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Labor Series

EUGENE MARTINSON

Interviewed by: James F. Shea and Don R. Kienzle
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INTERVIEW

[Note: this interview was not edited by Mr. Martinson.]

SHEA: Good afternoon. It's Friday April 27, 1995. We're at the home of our friend Gene Martinson who is a long time labor attaché who has served in Norway, Israel, Nigeria, and Australia. Gene, would you like to tell us how you got started in the labor attaché business?

MARTINSON: Well, as a young man I had a dream of getting into the Foreign Service. Later on when I got to college, the University of Wisconsin, I kept that for a while and majored in things that would call upon me I thought for the Foreign Service. But I became aware that my chances of getting in probably were slim because I wasn't the Ivy League and my family had no political clout. And I became interested in the labor movement and so I switched majors from modern European history to labor economics and ultimately [inaudible] I quit. The first year of graduate school was in '37 and the Flint Strike was taking place. I quit school to go and sign up as a volunteer for the union. And after the Flint Strike was over, I decided I wanted to become a union member and to do that I had to become an auto worker. So, I got a job in an auto factory and worked for several months in Pontiac, Michigan. It was a very exciting period because the Local I was in grew from a few hundred to 20,000 during those six months that I was there. But they had the mini-recession in '37 and my job evaporated in General Motors. So, I went to Chicago and got a job as a workers education teacher in the WBA [Workplace Based Assessment] program. I taught labor courses, labor history, labor economics and worlds of order, and I would conduct meetings and so on in South Chicago for the steel workers. Well, a lot of it I couldn't stand. WBA made a rule that you could only last 18 months. I got a job with United Airlines as an emergency measure just to find some bread and they sent me ultimately to New York where I was drafted. After the war, I came back and decided to get an advanced degree in labor economics, the University of Michigan.

KIENZLE: What Service were you in, Gene?

MARTINSON: I was in the Air Corps, and I was a weather forecaster.

KIENZLE: And did you go overseas

MARTINSON: I spent a lot of time overseas. I went over in the November '42 invasion of Casablanca and I was in on the invasion of Sicily in Italy. I was overseas for over two and a half years.

KIENZLE: And did that whet your appetite even more for the Foreign Service?

MARTINSON: Well, yes. I mean, it made me like just traveling around Europe, North Africa, Italy, and getting to Rome and so on. Yes, it did. It made me interested in pursuing that any way I could. I thought I would even try to stay in Europe and get a GI Bill, but it didn't seem to work out very well. The Army sent me back there, instead of discharging me immediately, like they did my buddies. They wanted to hold me back for a while until the war in the Pacific was over. On the way home, I met my future wife, [inaudible]. She was a secretary to Walter Reuther. My whole family was around Michigan. My brother had been Education Director of the Willow Run Local, the bomber plant during the war.

KIENZLE: Was that the Famous Local 600?

MARTINSON: The Local 600 was a Ford Local wasn't it?

KIENZLE: Oh, you're right, yes.

MARTINSON: So, I decided to go to the University of Michigan. It's a good school and I'd be near my family. Ultimately, I got past my doctoral prelims and got a scholarship—Fulbright Scholarship—to the London School of Economics to do my thesis and took a while before I decided what my thesis would be. It turned out I intended to write on the joint consultation in the nationalized British airline industry. My idea was that here the socialists had taken over and how did this affect the bargaining? The answer was instead of the old adversarial relationship, we'll have joint consultation. I thought that would be an interesting thing to pursue but at about that time my money ran out, and I had a son and I also lost my enthusiasm for academia. I was in London in 1949 and I met Sam Berger. I had heard about him.

KIENZLE: He was the labor attaché at the embassy?

MARTINSON: He was the labor attaché at the embassy in London. He was also from the University of Wisconsin. The University of Wisconsin contributed several people to the labor program. I also had friends who had become employed in the MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] Program in Paris where the Marshall Plan was centered. I visited Paris and talked to some of them, so I became sort of excited. Well, there is a place for somebody with labor experience in the Foreign Service. So, I decided to apply for that. I heard there was a vacant MFA labor advisor job at Norway and I applied for that. My answer was that the mission chief in Norway was himself a _____ official who was head of the Denver Trades and Labor Council. And although they had a position for

Labor Advisor on their books, he thought he didn't need one.

KIENZLE: Did you ever complete your doctorate

MARTINSON: No. No. ABD.

KIENZLE: ABD?

MARTINSON: All but dissertation.

SHEA: Also, just for the record, could you tell us where your family came from originally. Were they from Michigan?

MARTINSON: No. My home town is Sigourney, Wisconsin. I should say my father was born in Sweden. He came over as a young boy and my mother was a first generation but she spoke Swedish before she spoke English. She learned English as a second language in school. So, they were of Scandinavian background. My father was a railroad detective and my first introduction to the labor movement was during the big railroad strike of '22 [The Great Railroad Strike of 1922]. And of course, as a railroad detective, his job was to protect the company property. During the course of this, he invited some fellow that was getting in trouble from the union to come with his family and stay with us for a few weeks.

KIENZLE: So he was not a union person?

MARTINSON: My father was not a union man at the time. I remember resenting very deeply as a kid the intrusion of these kids whom I detested. Only later did I realize that we had been harboring a scab.

KIENZLE: At the time you didn't know what a scab was.

MARTINSON: At the time, I didn't know what a scab was, except that this man was in danger and my father was supposed to protect him. And I remember also my part of the country was pretty strongly union-progressive. It went strongly for progressives like [Philip] La Follette. And I remember the elections of La Follette in 1936. La Follette ran as an Independent. My brother used to get chased home from school every day. The reason was that my dad was for the Republican and everybody else at school was for La Follette.

KIENZLE: So, people took their politics very seriously.

MARTINSON: They took their politics very seriously up there. And it turned out in the end that that came to haunt me a little bit, because that part of the county voted against censure of McCarthy. And so, later on, while McCarthy was very sensitive to criticism coming from that corridor, he mentioned something that was mentioned in the local paper. Well, anyway, to get back to…

KIENZLE: How you got the job?

MARTINSON: No, I didn't get the job. The guy said he didn't need one because he was his own man. Well, about then, the Navy Department said, "Well, isn't there a labor attaché job there open, so let's ask the State Department whether you might not fill their requirements." So, they checked me over and said, "Yeah, he looks like he's got all the requirements." So, I went and processed as the labor attaché.

KIENZLE: How did you get into contact with the Labor Department at that point? What was the vehicle for recruiting you?

MARTINSON: I think it went somewhat like this: one of my friends at MFA or maybe even it would have been Victor Reuther [Head of the UAW Education Department] …Both the Labor Department and the State Department were somewhat drawing on their resource of the labor movement to suggest people for positions. Somebody at MFA told me about this job in Norway and they got the answer that, "It's not really open, but we heard that there was a vacancy in the State Department—is your man interested in that?" So, I don't know the precise process. I imagine that's how it went. Later on, the Labor Department said, "When you come back to the States from London Fulbright, drop by, and we'll let you fill out a formal application." There was no problem about that, except it took about six months before I got a security clearance.

KIENZLE: And you went directly from London then to Oslo?

MARTINSON: No, no, no. I went home for six months.

KIENZLE: Ok. Gene can we go back then to…

MARTINSON: Where was I then?

KIENZLE: Norway.

MARTINSON: When I finished my Fulbright and my son was born, I went back home and applied officially. They said, "Fine. The next thing to do is get your security clearance," but that took about six months. I got to work back in the auto factory to keep supplies up.

KIENZLE: And then you started officially with the State Department?

MARTINSON: Then I started. Went back to Washington and in a very short time I was given a briefing and sent on my way without really much preparation.

KIENZLE: No official training?

MARTINSON: No training. When I arrived in Oslo, they were horrified because I had

overlooked getting calling cards. I said, "Can't we have them made up here?" And they said, "Oh no, you have to have them engraved." This got me off to a bad start.

KIENZLE: When did you actually arrive in Norway then?

MARTINSON: Let's see, this would have been around the winter of '51.

KIENZLE: '51?

MARTINSON: Yes.

KIENZLE: And you then succeeded Walter Galenson [Labor attaché at the American embassy in Norway]?

MARTINSON: Yeah, he'd been gone for a while when I came. Walter, I don't think made too much of a splash in the labor movement. He was sort of an academic guy from what I understand. I've never met him. I read some of his books later. But he was interested in pursuing his academic interests. He had no basic trade union experience, so his relations with the labor movement were a little bit on the formal side. They didn't really accept him, as I understand, as a fellow labor man. In that regard, my background was excellent because I had participated in a major strike and so on, and my wife was the secretary of Walter Reuther who had a pretty high reputation as a socialist or social democratic type of man.

KIENZLE: Had you been politically active yourself?

MARTINSON: For a period of two to three years I joined a group called New America which is a very small, elitist type of organization which believed that in a sense they drew some ideas from the technocrats and they drew some ideas from Lenin. But they believed basically—their theory was—that it may be that the grown up people get out of the [Great] Depression and if that happens, we're going to go either fascist or—the big danger is to go fascist—but somebody, maybe the military, maybe some charismatic guy, is going to seize power. Well, I'm going to stop that. They may have to have a small elitist group who is ready to [inaudible] power be lying in the streets. They may have a small elitist group who is ready, who has a program, and who can say that they can rise to the moment and take over and be seen as leaders.

KIENZLE: Was this group aligned with any other international group?

