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Labor Series

BENJAMIN MARTIN

Interviewed by: James F. Shea and Don R. Kienzle
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INTERVIEW

[Note: This interview was not edited by Mr. Martin.]

Shea: Good morning. It's October 3, 1995. We're at the home of my good friend Ben Martin on Massachusetts Avenue right behind the Capitol. Ben, would you like to tell us how you got started in the labor business?

Kienzle: Maybe first we could start with a little bit about your family background and where you came from.

MARTIN: I was born and raised in Chicago, Illinois. My father was a skilled garment worker and a longtime activist in the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, and that in a sense set a background for me. My parents were labor Zionists, and active in the labor Zionist movement as well, and at an early age I became active, first in the Zionist youth movement and then in the Young Socialist movement in the '30s. From that, being an idealistic young socialist in the '30s, I decided to drop pursuance of my university education and went to work in the factories, became a factory worker in the electrical manufacturing industry in Chicago. And when the CIO [Congress of Industrial Organizations] movement was first established, I was a volunteer worker in signing up steelworkers in the South Side of Chicago for the Steel Workers Organizing Committee. And then from there—

Shea: Can you give us some dates?

MARTIN: This was as a teenager. I am speaking about '34, '35, '36. I was then a teenager, and by 18, with the formation of the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, I became active in its foundation in the Midwest, was one of its founding members in Chicago, became a local union officer, and then eventually became the secretary treasurer of the Midwest District of the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers—in '36, '37, this is—and then, ultimately, became combined business agent and national field representative of the UE [United Electrical] in the Midwest area. And then I soon became involved in the battle between the anti-Communist group within the union. In our area in particular, Communist influence was very strong, and in 1939, as the Communists became strong in the UE, I was fired by James Matlass, the maximum

Communist leader, who was then organization director of the UE. In 1939, then, I got a job in the Illinois State Employment Service, in Decatur, Illinois, where I worked as a field representative, and worked there until 1941, when I was drafted into military service. I served in military service from 1941 to 1946. I was drafted before Pearl Harbor and started out as a private, and when I left military service I was a captain in the Air Force. In 1945, I left military service in Paris and went on the G.I. Bill of Rights. (The G.I. Bill, or Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, provided for the readjustment in civilian life of returning World War II veterans.) I went to school in Paris at the École du Louvre, which is the museum art history school, for several years, and from then, in 1948–49, was employed by the European headquarters of the American Joint Distribution Committee [American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee], which was the American committee to assist refugees and displaced persons, Jews particularly, in bringing them back from concentration camps and resettling them back into their homelands and setting up some sort of economic and professional means for them to make a living. During those years in Paris I maintained close contacts with the French labor movement. A number of close friends of mine were leaders of the *Force Ouvrière* (Workers' Force), and I got to know many of the personalities involved in the labor movement in those days. And in 1949, upon my return to the United States—it happened to coincide with the expulsion of the communist-controlled unions of the CIO—I was asked by James Carey, upon the foundation of the IUE [International Union of Electrical Workers], to return back as one of the original field representatives in the Midwest of the IUE. And so from 1949 to about 1960, from the inception of the IUE, I was the international field representative. During that time I took a three-year leave of absence from 1958–1960. I had received a Ford (Foundation) Foreign Area Training Fellowship to become a specialist in labor affairs and industrial relations, and I spent a year in Far Eastern studies at Berkeley studying Japanese and then spent two years in the Far East living in Tokyo. My two areas of particular interest were Japan and India. I traveled widely in those areas during those two years. I worked closely with the Asian regional organization of the ICFTU [International Confederation of Free Trade Unions] in those years and lectured at the Asian Labor College in Calcutta and traveled widely. I also used the office of the Asian Regional Organization in New Delhi as my operating headquarters as I traveled widely in that area. During that period, too, I served as columnist for the *Japan Daily Times*. I ran a labor column for about two and a half years, in which I made observations and interviews about the Japanese labor movement and what was going on in labor relations. I had a research assistant, who was the brother of one of the leading figures of the Sohio [Standard Oil of Ohio], of the Private Railway Workers' Union, and he eventually became a staff employee of the ICFTU in Brussels, as one of their Far Eastern specialists.

Shea: Ben, was Dick Deverall there at that time?

MARTIN: Well, Dick Deverall would float in and out. The heads of the Asian office were really Japanese. One was an oldtimer who had fought the military dictatorship of Japan, had been in jail for a number of years, and became the head of the office. The other head of the ICFTU group was the president of the Metal Miners' Union of Sohio. He was a very interesting man. He headed the group of moderates within Sohio, and was

also affiliated with the ICFTU. He was the head of the group of unions that was affiliated with the ICFTU.

Shea: That was the socialist federation.

MARTIN: Yes, well, there were two socialist federations, and the socialists, of course, were split. You had the rightwing socialists, who were organized in sort of a separate party, and then the regular mainline Socialist Party, which was more radical and more aligned with the Sohio. The moderate socialists had their labor adjunct, first called Zenro, and then it changed its names various times, but was the moderate group. And so the trade unions were more or less aligned according to political loyalties into these two separate groups. But within Sohio there were the more moderate and the more radical. It was a fairly large spectrum of types you would find in Sohio as well, who were not as right-wing as those in Zenro but were sort of in the middle somewhere. And then you had a number of independent unions, too, in those days. When I was there I set up the relations between the Electrical Manufacturing Union, which was an independent union in Japan with the IUE, and I established relationships for them at that time, too.

Kienzle: So you were the IUE East Asian representative.

MARTIN: Well, informally, you might say, because I also represented the IUE when I spoke at the Indian International Trade Union Congress in India once, at their National Congress meeting as a representative of the IUE. I was there at the time with several representatives of the AFL-CIO—Harry Pollock, who died several years ago, who had been the USIA [United States Information Agency] labor rep for a while and who was in the State Department and had been a long-time labor attaché and had been in the International Affairs Department of the AFL-CIO [American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations]. I attended with Harry and Joe Keenan, who was head of the International Affairs Committee of the AFL-CIO, who came out of the IBEW [International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers] and who had at one time been very prominent in the Chicago Federation of Labor. Joe Keenan, Harry Pollock, and I attended the meeting together. Joe Keenan was sent out on an investigatory study, and he was being accompanied by Harry. And the three of us attended this meeting.

Kienzle: And your official position at this time?

MARTIN: I was a Ford fellow, nothing more. And also, when the International Textile Workers' trade secretary organized their meeting in Tokyo, I helped to organize the meeting and helped publicize it. I wrote articles for the *Japan Daily Times* for them and acted as a sort of informal counselor to the Textile Workers' trade secretary. I would do these various things because I was linked up. For instance, when Omar Bekou came through Tokyo—he was then the general secretary of the ICFTU—I briefed him and worked with him and explained to him various things. You know, I would serve in these various capacities. And toward the end, my activities became known in Brussels, and there was a Canadian who was the organization director of the ICFTU. Do you remember his name?

Kienzle: Let me ask you, who was our labor attaché there?

MARTIN: There were various people.

Kienzle: Was Lou Silverberg there at that time?

MARTIN: No, no, there was somebody from the IEM who was a grand launch rep of the IEM and then served as labor attaché. I can't think of his name, but I was in touch with him regularly, of course, during the years I was there.

Shea: Were you resident in Tokyo exclusively?

MARTIN: Yes, well, as I say, I traveled throughout the Far East. I visited for example in Malaysia the Plantation Workers' Union, and they hosted me there and set me up in their headquarters, where I lived in Kuala Lumpur. I was in Rangoon, where a fellow named Lou Walinsky, who was an economist with the Nathan Associates group, introduced me to trade unions and the political groups there. You see, while I was traveling, I was writing columns for the *Japan Daily Times*. And of course, through India, I knew many of the people there.

Shea: Did you just travel to India, or were you living there?

MARTIN: I spent three months there studying and worked with the two groups. I lectured in Ahmedabad, for example, to the famous Textile Workers' Association, which had been founded by Gandhi. I wrote articles in the Indian National Trade Union Congress paper on various subjects. I became a contributor to their paper. I got to know the HMS [Hind Mazdoor Sabha, or Workers Assembly of India], which was a pro-socialist group, particularly in Bombay. I went around with them. So I got to know and I spent time with its president, who was an important textile union leader in the southern town of Madras. I remember we spent one night just talking, all night, on the beach, about labor problems and stuff like that.

Kienzle: Did you work with Tom Babin?

MARTIN: No, Dave Burgess was the labor attaché.

Kienzle: I was talking about the general secretary of the Plantation Workers.

MARTIN: Yes, the famous one. No, I was working with the Malaysians directly in the Plantation Workers Union.

Kienzle: Dave Burgess was the—

MARTIN: —was the labor attaché in New Delhi at the time. And of course, I got to know Dave, and we spent time together.

Kienzle: Edward Skagen was the—

MARTIN: Ed Skagen, exactly. Ed Skagen was the labor attaché in Tokyo at the time I was there. And of course I got to know all the labor specialists in the academic community and in the Japanese labor community, and I would lecture sometimes before academic groups, for example, a group at the Tokyo University and elsewhere as well.

Kienzle: So it was a tremendous education.

MARTIN: Oh yes, and I traveled throughout the country. You see, before going there, I had been closely associated with Solomon Levine at the University first of Illinois and then at the University of Wisconsin, who was the most prominent specialist we had at the time on Japanese labor relations, and through him, before going over, I had met a number of people from Japan, in personnel departments of big corporations and in trade unions, so that by the time I got to Japan I already had a backlog of people I knew and relations I had set up, so that I got to move around quite a good deal and became known and accepted in many Japanese intellectual, academic, and trade union circles.

Kienzle: Was all your academic work at Berkeley, or did you study at other American universities as well?

MARTIN: I had a sort of broken academic background, since I had left college to go to work in a factory. This was at the upsurge of organization, ’36 and ’37.

Kienzle: Where did you start originally?

MARTIN: I went to Huntersville Junior College, then I went to the Central YMCA College in Chicago. I had about a year or two in there, and then I left. And then I picked it up again when I went on the G.I. Bill. I went to the École du Louvre for about two years, which was, of course, a graduate level school in art history. I was bilingual in French by that time. Of course, I had served in French North Africa in the Air Transport Command, as a staff officer. We were stationed in Marrakech, in Casablanca, in Algiers, and Tunis, so by that time, by the time I got to Paris, I was bilingual, literally, in the two languages. So I was able to use this. Then, of course, my education picked up again when I got my Ford fellowship. I spent a year at Berkeley in Far Eastern studies, in courses on India and Japan and, of course, an intensive course in Japanese language study as well. My education has gone in bits and pieces in this matter. I have never gotten a degree, but I’m probably at a Ph.D. level now.

Shea: I would say so.

Kienzle: And you were never employed as a professor?

