, etc.

Q: Would one go out in the bush and see villages where it is a completely different life or had this penetrated as far as you could see out there?

MARKS: In the bush, which began not too far outside the city, one could find fairly undisturbed traditional village life, but even in fairly isolated areas traditional life had been affected by the colonial experience. The people in the bush knew there were cities and a different way of life and were flowing into them. All African cities were, and still are, growing by leaps and bounds. Even with a declining monetary economy, Lubumbashi had reached a population of 300,000 and was still growing. When I went to Nairobi in 1960 - the biggest, most important, most sophisticated, and most prosperous city in Eastern Africa - it had about 300,000 people, while today it has something like 1.5 million. Not all of that African urban population is in the modern economy - occupying jobs in the new bureaucracy or private companies or running computers. Many if not most are living in the African "Cites" or bidonvilles. In the villages, of course, life remains hard and short, not yet touched by changes -, but most of all boring. Villagers, especially the young, are increasingly aware of an outside world and are rapidly drifting to the city. However, I was the American Consul, not a missionary, and so dealt with the new African elite.

Q: What were our interests there and how did you operate in this society?

MARKS: First and foremost was our interest in the copper industry. Zaire was a major producer of this world traded commodity, the supply of which had both security and commercial/industrial implications. Copper was the original justification for the establishment of the post and the interest remained. Not only was there the original mines, but two new, and quite large, operations were in the process of being developed - one by Japanese interests and another by a group of European and American investors.

We had a small, and declining, American business community in Zaire and some missionary activity. (The Public Affairs Officer in Zambia when I was there had been born and brought up in the Belgian Congo, the son of missionaries.)

Copper gave the Consulate a core reporting subject. But in the 1970s we were also preoccupied with the two political subjects I mentioned earlier: anti-colonialism, and the Cold War. In Lubumbashi we were sitting in the capitol of the old Katanga Province, just across the border from Zambia and the Tanzam railway coming down from Dar Es Salaam to Central Africa.

Q: And the Chinese.
MARKS: Not specifically in Lubumbashi as the Mobutu government - without backing - did not play footsy with the Chinese as did so many African governments. Still we were all in the same neighborhood so to speak. You may remember that there were many critics of our intimacy with, and support for, Mobutu; many of those critics were in the Congress. In preparing papers to deal with the critics, we would begin by referring to the map of Africa, pointing out that interest in Africa meant interest in Zaire. It is the largest country in Africa, located in the very center of the continent, and is the core of black Africa. In a sense it really is the heart of Africa - bordering and participating in the politics of every region.

In pursuance of that perspective we had a close and special relationship with Mobutu. His ties to us were common knowledge. For instance, it was generally assumed that he, if not still on the payroll, still had a relationship with the CIA. He was part of a handful of assets which the CIA later referred to as the family jewels. He was one of the chiefs of state with whom they had a direct relationship dating back to before they had achieved high office. The Chiefs of Station in Kinshasa had a special relationship, probably better than the Ambassadors, with Mobutu and everyone knew it.

In sum, we had the usual mixture of interests and concerns: an old-fashioned commercial interest, overlaid with the new politics of the Cold War and the independence movement in Africa. I personally was sitting out at the edge of this large country, 1200 kilometers or our embassy in Kinshasa. We had a huge embassy in Kinshasa, and three subordinate consular posts...Kisangani (Stanleyville), Bukavu, and Lubumbashi. All had had recent and dramatic history; the Katanga secession and the first UN peacekeeping mission; the death of Lumumba in Lubumbashi; the Simba Rebellion and the rescue of our consul in Kisangani, and the mounting of that rescue out of Bukavu.

Q: Yes, Operation Dragon Rouge.

MARKS: Yes, that's right.

Q: Michael Hoyt was the consul and we have his account of the event in our files.

MARKS: Therefore by the early 1970s we had been wrapped up in Zairian policy for over ten years. So had everyone else: the Soviets, the Chinese, the French, British, etc. If you were involved in Africa you were mucking around in Zaire one way or another.

Lubumbashi was one of the major poles in Zaire: with Kisangani in the north, Bukavu in the west, and of course Kinshasa as the capital. Actually with the end of the Simba Rebellion and of the European mercenaries, Lubumbashi was the second most important point: it had the big money in the copper industry and there was continuing concern about the old successionist tendency. The Consulate General was there with classic provincial reporting responsibilities. What was going on in the copper industry? What was the political mood, especially with respect to separatism? Was there anyone or any influence coming over the borders with Zambia or Angola?
In addition to this major responsibility, we had a few other ongoing duties. There were Peace Corps volunteers in the province, and some USAID programs, although both programs were managed out of the Embassy. There was a major university in Lubumbashi, and usually an American Fulbright scholar in residence. The ConGen did have a USIS Branch Office and an active USIS program. As I noted before, we were three State officers - myself and two vice consuls - and a USIS vice consul. It was a nice well rounded, fairly busy little establishment. The Consular Corps in Lubumbashi numbered six: apart from us, there were the Belgians (of course) the French, the Greek, the Italians, and the Zambians.

Q: One of the questions I like to ask of people who served in a place where we had both interests and strong ties, but is essentially falling apart, particularly because of corruption is how did you find reporting on the corruption? It does not behoove one to over dwell on the corruption because it was all pervasive but at the same time it makes your area look kind of chaotic and looks like we are backing the wrong horse or we should be doing something.

MARKS: There was a sort of tradition in Zaire which all of old "Zaire" hands laugh about.

About the sixth month after arrival in Zaire, substantive officers in the Embassy and in the consulates, would come to the conclusion that Mobutu's regime was corrupt, falling apart, and could not last much longer. I certainly began to write dispatches which presented that view. In fact, "generations" of FSOs wrote cables and dispatches of that sort for over 20 years. However, it is now 1996 and he is still in power.

To specifically answer your question, yes, we noted the corruption and reported it, endlessly and without pulling any punches.

Q: Here is this African country which is absolutely ruining its heritage and what it could have done. I think it would be very easy for an American to look at this and become very cynical about the Africanization, whither Africa and all this. Did you and your officers have to deal with this?

MARKS: Yes, although some of us became more cynical earlier and faster than others. I don't think I ever became quite as disillusioned as some as I had not start out as idealistic, so my mood swing over 20 years was limited. Some people started out highly idealistic and became very cynical and others just walked away. I had never bought into the "Noble Savage" or the theory of the virtue of uncorrupted natural man, so I was not as disappointed when Africans turned out to be no better than anyone else. I always thought you had to keep a historical perspective on this. For instance, I remember a day trip we took once, outside of Lubumbashi. We traveled by road vehicles (the old short wheel-based Land Rovers) about 100 kilometers to a riverside colonial country hotel well known in colonial days. It was located on a curve of a river, a lovely spot; the resident of Elizabethville (as it was called in those days) would go to picnic for the day or to spend the weekend. The hotel was now completely deserted and falling to pieces, and was inhabited by African squatters. Looking at the place, I had the sense of a scene which must have been common northwestern Europe about 30 years after the Roman legions left and Romanized Gaul was
heading into the Dark Ages. I had a sense of Africa heading the same way.

Q: You mentioned a military attaché.

MARKS: Yes. Relations with Mobutu had gotten a little tense as he pursued his economic policies. Our ambassador, Dean Hinton - a man of some character and strength of will - was leaning on Mobutu who was getting very irritated. Dean Hinton is a hard charging type but also a consummate professional, and he wasn't pressuring Mobutu all on his own initiative. This was 1975 and Washington was trying to rein in Mobutu a bit.

Apart from air pouches and telegrams sent via the PTT [post, telephone, and telegraph], our communication with the Embassy was either by telephone or our own single side-ban radio - neither of which were very secure. The situation kept deteriorating as Hinton obeyed his instructions to rein in Mobutu.

As the situation deteriorated, I was notified of the travel to Lubumbashi of the new military attaché, an army colonel, and the new air force attaché, a full colonel as well, on an orientation tour of Eastern Zaire. They would travel in their own aircraft, a C-12, and would be accompanied by their wives as a couple of crew, for a total of six.

The morning of the day they were due to arrive; I was called to the radio by Ambassador Hinton who notified me, in very guarded and elliptical language that he expected to be PNGed [declared persona non grata] later that day. And this indeed did happen, and we were so informed officially several hours later.

Meanwhile two colonels and their party arrived. The trip, of course, should have been turned off, but somehow it wasn't. We met them at the airport and brought them into town, putting them up at a hotel. The next day they were planning to do some flying around the area. I didn’t think that was a very good idea, given the situation with the ambassador being kicked out of the country, but the Colonel was a very big, very aggressive full colonel, and I gave way. (Maybe the fact that I was an ex-corporal had something to do with it.) He then winked at me, and hinted that he would probably have some trouble with the aircraft and would have to land at Kitwe, the copper town up the road where he didn't have clearance to land. In other words, he was going to do a little unauthorized snooping. I remonstrated with him, but he insisted and I gave way- a decision I have always regretted. I should have flatly said no and told him he was not going while he was on my turf, and offered him the radio if he wanted to call the Ambassador and get me overruled. Instead, I registered my objection and let him go.

So he went off and pulled his stunt by landing in Kitwe. The Zairians were furious and tried to arrest him there, but he got into the plane and flew back to Lubumbashi. When he arrived his whole group was arrested and taken to the hotel. I was hauled into the governor's office and raked over the coals; the governor was furious with me, demanding to know what these people were doing. He said the two colonels and their wives would be kept under house arrest in the hotel, and the crew at a currently unoccupied Fulbright house.

When I returned to the Consulate to try to sort things out, police guards showed up and
blockaded us. Then my wife called, somewhat in a panic, asking why there were military guards around our residence. We did a bit of checking and were told that the police at the residence were there to direct traffic for the reception planned that night for our visitors from Kinshasa, the Defense Attachés.

However the guards at the Consulate were there to keep us in, and I was busy trying to call the embassy for information and intercession at the central government level but I could not get through on the radio or the telephone. As the afternoon wore on and the frustration level rose, the telephone suddenly rang. It was my mother calling from Los Angeles. Having heard on the TV that there was some sort of trouble in Zaire, she called to find out what was happening and got through with little trouble. Meanwhile I still could not contact the embassy.

Over the next few days we provided food to the airmen under house arrest, and I would visit the Colonels every couple of hours or so, while we tried to get them released and returned to Kinshasa. By now, Ambassador Hinton had left the country. About the second or third day, I was at the hotel when the Air Force colonel took me aside and said that there was something I should know. The Army colonel, the Defense attaché, had a bag in his room at the hotel containing a pistol, two maps of Zaire, his daily journal in which he recorded what he saw every day. These notes included possible targets, intelligence information, and usually uncomplimentary comments about people - including Mobutu. Taking the hint I went to the Defense attaché and asked if he had any materiel or equipment which ought not to be kept in his room as Zairian intelligence people might well check through his room while he was at meals. He thought that was a reasonable suggestion and I took a bag back to the Consulate where I locked it up.

After three or four days, things began to calm down. We made the necessary apologies and the Governor agreed to release the attachés’ party and his airplane. They flew off to Kinshasa and we turned to back to our normal business including the follow-up to Ambassador Hinton's dismissal. Hinton's dismissal turned out to be fortunate for Walter Cutler, who was the Director of AF/W [Office of West African Affairs] at the time. The Department immediately wanted to replace Hinton and repair the damage in the relations with Mobutu send somebody so they which was certainly a lucky break for him. He was in the right place when they needed somebody.

Q: We have an interview with Walter Cutler, too.

MARKS: He was a first rate officer and probably would have done all right anyway. But this way he went from office director to head of a class II embassy overnight.

But now comes the joke line in this long story. A month or two later, I was home reading a book entitled The Military Attaché, a study of the American military attaché system. I was reading the chapter about military attaché operations in the early post-Cold War period, and the author was discussing the sensitivity and difficulties of the attaché business and the thin line the military attaché walks between overt and covert intelligence collection. To illustrate his point the author recounts the story of one of the more embarrassing examples
involving the American military attaché in Moscow in 1951 or 1952. This attaché, a brigadier general, traveled around the USSR [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics] when he could, recording notes in a diary, these notes included potential targets, weapons, and comments on the Soviet system and leadership. That diary was stolen from his room and the Soviets published parts of it, complaining bitterly about the attaché’s unacceptable "spying." The Attaché was PNGed and the story made the front pages of the New York Times. It was actually only a minor scandals of the early Cold War but it ruined that officer's career. When I reached the end of this story in the book, I almost fell out of my chair. The name of that Military Attaché in Moscow was the same as my Colonel from Kinshasa, and in fact they were father and son.

Q: Shows that knowledge is not necessarily passed on from one generation to another.

MARKS: I submitted a confidential report on this incident, and I understand that the Colonel retired shortly thereafter, not necessarily because of my report but largely, I believe, because he could not satisfactorily explain why the hell he went on the trip at all given ongoing developments including Hinton's dismissal and the deteriorating atmosphere in the capital.

Q: It sounds like a very difficult government with which to deal.

MARKS: It was. We were dealing constantly with people sitting behind desks or in chairs, in fancy suits with imperturbable faces and black sunglasses. Whether they were imperturbable and difficult or just imperturbable because they didn't know what was going on was very difficult to figure out. There were, of course, some very sharp guys but we had a quite a few promoted way above their performance competence - at least in Western terms, although not necessarily by local political criteria. Try as we might, we never became very well informed as to what was really going on behind those glasses, behind the facade. We did have a few people we could talk to, but I cannot claim that I was ever able to bridge the cultural gap to become open and intimate with any Zairian.

To a large degree I depended for intelligence on the local expatriate community. I was directly tied into the Jewish community, and to some degree into the Gecamines (copper company) senior Belgian management. Some of the other consulates, particularly the Belgian and the Greek, mined their communities extensively and we all exchanged information. We had a Fulbright exchange scholar at the University of Lubumbashi who was knowledgeable about student and faculty attitudes. He was a political scientist by the name of David Gould, who was unfortunate enough years later to be on PanAm 109 which exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988. USIS also had a lot of contacts with academics and university people, one of the benefits of running an academic exchange program.

Q: This often is the case and it isn’t necessarily bad.

MARKS: No, you do what you can.

Q: It sounds fine if you can reach into the local community, but often outside observers can
give a better perspective of what’s happening. What about the CIA?

MARKS: There were no resident CIA in Lubumbashi, although there had been a largish station at one time, during the Katanga secession. The Consulate itself formed interesting little compound with the this lovely little villa in the center and right next to it was a fairly nondescript empty building with a huge vault area which was once full of CIA people. Later after Shaba I and Shaba II, the CIA station was re-opened I was told there were suddenly 10 or 15 Agency types running around, in addition to the 5 State/USIS people in the Consulate itself.

That experience with the CIA raises an interesting point. After the end of the Katanga secession two or three thousand members of the Katanga Gendarmerie - Tshombe's army - fled into Angola and been granted refuge by the Portuguese authorities. They came with family and were settled as a community; reportedly the Portuguese even used them in the war against their own insurgents. They were settled in eastern Angola, thereby continuing to pose a potential military threat to Mobutu's government. Nobody knew much about them, except that they were there. I had heard about them when I was in Angola but information was scarce. In Lubumbashi in 1975 I tried to put some information together about them, again information was scarce. I sent in what I had by dispatch, but there was no reaction from Washington. I left Zaire in January/February of 1976 and the first invasion by the Katanga Gendarmes occurred about two months later - catching everybody completely off guard. It would seem to me that the Katanga Gendarmes was exactly the sort of situation calling for CIA activity but it turns out they had no contacts or information. It was another example confirming what some of us have long suspected, that is, that the CIA's reputation was seriously overblown.

Q: Did you see Chinese coming over the horizon with their railroad, or the Soviets?

MARKS: No, not really. We kept watching as Washington of course was very exercised about the possibility but that was happening more in Kinshasa than it was in Lubumbashi. There was not any resident Chinese or Soviet missions in Shaba Province and we never saw any.

Q: How did the ex-colonialists, the Belgians, fit into the picture during your Lubumbashi time?

MARKS: The old colonial regime had been a mixed bag, although largely Francophone although many of the missionaries and some of the businessmen were actually Flemish. Then there the two "immigrant" communities, if you will, Jews and Greeks, most of whom were now Belgian citizens. At one time the European community in Lubumbashi alone, not to mention Shaba [province], had been 16,000 or so, and we were now down to 6,000 [persons]. Those remaining were doing very well economically, but it was a declining situation and they knew it. The Zairian pressure to take over completely was evident and constant. Meanwhile, the deteriorating situation both economic and political - made it less and less worthwhile to stay, although many did very well through contacts in the government. But it was becoming harder and harder, and there was a slow drifting away of
people. Each year there would be a few hundred foreigners less. Nevertheless the expatriate community was the world in which we mostly lived. Efforts to connect into the African world were just not very successful. However many of the expatriates themselves had close contacts - built up over the years and now - through the business relations - which provided some insight. Still it was "through a glass, darkly."

The invasion by the ex-Katangan Gendarmes in the spring of 1976 was repulsed fairly quickly with the help of the Belgians and the French. It was followed in the spring of 1977 by what was called Shaba II in 1977, a more serious invasion during which some Europeans were killed, which was a severe blow to the morale and sense of security of the remaining expatriate community of Shaba. Many left permanently, or did not return, and I would guess that there are less than a thousand left now.

Many of my closest friends from Lubumbashi moved back to Brussels, and we have remained in contact. The young Belgian Vice-Consul - a brilliant young officer and scion of a distinguished Belgian diplomatic family - later was on duty in Washington as Political Counselor when he died - at a young age - of a heart attack while doing his morning jog around Chevy Chase.

Q: Why don't we stop now? If there is anything you want to add about Lubumbashi we can do it the next time.

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Today is the October 23, 1996. Ed, you said you went back to Washington early for a position in the African Bureau. Can you address this?

MARKS: I left in January, 1976, after only about 16 months of what would have been at least a two year tour. Actually I was enjoying myself in Lubumbashi, I liked being a principal officer, so when I received a cable from the Bureau asking me to come back to be the deputy director of AF/C (Office of Central African Affairs) I politely declined. About a week or so later I got another cable, in the first person, from Assistant Secretary Bill Schaufele asking me to reconsider. My wife has an old rule which she reminded me of... always go where you are invited, where someone wants you. Therefore, if the Assistant Secretary invites one to come back to take on a job, one should not say no. So I replied affirmatively this time. I went back in February; I guess it was, as Deputy Director of AF/C and Zaire desk officer.

Q: You did that from 1976 to 1979?

MARKS: Yes, for about 18 months until the fall of 1977.

Q: What constituted Central Africa?

MARKS: Zaire, the Congo, Gabon, Rwanda, Burundi. The office focused very much on Zaire, with comparatively marginal attention to the others.
Q: Well, let’s talk about the little ones first before going to Zaire. Was there anything going in Gabon?

MARKS: There wasn't much going in any of them. The only thing of any significance, or if you will, notoriety, was the imperial reign in the Central African Empire.

Q: By emperor you are referring to...?

MARKS: Bokassa, who took over in Bangui and renamed the Central African Republic the Central African Empire after crowning himself emperor in the style, he thought, of Napoleon.

Q: He achieved a certain amount of fame for being a cannibal.

MARKS: He was charged with that at the end and it may well be true.

Q: I’m told he had little boys, or parts of little boys, in his freezer.

MARKS: But, you need not add that particular charge for him to be a bizarre, exotic figure who may have been certifiable. As I said, he adopted the Napoleonic style and especially the Napoleonic bee symbol which he used to adorn his throne, robes, and crown. Bokassa organized a coronation which involved importing teams of white horses from France, to pull his carriage, as well as more mundane motorcycles and Mercedes automobiles. He may or may not have engaged in cannibalism but that was only one of the violent crimes he was charged with, many quite well documented. After all, trying to replicate a Napoleonic empire in Central Africa in the last third of the 20th century could easily qualify one for certifiable nuttiness. He was also vicious and bloodthirsty. But he got out of the adventure alive and I believe he is living in retirement in France. After all, he was a retired captain of French Colonial infantry, had apparently served with distinction in the French Vietnam war, and had a claim to a pension and residence rights. The French always had a soft spot for him and so after it was all over, he retired in France.

Q: While you were dealing with this was he still in power?

MARKS: To be honest, I can't remember exactly, but I think he was. However, it was not a serious foreign policy concern for us and I was not working on it directly. It was something we watched in a sort of bemused way.

Q: It was a French problem.

MARKS: Yes, somehow we never really got terribly exercised about Bokassa. Some Western and American Africanists were a little embarrassed by him. It was just one of those things you didn't talk a lot about if you were an Africanist. We left it to the French, as you say.
Q: What about Congo Brazzaville?
MARKS: Congo Brazzaville was, also, not a major concern for us. They were close to the Cubans and we had had some trouble with them earlier and closed down our embassy. While I was in AF/C we decided to return and sent an old friend of mine to Brazzaville to reopen the post. He surveyed the old chancery and residence and initiated arrangements for reopening. New staff began to arrive. Unfortunately, it turned out to be a sad career story. My friend went in as chargé but had been promised, informally, that he would be named ambassador in due course. However, the prospect apparently went to his head and he began to let it be known around Brazzaville that he would be the first. He had been specially told not to do that, and soon the African Bureau became aware of his behavior, which included getting into some sort of quarrel with one of his staff. I never knew the cause or the problem, or who was at fault, but essentially he had blotted his copy book in the eyes of Washington and he was soon pulled out.

Otherwise there was little going on in Brazzaville which interested us; there were few bilateral problems or interests. There was, of course, the Cuban presence and the general competition for Africa, but how worked up could you get about Brazzaville? The game was really in Zaire.

Q: How about Burundi and Rwanda?
MARKS: They were relatively quiet at the time.

Q: The Hutus and the Tutsi.
MARKS: Yes, the Hutu/Tutsi situation continued to simmer, but it was relatively quiet at that time. The general feeling was that it was a feudal situation of long standing, possibly unstable, but no real problem at the moment. We had embassies with modest AID programs, but we didn't pay a great deal of attention to them.

Zaire was important and, of course, Angola, which wasn't part of AF/C but bordered on Zaire and, since the Portuguese revolution in 1974, was a major concern of the African Bureau. The events in Portugal led, as some of us had predicted, to the Portuguese pulling out of Africa. Liberation groups took over in Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique but the most radical elements in the Portuguese army took over in Angola and immediately turned it over to the insurgent party - the MPLA - which was most closely connected with the Soviets. Soon after the Cubans became very involved in supporting the MPLA government in Angola and we became very excited. Zaire and Angola combined became major foreign policy concerns. The USG supported the other major Angolan insurgent movement and soon we had a hot war between surrogates in Angola.

This produced a lot of USG activity in Zaire - CIA, military, diplomatic - in support of “our side” in the Angolan war.

I arrived to take up my new job at the beginning of the Carter Administration. I hadn't been back more than a month or so when all hell broke loose with what was known as Shaba I,
the first invasion by the ex-Katangan Gendarmes. They came over the border from Angola and quickly captured the western-most copper towns in Shaba Province, and appeared to pose a very serious threat to the Mobutu regime. This possibility raised lots of questions for the Administration. Who were these ex-Katangan Gendarmes? Who was backing them? What were their politics? More important, the invasion raised the question of whether we would continue to support Mobutu? Mobutu had been our boy for a long time, but in the previous three or four years he had come under severe criticism for corruption and human rights abuses, ruining the economy, and generally behaving badly.

Now much of the criticism against him was true, and no secret. He was becoming increasingly autocratic and becoming corrupt. Yet, in the continuing cold War competition in Africa, he was clearly on our side. Even his political rhetoric was different from most of African leaders of the time which helped make him a darling of conservatives in Europe and the U.S. He stood in sharp contrast, for instance, to Sekou Toure of Guinea-Conakry who was able to get much Western approval, although he was a bloody tyrant, because he used effectively politically hip rhetoric about local culture, independence, etc. In addition, his performance was no worse than many, if not most, of his contemporaries but his blatantly Western orientation brought him a rising tide of criticism from left and liberal circles in Europe and the U.S.

The expanding war in Angola, pitting the Cuban backed government against the South African backed Jonas Savimbi, only heightened our interest and Cold War competitiveness.

This was the background to the policy problem facing the new Carter Administration, with its openly liberal perspective and commitment to human rights as a major element in its foreign policy. Mobutu was just the sort of Third World leader they despised. They loved Nyerere. Given that, in the second or third month of the administration comes Shaba I. However Mobutu was a long-standing U.S. ally and now was being seriously challenged. The Administration was therefore faced with a very interesting and practical foreign policy problem. A pro-Western, African government with excellent ties into the conservative community and the U.S. intelligence community was under serious attack. So the question clearly posed was whether we would support him even though we now found him personally distasteful. In one sense, the Carter Administration was being given an opportunity to get rid of him, without having to do anything nasty with our own hands. Merely backing away, not providing help and not encouraging others to help him, might have been sufficient to bring him down, especially if we made no effort to keep our decision secret. In the African Bureau, but especially in our office, we wondered what the Carter people would do, and we put that option in our briefing memoranda.

Q: I want to get it from your observation at that time. Were you both looking at the situation in Zaire and trying to figure out the political situation in the United States as regards this? You give them options, but options which you aren't quite sure they are going to go?