MARTINSON: No. No, no. It had no international connections. It believed that alliance with Russia was the kiss of death for any indigenous radical movement. After a few years, it became apparent that the power was not going to lie in the streets. The deal was basically successful. The trade unions were doing well and the threat of fascism seemed to be very remote and they disbanded. Fortunately, the remaining officials, before the last act, turned over a list of membership to the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation].

KIENZLE: To the FBI?

MARTINSON: The idea was that we don't want membership to be saddled with a notion that we were doing something secretive or against the interest of the United States. We were all totally on the level and to show our [inaudible] here's who we were.

KIENZLE: What date was this roughly? What date was the group disbanded? Time?

MARTINSON: About 1939.

KIENZLE: And this never caused you any problems during the McCarthy era?

MARTINSON: Actually no, because my membership in New America was never mentioned in the various security investigations that I had. During the time when I had my security clearance removed, I was with the History Department. I had several interrogations but they never mentioned that, never queried me about that. I knew another fellow that also had been a member. He was in a fairly high position in the State Department and I asked him one time if it had ever bothered him. He said no. So, apparently, they had made a clean retreat or withdrawal from the scene.

KIENZLE: Did you have any other difficulties during the McCarthy era?

MARTINSON: No.

SHEA: Can I ask one question? When you came in the State Department, Gene, who was your contact?

MARTINSON: UAW [United Auto Workers] was my reference. You had to have a reference point to an organization. So, mine was the UAW. Victor Reuther. You might say that he was the one that recommended me as sponsored by the UAW, recommended by the UAW.

KIENZLE: Do you recall your first contact with the State Department?

MARTINSON: Oh, that's way back. Can you tell me who the Chief of the Labor Division was at that time?

KIENZLE: Was it a fellow by the name of Otis?

SHEA: He had left by '19...

MARTINSON: Was it George Delaney? Was he there then?

KIENZLE: Delaney was there later.

MARTINSON: Later, I think.

KIENZLE: It was decentralized, I think, and each bureau had a regional advisor.

MARTINSON: I didn't have a strong impression of seeing somebody that was clearly in charge of everything at the time. I had more contact with the Labor Department.

KIENZLE: Who in the Labor Department? Jim Taylor?

MARTINSON: Jim Taylor. And there was an older fellow who was an Austrian.

KIENZLE: Oh, that was Arnold Steinbach.

MARTINSON: Yeah, Steinbach and some of the others.

KIENZLE: Do you recall Arnold Zinfel?

MARTINSON: Oh, Arnold Zinfel, of course.

KIENZLE: How about Phil Kaiser?

MARTINSON: I don't remember much contact with Phil Kaiser.

KIENZLE: What kind of a greeting did you get when you got to Norway besides the fact that you didn't have a card?

MARTINSON: I was fortunate to have a good site in the economics department. At that time, all the labor attachés were assigned to the economics department. My supervisor was a very agreeable fellow and his wife was very kind. Her name was Sue Whitman. They were very helpful. The MFA welcomed me with open arms even though I was not in their office. Actually, they proposed that I be officially accredited jointly as a labor advisor and labor attaché, which they did. It was very helpful. The political department regarded me with some suspicion. First of all, I didn't have the normal FSO [Foreign Service Officer] credentials or background. And secondly, pretty soon, I came to associate with people on the higher level and it wasn't custom for a junior officer to be doing. For example, I was invited by the head of the Trade Union and the head of the Labor Department to functions at which the prime minister and cabinet ministers are present. And I had the opportunity to talk to them and associate with them. Occasionally, I would pick up a little interesting information. But this was frowned on by the political section because they said, "Cabinet ministers, and certainly prime ministers, are off limits. That's the duty of the political officer. You're not a political officer."

KIENZLE: Who were your chief Norwegian contacts there?

MARTINSON: Well, the head of the Norwegian LO [inaudible] was one of my principal—and the publicity officer and the educational officer of the LO and a number of the presidents of the various seaman unions and some of the other—the electrical

workers union and the civil servants union and a number of the others that I became friendly, almost on a personal basis. We entertained. I would invite them and they would invite me back and so on. All the trade unions used to invite me to their conventions and they made a big deal out of it. Maybe you know about this: as international guests, you're standing on their convention and you're wined and dined and treated royally. And it was interesting in a way because they took you in really and said, "We'd like you to show you how we operate and introduce you to everybody." It was a very friendly thing.

KIENZLE: What was the position of Haakon Lie?

MARTINSON: Well, I should mention then that that was talking about my trade union contacts, but I also was very close to the associates with Haakon Lie who was secretary of the Labour Party. The labor movement in Norway, particularly at that time, was a fairly unified thing. The Labour Party and the trade unions and the cooperative movement considered themselves all a part of the labor movement. In that sense, that even included the government because the government was all labor. In effect, the governing elite in Norway at the time were the Labour Party and the labor government officials who were elected as members of the Labour Party and the trade union movement cooperatives. So, an entree with Haakon Lie was a sort of key to the top establishment in Norway. Haakon made it his business to see that I got in on some semi-private meetings. One time, I was invited to a little session which the head of the coop and the head of the Labour Party and the prime minister were all gathering for a social gathering together and I was [inaudible] around these guys.

KIENZLE: What were the main policy goals of the US Government in Norway at that time that you were working on?

MARTINSON: One was to strengthen Norway as a potential ally against Russia. That meant that we should support Norway in any way we can economically and also politically, to the extent to which we felt that we could aid our friends and put some obstacles in the way of their enemies within Norway. I think those are the main goals. We wanted Norway as a reliable ally in the Cold War which was beginning to steam up at that time.

KIENZLE: Were the communists at that time a real threat to take over power?

MARTINSON: I don't think they were a real threat but Haakon Lie was trying to convince me all the time that they were a threat and to some extent they were. They were active. Their main avenue of infiltration was through the trade union movement—like shop stewards on the local level that would increase their membership and a vehicle for their propaganda. Haakon was more or less interested in directly inserting himself into the trade union situation. When I say directly, Haakon went to the head of the union and made some sort of a deal.

KIENZLE: Did this cause problems for both sides?

MARTINSON: There was a little bit of tension in the Norwegian labor movement. Some felt that as trade unionists, they wanted to run their own business and they did not want the Labour Party meddling in their affairs. They could take care of their own communists. They did not need somebody's outside help. That was a slight source—not a major source—of bureaucratic tension, as you can probably understand. It also happened that Haakon was a very dynamic guy and ambitious. When the MFA started to have their labor productivity programs, Haakon wanted to take the ball and run and make the Labour Party the sponsor of these things. The trade union movement said, "These are labor programs and the relationship should be with us, not with Labour. That's political. This is trade union stuff." To some extent, I think, at the cost of some friction with Haakon, I sided with the labor movement. This product, deputy programs and their success, was really dependent on the degree of cooperation between the union movements who wouldn't give it to them. I departed a little bit, not a serious rupture in our relationship. I began to feel that we had to make our own decisions and not let Haakon make all our decisions for us.

KIENZLE: Did MFA concur with you on this?

MARTINSON: Yes. I got my way in that respect. The embassy having applied and got me officially assigned as a labor advisor jointly as a labor attaché, furnished me with a secretary, an office, and travel expenses.

KIENZLE: So that wasn't bad?

MARTINSON: That was another source of envy among the political officers and the other officers of the embassy, because here I was, having all these perks including trips and being invited to Paris for periodic consultations.

KIENZLE: Did the front office back you up?

MARTINSON: The DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission] was ok, a guy by the name of Strong and he was ok. It was on the next level, I think, the head of the political section. Now, among the guys in the political section, one was a bastard and one was a great guy. The bastard ended up by being a bastard all in all and he was shot. The other guy became Under Secretary of the State Department and he was there under Carter. I don't know if you remember his name. I think he was a great guy. The three major bastards in my life at the State Department all died violent deaths.

KIENZLE: Who?

MARTINSON: Another guy was my supervisor in Israel who was shot during an assignment down in South America. A third guy, who I won't name, shot himself and his wife. My enemies didn't fare very well, but that's just an ironic sidelight.

KIENZLE: Getting back to the productivity programs and the exchange programs, did you find those worked out well?

MARTINSON: They did. They worked out very well. The one snag was an exchange program. A grand old man who was Norwegian labor was a good pal by the name of Martin Tranmael. Now, Martin Tranmael during World War I, lead the Labour Party into the Communist International and then they left a year or two later, totally disillusioned. From then on, they were bitter enemies of the communists. However, when I had a chance to invite the labor movement to take one of these exchange tours of the States, they insisted that if they went, Martin Tranmael had to go along too. And Martin Tranmael, having been a past member of the Communist International, was ineligible under the [inaudible] Act. The labor movement was saying, "If Tranmael doesn't go, we're not going to go. You can take your trip and shove it."

KIENZLE: So, did Tranmael go?

MARTINSON: Ultimately, we tried to persuade the State Department that they should make a special exception because of the fact that they were bitter enemies of the communists and it would be shooting ourselves in the foot to insult the labor movement. They said, "We can't do that. Yes, we can make an exception, but we have to put it in his passport." This involved a certain amount of humiliation: taking him aside and scribbling this in his passport. So, it was sort of a delicate thing. Would they accept this trip providing he could go, but under this special exception rule which would be inscribed in his passport? They agreed, but I feared some terrible confrontation that would be unpleasant. It really would have damaged Norwegian-American relations seriously, for a while anyway.

KIENZLE: This would have been about 1952 or 1953?

MARTINSON: '52. Yes.

SHEA: You might be interested to know we did an interview with Haakon Lie about a year ago.