MARTIN: Oh yes, I’ve taught. After my return from my Latin American stint with USIA, I taught a course in labor in Latin America at the American University, also a

course in labor and international affairs. Then later on, I taught a course at the Empire State Labor College in New York City on comparative European industrial relations systems, which was also involved with Cornell University structure. And I have lectured a number of times. I also taught later on at the Foreign Service Institute. I set up the course on Spanish and Portuguese for foreign affairs officers who were being assigned to Spain or Portugal. I set that up and I taught it for several years.

Kienzle: I wonder if we could go back briefly to your time in Paris and your contacts with American labor representatives. Were you in contact with Irving Brown?

MARTIN: Well, only occasionally. I would occasionally see Irving. I really spent most of my time with the French there. I had close friends in France, and many of them were tied in with the labor movement there, particularly on the *Force Ouvrière* side. I was able to get a virtually firsthand view of the whole breakup between the French CGT [General Confederation of Labour] and the *Force Ouvrière*.

Kienzle: Could you describe or give an overview of the issues involved?

MARTIN: This was the outset of the cold war period, and the focus of the whole cold war as it translated into the labor field particularly reached intense levels in two countries, France and Italy. This was, of course, the focus of the AFL's effort too, to counter the strong labor influence of the French and Italian communists. And in France the CGT was extremely powerful and the communist influence was particularly strong, and so the input of the American labor movement coincided with the input of the American government in trying to counter communist labor influence in France. And so I was there at that particular time—this was following the formation of both the ICFTU and the World Federation of Trade Unions, and the World Federation of Trade Unions initially had its headquarters in Paris, too. Louis Sayan, whom I had met, had become the head of the WFTU and was then the general secretary of the CGT, too, before the break-up. And I met him. He had come out of the socialist movement and had converted to a communist. He had been one of the top figures of the old CGT construction workers' union. I met Louis Jouot then, too, the venerable figure, but by that time he was pretty much a spent figure. He was more an icon rather than really an activist. A new generation of people had taken over: André Bergeron and the others were now coming up, and of course they were closely tied in with Irving Brown, who was extremely active. I might mention one interesting thing that may be of interest. The famous incident. There was a shipment of American materiel for the Marshall Plan coming into Marseille. The CGT who controlled the dock workers' communist-controlled union were going to boycott this shipment. This became a sort of symbolic showdown between the two forces.

Kienzle: This was 1948?

MARTIN: I guess it was around 1948. Irving Brown became intent upon countering this _____ affair, and what he did was, he went out and hired some tough guys in the famous Marseille underworld to physically prevent the communist dock workers from the

unloading of this ship. And of course he successfully did this, and this became one of the great exploits of the cold war labor wars. The interesting thing was that the mayor of Marseille was Gaston Defferre, who was an old socialist who was a real wheeler-dealer who knew Marseille well. And a friend of mine, a Foreign Service Officer who had served in the Marshall Plan, showed me a letter he had from Gaston Defferre—this was several years later—and he was complaining, "Why in heaven's name did Irving Brown have to do this?" he says. "He should have simply picked up the phone to me. I could have fixed this up myself." Because he was a fixer.

Kienzle: Do you think that can be taken at face value?

MARTIN: I think so. Gaston Defferre was quite well known for having relations with everybody in Marseille and was a wheeler-dealer. It is quite possible that he was right; it is also quite possible that Irving Brown was intent upon doing something in the high visibility area to counteract the socialists. So each had his own interests in doing this, you see. Gaston Defferre, being a wheeler-dealer who would make deals with everybody in Marseille, could have quietly, I'm sure, quashed the communist boycott.

Kienzle: Did Irving Brown ever comment on this?

MARTIN: I never discussed it with Irving. He never did.

Kienzle: Did you have any contact with our labor attaché, Dick Eldridge?

MARTIN: No, I didn't have much contact with the embassy in those days. I saw Dick Eldridge on one occasion. I said hello to him, but I didn't have much contact with him.

Kienzle: Anything else about your time in Paris and the labor trends that you'd like to get on the record?

MARTIN: Only that the communists were really powerful in the labor movement. They really had a tremendous power. The winds were really running in their favor in those days in French politics. They were extremely potent. They had emerged out of the occupation with a tremendous prestige. They were known as *le parti des fusillés,* the party of those who were shot by the Nazis and the Nazi collaborators, so they came out with a tremendous prestige. And so a lot of people, even in the intellectual community, who couldn't really stomach them, played along with them at that time, too. So their power was really tremendous. I remember once sitting in at a mass meeting in the Latin Quarter, which was called by unified meeting of all the various left groups—the socialists, the Communists, and various independent leftist groups—to protest some given thing, and this really tremendous pug they had, by the name of André Marty, who was one of the top figures and was one of the most hard-line communists of all, decided at one point to simply take over the meeting, so he had a bunch of communist toughs come in and just take over the meeting, and André Philip, who was a very moderate socialist, who later became a very fiery anti-Communist, for good reasons, became the minister of the interior later on in the Socialist government, sat there and absolutely

fumed as these guys simply took over the meeting. Somebody in the audience got up to protest this, and he was just bodily picked up by these tough, working-class communist militants and just thrown out of the hall. They just simply took it over. That was the kind of an atmosphere that existed in those days in Paris.

Shea: It was the same thing in Italy. I was a student in Perugia in 1952, and I had been in Italy during the war and after the war. The prestige of the communists, who were very active in the resistance, was just like you describe it.

MARTIN: I remember I once sat in—some friends of mine in the *Force Ouvrière* got me in with Sayan's permission—I sat in on a *Bureau Confédéral* (Confederation Bureau) meeting of the CGT—this was just prior to the split—and Jouot was presiding, you see. He was president of the CGT and Sayan was general secretary. And the backbiting that went back and forth—but you could see the power of the communists—*wumpf*! When they wanted something—*wumpf*! They just rammed it through. You could see the frustration in the *Force Ouvrière* people. You could see the mentality. The climate was already building up toward a split by that time.

Kienzle: Was that a spontaneous French-led operation, or was there encouragement from the outside?

MARTIN: Our whole policy attitude was break with them. You don't stay in the same organization with the commies—get out, break off. So we urged everywhere, of course there was this big fight in Italy, more so than here, between the UIL [Italian Labour Union] thing—

Kienzle: —CGIL

MARTIN: The CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labour] and the UIL, and, of course, our good friend Dan Horowitz got in trouble over this whole difficulty, trying to work out some State Department policy, which did not necessarily go as far as the AFL-CIO's ferocious anti-communism did in those days. So the dynamic of developments, given the cold war, led to a break between the non-communist and communist forces, but by and large, it was really being pushed very hard by the Americans, who had an awful lot of clout because they were providing the money and the wherewithal to these people.

Kienzle: One question that intrigues me, was there a connection between your art history and your labor background?

MARTIN: No, not at all. Those were always two ambivalent areas. I kept going back and forth between the two. You see, I had studied at the Art Institute of Chicago, too, in my young days. I had visions of some day being either an art curator in a museum or a painter or something like that. So I kept going back and forth between my political labor concerns and my intellectual ambitions.

Kienzle: Did you continue your painting at all?

MARTIN: No, no, I dropped that. Once you get involved as a union organizer there's no room for anything else.

Kienzle: We're up to '49 now. We've covered the period in Japan.

MARTIN: Yes.

Kienzle: After your UIL experience in 1961, is that when you—

MARTIN: No, in 1960 or '61 or thereabouts, I had left the IUE staff, shortly after my leave of absence, and then joined the staff of the United Steelworkers of America and became a field representative in Wisconsin. I had served in Wisconsin for a number of years, too, for the IUE. I had been transferred from Chicago. On my return from my Ford fellowship, I had been assigned as the state representative of the IUE in Wisconsin, and then, in 1960—I had been sent down to the South for a number of years. I had been sent to Siberia for political reasons. There was then a power struggle taking place within the IUE between the Carey (James Carey) forces and the Hartnett (Al Hartnett) forces, and I had a mutual dislike between Hartnett and myself, and Hartnett had control of the staff, so he had exiled me to the South. I served union locals in Tennessee for a year or so and then took a job with the Steelworkers, back in Wisconsin, about 1960–1961. In 1961, I was originally supposed to—Let me backtrack for a while.

When I finished my stint in the Far East I had been offered a job as the East Asian representative of the ICFTU in Tokyo covering Korea, Japan, *et cetera*, and I was supported by the CIO people, since I was a CIO-er, but the AFL people didn't particularly have a particular liking for my general outlook because I didn't follow their policy of being strictly with the right wing labor group. I worked with both labor groups in Japan, and that created a certain amount of problems with AFL headquarters, since I wasn't working with anybody's particular policy. I was there as a scholar and trying to work out things. Anyway, the result was that they vetoed my appointment as an East Asian representative and when I returned I originally was to have become the director for Asia for AID [United States Agency for International Development]. I had been requested to take that job since I had some know-how about that. I had not known about the Tong wars going on between the AFL people and the CIO people. I was very naive; I was a provincial out of the Middle West. And Victor Reuther was an old friend of mine, and I stupidly put his name down as a reference on my form to take this AID job, and of course that killed it. From that time on I became very suspect as a Reutherite because of my personal relationship with Victor Reuther. So that fixed me, and my entire career was colored by that as a result. Then the Alliance for Progress was being formed, and a number of labor information officers were being recruited at that time. I was recruited by the USIA as a labor information officer, and I was assigned to Chile. I was with the embassy as labor information officer in Santiago, after going through language training here at FSI, from about 1961. I arrived in Santiago, and was there until 1963. I was to have returned as labor attaché at the request of the ambassador then, who was Ralph

Dungan, and there was some ambivalence. At first the AFL-CIO didn't want me to go; then they changed their mind at the last minute. They went back and forth. And so just at that moment the job of senior labor specialist in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research opened up. George Lichtblau was taking an overseas assignment, and that opened up. The job was offered to me, and so I took it, instead of going to Chile. Because of the uncertain political climate that existed, I decided it would be better if I stayed in Washington than go off to Chile.

Kienzle: In the United States rather than the Chilean government.

MARTIN: No, this was as a labor attaché.

Kienzle: No, I mean the uncertain political climate in the U.S. government.

MARTIN: No, the uncertain political attitude which the AFL-CIO had about that, because of my being a suspected Reutherite, you see? That was my problem. So I took the job, and in 1963 I joined the INR, in which I stayed until 1977.

Shea: Ben, as I recall, I might be mistaken, were you recruited by Bernie Wiseman.

MARTIN: No.

Shea: I do recall when they brought in people like Mel Bloom and Frank Ciaccone.

MARTIN: I came in at the same time. The labor advisor for the USIA was then Bill Gausman. He had served in London for many years. Through him. And also I received support from a number of people, including the then Secretary of Labor, the late Arthur Goldberg. I had the support of the Steelworkers.

Kienzle: He had been general counsel, wasn't he?

MARTIN: He had served for many years as general counsel to the Steelworkers. And the Steelworkers supported me in my entrance into the Foreign Service. He and various other people, Gaylord Nelson, the governor of Wisconsin, and various other people supported me. So I became the INR [U.S. State Department, Bureau of Intelligence and Research] labor specialist and stayed there till 1977, when I retired from the Foreign Service.