MARKS: No, no. The Office Director, Tom Buchanan, a first rate officer and colleague,
and I both felt this situation was kind of fun and amusing. We were well aware of Mobutu's faults and like most classic Foreign Service officers we were comfortable on the fence. Mobutu was a bad man, but on the other hand, Zaire was very important we could not see any better alternatives on the horizon or figure out what the alternative was. As you well know, when career diplomats can’t see an attractive alternative they tend to stick with what exists. Yes, Mobutu was bad news but, in a sort of negative defense, he wasn't as bad a monster as Sekou Toure or a half-dozen others. On the other hand, we knew the Carter Administration didn't like him; not without justification. We were prepared to go either way. At the beginning of the Shaba I crisis we wrote rather neutral memoranda, outlining American interests and concerns. We pointed out our obligations to Mobutu, noted his faults, and added that we did not see any reasonable alternatives. We then pointed out the alternatives which existed. They ranged from full support, including military support, to no support at all. We pointed out that the latter choice could well result in the fall of Mobutu, thereby ridding the Carter Administration of an ally it did not like, and by a method which was passive rather than active.

Q: Who were some of the action people involved?

MARKS: The Office Direction and myself. Then of course, the Assistant Secretary and NSC [National Security Council]. I don't remember that it went to many other people in the State Department.

Q: Was there a congress person who was in Mobutu’s pocket?

MARKS: There were congressional people interested on both sides. They were the liberal pro-African, interested in independence, and the Third World congressional people. They were a mix in the sense that they wanted to support Africa but didn't like Mobutu. Then you had some conservative types who were interested in the copper mines and believed that Mobutu was a good African, who said all the right things, and who were concerned that the Gendarme invasion was Cuban-sponsored. We had to spend a lot of time up on the Hill, with our battle maps, etc. We had quite a wild couple of months with 16-18 hour days, lot of briefings on the Hill, etc. Apart from the obvious dramatic aspects, it was a very interesting policy question.

The administration came down with a compromise. It would help Mobutu but only with non-lethal military equipment. This decision meant that we got very involved with the Defense Department in almost Talmudic questions as to what was lethal. Some things are obvious, like rations. Weapons are also obvious but what about body harnesses, the things you hang equipment on when you go into battle. What was really fun was the rifle clip for bullets. Was that lethal? What we ended up doing was sending a lot of supplies like rations, Cokes, etc. There was a great cartoon, in the Washington Post I believe, which shows a sort of barricade behind which there is a Zairian soldier and an officer waiving a big sword; and behind them is a wagon full Coca-Cola cases which is identified as U.S. military aid. The officer is saying, give them another round of Coke cans.

So the Carter Administration ended up fudging the policy question, deciding not to bite the
bullet on Mobutu. But the French played a major role because they ended up providing some of the real military hardware. That invasion proved to be relatively modest. It was pushed back successfully and quickly. The next year was what we called Shaba II, a second more serious invasion. I was gone from AF/C at that point. The Gendarmes captured almost all of the copper towns except Lubumbashi and killed a group of Western expatriates. The Belgians and French actually sent in troops, who pushed the Gendarmes back into Angola.

Q: Well, let's talk about the time you were there. We talk about Shaba I but how did it develop, who was behind it, what were the effects?

MARKS: It was never very clear, if I remember rightly. After the fall of Moïse Tshombe and the Katangan rebellion in the sixties, a number of his military force, called the Katangan Gendarmerie, which was a regionally based constabulary army loyal to him, went into exile in Angola in 1966-67. They settled in the eastern part of Angola with Portuguese approval and by all reports were used by the Portuguese in some of the fighting against the Portuguese colonial regime. So, they served a colonial power for a while. There were a couple of thousand of them, but nobody could ever determine the number with any accuracy. I tried to do a report on them in 1976 but was unable to get much information on them. They were being kept together as a unit by the Portuguese, but we hadn't heard much from them for a while. Then when they invaded it was never quite clear why. Maybe there is better information in the files than I was aware of at the time, but it was never quite clear whether the Angolans and Cubans had unleashed them or they slipped their leash.

Now, the second time around, when I was pretty much out of it, it was felt by many that there was more push and support from the Cubans than there had been the first time around.

Q: Were we seeing the Soviets through their Cuban surrogates behind these invasions?

MARKS: Yes, that was a major question about Shaba I, but there wasn't much evidence. I think it was felt much more liable to be true with Shaba II. Again I am not sure of the evidence because I left shortly after Shaba I and wasn't involved any longer.

Q: Did the Zairian army beat them back more or less?

MARKS: It was the Zairians but there was some French and Belgian presence. The Katangans never got too far in Shaba I. They only came as far as the two most-western copperbelt towns. In Shaba II they went much farther, all the way to Kolwezi, the town before Lubumbashi. It was a strange episode. Maybe more of a result of local actors than we liked to think at the time.

Q: How were the Katangan troops acting when they got to these towns?

MARKS: In Shaba I they were fairly restrained and didn't cause much harm. In Shaba II they got nasty and killed Zairians and foreigners. There were a couple of instances where
people were put into a room and machine gunned. So it was a different episode. Now, was that because of frustration with their first attempt? I don't know. I left after the first invasion and lost direct knowledge of the situation.

**Q: Were there any other issues from Zaire?**

MARKS: That was the big one while I was on the desk. The other big issue, and it wasn't pushed very far, was a new Carter Administration approach to Africa. The Administration wished to be more sympathetic to the Third World and to Africa. However, I don't think it went much further than rhetoric - "we understand you more and are more sympathetic." I think Africa got a little more assistance money and the verbiage was much more understanding. I am not sure the change made a lot of difference.

**Q: What was your impression of the embassy’s relations with the Zairian government during this time? It was a big embassy.**

MARKS: Remember Dean Hinton had been PNGed and replaced by Walter Cutler, who had been the office director. He spent his time trying to walk that fine line between "Mobutu is our boy" and therefore we have good relationships with him, while on the other hand, Mobutu had been frightened, although we had been supportive if not in an overpowering fashion. On the other hand, Cutler was in the interesting situation of knowing that Mobutu's main line back to Washington was through CIA channels. The CIA Station Chief was, in fact, in charge of one of the Agency's so-called "family jewels" in Mobutu, and could see and deal with him at any time.

**Q: Was this resented in the State Department establishment?**

MARKS: Yes, but there wasn't much we could do about it.

**Q: What gain to the United States did you see from having somebody like Mobutu in our pocket?**

MARKS: The obvious gain is a dependable ally as long as you can pay the bills. It was all in the context of the Cold War. He was somebody who could help with an Angola, a Chad, etc. We ran our agents through Zaire, denying others running their agents. This was our base, not their base. The map was colored our way and not the other way.

**Q: That's a big base.**

MARKS: Yes. You look at it in Cold War terms; Zaire was a pawn on our side and not on their side. The downside, which I think we all worried about later more than then, was that when you go to bed with a dog you wake up with fleas. We were in association with a not nice, not reputable leader. Now, we are into the old question of which school of foreign policy to believe in...Morgenthau's realism, Wilsonian idealism, etc. Much of how one felt about Mobutu and the relationship with him depended on where you were on the realist versus romantic school of foreign policy.
One interesting aspect, often true in other cases and which we ought to look at seriously, is the question of who ends up controlling the relationship when a major power gets into a relationship with a smaller power? In some respects the smaller power ends up controlling, at least up to a point, if only because of the career and institutional ties that have been created in the major country. Careers were made by having that relationship with Mobutu, particularly in the CIA. When a Chief of Station was sent out he handed one of the family jewels and he damn well better not lose it. So, if we ran into any trouble with Mobutu, Mobutu not only could play this bit over him but Mobutu probably had better contacts among his seniors than he did. Now this is a hypothesis that ought to be explored. We had the same situation in Iran; before the Shah fell there is the thesis that he knew more about what we were doing than we knew what he was doing because he effectively controlled our intelligence service. He would call back to Agency headquarters and say, "Your man is giving me trouble". Morocco is another example of that sort of relationship. The King has expelled or refused at least one ambassador because he wasn't the sort of obedient, polite political ambassador he wanted. So these relationships are a mixed bag and I think a lot depends on the one's judgment of the importance of the Cold War in Africa. If that was your primary concern, and it was to a large degree our primary concern, then Zaire was a major pawn in the Cold War conflict in Africa. So, you had to pay your bill, and you had to put up with the little things you wished he wouldn't do. But overall he was a net positive asset on our side of the Cold War. I think that is where even the Carter Administration ended up.

Q: You left there after a little more than a year?

MARKS: A year and a bit.

Q: You went where?

MARKS: As Ambassador to Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, in the fall of 1977.

Q: How did you get the job?

MARKS: I can give you what I know about it. I was sitting in my office and a guy I knew, Pat Kennedy, came by. He was working then for Dick Moose, Under Secretary for Management. Pat was making up lists of candidates for embassies in Africa. When we came to Guinea-Bissau, I said, "How about me? I have Portuguese and am an Africanist." He said, "Why not?" You may remember that was the time we were looking for what we used to call "baby ambassadors," younger officers at the 0-3 level. I certainly was young enough and junior enough, as a new 0-3. The next thing I know I was offered the job and I said I would be delighted.

Q: Did you have any briefings, training, etc.?

MARKS: Just the standard stuff. Reading in a little bit, working with the desk a little bit, the three-day ambassador's course - which was pretty non-substantive. I had some consultation in the building with the administrative people. That was about it. The assumption must have been that as a professional I didn't need a lot and/or they didn't have
much to offer. I think they do more now.

One amusing aspect of the whole business was to confirm in practice what one already knew by observation - ambassadors really are a special class in the Department of State and other related places, and are treated accordingly. Even ambassadors to dinky little places like Guinea-Bissau.

Q: You served in Guinea-Bissau from when to when?


Q: What was the situation in Guinea-Bissau when you went out there?

MARKS: I was the second ambassador there, the first having been Melissa Wells who had only been at post for three or four months before being withdrawn and sent to the U.S. Mission to the UN in New York. The embassy had only been open about a year, following independence in 1975. I was accredited to both Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, and the intention was to have a resident mission in both with one ambassador going back and forth. The post in Cape Verde had not yet been opened up and the post in Guinea-Bissau was small. Counting myself there were three officers, a communicators and an American secretary, an AID mission officer with three or four technicians - ten or eleven Americans in all.

Later, when we opened up in Cape Verde we had a resident staff of eight or ten Americans plus locally engaged staff.

Guinea-Bissau was a very small, very poor country and conditions were about as difficult as you can imagine. Although the post had been open a year when I arrived, we were just moving into permanent housing. The staff had spent that year living in hotel rooms and I assure you the hotels in Guinea-Bissau were not exactly 3 or 4 star. They were about a half star. It was grim. The Chancery was the bottom floor of the highest building in town, which meant five stories, and we had three floors up above where we were building apartments. They were fairly big apartments (for Bissau) with two bedrooms, two bathrooms, living room, dining room, kitchen and an entry way. They had marble floors and were pretty classy for the local scene.

We arrived by Defense attaché plane from Dakar and were taken to the Ambassador's residence. It was ludicrous, although by Guinea-Bissau standards it wasn't all that bad. But it was really pretty bad. There was no electric power most of the time even though later we installed a small generator. Water was kept in a roof-top reservoir which was filled by the local fire department once a week. The Residence was next to a cemetery and a guy who made coffins, and a pig farm was across the street. It was just grim. We were there about a month when the new apartments above the Chancery became available so I pulled rank and bounced one of the staff and took the top apartment. The administrative officer had one of the other apartments (he was the one I bounced from the top floor apartment) and the communicator and my secretary, a married couple, had the third one. However, it was grim and even this permanent housing would not have met most standards elsewhere in the
world.

There was little food available except what we brought in by the West African commissary delivery service organized by the African Bureau. This arrangement ran its own airplane, which would drop by every three or four months. There was practically nothing on the local market except rock oysters, not bad shrimp, and occasionally some vegetables, papaya, and mangos. Sometimes there was rice and peanuts, and once in a while once could get hold of a suckling pig or very small, quite delicious little birds.

The country suffered enormously from water and power shortages and in the three years I was there we spent over half the time without power. Finally we installed our own generator. Remember this was in a West African tropical environment so the lack of power and water was serious.

There wasn't much to do, and there wasn't much to see. The foreign community was very small and the local community was still quite standoffish.

I suppose the worse thing was that it was boring. We could get to beaches only after driving for an hour and a quarter up a miserable road; and the beaches weren't that good. There was very little social life. There were only two tennis courts in town, one of which was taken away by the ruling Party for its use. There were no clubs, only a small foreign community, no cultural life - life was really very limited.

From the day I got there until the day I left, we spent an incredible amount of time on administrative questions, in an effort to keep the Mission functioning while trying to upgrade it. Rent a little bit better house, get generators brought in and installed, obtain a little more space so we could spread out a bit. There was a Washington approved project to build an American embassy compound on land set aside by the Guinea-Bissau Government for the diplomatic corps. The site was located on the road to the airport. The idea was to build a compound with a swimming pool, residences and an office, etc. I spent three incredibly frustrating years negotiating with alternating teams of people from FBO and the architects who never somehow could get together. So, although the project had been approved in principle before I got there and the money approved, I spent three years and it still hadn't even been started when I left. The compound was built a year or so later.

Only a very few journalists and VIPs came through. One journalist, Lamb from the Los Angeles Times, visited for a few days and wrote a little article about the American Embassy with the dirt floor. In fact, although the Chancery was in a relatively modern building we did still have a dirt floor, although we also had gorgeous hardwood paneling separating the little offices. Lamb didn't know what to make of an American Embassy with a dirt floor and where the Ambassador lives four floors - without an elevator - above the "store."

We did eventually manage to rent some additional space next to us, spread out some and lay down a floor. I doubled the floor space of the Chancery, which allowed us to set up a small USIS display, and we ended up with hardwood floors just like real civilized people.
So, that is a sense of what we did, spending an enormous amount of our time on administrative activities. I remember when I went to a chiefs of mission meeting in the Cameroon. We were sitting around exchanging war stories and I think it was our Ambassador to Nigeria who made the comment that his phone at home hadn't worked for six months. I couldn't resist it and into the silence I said, "Oh, you have a phone?" It was generally accepted that we had the worse conditions in all of Africa. When we were inspected in our third year, the Senior Inspector stated in his report that "It is a very real question as to whether we should ask Americans to live in these conditions to represent the United States of America." We didn't think it was all that bad, but the inspectors did put that statement in their report.

**Q: What did your wife do?**

MARKS: She just sort of got through the days. She mingled with a few of the other ex-pats and we were away a lot taking longish vacations; she spent time visiting family. Boredom I would say was a problem almost more than anything else. We finally acquired a TV and VCR, which helped a little. I remember the sensation we caused with some showings of "West Side Story." My wife was also ill a lot and was medevaced three or four times. We never really did figure out the cause of her illness. One particularly bad attack occurred when we could not get a USG government plane and the President of Guinea-Bissau lent me his DC-3 to fly her up to Dakar, where the Peace Corps doctor was available for an emergency case.

Bissau was a weird place. One of my best friends was the Portuguese ambassador, Antonio Pinto da Franca, now Portuguese ambassador to Germany. We were very close, both husbands and wives, and we now go often to Portugal to see them. Antonio had an artistic, literary sensitivity and pointed out that Bissau was really a very surrealistic place. We had many little incidents or adventures that are sometimes difficult to explain but were straight out of Lawrence Durrell. Remember the *Sauve Qui Peut* and *Noblesse Oblige* stories about Yugoslavia in the early days of the Cold War?

**Q: Oh, yes. I went to Yugoslavia a few years after he wrote the Esprit de Corps.**

MARKS: Well, we had a little bit of that atmosphere there. Let me tell you a few stories. First, the official car. When I arrived in Guinea-Bissau, the Embassy official car was a big Ford Tourino sedan. It gave us prestige because it was big and American. The local government types had Volvos that the Swedes had given to the government. The other ambassadors had Mercedes except for the French, of course. And, I had this big Ford which was about a third the price and a tenth the quality of the others, but it was big and flashy. As you know, we fly two flags on our cars (the American and the Ambassadorial) while other embassies fly only one. My driver loved that. But, when I arrived the car was showing wear very badly, although it wasn't that old. I put in a request to have the car replaced and was told that the replacement wasn't scheduled for another 44 months or so. I kept arguing that the car was not working very well but didn't get very far in convincing anyone in Washington. Finally, one day we had a situation which changed everything.
The prime minister of the Guinea-Bissau was killed in an automobile accident and a state funeral for him was organized at the Presidential Palace - the former Governor's Palace. The Palace was located on a traffic circle in the center of town, and much of the city's population was gathered around this circle. On the stairs of the Palace were gathered the local dignitaries and the diplomatic corps. We dips [diplomatic representatives] had all pulled up one by one to be let off to join our group on the stairs before we went in to see the body lying in state. My driver had the two flags flying on the big white Ford and off we went, actually a distance of only about five blocks from the Chancery. We drove up the main street, and pulled around the circle and stopped in front of the Palace. My driver got out and ran around to open the door for me (I was dressed in tie and jacket, even in the tropics.) He then ran back to start the car - and it wouldn't start. In front of practically all of Guinea-Bissau, the American Ambassador's car would not start. I disappeared into the diplomatic crowd, distancing myself from this disaster as fast as possible. My driver, to his permanent humiliation, had to find four or five guys to push the car off the circle.

When I reported this scene to Washington, they immediately diverted a new car to me. It was a big, new, bronze colored Chevy Impala and my driver loved it. It was the biggest, flashiest car in town.

Like most African and Latin countries...remember that Guinea-Bissau was African, Latin, and Communist at that time...a big event was an official arrival or departure at the airport, particularly if it were the president or the prime minister. We - the diplomatic corps - would be convoked. The 12 ambassadors, counting the PLO representative, would get into our cars and drive out the 15 to 20 minutes to the airport where we would stand in the diplomatic line-up, grouped right after the government officials and the local notables, to say hello or goodbye to whoever was coming or going. We would watch the ragged little honor guard, still using the Soviet goose step. One day this ceremony gave rise to an amusing incident.

I had been in Bissau about a year and a half at the time, and was now number four or five in protocol ranking. At that point the Russian Ambassador was the dean of the corps and the Chinese, I think, was the number two, the Portuguese was number three. We all arrived that day but as the Russian Ambassador was away a young, thug-looking Russian second secretary immediately went to take the place at the head of the line. Horror reigned in the diplomatic corps. A junior officer cannot take the place of a Chief of Mission in a receiving line; he must move down to the end of the line where the chargés stood. But, the young Russian wouldn't move or respond to our comments; he just stood there dumbly. The Chinese Ambassador was furious, and we all were indignant (some more seriously than others). The Chinese Ambassador got hold of the G-B [Guinea- Bissau] protocol officer who went to the Russian and told him he had to move. The Russian did so, grudgingly, and the Chinese Ambassador took his place at the head of the line. Then the Portuguese took his place, and I followed next to him. Next to me was the very smooth, sophisticated ambassador from Guinea-Conakry, a man who had been ambassador in Paris and Moscow and was now in their neighboring country with whom they were trying to improve relations. He was a very suave, French African type with flowing robes, and he moved into his place.
next to me. Now, right next to him usually came the East German ambassador; a tall, gangling, Ichabod Crane type, a modest man. By protocol, he was supposed to come after the Guinea-Conakrian but the young Russian now appeared and took that place instead. The East German fluttered around, trying to get the Russian's attention without actually saying anything but the Russian just ignored him. The East German finally resigned himself and, with a shrug, accepted a place next to the Soviet Second Secretary. The next in line after the East German was North Korean Ambassador, a short, dour looking man, who took all this in but didn't say anything. All the rest of us were all watching this, and as the East German accepted his role and took his place after the Russian Second Secretary, the Guinea-Conakrian raised his voice and commented loudly, "Il n'ose pas!" ("He doesn't dare!).

We had a sequel to this incident. The next week was the regular monthly luncheon meeting of the diplomatic corps. The Portuguese ambassador and I decided we had to do something about the airport incident. After all, we had had a breach of diplomatic protocol, precedent, tradition and manners. We got together with the Guinea-Conakrian ambassador and agreed to do something at the meeting. At the luncheon, the Portuguese ambassador started out, and speaking more in sorrow than in anger about the problem of junior officers who do not understand, and how they must be educated and taught to understand the rules and traditions of the diplomatic service. When he was done I jumped in spoke more or less along the same lines. After I finished, the North Korean ambassador jumped in and made a little speech. While we had actually been joking, he as serious and furious. Following a little more discussion, we passed a resolution calling for the dean of the diplomatic corps, the Soviet member, to address all chiefs of mission reminding them of the rules and traditions and practices of diplomacy. Specifically, all chiefs of mission were enjoined to insure that their subordinates understood these rules and behaved as required of responsible diplomats. All this was directed towards the Soviet ambassador, of course.

The only real result to come out of that exercise, other than we had had a good time, was that I could later take cigarettes off the North Korean ambassador who up until then would not even shake hands with me. (I was giving up cigarettes at that time - unless, of course, someone offered me one.)

Speeches at the national party conventions: Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde were independent countries with their own government structures, but they had a joint political party - the PAIGC, Amilcar Cabral’s party. The president of G-B was the president of the PAIGC party and the president of Cape Verde, Pereira, was the vice president. They used to have national conventions. Now, I mentioned before that the Guinea-Bissauans and the Cape Verdeans are African and Latin by culture, and the leadership had grown up in a Communist political culture. Remember all three of those environments have what we would call in an Anglo-Saxon community, diarrhea of the mouth. They all believe in and practice rhetoric. One year President Cabral spoke at the joint national party convention for ten and a half hours over two days. The next year President Pereira spoke for twelve and a half hours in one day. My Portuguese colleague and I made it a point of honor to stick right through it, the end.
Q: Were your eyes open?

MARKS: I wouldn't swear to that. Not all the time. But other people bugged out. Pereira gave his speech in one day while Cabral gave it in two days. It was incredible and I can't remember a single word that was said.

Dress. Now being proper Africans, leftists, and freedom fighter types, the slogan of the party was "À Luta Continua" (The fight continues) and they, of course, wore a version of the African safari suit in Bissau. I used to notice, however, that when they got into an airplane to go to Lisbon for delegations they all wore black suits, white shirts, dark ties, just like the Portuguese. Then I noticed something really funny. One day I went out to the airport (this was in Cape Verde, not Guinea-Bissau) and I found the foreign ministry crowd out there in black suits, white shirts and dark tie and asked what was going on. They replied "The Senegalese are coming." The Senegalese are very formal, very French. Apparently once the Cape Verdeans had gone out to meet a Senegalese delegation who got off the airplane in French cut suits, ties and jackets, and there they were slopping around in their safari suits, terribly embarrassed. From then on they would wear safari suits at home except when the Senegalese were coming.

The CIA in their search for Cubans. This was a time when the Cubans were very busy in Angola, very active in Africa. The CIA, being pushed by the White House, had launched a major campaign to recruit Cubans. We did not have a CIA station in Guinea-Bissau; we were too small I suppose. I had been there about a year and a half when we got word that Washington wanted to send in a CIA officer on TDY [temporary duty] to look around and see if he could do some recruiting. There was in fact a large Cuban presence there; the Cubans having been very helpful and supportive to the PAIGC in its independence struggle. The Cuban ambassador, a lady in fact, was very well thought of around town. We didn't mix with the Cubans much, obviously, but we certainly noticed how well they were tied into the local government.

I replied to Washington's query confirming that there was a big Cuban embassy in the country, but commented that we were unlikely to be able touch them because this was a small, intimate, goldfish bowl sort of place. I didn't think you could do it. Washington didn't agree and informed me that they were sending an officer from London who spoke good Spanish. He would come down for an administrative TDY to help us do this and that, etc.

So, he gets off the plane and the first day says he would like to make some contacts and asked how to do so. I said he could play tennis if he played. He did, so off we went. Two or three days later he told me that he had made contact with a Soviet diplomat and that should lead him to some Cubans. I asked him who he had met and when he gave me the name I couldn't help but laugh. I explained, "You know, everybody in town knows our new friend as the Western contact guy in the Soviet embassy." My young CIA colleague said, "Oh, no, that couldn't be true." He insisted that he had made a good contact, and that the Soviet didn't know who he was. The two of them proceeded for the next two weeks to go out fishing on Sundays and see each other a lot in between. I told the CIA officer, "Look, you
were picked up before you even left London, or at least when you got off the plane here. You are being played by them. You haven't found them, they found you." He refused to admit it, but after about three and a half weeks he came in to my office and said that he really could not manage to meet a Cuban. He then sent a message off to his headquarters requesting permission to go home, and off he went. That was the great Cuban recruiting episode by the CIA in Guinea-Bissau.

There were lots of incidents but here is one that was really very Lawrence Durrell. The new minister of foreign affairs decided he would have an annual diplomatic dinner. So, he arranged one at the hotel.

Q: You are talking about the North Koreans, the Cubans, and there must have been some others with whom we didn't have relations.

MARKS: We'll get to the political side later.

The dinner was going to be outside by the swimming pool, which hadn't been cleaned in years. All the diplomatic chiefs of mission - all 14 of us - showed up. The Soviet came not only with his wife but two aides who were not given seats. There was a big fuss about that. We all sat down around this table next to the swimming pool, in the dark African night with light coming from the windows of the hotel dining room. There were bugs all over the place. After we were settled, or less, the Foreign Minister got up to speak but the lights went out, in the hotel and all over the city. But, he was prepared and had an aide with a flashlight who held it over his shoulder while his read his speech. We sat there in the dark next to an empty swimming pool on a hot African night while the Foreign Minister of Guinea-Bissau read a classic and meaningless diplomatic speech - long, in the Latin fashion - by the light of a flashlight while the mosquitoes buzzed and numerous wild cats roamed around and scrounged for food. The Chinese ambassador passed around a little tin of anti-bug ointment and all went pretty well, considering, except that the wife of the Brazilian Ambassador was bitten by one of the cats. That was the first government sponsored diplomatic dinner in Guinea-Bissau. I reported on it by dispatch; I just couldn’t resist not doing so.

