The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

# KEVIN J. MCGUIRE

*Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy*
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*Q: Today is 13 August 2014 with Kevin J. McGuire. Kevin and I served together in Greece back in the '70s. Kevin, let's start at the beginning. When and where were you born?*

McGUIRE: I was born in New York City in Jackson Heights on January 28, 1943.

*Q: OK, right in the middle of WWII.*

McGUIRE: It was indeed.

*Q: Let's get a little family history. What do you know of your father's side, where the family came from and how they got to the United States and what they had been occupied doing?*

McGUIRE: My father's family came to the United States in the mid 1830s from Ireland, from the Cavan-Fermanagh area and worked on the Erie Canal. The family lived in upstate New York until the late 1800s when our branch moved to New York City.

*Q: Now let's go back to your grandfather. What was he up to?*

McGUIRE: My paternal grandfather died long before I was born. He was a local government worker of some kind. He may have been in the fire department. I am not sure.

*Q: And your father?*

McGUIRE: My father was an employee of the Australian Consulate in New York City when things were going well. Unfortunately he had a drinking problem and things did not go well for very long. So from the late 40s on we saw less and less of him. He ended up as a dock worker and really played no role in the family, provided no assistance at all.

*Q: How about your mother's side?*

McGUIRE: My mother's maiden name was Kelly; her parents migrated to New York City from the Galway area of western Ireland. I don't remember the exact time frame but it would have been around the 1880s. My maternal grandfather also died young. I believe

he was with the department of sanitation. My grandmother was something of a wheeler-dealer and one way or another she managed to invest some money in real estate, which is how the family ended up living in a private home in Jackson Heights by the time I arrived. Jackson Heights was not an elite area but the family had reached the point where they could move into reasonably attractive housing close to the center of New York City. My mother was the first one in the family to go beyond high school. She became a New York City school teacher. Education was something that was uppermost in her mind. For my brother and myself that was clearly the way to move up the ladder.

*Q: So she was the force in the family.*

McGUIRE: Absolutely.

*Q: How did you interact with your mother?*

McGUIRE: The family was small and close. Our aunt lived with us so there were two adults and my older brother and myself. My mother took her work very seriously. She was the sole bread winner. She had a very serious case of asthma, so things were difficult for her. She took great interest in our school work. I can remember being resentful during the summer vacations when I was in the first and second grade because I had to go in for what seemed like hours a couple of times a week in order to practice writing, reading and math. So my brother and I were inculcated with a sense of doing well in school. My brother got a scholarship to Regis High School which still is one of the best high schools in New York. I went to Bishop Loughlin which was a Diocesan scholarship school. We went to first class private schools; we didn't pay any tuition. We started working full time in the summers from age fourteen to get ready for college costs.

*Q: As a kid in the early years of schooling were you much of a reader?*

McGUIRE: Yes, this is something both my brother and I enjoyed. We both did very well in school. There weren't any rewards at home for doing well; it was expected.

*Q: It sounds like you had a firm mother's hand.*

McGUIRE: We did.

*Q: Who was older your brother or you?*

McGUIRE: My brother was four years older.

*Q: How did you work with him? Was he your role model or was it competitive?*

McGUIRE: A bit of each. We have three sons. My second son has some personality traits very similar to my own. When you have an older sibling you are behind the curve so to speak at the dinner table. There are intelligent people discussing issues that are maybe a bit above your head so you develop some skills to get some face time, humor, timing,

maybe a touch of irony. My brother and I got along well. He certainly set a high standard academically and in that regard he was a role model rather than a competitor. We were pretty close when we were younger but four years is a big difference and we took different paths as we got older. The Foreign Service was not an easy place to maintain contacts with friends and relatives during much of my career. There were no e-mails, no Facebook, et al.; even telephoning could be difficult. Home leave provided opportunities to see people you were close to, and the occasional visit to one's post from family and friends helped, but maintaining ties was not easy.

*Q: So when you were a kid do you remember some of the books you were interested in reading?*

McGUIRE: I can remember walking up to our local library during the summer months when I was in the third or fourth grade. I remember the Dr. Doolittle books, and a fictional series on baseball that I loved. My uncle got me started on Kenneth Roberts when I was around 10 and I think I read everything he published. I loved Mark Twain. I also would pick up things my brother was reading. There was usually something by Normal Mailer or James Jones lying around as I got a little older. I would grab whatever was around. In high school we had a wonderful exposure to a wide range of great reading. Our house was also full of newspapers. Every day we got the New York Times, the Herald Tribune, the Journal American and the World Telegram and Sun. And we had a news magazine or two as well.

*Q: I assume you were Catholic. Was the Catholic Church an important factor in your life?*

McGUIRE: We went to mass every Sunday and I did a lot of extra things like First Fridays and Lenten observances. Both the Kelly and McGuire families were active practitioners. I went to public school for two years where my mother taught. Then I switched to the local parochial school where my brother was already enrolled. Loughlin High was Catholic and Holy Cross as well. I remain a practicing Catholic to this day.