Kienzle: When you were in Chile Frei was in power, wasn't he?

MARTIN: Yes, Eduardo Frei. I might say, incidentally, that I had applied to the Foreign Service as a labor attaché under Jim Taylor, and Jim tried to place me. I was at one time considered for the job in Cyprus. They were going to set up a labor officer there. Then they decided they were going to assign me to Tunis, but what happened in Tunis—it's very funny. George Weaver, of course, was the guy in the unit. George had found in Tunis a young political officer who was a black man, of course, whom he wanted to

advance. And so suddenly, my appointment—my appointment was in the pipeline for Tunis. He served as ambassador in Argentina—

Kienzle: Terry Todman.

MARTIN: Terry [Terence] Todman. He was a young beginning political officer, and George Weaver discovered that and decided that it was more important for him to move Todman ahead, and so I was dropped and Terry Todman became the labor officer. You see, John Condon was then moving from Tunis to Algiers, and so the spot became open. So instead of that, I decided to go to USIA as a result.

Kienzle: Well, George owed you one, though. Didn't he come up with something?

MARTIN: Todman?

Kienzle: No, George Weaver.

MARTIN: No, because George and I—well, that's another history. George and I have always had cool relationships for a messy business that occurred in the IUE a long time ago. I don't know if you want to go into that. Yes, we knew each other from the IUE. Of course, he was special assistant to Carey for many years, and it was Carey who sponsored his move into government, of course.

Kienzle: If you'd like to give a few details, that would be fine.

MARTIN: Well, all right, if you want to. You see, Carey had become in the AFL-CIO the head of the Civil Rights Department, and he was intent to show how he felt the assimilation of the movement of Blacks in the labor movement was important. I was serving, as I mentioned to you, as a field representative in the IUE then in Chicago. And I and another fellow, we were the fellows who were really the most influential people in the IUE group. We had about eight or ten thousand members in the various local unions, and so all of a sudden, Terry picked a black fellow who was on the staff of the union in Dayton and plumped him down in Chicago, made him regional director, and then gave us orders to support him as the head of the regional organization which covered the Illinois, Wisconsin, and Minnesota—the Three States Regional Federation. And this was so outrageous, everybody in the union—nobody knew this guy. And he was a mediocrity. He was a creation of George Weaver. He was a buddy of George Weaver, and Carey was intent upon getting a Black on the executive board of the IUE, just to show off, you see. To do that he was willing to run roughshod over our concerns and our people.

Kienzle: Weaver was born in Pittsburgh, but he grew up in Dayton.

MARTIN: That's right, and he knew this fellow, who was really not a very attractive person, believe me, and not very able and not very smart. He just happened to be one of the boys, and he was somebody that Carey could use to show that he was really pushing the Blacks. But you see we had so few able Blacks available in the IUE, he picked up

this guy and he dumped him on us, you see. It just created a tremendous outrage, and George Weaver and Hartnett were sent in to twist our arms. And of course, I resisted this. I thought it was so outrageous to do this to us. And of course, ultimately it was defeated. And this got me into hot water with George Weaver. George Weaver has never forgiven me for this, so I was never on George Weaver's good list.

Kienzle: He paid you back years later?

MARTIN: Right, sort of.

Kienzle: Did the IUE have some sort of system of voting in their regional directives?

MARTIN: Oh, yes, this was done by a vote. But what he wanted us to do was for me to go out and proselytize among the local unions to support and get their vote lined up. And I gagged at this. I wouldn't do it. It would mean betraying my trust with a lot of local union leaders for somebody I didn't know, just because Jim Carey wanted to have a Black on his executive board.

Shea: When you were in Chile was Norm Pearson the labor attaché or Tom Walsh?

MARTIN: Tom Walsh was the labor attaché. Tom Walsh and myself were there, yes.

Shea: Did Allende come in at that time, or was it after?

MARTIN: No, this was later. During the period we were there, Allende (Salvador Allende, president of Chile from 1970 to 1973) was the joint Socialist-Communist candidate against Eduardo Frei, who was the Christian Democratic candidate, and the embassy, of course, was strong out for supporting Eduardo Frei. But we had a very strange situation in the labor field. The embassy labor policy did not necessarily track with our political policy. That is, politically we were supporting the Christian Democrats and Eduardo Frei in the '60s, but in the labor field, the AFL-CIO was working with people some of whom were conservatives who were tied in with the Radical Party, some of them with another group. Wenceslao Moreno, who was a strange figure, who ran the longshoremen's union and became a vice president of the ARIT —he eventually became the labor adornment of the Pinochet (Augusto José Pinochet Ugarte, ruler of Chile from from 1973 to 1990) government. And became the labor attaché in Washington. He was a semi-literate, but he was a guy who always played wherever the money and the power was. And he played with the AIFLD [American Institute for Free Labor Development].

Shea: Did Serafino Romualdi come there at that time?

MARTIN: Oh, yes. I used to see Serafino. I had good relations with Serafino. But in those days, the AFL-CIO was just at the fringes of the labor movement. The real forces there were the Christian Democrats, the Socialists, and the Communists, and we were really on the outer limits of it, you see.

Kienzle: W*hen you say "we," do you mean the—*

MARTIN: —the American labor movement. The American labor movement's contacts were not terribly good.

Shea: Do you recall Clotario Blest?

MARTIN: Clotario Blest was an extreme leftist, of course. He died.

Shea: He died recently.

MARTIN: Yes, sure.

Kienzle: Did the U.S. government support the AFL-CIO's position on labor in Chile, or did we define a different policy towards the labor movement?

MARTIN: Well, we pretty much accepted their policy, although it created difficulties for us and it created tensions. In an effort to try to bridge the gap, I set up relations with Christian Democratic groups, Christian Labor groups. Where the Christians were particularly good was in the *campesino* areas. I worked with them particularly in the vineyards in central Chile, but this incurred the wrath of the AFL-CIO because they wanted to force these people to work through the AIFLD. Now one of the big problems we had—and there were discussions that went on in the embassy and with the AFL-CIO—was not necessarily to force everybody to work through the AIFLD, but to perhaps work out assistance programs through these other groups which politically did not feel like the Christian Democrats, did not want to identify themselves with the AIFLD, which would in the labor movement make them stooges of the y*anqui*, openly. So we were not able to work out as sophisticated a policy. The AFL insisted, you had to go through the AIFLD. I had long talks with Morris Palladino about this and Bill Dougherty, but they were all under orders. I guess Meany (George Meany) was very strong with them. But the line from 16th Street was you had to work through AIFLD or nothing else. And this created great difficulties in extending American influence in the labor sector in Chile.

Kienzle: You said you worked with the campesinos*.*

MARTIN: Yes.

Kienzle: What kinds of things did you do?

MARTIN: Well, one of the things I did, for example, was after John Kennedy was assassinated, we set up John Kennedy Libraries in the USIA. We would set up a collection of books with a portrait of John Kennedy, and we would come down and hold meetings, you know, and set it up, *et cetera*. And this was a means by which the Ambassador could come in. And we even went into Communist-dominated unions and did this. The pro-Kennedy sentiment was so strong, not even the Communists could stop

this, for example. And I was able to move into a number of areas. It was really tremendous, the pro-Kennedy spirit was so tremendous. This was a wonderful way of getting into areas normally for an American embassy official or an AFL-CIO person to get in was very difficult. And we were able to get in, and it was a very successful program. We did that. I also helped set up a magazine, a labor magazine in Chile, which circulated very widely, which was edited by a number of Chilean labor people, but which we helped edit and set it up. We did both. It served as a bridge—we gave publicity to unions which were independent, outside the AIFLD. At the same time we gave information on AIFLD seminars that were going on. We tried to bridge this whole area together. And also we set up a series of manuals. We edited manuals—how to set up a union, how to set up collective bargaining, how do deal with your social security problem. They were tremendously successful. They were sponsored also by the Labor Lawyers and Social Security Association of Chile, so it had a real imprimatur. It was so successful that left-wing unions used to call us up and ask us for copies of things, so they wanted to use it.

Shea: The CLASC [Confederación Latino Americana de Sindicatos Cristianos] (Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unionists) was active in Chile at that time.

MARTIN: Yes, and I maintained some relations with these people.

Shea: I recall a Chilean official of CLASC by the name of Goldsack.

MARTIN: José Goldsack. I knew him, and I maintained relations with him. I was the person in the embassy who had relations with two groups Tom couldn't or wouldn't or wasn't able to. I maintained relations with the Socialists, who were in the CUT [Central Unitaria de Trabajadores y Trabajadoras] (Workers' United Center of Chile) with the Communists, and with the Christian Democrats. I was the one who had relations with Goldsack. They considered me the friendly person in the embassy.

Kienzle: This was the division of labor between you and the labor attaché?

MARTIN: It wasn't. I just created it that way, even though it incurred the enmity of the AFL-CIO. They didn't like what I was doing there.

Kienzle: How did the labor attaché and the embassy react to this division of labor?

MARTIN: Well, we had our differences, and it was a problem. I presented arguments for it, and the embassy people agreed to it. The DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission] and the ambassador agreed to it, and they very much encouraged me in what I was doing, although I created problems for the AFL-CIO, though.

Kienzle: Your working relationship with the labor attaché at that time?

MARTIN: At times it would get prickly because Tom Walsh felt more under the pressure of the AFL-CIO and tried to adhere more to what they wanted him to do, you see, and I

was more freewheeling. It created problems.

Shea: Ralph Duncan was the ambassador.

MARTIN: Ralph Duncan was the ambassador, and John Holva was the DCM. They both highly approved, because both of them requested that I come back as labor attaché, because I had the contacts.

Shea: When you had your contacts with CLASC, did you come in touch with Emilio Mósforo?

MARTIN: Oh, sure. I knew Emilio. We knew each other well. I also gave lectures on labor relations at the Catholic University, which was the Christian Democratic stronghold. They permitted me to do that, too.

Kienzle: Could you define CLASC?

MARTIN: CLASC is the Confederation of Christian Trade Unions of Latin America. Not all the Christian Democrats in Chile were aligned with them. There were two factions within the Christian Democratic labor sector. There was one group that wanted to work with the ARIT, for example, another group that worked with the Christian trade unions, and another group which sort of remained in the middle. So the Christian Democrats were really spread all over the place. It was a matter of working with these various groups, you see. If you wanted to be successful and have labor influence or labor contacts, you had to establish relations with all these different sectors, you see.

Kienzle: CLASC was a competing organization?

MARTIN: Yes, it was competing, and its influence was mainly in the *campesino* field. The *campesinos* were affiliated to CLASC.

Kienzle: Where was it located?