MARTINSON: One of the interesting things was that Martin Tranmael spent some time in the states working as labor and became influenced by the IWW [Industrial Workers of the World]. He spent a year or so in Superior, Wisconsin, which is my hometown. The Norwegians became independent in 1905 [from Sweden]. All the Norwegians who had been working in the States decided to go back. This was their chance. Norway would become new and democratic. So, they went back. Ultimately, a couple things happened towards the end of my two year tour. One was that one day the MFA came into the office saying, "Disassociate Martinson immediately from the MFA program." They positively disassociate. The idea was not to quietly disassociate but to make it known that I was no longer to represent the MFA security. So, I went to the DCM and said the MFA had done this to me. They said, "As far as the State Department is concerned, you're still cleared for us until they tell me differently. Keep on as usual even if it means you continue to read the MFA cables. Tell us what is going on." But it was nevertheless a shock and the word got around that somehow I had some problems. Then, not too long later, two or

three months later, the big RIF [Reduction in Force] of 1952 came. Eisenhower had been elected and he promised to reduce the bureaucracy by 10 percent or something. They had to mostly lay off local employees. Because they were easily dispensable numbers they could fill their 10 percent. But they had to cut a few out and I was a reserve officer and low man on the totem pole and somehow Labor Department got the idea that I was in trouble with MFA security and somehow got the idea that it would be better for me to be RIF'd than to be ultimately discharged because of security problems. I, of course, didn't feel that way at all. I felt that I had nothing to evade or nothing in my background that made me disloyal in any way shape or form.

KIENZLE: Did you find out on what basis they had…?

MARTINSON: Yes, I think that at one point, back in '37, the union had sent a delegation [inaudible - very end of tape side one]…

MARTINSON: My local union in Pontiac, where I was working at the time, sent a delegation to Pittsburgh during the American League Against Foreign Fascism which is more or less a communist front although not totally. This brings in my membership in New America. New America felt they could—when we were in competition in the labor movement for membership and influence, we were anti-Communist and we thought we could perhaps infiltrate the American League Against Foreign Fascism and get on some of the committees and sort of act as a mole or work from within. Of course, my name went down in the books someplace as having attended...

KIENZLE: So you were on the delegation?

MARTINSON: I was an official delegate to the conference. That made me ipso facto suspect. Well, the State Department investigated that and they checked out my story. They found that it rang true. I could verify what I was doing and why I was there. It didn't bother them, but the MFA didn't bother to check it out.

KIENZLE: And the State Department didn't communicate this?

MARTINSON: No, no. As far as I can see, there was no communication at all because the DCM said, "The State Department insists you're secure. Until they tell me differently, you're secure." It was very difficult though, because how can you be half slave and half free, so to speak? It did bother me, greatly. No matter what the DCM said, my career was going to be in jeopardy until this was cleared up. Somebody in the Labor Department thinking maybe it was in my best interest—or I don't know in whose best interest they thought it was—that it would be better for me to be RIF'd than have the risk of being fired. So, they decided I should be sacrificed to the RIF program.

KIENZLE: Were you RIF'd?

MARTINSON: I was RIF'd. I got my pink slip. Then, I was about ready to go home permanently and they changed their mind and sent a cable to reassign me to Norway if I

was still there. But if I was not there, I was to proceed to Washington. I was already in London on my way home when the cable came, so I didn't go back. I sent my farewells and I didn't even want to go back.

KIENZLE: You were there for two years?

MARTINSON: Two years, yes. After having said all the farewells—Haakon Lie by the way, was one of those who was active in saying the Norwegians didn't understand what was going on. They regarded me as being reliable. From all they could tell I was a very reliable anti-Communist and they were upset.

SHEA: Gene, who was the ambassador at that time and what was his attitude?

MARTINSON: The ambassador had changed. The first ambassador that came was a fellow by the name of C. Albert Bay. He was an American ship owner of Norwegian ancestry. Upon introduction to him he said, "Well the union [inaudible]." He said, "Well, when I was a kid"—he told us how he had worked his tail off for 15 cents an hour and came up the hard way and didn't need any unions. That was his attitude. As you can see, I rated very highly with him. The next ambassador, his name was Strong, I think. He was a liberal democrat, I think. He understood what I was about and why it was a good thing to have a labor attaché in a country dominated by the labor movement. He was supportive, but he was too new. He came practically [inaudible]. He couldn't do much about it.

KIENZLE: He was a political appointee?

MARTINSON: Yes, I think so.

SHEA: Not a career...?

MARTINSON: I think so.

SHEA: Were you reassigned then after…?

MARTINSON: Well, I went home and they said, "Well, since you weren't in Norway, your RIF became effective"—but it was very mixed up—they would try to do something about it. Ultimately, it took them a hell of a long time. I don't know what was going on. I used up all my home leave and all my sick leave and all my accumulated leave and finally they said, "Ok, you're going to be reassigned to Tel Aviv."

KIENZLE: As labor attaché?

MARTINSON: As labor attaché.

KIENZLE: Did you have any temporary assignments in Washington?

MARTINSON: Well, I had been home using up all my home leave and accumulated leave and everything. Then, I came to Washington and went through all the briefings for Tel Aviv and went to see my predecessor in Israel, Milt Fried. I went to see him for a briefing and I went through the various briefings you go through. I had my stuff ready for shipment and I went to get my tickets and the travel clerk said, "Well, I can't understand, you're orders have been canceled. I can't give you tickets."

I said, "What do you mean? I just came from my last briefing. I'm all ready to go."

She said, "I'm terribly sorry. Didn't they tell you? Haven't they told you?"

I said, "No, told me what?"

She said I should go see my administrative officer and ask why they had pulled the plug on me.

KIENZLE: Did they give any explanation?

MARTINSON: No. But while I was home, I had given an interview in the local paper in which I talked about Norwegian-American relations and I said, "They're great. The only problem the Norwegians have is they fail to understand Senator McCarthy and they are very upset about him."

This appeared on the front page of the local paper. Shortly after that, I went back to Washington and found that suddenly my security clearance had been pulled.

KIENZLE: Do you think there was a cause and effect relationship there?

MARTINSON: What do you think? I couldn't prove it. But the coincidence was remarkable. They actually didn't have anything when I said, "What's this all about?" They made up some story and said, "When you are RIF'd they put your security clearance at the bottom of the pile." There was a rule that Truman had made that anybody had to be re-cleared periodically.

KIENZLE: This was the beginning of the Eisenhower administration wasn't it, at this point?

MARTINSON: The Truman administration had made this rule but they were under a lot of pressure. Truman, as you know, gave way in many respects. Some he regretted. But he made it easier to charge civil servants and a lot of them were kicked out without much opportunity to defend themselves. One of the rules from that tightening up in security was that your clearance had to be redone every time you were reassigned to foreign posts.

"Well," they said, "we put yours in the bottom of the pile, so now you're going to have to start over. You have to wait."

But they didn't say, "Well, isn't my previous clearance good enough until changed?"

No, they pulled it, positively. So, they assigned me to the historical division of the State Department.

KIENZLE: How long were you there?

MARTINSON: Oh, six months. I was editing classified German [inaudible].

KIENZLE: In German?

MARTINSON: Yes, in German. I had enough college German to get by. This was at the time when McCarthy was first being challenged by—you know his name, I just forget it. Anyway, the Army-McCarthy hearings—I used to go home and watch those religiously. Finally, McCarthy stock went down to the point where the Senate ultimately censured him. At that point, I said, "Well, assuming that McCarthy is my problem, now is my opportunity. With McCarthy's political stock going down, maybe mine is rising." I got an appointment with the Assistant Secretary for Administration. I didn't think I could get that high, but he was very easy to get. I walked in the next day and prepared to give a spiel, either put up or shut up. I mean, he hadn't prepared any charges against me. "I'm prepared to answer anything you want to say, but you have to give me a chance. You can't just keep me in limbo. I deserve better treatment than that." I was going to hand out my little speech all prepared, but instead he said, "Oh, Mr. Martinson, I've heard something about you, let me shake your hand. I've shaken hands with a lot of loyal Americans but never one I think whose loyalty has been so carefully scrutinized as closely as yours."

KIENZLE: Who was this?

MARTINSON: I don't remember his name. I think he was one of the Quaker Oats political appointees.

SHEA: The CBS one was Edward R. Murrow.

MARTINSON: Well, it turned out my reasoning was correct. McCarthy veto power or access to the State Department diminished very sharply after that. They decided that it was time that they were able to make their own decisions.

The secretary said, "Where do you want to go?"

I said, "Well, I'd just as soon go to Israel, that's where I was headed."

He said, "That might be a little difficult but I think we can do it."

So, in fact, he did and I went.

KIENZLE: How long did it take from the time that you met with the Assistant Secretary to the time you were actually leaving?

MARTINSON: Almost none. In fact, it was a done deal. He was telling me that I had been cleared so I was free to go wherever the State Department wanted to assign me to. He agreed that he would help me get whatever kind of assignment, if possible, that I wanted. And I said, "Well, I prefer to go over as I'd assigned originally." So, he did. The State Department was kind enough—I suggested—that it would be diplomatic for them to send me via Norway so Norway could be assured I was still around and could help.

KIENZLE: When did you arrive then in Israel and how would describe your…?

MARTINSON: On New Year's Day in '55. Israel was a very, very different place than Norway. And I found that out quite early and quickly. It was a combination—the head of the international department [inaudible] at that time was a fellow by the name of Barcott. Later on, he was ambassador of Scandinavia.