Anyway, those are a few incidents illustrating the type of place it was. As I said, we were largely involved in administrative questions, trying to get along and build up our resources and facilities. It was all essentially boring but there were periodic surrealistic incidents and events.

Okay, now the place. Guinea-Bissau is a small West African country, with a long connection with Europe as the Portuguese had gotten there in about 1460. This was part of the legacy of Prince Henry the Navigator and the great period of Portuguese exploration when they changed the world. They created the First World empire and created the first lasting connections between Europe and the rest of the world. When the Portuguese were done, the world was tied together in a way that it never had been before and remained so. The Portuguese began rounding the coast of Africa in the early 1400s and hit Cape Verde about 1446 or so. That is about the time that Constantinople fell to the Ottoman Turks.
They established themselves in Cape Verde and then moved on to the African coast and there is at least one fort in Guinea-Bissau that dates back to the late 1400s. Then they continued down the coast. So, the Portuguese had been in Guinea-Bissau a long time.

But, what you had in Bissau was a mixed society with three major elements: the Cape Verdeans, a mestizo people from Cape Verde, the local mestizos, and pure Africans. Interestingly, the frontier between the Moslem north and the animist-Christian south ran right through the country. Historical records showed that Islam had been working its way down the continent for centuries, and that there were really no Moslems in G-B until sometime during the last half of the last century. Now, in the last half of the 20th century, Senegal to the north and Guinea-Conakry to the west and south were almost completely Moslem while Guinea-Bissau was about 40% Muslim or so. This was a process of conversion, no immigration. Despite centuries of Portuguese rule and the existence of a relatively small Christian mulatto class, the general population remained animist or traditional until converted to Islam.

The leadership class was basically Cape Verdean, an upper class of society of ten thousand or so who had, as a group, been in Guinea-Bissau for centuries. The existence of this class gave rise to the observation that Guinea-Bissau really had been colonized not by the Portuguese but by the Cape Verdeans. Under the leadership of Amilcar Cabral, a very interesting and sympathetic character, it was the G-B Cape Verdians in cooperation with exile Cape Verdians from the Cape Verde Island which fought the anti-colonial war.

It is interesting to note in Guinea-Bissau, this tiny little spit of land, the Portuguese had close to 60,000 troops and were losing. By the time the Portuguese rebellion occurred in 1974, Amilcar Cabral and the PAIGC literally controlled two thirds of the territory of the country, night and day. They actually administered it. Meanwhile, in Angola, where the Portuguese had about the same number of troops they were never seriously threatened by the rebellion. They controlled the territory up until the revolution in Lisbon. But in Guinea-Bissau, the PAIGC was literally beating them on the ground. In fact, it is the only place in Africa where independence was really won on the battlefield, despite the fact that everybody now talks about liberation struggles. Guinea-Bissau is the only place where armed insurrection actually succeeded, where the African guerilla group was actually winning on the ground. Even in Rhodesia the struggle was won politically although the armed struggle certainly had an impact.

So, the Bissauans were very proud of themselves and the memory of their victory was what gave them a tremendous sense of confidence. As a liberation movement, they were very close to the Cubans, the Palestine Liberation Movement and other liberation movements. As in the case of all of these movements, the Soviets had provided at least morale support and now after independence the Cuban, Soviet, Chinese, East German and North Korean embassies were very prominent in our little city, as well as PLO mission with full diplomatic status. There were resident ambassadors from Portugal, Brazil, Egypt, Guinea-Conakry, Zaire, and, of course, us. There was a French embassy headed by a Charge d'Affaires, and Swedish embassy staffed with aid types. And yet, I found when I got there that their communist identification, their affiliation with the East in terms of the
Cold War, had been clearly very instrumental. If you were a liberation movement, where else do you get help? You got it from the Left, from the Soviet side of the Cold War. After all, the Americans and the West weren't really going to help you. So, although several years after independence the Guinea-Bissauan government still used all the terminology of the liberation movements of the Left and were still talking about setting a state economy, you could see the beginning of a shift. Their commitment to revolutionary ideology was clearly not held by all down to bedrock. I was able to see shifts in their alliances while I was there. We tried to work on it as best we could. We had a USAID program, tried to establish the Peace Corps and while there was some initial standoffishness, we could see it melting. So, we worked on that melting for the three years I was there.

At the same time, after I was there about a year, we finally opened up the embassy at Praia, Cape Verde and put in a resident chargé, and a staff of about 10 Americans, including a USAID staff. You will remember that I was accredited to both countries and had made periodic trips to Praia. The idea was that I would remain in residence in Bissau but travel periodically to Praia, with my DCM acting as Charge between my visits. In Praia we went through the same problems as in Bissau, concern for administration and boredom. Although Praia had a few beaches, it was still difficult getting along on the local economy.

By the way, although Cape Verde is what it is called, it is basically a group of desert islands. I have never seen such blasted territory in my life. Island after island looked like a Sahara desert. It is a hard, hard place. Cape Verde is not really an African country although obviously it has a large and important African component to its culture and population. It is more of a back-woods provincial Portuguese province. It is poor, not much better off than most Africans, but it is a mulatto country. Every Cape Verdean is a mulatto. You never see anybody who looks like a full European Portuguese, whatever that means, and you rarely saw anybody who looks pure African. Everybody is clearly of a mixed interracial background. Cape Verde was a group of uninhabited islands when the Portuguese arrived in 1450 or so. They settled some Portuguese and began to import African slaves, first to work on the islands then as transits to Brazil and the New World. Over the generations the population mixed, but the essential culture is Portuguese. The native language is Crioulo, a Portuguese variant, and a culture, including music, which is clearly part of the wider Portuguese world.

Being a poor country with little in the way of natural resources, they have long followed the path of immigration. There are more Cape Verdeans in the capital of Senegal than there are in the capital of Cape Verde. There certainly are more Cape Verdeans in Lisbon than there are in most of the Cape Verde islands. And there easily as many people who claim to be Cape Verdeans in the United States than there are in the Cape Verde islands. I think I noted earlier that the Guinea-Bissau merchant and leadership class was largely Cape Verdean, and I remember a Cape Verder who was an FSN in Luanda, after he had left Macao.

MARKS: Yes, mostly in New England.
Q: Many worked in cranberry agriculture.

MARKS: That's right. And as fishermen. The Portuguese community of New England is split actually into three parts: Cape Verdeans, the largest number, Azoreans and Portuguese from Portugal. When I was ambassador, there were 300,000-350,000 Cape Verdeans in Cape Verde and there were over 350,000 in the United States. Every Cape Verdean - it seemed - has a family member in the U.S.

When the Portuguese prime minister visited the United States, I joined him in Boston briefly. At one point during the visit, one of his young military aides said "Mr. Minister, may I go home for dinner?" His father lived in Boston.

The Cape Verdeans are a hardworking people with a very traditional Portuguese work ethic. The Cape Verdean diaspora community is a major source of income for the islands.

Q: Did this translate into Senator Kennedy...?

MARKS: Yes, there was a small American congressional group, a couple of senators and a couple of congressmen, who were interested in Cape Verde. Kennedy was one and the most prominent senator.

The origin of the American Cape Verde community is very interesting. It dates back to the late 18th century with the American whaling industry. The whalers would leave New England ports for the center of the Atlantic, around the Cape Verde islands, to begin their hunting. They would leave New England with minimal sailing crews, and fill up their crews with Cape Verdeans. Then they would go hunting for whales and drop off most of the Cape Verdeans on the way home to New England. But a few Cape Verdeans stayed aboard and the first Cape Verdean became an American citizen, I think, in 1812. Since then the community has grown to where there are more Cape Verdeans in the United States than in the Cape Verde islands. This meant nobody in Cape Verde was very anti-American, despite the Third World ideology and rhetoric of the government. Too many ties to the U.S. On the island of Brava, which had been the major port of call in the whaling days and where everyone had relatives in the U.S., there was an effort to rebuild - as a memorial to the immigrants - a sailing ship which had carried Cape Verdeans to the U.S. as late as the 1920s.

Q: Well, this was the Carter Administration which was trying to learn to live with Soviets and others, not as hard line, but at the same time very strong on human rights. How did that translate for you all?

MARKS: In terms of human rights, we were not faced with any serious problems. Both of the governments were Party run and I wouldn't call them particularly democratic. They were still in their "revolutionary" mood but they were not very heavy handed. There were not a lot of people in jail, and those who were in jail in Guinea-Bissau were in for clearly in for criminal not political reasons. It is important to note that a few years later the first democratic government turnover in Africa occurred in Cape Verde. The PAIGC lost the
election, obviously an honest one, and President Pereira quietly handed the keys over to his opponent.

Q: So you didn't have to run around and make representations?

MARKS: No, because neither of these governments were egregious abusers in any way. I won't call them democratic societies, but they were very relaxed. There was not a human rights problem.

There was also general sympathy for them, partly because of the interest of the congressional group. We were fairly generous on AID, although I have forgotten the amounts. We had more trouble getting them to accept it than we did getting money to do it, because they were still in their revolutionary mood. We had ideological differences with the layer of party militants in the government, but they were being joined and diluted by others and the atmosphere was starting to mellow.

We were competing in the Cold War context, competing against the large Soviet, Cuban, and East German presence. Even the soldiers marched with a Soviet goose-step. The air force was equipped with MiGs (three only, however, and rarely flyable). Nevertheless, it was all rather laid back. I got along quite well with my Soviet colleague, but not with the Cuban who wouldn't mix at all. I told you how the North Koreans and I finally established a degree of minimal cordiality. The East German was reasonably friendly. The PLO and I stayed away from each other, but we got along rather well with the Chinese-language being as big a hindrance as politics. It was just not a terribly contentious environment. We, in the American embassy, working closely with our Portuguese colleagues, were trying to quietly massage them and move them back towards their connection with Portuguese culture and their Western roots, and it was working. The Cape Verdeans are particularly bourgeois in attitude. So, although the international context was very Cold War, the atmosphere was not terribly dramatic but rather low keyed.

Q: Did you have any problems with UN votes or did you just go through the motions?

MARKS: To some degree we just went through the motions, after all, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde were small fish in the UN world, but I was working with them. Also, as a newly independent government that they felt a sense of obligation as well as affiliation with those who had been their allies and had provided help during their liberation struggle. That group did not include us. In a sense they were paying off debts by supporting Third World or Group of 77 positions in the UN, for instance, in support of Palestinian positions. Certainly as small, poor, newly independent African countries they were more at home with that group. You know, that is what new governments, at least at the beginning, until the realities of running a real government began to impact. We could see some of them in the government starting to appreciate the realities of actually governing a country... not all of them, but some.

The most radical man in the government, ideologically speaking, was the Minister of Development, a well-known, recognized, and self-admitted communist. Remember, the
government did not identify itself or consider itself to be communist; socialist maybe but not communist. But Minister Cabral was, but of a specific type. He was a classic Western European, in this case Lisbon, radical. However, he was also the government official who adopted tennis quicker than anybody else and used to show up at the court in Jimmy Connor sweat suits and three rackets. He cheated too, by the way, on the tennis court. I once saw him in an amusing situation on flight between Cape Verde and Bissau. International traffic between Bissau and the outside world was largely in the hands of the Portuguese airline TAP, which had only one class on its 707 flights between Bissau, Praia, and Lisbon. But they also arranged that two center rows had more space than the others, by taking out a row of seats. These rows were informally reserved for VIPs. For instance, the Soviet ambassador would always send his young thugs on board to grab one row before he got on. Anyways, one day my wife and I got on in Lisbon and got our seats in the "VIP" section. However when our communist minister arrived with his family he found that all the seats were taken. I just sat there and watched him, dressed in his European tweed jacket with the academic leather patches, focus on an obviously lower class Guinean sitting in one of the seats in effort to talk him out of the seat. But Senhor Average Citizen was being difficult. We watched the minister walk up and down the aisle getting more and more excited. He really wanted to pull rank. Finally he called the stewardesses and did pull rank: the communist Minister of Development was going to throw a member of the proletariat out of his seat. Great fun to watch. But the incident was sort of revealing; even the most militant were mellowing, especially in Cape Verde. This development was easy to watch as the small size of the Guinean and Cape Verdean societies made for very intimate politics. The politics we were observing was more or less like that.

The economic situation was interesting because both countries were not only newly independent, but were also poor and clearly needed economic assistance. For instance, Cape Verde got along on three things: receipts from Cape Verdeans from outside (at one time we figured there was close to 5,000 Cape Verdeans serving as crewmen on Western cruise ships), foreign aid, and a yearly check from South African Airways for the use of the international airport on Sal Island. Sal is basically a dirt aircraft carrier and the only thing on it is Cape Verde's international airport. South African Airways stops there on the way to and from Europe. Cape Verde came under criticism from other Africans for permitting this, but they answered, "We need the money" and continued permitting the flights. You would go to Sal airport and often see a South African Airways plane land on its way to or from Europe. About the only other international flights you might see would be a Cuban airplane carrying 300 tourists to Angola, all young males. Together they made an interesting clientele.

So, we were trying to push development aid in Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau: the usual stuff - roads, irrigation, agriculture, water conservation. In Cape Verde AID was studying how to build dams to conserve water in a semi-desert. Cape Verde was in the tenth year of a drought which went on for another four years before it broke. I think since then has gone into drought again. Guinea-Bissau, on the other hand, is very full of water, with lots of rice and peanuts growing. It also had marvelous offshore fishing waters rich with crabs and shrimp. However they had signed a deal with the Soviets in the flush of the immediate post-independence enthusiasm, and the Russians were now busily vacuum cleaning the
coast. When we were in Bissau you could only buy small fresh water shrimp gathered by peasant women; the big sea water gambas were gathered up by the Russian-Guinea joint fishing venture and shipped to Sweden for freezing, from whence they were sold in Western Europe for hard currency. Some of the frozen shrimp were brought back for sale to the diplomatic community and the local "nomenklatura." The real scandal, however, was that the joint venture company somehow never made any profit, and the G-B government never received any benefits. By the time I arrived in Bissau, four years after independence, the G-B was attempting to get out of this deal, but was still torn between its old feelings of gratitude for political support in the freedom-fighting days and its new irritation at being robbed. This opened up discussions on possible USG assistance in fishery management, and specifically technical assistance by the U.S. Coast Guard. However those discussions never produced any concrete results; the major problem being lack of funds to finance a Coast Guard assistance program. Still, it indicated how the G-B government was beginning to revise its view of the world.

We were in the back waters of the Cold War really. Even the Soviets and the Cubans in Bissau knew that. The local government considered itself revolutionary but was slowly starting to mellow and change. We were all interested in economic development but it was easier said than done. These people were trying to figure out what it meant to be independent, what do you do now that you win. And how to deal with a very strong Portuguese culture legacy.

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Q: Today is November 6, 1996. Ed, you said you had a couple of comments you wanted to make.

MARKS: These may be repeats but I was thinking about them last night and would like to go over them again. I would like to emphasize again the number of multiple pleasures which come with being chief of mission. It is an extraordinarily satisfying and gratifying activity to be in the field in that situation, even when you are in fact really out on the fringe of things, in the back of beyond so to speak, as I was. There was a sort of pleasure which I suppose artisans get, just in practicing your craft. Even if what I was doing was not connected with stories which reach the front page of the New York Times, I was out there practicing my profession. Even with no dramatic successes that to chalk up, one can leave a job like that with the satisfaction that you practiced your profession and did it reasonably well.

The experience was an interesting period for another reason. It was the last years of the period of kind of automatic, instinctive, emotional Washington sympathy for Africa which started with Kennedy and ran through the Carter years. At the end of the Carter period, and I left Bissau just about that time, there was no longer that automatic, almost ideological, emotional sympathy for Africa, which had marked our policy all through the sixties and the seventies. (Except maybe among the Africa crowd in the State Department and USAID) Washington didn't turn anti-African, but the Republicans had a different view of the world. I mentioned earlier that the Africa clique - or claque if you will - those who were almost
instinctively interested in Africa, come from the left side of the political spectrum by and large. The center and particularly the right is not necessarily anti-African, but is not emotionally interested and attuned to Africa. So with the end of the Carter period we entered a period where Washington no longer had an emotional attachment to the Third World in general and Africa in particular.

However we were still very much operating in context of the Cold War. And it was very much evident, even out there in Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau, that the tension in the American development program between development and politics was very alive. Generally we tried to do both.

I don't remember if I mentioned this before but since Guinea-Bissau was my last African post I think I should mention an interesting phenomena of ex-colonies, at least in Africa. That is the very strong emotional and cultural ties which remain after independence between the ex-colony and the former colony country. Have I mentioned that before?

Q: Well, you talked about the dress, etc.

MARKS: Well, it is stronger than that. You find it among all the former European colonies in Africa: the French, the Portuguese, the British and the Belgians. The fact is the former metropolitan capital is their idea of what the big world is really like. They may have gone to school there, or if not, they had an education which focused on it. Many still have family or relatives back in the metropole; would be sending their children to school there if possible, and still follow the fashions (all sorts) from there.

I noticed the continuing existence and strength of this tie when granting cultural visitor grants. When arranging such trips, and I have been involved in doing so in every one of my African postings, you would try to find out what the prospective visitor would like to do and see in the U.S. As the final plans fell into place, there would always come that moment before departure when the visitor would say, "By the way, on my way home, would it be possible to connect through London (or Lisbon, Brussels)?" They were going to the States, which was a very dramatic and exciting adventure, but they also wanted to go to the "real world," the former metropolitan capital. It was, I suppose, a classic love-hate relationship. This phenomena partially explains why the French can continue to play an important role in Africa. Remember De Gaulle's famous remark when he was told that Sekou Toure had turned down the offer to be part of the new francophone Community - "Poor man, he will never see Paris again." We in the U.S. have tended to assume that the former colonial peoples hated and wanted nothing to do with their former colonial power, but in fact, it is often just the other way around.

As I mentioned previously, it was interesting to see, especially in Cape Verde, the waning of revolutionary ardor, the first signs of materiel privileges for those at the top, privileges not available to everybody, and of not feeling embarrassed by it. The situation hadn't quite yet reached serious corruption, but that may be coming.

One last comment, unfortunately a sad way to end. I had a problem with a member of the American staff. The consular officer in Cape Verde, the junior FSO, was extremely
difficult in all sorts of way. She was difficult professionally and personally, for me and for the other members of the staff - especially the DCM, who was chargé much of the time. I won't go into all of them, but I did get rather upset when I arrived in Cape Verde on one of my regular visits, and found that she had refused to give a visa to the Cape Verdean Foreign Minister unless he called for it personally at the Embassy. She was quite unapologetic and often refused to accept any instructions or guidance. The situation dragged on for months. It turned out she had a previous history of problems at other posts and was in her last year of probation as an untenured officer. One of the last things I did in Cape Verde was to write the supervising officer's review of her efficiency report. The rating officer, the DCM/chargé, said he could not recommend her for tenure and I supported him. I wrote a very specific recommendation against granting her tenure. When I left post for the U.S. I took along about six inches of documents I figured I would need when she filed her grievance. I expected an unpleasant experience but was prepared to do it because she was so unsuited for Foreign Service. To my surprise, the grievance was never filed. I later learned she was given a one year extension on her probation and eventually granted tenure. Very disappointing given a documented file of professional and personal problems over the whole five year probation period. Clearly the powers that be were unwilling to bite the bullet and deny tenure to a candidate with three claims to special treatment: gender, color, and disability.

Q: Normally when something like this happens it turns out the person is a minority rather than a woman.

MARKS: She is a triple minority.

Q: A white female officer would not have gotten that.

MARKS: Probably not. As I said, it was not just her performance in the one or two years she had been with us in Cape Verde. She had a long record of difficulty. It was disappointing the system was so unable to deal with an officer clearly unfit for the Foreign Service. Despite a documented record all they could do was extend her probation for a year and then grant her tenure. It was a sad commentary.

Q: It does reflect the times. There was tremendous pressure on the part of the Department of State to get more minorities. At that time, and probably still today, there was so much fear of showing racial prejudice that the Department of State would essentially not enforce its own regulations in order to avoid difficulty. This gave the officers in the field a very difficult time. For example, carrying these documents because you thought you would end up in court having to defend your decision. After Guinea-Bissau you went where?

MARKS: I went to the National War College.

Q: You were there from when to when?

Q: Was that at Fort McNair?

MARKS: Yes, Fort McNair here in Washington.

Q: Can you talk a bit about the atmosphere and what you got out of that?

MARKS: The National War College is a senior military educational school for selected lieutenant colonels and colonels and their naval equivalents; selection does not guarantee promotion to flag rank in the military but is a prerequisite. Those who go to the senior war colleges are the pool from which flag officers are later drawn. The National War College is particularly interesting because, from its founding in 1945 it had a State Department connection. George Kennan was the first vice president of the National War College, and that was deliberate. Apart from the VP, the faculty always has included a few FSOs. One fourth of my class at the NWC was civilian officials, of whom almost half were FSOs or FSRs [Foreign Service representatives] from State, USIA, or USAID. There were also representatives from other agencies, like the CIA and the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation]. A lot has been written about the experience of going to the War College, particularly by FSOs and I think we mostly agree it is a fascinating experience. It is, by the way, enormously amusing, gratifying and occasionally unsettling for former corporals like myself to spend time in intimate collegiality with full colonels.

Q: I know, as an airman first class I used to have a hard time when I used to go to NATO Headquarters.

MARKS: Exactly. We were at Fort McNair, where the War College is located, for about nine months. During the first few days or so of checking in and registration, we civilians were somewhat bemused and confused by the military atmosphere, until someone said to relax and reminded us that the military would walk us through the whole process: tell us what is coming up, tell us when it is coming up, will tell us it is here and finally tell us what had just happened in case you missed it. You don't really have to do anything but float along with the flow. Somehow the system and the process will get you where you have to be. And so it proved.

The 1980-81 academic year at the War College was, we later found out, the end of an era. The controlling academic theory at Fort McNair, up to and through that year, was that the year was supposed to be a sort of sabbatical for promising military officers. It was not intended to be demanding in an academic sense, with a heavy load of work and tests, but rather a year in which the selected officers were to be offered an opportunity to step back, think, muse, and reflect. Maybe even spend time with their families and explore some new interests. The idea was that they were moving into a different stage of their career, senior officer as compared with their professional life up to then as operators. In a sense they had been order takers up to then, and were to be given time to catch their breath before they became order givers.

We were given an extensive reading list, books as well as well as lots of faxed materiel. We had classes most week days, all in the discussion mode, interspersed with guest lecturers.
The schedule was organized so that we had Fridays off, and most afternoons. It was not an arduous schedule and we all drifted through the year. In later years, the War College moved towards recreating itself as a degree granting institution.

The military officers responded in various ways. Some were restless by the change of pace from their hard charger days as ambitious officers, but most eventually adjusted to the program, some more cynically than others.

The civilians took all this in stride, by and large, and generally enjoyed our military classmates and the exposure to military culture. My feeling was the FSOs became part of the faculty in a sense. There was a lot of military stuff in the curriculum and that was new and interesting to most of us. But there was also lot of national policy which most of us knew a lot about. The foreign policy stuff was mostly new to our military classmates, and it constituted a good deal of the purpose of the school from the military perspective. So, in many respects we were a resource of information. As a group we are fairly articulate and talkative, so you would find in most classes the FSOs talked - I would hope also contributed - a lot.

We all got along pretty well, although there was a certain amount of mutual incomprehension between the two cultures. Having a chance to mingle with the military was constructive and useful for us civilians and I can only hope the same was true on the other side. I believe it was for some but not for all. They left the War College with the same view of civilians that they entered with. Without going into great detail, I suppose it could be summed up in the observation that the military were mostly mid-West Republicans while the civilians were East Coast Democrats. The military, nevertheless, shared with us one important characteristic: a sense of commitment and duty to the Republic. It isn't all about personal advancement and doing your lawn on weekends. They also have a commitment, by and large, to institutions and concerns outside of personal careerism. Of course, they are also ambitious as we are, but life is not just how much money to make this week, and can I get a bigger house. It also concerns a commitment to an institution, their Service, and above that the Republic and the security of that Republic. Those considerations are an important part of their life, as it is ours. This is what really distinguishes us from people in the private sector. Therefore, although there were real differences between civilian government and the military, there was this attitude which helped bridge it. If a debate got out of hand over differing perspectives, reminding the military of that was always salutary; it brought them around to the realization that others were also patriotic and disciplined.

Although the mixture in and outside the classroom contributed to some growth in mutual understanding, the real differences between the culture of the Foreign Service and the culture of the military of course persisted. After all, military officers are, by and large classic Type As: very energetic, goal oriented, concrete thinkers.

Q: Could you explain what you mean by Type A?

MARKS: Type A refers to a psychological testing process which characterizes people into
various categories A, B, C, and D. Type A are goal-driven, hard working, self-driven individuals. A workaholic would be an extreme Type A. The military career seems to put a premium on those sorts of people, and they like to view themselves as such. The arch-typical military officer is a Type A person.

The military, by the nature of their profession, by the nature of their culture, are constantly concerned with how do you dominate a situation, how do you control a situation. You win a battle, you win a war by mobilizing your concrete resources in order to eliminate chance as much as possible and control the situation and obtain a determined result in a given period of time, in a given place, in a given situation.

This approach or perspective is, of course, completely different from the Foreign Service and what diplomats do. We operate in a non-ending situation, as foreign policy will never be resolved or completed. We deal in a world where the other nation states are, like our own country, immortal creatures and we are concerned with process almost as much as with results. Personally we know there will be another tour, another assignment, another set of problems. Many Foreign Service and foreign policy problems are challenges you manage and live with, you don't usually resolve them.