MARTIN: At one time the headquarters were in Caracas. Emilio Mósforo came out of Argentina. They had a sort of strident nationalist, anti-*yanqui* view, and this offended George Meany tremendously. This created a problem, and then, of course, when I came back to the United States, one of the first things I did in INR was do an extensive study of the Christian labor movement, what it amounted to, and where their points of strength were—there was a lot of ignorance about this in Washington—and then tried, together with people in INR in the State Department, a lot of people in the State Department, to persuade the AFL-CIO that you could attract the bees more with honey than with vitriol, you know, by trying to sort of get them to come in, not necessarily forcing them to go into your straitjacket; understanding, being a bit more compassionate about their political problems, and then trying to work out something more realistic in the relationships, and then sort of try to act as a moderating influence on the more radicalizing influences. You see, within the CLASC there were more radical and more moderate influences. And I

was arguing that it behooved the American interests to try to work with the more moderate groups in there.

Shea: I knew Mósforo quite well—

MARTIN: I did too.

Shea: —and he certainly had his differences with the AFL-CIO, but he also had his differences with the German trade unions. In fact, the Germans always considered him too radical.

MARTIN: Yes, but at the same time, he was financed primarily by the German Bishops' Fund, the Misereor Fund. (The German Catholic Bishops' Organization for Development Cooperation.) Their attitude toward the Christian labor people in Latin America was that yes, they're kind of radical, but these people are idealistic, they're well meaning, and over the long run perhaps we can serve as a moderating influence. This was the attitude held both by the Brussels headquarters of the Christian Intentional and by the German bishops in working with them.

Kienzle: What came out of the recommendation that you made that the United States deal with the moderate Christian unions?

MARTIN: It never went anywhere. We weren't able to exert any influence over the AFL-CIO at all. They remained adamant in their attitude. You see, what the AFL-CIO was concerned about was if they gave way anywhere, toward any kind of a labor assistance program outside of AIFLD, this would open up the dikes. So they were adamant and forcing everybody to get into the AFL-CIO-controlled labor program, you see. To them, this was a bureaucratic thing; it was a matter of power, of control. They were afraid of diffusing their power by letting it out. But by doing that, you see, they were creating problems for our foreign policy concerns. I'm sure Jim understood this. Jim was in Latin America at that time. All of us who served in the field in Latin America had this same problem, because you couldn't force everybody to work just this way; you had to have a wider spectrum of alternatives available if you were going to have effective labor assistance programs in Latin America.

Shea: At that time, Ben, who controlled the copper miners in Chile?

MARTIN: The Socialists. And the Socialists wouldn't have anything to do with AIFLD, absolutely nothing. And they were the powerhouse of the Chilean labor movement.

Shea: I recall one Chilean copper miner leader named Jorge Castillo.

MARTIN: No, I don't remember him. There were others. I forget their names now. There was a very strong leftist strain in Chile, socialism, you see, and this had to be taken into account. The embassy had very little in the way of contacts with the Socialists, very little.

Shea: Society was very polarized.

MARTIN: Oh, yes, it was a highly polarized situation.

Kienzle: Did AIFLD have a representative in Chile at that time?

MARTIN: Later on they had one. They didn't have one then, but they brought one in shortly after that, and they had a new residence.

Kienzle: After you left, so you didn't actually work with the local AIFLD representative in Chile.

MARTIN: No, I worked with people who happened to be there who were working on programs which they had set up. They were running seminars, and they were sending people up here to their programs here. They had a resident program here outside Washington, a training school, and they had people they were sending up here. Their program was not a terribly successful program.

Shea: That was in Front Royal.

MARTIN: They were dealing only with peripheral elements in the labor movement at that time. Their main group was the longshoremen's union, which was a strong union. It was controlled by Wenceslao Moreno, who was really a self-seeking opportunist. He was a guy without any real scruples.

Kienzle: Okay, anything else you'd like to say about your experience in Chile that you think should be on the record? You can always add it later—

MARTIN: Well, perhaps so, but in the later program we did have our problems, and I think the ambassador understood this. It was one of the reasons why he wanted me to come back. He thought that my attitude, my outlook, was a good one, but of course he was very wary of the AFL-CIO, too. He had served in the White House and had been burnt by George Meany, too, so he was very careful in not incurring their dislike either. So we were in a careful balancing act.

Kienzle: Was this identification that you had with the CIO still problematic in any way in dealing with the AFL-CIO.

MARTIN: Well, it was to some degree in that I seemed to be a person they didn't control fully and I was suspected of Reutherite tendencies. This created problems for me all the time.

Kienzle: Did the labor attaché have any direct contacts with the AFL folks rather than through the State Department?

MARTIN: Oh, yes, all the time, of course. We all did. Andy McClellan would come to visit us regularly, and when Andy came into town I would, of course, arrange things, too. We had a radio program. I would arrange the tape programs for Andy, and we would sit down with Andy. I would sit down with Serafino Romualdi, with Morse probably. We had a steady stream of people coming through. Bill Dougherty came through, and we had constant discussions with these people, oh sure.

Kienzle: Shall we turn to your experience in INR and what the labor issues were that you felt were there and seem memorable in retrospect?

MARTIN: Well, first, perhaps, it would be well that I explain just what the INR labor specialist did. I served as a sort of advisor for the bureau, in which I would work closely with our regional offices in trying to get input on labor analysis and labor coverage. At the same time, I was covering the international organizations—ICFTU, WFTU, the Christian International, the ILO [International Labour Organization], things like that I would cover as well. And then I also served as the link between the intelligence community and the labor field. For example, the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] would ask me to contribute reporting requirements for their field people. Not only on international organizations but even on various country programs. I would solicit these things and collaborate with our regional offices, and I would meet regularly with the CIA people in developing these reporting programs, and we would have exchange of material too. When I went on field trips out into Europe, particularly London, I would meet the regional CIA people who were involved in Labor coverage and discuss with them overall trends, reporting requirements, etc. Their headquarters was in London, primarily, as far as European labor requirements were concerned. You see, I was situated in the Western European office, so my primary concern was Western Europe although I covered, as I say, the entire globe. And as I say, one of the first things I did when I came back was to try to educate people in Washington on the Christian labor movement. I did a long study of the Christian labor organization. And then we held meetings after that. Since my document became a matter of great curiosity at 16th Street, the AFL-CIO headquarters, what we did was we got clearance and we had Andy McClellan and Bill Dougherty and somebody else—

Shea: Ernie Lee?

MARTIN: No, Ernie didn't come down then. And I read the entire paper to them. It was a paper classified "Secret." They were dog-in-the-manger about it. Grrrr. You know, they wouldn't really accept it. I met them with a number of people including the director of the Latin American office of INR and several other people at higher executive levels. Phil Delaney was there too. Phil agreed with me, you see. This was the interesting thing. On this issue, Phil agreed with me. I had convinced Phil and he had agreed with me that this was one issue on which the AFL-CIO was really going overboard, and we tried to argue with them. "You've got to soften up your attitude. You just can't be so hard-nosed about it. It ain't working." Ah, we couldn't get them off the dime. I think the real reason was that George Meany, on this issue, was adamant. He wouldn't give an inch on this issue, and of course, neither could Bill or Andy at that time.

Kienzle: What criteria did the AFL—they would work with and which unions they would exclude?

MARTIN: Well, it was simply a matter of whether the union politically would go along with what they believed to be the case. For example, if a union had to have a strong anticommunist attitude it had to have no relationships of any kind with any union of a procommunist nature or of a communist nature. They were very rigid. And the Socialists very often too. And then on the Christian Democrats, they then applied this to the Christian Democrats too. Especially the Christian Democrats who were very anti-United States and had become very critical of U.S. policy, so it became very rigid, and this was the problem.

Kienzle: And the danger of their dealing with only marginal groups?

MARTIN: Yes, and I remember even in Peru. What's the name, who was in Peru for the AIFLD?

Shea: Jesse Friedman.

MARTIN: Jesse Friedman was really staunch AIFLD people. Jesse would complain to me—he was an old friend of mine—how the rigidity of the AFL-CIO policy of Lovestone (Jay Lovestone) and the others was creating terrible difficulties for them in the field. They wanted to move out a little more to people who they felt, if given the chance, they could perhaps influence and move in a more moderate direction. But this rigid AFL-CIO attitude was, by our cooperating with these people or giving them any assistance we're giving them greater legitimacy. This was the great argument. But it was really a counterproductive argument, too, because it worked to our disadvantage as well. It put us in a more restricted, limited orbit of activity.

Shea: You of course know Arturo Jauriji.

MARTIN: Of course I knew Jauriji. Jauriji just did what he was told to do.

Kienzle: You mentioned that you were the liaison with the CIA. Do you care to comment at all on the extent to which the CIA might have been involved at all in cultivating labor leaders, especially in Western Europe after World War II?

MARTIN: Well, this is now a public fact. I don't think I can add much to it. Of course they were, and they did it through the usual CIA means. It was a regular operation, and they worked in close cooperation with the AFL-CIO. This is an open fact. And we talked about this when I talked with the Agency people. This was no secret.

Shea: They worked closely with the ICFTU?

MARTIN: Some were prone to working with the ICFTU; others were not.

Shea: And ITSs?

MARTIN: It depended. Some ITSs to a greater extent, others less. They could not work so well with the International Metalworkers' Federation, but in the Commercial Workers Federation the Agency was very influential because of the American input there. And so it varied a great deal; there was a great deal of collaboration by this, as I will tell you later on about another incident that will illustrate this even more graphically. But there was extensive—and the CIA would not get itself involved in anything which would create problems with them with the AFL-CIO. Their primary concern was to continue to nurture and maintain this relationship, and even though privately they may have sometimes argued with Meany and others about how to proceed in a given thing, they would always defer to Meany on this. Meany was very strong in maintaining the AFL-CIO policy, and the Agency wouldn't mess with them on that issue.

Kienzle: On individuals, were they still recruiting labor people while you were there?

MARTIN: Oh, yes, oh, sure. As they had in every other field, they had people on stipends, and they were paying people, of course.

Kienzle: Did George Meany have any veto power over who would be recruited?

MARTIN: I don't think it went down to that level, no. At the local operating level it was strictly a matter of the operational requirements that they felt. The Agency, of course, had people in the communist movement, people in the socialist movement. This had nothing to do with Meany. Meany didn't want to know about it.

Kienzle: The white envelope corrupts all ideology.

MARTIN: Of course, the net that the CIA spread was a much wider net, and the AFL-CIO was interested in its own particular parochial interests.

Kienzle: Do you think there was any negative effect of this recruitment policy on democratic institutions? In other words, did recruiting labor leaders—

MARTIN: It's hard to generalize. In some cases probably it did; in others it didn't. You would have to cite a specific instance. But you know, it's in the nature of an intelligence operation to go out and recruit people like that, so if you're an intelligence agency, you do that. Whether in a particular instance it worked against the democratic dynamic is a matter of specific articulation. You can't say necessarily. In France or in Italy sometimes it was necessary. Sometimes it may not have been. You'd have to cite me a specific instance of which I have some knowledge.

Kienzle: You wanted to tell us about a specific incident.