The Israelis, for one thing, are a very, very sophisticated group of people. All kinds of connections internationally and equally importantly with people in the States. They had their own need of German [inaudible] US to them. They could tell me things about America that I didn't know myself. And they made that quite clear to me early on.

Barcott, for example, invited me, in my first introduction, I remember very well him going into his office and he said, "You know, we've checked you out. Our friends in Norway gave you a good report. Everything else we've heard about your or feel about you, remember this, you may feel"—well…he had a somewhat different attitude, perhaps. "We don't accept you're [inaudible] in the trade union movement necessarily as the tall ticket." He said, "We feel you're working for the American government and we regard you as being a diplomat. That's something I'll keep in mind. We were happy that you had this labor background but that is secondary. Primarily, we were interested in U.S. government and relationships. So, if you understand this, we are going to get along much better than if you had any other conception, like for example you might have had in Norway." That was a dose of cold water which quickly brought me to the realization that things were quite different in Israel.

KIENZLE: Gene, was Ben-Gurion the Prime Minister?

MARTINSON: He was. And Golda Meir was Labor Minister.

KIENZLE: Do you recall who was Secretary General of the [inaudible] group?

MARTINSON: One of the chaps that later succeeded Golda Meir as Minister of Labor. That was the way you went. That was the chain of ascension …[inaudible] Minister of Labor, Prime Minister.

Golda was very hospitable. She invited the British labor attaché and I—we had arrived

pretty close together—both of us and our wives for an around Israel tour at government expense.

KIENZLE: With her?

MARTINSON: Not with her, no. With a guide to show us around. We were a little bit shocked at this because I thought, can Israel afford it? This is not the sort of thing we would even do in the States at that level. I don't think we take our foreign labor attachés and send them on a government paid trip around the States. But it was nice. [Inaudible] was a totally different thing than the AFL-CIO [American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations]. For one thing, it served a summer of coops that it ran. The membership in this group was by party affiliation. So, the Labor Party was the majority party and they ran it but they allowed in anybody—some religious and even the Herut, who in terms of the labor movement were a very small minority but they were represented. Back to the relationships for the embassy, which is a constant problem sometimes, back in those days, depending on where you were. In this case, the Labor Party, for example, Mapai, invited me to their convention. On the pattern of Norway, I wanted to accept, but I thought that I needed to get clearance. Well, the clearance was denied me. The embassy didn't think I should go to the labor party conference.

KIENZLE: Was that from the political section?

MARTINSON: Yes, yes. They said, "First of all, they have no right to ask you to go. If they want to ask the embassy to send a representative, maybe we'll think about it." [Inaudible] to pick from the embassy the ones they would like to have attend their convention. So, whatever reason was operative I don't know. They nixed that. My argument was: "Sure, we should go to the party if they want us to. We'll accept an invitation to the Herut's convention if they want to invite us. Always make it open that we were attending as we would anybody that wants to send us an invitation we would be happy to attend." But no, they said it would set the wrong precedent, so I didn't go.

An interesting development toward the end of my tour in '56: things were getting pretty tense. The Fed Aien were raiding into Israel, raiding parties. The Israelis would retaliate. We were living pretty close to the border, just three or four miles from the border in the neighborhood of Petitiqva. I was living in something called a shichoon Beilinson which is a shichoon for the Beilinson Hospital. One of their chief physicians was on leave and so he rented his place. At one point, a little guy, sort of a mousy looking guy, nondescript looking guy, came up to me. I guess he was interested in Herut. I don't know how he got in touch with me but he did. He found out who I was and made an effort to talk to me. He wanted to talk to me. I was a little bit curious. First of all, I was shying away a little bit because Herut didn't have a good reputation. They were the descendants of the people who blew up—Stern Gang—who blew up or killed Hamerscholten, [inaudible] Manacam Bagan [inaudible] actually and so they had this terrorist reputation.

SHEA: Weren't they airgoon?

MARTINSON: Airgoon was the military wing, yes. Well, this guy got to talking about conditions in Israel and he started telling me that things were getting…The Army was thinking they might have to make a preemptive strike. That if they let the situation develop without retaliation, then in six months maybe Egypt would be so powerful that it could never be defeated. Well, this is pretty wild stuff, and I listened to it a couple times with him. I didn't know really how to evaluate it, but it sounded authentic. So, I had a friend in the political section. His name was Steve Kozack. Well, Steve has an eye for this sort. He loved this sort of stuff. So, I took my contact on to Steve and Steve followed and cultivated him and he started getting amazing information about the thinking of the general staff and the contingency plans they were making. I knew that I would never—it was not my job to report this. But Steve tried to report it and the embassy DCM wouldn't let it go by.

KIENZLE: Who was the DCM at that point? Was this in the Walworth Barber era?

MARTINSON: The ambassador had been formerly the Consulate General of South Africa.

KIENZLE: You couldn't get this out of the embassy?

MARTINSON: No, so he got _____ to back channel it. So, actually, this contact provided us some very solid, turned out to be excellent, intelligence which if given its proper weight should have warned us what was going on. But the embassy wouldn't have anything to do with it—too flaky a source.

KIENZLE: Was this source then someone in the labor faction of the Herut Party?

MARTINSON: Yes, in the Histitute and had contacts through Herut to the military. So, I illustrate that as a point where a labor attaché's contacts could be helpful.

KIENZLE: And a relationship of trust.

MARTINSON: Yes, but in this case, although the information apparently, according to Steve, got to the States, it was, as far as I can see, never given its proper weight. Anyway, towards the Suez Crisis, as that approached, my next door neighbor was a chief gynecologist of the Beilinson Hospital and his wife was a Swede, so we had a very friendly—they would invite us to dinner and we would invite them back and we were very friendly. One day he came in and said, "I've got something, you'll never believe this." No, he said one day, "We've been told to evacuate all the non-emergency patients and we are preparing to accept casualties."

My antennae went way up and a few days later he was at our place for dinner and he said after dinner—we were having brandy or something—he laughed like hell and he said, "I got something funny to tell you. Today we got our first casualty." He said, "A French soldier."

I said, "What was the problem? Did he get shot?"

He started to laugh and he said, “No, he had the clap, but he didn't pick it up in Israel," he said. "He picked up in Marseilles." Here was pretty good imminence that something was going on.

KIENZLE: The French military had arrived.

MARTINSON: The French military had arrived in some capacity or other at the hospital. I had another friend who was calling, a buddy of mine, who went to school back in Lennox who was now in Israel and his wife was a reserve. They kept me informed as to the all instructions they were being given, so I was pretty well briefed. I remember very much a country team meeting. When these things begin to get hot and I reported my intelligence and I remember very well the Air attaché said you shouldn't believe these rumors. He said, "I've been to the Air Chief of Staff and he assures me they're absolutely nothing at all." That was very shortly before the Suez Crisis.

KIENZLE: So, the official embassy position was that it was unaware of any buildup?

MARTINSON: As far as I could tell unless they were sending cables that I wasn't privy to.

KIENZLE: You mean back channel type?

MARTINSON: Yes, back channel stuff. The official position they were reporting was that they saw nothing to substantiate these rumors. They had no factual things. And of course, they were supported in this case by at least one of the military attachés who had been told by somebody he could trust that they don't think there is any conspiracy—this business about a British, French, Israeli conspiracy—there's nothing in it. Then, when the thing broke out, they had orders to get rid of some of the staff. There was no reason to do that because Israel was not in any danger. They were being evacuated from Egypt where there were some activities. They felt that they had to be even handed. They had to reduce staff in Tel Aviv to show they weren't playing any favorites. Well, I got chosen to be one of the evacuees. I have a feeling I offended the ambassador. Because the day when the Suez Crises started, the Israelis cut off the cable links we had with the embassy—with Washington. So, the ambassador was very much worrying what should he do. I happened to know that people were calling up the States by telephone. I said, "Well, Mr. Ambassador, I understand the telephones are still open and this business of refugees is not classified. Why don't we just call up Washington and see what they want us to do?"

SHEA: He didn't appreciate your candor?

MARTINSON: He absolutely didn't appreciate it. I was telling him—making this suggestion.

KIENZLE: Did you see Golda Meir on a regular basis?

MARTINSON: Not too often. Actually, Histitute was the basic source of information. It was so important that really the ministry of labor was more I think—maybe I'm wrong—but I think it was concerned with general politics and building up the infrastructure and so on. But Histitute was almost a government in itself. So, there was really not much need to talk to Golda Meir unless you were going to—because she was on the very highest rungs of the government and one of the very trusted people within the Labor Party. Actually, she became the Prime Minister. By the way, she was very much of a hawk. She was a pretty tough gal. I didn't have very many opportunities to talk to her. She was very cordial. She also lived in Jerusalem. We were in Tel Aviv. So, access to her was somewhat restricted by that geographical…in all these things, the labor attaché seemed to get the shitty end of the stick when it came to travel funds. In Norway, C. Albert Bay, that millionaire, hogged all the funds himself—like a foreign—to pay for it all himself. But he hogged all the travel funds and had it not been for the MFA, I wouldn't have gone anyplace.

KIENZLE: But in Tel Aviv did you have to have…?

MARTINSON: In Tel Aviv not so much, because I could take off in my own car and drive to Jerusalem. It was a matter of getting permission from the embassy because the idea was we were sort of trying to create the impression we didn't really recognize Jerusalem as the capital. And we didn't want to prejudice our contention in that respect by overly accepting the Israelis and saying in fact we recognize it. You have to go to Jerusalem to find out what you want to know.

KIENZLE: What were the major labor issues at that point that you followed at the embassy?

MARTINSON: The major labor issues?