So, the whole gestalt of the Foreign Service and the military are completely different. Not that one is right and the other wrong; they are just different. These are different professional cultures derived from the world we live in and the work we do.

No military man wants to have a 30 or 50 year war, but Foreign Service people can live very comfortably with a 30, 40, or 50 year relationships and challenges - witness the Cold War.

Having this class of cultures at the War College was very interesting, and very amusing. Before I went to McNair, a colleague, Ted Briggs, described to me how he had found the characteristics of the various services when he attended the NWC; a characterization which I found to be essentially true. He said the Air Force types were young, relatively good looking, very technologically oriented, very quick and very shallow. The Navy are the most insular, the most provincial. The Marines are the quirkiest and often the most intellectual, and the Army the most like us, that is, most like civilian officers of the foreign affairs agencies. I found Ted's observations - as generalizations - to be quite accurate.

Q: Was the Vietnam war sort of over as far as the military was concerned or was there still a feeling that the government had let us down?

MARKS: My classmates of the NWC Class of 1981 were, of course, the Vietnam era professional military. They were now colonels and lieutenant colonels, navy captains and commanders but they had been lieutenants, captains, and - rarely - majors in Vietnam. They were the ones who had stayed in after Vietnam, they were the long-term professionals. For my term paper I did an interview study of my military classmates on their attitudes towards their services, the military in general, their career, Vietnam, etc. The most widespread reaction I obtained was the feeling they had that they had been let down, been deserted, by the public, by politicians, but most importantly by their own senior military
leaders. They felt their own seniors had not fulfilled their professional responsibility to explain to the political leadership what was really going on in Vietnam. To explain to the President openly and honestly what was necessary to win, why we were there. My classmates by and large charged their own senior leadership with having failed in their responsibility to their own men and to the nation by allowing careerism to get in the way of really speaking out and leading the services in Vietnam.

By and large I came up with unexciting observations, but I did find one particularly interesting. I asked if, among military regulars, there was anything like the German army response towards the First World War...a feeling they had been stabbed in the back, had been betrayed ...and was told there was none. Certainly there was no wavering in any way of the traditional American military acceptance of subordination to civilian control. There certainly was a sense of unhappiness about what had happened, both the war and its affect on the military services, and a desire to rebuild and restore, and a fervent desire to do it better next time, but no sense of having been betrayed. The traditional American military/civilian relationship was intact.

I found my military colleagues to be impressive people. They cared about their profession, about their Service, about their responsibilities. They had a sense of mission.

Q: I think this is an important element. I think it comes from our generation who served in the military and always viewed officers with a certain amount of distrust and standoffishness. But, at the same time you understood you were all in the game together, and when we came into the Foreign Service we had the same ethos, etc.

Unfortunately a new generation is coming up which has not had that same appreciation of the military and tends to look down upon them. One has to work at that and make sure there is an appreciation.

MARKS: I think you are quite right. Our generation was more sympathetic to more traditional concepts, for all sorts of reasons. I don't know what the new crowd feels like. Yet the military has made a real come back from the Vietnam days. They are now widely respected in American communities.

I was looking back at my article the other day and what struck me again was that these were people who had a sense of mission other than personal. They were people who cared. And, of course, it was gratifying for them to be at the War College because it was a mark of professional note and esteem. Most of them did not go on to be generals, but it was from that crowd that generals would be picked, and selection for the War College was in itself a sign of professional recognition.

Q: One of the reasons the Foreign Service valued this experience is because you came out of there with increased appreciation for the dedication of our uniformed officer corps, meaning that you would do a better job later on in the Foreign Service understanding the other side of one of the very vital elements of our foreign policy apparatus.
MARKS: Yes, and I think it did. I never ran across any of our colleagues who had been to any of the war colleges who didn't feel that they had learned a lot, had obtained some important insight and were therefore much more comfortable and able to work with the military. Having said that, I don't think one can in anyway claim that the State Department as an institution has benefited much from this relationship. Our institutional relationships with the military are appalling. We pride ourselves on being institutional interlocutors, the links between our government and other governments. But intergovernmentally we are terrible. We just don't deal well with the Department of Defense at all. For instance, how we have handled political advisors to CINCs (regional commander-in-chiefs) is a long history of wasted opportunities. So, we participate in the War College, we do assign political advisors, and we do conduct an exchange program with DOD, but we do it because it is required rather than seeing it as an opportunity for the State Department and the Foreign Service to do our job better as an institution, not merely as individuals.

Q: Then you left in 1981 and went where?

MARKS: I left in the summer of 1981 without an onward assignment. I was clearly a bit of an assignment problem. I had been an ambassador as an 0-3 and made 0-2 (a present OC [senior pay grade]) just after arrival at the War College. Usually one became an ambassador after going to a war college, but I had been sent to the NWC as a place to park me. There had been some difficulty between myself and the Assistant Secretary and no other jobs were available for me at the time. There still did not seem to be one, so Personnel sent me over to the Bureau of Public Affairs where I was the director of a brand new office dealing with intergovernmental affairs. This was the beginning of the Reagan Administration and he was interested in decentralizing the federal government, and having the federal government work more with state and local governments. The idea was to set up a little office in Public Affairs which would reach out and be part of the network of intergovernmental relationships between the federal and local governments under the leadership of the White House. Someone in the White House had been appointed specifically to do that.

At first there was just myself and a secretary. Later I was given an assistant, a rather attractive political appointee from western Pennsylvania. It was all early days for this approach. We would go to large meetings at the White House, try to sort things out, and set up some programs showing where we were going. I did this for about two or three months and then a more appealing job came to me. Ambassador Robert Sayre, who was Director of Counter-Terrorism, had a project which he offered me: to design and organize a new program for anti-terrorism assistance. The purpose would be to assist other countries in the expansion and augmentation of their capacity to fight terrorism. Remember, this was at the height of the terrorism scare.

Q: How long were you there?

MARKS: From January 1982 to 1985, about 3 and a half years. The background to this project was interesting because of the widespread general concern about the spread of terrorism... Munich, the Red Brigades, etc... all over the world. The USG was very
exercised. Diplomatic security programs were expanded and Ambassador Bob Sayre, as the Director for Counterterrorism Programs, was supposed to expand the program. He came up with this idea of providing training assistance to other governments. Now, you may remember USAID’s Public Safety program, a police training program, which had become one of the quote scandals unquote of Vietnam. USAID had been involved in training police in Latin America, and some of those country programs where the governments where less than democratic had come under attack. As the Vietnam war expanded, the Public Safety Program was also expanded and came under a great deal of criticism. Eventually Congress decided to prohibit all U.S. government involvement in civilian police training and assistance anywhere in the world.

The government's counterterrorism had a number of aspects - military, intelligence - but it was also felt that civilian authorities - police, airport authorities, customs, etc. - were also very important and had been neglected, especially since the end of USAID’s Public Safety Program. I was given the tasks of taking this general instruction from the White House and turn it into an operational program of some sort. There were the usual questions of scope and function What was it going to cost? What kind of staffing did we need? Then we had to figure out a legislative strategy including drawing up draft legislation. So, I entered on three and a half years of some of the most satisfying time I spent in the Foreign Service. It was and is rare to get to do something almost all by yourself. I had a tremendous sense of ownership of the Anti-terrorism Assistance Program.

I started out by myself, and then was assigned a secretary. Later a senior FSO, an old classmate of mind who was between jobs, was assigned temporarily to help me. There was very little movement. I spent the time doing research, for instance calling on the FBI, and drawing up preliminary plans. What would the program look like, what would it consist of and what would be its objectives? As it turned out, I was given a long time to work those issues out in my own mind. In this process I was meeting and dealing with the military and civilian equivalents of the people we would be dealing with overseas. I visited the special teams of the Washington police, the New York police department (which has very extensive SWAT [Special Weapons and Tactics] teams and intelligence operations), the Federal police training center in Glencoe, Georgia, the Los Angeles police, etc. So, I moved around and started to learn my way around this world so very different from diplomacy.

As I said, the first months were very quiet. We were not ready to go to Congress yet and so I was basically marking time. Finally we got the go-ahead and I drew up a fairly detailed proposal. I formulated a strategy which would focus on senior level crisis management rather than the sexy stuff: bomb squads and SWAT teams. I set down a basic principal: if you do not have senior level crisis management orientation - if you don't have somebody at the top who is responsible - it can be very difficult to effectively utilize shooters, demining experts, guards at the airport, etc. The technical experts must work for a national government with commitment, organization and understanding. So, I initiated an approach for an exchange program which would try to start by bringing multi-agency teams of senior officials from other governments to meet with their counterparts in our government and be introduced to the concept of crisis management at the senior level. From this we would
derive the required training and resources of institutions.

Q: *Is this driven at all by legislation that you couldn’t hand out guns and thumb screws, etc.?*

MARKS: Yes. But, on the other hand, we knew we could not just give theory courses to ministers of customs and immigration. We also needed to get into the nuts and bolts of operations and in some cases be able to offer technical assistance, to include training and possibly equipment. We had to be prepared to discuss the use of SWAT teams, demining, etc.

When we shifted gears and really began to move this program, the next stage was selling it on the Hill. I started a program of consultation with staff aides as there was great suspicion about police training programs, particularly on the Democratic side. In the drafting and working out of the legislation, a major question was that of equipment and arms. We succeeded in getting legislation which did authorize us transfer a limited amount of arms and related equipment under specified criteria. Most of all, the program was not to be exclusively or primarily an arms or equipment transfer program. But the legislation which we painfully worked out over the period of a year did say there is a place for equipment transfers in the program. So, in the end we got legislation which: (1) Exempted us from the general prohibition contained in Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act against dealing with foreign police forces. It enabled the federal government on a civilian level to deal with foreign police forces. (2) In doing so, we would be able to provide training, exchange orientation visits, provide training in American institutions at our expense (unless the other government involved paid); and (3) A budget. I think it began with $2 million and then went up to $5 million the second year.

So we got a package of particular legislation which exempted us from an existing legislative prohibition and authorized us to operate a specific program.

Q: *How does one get a package? Can you talk a bit about what you did and others did in order to get this legislation through?*

MARKS: Well, first we needed a general decision by the Administration that it wished to do this.

Q: *Did you have problems selling this to anybody within the Administration?*

MARKS: No. It was already Administration policy. The White House wanted to have this program. It had already sent word to the Republicans on the Hill, and the appropriate committees, that it would be introducing this program. It was then our job - Ambassador Sayre, myself, and people in Congressional Relations - to work with the Hill, mainly of course, the staffers. The Republicans were willing to approve this Administration proposal, but some Democrats were very opposed. There were, of course, members of Congress undecided, in the middle, not sure what we were talking about and so wanted their staff to work it out.
So, the main lobbyists were Sayre and myself. In fact, I did most of the daily work, both in the Department with Congressional Relations, the lawyers, and PM [Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs] and outside with other agencies like the FBI. Our major focus, was with the staff of the key senators and congressmen who cared about this subject - either pro or con - and over a period of time slowly drafted up legislation which was finally passed. The legislation is full of compromises, agreements, and careful qualifications and criteria put in by those who were very nervous about the whole concept. There were a few people on the Hill who were ideologically opposed to any involvement with foreign police. Many, however, on the Democratic side remembered the public safety problem and were concerned about it, but recognized a kind of general legitimacy of the proposal if it could be appropriately structured, protected and fenced off. They didn't want to see a return of USAID’s Public Safety program. So that is what we spent six months to twelve months doing and finally came up with this legislation which defined and authorized the program and provided the initial, first year funding. It is a nice, neat little piece of legislation of which I am very proud. With that my office was given more status and increased to eight or nine people.

With a program now in hand, we circulated a program description (a sort of sales brochure) to a selected list of embassies and upon receipt of expressions of interest from a number of countries, we then launched ourselves into a series of sales trips around the world. We went to the Arabian Gulf, to Portugal, England, Holland and Belgium in the first round.

Q: I would have thought the British, the Belgians, the Dutch would have had their own programs having had a lot of experience with terrorists.

MARKS: Yes, but there were two aspects to our approach. We carefully designed it so it would be not just a training program. It also had as its objectives the expansion of contacts and relationships between parts of government which normally did not have relationships with across national boundaries. So to a sophisticated country it was not that we were going to offer equipment and training, but how could our officials interact and expand cooperation with each other and exchange information and ideas. So we talked a lot about exchange visits. And then in some countries it would obviously lead to training assistance and equipment. We intended always to begin with the proposal to exchange experience and ideas, and with some countries it would remain at that level.

We began with a cable sent worldwide to Foreign Service posts announcing the program, explaining the various sorts of activities we were prepared to consider and asked for posts to inquire of their host government if they were interested and if so in what. Our contact travel plans then depended on the kind of responses we got from governments. For instance, we went to England and they in turn sent an exchange team to the U.S. You are right; they were of course very sophisticated on the subject and gave lectures to our people. The Italians also were quite experienced and I remember a marvelous presentation by the Italian delegation who visited us. This was shortly after their rescue of the American general, Dosher, who had been kidnaped by the Italian Red Brigade. The team that had actually rescued him came over as part of the Italian delegation and they gave a lecture on how they did it to a combined audience in Washington, including FBI agents. The best part
of their presentation was the revelation that their door breaking technology consisted of a
former Italian weight-lifting champion whose specialty was breaking down doors with
sledgehammers. (American units used a specialized explosive package.)

The strategy was to involve local government and local police a lot. So, the program was
intended to include a range of activities from exchange among professional colleagues,
personally and institutionally, shading into assistance in helping them get organized if that
was appropriate, to follow-on specialized training. We worked up a brochure of courses,
drawing on existing curriculum of various Federal and local institutions: the Federal
Aviation Training School out in Oklahoma, the Glencoe, Georgia Police Training Center,
the New York police, etc. By the end of the first year over 1,100 foreigners had come to the
United States in one capacity or another. And in the second year we went over 2,000
participants. I don't know what is happening now but I believe the budget soon went up to
$10 million and stabilized at that. So, we got going pretty fast once we got approval.

What I insisted on, because I thought it was the core activity which I tried to push with
every country, was to set up a meeting between senior people of our civilian agencies and a
similar delegation from that country. I believed that the trip to the United States of a big
group from some countries would be a useful, educational and informative function in
itself. I was playing on the old African "been-to" syndrome. Just having traveled abroad,
and especially to the U.S., confers a certain prestige. Also, we have all noticed that
delegations that travel together create a certain link among themselves, a certain
comraderie. I thought that in countries which lack high level integration and coherence just
getting a group of senior people together for a three week trip to the United States would
help form links among them which would lead to better coordination in the future.

I have long lost contact with the program, but it has continued, I understand, with the same
mixture of exchange among equals, and assistance where appropriate. It has improved
intelligence exchange, and has improved, hopefully, policy and management coherence
among at least some of the recipient countries. I note that in the annual counter-terrorism
report of the State Department, the ATA [Anti-terrorism Affairs] program is always
displayed up front with concrete figures.

Q: To look at this but keep it within the context of the time you were there, who were the
terrorists? What were we aiming at?

MARKS: The terrorist environment at that time, which has changed since, was heavily
focused on quite small, relatively discrete terrorist groups such as the Bader Meinhof in
Germany, the Red Brigade in Italy, the IRA [Irish Republican Army] in Northern Ireland,
the Red Army in Japan, some Middle Eastern groups and the Tupamaros in Latin America.
So, one found them everywhere. These were small groups of terrorist we used to classify
into three psychological categories: crooks, crazies and crusaders. The Intelligence
community was primarily responsible for going after them while we were concerned with
civilian issues such as protective measures in airports, security for individuals, and
assisting governments with a way of handling terrorist threats and incidents. At that time
the archetype incident was the blowing up or hijacking of an airplane. Therefore, for
instance, governments were all forming SWAT or hostage rescue squads to assault or rescue them.

Essentially, we were focusing, dealing with these relatively small, highly motivated terrorist groups, who were performing fairly discrete acts against states—the most dramatic being airplane hijacking at that time. The major analytical or intelligence argument that went on at the time was to determine to what degree they were operating on their own, and to what degree they were state supported. At one extreme there was what we called the Wurlitzer organ theory, which was that Moscow organized, trained, equipped, manipulated, and directed every one of these organizations around the world. The other extreme was that the Soviet Union had nothing to do with them at all, as they were all local, indigenous idealists. The answers produced by the intelligence community and most observers was usually muddled and in the middle. There certainly were states supporting terrorism, not only the Soviet Union but including others like Iraq. On the basis of this general assumption, we felt that governments could do a better job of dealing with these sorts of threats by better organization, better planning and more focus on the problems of a relatively small number of groups performing a limited number of terrorist acts intended to destabilize a local political situation. [Of course, from time to time, it appeared there] was some degree of international transnational support from certain governments and a consequent ability to move around some internationally.

Q: Did you have any problem as you identified these things because of the politics of the United States where the IRA, particularly in Massachusetts and New York, was not considered to be a terrorist group?

MARKS: To a certain degree, I must say we soft-pedaled the IRA. Only the British labeled them a terrorist organization. Everybody else tried to stay away from the issue. In the Middle East the United States has always maintained we are going to be neutral, albeit a little bit inclined towards Israel. Nevertheless we are going to support both sides, and terrorists, we argued, really didn't help anyone. So we were always able to square that circle. The problem in Latin America was that some of the governments are really quite unpalatable and that was a major problem in our discussions with Congress. Were we going to go and provide support for the secret police of non-democratic, nasty governments? We had to provide assurances that we wouldn't do that.

Q: Did you have an agreement that you weren’t going to play with Honduras, or something like that?

MARKS: Yes, although I have forgotten the specifics of how we avoided doing so. Most probably by our decisions not to send invitation telegrams to every post. There were some governments that we clearly did not send an offer to as we had no intention of getting involved with them.

Q: Did you have to do some prioritizing around saying something like Norway doesn’t have much of a problem so we won’t use our money there?
MARKS: To some degree, but remember, we structured the program so that we were very interested in having Norway participate, not as a recipient of our expertise but as a participant able to pay its own way. We would provide hospitality and a program, and we would hope they would invite us to visit them, in which case we would pay our way. The assumption was it wouldn't cost much with some countries, in that it would be a mutually financed exchange program. We worked with the geographic bureaus to identify good candidate countries. We also check with some local embassies to see if they thought their governments would be interested. So, there was a certain natural selection that took place based on interest, timing, availability, and who gets around to answering our mail.

Q: Were there any cases that you can mention where somebody came in and said they would be delighted to come and you wished they hadn’t or something like that?

MARKS: I can’t think of anybody offhand, in the first couple of years. But, as I said, we carefully did not send our invitation cables to very egregious cases.

Q: How did you handle senior crisis management?

MARKS: We tried to do this by having it flow naturally in the nature of the program. For instance, Portugal just a few years after its revolution was still a very unsettled country, in European terms. The threat of it going Communist was over, but just. They were very interested in our program and we proposed that their participation begin with a delegation of senior people from the civilian agencies that are concerned with terrorism and counter-terrorism...the foreign office if you wish, but also police, customs, immigration, airport and port authorities, and anybody else involved in these areas. They nominated a delegation which came to the United States for two weeks. By this approach, we felt we were encouraging them to think about who is involved in counterterrorism. Some of these officials had apparently never met before getting together as a delegation, even in a country as small as Portugal. We had that happen a couple of times. So, just organizing a delegation created a new dynamic in the government. At least we hoped so.

These senior level delegations came to the United States where we arranged a custom program for them. They generally went to the FBI Crisis Management Center, to the State Department Operations Center, etc. More importantly we emphasized how we were organized to deal with terrorism in an interagency fashion, at least in theory. I hope we did it in a way that made it clear that we hadn't solved all the problems but admitting that our theory was better than our practice. Also we said this was how we were going to do it, but did not attempt to set out our approach as a model for anyone else. We explained our interagency process: with State as the lead agency on international terrorism activities, and the FBI the lead on domestic terrorism. We tried to explain how the various agencies interact, use of interagency committees and boards, how intelligence is passed around, how we are doing training, etc. We provided a very extensive introduction to what we were doing, including an extensive exposure to our crisis management centers.

The program would then expand outside the federal government and Washington. We would arrange for them to meet outside experts in the field, academics, psychologists,
psychiatrists. We would take them to places like New York which is a very complicated environment and an accordingly complicated set of local agencies. The New York police are very sophisticated on the question of terrorism. They would usually visit the Federal Government Law Enforcement Training Center in Glencoe, Georgia, to show them cross training for agents from different agencies.

We would hope that this exposure would lead to follow-on programs, after they returned home. It didn't always, but mostly did. For countries where there was a need for assistance, obviously not the British, but for almost everyone else - Africans, Pakistan, India, and even Portugal at that time - the hope was that after seeing what we had in the States, they would review their own situation and draw up a program in which we might be helpful. For instance, training hostage negotiators, bomb squads, crisis center personnel, etc. The idea was to draw up a country specific program. Under that program we might send trainers and/or provide training opportunities at U.S. institutions. But, the overall approach was to encourage local policy and management and then move on to technical assistance.

Q: This existed under the Bureau of Anti-terrorism?

MARKS: Yes, actually the Office for Combating Terrorism, a State Department bureau level office, of which I was one of two Deputy Directors at the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State level.

Q: It's not part of AID?

MARKS: No, it is not part of AID. We even had our own budget with specifically designated program funds from Congress. This was very unusual for the State Department.

Q: Where did you go after that?

MARKS: My time was up in the summer of 1985. There wasn't much available for me so I worked out an arrangement to be detailed for a year to the Center for Strategic and International Studies. However before leaving CT, it might be interesting to record the one time during my assignment in counter-terrorism where I was involved in an operational matter. My own program was strictly for training and liaison, and I did not generally get involved in CT operations, except for serving on terrorist incident task forces in the Operations Center. But there was one terrorist incident where I played a major operational role, in the Sudan. A rebel group in Southern Sudan kidnapped a small group, for or five, of missionaries of whom at least three (I think) were Americans. This was in the early days of counter-terrorism and many of today's standard techniques and responses either did not exist or were being developed. In this case, it was decided to assist our embassy in Khartoum by sending out an inter-agency team to reinforce the embassy. We were about ten, including a couple of CIA and some Army Special Forces types, and I was asked to go as the team leader. We left on something like three or four hours notice, by Air Force C-147 (I think that is the designation) from Andrews Air Force Base. This was the first deployment of this type. We ended up staying in the Sudan for about two weeks, mostly working in the Embassy, although in the second week, three of the team were deployed
forward to Juba in the south, closer to the kidnaping site and the location of the rebel group. The incident was finally settled when the Sudanese army launched a successful dawn rescue raid on the rebel headquarters. Actually, we in the Embassy and our Special Forces specialists had recommended against the raid as we doubted the competence of the Sudanese military. The raid was successful in rescuing the hostages, although the "dawn" attack did not occur until full daylight. Nevertheless, one of the hostage holders told the hostages to get out the back window of the building they were in and hide in the rocks until the firing was over. In other words, we were lucky. Afterwards, we labeled ourselves the Jubal Field Force. Although our involvement was probably not crucial, it was a pioneer effort in crisis deployment of staff in an overseas terrorist incident involving U.S. citizens.

Q: Will you explain what the Center is?

MARKS: The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is a prominent Washington policy think tank, one particularly concerned with military and national security questions. For instance, it is the place from which the Nichols-Goldwater reform of the Department of Defense originated. But, like all think tanks it gets involved in broader international policy questions. They did - and still do - a lot of work on terrorism and counter-terrorism as well. So, I was detailed there as a State Department officer, as a visiting Senior Fellow, for one year.

Q: So, we are talking about 1985-86.

MARKS: I was supposed to go in August but was held back to work on the El Salvador situation. Part of the El Salvador problem involved U.S. assistance to El Salvadoran security services and because of my involvement in the anti-terrorism program, I was involved for a couple of months in helping to put together and design the police training program for the new El Salvadoran police who were going to be an important part of the proposed peace process. I actually did not get to CSIS until about November/December and ended up spending only about six months there because I left for Sri Lanka in June.

Q: First a little bit about the El Salvadoran police. Did you get any feel for what the problem was as far as your exposure to the Salvadoran system?

MARKS: I didn't get directly involved political or diplomatic process. I worked on designing a training program. I did get involved peripherally of course, but saw little more than what was already in the serious newspapers. It was a complicated social war in the country. Ideology was clearly playing a role but there was a class and social war going on as well. A society that was so badly fractured, maybe had never been unified, was trying to create institutions across the chasm. Obviously working with the police was going to be a very sensitive, socially and politically. We worked on recruiting, training and other programs, but it was clear what we were doing was a technical exercise of importance, but still not key. Nevertheless, it was the political settlement that was going to count. If people wish something to work, it can, but if they don't, the bloodshed will break out in the barracks, no matter how good the curriculum is.
Q: What were you doing at the CSIS?

MARKS: I went as a Senior Visiting Fellow to work with Dr. Robert Kupperman on terrorism. Specifically, I was going to work on a conference project he was setting up. This was my introduction to the think tank process where you get some money, set up a series of workshops, then hold a big conference with as many prominent names as you possibly can. They sit around and exchange great thoughts, which someone records. Later a couple of staffers get together and weave these comments, plus whatever the directors of the project (Kupperman and I) really want to say, into a report. I was the editor of the final published report entitled "Combating Terrorism: A Matter of Leverage." That came out in May or June, about the time I left CSIS.

During those six months, I also did some speaking around the country on terrorism, and some published articles. I also, of course, lobbied at the Department of State for my next assignment.