MARTIN: Oh, yes. This one is of particular interest, I think, for historical purposes.

This concerns the time when Meany and the AFL-CIO decide to leave the ICFTU. This created a great concern for us in the State Department, and this became a concern to the secretary, too, Dean Rusk.

Kienzle: This would have been the middle '70s, roughly?

MARTIN: I forget. Was it about the mid-'70s, Jim, that the break with the ICFTU came?

Shea: Yes.

MARTIN: So we were concerned as to what were the repercussions of all this. How would this affect foreign policy concerns, *et cetera*. And I had established a certain standing with the Secretary's office through my INR work, and so the 7th Floor had to decide what to do, if anything, about Meany's break with the ICFTU. And there was a luncheon held every Thursday—Lyndon Johnson was then President—he held a meeting every Thursday at lunch, where major policy matters with the Secretaries of State and Defense and others were taken up at the luncheon. And before attending that luncheon, Rusk, through the director of INR, asked that I advise him what he should advise the President to do on Meany's departure. He wouldn't go to Phil Delaney, because Phil Delaney was looked upon as the voice of the AFL-CIO. What would be the point in doing that? So they figured I was more neutral; they would ask me. So I said, "My God, no. This is something you don't want to mess with Meany on."

Shea: That was prior to '72, because Phil Delaney died in 1972.

MARTIN: Oh, did he? I guess it was prior to that. Of course. And so I sent word, which Rusk used at the lunch: stay out of it. And that was exactly what Johnson did. What I then tried to do was the director of the INR and myself met with the under secretary for political affairs, who was Kennedy's boy in the State Department, who had served under Bobby as under secretary of Attorney General before then—it's on the tip of my tongue. In any case, we've identified him. So I met with the under secretary and recommended that we do a national intelligence estimate to weigh the pros and cons to weigh the fallout there would be on foreign policy matters, this departure, and what should be State Department policy. And he agreed, so we proceeded to do this. But in order to do this, you had to get the CIA's agreement, you know, because a national intelligence estimate is done jointly between CIA and State. The CIA would have nothing to do with this, because they didn't want to be messing in any way with George Meany. This meant for them taking a position on something which was dear to the heart of George Meany. So we had to drop the national intelligence estimate on the departure.

Kienzle: You mentioned briefly that Delaney was the voice of AFL-CIO in the State Department. Did you ever go into the pros and cons of having someone that close to the AFL-CIO as the labor advisor?

MARTIN: I think it's a mistake. It's a terrible mistake because the man cannot serve really. He's not his own man. He can't serve two masters. I think the ideal situation

would be to have somebody there who is objective, who has independence but who at the same time entertains the good will of the AFL-CIO. You don't want anyone in there who'll create problems for you, but somebody who is in a position to weigh the situation carefully and give you a balanced view, taking into account both the labor field and the—so that I think, in that sense, someone with a Foreign Service background with a labor background, but somebody who is of independent mind and character, is the best possible person to occupy that position.

Shea: Somebody like Dan Horowitz.

MARTIN: Well, yes, up to a point. Dan, well, I won't comment on that.

Kienzle: You're welcome to comment.

MARTIN: I think Tony Friedham was a better representative, a man of more independent spirit, and was more of an ideal person for that job, perhaps, than some of the others I can think of.

Kienzle: Are there other issues during your tenure in INR that you'd like to mention?

MARTIN: I think what I tried to do—and I think this was successful—is that the intelligence reports and the analysis we did in INR on labor was I think one of the few things that were available to the labor officers in the field to give them a background on what was going on in the rest of the world insofar as labor was concerned and to relate it to their own situation, and I think we served a valuable function for that, too. So I think in that sense we rendered a service, too, both to the field and to the people. Also, it helped give general Foreign Service people an awareness of the importance of labor in the overall functions, in the Foreign Service mix. And it was the only means you had available to do that.

Kienzle: Did the AFL-CIO ever complain about your independent stance in analyzing the issues?

MARTIN: Oh, yes. I got into all sorts of trouble. On Italy, for example, when I did a paper on Italy after the "Hot Autumn," the Hot Autumn was the great strike waves in Italy of 1968. I did a long paper on that. And then I did several papers after that. After that point, from 1968 on, labor was tremendously important in Italy and in understanding what was happening in Italian politics. I spent six months doing a paper on the Hot Autumn. And then after that, I did a paper in which I committed *lèse-majesté* in that I said that the Italian Communist moderates were becoming more moderate, you see. And that got me into real trouble.

Kienzle: Who leaked it to the AFL-CIO?

MARTIN: Well, Dan Guth, who was the European labor advisor. He was an AFL-CIO loyalist, and he tried to get the paper suppressed. It was approved by the Italian Desk, by

the director of Italian Affairs, by INR, but not by . . . it was suppressed, too. As an act of pettiness, I had done a paper on Portuguese communist labor influence, which you'd think would have been okay, you know, pointing out how important their influence was, and then Dale Goode, who was labor advisor in the SIL, who had served in Germany, just out of pettiness, vetoed the appearance of my paper in the CIA daily thing that they put out, you know. They had selected my INR paper. Even though I was pointing out how serious the communist influence was, just out of pettiness he vetoed it.

Kienzle: Was he also the voice of AFL-CIO?

MARTIN: Oh, absolutely. Oh, my God, yes.

Shea: He followed Harry Pollock, and Harry Pollock, in my opinion, although he was from the AFL-CIO, was much more independent.

MARTIN: Yes, he was more intelligent. He had a brain. No, no, whatever you can say about Harry, he was intelligent, he knew what was going on. He just protected his rump, that's all.

Shea: In fact, Dale Goode, on retiring—

MARTIN: —went to work as a special assistant to Kirkland, yes.

Kienzle: How about John Warnick? Did you work under his tenure at SIL?

MARTIN: No, I was gone by that time. I had retired in 1977.

Kienzle: Were there others in the Department who were leaking papers and things to the AFL-CIO?

MARTIN: Oh, my God, it was a sieve. Of course. They knew everything. They had all kinds of people there. I don't have to give you all the names. You know them. We all know them. Oh, yes. Stuff was being leaked constantly, even among the most sensitive papers. Besides, they had access to it through the Agency. The Agency was feeding them all kinds of stuff, too, anyway. I remember once talking to Andy McClellan. I had seen a CIA report on persecutions of Guatemalan labor people, and without indicating my source, I tried to hint to Andy one day that something was going on in Guatemala he should be thinking about. He said, "Oh, you mean that report you put out on that?" He knew about it.

Kienzle: He had had it first. What would you recommend in the way of access to information by the AFL-CIO? What do you think are the ideal terms?

MARTIN: Well, I think that it's important that there be an exchange of information on a confidential basis between the American labor movement and the State Department. Of course there should be. I have no particular problems with that. I think that it should be

done, as I'm sure it is done in other fields as well, on a privileged basis with various groups with which the State Department cooperates. But you see what made it difficult for the State Department was that there was this Meany-Reuther _____ war going on, blood feud, which placed Foreign Service officers right in the middle on these kinds of things. And sometimes this information was used in this battle between these two factions.

Kienzle: Did you see a lot of end runs around the State Department to 16th Street?

MARTIN: Oh, yes. It occasionally happened, sure.

Kienzle: Are there other things that occurred while you were in INR that you'd like to highlight?

MARTIN: Well, I would just say this: that one of the things that I think are important, especially with a shrinking labor officer corps, is that it is important that the capabilities of INR be maintained, even more so than in the past, because it's one of the sole means you have available to give information to the field on important areas of concern to the foreign policy area in the labor field, especially when you have so little coverage going on in the field itself, that at least you can perhaps cover these empty areas through information analysis provided by INR. It's one of the sole remaining areas in which you can use this to cover this area, need for information.

Kienzle: Do you think this should be done by someone who stays in INR for a fairly lengthy period of time, or is this something where labor attachés can be rotated into the job?

MARTIN: I think some labor attachés can be rotated into the job, but I would be careful to make sure that you have somebody of real competence and intellectual caliber who can do the job. I think you can use both. I think you can use people from academia and perhaps use both in trying to cover this area.

Kienzle: Was there an effort to draw from academia while you were there?

MARTIN: No. What I did, I ran a program to provide research programs. You see, the INR also acts as the arm of contact between the academic community and foreign policy, and what I did was to try to run conferences and commission studies. For example, I commissioned a study by Everett Caslow on the International Metalworkers' Federation, which was done, and Caslow put that out. We had several other papers which we did. I tried to commission a study—this is one that might be amusing. You know, at the time of the great strike wave in France, which was in '75 or thereabouts, after the student revolts—that was in '68, '69, '70. So the ambassador shortly after that was the brother-in-law of John Kennedy, Sargent Shriver. And of course, for many years the privileged patron-client relationship between the AFL-CIO and the French labor movement was *Force Ouvrière*. But there was also the deconfessionalized Christian labor confederation known as the French Democratic Confederation of Labor, which was

moving in a very interesting direction and was growing, but which we refused to have any relationships with it because the Christians had gotten into a united front on some issues with the Communists, and of course that was anathema. That killed off any possible relations that the AFL-CIO might have with them, which was a mistake. And John Condon, who was the labor attaché there, had been secretly maintaining relations with them and had excellent relations with them, unbeknownst to the AFL-CIO.

Kienzle: Another one of the wheeler-dealers.

MARTIN: Yes. Oh, John was very good at this, and he was very successful. He was one of the most successful labor officers we've ever had.

Kienzle: Is that right?

MARTIN: Oh, absolutely. John was brilliant, and politically as well. Well, for one thing he wanted a new labor attaché there, and Phil Delaney became very nervous that Sargent Shriver might ask for me, because I knew French and I knew the French labor movement. They were very nervous that I might be requested, but I said I didn't want to get involved in that anyway. I told Phil. But, in any case, what I tried to do was commission a study, and Everett Caslow knew France extremely well. He had served as the labor advisor for AID in France for a number of years and knew everybody in France and spoke French fluently. He was the ideal person. He was then at the University of Wisconsin. But it was also known that Everett had very friendly relations with the French Christians. He was one of those also who tried to persuade the AFL-CIO they should extend their relations with them. Even the labor attaché then who was in Paris, Irving Lippy, approved of the idea. He was an oldtimer, who had served everywhere in Europe, in London, in Brussels. Irv, of course, knew the value of Everett Caslow's abilities, and so approved it too.

MARTIN: That's too bad.

Shea: _____ Newspaper Guild _____

MARTIN: Right. Irv was a real pioneer in this whole field. Well, in any case, Irv, as labor attaché, approved the idea, too. And so we appropriated the money, gave it all, and so at that time Irving Brown was already here working as International Affairs director, and Irving got very exercised because he saw this as a threat to the exclusivity of the AFL's relationship to the *Force Ouvrière*. He thought that Everett was going to go there and was going to put out a report in which, probably, he would recommend that American representation and assistance be extended to the CFDT [Confédération française démocratique du travail] (French Democratic Confederation of Labour) as well. And so he got very exercised about this, and he came to the State Department and went to see Bohlen (Charles Eustis Bohlen), who was then serving as the under secretary of political affairs, since they were old buddies from when Bohlen had served as ambassador to France, and he tried to importune Bohlen to cancel this thing. (Bohlen served as deputy under secretary of political affairs from February 1968 to January 1969.)