KIENZLE: Or the major work that you focused on?

MARTINSON: As I remember it, it was an issue of basically, things were very politicized. The issues were more political than economic. You didn't have many strikes to worry about in that sense. It was an issue of, and there were some problems about, the utility or the coops. They were becoming—they were inefficient. But the issue was really what direction the country would take. Everybody was concerned with security and how to deal with the problem of surrounding Arab countries and their hostility. I spent a lot of my time trying to assess for the embassy what the likely trends were in Israel. Was the Labor Party going to continue this [inaudible] or were they seriously threatened by either the left—or not much the left—but they were there—or Lapalm or probably Herut.

KIENZLE: Herut on the right?

MARTINSON: Yes, on the right, yes.

KIENZLE: What about the ties with the Soviet Union? I know early on we were quite concerned about ties with the Soviet Union.

MARTINSON: Well, of course, I don't believe at that time there was any ties. Israelis were ready for ties but I don't think the Russians wanted them. The Russians were fueling Egypt—arming Egypt. That meant that Russia was, in a sense, very hostile towards Israel. That was a source of concern. Lapalm was not exactly a communist party but it was sort of much more friendly toward the communist position than Mapai. There was a communist party in Israel, very small.

KIENZLE: Was it relevant?

MARTINSON: No, it was strictly irrelevant. And you can imagine the Israelis are not stupid. With Russia arming Egypt and so on, the stock of communism wasn't very high in Israel.

SHEA: You, of course, knew that the Histitute was an employer and a union at the same time.

MARTINSON: Exactly. Yes. Yes. They were almost a government in themselves. They produced the prime ministers for the Labor Party. A good deal of my time actually turned out to be sort of hosting visiting delegations who came from America in great numbers because Histiuite was very active in developing good relationships and backing American groups. They invited key people to come over and thought the labor movement was a source of funds for Histitute. So, one of the ways, of rewarding people that were supporting Israel was to invite them to see what we're doing. That course was very useful in their effort to…so, I saw a lot of people and there was a lot of interest in Israel. Israel was only at that time five or six years old. A lot of people came to find out what was going on.

KIENZLE: Were these union groups that you dealt with or congressional groups?

MARTINSON: The union groups were sort of turned over to me. The Histitute made a bit of a coup and their American contact got Jimmy Hoffa to sponsor a birthday dinner for Jimmy with the proceeds to be donated to the Histitute. When Jimmy Hoffa came, he was already in somewhat bad repute. It was a hot potato. So, the ambassador made sure that I—he didn't want anything to do with it—he said, "You take care and keep him out of my way." So, he gave me the job of following Jimmy Hoffa around. It wound up several hundred thousand dollars, so the Histitute invited Jimmy and some of his people to come. I had the job of following him around. It was a rather interesting job. I have a picture of myself at a dinner given in Jerusalem in which I'm at the podium and behind me are Jimmy Hoffa and the Mayor of Jerusalem and the Minister of Justice.

KIENZLE: Not Labor?

MARTINSON: Yes, there was a member of labor there too. He was not a prominent

person.

KIENZLE: Was Teddy Kollek the mayor of Jerusalem then?

MARTINSON: Yes. Teddy. Anyway, I was evacuated ultimately to Rome. There was some discussion to whether I should go back or for a second tour or not. It wound up that they kept us in Rome for almost two months on TDY.

KIENZLE: …Duty?

MARTINSON: No. Just doing nothing. It was a pleasant time but a little bit disturbing that you didn't know what the hell was going on. So, ultimately they said, "You are going to Australia."

SHEA: So, this was 1956?

MARTINSON: 1956.

SHEA: Any final observations you'd like to make about your tour in Israel or concluding remarks?

MARTINSON: I don't know how I would sum it up. It ended to me… [inaudible end of tape side 2].

MARTINSON: …not really. I find it hard to sum up in a way because in a way I felt it was very incomplete. I was sort of just getting into the swing of things, when I was rudely jerked out. I had mixed feelings in terms of my own feelings about Zionism. My wife was Jewish but also very strongly anti-Zionist. Her father had been a Buddhist who believed that the answer to the Jewish problem was socialism, not Zionism. She retained that belief. I tried to look at it as objectively as I could but I was never totally happy because I saw that it was one of these terrible things that there wasn't any good answer to.

SHEA: Did your wife have any difficulty as a result of her Buddhist views?

MARTINSON: No. No. We met all kind of Israelis. A lot of them were all stripes and opinions. A lot of them, for example, were secular and they resented the orthodox influence in the government. As to the relationships for the Arabs there was also a vast difference. Some believe that you should make every effort to improve relationships by cooperation. Other feelings were that only force will answer our problems. We have to be strong. I still haven't resolved all these problems in my own mind in terms of how I would interpret it. I admit to some isolation in that regard. The idea of establishing a state in the middle of this sea of Arabs sounds like a very difficult thing. I mean, I worried about the practicality of it. And I worried too about what seemed to be happening in Israel. All these Socialist pacifists goals that they'd set out were being set aside in terms of preparedness defense—hard line—we can't afford these things, we have to get together and prepare for conflict for with Arabs. Not because we want to, because that is

what they intend to be doing. I could see this coming and it's about what I feared was taking place, in terms of the affect this had on Israeli society.

KIENZLE: Did your tour predate the arrival in large numbers of Sepharden?

MARTINSON: Yes.

KIENZLE: So, you basically were dealing with…

MARTINSON: European. Yes. There was only a few that had come, not the large influx. So, that was not a big problem at that time. Also, I worried a little bit about the Israeli connections with black South Africa, who they saw as natural allies in many ways, and that bothered me a bit because the Israelis were looking to their own security interests. Those interests I didn't share as an American.

KIENZLE: Were you aware of any defense cooperation with South Africa at that time?

MARTINSON: I wasn't. I was aware of some, but I didn't try to look into it. Later on, as a private citizen, I became aware that Israelis were arms merchants to some of the less desirable governments—Central America.

SHEA: Well, let's go to one of the more honorable governments in this world, Australia. When did you arrive and…?

MARTINSON: Australia was a new world too. I arrived and was put in the consulate in Sydney. Now, that in itself was a source of continual discussion over years because the labor movement was strongest in Sydney in many ways. Sydney was the largest, most well energetic-New South Wales. The TUC was located in Melbourne. That's where many of the ministry of labor and many of the government departments were at the time. Canberra had just recently been named the capital of the country and it was being built up but was a bunch of shadow governments there. All the bureaucracy was elsewhere. The parliament went to Canberra for their short, short sessions and they went back to Sydney, Melbourne, Queensland, and so on. But my predecessor's name, Herb Weist… Well, I soon heard gossip floating around the labor movement and the trade unions was the famous episode in which the head of the labor party publicly slapped Herbert. It turns out that the labor party guy, I forget his name, had heard Herbert saying some unkind things about him to the effect that he was soft on communism or something.

KIENZLE: So he unloaded?

MARTINSON: He unloaded.

SHEA: Was Monk was the Secretary General of the ACTU?

MARTINSON: Albert Monk.

SHEA: Do you recall the port worker, union leader Jim Healy.

MARTINSON: Yes, but Healy—wasn't Healy a commie?

SHEA: Yes.

MARTINSON: Wasn't he located in Sydney?

SHEA: Sydney, yes.

MARTINSON: Right. Yes, I remember going into [inaudible] and I liked to do that on seeing—you know what we think of the Communists and I tend to share the government's opinion on that score. But that doesn't mean that I shouldn't get to know you or I don't want you to know who I am. Maybe there are things we could talk about, I don't know. But I'd call and find out. Sometimes that complicated me and I didn't know who the hell the guy was. I had some estimation about his qualities or something so I thought that was useful. I did that other thing-not normally I don't think, because there wasn't anybody worth calling. The communists weren't at that level. There was an active communist movement in Australia. This distinguished it from well Norway, that was marginal. The ID's really could forget it. The dock workers could make things uncomfortable by refusing to handle cargo or something that they thought was political for political reasons. As you know, the Australian labor movement was split in three. There was the Australian Workers Union, which was mainly a union of laborers and sugar cane workers centered in Queensland. It was all over Australia but mainly based in Queensland. Its head was a guy by the name of Big Tom Doherty. Big Tom was, as you can imagine, was a man who came up through the ranks as a laborer in the sugar cane, sheep shearing...

SHEA: Sounds tough.

MARTINSON: Real tough character, hard drinker. A real hard drinker. The Australians tend to be hard drinkers.

SHEA: And the other two factions?

MARTINSON: One was the Catholics. And of course the monks, Australian ACTU. The ACTU was centered in Raburne. One of the problems in Sydney, I had practically no travel expenses to go any place outside Sydney. One monk came up to Sydney as he did occasionally. I got in touch with him and had him to dinner and so on. One of the few times I went down to Melbourne was when the USIA sent a steel worker research man. I took him in stride and their funds permitted me to take him down to Melbourne.

SHEA: Was that Otis Brubaken?

MARTINSON: No.

SHEA: No? Jack Sheehan?

MARTINSON: The steel workers?

SHEA: Yes...

MARTINSON: No. Sorry, I don't remember his name. I've seen him occasionally at some of these labor department gatherings. But, be that as it may, it took something like that to get me to go to Melbourne.

KIENZLE: So, it was a problem in the lack of travel funds and the…?