Q: So then you went to Sri Lanka. How did you get the job?

MARKS: While at CSIS I was looking for an onward assignment, as we all do near the end of an assignment. What I wanted, of course, was another chief of mission or principal officer position. I didn't particularly want to go back to Africa. I was prepared to go back to Europe but there wasn't much of any interest for my background and rank. I always wanted to go east to Asia and looked around there. Somebody asked me to consider going to Sri Lanka as Jim Spain's DCM. Although it wasn't the most exiting of possibilities, from a career point of view, I didn't have anything better in sight, wanted to go overseas, and always wanted to go to Asia.

Jim Spain, someone I had known over the years, had been nominated as ambassador to India, which would have been the culmination of a very distinguished career on the subcontinent. However, at the last moment he got elbowed out by another career officer with better White House connections. Jim, who had the year before suffered a very serious personal tragedy when his wife and daughter were killed in an automobile accident, was offered the consolation prize of Sri Lanka. He shrugged and agreed, not wanting to stay in Washington.

And it turned out, my wife has always had a thing about Ceylon because she remembered her father, who had been with Iran Air, coming back from Ceylon when she was child with marvelous things to say about it and bringing her wonder presents of semi-precious stones and other stuff. So, I accepted Jim's offer and we went off as DCM in about August, 1986.

Q: You were there from when to when?


Q: Could you describe the situation in Sri Lanka at that time and the American interests therein?
MARKS: Sri Lanka is a comparatively small country, I believe it is usually described as about the size of Maryland, located just off the southern end of India. Except for its location next to India, it was of limited strategic or other interests to the United States. However, there has been a long American involvement there, particularly with missionaries, for many, many years. Mark Twain even stopped there during his trip around the world and one of the chapters of his book about that trip is about Colombo. It is a country which the Indians consider to be in their sphere of influence, and any American activity raises suspicions and concerns in New Delhi. In the subcontinent, it is really India and Pakistan [that are of high interest] and places like Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Maldives really are peripheral to our relations with India and Pakistan.

One particular point has always bedeviled our relationship with Sri Lanka and India is the Indians conviction that the United States lusts after Ceylon’s port of Trincomalee. [This was the port from which] England and Nelson protected India. The monsoons are such that sailing ships cannot sail out of India's east coast harbors for almost half the year. So, the English navy protected India from any invasion that way by Trincomalee, an enormous, gorgeous natural port, which stood off the side and to the South and provided a naval guard post for India. Later, when the days of sail were over, it became a mammoth coaling station for the British navy in Asia. So, for several centuries it had had a real strategic value for the defense of India. The Indians were convinced that the United States, with the end of British involvement as the former imperial power, lusted after Trincomalee and spent all our time trying to figure out a way to convince the Sri Lankans to permit the establishment of an American base which would threaten Indian interests. No amount of explaining to the Indians that in the days of modern ships, modern communications, and particularly nuclear subs, we have no need for Trincomalee for any purpose whatsoever and wouldn't take it if it were offered to us. It was both amusing and frustrating to have our relations with the Indians and the Sri Lankans (some of whom also believed this nonsense) complicated even a little bit by this historical but outdated strategical romanticism.

As I said, there was an American missionary relationship which went back to the beginning of the 19th century and there was a small Sri Lankan community in the United States. By and large this was a relatively new immigration, and included a large number of Sri Lankan Tamils which posed some problems with the rise of the Tamil insurgency. Commerce had been limited to Ceylonese tea but more recently a Sri Lankan textile industry had been developed, and had quickly filled up their quota with Hathaway shirts, Lands End clothing, etc.

Q: Would you describe the embassy and how Jim Spain ran it?

MARKS: Yes, but let me back up for a moment. One very interesting aspect of Sri Lanka is that it is a functioning democracy. It has been since independence. It is an interesting little country which has one of the highest literacy rates in the world, compared to Western standards of literacy. Women had achieved the right to vote back in the twenties, before they did in the States even. It had had internal self-government even before independence a peaceful transition to independence in the late forties. And, despite a Maoist-type
Sinhalese youth rebellion the early 1960s, and two current insurgencies when I arrived, one by Tamils and a resurgence of the Sinhalese movement, the country still had a functioning democracy. In addition, the Sri Lankan president, J. R. Jayawardene, had - in 1997 - been the first political leader in the Third World to win election on a platform calling for market based reform of the government's economic policy; in other words he had been the first Third World leader to jump the ship of "socialist" ideology. And this right in the backyard of Gandhi-led India. That, and Sri Lanka's open democratic political system, gave it a certain cachet in Washington.

Q: Did they play any role in the Vietnam War?

MARKS: No, not at all, which means they missed out on the commercial and economic benefits many Asian countries took advantage of. Sri Lanka, or Ceylon as it was called in those days, had been the most developed and most prosperous country of the region up to the 1950s or thereabouts, with high rates of literacy, excellent health statistics and life expectancy rates, and the best per capita GNP [gross national product] in the area - by far. Population pressure was not severe and the sort of poverty common in the other countries of Asia, and especially the subcontinent, was absent. But instead of building on that foundation, the country pursued the so-called "socialist" economic policies favored by most Third World countries and India in particular. These policies produced twenty years of stagnation, exacerbated later by internal insurgencies.

We had a very nice little embassy. The old chancery was a beautiful, turn of the century mansion, located right on the coast. We built a very attractive new Chancery about 1983. It was modern and contemporary in style but reflected local architectural traditions in a very sophisticated way which was much appreciated locally.

We had a Peace Corps program, a good sized AID mission (about 20 direct hire AID employees and a $25 million program), an active USIA program (a cultural center, library, etc.), a military attaché with a small military exchange program, and of course the regular embassy sections. Counting Peace Corps volunteers (about 30), there were about 80 or so official Americans in a comprehensive mission in a smallish country of about 16 million people. The private sector American community was quite small, even when counting a handful of missionaries.

Jim Spain was a very senior FSO who had written some well reputed books, especially his first book on the Pathans. He had served in India, Pakistan, and Turkey and knew that part of the world very well, going back to his first post, Karachi, in the late forties and early fifties. About a year or so prior to Sri Lanka he had experienced the tragic personal lost of his wife and daughter in a car accident. He was suffering some professional disappointment in having been at the last moment denied what would have been the culmination of his career as ambassador to India and instead being given one of the minor embassies in the area. He took it well and it helped him to come out of his personal tragedy.

Spain was strong ambassador, but also one able to delegate and he made me his alter ego. Therefore, most of the mission most of the time dealt with the head office, either Spain or
myself. I spent more of my time on internal administration and management than he did, but also did a fair amount of my own reporting. We ran an active post, but with two of us to do the work and with neither of us interested in "make-work" we were out by 5:00 and playing tennis before we went off to participate in the very active Colombo social life.

However this does not mean that we were lazy or lax or disinterested. Both of us being quite experienced (as I noted above Spain had hoped to be given India given his experience and seniority, and it was not unreasonable for me - given my background - to have hoped for the COM [chief of mission] position in Colombo for myself. Both individually and as a team we were overqualified). For instance, we spent a good deal of time my first year on a traditional Foreign Service management question - the staff of the USAID Mission. In the fiscal year of my arrival, the aid program had been cut in half - from $50 million to $25 million. Spain's reaction - classic FSO - was that this cut should result in a proportional cut in the USAID staff (which was somewhere over 20 direct hire Americans.) The AID Director was a cooperative type but was replaced within a few months of my arrival before Spain's effort to cut staff had gone very far. The new AID Director was cut from very different cloth. He was smart and experienced but very "turf" conscious and protective of his mission. He rejected out of the hand the proposal that his staff should be cut (merely because the budget was cut). He resisted Ambassador Spain with great bureaucratic skill, and only after a long struggle was forced to give up some positions.

Substantively, Sri Lanka was an interesting post, with a number of political and economic problems but with limited U.S. interests. Therefore we were relatively free to go our own way, as Sri Lanka was - so to speak - below the radar level of the 7th floor of the Department One interesting aspect of the country was that it was a functioning democracy, with regular elections and political parties which rotated in and out of power. At the same time, however, there were two ongoing insurgencies.

The country gained independence in the late forties and by the early fifties the dominant political culture was Third World socialist, under the leadership of the most prominent member of a very prominent local family - the Bandaranaiikes. When Prime Minister Bandaranaike was killed in [September] 1959, his wife - Madame Sirimavo Bandaranaike - became the first woman prime minister in the world. She was also very Third World radical - à la Sukarno and Gandhi and such - in her perspective and politics. Then in the early 1960s an insurgency group of young radical Sinhalese, educated and without jobs and rather Maoist in character, revolted against her government. She crushed them with very real severity.

In the late seventies that same movement, called the JVP [Janata Vimukthi Peramuna, or People’s Liberation Front], revolted again. At the same time the Tamil separatist movement in the north flared up. By the time Jim and I got there in 1985-86, the Government had lost control of most of the north, including the city Jaffna. Meanwhile in the southern part of the country the JVP was becoming increasingly active. So, you had both of these insurgencies going on at the same time on this little island: one ethnic based and the other ideological.
In addition, a few years before we got there, the 25-year run of Third World or Fabian socialist government had been replaced by J. R. Jayawardene, the first among the Third World leaders to make the shift to a free market approach to the economy. I think he won his election in February 1978. He ran for office with the argument that the socialist policies of the Bandaranaiakes had been wrong and that the country needed to switch to an open, free market economy, privatize the government-owned institutions, etc. His plan was to open up the economy and focus on two sectors: textiles (clothing in particular), and tourism. Sri Lanka is a naturally beautiful tourist paradise. Just as the country was beginning to get some good effects from this policy, the Tamil insurgency started and a year or so later the Sinhalese JVP rebellion surfaced again. So when we arrived, Jayawardene was making economic progress but it was being stalled and frustrated by these two insurgencies. So, you have a democratic government with a market economy approach faced with two insurgencies. While none of this was top level policy in Washington, it was very interesting from a professional point of view.

Q: Did we have any stand in this?

MARKS: Yes, we supported the J. R. government, particularly in terms of his economic policy. We of course supported Sri Lanka democratic tradition. We were essentially opposed to the Sinhalese insurgency movement because it was rather Maoist in character although we were sympathetic to the problem of unemployed youth. We were not very sympathetic or supportive of the Tamil separatist rebellion, both because of its ethnic separatism and its violence. We took the view that while the Tamil community, which is about 15 percent of the country, had legitimate grievances; they were not severe enough to justify the taking up of arms. Also, we felt that they were still functioning in a democratic enough society which still offered political ways to deal with these problems. By 1985-86 the Tamil insurgency movement had had a shakeout and one group was now in charge: the Tamil Tigers headed by a guy called Prabhakaran. He was, and still is, obviously a very most talented guerrilla leader but he was also very blood thirsty. We were not too sympathetic to his movement and his tactics, although we were sympathetic to some of the Tamil concerns.

The Sri Lankan Tamils had played the tradition of colonial role of the outcast elite. They had done exceptionally well in the colonial period and naturally wanted to continue their prominence after independence (for instance, fifty percent of the Permanent Secretaries at independence were Tamils). However the Sinhalese majority were obviously not going to permit this, and the independence negotiations were very concerned with the competition between the Tamils and the Sinhalese. That competition continued after independence and produced a very complicated internal political life in the country: the traditional divide between left and right complicated by the tension between Tamil and Sinhalese. Anyway it was all very complicated. There were many Tamils living in Colombo and well integrated into the professional and business elite (however no longer in the governmental ranks). We mixed with them as much and as easily as with Sinhalese; all this while the insurgency was going on. It was very complex.

So, although both Jim and I felt that our careers had come to a plateau, and maybe even an
effective end, as professional diplomats we had a lovely island country, filled with interesting and friendly people with a rich, old culture, and interesting economic and political problems. Living conditions were excellent and the tennis good.

Another charming quality about Sri Lanka is that I have never been in a country in which foreign diplomats were so well treated. They thought we diplomats were just super. From the moment you arrived in country the invitations start to arrive. Sri Lankans are very social and sociable people; they love luncheon parties, receptions, cocktails parties, dinner, and dinner dances. They entertain extensively among themselves and their automatic inclination is to invite foreigners to join them. And, when you invited them, they showed up on time and within a week or so, invited you back. It was lovely. The women of the professional, business, and governmental classes were well educated and very social. So, in every respect it was an absolutely delightful place for diplomats. We weren't dealing with the great problems of the Soviet Union or the future of the world, we were not the major player on the local scene, but I must admit it was kind of fun.

Q: Which is always wonderful.

MARKS: Yes. Now, when I say we are not the major player on the Colombo scene does not mean we were not important - the United States is always important - but that in this case someone else, the Indians, were a more influential external actor. Of course, there were those who wanted us to play a bigger role, but USG policy was to be fairly restrained in Sri Lanka. Interestingly, the Indians assumed we wished to play a bigger role and some Sri Lankans wanted us to. For instance, the Indians always assumed we had a covetous eye on the port of Trincomalee. We did not, and one day Jim told the Indian High Commissioner quite flatly that we were not only not seeking access to Trincomalee, but that we would not accept it if offered, and that he, the American Ambassador was in a position to turn down such an offer without bothering to query Washington for specific instructions.

Colombo presented, very clearly, an interesting and amusing phenomenon of our profession. In any capital in the world, there is a diplomatic pecking order, that is, who is the most important ambassador in town. [The protocol pecking order is based on longevity at post. I’m talking about the local power pecking order.] Usually, the American ambassador is the chief pecker, to speak, in the pecking order but there are local variations. In French West Africa, for instance, the French ambassador and the French embassy generally occupies the top of the pecking order. He may have to share that position with the American ambassador, but the French ambassador is always at least as important. On the other hand, if you go to Botswana, the French ambassador will not be very important, nor would I expect him to rank very high in Uruguay.

Now in Colombo, the number one diplomatic honcho was the Indian. His colleagues in some places barely can get into the local chamber of commerce but in Sri Lanka the Indian ambassador was considered (and often called) the proconsul. Sri Lanka was Indian turf and the Indian High Commissioner was the number one diplomat in town. He had a large and well staffed embassy and the intrinsic importance of the Indian high Commission was
evident in the quality of the incumbents. (The man there in my time moved on to become
the career head of the Indian Foreign Service.) The Soviet ambassador also carried a great
deal of weight, even though they did little in the country, because the USSR was a world
power. The Pakistanis were important as a regional power but were clearly in the shadow
of India. The Brits, as the former colonial power, still carried a good deal of weight (their
foreign aid program helped as well as the old colonial ties) but the French and Italians were
all minor players.

I think our general importance was augmented by the fact we were a good embassy. Jim
Spain was clearly a major league professional diplomat who knew his way around that part
of the world. And, I think I was good at my job and we had some good people. So we were
a good embassy playing a role there because everybody knew who we were in the world.
We also had a reasonably big AID program, the Peace Corps, and some military assistance.
However, people wanted us to play a bigger role than we wanted to play, playing us off
against India. This was a nice little professional challenge for Jim and myself, both being
American diplomats who grew up and worked during a period when the United States
basically took the lead everywhere, or tried to. Since WWII Americans have been used to
practicing aggressive and domineering diplomacy and but here the situation didn't call for
that. Neither Jim nor I wanted to move beyond a somewhat restrained role, supportive of
the government, but not going too far. It was a nice professional challenge and I think we
did it well. While wanting to ensure that American prestige was protected, we did not want
to challenge the Indians for influence. In fact, we wanted to encourage them to play as
positive (as we saw it) role. However we always felt that the Indian never really trusted us,
and the Sri Lankans were a bit frustrated by our unwillingness to step out too far
(challenging Indian hegemony on the one hand, and actively supporting the government in
its anti-insurgency war on the other.)

So, our professional challenges were in a sense modest and restrained. We wanted to be
constructive but not take on more than we wanted, not to become the bull in the china shop.
Nor did we wish to give intimations that we might do more in the future and certainly not
let people jump to any conclusion that we could be the solution to their problem. At the
same time we did want to be constructive and supportive with the Indians without pushing
them to believe we were trying to supplant them, which they thought we were. There is an
Indian paranoia about us. There was Trincomalee to start with and then they also thought
there was oil all over the place, although no one had yet discovered any, and we were trying
to get at it. Essentially they had the general feeling that we were trying to move into their
turf.

The Indian involvement in the Tamil insurgency was long, involved and not completely
honorable. The Tamil community of Sri Lanka, 15 percent of the population and about a
couple million people, is only an overseas extension of the 50 million Tamils who form the
population of the largest and most populous state of India, Tamil Nadu, right across the
narrow straits from Sri Lanka. There was an automatic ethnic alliance with the Tamil rebels
who had always used Tamil Nadu as a base for recruiting place, raising money, and
training. This was clearly allowed with the connivance and often the encouragement of the
Indian central government, and of course of the state government of Tamil Nadu. Madame
Gandhi and her government had been involved in the fostering of the Tamil rebellion as a way, I suppose, of keeping the Sri Lankans in line. There is an historical irony here because the movement she and her people helped foster was the movement which later assassinated her son, Rajiv. After taking office following the murder of his mother, Rajiv changed policy towards the Tamil insurrection and was later killed by the Tamil Tigers. Who says history doesn't have a sense of humor?

So, the Indians had been involved. Not the whole Indian government in a formal manner, but the intelligence organization (RAW [Research and Intelligence Wing]), probably some of the political types and certainly the Tamil Nadu provincial government, had been involved in some fostering and a mixture of encouraging and restraining the Tamil insurgency, if only as a way of putting pressures on the Sri Lankan government. The Sri Lankan government under J. R. Jayawardene had distanced itself from India. Madame Bandaranaike had been soulmates with Madame Gandhi, agreeing with her in every respect... their view of the world, their view of economics, and their view of the United States. When J. R. defeated Madame Bandaranaike in 1977 and became prime minister, he changed economic policy towards a free market economy. This was the first such economic policy change among Third World countries, which made J. R. popular in Washington but was considered heresy in New Delhi. As you know, the Indians are reasonably arrogant and don't believe that the little peoples surrounding them have any right to individual policies, much less distance himself from Indian international policy. Madame Gandhi was not amused, and was very angry. So, the fostering of the Tamil Tigers was to some degree teaching Colombo a lesson.

In 1985-86, the security situation in the North and the East kept deteriorating, although not in Colombo itself or in fact in most of the country. The Tamil Tigers kept bringing weapons and money across the Palk Straits from India and further afield, such as Singapore, conducting training in India, setting up an extensive international network in the United States and England where they were able to raise money. There were reports of their getting involved in the drug trade. The war kept going on and the situation kept getting worse and worse. By now they controlled the city of Jaffna and the only Sri Lankan presence up there was a small army unit besieged in the old fort. Throughout much of the north, the Sri Lankan army and officials could not go. Although, in a very charming Sri Lankan way, the civilian officials, like the mayor, the police, the teachers, and the hospital personnel were still being paid by the central government, even though the area was really under the control of the insurgents. We thought that was kind of civilized.

But, the situation kept deteriorating through 1985 and 1986, with respect to both insurgencies. For various reasons, Jayawardene was publicly and privately pushing the Indians into having to take an open position. Presumably he was taking this risk because he calculated that they could not come down on the side of separatism. The Indians, remember, while they were sympathetic to the Tamils never officially supported the Tamil claim for independence. As we got to the end of 1986, Jayawardene, we felt, was starting to push the Indians to a fish or cut bait situation, something they didn't want to happen.

The general view is that New Delhi forced its way into the situation, playing the regional
power determined to resolve local conflicts in its area. However, I always felt that Jayawardene maneuvered the Indians into their action. At the same time that the Tigers had become stronger, the Sri Lankan army had been improving as well. Up until the late seventies the Army had been pretty much a club for sons of the upper classes: good officers messes, nice uniforms, etc. Since the outbreak of the Tamil rebellion in the early 1980s the army had been improving and had had some significant successes in late 1986. There was some concern in many circles that Jayawardene would go for a military solution - try to crush the insurgency on the ground. Obviously this would mean enormous bloodshed, and quite possibly a really protracted civil war which India - and possibly the world - would not be able to ignore. A Biafra-like catastrophe. There was some public and political pressure in Sri Lanka (possibly orchestrated) to go for this solution.

Jayawardene launched a public campaign, in which he brandished two alternatives: either India would take up its responsibility, or he would be forced to go for "a military solution." In the end, the Indians decided that they would intervene. First, they sent a flotilla of ships who were turned back and then some airplanes who dropped food parcels to the Tamil population in the north. This produced little results and finally New Delhi decided to send an Indian "Peace Keeping Force." Numbering eventually 15,000 troops, the IPKF moved into the Tamil north. An agreement with the Sri Lankan government was patched up which authorized them. The IPKF took over administration of the Tamil north. At first they were welcomed by the Tamil insurgents, who may have thought that the Indians would expel the Sri Lankan Government and turn the Jaffna peninsula over to them. When this did not happen, and only three sided negotiations occurred, the Indians and the Tamil Tigers fell out and a conflict ensued which cost the Indians a thousand killed and several thousand wounded. At this point the Sri Lankans stood aside and let the other two fight it out.

Then in 1989 there was an election and J. R. Jayawardene lost and Ranasinghe Premadasa, from the same party, took over as Prime Minister and then instituted a presidential system. He started pushing the Indians to get out and, not resisting too much, they finally did. The Indians, especially the Army, left quite fed up and disgusted. The Indian army felt they had walked into a bad situation, having been misled by their civilian intelligence colleagues (RAW, the Indian CIA). The Army had gone in, did all of the dirty work, and accomplished nothing. They had suffered deaths and casualties and nothing had been accomplished. In a sense, the unhappy experience of the IPKF in Sri Lanka and the later assassination of Rajiv Gandhi by the Tamil Tigers demonstrated that his mother's policies came home to roost. Now President Premadasa tried to implement a conciliation policy with the Tigers, but he didn't get very far either. He reworked various power sharing or devolution schemes, but the Tigers rejected them and eventually killed him as well. So, the Tamil Tigers, who were a very competent rebel organization, have killed two prime ministers, one in India and one in Sri Lanka, numerous Sri Lankan ministers, and have been very successful in their numerous terrorist or insurgency activities.

Meanwhile on the JVP side, the Singhalese youth rebellion, events took a dramatic turn in late 1989. Up until then, there appeared to be a sort of agreement between the JVP and the security forces, especially the police. A kind of live and let live agreement. The JVP restricted its attacks on security forces - who mainly come from the rural areas - who in
turn turned a bit of blind eye to JVP activity in the villages. Then in August or so of 1989, the JVP made a horrendous strategic mistake. They launched a terror campaign against the families of security forces person, killing some family members and distributing leaflets urging security forces personnel to desert the government and rally to the JVP or have their families face further attacks. The reaction was exactly the opposite, the security forces went on a rampage and in a period of several weeks or so destroyed the JVP, killing, presumably, many innocents at the same time. By the time I left Sri Lanka in November, the JVP insurgency was over.

So, you can see from a professional diplomat's point of view this was a complicated, maybe tragic, but certainly interesting situation. I had spent many years in the Third World as represented by Africa, but Sri Lanka was a very different situation. Third World by definition, yes, but a very cultured and complicated society with a rich history. Both Jim Spain and I were interested and active enough but also restrained as we agreed that there was little scope for a more active USG role in Sri Lanka. We were sympathetic and supportive on the fringe, but did not wish to play a more active role, for instance expanded military assistance. Ambassador Spain retired in the spring of 1989, and actually set up housekeeping in Colombo where he still lives, and I took over as chargé until November when I left. I opened up the reporting a bit, but made few other changes. Thus ended what both my wife and I considered our most memorable post in the Foreign Service. We loved the country, the people, and the culture and I certainly enjoyed the work even if it represented at best marking time for me professionally.

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**Q:** Today is November 25, 1996. Ed, you left Sri Lanka in November 1989 and went to the United Nations in New York. You served there from when to when?

**MARKS:** From November, 1989 until roughly October, 1993.

**Q:** What was your position at the United Nations?

**MARKS:** I was the Minister-Counselor for Economic and Social Affairs, and also the Deputy United States Representative to the Economic and Social Council - a Presidential appointment. In essence I was the head of the economic and social affairs section of the U.S. Mission to the UN. My direct boss in the Mission was Ambassador Jonathan Moore, who was the Representative to ECOSOC [Economic and Social Council] and one of the Mission's five ambassadors. As you know, the official title of the COM at USUN, Thomas Pickering at that time, is the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, while his deputy is the U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, one other ambassador is the representative to ECOSOC, and the other two have non-specific titles. USUN is a very top-heavy diplomatic mission, with five ambassadors, and eight or nine ministers-counselor.

**Q:** This is the Bush Administration. He had been an ambassador to the United Nations. Could you describe what ECOSOC did at that time and what were our relations with it?
MARKS: The Economic and Social Council is one of the main organs of the United Nations, established by the UN Charter along with the Secretariat, Security Council, General Assembly and International Court of Justice. It was originally intended to be the economic counterpart to the Security Council, but had over the years been expanded in number until it had 55 members and been essentially marginalized. This marginalization reflects the whole history of the UN and the Cold War where the major powers, particularly the United States, was interested in using the Security Council for security reasons in terms of the bipolar confrontation with the Soviets, and not at all interested in having the UN become any sort of global, economic management institution. The organization of the Security Council and the existence of the veto meant that we could also, at a minimum, prohibit adverse action in that body. However, in the General Assembly and the expanded ECOSOC, the majority voting procedure and the existence of a non-West voting majority meant that the West in general and the U.S. in particular were not about to allow economic and trade policy to be determined by votes among the total membership of the UN. This attitude was in place even before the emergence of the Third World voting bloc became anti-American.