Well, Bohlen didn't want to get involved in this. This was an affair of INR. You know, the Desk had approved it and everybody else. But it was finally killed by Dan Guth. Dan Guth, who was the labor advisor, persuaded the assistant secretary for European Affairs to cancel it, and so it was canceled.

Shea: And Dan knew how to do it.

MARTIN: Oh, yes. Dan was a very good, skillful bureaucrat. And everybody in the European Affairs Bureau knew that he was the voice of the AFL-CIO, and they didn't want to mess with him. You know, they were scared.

Shea: It was interesting because he was not from the AFL-CIO.

MARTIN: No, but he became one of their closest friends. He was particularly close to Jay Lovestone. Phil and he didn't get along too well. Because Phil and Jay had their differences.

Shea: Darn right they did.

MARTIN: There was a sibling rivalry going on there.

Kienzle: What were the differences there?

MARTIN: It was a power thing. It was a turf thing. It was a matter of who could get the attention of George Meany more, was it Phil Delaney or was it Jay Lovestone. It was a matter of Phil trying to show George Meany that he was the guy with the moxie and the influence, more so than Jay Lovestone.

Kienzle: Anything else that you want to mention about your INR experience?

MARTIN: Well, I suppose if I think about it, there could be dozens of things, but at the moment it doesn't occur to me.

Kienzle: You were there during the bureaucratic fights then, when Dan Horowitz was brought back to refocus the labor attaché corps with a more "Foreign Service" approach.

MARTIN: Yes, I had an experience with Dan. Dan and I are old friends, but I had an incident which left an unsavory taste, I might recount. You know, at the time, about the Italian thing, I had prepared a paper, which I was going to deliver at the annual meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Association, on the developments in the Italian labor situation, which was at slight variance—I mean, I was very careful—with the AFL-CIO policy. By that time, too, I was taking the position that the CGIL was moving in a more moderate direction. What got Dan Guth's ire up was, I said that the Italian Communist Party was moving in a more moderate direction, when he canceled the INR paper that I had done. But then I had established myself because I had taken this attitude, and of course, I had reiterated this same thing in my paper, too, on the Italian labor situation,

pointing out the dynamics that were developing in the Italian labor situation. But the paper had to get clearance from Dan Horowitz, but apparently the AFL-CIO twisted Dan's arms to persuade him not to permit me to deliver this paper at the Industrial Relations Research Association, and so Dan vetoed this paper, even though it was fairly innocuous.

Kienzle: It was so ironic because years earlier—

MARTIN: —he had gotten in trouble, too.

Kienzle: —he had gotten in trouble for advocating contacts with the Socialists.

MARTIN: Well, Dan had his problems, too, and did not want to incur the wrath, at that particular moment, of the AFL-CIO. He was hoping to become consul general in Naples, and so didn't want to create any problems.

Kienzle: Well, he did actually.

MARTIN: Yes. Well, this is the kind of situation a Foreign Service officer finds himself really caught in, and so, yes, I guess he might not know which way to jump. It's painful.

Kienzle: Well, I gather that Dan Horowitz had the confidence of the people on the 7th Floor in the State Department, and his appointment in part was—

MARTIN: Well, I'll tell you. Actually, for many years, the SIL appointment was made by 16th Street, or if the State Department wanted to propose somebody to serve in that position, they had to get the prior approval of the AFL-CIO. This was considered the AFL-CIO's spot in the State Department. It was their office. And so nobody could occupy that office who could not pass muster by the AFL-CIO. See, the attitude by the 7th Floor and by the White House was that, yes, we had some difficulties with the AFL-CIO and the labor field, but the labor field really was their baby, and this was their payoff politically. Let them have it; let's not create any waves there. This is part of the cost of maintaining a good relationship with the American labor movement. And since Meany was an activist in international labor affairs, this was something he wanted, and you gave it to him.

Kienzle: Did this create any problems with the old-line senior Foreign Service? Did they feel that SIL was not a "team player" in the State Department?

MARTIN: Oh, yes. They all knew it, and that if there was some problem they had, they would try to steer it away from SIL. They knew that was the voice of the AFL-CIO. I remember once—oh, this might be of interest to you, too. I think it was in the '70s. There was a new deputy assistant secretary who took over in charge of labor affairs in the ARA, in the Latin American Bureau. (The former Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State) He's now the chairman of the Metropolitan Museum of Art. He served as ambassador in Czechoslovakia. He was DCM in Caracas for many years.

What's his name? His name is on the tip of my tongue. I'm sure that Jim will know him. We'll fill that in later on. Anyway, he knew that I had an independent view of things and that I had served in Latin America and I kept my finger on Latin American affairs. So he asked my counsel on how to proceed and what did I think of the AIFLD operation in Latin America, *et cetera*, and so I told him, "Watch out, this is hot stuff, you can get burned in this area very easily." And so I warned him that this is a minefield that you're walking in, especially for an aspiring Foreign Service officer who is at the point of becoming an Ambassador to mess with. But he was very idealistic. He was very determined to work with integrity in this field. He had been told privately by the ambassador in Brazil that he was very unhappy with the way they were working there and that he wanted greater scope to operate there. So he had had a couple of ambassadors in Latin America already express privately to him their unhappiness being restricted in how they could operate. So I brought to him various people who gave him an eye view of what was going on, including Americans working in the OAS [Organization of American States] who knew something about it, labor officers who had served in Brazil and elsewhere. And we particularly focused on São Paolo, and in São Paolo the AIFLD was spending close to half a million dollars a year in running a labor institute there, which was being run by a notoriously corrupt labor figure there called a *palego*. *Palegos*, in Brazilian labor terms, are corrupt guys who are sort of paid off, who work with the government and, you know, move with the winds, not people who are really devoted to labor ideals. And what Bill Dougherty was doing there was simply paying this guy off for getting an entrée into the labor circles. Bill Dougherty sometimes worked on a bread and butter basis. He would buy off guys so he could move into areas, you see, and he had bought this guy off. But according to a labor officer who had served there, he said this thing was counterproductive, he said it is a waste of money. We weren't getting anything and we were being identified with the most corrupt elements of the labor movement.

Kienzle: Which labor officer was that?

MARTIN: Alan Silverman. And so he had Alan talk to him and I talked to him and the OAS people talked to him. And so after listening to all this, he decided, well, he was going to hit first at São Paolo, and the budget there. So he went in to the assistant secretary, and the assistant secretary said okay, go ahead. So he started moving in this area and, *boom*, a letter came from George Meany: "I trust that before you make any revisions on our operation in São Paolo you will consult with me." That did it.

Kienzle: That did it.

MARTIN: That meant, if you mess with my budget, I'm going to pick up the phone to the White House. That was it. That was the end of the adventure. Of course, the assistant secretary then instructed him: better pull back.

Kienzle: It put the fear of God in him.

MARTIN: Yes. But this is the way it operated. Here you had an idealistic deputy assistant secretary who wanted to do the right thing, and an ambassador in Brazil—who

later became assistant secretary for ARA—who wanted to do the right thing, but all these guys—and I've talked to various assistant secretaries in ARA, and they knew the score and they knew the problem—but the political power of the AFL-CIO under a Democratic administration was just too great. And this was a field that the 7th Floor just didn't want to mess with. It was not important for them, the labor field, for them to get entangled with and to create problems with the White House.

Kienzle: Probably that kind of fear doesn't exist any more.

MARTIN: Well, it does exist. Because the AFL-CIO, even under a Republican administration, or a Democratic administration, or a Republican Congress, is still the favored means by which to carry on an international labor program. And as you see, the labor budget for international institutes, the regional labor institutes, is still way up there. It hasn't been reeled in in price very much. Nor has the Congress yet, so far as I know, done anything really—

Kienzle: I think they've tried in the last year to cut the budgets back quite a bit.

MARTIN: Well, maybe they have, but that's a novelty. It's a new one.

Kienzle: How do you strike the balance between AFL-CIO participation in the assistance process and really ramming through projects that should be examined and perhaps cut back or modified?

MARTIN: Well, of course, the labor institutes are a very useful means. The Friedrich-Ebert Institut [Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung] (Friedrich Ebert Foundation) is a very useful means for the German government and is very effective in a number of countries, much more effective than our regional labor institutes, because they have a much more broad and flexible, sophisticated policy in dealing with diverse labor political groups. So it is not a matter of whether or not you fund regional labor institutes; it's a matter of how much leeway they're given in controlling and influencing your independence in administering an *overall* labor policy. It is whether you subjugate your own ability to formulate policy in this area to AFL-CIO parochial concerns and, therefore, limit or restrict broader foreign policy concerns. I think this is where the dividing line comes in. And I think it's a matter of being able to sit down and negotiate and reason out a program with the labor movement which meets both interests. The problem has been that there has been a just surrender of policy in this area to Meany and then to Lane Kirkland. And this, unfortunately, has been the problem. And this created terrible problems for those of us who are sympathetic to labor interests but at the same time try to concern ourselves with broader foreign policy interests.

Kienzle: Would it be overstating the situation to say that when the AID office was abolished in SIL, the State Department in effect delegated most of the operational responsibilities to the institutes and sort of withdrew from direct labor programs?

MARTIN: Well, that was a contributing element, no question about it. There was no

question about it, and you see, the AFL-CIO has always had an interest in having a monopoly control over labor assistance programs. And with the demise of the AID programs it just facilitated their argument. It strengthened their argument, that instead of you guys getting involved in the State Department in running labor assistance, we'll take over, that's our baby.

Kienzle: AID essentially washed its hands of labor activity at that time.

MARTIN: Precisely.

Kienzle: And so the only real handle was the budget, and whether agreement could be reached on the general parameters of the institute programs abroad.

MARTIN: Yes, I agree.

Kienzle: Anything else you want to mention? Let's talk about after your retirement in 1977.

MARTIN: After I left the State Department, I became a senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Kienzle: Really.

MARTIN: My boss in INR became the director of it, and he asked me to come with him, so I took early retirement—a little bit early retirement—and went off with him.

Kienzle: Can we name your boss?