MARTINSON: Yes, it was. Yes. Tom Doherty—I decided to take a family vacation in Queensland and the Great Barrier Reef and Brisbane. I was doing that on my own. I told the embassy I'd do a little bit of work on the way. So, I decided that would be a great opportunity to find out what was going on in the AWU. Well, Tom Doherty used to invite me for drinking sessions. He had a club. The hours were restricted…

KIENZLE: Six o'clock closing…?

MARTINSON: Yes, right. But you had to have private clubs. So, everybody that was anybody had these private drinking clubs. Well, Tom used to take me over there and we'd drink nothing but Johnny Walker Black. That was Tom's drink. Anyway, he called up Brisbane, as the district man and he said, "My friend Gene Martinson is coming up there, he's the labor attaché and I want you to be sure that he sees a good time, that he sees everything we are doing and that he has a friendly reception where ever he goes." Well, every place I went in Queensland, there was an AWU man ready to meet me and show me the town. It was great. The AWU was a key to all the doors in Queensland. The employers felt it was not wise to offend the AWU because of its power, both political and economic.

KIENZLE: Were the other two factions also represented in Queensland?

MARTINSON: Yes, they were but let's say like by specific crafts. The AWU was an [inaudible] union.

KIENZLE: The laborers equivalent?

MARTINSON: Not exactly an industrial union, just a general, catch all union. A little bit like the teamsters in a sense. They took in everybody and they were sort imperialistic aggressive in terms of …

KIENZLE: For the general union…?

MARTINSON: A general union, yes. A general union is a good word for it. A lot of the labor power in Australia was sort of centered in what they call the Trades All Consuls.

The Sydney Trades All Consul was a very important and influential group. Much more important in Australia than the local AFL-CIO consuls are in the States. Wouldn't you say so?

SHEA: Absolutely. You're absolutely right. Almost all the activity was centered there. The meetings were always well attended.

MARTINSON: Indeed. It was a lively institution.

SHEA: When I was there, I attended those meetings almost on a regular basis and the Communists would turn out in mass.

MARTINSON: Yes. Free speech was a reality in Australia. Trades All Consulate was very convenient. Actually, practically all the unions had their offices in the Trades All Consulate building. So, that was easy. One visit and you could sort of cover the whole business. It made it very convenient.

Things were going fairly well. I had some problems with the Consul in general and one of the consuls in particular. Mostly, they had this sort of a standoff position about labor. They were sort of off key, not really true Foreign Service…

KIENZLE: Couldn't quite understand if you were working for the same government?

MARTINSON: Right. They didn't think we were working for the same government. We were reporting to some foreign organization. I think I got shafted because of their hostilities.

SHEA: Were you working for the embassy at that point?

MARTINSON: No, I didn't report to the embassy. I reported through the Consul General directly through the State Department.

SHEA: I see. That's why it was so difficult then.

MARTINSON: This became a source of a problem for the ambassador. The ambassador said, "What's this guy doing reporting on national labor affairs? The only national reporting ought to come through the embassy. I want this guy in Canberra." So, he lobbied and got me reassigned for a second tour to Canberra.

KIENZLE: Oh, I see, so you spent 1956 through '58, roughly in Sydney, and '58 through '60 in Canberra.

MARTINSON: Yes. Right. I said, look if you could have switched, send me to Melbourne. I mean that's the head of the ACTU and the government minister of labor is there. We don't think Sydney is the place for him. Melbourne would be the next best choice. But Canberra, no, who's there? There's no Trades All Consul there. There are no

trade unionists there to speak of. What are you going to do? You're going to have to go back to Sydney or Melbourne to find out what was going on. Well that didn't cut any ice with the ambassador. They wouldn't give me any travel funds either.

KIENZLE: Who was the ambassador at that stage?

MARTINSON: I got a mental block on this. His feelings were made clear one day. We had a country team meeting. He had been rifling through my mail and he saw that I was getting an international labor affairs magazine. A monthly labor thing that the Labor Department sent. He's curious and he started reading it and he kept it. At the country team meeting he came to me, "Now Mr. Martinson," he said, "I just happened to be reading this magazine, International Labor Affairs, who publishes that?"

And I said the Department of Labor. He said, “I see that they have given credit to our consulate in South Australia, Ausland, for some labor reporting he did.”

I said, "That’s right."

He said, "Well, what do they have to do with the State Department reporting?"

I started to say, “Mr. Ambassador, the Foreign Service Act of 1946 gave the Department of Labor certain rights and it was part of that. They would like to encourage more labor reporting among Foreign Service officers who are not labor attaches because we can't have labor attachés every place. So, Ausland, has written a nice [inaudible] and they want to give him credit.”

Well, the ambassador, said, "That is awful. They could ruin this man's career."

So, I immediately understood where I stood. It was really rough. There was a period—bad two years—because in fact, I was sort of had nothing to do. I made friends with some of the labor MP's including Goff Whitman who later became Prime Minister. I met Goff Whitman because his son and mine had gone to the same school in Sydney. So, we became sort of friends that way. But I wasn't allowed to report on labor affairs, legal affairs I should say. So, that left me sort of high and dry. I felt that my tour in Australia—certainly the last two years—but I could have made use of the contacts I had accumulated in the first two years—where all of a sudden I was cut out.

KIENZLE: Well, the position was shortly thereafter moved to Melbourne.

MARTINSON: It was moved to Melbourne at a later time. It was moved back to Canberra.

KIENZLE: I think that's right. Bob Walkenshaw was in Melbourne in 1961 or so.

MARTINSON: Well, I complained. Back home I complained loud and bitterly about the illogicality of putting the labor attaché in Canberra and I think my advice had some effect

but it didn't help me any.

Shaw: When they told me I was going to Melbourne and I arrived in Australia, I was sent to Canberra and that was because the embassy wanted to have control. But they did have the caveat that I would have plenty of money to travel.

KIENZLE: Were you able to travel?

Shaw: Yes, I was.

KIENZLE: Any general observations you want to add to your tour in Australia?

MARTINSON: I found the Australians very agreeable, easy to get along with, open sort of guys. The Australians were desperate to go abroad. They felt very cut off. Unfortunately, like the Chinese, who were inviting some of the trade unionists to come and visit China. This was a problem because here they were offered a free trip to China and we were supposed to sort of discourage them from-that's visiting Communist countries and so on. But the attractions of foreign travel easily won out. I don't think it made any difference in the long run.

Shaw: How about the Soviet Union? Were they sending people to the Soviet Union at that time?

MARTINSON: If they were, I wasn't aware that anybody in the Socialists or the labor party union was going to Russia, no. The thing on China, yes, not Russia. I had very little contact with them and as far as I was concerned, they were going their own way and I was going mine. If they had any interest in what I was doing, I wasn't aware of it.

KIENZLE: You mentioned earlier that you called on a Communist trade unionist?

MARTINSON: Right.

KIENZLE: Did that cause the AFL-CIO any heartburn?

MARTINSON: I don't know if they knew about it. Oh yes, this reminds because this problem of…they had the AFL representative to the Asian [inaudible].

SHEA: [inaudible]

MARTINSON: No, before him.

KIENZLE: Maybe it was Harry Goldberg?

MARTINSON: Yes, Harry Goldberg. Harry Goldberg was not the most diplomatic character in the world.

KIENZLE: He was [inaudible] or ILG?

MARTINSON: I don't know what he was but he was Jay Lovestone's man. He wore his anti-communism as a badge. He was a bit notorious from what his public statements had been. So, the Australian press wanted to interview him when he came to Australia. I didn't know who in the hell he wanted to see. The ACTU wasn't interested in talking to him. But he had some contacts, I guess. But he didn't seek me out as a source of contact.

KIENZLE: Gene, didn't he have contacts with a right wing group, the Catholic group?

MARTINSON: Yes, he did. Yes, he did.

SHEA: Santa Maria and company?

MARTINSON: Santa Maria. Santa Maria group were an actively anti-Communist group. In the official [inaudible] organization, denied that they were communists which was quite true. They were not communists in any manner, shape or form, although they did some have some affiliated unions which were left winging. I believe the seaman for example were a part of the ACTU. So, they had communist unionists in their midst. But the official line was non-communist and they resented and they felt that the Santa Maria's group was disruptive and they were weakening the labor movement to pursue political cause.

KIENZLE: Did you see any evidence that the U.S. Government might have been funding some of Santa Maria's operations?

MARTINSON: No. Santa Maria was located again in Melbourne. I had no direct evidence and actually I could only assume they probably did but I wasn't interested in pursuing that. I didn't think that was not my problem to find out whether we had any back door connection to Santa Maria group or not.

KIENZLE: Did you have connections to the Santa Maria group yourself?

MARTINSON: No, I did not.

KIENZLE: No dealings to speak of?

MARTINSON: I had met some of them. I didn't make an active effort really to cultivate them. I felt maybe, rightly or wrongly, that I would stick to the main source of power and not let the relationship with Santa Maria make me suspect in the eyes of the ACTU and the labor party. I didn't think it was that significant and worthwhile to do that. I mean, it wasn't critical that we had to choose sides and they were the only possible barrier and I didn't believe that myself. I thought their efforts were not necessarily productive.

KIENZLE: Did they have any significant number of workers in their federation?

MARTINSON: They never were a big economic force, I don't believe, as I remember. They had a few.

SHEA: As I recall, I was there in later years, they were strong in the service unions.

MARTINSON: Indeed, I was going to say that the clerical…right. Yes, right. Not the industrial. They had no power in the industrial sections of the labor movement. Well, that pretty much covers Australia, I guess.

KIENZLE: Ok. After Australia you were reassigned to…?