By the 1970s time the UN had expanded from its original 50 members to 130 or 140, and the largest single group - a majority in itself - belonged to the Group of 77 or Third World bloc. By the time I got to New York the G-77 had 122 members, all of whom voted as together on almost all economic and social issues from a Third World perspective which was not the same as ours. As a result ECOSOC had become marginalized as the Group of 77 pushed for changes in international rules and agreements which would foster two things. One, an institutionalized process of recompense to the Third World for the harm they had suffered in the colonial period. Recompense would be in terms of trade measures, subsidies, and privileged positions. Second, and closely related, was an attempt to obtain an increased amount of the transfer of technical research from the rich to poor countries on concessional, if not free terms.

That had been the central issue for 30 or 40 years, with the United States and the rest of the West essentially blocking it. We were not about to have a one country, one vote directed international board of economic and social policy. The G-77 or Third World was pushing for it. The Soviet bloc would rather mischievously support the G-77 on these issues, but we never knew what Moscow would do if the G-77 position ever had a chance of being adopted.

That was the situation in ECOSOC and why it had become essentially marginalized over the years. We, the U.S. and the West in general, would go in there with delaying tactics. Nothing could be passed that we would not approve of, even if they had the votes. However, in the late 1980s, as it became clear that they would always be unable to pass these measures, a new voting strategy was adopted by the G-77 - later called consensus minus one. In this approach, the G-77 would modify its proposals so as to attract the support of almost all countries, including many rich countries of the West, leaving only the U.S. and a couple of others to hold firm. Often the U.S. would merely abstain (hence the phrase consensus minus one). It was a means of isolating the U.S. by passing vague and
essentially meaningless resolutions which nevertheless the U.S. would not accept (possibly out of concern for domestic reaction or excessive legalism while the Europeans would merely shrug their shoulders and go along). The real sticking point for the U.S. was the inclusion in many of these resolutions of anti-colonial type issues which included the Cuban problem and U.S. policy toward Cuba, as well as the whole question of the Middle East and Israel. So, the U.S. had spent years resisting to a large number of proposals. It was a delaying strategy, a parliamentary guerilla war in what had become a very marginalized part of the UN system. That was the situation up to 1989 when with the end of the Soviet Union all sorts of things changed, including the whole mood, tenure and possibilities available to us in the United Nations.

Q: What was Tom Pickering’s operating style at the UN?

MARKS: I am a firm cardholder in the Pickering admiration camp. The conventional wisdom in New York and almost everywhere is that he was the best representative we ever had at the UN. He is as we all know the quintessential professional and a man of all sorts of qualities and skills. He has an extraordinarily high energy level, who is just running faster than everybody else all day for longer hours. It is not forced. He is just a high energy person. He has an extraordinary memory, never seems to forget anything. He is not a genius, but he is very intelligent and a serious professional. I will give you one incident. I went up to see him with one of my officers to brief him on a quite detailed and technical subject, pelagic deep sea fishing. We were briefing him for a meeting he was about to have. We were in his office no more than 12 minutes. In that time he had heard the briefing, read the three page memo, and played it back once to see if he understood it.

This is a man who would come to huge staff meetings with never a piece of paper, never a note, run through a complicated agenda, ask detailed questions, listen, make decisions, and give instructions. It is true that others in the room were taking notes but you always had the feeling the notes were for others, not for him. He is always in control of details, not vice versa. Therefore if I took a telegram or memorandum to him for review, any change he made was for a substantive reason - he knew something you didn't, or he wanted something different said, including a judgment call. It was always substantive and you always knew why it was there, although you may not always have agreed with the change.

Q: What was your impression at that time of Pickering’s support back in Washington, particularly from the Secretary of State and his immediate circle and maybe the President?

MARKS: Everybody knows that Pickering is an extremely articulate man, and at the UN he was in a very prominent position. USUN is across the street from the United Nations and we would all - Pickering included - cross the street to go to meetings. The press is permanently placed on the way into the Security Council chamber, which was Pickering's basic arena. You cannot go in and out of the Security Council chamber without a media camera, without a gaggle of journalists. So, you have an articulate man in a prominent public position who has to expose himself to the press as much as four or five times a day when the Security Council is in session. He has no choice. All of this in a time of enormous change when the U.S. was particularly prominent. The fall of the Soviet Union, the
changes in the UN and a renewed emphasis on the UN, and a whole bunch of front page issues such as the Iraqi war. All this made Pickering front page copy for the media and he received enormous coverage.

This led to the problem with Washington, and specifically with the Secretary of State. Actually we never knew whether the problem was with Secretary Baker himself or with his press spokesperson. She had been with Baker for many years, a long time political colleague, was very close to him on policy matters. She was the keeper of Baker's public persona and clearly unhappy with anyone else in the foreign policy arena who received coverage and prominence. Given the times and the mood, of course, Pickering appeared to be on the front page of the NY Times every day. She kept clearly putting bounds on Pickering. In fact, word came down once, quite formally I think, that he was not even to give a press interview without clearing it with Washington. This was impossible given the situation I described above. He could, of course, stiff the press as he walked in and out of the Security Council, but this would have been counter to what we were trying to do. We had policy positions and objectives and he could make a good case for them. The alternative was to be ungracious to the press and to the public. So there was a constant tension between Pickering and Baker's office. They tried to muzzle him, which is ironic as Pickering is not at all a seeker after publicity. He is not a prima donna.

Another problem was a sort of running battle with the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of International Organization Affairs [IO], John Bolton, a very bright but a very conservative man. He knew a lot about international affairs and about the UN, but represented a conservative perspective that essentially is very mistrustful of the UN. Pickering has a much more open, receptive attitude towards international cooperation and organizations so there was inevitably tension between USUN and the IO Bureau reflecting the differing perspectives of their chiefs. Pickering's attitude, I must say, was shared by many of us in the Mission, including my direct boss, Ambassador and U.S. Representative to ECOSOC, Jonathan Moore.

Finally, as a backdrop to all of this was the dramatic change in the world environment with the end of the Cold War. Pickering and most of his staff saw the changed situation as an opportunity, while Bolton and other conservatives were concerned about the dangers. We saw the current situation as a place of opportunity to do all sorts of things in pursuit of American foreign policy and interests in the post-Cold War period for lots of reasons. The breakup of the USSR and the Soviet bloc, the changed attitude among many of the G-77 or Third World countries, the sudden prominence and dominance of the United States, the rise to importance of new issues to the so-called transnational issues, such as narcotics, deep sea fishing, human rights, population, terrorism, failed states, peacekeeping in a non-confrontational, etc. All sorts of issues were now open and could be dealt with to some degree in the UN which had turned from "a dangerous place" as Daniel Patrick Moynihan once called it to a forum now wide open to American influence and interest.

Pickering was generally considered the single most successful representative to the United Nations, not merely because he was popular and did well generally, but because he was able to accomplish pretty much everything the USG wanted to accomplish during his
period at the UN. One example was support for the Gulf war. We were also able to get a change for the better in the treatment of Israel in the UN, a matter of some domestic as well as foreign policy interest. In fact, I carried out the floor campaign which obtained the first pro-Israel vote in a UN body since possibly the original vote which established Israel. And the following year, after that trial run, we got a new GA [General Assembly] resolution which reversed the old Zionism equals racism resolution. We were able to do those sorts of things in the UN at that time. Pickering led a mission that attempted to accomplish many things because we saw opportunities in what had been a closed arena up until then. It was an exciting time to be at the UN.

Q: You keep mentioning the fall of the Soviet Union. Could you explain the timing of that from your time there and how this impacted, which may be in a sort of series of steps on the UN as you saw it?

MARKS: With the actual collapse of the USSR in 1990, the successor Russian Federation had a loss of confidence and influence. The international political environment changed without a competing superpower to the U.S. The new Russian Federation could no longer seriously promise anything or threaten anyone. The Third World movement was predicated on the fact you had two super-powers between which the countries of the Third World could maneuver. Well, with the collapse of the USSR there was no maneuvering space left. As one of the super-powers disappeared, the other power acquired vastly expanded prestige, and in a sense became the only game in town. The intellectual and ideological alternative to the West in general and the U.S. in particular was gone. As a result, the Soviet Mission to the UN lost almost all prestige and influence in the corridors of the UN. In fact, we found them hanging around us for help and guidance. This was very interesting to watch. As an example of what I mean, let me review the question of the Chernobyl nuclear accident, and how it played out in the UN.

Q: Could you explain what it was?

MARKS: The accident at the nuclear plant at Chernobyl, Belarus, in 1986, was the worst nuclear accident in history. It caused thousands of deaths, and contamination of a large bit of territory both in Belarus and the Ukraine. In 1989-90, the Ukrainians and Belorussians had been coming to the UN to obtain support, money, etc. through the UN processes. Remember that Belarus and the Ukraine had always been full members of the United Nations, even though Soviet satellites. They were part of the Charter compromise of 1945 and maintained diplomatic missions to the UN in New York. They functioned of course, as sections of the Soviet Mission and were never known to have a word of their own to say, and voted the way they were told. This arrangement essentially gave Moscow three votes in the UN, in addition to the votes of the Warsaw Pact nations.

So from 1989 on we would watch each year, in ECOSOC and in the Second (Economic) Committee of the General Assembly, the missions of Belarus, Ukraine and Russia present resolutions which attempted to obtain foreign sympathy but also calling on governments and the UN system to provide money and technical assistance to help them deal with the horrible aftermath of the accident. As head of the Mission's economic and social section, I
was the officer in charge, or at least the floor manager, of our representation in those committees of the UN. Therefore I watched, in the period of 1989-93, the change of the relationship between the Russians, the Belorussians and the Ukrainians.

I was in a particularly good position to do so, as the U.S. ended up the de facto negotiator for the other delegations, as the rest were prepared to go along with anything Washington accepted. (Washington was prepared to give lots of sympathy, a reasonably amount of technical assistance, but not prepared to agree to an open-ended program of financial assistance.) So, I was instructed to make sure that the resolutions contained language no more committal than Washington would go along with.

The negotiating process was quite interesting, and went on over my four years there. The negotiating took place among a very small crowd, myself and occasionally someone else from my section, and representatives from the three interested Missions. We would usually hold our meetings in one of the coffee rooms. In the first year, the Russian did the talking and the other two (or three or four) just sat quietly. By the second year, the Russian diplomat led their side but the others participated. In the third year, the Ukrainians sent their Permanent Representative and he did most of the talking, with an occasional remark from the Byelorussian and not a word from the Russian. By my fourth year, the Byelorussian took the lead, claiming to be the most severely affected, with the Russian (a very able young Russian diplomat and a very good friend of mine) continuing to remain silent - playing the role of observer. We saw this shift as the Ukrainians and Byelorussians asserted their independence. It was fascinating.

**Q:** What was Pickering's attitude towards ECOSOC?

**MARKS:** Pickering was interested in everything, and did not limit himself to the sexy political issues and the Security Council. He was interested in ECOSOC (and the Second and Third Committees) because in his view of the contemporary world and the opportunities at the UN, many of the issues were in the economic and social area. He understood that close to 80% of UN funds and UN personnel were engaged in the economic and social areas, even though the political work and the Security Council got most of the headlines. He was especially interested what were called the transnational issues which were rising to the top of the strategic priority list, both for our country and for others. The collapse of the Soviet Union and its influence meant that the UN was now available to deal with these issues to some degree. The UN became a more useful forum in which to deal with these issues. That is the way he saw it and the way USUN approached the UN. There were now possibilities to do some things in the UN that we couldn't do during the Cold War.

**Q:** Was it ECOSOC that was the bête noire of many conservatives or was it another one?

**MARKS:** That would have been UNESCO [United Nations Economic, Science, and Cultural Organization] from which we had withdrawn in the eighties.

**Q:** So there was no connection with UNESCO?
MARKS: Not really, although as a UN specialized agency UNESCO is supposed to come under the general policy guidance of ECOSOC. This raises the question of the character of the United Nations as an organization which most people are quite ignorant of, including many policy makers and including this administration which is pro-UN but doesn't understand the UN. What is the UN? What is it as a creature? What, for instance, is the difference between intergovernmental and secretariat institutions. These distinctions are not understood and that failure gets us into a lot of trouble. It is a major reason which is why the current administration is making a mess of UN reform and its relationship with the Secretary General. Basically they do not understand the UN.

The UN can be viewed as a set of interlocking circles: the UN Organization, the UN system, and the UN family. The organization is the central administration, if you will. That means the main bodies (Security Council, General Assembly, ECOSOC, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretary General and the Secretariat). It is very New York centered. The system is the Organization plus the several dozen funds, programs (e.g. UNICEF, UNDP) and specialized agencies (e.g. ILO, WHO, UNESCO). The family is the other two plus the Bretton Woods organizations.

As a specialized agency, UNESCO has its own intergovernmental governing body, its own secretariat or staff, and an appointed and essentially autonomous boss, and most important its own funds provided by member states. Nominally it comes under the policy direction of ECOSOC, but since it has its own intergovernmental governing board the relationship with ECOSOC is limited. USG delegations are represented in both places - the system wide General Assembly and ECOSOC and the agency specific governing bodies. However it is not always the same officials who go to these meetings. While the Economic and Social Section of USUN would go to many of these agency governing boards there would also be other USG officials from Washington and often from other agencies and departments. For instance, UNDP and UNICEF are located in New York so at their annual meetings the USUN delegation would be buttressed by USAID specialists from Washington. UNESCO met in Paris, so people from Washington used to go to the UNESCO governing board meetings. However since the USG withdrew from UNESCO (we were fed up with its policies and the corrupt management), we did little with UNESCO unless it came up in ECOSOC meetings.

Q: Did you feel at odds with the IO Bureau in Washington?

MARKS: Yet we knew there was a generally favorable feeling towards the UN at the White House. A major reason for the tension between us was a significant difference between Bolton's and Pickering's views of the world. Pickering saw opportunities in a changing world situation. Bolton had a more conservative attitude that the world remained a dangerous place where you have to watch yourself. I think he felt that most of the world was essentially anti-American and could not be trusted. Pickering felt we ought to participate actively and positively and play a constructive leadership role.

There was also the normal difference of perspective and tension between the field and headquarters. This problem was exacerbated due to the fact that the USUN is a very special
mission where the USUN representative is of the same rank if not senior to the IO assistant secretary. In fact, prior to Pickering, all PermReps had been members of the Cabinet. He wasn't, nor was his successor Ed Perkins, but Clinton's appointee, Madeleine Albright, was put back in the Cabinet. In addition, part of the problem was that the officers on site in New York were playing more generalist diplomatic game while many of the people back in Washington were specialists who only dealt with a part of it.

So, we had a range of reasons for the tension. The difference of perspective between a global view of opportunities and a global view of dangers. Some personality differences complicated by bureaucratic turf wars. There was the concern in some circles in the Department with Pickering's public prominence. And then, of course, there was the [acerbation of the] normal differences between field and headquarters. All of this, remember in a context where USUN was in the State Department telephone book and we didn't even have to dial long distance. Headquarters was just down the road from us. At times they were just too close.

Q: Let us go to some of the issues, we will go to the Gulf War later.

MARKS: I had very little to do with the Gulf War. It was a political issue handled by the Political Section and in the Security Council. I had very little to do with it until after the war was over when the Sanctions Committee was created, and my deputy became the U.S. Representative in its working meetings.

Q: What were the issues you were particularly concerned with during this period?

MARKS: We had a whole range of issues, of course, but deep sea fishing becomes a major issue in the later 1980s. This issue involved the spread in use of the huge nets of 70 to 80 kilometers in length which deep sea fishing ships would use to sweep the seas, sweeping up everything in their path. Everybody does this, but the worst practitioners are the Japanese and the Norwegians, among the traditional fishing countries. The issue was raised and pushed by the sustainable development movement, the Green movement in other words. It was one of the few economic issues dealt in the United Nations context. The USG was interested as we have our own fishing industry, although our industry has apparently not gone in or the very big nets; we would limit ourselves to the 20-40 kilometer nets. So, we had our fishing interests to take care of.

UN conferences were held, often in ECOSOC, and a special commission was set up under UN context to deal just with the fishing net problem. Negotiations went on for two years, culminating in an international convention regulating the use of these nets. It was a complicated diplomatic negotiation involving very complex interests. The U.S. like many countries had mixed interests with the fishing companies on one side and the Green movement on the other. An involved compromise agreement was worked up which created an international regime limiting and controlling the use of these sort of nets. It was a very constructive exercise.

This was a bit of the model that Pickering and many of us were all talking about. It assumed
that the UN was an acceptable and useful forum in which you could deal with issues that by
definition couldn't be handled by any one country. No country could formulate a policy on
the use of fishing nets that would be of any use. It required multinational action. With the
end of the Cold War and the end of automatic confrontation on almost any given issue, we
now had a place where we could get together and talk about issues, not the international
political structure. The fishing net exercise was a good example of what Pickering and
others thought were opportunities to use the UN in new and constructive ways.

Q: How did you find the Japanese and Norwegian delegations?

MARKS: On this subject? Difficult. They were very hard-nosed, and the Japanese were the
worst of all. It finally came down to everybody negotiating with the Japanese, and we had
to muscle them very heavily. Generally, however, we got along with both delegations very
good; I had very close friends in both.

Q: It is one of these things where it doesn’t take a rocket scientist to understand that if you
are destroying huge areas of fishing, you lose your fish. This was already becoming
apparent that there were startling deficiencies in the amount of fish.

MARKS: Right. But will you explain to me why people shoot heroin into their veins when
they know it is a dangerous activity? People do these things and governments sometimes
take very difficult positions, for various reasons. In this case, both these countries have
important fishing industries So do others, and it took two years to achieve consensus. The
Japanese were the final holdout and the most difficult. They were not against the agreement
and regulations in theory, but were very difficult about the specific conditions and terms.

Dealing with problems in the UN and the negotiation of UN resolutions drives some people
up the wall, or at least until they get into it. The process is almost a caricature of
bureaucratic or diplomatic pettifoggery and of wordsmithing. Resolutions are negotiated
and passed which are not law, have no binding authority in international law, but are norm,
if not precedent, setting and thereby contribute to customary international law. Countries
read every word to make sure they are not in some way prejudicing their view on positions
that are important to them. Since countries have different agendas, everybody is looking at
it from a different perspective. For example, on issues that have nothing to do with the
central issue for India and Pakistan of Kashmir, both will read all sorts of resolutions to
make sure there is no language which can in any way be interpreted to throw a bit of a line
to the other side on the Kashmir issue. Every country has a concern like that. The PLO,
which is not a member of the UN but has a delegation there nevertheless, not only
introduces numerous resolutions touching directly on Palestinian questions, but they also
watch and try to slip language into unrelated resolutions. In this they are abetted by other
Middle East and Third World delegations while the Israelis with our support stand guard
against this campaign. We generally lose and the USG “no” votes on this matter alone
constitute a third or more of our negative votes in given GA session. You now have some
180 delegations doing this, in five different official languages no less. You see the
complexity.
Multilateral diplomacy in the UN takes place in various fora. There are the formal sessions, when the General Assembly or the Security Council or ECOSOC meet. Then you have the informal meetings where the negotiations take place, which take place on the record with translators and written records. But there is another category of meetings called informal-informals with interpreters, but no record kept. These plus the "corridor" conversations are where the majority of negotiations on resolutions actually takes place. Corridor negotiations include, of course, lunches, dinners, coffee bars, cocktail parties, and small gatherings in somebodies office. In fact, the intimate nature of the UN - where hundreds of representatives mill around a fairly small area (a very large building with many rooms and the adjacent several city blocks) - resembles a vast marketplace, full of bustling bazaari merchants.

The first time you walk into a UN meeting of delegates, it is difficult to believe what you are hearing, the apparent pettiness of the discussion. The dogged argument over seemingly irrelevant wording. However, after a while you become acclimated to it and realize it is not petty because the discussion is largely about code words. You begin to realize that these delegates watching every comment and every word from different national perspectives. Can a particular phrase in any way be used later in another context on another issue of importance? Can the phrasing of a resolution on Eritrea, for instance, lend itself to be used later in the Kashmir situation, and if so by which side? The involved delegations will hold it up negotiations completely if they think so. Think of the range of the matrix now, of 180 delegations on all these subjects, all watching out for implications. Suddenly you realize the complexity and why this is such a ponderous, slow, pettifogging process. that means the process has lots of limitations. It will never be a race horse. It will never become a national parliament, bit it is not supposed to be. It can do certain things, but can't do others.

Let me comment on the UN culture, particularly in New York. On the East Side of Manhattan there is three or four block area consisting of UN offices and national missions (although some are scattered further afield). It is a pure physical expression of the Corps Diplomatique, but a diplomatic corps without a host government and without a local community. It is free from consular duties, free from worrying about national days for its own community, and free from a host national government. If thought about in that context, professional diplomats at least will understand a lot of what goes on in the United Nations in New York.

Q: What was the attitude towards the UN bureaucracy? This has been a continuing target, particularly of Congress, but also the media.

MARKS: In a broad sense, the UN world is made up of two communities, the delegates and the officials. Again, this is something not understood by many people. People in the national missions are delegates who represent their country at the UN. The majority are there permanently, on regular diplomatic assignment, but there are many who come and go often for the annual GA or other meetings. Delegates go to meetings where they interact with other delegates as their primary responsibility but they also interact with Secretariat officials. This task resembles what diplomats generally do with their host government in national capitals. (The relationship is complicated in that many Secretariat officials
perform staff support functions for delegates' meetings: interpreters, the recorders, etc.) Secretariat officials are recruited in various ways. Some are UN professional staff pursuing a bureaucratic career in the United Nations. Others are political appointees: the retired diplomat from x country, the nephew of a prime minister somewhere, the political exile with friends, etc. There are also people on secondment from their governments, mostly diplomats, who are spending a few years at the UN. But the basic difference at any given moment is between delegate and official, even though some move back and forth over time.

What do we think about them? They are a very mixed bag. There are some very impressive people who work very hard and are first rate by anyone's standard, there are lazy time servers, and there self-serving corrupt officials. The selection process is not at all clean but is full of nepotism, old boy connections, favoritism, and back scratching. Although is supposed to be a bureaucratic merit system, it falls quite short.

Q: Like the congressional staffs.

MARKS: Yes, somewhat.

Q: How does it compare with national bureaucracies?

MARKS: Parts of it are better than many national bureaucracies, parts are better than some national bureaucracies, parts are as the worst. It is a mixed bag which deserves to be condemned but also to be understood. The UN is not a national institution but more like a permanent international conference. It is not a free standing institution with any authority of its own or any autonomy. It has no independent power, authority to raise money, or authority to issue any binding rules or regulations. It is a universal conference, based essentially on consensus. Given that, why would one expect its bureaucracy to be the caliber of a General Motors or of any reasonably competent national government. Every country is a member, has a right to belong, to be represented and expect to get a little something out of it. What is not understood in Washington is that the three or four patronage positions which Kenya, for instance, has gotten at the UN is part of what Kenya gets out of the UN. And if their three or four people are not there by pure merit, well, that may be the price of a universal consensual organization. Everybody has to get something out of it or why should they belong.

So, the UN is a very mixed bag and yes, should be made better, but let us accept the world we are in and the sort of organization this is.

Q: Who was the Secretary General when you were there?

MARKS: Perez de Cuellar, when I arrived and later Boutros Boutros-Ghali from Egypt.

Q: What were you getting from your impressions, from our delegation and maybe from other places about Perez de Cuellar's term of office?

MARKS: Perez de Cuellar is the quintessential Latin diplomat: intelligent, well educated,
experienced. He was rather low profile in style but it should be remembered that he did not have a mandate to be aggressive and a problem solver. Remember, he was a Secretary General selected during the Cold War. Since Dag Hammarskjold, all Cold War Secretary Generals have been compromise choices kept on tight leases by the big powers. The permissible lines of activity in the Cold War were restricted to activities to which none of the major powers objected. Perez de Cuellar was respected, but essentially functioned as a low profile compromiser and mediator, and he was good at that.

However, the United States and some other powers were unhappy with him, claiming they wanted a more aggressive manager, a different kind of Secretary General. They didn’t have anything against him personally. They said they wanted a different Secretary General. They recognized that he a good back room negotiator, who worked hard bringing people together, and operated quietly in the area that he was authorized. Then the Cold War ended while he was in office and the U.S. and other powers went in search of a more effective political figure and manager - or so they said.

Q: Was Ed Perkins there while you were there?

MARKS: Yes, for about eight or nine months following Pickering's departure in early 1992.

Q: What was your impression of him? He was also a career Foreign Service officer. His main interest as Director General seemed to be in promoting the cause of more diversity.

MARKS: Ed Perkins is a gentleman with a solid professional background. He is serious man, and a nice person. However, he was not at the UN very long, being replaced by the new Clinton Administration with Madeline Albright after only about eight months. In any case, he didn't have the horse power of Tom Pickering, but then I don't know very many people in the Service who do. Perkins had a tough act to follow, essentially did not have enough to place his own stamp on the mission. I think his basic view of the professional situation was similar to Pickering, but as I said it was a time of transition in Washington he had very little scope.

Q: You mentioned deep sea fishing and then there was another major issue?