MARTIN: Oh, sure. Tom Hughes. Tom Hughes was for many years the director of INR. And I ran a Spanish labor program there, but I ran a broader labor program as well. And what I did was I set up a program to make contact after the death of Franco. You see, just before leaving, what prompted me to get involved in this was, just before leaving INR, upon the death of Franco, we set up in INR a team of people to do research papers and studies on what was going to happen in Spain following the death of Franco. And I took over the labor function on that thing. I did the labor paper and several other papers on Spain after Franco. And I became increasingly immersed and interested in this whole area. The problem was, then, how to make contact with the Socialist Party. It was a young Socialist Party, very touchy about its relations with the U.S. government, had a somewhat leftish program, and I think the important thing was to get Felipe González, who was then the young new general secretary of the Spanish Socialist Party, to the United States—to get a chance to expose him to contacts here. And one of my first things I did when I went over to the Carnegie Endowment was to persuade the United Auto Workers to sponsor the trip of Felipe González to the United States. And I sat down with his people and worked out a visiting program. I then went to the State Department and my former boss, who is now the under secretary for political affairs at the State Department. He was then executive secretary. Peter Tarnoff. He was an old friend of

mine. I talked to Peter and arranged the program to get the secretary and also to get the White House to meet with him, to have a meeting with Mondale. And we arranged a highly successful meeting with Felipe González. I had Felipe González speak at the Carnegie Endowment, at Johns Hopkins, and we sent him around the United States to a series of meetings, and this opened the doors to contacts with the Spanish Socialists. So this was one of the first things I did there. And then I actively got involved in persuading American unions to contribute financially to an organizing fund for the General Workers Union [Unión General de Trabajadores] (UGT, General Union of Workers), the Socialist trade union group, which was the non-communist group, which was then the minority labor confederation. The Communists were the larger, the Workers' Commissions [Comisiones Obreras]. And so I got Douglas Fraser interested. You see, before Felipe González came to the United States, I accompanied Doug Fraser on a trip to Madrid. We met with Felipe González and the leaders, and I got Fraser fired up about Spain; and he not only financed the trip of Felipe González and his entourage to the United States, but the International Metalworkers' Federation set up a solidarity fund, so to speak, to assist the UGT, and the United Auto Workers gave close to $350,000.

Kienzle: Is that right?

MARTIN: And I attended the world congress of the International Metalworkers' Federation in Munich—that was I think in 1976, or thereabouts—and sat down with the international affairs director of the Steelworkers, who then became the president of the Steelworkers, Lynn Williams (Lynn Russell Williams), and I acted as interpreter, and I had him meet Corcuera, who was then the secretary of the Spanish Metalworkers' Federation, who later became Interior Minister of Spain, and I gave him an idea of what was going on, and then Williams contributed $25,000. He then sent two steelworkers over to Madrid and they gave a check for $25,000. I got him interested, and Shanker (Albert Shanker) was, on his own, getting himself involved with the teachers' unions, too. All during this time, the AFL-CIO was very queasy about the UGT, because they were involved in a unity of action pact with the Communists, and so they wouldn't have anything to do with them. They were looking around for other people to work with. The only people the AFL-CIO found to work with was a small group, the Basque Workers' Solidarity [Eusko Langileen Alkartasuna, ELA, or Solidaridad de Trabajadores Vascos, STV] group, as I'm sure you know, in the Basque Country—a good group, but they're just a tiny part of Spain.

Kienzle: Marginal to the main activity.

MARTIN: The STV. They had no other contacts in Spain.

Shea: Was John Gwynn there at that time?

MARTIN: Yes, John was there. And it got so bad that Irving even looked around to some ancient anarchists because they were very anti-communist. He looked around to them for possible contacts. It was ridiculous. They were nobodies in Spain.

Kienzle: Did you contact Irving at all?

MARTIN: No, there was no point to doing that. But even the paper I did on Spain before I left the State Department created problems with Dale Goode, because it didn't meet the party line, because I said nice things about a Christian labor group, USO, which was really a sprightly group which had some very able young leaders, which ultimately merged with the UGT.

Shea: That was Zaguirre.

MARTIN: No, it was Zufiaur (José Maria Zufiaur Narvaiza). Zufiaur was still the top leader and Zaguirre was the number two man.

Shea: Oh.

MARTIN: Yes, right. But because I was making these evaluations, Dale Goode had talked to the AFL-CIO about this, and they had said I wasn't saying the right things as far as their political interests, so he insisted that the paper be sent to Madrid and be shown to John Gwynn. And John responded, he said, "Yeah, he's absolutely right!" So abashedly, Dale Goode had to let me issue the paper. But this is the kind of petty little quarrels I would get into sometimes. And anyway, I got myself increasingly involved in sponsoring meetings and arranging contacts for Spanish political and labor people, as at that time the embassy was sending over increasing numbers of Spanish socialists, particularly UGT people; and I would arrange meetings for them with various trade union groups and sponsor meetings for them to with meet with people in town here through the Carnegie Endowment. Also in cooperation with the German Marshall Fund, I was running banquets. We ran banquet conference meetings for important people—like Win Cook, when he came here, I ran a roundtable discussion for Win Cook and had a number of trade union people come down to meet with him, and we ran a dinner for him. And when the secretary of the ICFTU came down, the German fellow whom the AFL-CIO didn't like was then general secretary. Do you know whom I mean? He had been in jail and was an alcoholic.

Shea: He came to Israel, too, once.

MARTIN: Yes. Anyway, I ran a dinner for him and brought people down. I even ran a meeting for Irving Brown. We had Irving Brown speak at this weekly conference—we have regular meeting sessions. So I worked our labor program into the Carnegie Endowment. I was there from 1977 to 1979. And then when I left in 1979, I spent the next two years setting up a program for Foreign Service officers posted to Madrid and Lisbon at the Foreign Service Institute. I served there then for two years as the instructor for this program. And then I got a research grant and went off to Spain and worked on my historical study of the Spanish labor movement, called *The Agony of Modernization: Labor and Industrialization in Spain*, which has been published by the ILR press, Cornell University, and then was published in a Spanish edition by the Ministry of Labor in Spain. And I have maintained my close contacts with the Spanish labor movement ever

since. [S*hows the book*] This is the Ministry of Labor edition.

Shea: This is a Spanish edition.

MARTIN: The other one, I have to take off this thing. I'll show it to you later.

Kienzle: That's quite an honor to have your book translated into Spanish, at their expense, presumably.

MARTIN: Oh, yes. They even paid Cornell $3,000 for the rights to publish it.

Kienzle: Do you get a royalty?

MARTIN: No, Cornell kept it to cover the costs of publishing my book. You know, university presses are pretty tight.

Kienzle: Oh, man, they're cheap.

MARTIN: They're pretty tight on this, yes. I have spent much of my time since then observing what has been going on in Spanish labor affairs and Spanish political affairs, and have occasionally written about that.

Shea: Has Redondo retired, do you think?

MARTIN: Yes, he retired last year.

Kienzle: Who is Redondo?

MARTIN: Nicolás Redondo was the longtime major figure in the socialist labor movement, coming out of the anti-Francoist opposition, out of Bilbao. He was a shipyard worker up there. He comes from a traditional Socialist family in Bilbao (and he, with Marcelino Camacho [Marcelino Camacho Abad], were the two great figures that arose out of the anti-Francoist labor opposition movement) and served as general secretary of the UGT from 1976 until 1994 and became very estranged from the Socialist government, from Felipe González, over economic policy. And this led to a traumatic general strike in Spain in 1988—a highly successful one, the most successful general strike of this century.

Kienzle: Is that right?

MARTIN: Conducted under a Socialist government.

Kienzle: Against the Socialists, by socialists.

MARTIN: By socialists and communists against the Socialist government. Ten million people out of the labor force went out on strike. It was a tremendous thing.

Kienzle: [*to Jim Shea*] You were there then, weren't you?

Shea: No, no. Who was there? I think Frank Molino was there.

Kienzle: This was in which year, again?

MARTIN: 1988, December 14.

Shea: No, it was Frank. I was in Rome at that time. It was a hell of a strike. Redondo was interested because Felipe González had got him out of jail.

MARTIN: He served as his lawyer once when he was in jail, yes.

Shea: It was very interesting. I always thought Redondo was basically a very honest person.

MARTIN: Oh, yes. He was very honest, but he was an old-time Socialist. He could not comprehend that it was possible for a socialist government to assume a sort of centrist macro-economic policy—and such as the Socialist governments have been doing throughout Western Europe. Since the failure of the Mitterrand government in their effort to establish a sort of Keynesian social democratic economic policy failed in '82-83, all socialist governments in Western Europe have gone to orthodox conservative macro-economic policy-making. But for Redondo, he could not accept this. This to him was an utter betrayal of basic Socialist principles, and so he entered into a very visceral and very painful breakdown of relations between the UGT and the Socialist government and the Socialist party. Well, one positive thing that came out of this whole business was that the UGT liberated itself from its subordinate position within the socialist family and has assumed a much more independent trade union role. And this is all to the good, and this is a result that is causing the Workers' Commission also to greatly loosen its ties with the Communist Party, and it has become also much more independent—so that trade unions in general in Spain, particularly the two mainstream labor confederations, are now increasingly more independent in their views.

Kienzle: And they're healthy and vigorous?

MARTIN: Well, trade unions occupy a rather weak position in Spanish society. The reasons for that are rather long and involved, and are concerned more with just the very nature of how Spanish society and economics have developed.

Kienzle: And the issues are covered in your book?

MARTIN: Yes, I mention them in my book, toward the end, there, yes.

Shea: Unemployment, for example, is very high, maybe twenty percent, one of the highest in Europe.

MARTIN: Twenty-three percent now.

Kienzle: Does your book also cover the Civil War period?

MARTIN: It covers from the inception of trade unionism in Spain in the early 19th century to the end of the Civil War, and then has a very short postscript in it which covers what has taken place during the Franco Era and what has taken place up till quite recently in the Socialist government.

Kienzle: Do you include in your coverage the role of the foreign legions, the foreign contingents in the Civil War, like the Abraham Lincoln Brigade?

MARTIN: Oh, I mentioned them in passing. They're really not germane to the main argument of the book. What I cover in the book primarily is the role of trade unions during the Civil War and under the Spanish republic, more than that. But, you know, in order to explain that you have to make some reference to overall general developments that took place at that time. So I do mention it, the international brigades and that sort of thing.

Kienzle: Any other observations on Spain that you'd like to make based on your study?

MARTIN: Well, one thing you learn about Spain is that there is nothing simple in terms of understanding what has taken place in the past in Spain and what is taking place. It's an amazingly complicated country, because it's a country which had a very swift—meteoric—modernization process, as a result of which, much of the past remains. So you get an intermingling of the past and the present, in such a manner, in a very original and unique manner, in such manner that, in order to decipher and comprehend what is going on, you have to delve very deeply into the past and the present to understand why they're acting this way and in what manner. And that goes for politics, it goes for trade unionism, it goes for any number of areas of society and behavior of Spanish culture.

Kienzle: Are there other areas of concentration since your retirement?

MARTIN: Yes, I am presently completing a book, which is to be called *The Reign in Spain of Felipe González: Politics in a Post-Authoritarian Society*, in which I try to explain the successes and the failures of the Socialist government in terms of not only what has taken place within Spanish socialism, but also the legacies that have been inherited from their authoritarian past, which continues to exercise an important shaping influence on how people act, be they socialist, conservative or what-have-you in terms of political behavior etc.