MARTINSON: I was assigned to Sweden and I thought, "Oh my God, that's wonderful." And then they asked me to stay behind and brief the incoming labor attaché. I didn't think it was necessary because I got along without briefing and I thought I could leave him enough…

KIENZLE: That was Graham McKelvey?

MARTINSON: Yes. A day or two I could tell him all he needed to know. The DCM at some point said, "Well, it's always been a problem, you guys never…I want you to stay at least two weeks so the guy is thoroughly briefed." Well, the two weeks were over and the ambassador in Sweden had decided he wanted to keep his former labor attaché; he didn't want a new one. He was a brand new ambassador and the labor attaché was a very important part of the embassy and he didn't want to deal with somebody he didn't know. So, he said I want to keep the old one. So, I was high and dry. They kept me awhile because it took the Labor Department by surprise and they had to dream up a new post for me. So, I was high and dry for a couple weeks in Canberra while McKelvey was busy beginning his tour. Finally, in the middle of the night, I called up—I decided in desperation—to call up the Department of Labor myself and find out what was going on. I think it was four o'clock in the morning in Australia. And they said, "We've got a good post for you. We're thinking of sending you to Lagos."

"Where in the hell is Lagos?"

"Well," he said, "it's in Nigeria, the biggest country in Africa. It's an important country."

KIENZLE: This was during the period when a lot of countries were becoming independent in Africa?

MARTINSON: Indeed, Nigeria had been only six months independent. It was important from African perspective. It was an important country. So, I found myself going without any…Oh, they did send me through State Department. But you know what they did? The bastards wouldn't allow my wife and kids to go with me.

KIENZLE: You're kidding?

MARTINSON: Because it was cheaper to go directly from Australia to Nigeria than it was to go via the States so the bastards wouldn't let my wife…

KIENZLE: You didn't get home leave then?

MARTINSON: No.

KIENZLE: Oh, boy. This was 1960 roughly?

MARTINSON: Later because—it was 1960 wasn't it? Yes. I remember when I was moved from Sydney, I was given a government furnished house. I didn't need any furniture. So, I went to Canberra and there was no government furnished housing available. I had to find my own. The best I could find was a semi-furnished house. So, I asked the Department for permission to send furniture from the States to fill up the apartment. I said I didn't transport any furniture to Sydney because it was government furnished. Now I want…they said, "Well, you're not entitled to order furniture when you're getting transferred from one post to another in a country." I pressed the point and said, "That's not right." Then they came back with this answer. They said well …[tape stops playing before the end of side 2].

MARTINSON: What's the excuse for denying me…

KIENZLE: Because you'd sold your furniture?

MARTINSON: Yes, without any—they'd just assumed that I'd made money. There was absolutely no basis for…I was given three days' notice to evacuate. I didn't know what the situation was going to be. And the next door neighbor or somebody wanted my furniture and I said, "Ok, you can have it."

KIENZLE: So, you sold it under duress in effect?

MARTINSON: I sold it under duress because I didn't know who was going to pack it up for me or anything.

KIENZLE: These are Foreign Service horror stories.

MARTINSON: Right, horror stories. Then, when my brother died, when I was in Sydney, I flew home at my own expense to go to the funeral because I needed to. My brother-in-law was a friend of Stu Simonton, you know Senator, Arms Services Committee. I heard that they were flying military flights all the time between the States and New Zealand and Antarctica and so on. So, I said, "Why can't I fly in a military plane back home?" Simonton said, "Well sure, we can arrange that for you but the State Department has to say yes." I went to the State Department and they said, "No, we can't do that. If we did that for you, everybody would want to do that." So, I had to pay. It was expensive to travel from Sydney to the States and back out of your own pocketbook. That's unconscionable. But now I think you're entitled to go home…

KIENZLE: Things loosened up very much.

MARTINSON: A bit loosened, yes.

SHEA: Just to get back to Australia for one second, do you recall Larry Short of the Iron Workers?

MARTINSON: Oh, Larry Short was one of my best friends. See this picture? That's his wife. That's her picture. Oh, yes, we were great friends with Larry Short. He was one of the most outspoken anti-Communists in the ACTU. We were very friendly.

SHEA: [Inaudible]?

MARTINSON: He was short too. A real interesting and agreeable guy to know.

SHEA: I became a very good friend of his.

MARTINSON: And by the way, he had a big circle of friends and one of them was a barrister who I got to know very well. He became Head of the Arbitration Court in Melbourne, and then was named Governor General…

SHEA: Kerr.

MARTINSON: Kerr. Yes.

SHEA: John Kerr.

MARTINSON: John Kerr. John Kerr and I were fairly friendly. John invited me to his place a couple times for dinner in Sydney. But he didn't become Governor General until long after I left. Then as it turned out—I was a friend of Goff Whitman and a friend of John Kerr—well, then, John Kerr fired Goff Whitman. The outcry was so great that John had to retire to England.

KIENZLE: Getting back to Nigeria.

MARTINSON: Oh, by the way, then the next guy was Prime Minister was the former Research Director, Bob Hawk. Bob Hawk was quite a drinker, but he later I guess went on the wagon.

KIENZLE: Anyhow, you arrived in Nigeria in what, late 1960, roughly?

MARTINSON: Yes.

KIENZLE: And how was the tour there?

MARTINSON: It was a fascinating tour. There was not much carryover from one country to another from Norway to Israel to Australia to Nigeria. This environment was totally new. We lived in a sort of a compound that had been a European compound and we sort of took over from the culture that the English had established. We lived in an embassy house and we had about five servants. A couple house boys and a gardener and what do you call it, a watch night. A guy that just sat in a chair all night in front of your house.

KIENZLE: Was there a viable labor movement in Nigeria at that time?

MARTINSON: Yes, there was. There was a very active labor movement. This had been cultivated or initiated with the encouragement of the British. Under the British labor government's early influence, they felt it was only fair to encourage development of trade unions in the colonies which were due to become independent. The labor movement there was divided again into three parts. Sort of similar to Australia. There was a communist wing, a non-communist wing and a Catholic wing. Again, I got to know them all. One of the things it was very difficult to sort out was the importance of tribal loyalties within the labor movement and elsewhere in the government as well.

KIENZLE: Was it a unified labor movement or was it on a regional basis?

MARTINSON: It was a unified labor movement. I mean there were three branches. But they were all located in their headquarters in Lagos. Their jurisdiction was a little country.

KIENZLE: The three movements didn't have separate units in say [inaudible] or Northern Nigeria?

MARTINSON: No. No. There may have been some regional difference in their power-their local influence. I really can't tell you a whole lot about that in that sense. Things were not quite as easy—as evident—in Nigeria as they would be in another country. You needed help to sort out all these things. I was fortunate to find an ex-Nigerian newspaper reporter to be my sort of gopher in the system. He was excellent.

KIENZLE: So you had a local assistant?

MARTINSON: I had a local assistant that made the rounds just like he was a reporter. He was used to doing this and he knew everybody. He was the source of a lot of good information which was very helpful. You needed somebody like that, certainly, unless you'd had years of experience. It would be very difficult for you to operate without that kind of help.

KIENZLE: What were the major goals of your activities there?

MARTINSON: At that time, the Cold War was maybe at its height and Africa was a battleground in which the Russians and we were mining for support and influence. So, the Russians were very active in trying to win loyalties out of the Nigerian labor people.

They invited dozens and dozens of them to come to Moscow. Some for university educations, extended training and indoctrinations. There was a bit of a contest really between…That was again a bolten source of influence because Nigerians wanted to know naturally what was going on in the wide world outside of Africa which had been denied them up until now. But now they were independent and they wanted to see and they were open to these invitations. So, we had to compete in that respect by inviting people ourselves.

KIENZLE: That was a very active period for our foreign policy in Africa when the Kennedy administration…

MARTINSON: Indeed, Robert Kennedy took a tremendous interest in labor in State Department affairs.

KIENZLE: Oh, he did?

MARTINSON: He did. And one of his ideas was—the bright idea was—that we should—embassies should try to identify young promising leaders, of all kinds, and we should get them to the States for extended periods and win them over by education and other means we had of persuading them.

KIENZLE: And that was at Robert Kennedy's initiative?

MARTINSON: Yes, right. He was really cracking the whip. He said he meant business. Every officer was required to make lists of people who potentially who could be top leaders. I'm a little bit skeptical myself because I said let's put it in the United States, a place we know a lot about, how many people you can identify as being candidates for president or cabinet members. Not picking people who are already there or near there, picking people who are very promising but on the lower rungs and who are young enough to be influenced and then become our boys and voices in the [inaudible].

SHEA: Did you get a chance to travel in Nigeria, Gene?

MARTINSON: Yes, I did. I traveled throughout Nigeria so at least I got an idea what was going on. Not so much politically because the labor movement sort of petered out. It was Lagos based and to some extent beyond Lagos had gotten very thin.

KIENZLE: Was Lagos a chaotic city at that time?

MARTINSON: Oh, it was. All kinds of construction were going on. It was a sort of a boom town. There was a president who was very popular, his name was Azikiwe. I was there for three years. At the end of my tour, the labor movement decided to make general demand on the government for some wage increases and some other concessions. The government refused and they had a general strike. I was due to leave the country. I had it all worked out to go and the ambassador said, “Well, you can't leave now during a general strike.” So, I stayed and the interesting part of the whole thing was the general

strike was conducted very well. There was very low violence and it brought the whole country to a halt and they won it. They got their concessions and it was a big deal. They had a celebration party at my house. All the factions came, the communists, the Catholics. They all gathered in this case. In this case, they had forgotten their particular differences and they had solidarity and they all celebrated that. Everybody got along fine.