MARKS: There were a number of other outstanding major issues in the economic and social area. The deep sea fishing is the neatest one because it came to a resolution, with an international convention. Sustainable development was blowing up tremendously as an issue, and finally ended up with that great big Rio conference in 1992. It was followed the year after by a UN conference on women, and then later UN international conferences on various social and economic issues throughout the decade. It was in the context of the sustainable development issue that an interesting new characteristic of the modern world made itself manifest, that is, the rise of non-governmental organizations or NGOs. NGOs has existed in small numbers for some time, provision for their involvement in international affairs was even included in the UN Charter. However, by the early 1990s, there had been an explosion in their number and influence. At the Rio Development
Conference in 1992, 6,000 NGOs registered to participate. A number of them were ad hoc institutions created for the Conference, and somewhat cynically described as three people and a fax machine. Nevertheless they made a significant impression and since then there has been further growth in their numbers and influence.

Q: Could you explain what you are talking about when you talk about non-governmental organizations, the NGOs?

MARKS: NGOs have been around for a long time, of course, and the original Charter of the UN included reference to and a place for non-government organizations in ECOSOC. The Charter has provisions for the registration of NGOs - under certain criteria such as their bona fides, international character, and their connection to items of interest to ECOSOC. Five quite large NGOs - Lions International being one of them - were involved in getting this provision included in the Charter and were the first NGOs registered. The idea was these organizations - respectable and properly vetted - would have a formal observer status at ECOSOC meetings. Although not entitled to vote or to speak except when invited, they did have the right to attended meetings and to submit papers. It was an early attempt to provide access for the private public.

But in the seventies and eighties the number of NGOs began to grow, dramatically. At first the explosion of NGOs was in the human rights area. Now, human rights is a subject which is the responsibility of the Third (Social) Committee of the General Assembly, but also ECOSOC and most especially the Commission on Human Rights. This is a specially established UN intergovernmental body with about 50 some member State delegations which meets every year to discuss just human rights questions. So, particularly in the field of human rights the number of NGOs have grew rapidly, demanding more voice in UN deliberations.

Then, the end of the Cold War unblocked the international situation in a very real way. Private civil movements which had been growing underneath the Cold War structure broke into the open and developed into a very large, worldwide NGO community. The Green or environment movement was a major source of NGOs. They have been very active in lobbying their governments, going to the press and at the UN they are all over the place. They are demanding broader rights of participation, and have become major players at international conferences. And, one of the things the UN is going through is how to deal with this explosion of non-governmental members of the UN community and how to integrate them. In fact, ECOSOC has recently appointed a new committee to look into the rule on NGO participation and the possibility of giving them more rights to participate in UN bodies.

Q: This type of community activism is a natural growth in the United States. Is this true in other places?

MARKS: Increasingly so. Although it is clearly a very American and British phenomenon, it is growing everywhere. Particularly with respect to human rights and sustainable development, we are seeing the growth of truly indigenous NGOs in lots of countries.
where you would never have seen anything like that. Obviously it is still difficult to do this in some countries, it would be very difficult to create a true NGO in Burma on either of those two subjects. But, even in many African countries you are seeing the growth. They are becoming a major factor in both domestic and international politics.

**Q: What do you mean by sustainable development?**

MARKS: Sustainable development is a merging of two streams of policy concern that have been around for quite a long time. One is economic development and the other is concern for the environment, the old conservation movement. There is also an overarching element of economic equalitarianism. The merger is designed to define agreement or agreements on policies which will produce economic wealth by methods and procedures not damaging to the future health of the earth and of future generations. For instance, how do you obtain tropical woods for consumption by people without destroying the tropical forests, and thereby depriving future generations? How do you get pursue economic development which benefits the world's poor? Sustainable development advocates argue that most of the current methods of rapid economic development are extremely polluting. However, the countries of the so-called Third World argue that this concern is self-serving, in that the rich became so and now are trying to tell the poor not to do so. The sustainable development advocates respond that it is necessary therefore to figure out methods of economic development that are non-polluting and therefore sustainable over time.

As for the rich countries, the problems is to change their economic processes and procedures so that they stop polluting. Sustainable development is a catch-all topic, involving questions about ozone levels, acid rain, fisheries, loss of arable land, the Sahara desert, and such. Soon it will get into health problems. But, it is basically the merger of various concerns over how you preserve nature and still get development. Sustainable development became and still is very fashionable in, especially in NGO circles. However some governments, for instance the Scandinavians, have picked it up also. The movement resulted in the creation in the UN of the Commission on Sustainable Development, a major new intergovernmental body. Note that this development was very popular in the Clinton Administration, especially with Vice President Gore, although it was received with great skepticism in the Congress.

**Q: In your work what was your main concern in this?**

MARKS: We had three main concerns. One was that it was not a bad idea, Why not cooperate in this area? Two, our UN delegation viewed its role as that of a leader, which means seeking and/or crafting acceptable deals. And three, there was strong pressure from Washington to make sure we in no way committed ourselves to any increase in resources, i.e. money. Washington was going over every word to insure we in no way implied that the United States would provide additional resources. We had to make sure that all language carefully stated that while we are in favor of sustainable development, all new programs would have to be pursued in terms of currently available resources. And, of course, more of the Green NGOs and lobbying groups were trying to get increased resources for sustainable development programs. So, that was the key negotiating question.
**Q:** Did you find any of the other affluent Western powers were taking a more relaxed view towards this?

MARKS: Yes, although the Japanese were very much with us. They also did not want to have any additional commitments. The Western Europeans varied, but basically they were a little more relaxed than we were, yes. The whole question of the attitude of the Europeans towards sustainable development at the UN is a very interesting one. They were more relaxed on two grounds. First, they were more sympathetic to the general idea, being pushed by their own Green movements. Some of them were willing to put more money into it, especially the Nordics and the Dutch. Second, they were a little more cynical. The United States generally takes a much more legalistic position in the UN than most governments. Others are often more willing to go along with fuzzy phrasing, knowing that they will interpret any particular resolution when the time comes. We are much more legalistic, take UN resolutions more seriously, and are much more concerned that we really can live with the phrasing as it exists. Some of the European governments would say, “Oh, what the hell. It’s close enough for government work and it doesn’t really bind us, so we can live with it. And if we can’t, we won’t, so what the hell.” In other words, they are much more relaxed and cynical about the binding precedence of UN resolutions. We, on the other hand, keep saying these resolutions do not constitute binding international law but keep dealing with them as if they were.

**Q:** Did you find at all a dividing line between those countries allowing free enterprise and those putting more restrictions on their economy?

MARKS: From 1990 on almost no one would defend anything remotely socialist, except maybe the Chinese (who, however, supported the USG proposed resolutions on the virtues of entrepreneurship) and the Cubans. Everyone else would get up with a straight face and talk about the glories of free enterprise. It became quite the rage to praise free enterprise. In fact in 1990-91 we drafted a series of resolutions praising the concept of private enterprise and entrepreneurship. Everyone voted in favor, Russians and all.

**Q:** And that was an anathema to the third world before.

MARKS: Two years before you couldn't get a soul to even consider such resolutions, but there we were pushing them through. And remember the UN is the corps diplomatic in its purist essence, so the degree of tongue-in-cheek hypocrisy is fairly high.

**Q:** Speaking of small governments, what about the arrival on the scene of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Micronesia, etc.? Did you all find yourselves as mentors?

MARKS: To some degree, but not to all. We got to play a little bit more of a role with some of the former Soviet Union people because the Russians had so badly lost prestige and status, and were themselves floundering. Therefore we were even mentors to the Russians for a while. But that was a brief period. They have now regained their poise and have started to push back and assert themselves, which we should have known would happen. So, yes, small new countries latched onto various people for a time. UN membership
jumped to 180 or so. They even had to increase the seating in the General Assembly room, put up a lot more flag poles, etc.

Q: Ed, were there any other major things which you were dealing with that we should talk about, or should we move on?

MARKS: Well, as the UN was my last real assignment, when we finish with the UN we finish. Let me talk about the Israeli issue because I played a role about which I feel very proud. Israel had been in the UN since its establishment, but from the fifties on had become pretty much a pariah with the growth of the Third World movement, and the creation of the huge voting block in the UN of the G-77. Remember that block works on pure consensus, so that everybody in that block gets the whole group to support their position on a subject of particular interest to them in exchange for the same support to others on their particular issues. This meant that on anything to do with Israel and the Middle East the Arab countries got the whole block to vote their way. Although a Member State, therefore, Israel was consistently the object of critical resolutions, even though many countries had good bilateral good relations with Israel. When it came to voting on Israeli issues, it was the United States and sometimes only some or all of the Europeans, who would support Israel or at least abstain.

Now, every Member State is a member of the General Assembly but almost every other intergovernmental body in the UN is an elected body. For instance even the Security Council includes 10 elected members in addition to the Permanent Five while ECOSOC has a membership of 55 who are elected for three year terms. The U.S. and several other major countries are always elected to ECOSOC - although a defeat for the British a few years ago was a bit of a scandal - while other countries take their turns. But, Israel never gets elected to anything. And in addition every year Israel is the subject of critical resolutions in the General Assembly and other inter-governmental bodies. These resolutions are passed by large majorities (the Group of 77 remembers has over 120 members). Only the U.S. can be counted on to ensure that these resolutions are not unanimous.

Well, with the change going on after the end of the Cold War, we saw an opportunity to push a breakdown in the traditional predictable voting patterns in the UN. So we started to talk about the long-standing and invidious General Assembly resolution equating Zionism with racism, a resolution which embittered Israel. We knew that overruling it would be hard, the Arab bloc would certainly would be against it, and would call on the Group of 77 for support. As a tactic, we made a first run in ECOSOC by trying to get Israel elected to one of the ECOSOC subordinate inter-governmental bodies. I can’t even remember which one, to be honest – there are number of these small commission and committees. I was the floor manager for that. We spent about a year lobbying then introduced Israel as a candidate for this particular commission at the summer ECOSOC meeting. It was held in Geneva (ECOSOC alternates between New York and Geneva). I was the head of the ECOSOC delegation and floor managed the campaign. We were successful, Israel was elected providing the first vote in favor of Israel in 40 years or so. It was a tremendous breakthrough, and I was the hero of the Israeli delegation (and I am told spoken of well in
the MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] in Jerusalem. This became important when I later was somewhat imprudent in a corridor discussion with a PLO representative (a real no-no), and the Israelis were prepared to cover for me. The next year we introduced a successful resolution in the General Assembly withdrawing the Zionism equals Racism resolution which passed years ago. Of course, other developments in the Middle East contributed to our success.

Q: What do you mean you floor managed?

MARKS: First, let me explain the background to voting in ECOSOC (and in the UN) in general. Member delegations organize themselves in so-called regional groups. For instance, the U.S. belongs to the Western European and Other Group (the others being the U.S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand). There is an Eastern European group, an African group, a Latin American group and an Asian group. Each has so many seats in any given UN intergovernmental body. In ECOSOC, for instance, of the 55 voting seats, 6 belong to the Western European group, 8 to the Latin American group, etc., all based on the total number of countries in each particular geographical region. Israel did not belong to any group, which meant it could not fill any groups quota. So, if Israel was interested in obtaining one of the 32 seats on the Committee on Technology, the Israeli delegation would have to find a Regional Group will to give up one of its seats. Only the Western Group would consider doing so but never did because of the impossibility of winning – given that almost all of the members of the African, Middle Eastern, Asian, Latin American, and the Eastern European groups were either members of the Group or 77 or allied with them and would vote against Israel.

With the end of the Cold War, however, and the resultant shifts in attitudes we felt the time might be ripe for a successful election of Israel to some body. We got the European group to support Israel for membership in a minor subsidiary body of ECOSOC and began to solicit core support among sympathetic delegations. Then we started planning for the next meeting of ECOSOC by negotiating with some delegations while bypassing others. At the ECOSOC meeting, we put the nomination in play, and ratcheted up our lobbying. We also solicited support directly with some governments in their capitals through the State Department and our embassies.

Q: What is in it for country B when you come up to them? What kind of argument did you use?

MARKS: It varied enormously, of course. With like-minded governments (the Western Europeans, etc) we argued that the time was ripe to remedy a long-standing injustice in the treatment of Israel in the UN and that doing so would contributed to the Middle East peace process by demonstrating to Israel that it could obtain a normal place in the UN and in the international community. Towards delegations not fundamentally anti-Israel but caught up in Group of 77 obligations, we would argue as follows: “My dear colleague, the world has changed. The Cold War is over and we need to open up the UN. Israel is a member of the UN and we are not going to solve any problems by keeping isolated. The United States is strongly in favor of this. The French are strongly in favor of this. The Dutch are strongly in favor of this. And it is time we all changed our UN attitude towards Israel.”
Some were sympathetic and agreed with us from the beginning. Others really didn’t care and realized that times had indeed changed. In the end we were successful, for various reasons, the traditional G-77 consensus broke on this issue. In their meetings...and there are lots of G-77 meetings all the time...this subject came up and the issue became whether it would be a consensus or non-consensus vote. All the lobbying we and other like-minded delegations, and the Israelis, had done was successful and G-77 decided that issue would not require a group consensus vote. Once that happened, it broke the thing wide open. With that we could really concentrate our lobbying, plan a debate strategy (who would say what) and were able to obtain a heavy vote in favor of Israel’s candidacy.

And then the next year, as I mentioned earlier, we went into the General Assembly and got the Zionism equals racism resolution abrogated.

This was very important to the Israelis who deeply resented the resolution. Our success demonstrated this change in the UN and in our international relationships. During the Cold War delegations voted on many issues as a result of the Soviets had called “the correlation of factors.” Now that the correlation had changed, delegations voted differently and specifically became much more solicitous of U.S. views.

Q: You mentioned human rights.

MARKS: That was an on-going problem and question, growing in weight as the U.S. has an aggressive policy on human rights. We are not alone in this, the Dutch and the Nordics for instance are often out ahead of us. Deliberations in the Third Committee of the General Assembly and the ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights are often donnybrooks. We usually went to Geneva for the annual Human Rights [HR] Commission meeting and try to condemn the mainland Chinese, and the Chinese go armed for bear to ensure that our resolution is not passed. The Palestinians try to condemn the Israelis and others attempt to condemn some of the Arab countries. This was also the period of the break-up of Yugoslavia and the beginning of that set of problems. In 1992-93 the question of ethnic cleansing arose. So, The Commission on Human Rights is a very contentious place where very touchy and nasty issues are raised and which governments subject to attack energetically resist. We usually have a special representative with the title of Ambassador for the HR Commission from Washington. The first two years I was there it was a refugee Cuban named Valedares, who was replaced by a black American politician. Former VP candidate Geraldine Ferraro held that position for the last couple of years.

The HR Commission is a forum where a specific part of American foreign policy is identified and pursued. So, the human rights NGOs and lobby groups push us to take a very aggressive stance and it is difficult in that body to engage in the usual diplomatic trade offs. But on the other hand, everyone has to to some degree, even the Israelis and the PLO. Nevertheless the rhetoric gets pretty carried away, especially on the Middle East, Chinese, and Cuban questions. The Administration can really get its ears beat back. Interestingly, the Department of State’s annual human rights reports now play a big role in those debates, as it has become the basic document for many if not most debates in the Commission.
Q: It is an interesting thing that these reports which were mandated some years ago by Congress, which everybody screamed about in the State Department, have become part of the international vocabulary.

MARKS: Very much so, and used by everybody, including governments people who were defending themselves against charges of bad behavior. They were always reasonably good, but have gotten better and become almost everyone’s standard.

Q: You mention the Cuban question keeps coming up. In the context, what is the Cuban question?

MARKS: The Cubans have a very large mission at the UN, almost as large as ours. They are smart, aggressive and very skilled. The Cubans spend a lot of time competing with the United States, attacking, trying to get language in resolutions attacking the United States for, among other things, our sanctions policy against Cuba. From time to time, we will attack them, particularly in the human rights area.

So, you often get an exchange of words between the Cubans and the Americans. But they are very good at multinational diplomacy and important at the UN. They were an original member of the Group of 77 within which they play an active and often leadership role. They are very supportive of other countries such as the Arabs, Africans, etc., and can therefore draw on their credit when they need to. They have very effectively used the G-77 consensus voting policy. When that policy broke down some in recent years, some of the more successful Third World governments such as Malaysia and Singapore found they needed a more complicated view of the world, the Cuban found they were having to work harder and were having less success.

Q: Did you ever have any relations with them, ever sit down at the delegates lounge or something?

MARKS: Yes, I have. There was a great deal of collegiality at the UN, professional diplomatic collegiality. The atmosphere is very intimate as we are together hours on end, especially during General Assembly sessions. There are very few delegates that you cannot at least be collegial with, unless there is a personal problem. I even once got into a corridor discussion, with many other delegates standing around, with a PLO delegate which is very dangerous for an American official. However an Israeli colleague said he would get the Israeli Foreign Ministry to cover for me if I ran into trouble over this incident; given my effort on their election to an ECOSOC subordinate body noted earlier, I was in their good books.

Q: What about China?

MARKS: The Chinese are a major, brooding presence in New York. They are usually very restrained in their behavior, do not say much, nor are always present. If they get excited about a subject, they can get very difficult. Yet they can often be quite constructive,
working with others to obtain consensus, something they are usually in favor of. I got along well with my counterpart, the Chinese Mission Minister Counselor for ECOSOC matters. He was an older man, with a great deal of experience. He spoke reasonably good English, and we got along very well. He was a reasonable soul and we both tried to stay out of each other’s way on substantive matters, certainly did not look for fights. He was very cooperative, very skilled and we, as I said, we got along very well. If we had to disagree, we did so without making it very emotional or personal.

Also as I noted, the Chinese are ever-present in UN activities and meetings, even if often a passive way, observing manner. They generally do not attempt to lead but do lots of backroom and corridor work. This style may be forced by their relative lack of comfort in English and other Western languages, and the rare number of others who speak Chinese.

There is a major difference in UN meetings, particularly in the economic and social areas, between the countries that are represented at every session and meeting, and those with small staffs and more limited interest who drift in and out. This is not always a question of the countries size; comparatively small countries like Holland and Singapore are all over the place.

One interesting development was watching how the Western Europeans operated in the UN. When I arrived in 1989, the Western Europeans had been coalescing as a cohesive group for years. As members of the European Community now the European Union [EU], they meet for coordination of positions and this coordination has been hardening. The EU diplomats would meet every morning in the EU Mission (they have one) and coordinate their positions. Then one of them would be designated as the EU spokesmen (usually the delegate from the country then serving as EU president) who would speak for them in meetings. He (or she) would always begin any statement with “Speaking on behalf of the 12 associated members of the European Community. He would be surrounded by representatives of the other members of the EC, of course, would often the participate debates on their own.

This posed a new and special problem for us. We have different relationships with different members of the EC and a very special one with the English. We had traditionally depended on them to keep us informed as to what was going on inside the EC group. Over the time I was there, however, 1989-93, we saw a clear, definite intensification of the EC. They early morning meetings increasingly produced a common EC position, one applied equally to us as to other delegations. Increasingly it became difficult for us to get inside the EC group and influence them by bilateral discussions and negotiations. Although many of the Europeans remained friendly and close to us, we found that increasingly we had to negotiate with them as a group, after they had formulated a common position.

Q: I would think there would be an endemic problem to that and that would be once they had reached their consensus they couldn’t very well change it. That was it and in a way it developed a rigidity.

MARKS: Absolutely, that is what I meant. For instance, it had long been a habit for the U.S.
delegation to meet with the Europeans to exchange ideas and even to coordinate tactics. Usually this was done bilaterally, depending on a combination of country and personal relations. Increasingly, however, we would now meet more formally, the United States delegation and all the EC delegates together. (This was true on the ECOSOC side, I am not sure how things were managed on the political side.) We were trying to go over issues before the EC group solidified its positions. That became increasingly hard during my tour in New York, even though I got along extremely well with most of my European colleagues (except for the Brit, despite the “Special Relationship” and my long lasting Anglophilia, we did not get along. He had a bad case of arrogance and probably hidden resentment of the U.S.). But that was what was happening and it became difficult to work with the Europeans. This was a comparative judgment; we certainly remained on better terms with them than with most others.

However, one day at a large informal meeting I became increasingly tired of the EC spokesmen (probably my British colleague) who preceded every intervention with the rolling phrase “Speaking on behalf of the 12 associated states of the European Community...” On one of my interventions, I mimicked his tone and began my statement with “Speaking on behalf of the 50 Associated States of the United States and the Associated Commonwealth of Puerto Rico...” This brought the house down, I must say.

This development created numerous incidents. For instance, not only were the European Community delegates increasingly solidifying their positions, the European Commission itself had established a Mission at the UN. While that mission did not have voting status, it could participate in all meetings. In addition, all the EC delegations would hold their group meetings at the European Commission. In the fall of 1992 the EC Mission overreached itself and drafted an ECOSOC resolution, which would have moved them very close to full independent membership. The resolution was not specifically about the European Commission, but it was a reordering of the participation requirements for regional organizations like the European Commission giving them a much more active role in the UN and very close to the rights of Member States.

Actually the United States government was not uninterested in this and not unsupportive in theory: we always have been a big supporter of the European Community. But, for various, largely legal reasons, we didn’t want to go down this road at this time. The EC was pushing the proposal in a way which we thought would create problems with respect to other regional organizations, creating a precedent for other, less respectable organizations. We also thought this proposal was somewhat of a back door approach which might create problems in the future. Nevertheless, the EC Mission had obtained support from the EC Missions (although many admitted later in private that they were less than enthused with the whole idea) and when it was introduced at the ECOSOC meeting, we began the negotiations. I had the lead on this, and essentially proposed a serious redrafting in order to avoid the problems we saw.

The European Commission people were very aggressive, seeking a very clear and very real new status. Given the USG position, I found myself on the side of many Third World countries who resented this push by the Europeans. (They are always very sensitive about
any challenge to their sovereign status and any effort by the Europeans or us to change the situation to their disadvantage. They saw the EC initiative as a way for the rich to obtain even more influence in the UN).

This EC initiative opened up a whole summer of fun debates for me, where I found myself in partnership with a very intelligent and aggressive lady delegate from Colombia who was designated as the G-77 spokesperson on this issue. She was furious with the Europeans who she felt were trying to put something over on the rest of the UN membership. The Japanese were also upset, and we formed a triumvirate to oppose the EC Mission. Actually, I put this coalition together, and in meeting after meeting we just shredded them to pieces. The poor EC delegate had to take the brunt, as his colleagues from the EC national missions gave him only nominal support.

Finally, we had been so successful in opposing this initiative, that a high powered delegation flew in from Brussels, five quite senior Commission officials. The Representative of the European Commission gave a little stag dinner for me and a couple of my staff, just to start off the week they planned to be in New York to resolve their problem, i.e. to soften us up.

The discussions went on all week and I had a great time. That week led me to better understand what the Economist magazine had always noted about the style of senior bureaucrats of the European Commission which has apparently made them quite disliked all over Europe. They were extremely arrogant, convinced they are the only people who know what is going on, and if they want to do something, everyone should just get out of their way. Well, to be blunt, I had them by their balls all week; they were on our turf playing by our rules. Supported by my coalition partners we just said no. It was very interesting, their position was, if they wanted it, we had to give way. We kept saying no. We had some very interesting exchanges which tripped them up all over the place, as they were playing by their rules and criteria and we just did not accept them.

However from their perspective their objective was logical and should be achieved. After a week of discussion, we sent them back to Brussels furious and outraged that people would deal with them that way. It was a marvelous week of multilateral negotiation where for once I was on the majority side. It was also fun to watch the other European diplomats maintaining a straight face as we manhandled the Brussels officials. It was clear that many people share the Economist’s view of EC officials.

Q: I hope you weren’t too tough on them because I think these bureaucrats are going to be our salvation. I think they are going to so screw up the European Community as an economic rival, that it is going to make them a patsy for the United States to deal with.

MARKS: We had a whole number of activities of this type. It was a very rich four years.

Q: It sounds like an excellent time.

MARKS: Yes, it was a lot of fun. Relations with Washington were difficult, but relations
inside the Mission were superb, although the excitement declined some after Pickering left. But the real excitement was participating in the activities across the street, in the UN itself. I would leave the Mission as soon as I could, and cross the street to disappear into the UN - all day if possible. Meetings and discussion would follow each other, and lunch would be at a restaurant or one of the coffee bars. At the end of the afternoon, we would often go straight to someone’s reception where the same people would continue the same discussions and negotiations. It was all office talk and the wives hated it, and mostly didn’t attend. Afterwards, we would often go straight back to meetings.

Q: I was going to say, what does this do to the family life?

MARKS: It was difficult for some, but my wife was relaxed and said the hell with it, let him enjoy himself. And I did, even if and maybe because the activity was constant and rather exciting it its own way. Meetings and sessions, particularly during the General Assembly in the fall or ECOSOC in the summer, often mean twelve, fourteen, sixteen, eighteen hour days. We had one three week period when the hours got longer and longer until during the last four days I only went home twice, just to change clothes and take a shower. During that session we worked around the clock three nights in a row. As I noted earlier, we worked very long hours at the UN, with lunches and receptions part of the work day in a very real way. You often went from one reception to another, meeting the same people and doing your lobbying and information gathering. And then we would go back to the office to report or back to the negotiations. It was all very intense and of course, if you like that, and I do, it was marvelous fun.

It meant constant professional interaction with a group of three or four hundred people, and it became quite intimate with the core group of maybe a hundred or so. It was almost all shop talk, and as I keep repeating, I enjoyed it thoroughly. Not everybody did. Some delegates from smaller delegations, with Missions not as close to the UN as we were, would literally go to their office in the morning, check their traffic, review their papers, fill up their briefcase and go to the UN and not go back until late at night to file their reports. These colleagues also had to cover the whole range of activities on their own. Some got good at it, some just coasted.

Q: Well, Ed, then you retired.