Kienzle: Do you have a publisher?

MARTIN: No, I haven't looked yet. I am about to begin because events are developing

so quickly. What I plan to do is, the book will not be completed until the results of the next election are in. They are going to be held in March in 1996, and as I approach that period, I'll be able to more clearly refine my analysis and overall configuration of the dynamic, and at that point I'll get closer. I'm starting to look around for a publisher now.

Shea: Felipe is still a very young guy.

MARTIN: Yes, he's in his fifties.

Shea: Do you think he'll hang on?

MARTIN: I think so. He's making noises now of stepping down as the presidential candidate in the next elections, but he's being importuned by the Party to stay on. They have made polls indicating that if somebody else runs—See, this is the party which has had the indispensable man running it for so long that replacements available to run the party are so far below, in terms of capabilities, popularity, national standing, that polls seem to suggest that the party has taken that if they would substitute Felipe, despite the fact that he has undergone a loss of credibility and popularity, still the party would lose tremendously by putting somebody else of lesser-known familiarity and capability. They might lose as much as 30 more seats than if Felipe were there.

Shea: What about alleged corruption in the party, Ben?

MARTIN: Oh, it is there, it is there, and this is a real problem. It is a problem not only for the Socialists. It is endemic in Spanish culture. The problem is that the Socialists were not sufficiently sensitive to the spread of corruption, especially by a party that remains in power for so long. This hurt them grievously, and it will be many, many years before their moral standing will have been rehabilitated, from their inability to seriously tackle the corruption issue, which has affected even parts of the Socialist Party. But what this has done, too, it has clouded and obscured the really major accomplishments the Socialist government has done. What is done is that people tend to become transfixed by the stains on the Socialist image—of the corruption, of the misuses and abuses of power—and tend to forget that it was a Socialist government which consolidated Democracy, brought Spain into the mainstream of international affairs and has greatly—Spain's international standing—has greatly improved the economy and the standard of living of Spaniards. These and a number of things are major accomplishments, and yet they're being, sort of, clouded and obscured by the scandals. Much of the scandals, too, are the result of an orchestrated smear campaign which has been carried out primarily, it has been discovered, by Mario Conde, who was the head of Spain's largest banking institution, who has been ousted because of his embezzlement and misuse of funds, and now out of vengeance has conducted an orchestrated campaign of vilification and character assassination against González and the leaders of the Spanish government, so that you have not only corruption, but you have this sort of orchestrated campaign of vilification together, which has produced a terribly injurious effect on the Socialist image.

Kienzle: What kind of corruption is there? I mean, on the specifics.

MARTIN: Oh, there's a variety. Well there's corruption, one, in funding of political parties. All parties do this. In Spain, for example, parties are supposed to rely exclusively on public funding. There is a very generous public funding, government funding, of political parties, which is given on a pro-rata basis on the basis of how many votes you received, how many seats in the parliament you've had, *et cetera*. And it is costing the government over $120 million a year now to subsidize parties. But the cost of political campaigning is now so high, and in Spain, as in most other countries in Western Europe, political parties have looked for illegal means to supplement public funding. And in Spain what they did was, copying the French and the Belgian Socialists and the Italian Socialists, they set up dummy foundations or corporations in which they had big corporations and companies give political payoffs in exchange for fictitious services rendered. And millions of dollars have been raised this way. This is what is known as the Filesa scandal in Spain. And there is a court case going on. It's slowly lumbering through the court system. But it's a fact: the Socialists have been caught with their hand in the till. But also the Conservative Party has done the same thing, you see, except that the Socialists were in power and they could raise more money.

So this is one form of corruption. You had individuals involved in corruption—Mariano Rubio, who was the Socialist appointee as governor of the Bank of Spain—who is a very pro-Socialist guy and a close friend of Felipe González. While he was governor of the Bank of Spain, he operated on the stock market and through favorite special information which he received—

Kienzle: Insider trading.

MARTIN: —insider trading, it's called—and made a great deal of money and falsified his income tax returns on this, did not pay income tax returns on this and did not tell anybody that he was carrying on this illegal activity for a governor of the Federal Reserve Bank to do. He is now under criminal indictment, and he was ousted, of course, from the Bank of Spain. The Socialist appointee, who was the number three position in the Ministry of the Interior, Luis Roldán, who was the head of the Civil Guard, which is the elite police constabulary of Spain, amassed a fortune of $30 million by payoffs on building construction contracts for Civil Guards barracks and stuff, and then fled the country. He has now been caught, and he's another one. And when Mariano Rubio was ousted as governor of the Bank of Spain, because of this insider trading business, the minister of agriculture, Albero (Vicente Albero Silla), had to also resign, because he was doing the same thing with the same stock market firm. He had to resign quickly.

You had another outrageous one, but this is very Spanish. Here's one that's very Spanish. The Socialists collaborate in coalition government in the Basque Country with the Basque Christian Democrats, the Basque Nationalist Party. They jointly run the government there. And, you know, as in Italy—you have the Basque health service. They have nationalized health insurance, you know, in Basque country. They had a competitive written exam to fill a number of positions in the so-called Basque health civil service. And thousands of people applied and took part in this written exam. But then

what the socialist heads of the Health Service did was they falsified the returns of the exams so as to make possible putting in 200 people who were either members or close to the Basque Socialist Party or members of the UGT. How about that? That's corruption.

Shea: Then the vice president, too, Guerra, wasn't it?

MARTIN: Oh, Alfonso Guerra's brother. (Alfonso Guerra González, and brother Juan Guerra) Oh, this is an awful story. This is where the whole chain started. Alfonso Guerra's brother, who was the number two man in the Socialist Party, deputy secretary general, who was also named deputy prime minister, and he had a field office in Seville. You see, he's from Seville, he's from the Sevillian clique that really is the core group that runs the Socialist Party. And you know, on weekends he goes back to Seville because he tried to maintain control over the Andalucían Socialist party. He runs a bookshop in Seville. But for various reasons, every weekend he went back to Seville. And he had a field office in Seville for the deputy prime minister. This office was run by his brother, and his brother was an impecunious door-to-door Bible salesman before that. That's why he gave him the job. He comes from a very poor working-class family there, and he was trying to take care of his brother. So his brother—he had him take care of this office. His brother proceeded to use the prestige and the name of this office to carry out all kinds of corrupt deals, with real estate, for example, getting control of some government property and then reselling it—all kinds of deals, illegal deals, using his brother's office for doing this. And he amassed a tremendous fortune doing this. And of course, he didn't pay any income tax on this or anything else. And of course, he was caught. When he broke up with his wife, his wife went and blabbed to other people. As a result of this, of course, nobody could really lay a finger on Alfonso Guerra directly linking him, but this was carried on in his office and this is a man who is one of the most astute, sharp political operators in Spain. That he wouldn't know that his brother was carrying on this hanky-panky—it was unbelievable. Anyway, he had a moral responsibility. And after a year of trying to figure out how they could cover him, which they couldn't, and in which the scandal was really getting awful and affecting the image and standing of the Socialist party, González was forced to request Guerra to resign as deputy prime minister. And since then Guerra has been undergoing a series of 15 indictments. Several he's been indicted on; several he's been exonerated on. It's currently going on even to the present day. And this became a notorious thing: imagine the number two man's brother, working out of his office, sticking his hand in the till and stealing money like crazy. There are others, too, that have been involved, but these are the most prominent ones. Then, of course, there's been the misuse of power—it's incredible. But again, you're talking about a country that's just barely out of the authoritarian stage.

Kienzle: But so far Felipe González himself has not been involved in the hanky-panky himself.

MARTIN: Oh, no. Felipe's personal integrity has been unquestioned to this day, even by his opponents. But what he does bear is a moral responsibility, for not having taken energetic steps to prevent this. And even when he ran in 1993 in the election, he committed himself very firmly. He was going to clean the Augean stables himself, but he

never did.

Kienzle: Is that right?

Shea: I heard that speech, in fact, in _____. He went all out and put his personal prestige. How about, yes, I was thinking about Felipe González would be almost like Bettino Craxi in Italy.

MARTIN: No, no, no. Bettino Craxi (Benedetto Craxi) is a personally corrupted man. There is nothing personally corrupt about Felipe. He is a man of great personal integrity. Whatever errors he has made have been errors of omission rather than commission. There have been errors of sensitivity to these problems, because, you see, Felipe González loved to tinker with only certain things in running the government. He's a foreign policy wonk. He's worse than George Bush. The guy is a fantastic enthusiast about foreign policy affairs. He also loves to tinker with macroeconomic policy. He also was involved in the secret negotiations with the ETA terrorist group. Things like this are important to him. Dealing with more tawdry things like corruption or, you know, other things where he has to get himself involved in tinkering with all the micro-management details—he doesn't like to mess with that. And this, of course, has left the thing open, I think, to the creation of all kinds of problems. Besides, Felipe himself has an authoritarian mentality. He's a Spaniard, in the sense that he's part of this legacy that still exists, and so he tends that some of these things are just not done by the man on top. People down below are supposed to take care of these things, and they, in turn, have not been very assiduous in minding the shop.

Kienzle: I think that's a very comprehensive view of Spain. Are there other activities you've been involved with since your retirement, pertaining to labor?

MARTIN: Well, I keep in close contact with the trade unions in Spain, particularly with the UGT, and I know what's going on, and I keep close contact with them. The UGT ran a book presentation ceremony for me last year, when my first Spanish edition came out, and José Maria Zufiaur presided as chairman of the meeting. The embassy people were down too for that.

Shea: Who is their international guy now?

MARTIN: The same one, Gugliomatti, or whatever his name is?

Shea: Manolo – he has an Italian name.

MARTIN: Giamatti, I think, or something like that. And José Maria Zufiaur now has retired to just being the director of their international research thing, their Institute for Research. He's their research director, and he's retired from the politics of the thing. But he remains as a sort of quiet advisor to the present general secretary for the UGT.

Kienzle: Are there any final comments on the labor attaché program?

MARTIN: Well, only that it's very sad what is happening—and one observes this with a certain amount of melancholy and nostalgia—because I think that, whatever problems we in the labor function had, we rendered a service to the Foreign Service, and we were always looked upon as a sort of little parochial group, apart from the rest of them, and that has been most unfortunate.

Kienzle: Okay, any final comments you'd like to make before we conclude?

MARTIN: No, that's all I can think of.

Kienzle: If not, I want to thank you very much, Ben, for a very enlightening discussion here. I learned a lot about Spain, and I learned a lot about your activities in Chile and INR. It's been very helpful. Thank you very much.

MARTIN: You're quite welcome.

Addendum:

MARTIN: The deputy assistant secretary of ARA at the time who had been the DCM in Venezuela, and became the ambassador to Czechoslovakia. He's now the head of the—

Shea: Bill Luers?

MARTIN: Bill Luers is whom I'm talking about, who tried to reform labor in the—

Kienzle: We'll add that to the transcript.

MARTIN: Yes.

End of interview