KIENZLE: I take it then that the labor movement was truly independent of the government at that point…?

MARTINSON: Yes.

KIENZLE: …if they could successfully carry out a general strike.

MARTINSON: Yes, they were feeling their oats. They were educated by the TUC and they took it from the British and to some extent the Americans. They figured we're a trade union and this is what trade unions do.

KIENZLE: Did the British TUC maintain continuing ties with the Nigerian trade union federation mainstream?

MARTINSON: As far as I could tell, not directly. They did have a labor attaché. But you were asking me about the general thrust of policy. The general thrust of policy of the time…here is Nigeria, the largest, most populous country in Africa. It's a fledgling democracy. Let's try to strengthen its institutions. Which meant give it whatever help we can and try to keep it out of the hands of communists, safely in our orbit. That's what we trying to do. And we had a lot of big MFA programs-aid program- that involved the University of Michigan [inaudible] and a very active aid mission. So the place was crawling with CIA. This was one of the problems I had because everywhere I went, I found that the CIA had been there ahead of me.

KIENZLE: With your labor contacts as well?

MARTINSON: And they were paying off people that I was cultivating on a normal basis. They were getting money from the CIA on the side. So, I never could be sure where I stood. It was a bit annoying because it was necessary.

KIENZLE: Did they coordinate with you at all?

MARTINSON: No. I found out what was going on because they didn't know that some of them would talk.

KIENZLE: Did it infringe at all upon your…?

MARTINSON: Sure it did. I had felt in many cases that there…how many guys do you want to put on one person. I felt that sometimes we were being played off-who's going to offer you the most.

KIENZLE: Why give it to you for free…?

MARTINSON: I, for example, had command of certain trips to the states. I could nominate people for trips to the states. That gave me a certain…But the CIA could arrange for things too. We weren't in the business of giving cash to our friends. Although there were occasions-at least one occasion-in which one of the ICFTU representatives came to me and he was claiming to be in desperate straits because some of the communists were about to-they didn't have enough money to send people to a conference in which they expected them to come-in which the communists were backing or something. So I arranged some money for that. Not directly. I got the money from the CIA and passed it on. The CIA was not disturbed about that at all.

KIENZLE: How about the exchange programs. Did they work with the Nigerian folks? You mentioned that there were…

MARTINSON: Oh, they worked. They worked very well. Well, maybe this is being too patronizing but for a Nigerian to go to the States and see how we lived and how things operated was kind of anti-experience and a lot of the things he might learn from the States were not applicable at all. Back home in other words, you might say they were slightly spoiled or got a distorted view because of the vast difference in cultural backgrounds, but yes, we were very active that way. It was sort of laughable in the end to see us-that we were so overkill in the amount of resources we spent in Africa.

KIENZLE: This Cold War mentality basically?

MARTINSON: The idea was that we were in a pretty desperate struggle with the Russians and we were determined to win—willing to put in whatever it took to win. I completed my tour after the general strike. I thought it was a nice way to end my tour. One of the few general strikes that ever succeeded, even if temporarily, because I think the government later reneged promises they made. But at the time it was a victory. It was the government that caved in, not the unions. So, I went home and I got assigned to the State Department.

KIENZLE: In a labor assignment?

MARTINSON: I went for the ECA [Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs].

KIENZLE: The equivalent AID [Agency for International Development].

MARTINSON: The AID section for a couple years then I went to INS for a couple more years before I retired.

KIENZLE: Your last labor experience then was really in Nigeria?

MARTINSON: Yes, in the field. Except for one thing. When the African War broke out,

they didn't have a labor attaché in Nigeria and the embassy wanted me to come back because the situation was pretty delicate and they needed some people that knew their way around. They asked me to come back on temporary duty until they could get a new labor attaché there. So, I went back for a couple months. During that time, the hostilities were ready to explode. I went on a trip from Lagos to the east and I got the Niger River. On one side of the river—the bridge crossed the Niger—was guarded by government troops. On the other side there were government troops. The one on the east side was commanded by eastern government and the other side was the Lagos government. I got to Port Harcourt, which is the shipping center, and also an oil center. I got to Port Harcourt the day after a little massacre had taken place because up North there had been a terrible massacre of Igbos. Igbos were the easterners, but they were traders and civil servants. They called them the Jews of Nigeria. They were educated. The [inaudible] slaughtered them. They went on a genocidal rampage. It was like Rwanda. The refugees were put on a train and sent back to the east. But every station along their way, a group of [inaudible] got on the train and slaughtered some more. By the time got to Harcourt, there were a bunch of slaughtered people on the train, very few alive. That evoked a contrary reaction, which was pretty much controlled. But it pretty much illustrated the tension that was taking place.

KIENZLE: Was there any real need for a labor attaché at that time?

MARTINSON: It wasn't a question of being a labor attaché, it was a question of the political knowledge and the contacts which the labor attaché acquired. The labor people, by virtue of their contacts, had a lot of useful information. This is the whole idea of the labor attaché program. Here's a source of information that you shouldn't neglect.

KIENZLE: You were able to go back and then pick up on the contacts you had?

MARTINSON: It wasn't that long, unfortunately. I had friends on both sides so that was helpful too. I went east and I was driven there by an embassy chauffeur but I had to fly back by that time the bridge was closed. It was not safe to land travel. I got back to Lagos and they had a discussion that the war was ready to break out. There was a discussion of what was the prognosis. What was the embassy view as to what would happen if a war did break out? I offered as my point of view that it would not be an easy war because the Ebos were very, very determined and they were also intelligent, educated people and they would not be easy to-even if the control by the Lagos government had all the armor. But I remember the military attaché saying that with the armor the Lagos government possessed they'd predicted the war might last six weeks. Well, it lasted almost two years.

KIENZLE: Did you report that?

MARTINSON: It wasn't a requirement. I didn't report it independently, but it was part of a country team meeting in which we all gave our assessments. I didn't think it was my business to write a dispatch saying I think the war would last two years or last a long time as opposed to what the Army attaché thinks. This is my private view, but this is my feel for the contacts on a level which the Army attaché probably couldn't reach very well from

his position. I think they're also impressed by armor tanks and you know that's what counts. That's one of the reasons I became very skeptical about later on in Vietnam because my experience in Nigeria led me to be very, very skeptical as to how much nation building we could do considering cultural differences and how our influence is marginal. When they got to talk about rebuilding South Vietnam as a model democracy I couldn't buy that at all. I also realized too that like the Nigerian Army fighting in Vietnam is not going to be totally a matter of armor against determined, indigenous population. It wasn't so indigenous, but they were Vietnamese anyway. That's it isn't it.

KIENZLE: Any final or general observations you would like to make before we close?

MARTINSON: Well, I of course, remember from an earlier generation than the labor attaches in which our ties with the labor movement were fairly close and we all had fairly substantial backgrounds one way or another in the labor movement. We felt more identification of that. We also were entered into the place where there was an atmosphere of good feeling with the Roosevelt, Truman era and American AID program. Which labor had probably influenced. Labor and government seemed to be in the incendency and Britain and Germany and Scandinavia and in Israel as well, and Australia.

SHEA: Australia, sure.

MARTINSON: Indeed. So, the role of the labor attaché in terms of its relevance to the existing political structure was much more important, I think then, than it may be now. The other thing was that-well now I begin to wonder because as it developed more and more of our business was to pick up soldiers in the Cold War. I mean this became our principal-overshadowed some of our other things that we started off with-labor reporting and the basic sense the Labor Department wanted us to do. It was overshadowed by the need to find out what we could do to support democratic trade unions and subvert or convert the communists. I was not terribly sympathetic. I mean, I understood the need and I contributed my share to the cause in terms of participating and supporting our activities in that field, but my heart wasn't really in it. I felt that sometimes we were choosing the wrong friends and supporting groups which were hardly worthy of support just because they were anti-Communists. We were not discriminating enough in our support. Anybody who was anti-Communist could get American money and support whether they had any real reformers or labor people with typical labor goals and aspirations. So, I wonder what—I don't understand now really whether the place of the labor attaché would be the same with the Cold War over.

SHEA: I think there is a search to try to redefine…?

MARTINSON: Redefine, right. And later on of course, the State Department began to induct more labor officers—political officers or economic for labor assignment and that was good. It was all a question of where you belonged. It was all a disputed issue when I was there whether you belonged in economics or political section. That was a constant sort of dispute. In essence, I think we really belonged-we were hybrid but became more and more political as time went on. It became more logical to put us in the political

section. Actually a lot of this friction needn't have taken place. If we were part of the political section, they couldn't object to our contacts in the political field.

SHEA: What about your identification with the CIO? Did that…?

MARTINSON: That's another thing I haven't touched on really. There's no question about it, I was nominated or proposed by the CIO. More the UAW than the CIO. The CIO representative's name was Ross, Mike Ross. Mike Ross, I understand, he's gone now I suppose, long ago. But Mike Ross bought the labor department proposition that it might be better to let me go as a RIF than to keep me on where I might face some sort of investigation or what not. I found out about that and I guess I got to Walter who told Mike that I had Walter's confidence and that was not the right thing to do. So that was part of the reason why they reversed the RIF. But nevertheless I owe a lot to the CIO, to the UAW particularly for being in there in the first place and later on supporting me when everybody else was willing to throw me to the wolves.

KIENZLE: Was there any pressure from the CIO for you to report directly to CIO people?

MARTINSON: No. Never.

KIENZLE: Never?

MARTINSON: Never, and I knew Victor personally. We were personal friends.

End of interview