MARKS: No, then I returned to Washington, where I was detailed as a Visiting Senior Fellow to the Institute for National Strategic Studies of the National Defense University [NDO] at Fort McNair. After two years there I retired.

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Q: Today is December 11, 1996. Ed, let’s talk a little bit about the reform of the UN.

MARKS: My arrival at the UN in 1989 coincided with the end of the Cold War, which dramatically changed the whole political environment of the world and of course the environment of the UN. The UN had been, after all, frozen for 30 years or so with the U.S. 153
and its allies on one side, the Soviets and their allies on another, and a large number of people called the Third World between them. The UN had been frozen in such a way that on almost any given issue there was no need to take a vote. You knew how it was going to turn out as the three sides lined up. The end of the Cold War however opened up the UN. All the players looked around to find new ways and maybe new positions and relations in order to play important roles. The options were open, so to speak. The U.S., for instance, started out with President Bush’s “Brave New World” insight, and we suddenly became very involved in multilateral questions, such as how the UN could engage in active peacekeeping and crisis management – subjects which we had carefully avoided until then.

These were of course political subjects but, although my portfolio in the Mission was economic and social affairs, I became involved from the humanitarian assistance side. The end of the Cold War seemed to have opened up a Pandora’s Box of local and internal conflicts creating horrendous humanitarian crises. The first reaction of many governments, including the U.S., was to deal with these problems through the UN, through a form of expanded peacekeeping married to humanitarian assistance. This approach produced interest in the idea of multinational humanitarian assistance and initiatives to create a new UN body to deal with implementation of this new concept (Department of Humanitarian Affairs or DHA), and authority in the form of a GA resolution. The discussion and negotiation of these proposals took place in ECOSOC and the GA’s Third (Social) Committee which were my turfs. It was a subject of long-term significance as to turned on interpretation and reinterpretation of the concept of national sovereignty in international law. The repercussions of that negotiation and subsequent action continue to reverberate today. Interestingly, the U.S. and most developed countries, especially Western Europeans, were relatively enthusiastic about the concept of humanitarian intervention while the Third World delegations were very suspicious and skeptical, seeing it as new authority for the former colonial powers to pursue neo-colonial ambitions through the UN. As a result, the final product was carefully circumscribed and DHA was limited to a coordination role between other UN agencies. Nevertheless these changes allowed, if they did not lead to, later UN activism in places such as the Balkans and have significantly altered international law. The world is no longer a pure Westphalian place – at least with respect to international law. (I have continued work in this area since I left the UN, both at NDU and since retiring.)

Another activity I did get involved in reform of the UN. It went under the mind numbing UN phrase of Revitalization of the Economic and Social Council. UN reform had been a subject of discussion for a long time but had never gotten anywhere. But in the late 1900s, the five Nordic countries released a report they had done on their own proposing on significant revitalization, or reorganization, of ECOSOC. ECOSOC is a main organ of the United Nations, according to the UN Charter, and originally intended to be the economic equivalent of the Security Council. It never worked out that way and ECOSOC became marginalized for all sorts of reasons, one major one being that the United States and its Western European allies did not wish to have the UN become a forum in economic decisions were made. All the deliberative bodies of the UN work on the one country-one vote principal, and we were not about to have economic decisions made that way. We preferred the World Bank group where we have weighted voting.
However, the end of the Cold War created a new situation which seemed ripe for some reorganization in an attempt to revitalize ECOSOC. The objective was not to restore a major role for it in macro-economic decision making, but to revive what its original role as the source of political and policy guidance for the UN’s operational departments, specialized agencies, funds and programs such the World Health Organization, World Food, UNDP, UNICEF, etc. And that is what the argument revolved around.

I spent much of my three and a half years on this subject. As the head of the Economic and Social section of the Mission, I was the floor leader, doing much of the lobbying and the primary drafter of the position papers. This was a major activity for us in 1991, ‘92, and ‘93 in the General Assembly and in ECOSOC. In the end, we passed two ECOSOC and General Assembly resolutions; resolutions which to insiders were very close to revolutionary. The final one was not passed until after I left in 1993, but I had completed the negotiations on it prior to leaving.

It was important because it reversed 30 years of UN practice which had consistently broken up, diversified and dispersed authority. More and more committees and subcommittees had been created, and operational authority had been dispersed to the specialized agencies, funds and programs - divorced from any central leadership by the General Assembly or ECOSOC. All this is admittedly very esoteric, deep into questions of UN culture, arising from the fact that the UN is a hybrid institution. In one sense it is nothing more and nothing less than a permanent, ongoing diplomatic conference. That is the political side of the UN. The other side is that it is a set of international bureaucracies, each headed by a mini-general assembly or governing board. There is a real difference in the UN between the UN as an intergovernmental political body representing governments and the UN as a set of international bureaucracies. These bureaucracies, such as UNICEF and UNHCR, were famous or notorious for going their own way, or at least representing viewpoints not acceptable to Washington.

**Q: UNICEF is?**

**MARKS:** It is the UN’s Children’s Fund, begun soon after WWII and famous for being represented by people like Danny Kaye and Audrey Hepburn. A very effective but also very successful in creating an image and a reputation. In fact it is a very effective international organization, but somewhat parochial, in that they have marked out their own turf – children’s relief – and resent any attempt to get them involved in working with other organizations.

The UN reform movement I discussed above a whole bunch of delegations not restricted to North/South or East/West. It included us, the Western Europeans, Canadians but also the Pakistanis and the Russians. The Moroccans were very cooperative as were some of the Latin Americans. It was a very ecumenical group of delegations and, in fact, I sometimes thought participation in reform was more often than not a decision by the resident mission, rather than being a decision taken in capitals.
After months of discussion and negotiation, we finally passed a UNGA resolution, which had a number of points. First, ECOSOC was formally designated as the central policy governing board for the four UN funds and programs: UN Development Program, UNICEF, World Food Program, and the Population Development Program. In pursuant of that decision, the governing boards of these organizations 1) had their authority restricted to questions of a management nature, and 2) specifically made subordinate to ECOSOC for policy guidance.

What we had done in essence was regroup dispersed policy authority and pull it back to a central organ of the UN. This was very difficult to do, as there was a great deal of opposition. The organizations themselves, of course, opposed the shift in authority and lobbied like mad. The UNICEF people in particular ran around and tried organize delegations in opposition. None of these organizations wanted to lose authority to a central political body. But, we got it through. In my case, I spent a great deal of my time negotiating and fighting with Washington. Not everyone in Washington was excited about UN reform, and the Assistant Secretary for IO John Bolton was extremely skeptical. He was not enormously enamored of the UN in any case.

To anyone who knows about the internal workings of the UN, this was a truly important reversal, all developments up until had been in the opposite direction of decentralizing authority and creating new committees and sub-committees. It may, of course, all come to naught because many governments, including Washington, have never quite realized the potential significance of this change. It is potentially significant because it gives - in Archimedean terms - a place from which to move the system. Washington doesn’t see it, however, which is a source of great frustration to many of us. Washington has not really attempted to use this opening in any meaningful way. Meanwhile this Administration talks about reform, better management and prompt response to emergencies, yet here is a tool we have given them but which they are not using. They appear to be more interested in television bites, PR management, and fights with the Secretary General instead of understanding the true character of the UN - good, bad and indifferent - and how to use it for your own purposes.

The major problem I have with the present Administration’s UN policy is that it does not understand the UN, and therefore most of what is said is therefore either irrelevant or perverse and does not accomplish what we want. The Administration has made no attempt to understand the nature of the creature, and what carrots and sticks will actually work. Meanwhile, our UN reform activity, still an ongoing process up there in New York, was successful to a significant degree and there now on the books a tool for management of the dispersed UN system, a better tool than is appreciated in Washington. But, of course, use of this tool requires 1) greater comprehension of the UN than exists and 2) willingness to engage in multinational bureaucratic trench warfare. It is long term work, not particularly dramatic on any given day, will rarely produce a headline. It is the exercise of day-to-day leadership of a very complex organization.

Q: But it was put into shape by the time you left?
MARKS: Yes. I was involved in helping to negotiate one of the first reform resolutions passed in 1991, and then I was involved in a major way in the most comprehensive resolution on ECOSOC reform finally passed in 1993 or maybe even in early 1994 just after I left. At the last stage of negotiating this resolution, in the General Assembly in the fall of 1992, the Nordics, particularly the Swedes, got into a snit and said they wouldn’t go along the compromise we had negotiated. I always found the Nordic diplomats to be intelligent and interested, good colleagues, and serious people, but they don’t know how to close a deal. At the end they often have a great deal of difficulty compromising. In this case since they had initiated much of the reform program and the final result jettisoned a lot of their ideas, they became very unhappy and finally wouldn’t sign the final deal. It took another year of massaging them to bring them around. But we had a negotiated text in place when I left and I feel very good about it. It is perhaps a modest legacy that a crowd of delegates left, but it is already apparently making some difference for the good in the UN system. Perhaps not as much as it could, and it should have been followed up by further reforms along those lines. But tightening up authority gets one into areas where it requires governments to make commitments about their own willingness to do this sort of work, and to commit more resources. Although, this Administration (Clinton) seems to believe in the UN it also seems to believe it can lead from behind. Not paying one’s bills while pushing others to do so and to make commitments is an approach I do not quite understand.

To be fair, much of the Administration’s problems in the UN stem from congressional opposition, but the Administration does not appear to be able to handle that opposition.

One final remark while we are talking about the UN. The openings made by the end of the Cold War are still there, and the real debate in foreign policy should include the role of the UN.

In my opinion, this Administration really does not understand the UN even though it is obviously intellectually oriented towards a multilateral foreign policy, and with the best intention has been perverting its own objectives by its mishandling of the UN in New York and in Washington.

Q: Obviously you are still involved, you must have your own contacts up at the UN. Last week, President Clinton named Madeline Albright, who had been his Ambassador to the United Nations, as Secretary of State. What did you get about her time at the UN?

MARKS: I have kept close to UN affairs because I went to INSS, which we can talk about later, I was working on UN related subjects, peacekeeping and UN reform, etc. We will have to wait for history to decide what her role has been at the UN. She led a very political mission to the United Nations. Her immediate senior staff were almost all political appointees, although, apparently she got along very well with her number two, a career FSO. But she very much staffed up a heavily Schedule C mission of political appointees. One of her primary, closest supporters and assistant is a young man whose real talent and experience in public relations. Ambassador Albright is very, very press and public relations oriented. One journalist commented on TV the other day that her appointment has little or nothing to do with gender politics, but it has to do with sound byte politics. She is a
master at it, and has been from the beginning the only consistent voice on foreign policy in the administration. The Secretary of State himself has not been very active except in specific areas. So, in many respects Ambassador Albright has been increasingly the primary foreign policy spokesperson of the administration.

She has also spent almost as much time in Washington as New York and has clearly played as role as a major foreign policy advisor to the President. She clearly has no intentions of being just the representative in New York.

Ambassador Albright clearly represents an instinct and perspective of the Clinton Administration to be pro-multinational and pro-multicultural in foreign affairs, and also pro-United Nations. I believe the Administration calls its approach aggressive multilateralism.

But my feeling is that they haven’t done well at the UN and I find it interesting that Madeline Albright has been touted as a good choice for Secretary of State because she did well in New York. I think the Administration, represented by her, has done badly in New York in policy terms, although they have done very well in terms of publicity and domestic perceptions. We are now touching on that great divide between those of us who are professional foreign policy people and really only care about foreign policy. However, all administrations are a mixture of foreign policy and domestic types, except in this Administration the foreign policy component seems comparatively minimal. The Clinton Administration has pursued what is largely a domestically oriented and very PR oriented foreign policy. At least, that is what they did in New York.

For instance, there is the contradiction of being pro-UN but doing so badly at the UN, as exemplified by the embarrassing exercise with Boutros-Ghali. I think that early in the Administration they decided that in order to achieve anything in terms of foreign policy in any multilateral forum, and the UN in particular, except for NATO, they had to deal with the segment of the population and in Congress who are very anti-UN. Senator Jessie Helm and crowd. In particular, the Administration apparently decided to pre-empt the UN reform issue, to steal the thunder of Helms and others who argued there was waste, fraud and malfeasance at the UN. So early on, they said they were going to push managerial and organization reform of the UN. It is an interesting tactical political approach. But there are two basic problems with it. One, the people in the Administration who ran this operation really didn’t understand the United Nations. Because they did not understand the UN, they did not appreciate that all the things that critics criticized the UN for - staffing problems, promotion policies, use of money, administration, how it behaves as an organization, etc - is partially bad administration and bad management, but also stems from the nature of the creature. The UN is a consensus organization with universal membership, every country belongs and has a right to do so. The member states of the UN have with different cultures, standards, morals, and bureaucratic behavior, capabilities, resources, and interests. Many are small countries who don’t get much out of the UN except some UN development assistance, a couple of jobs in UN agencies, and the opportunity to speak in a global forum to the world community.
So, what we call bad administration is often just the character of the animal. For instance, some Americans are upset by the sheer amount of verbiage produced at the UN. Well, if you have 182 members, all of whom are legitimate members and have a right to speak, then you are just going to have to sit and listen to everybody speak because that is the core justification of the institution. It is Congress, not General Motors which is the model.

Also, because the Administration really didn’t understand the UN, it could not differentiate between what problems were the remediable problems and which arose from the character of the institution. Because they did not understand this distinction, they didn’t realize that reform could not be done quickly or easily, and would require political costs. It is also probably a long term activity.

Meanwhile, the Administration had gotten itself embroiled in something they could not finish, in pursuit of a tactical objective they couldn’t obtain in a short time frame. Possibly more important, however, is the second problem with their approach. They have yet to realize or accept that people who are anti-UN really do not care about this matter of alleged administrative mismanagement. If the UN became as well managed as McDonalds, they would still hate it. They are anti-UN on principal, not because they think it is badly managed. They would hate a well-managed UN even more.

As a result, and because of the dynamics of American politics and the American media, the Administration personalized this war against Boutros-Ghali: a very short man with a funny name who has the temerity to tell us what he thinks. So, we - or maybe only Ambassador Albright - demonized him. Then we found ourselves, the United States, in a monumental political conflict with a 5 foot 4 inch Egyptian international civil servant. Of course we won and he is out of office. I don’t necessarily want to defend him, he has his faults, but it is not only undignified, it has clearly cost us in the expenditure of political capital and undignified for the U.S. to engage in a personal conflict of this sort. Over the years it will cost us influence in many circles in the Third World. It has also probably cost us what the economists call the opportunity costs of what might have been done in the UN over those four years. Instead we engaged in worrying about arranging the deck chairs on the Titanic, so to speak, with a preoccupation with UN personnel policies and a political fight with Boutros-Ghali. We won, he is out, but does this mean the UN is now going to be reformed? Does this mean we are going to get the Secretary General to say what we want? Does this mean that Congress will now say, “Oh, marvelous. Here is your billion dollars in arrears we owe?” Is Jessie Helms reformed? None of this has happened. All the problems are still there. We have wasted four years irritating many of our friends, forgetting about our enemies, and failed to use this time to make the sort of changes in the UN which would make it a more useful foreign policy tool for the United States and for the world in general.

Q: There is a famous poem about the Duke of Cumberland’s battle, it was a famous battle but no one could figure out why.

MARKS: Yes. Boutros-Ghali was out and “‘twas a famous victory.” It really is sad because the Administration has in a sense shot itself in the foot. To mix my metaphors, it has hoisted itself by its own petard.
As for Ambassador Albright, we will see where she goes now. She is bright, articulate, well-connected and has experience. However, if people think that with her as Secretary of State there will now be more interest in the UN, they have made a fundamental mistake. I don’t think she has much real interest in the UN at all, it was a stepping stone for her. And, that may not be inappropriate in a Secretary of State who has more to worry about than just the UN.

Q: Well, when did you leave the UN?

MARKS: In November 1993 I left New York and came to Washington. I had been job hunting for some time but nothing particularly interesting was offered or came up. I had some contacts at the Institute for National Strategic Studies of the National Defense University at Fort McNair and was offered a post as Visiting Senior Fellow. INSS is a Department of Defense think tank created by General Powell when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and it works primarily for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was established as part of the National Defense University which includes the National War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, all located on that lovely campus at Fort McNair. INSS has a mixture of people on its staff, civilians and military, some permanent and some on short-term assignments as Fellows. There is usually a Foreign Service Officer as well, on detail from the Department, and I got that slot.

As I said, I had been recruited for this by some people I knew there who were interested in UN activities, particularly peacekeeping. This was a new subject and the military was becoming interested in it, especially at they were becoming more and more involved in doing it. Although I had not been involved in peacekeeping myself in New York, being on the economic and social side of USUN, I had been involved in the creation of the humanitarian assistance aspect of peacekeeping which was becoming increasingly important. So, I went there to sort of think and poke around on the subject of peacekeeping.

There was not a great deal of organization or discipline at INSS, and in general no required work. I must admit for the first winter I just sort of hung around trying to get into a rhythm very different from that of an operational job with its telephone, in-box, and due dates. At Fort McNair, people would wander in at nine, ten o’clock and leave at four or five in the afternoon, which was when we were often just coming back from lunch in New York, ready to face the second half of the day.

I was at INSS for one year. Then as I was getting close to my time-in-class and there was nothing in the way of anything interesting in the way of an assignment coming up, so I did some negotiation with the Department and asked for a one year extension. Somebody in Personnel huffed and puffed and said with only a year left before retirement they couldn’t extend me on their payroll. I said, in that case find me a job I’ll accept or I will walk the corridors and bother everyone. In that case wouldn’t be better to leave me at Fort McNair? So, they did.

The second year I did some interesting work, and published several articles and what INSS
calls “Strategy Forum” reports. I also worked on a longer piece, a monograph of about 200 pages, which was published last week. I worked quite a bit on peacekeeping which I have continued since I retired last year.

It was a pleasant and often interesting two years. I did some consulting work for the UN which took me to Georgia in the Caucuses and led to similar work after I retired. I participated in conferences, wrote some papers, and pursued a very unstructured, unpressured life for two years. It turned out to be a rather interesting and easy way out of the Foreign Service. The pressure was off and it got me involved in activities which I have continued since I retired.

Q: One of the things which I think is interesting, you have these think tanks, both government and private, where people write papers, etc. Looking at this in an objective way, from your experience, do you have any feeling, within the military particularly in this case, that there is any connection with what others were doing?

MARKS: The short answer is yes, with a lot of caveats. The think tank world involves work being done in academic communities and covers a wide range of activities and attitudes. There are places like INSS which is a wholly owned government think tank. There are the government created and financed institutions, the most famous being the RAND Corporation created by the U.S. Air Force in the late forties. For many years it worked almost exclusively on government contracts, although I believe it has since branched out to work for the private sector. Rand was and still is a very important and influential institution. RAND and similar institutions work under a special law which provides for the provision of government money and/or a tax free status. There are a large number of these institutions, which work to a large degree on government contracts. And then you have the academic centers. Almost every major school has set up a center for this and a center for that. Harvard is famous for this. And, then there are the classic think tanks like Brookings, the Center for Strategic International Studies, the Heritage Foundation, the Cato Foundation. Some of these are really entrepreneurial academic, if you will, like CSIS. Some of them are clearly ideological, for instance the conservative Heritage Foundation was set up to counter the Brookings Foundation.

Q: Brookings being liberal, Heritage being conservative.
MARKS: Quite. And there are many that work in fairly esoteric areas, For instance, I was introduced last week to the Police Executive Research Foundation (PERF), a professional police think tank interested in the theory and standards of the police profession.

This network of institutions are a vital part of the American governmental and political structure. It is not alternative government in the career sense, but political policy or senior administrator types retreat to these places when their party is out of power, or when they do not have the clout to get a job in the executive. It is also where many earn the credentials to obtain jobs. Obviously I am not talking about career civil servant or Foreign Service people. Those on the American left tend to go Brookings or Harvard or places like that, while those on the right are more likely to go to Heritage or even CSIS. With luck, your party comes back in and if you have used the time well to burnish your credentials you can come back in
again at a higher level. When out of power, you write the papers that push the positions you lost while in office or propose the ones that will catch attention so you will get the government job you want next time around. These become, of course, the sources of policies and ideas for the elected officials. The think tanks and academic centers are where ideas are floated, debates are pursued. That whole sector is a very, very important part of the U.S. governance structure, where ideas are talked out, worked out and alliances are formed.

Rarely do you get a straight line - a research fellow at a think tank writes a paper and that becomes USG policy. Think tank work often becomes policy, but in a diffuse manner. One of the most dramatic examples of this was, of course, the Goldwater-Nichols reform of the U.S. Department of Defense. The original ideas were floated around in CSIS, among other places, by a number of military affairs specialists. They somehow caught the attention of Senator Goldwater: CSIS has excellent contacts on the Hill. He was interested and agreed to be the chair of a study process. Meetings were held, papers were written and finally CSIS created the Goldwater-Nichols Commission on DOD reform. CSIS provided the venue and the staff work and a major formal reform proposal for the Department of Defense was formulated and introduced into Congress by Senator Goldwater and Congressman Nichols. The net result was a significant reorganization of the U.S. government. Being so clear-cut, that was a relatively unusual success for a think tank, but variations of that sort of effort go on all the time. In fact, the Goldwater-Nichols success story is a model for all think tanks and academic centers.

INSS is a part of that world, although not the biggest or most prestigious member. It belongs to and works more directly for a very special Washington figure, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and so is a government, official creature. Still its Fellows and staff participate actively in the continual round of meetings, workshops, and conferences, interact with their counterparts in other institutions, and publish articles, papers, and books. This is a weird and wonderful world where people spend their time writing and talking. There is a lot of recycling of paper, any decent little idea should be able to appear several times: in an article which you spin into a monograph, in an op-ed piece, and then finally part or all of it appears in a collected works by someone else. Later you try to return the favor by including his piece in a collection you put together. By this process people make their name, reputations, and hopefully get jobs and promotions. It is part of the real structure of the United States Government.

Q: Did you have any feel for anything that you did or maybe was done during your two years there that had any reverberations up through the Joint Chiefs or something?

MARKS: No specific item or subject, no. Although I wrote one long paper which was combined with a related article by a colleague, published as a monograph in the McNair Paper series, and which won an award. But, no, I can’t think anything I did in which can be specifically identified or tracked. However I was working on a subject of some importance and increasing concern - peacekeeping and peace operations - and therefore was an active participant in the policy ferment which focus on that subject. By the way, do you know who Fort Lesley J. McNair was named after? He was the Army
Lieutenant General often called the trainer of the American Army in WWII. He also has the dubious credit being the highest ranking American to be killed by friendly fire, ever. After spending the early part of the war as the commanding officer of Army training, an important job as the Army was built up from almost nothing, he was appointed to a senior command in the Normandy campaign was killed when his headquarters was attacked by the American Army Air Corps. Well, that happens in war I guess. Fort McNair in Southwest Washington, which dates back to the Revolution, was renamed in his honor.

Q: Can you briefly touch on what you have been doing after you retired?

MARKS: My time in class came up and, counting my military service, my time in the Foreign Service amounted to 39 years of government service. I retired November 30, 1995. Since then I have become the usual odd jobs man. The choices in retirement are to find another full-time job or create a new career like writing, turn to a full-time hobby like golfing or boating, or become an odd jobs man. Some of these jobs are remunerative, but many are pro bono. In my case a lot of what I have done continues what I was doing in INSS. For instance, I have a contract from INSS to write a monograph on peacekeeping and regional organizations.

I have become an Adjunct Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the place where I once spent a year on detail. I am continuing work on my own in the same general areas, and writing on peacekeeping, the United Nations, as well as on the Commonwealth of Independent States, the former USSR. So, my major activity has been to continue working in the area of peacekeeping, UN reform and UN activities.

Did I mention the UN job? That is kind of fun. While at USUN I got to know a lot of people in delegations and in the UN bureaucracy. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) recently became involved in the countries of the former Soviet Union, with a project entitled “Democratic Governments and Participation” which is providing as technical assistance to the 15 countries of the former Soviet Union. The project focuses on institution building in these countries, including the judiciary, the police force, the prison force, creation of ombudsmen, and the ministries of foreign affairs. etc. I was contacted by an old colleague, a Moroccan, and asked if I would be interested in doing the foreign affairs part of the overall project. I, of course, said yes and the next thing you knew I was off to Tbilisi, Georgia. This happened while I was still at INSS on active duty, but this year - 1996 - I continued the project as a private consultant and went to Armenia and Azerbaijan. In each place I spent a week or two interviewing ministry of foreign affairs people and designing a technical assistance program to be financed and implemented by UNDP. It was an interesting and amusing thing to do, stemming right out of my professional career. I drew up three specific country programs, for the three ministries of foreign affairs. The programs are supposed to go through and I hope they do and that I will get involved and have to go back to Tbilisi, Yerevan and Baku. It is fascinating part of the world, and quite new to me.

Q: This type of work is fascinating. I have gotten involved a little with the Federated States of Micronesia and I went to Kyrgyzstan because I am a consular expert. I have talked to
them about setting up a consular service, the pitfalls to avoid, etc.

MARKS: I know we both have found that this is very gratifying, to be able to use our experience and not let it all just disappear into the mist of Saturday afternoon football games. I am hoping the UNDP project continues into implementation as it will be a nice coda to a career. I would get great satisfaction out of helping three new countries set up reasonably competent professional foreign offices and diplomatic services, which I have to believe are necessary instruments of a free and independent society. Otherwise I would have to feel my own life was wasted.

Q: All right, we will end at this point, Ed. Thank you.

ADDENDUM – added April 2015.

*Three Years Before the Mast* – journal article about Marks’ three years with the Pacific Command:

*End of interview*