*Q: As a young boy were you tempted to go into the priesthood?*

McGUIRE: No, I never considered that.

*Q: Where did you family fall politically?*

McGUIRE: My mother was registered as an independent. That was because she was in the public school system and she felt that if you put down Democrat that might rebound against you. We would discuss politics at election time when I was young. She was usually a supporter of the Democratic party, but not always. She was initially opposed to the teachers' union. This would have been in the 1950s. She felt that the union might have a negative effect on education. But then the union did some things in defense of the teachers on salaries and working conditions, and did so without adverse impact on the quality of education. So her view of the union changed, and she became a proponent. As I

said the house was filled with newspapers, with various political orientations. We had them and we read them, and that led to some interesting discussions.

*Q: How about the radio? Was that something that you remember?*

McGUIRE: I can't remember much radio coverage of the political scene. We had a TV fairly early on. I can remember Douglas Edwards and the newscasters of that era. We listened to Edward R. Murrow fight McCarthyism. We used to watch the news around dinner time and usually caught the 11 pm news before bed time.

*Q: Well did you have any sort of favorite radio or TV shows that you watched?*

McGUIRE: As a kid, we watched the early comedy shows, Sid Caesar, Milton Berle, George Burns, Jackie Gleason and Lucille Ball. The Tonight Show started with Steve Allen in the 1950s and my brother and I used to watch him, and Ernie Kovacs.

*Q: Well in Jackson Heights as a kid did you get into New York much?*

McGUIRE: Yes. The Empire State Building was visible from our street and Jackson Heights was a quick subway ride from downtown. It was a great place to grow up. When I was a youngster my mother would take us to Central Park, to the zoo and the wonderful museums or to a show for a special occasion. When I was in high school friends and I would go down to Broadway and you could catch a play for a buck or two. You would go from box office to box office and they would sell tickets that hadn't been claimed five minutes before show time. And then there were sports teams of all kinds. We loved the Yankees. We had one Dodger fan and one Giant fan in our crowd and we barely tolerated them during the baseball season. We used to go down to Yankee Stadium on the subway and catch games there. In the winter time we would go down and see the New York Rangers and the Knicks. Both teams were terrible in those days. I am talking about the early 50s. But we had enough glory from the Yankee World Series championships that we didn't mind having not so good teams in hockey and basketball. In the winter we ice skated in Central Park; in the summer we could go down and watch Shakespeare in the Park. And it wasn't just access to downtown. We had a sports center just outside my door, also known as 72nd street. We played stickball, touch football and roller hockey right there depending on the season. In the summer we would go all over. We had a bunch of young boys in the neighborhood. We would bike over to Flushing or to St. Michael's Park to play baseball or catch the bus to the beaches at Rockaway. In those days that wasn't unusual. You would have breakfast and then disappear until dinner time.

*Q: I grew up in that era too. The kids were basically feral. Get out of the house and be back by 6:30 or whatever time dinner was. That was sort of the adult supervision. It worked very well.*

McGUIRE: There was always something going on. And we cooked it all up; we had nobody to organize us. We didn't need organization. We got enough guys together for two baseball teams and we would go out and play baseball all day and then maybe go

down to nearby McClancy High School and play basketball in the evening. Life got more complicated when we turned 14 and just about all of us found full time summer jobs.

*Q: Were there problems with ethnicity in your area?*

McGUIRE: Jackson Heights was a very mixed area at that time. I am not talking about racially, but in terms of ethnicity. There were a lot of Catholics; Italian and Irish but some people of German and Eastern European heritage. There were Protestants. There were Jewish families. A Chinese family lived three doors up from us. We were all living in this one community; the kids all played together and the adults got along without apparent issues. There was a racial divide in those days as there still is although I am constantly astonished that even with all of the problems that are out there so much progress has been made. We were living in the north in a very cosmopolitan city but there was a black community out in Corona, two miles away from where we lived, and there was very little integration of housing.

*Q: What was your school like at the elementary level?*

McGUIRE: You mean in this regard?

*Q: Overall.*

McGUIRE: At St. Joan of Arc the ethnicity spread was broad. We had kids from all over; I am talking about heritage now, from all over Europe. All of us were Catholic of course. There were some Puerto Rican kids. I can't think of any blacks at all who were at St. Joan's. But the school was in the middle of a neighborhood that was pretty much white. As I say Corona was the nearest area where there was a black community. All the students at St. Joan's were Catholic, and most blacks were Protestant. In terms of academic standards St. Joan's was a typical parochial school of the day. The nuns were highly dedicated, but their training was not always the best. Discipline was never a problem. Most parents were involved and most of the kids were committed to learning.

*Q: Was your church basically an Irish Catholic Church?*

McGUIRE: No it was very mixed. There certainly was a strong representation from people with Irish heritage but a lot of Italians. There were people from Germany, and Eastern Europe, including from Poland and Czechoslovakia. This included families that had migrated to the U.S. after World War II.

*Q: Well then in grammar school what subjects did you like and what subjects didn't you like?*

McGUIRE: I liked pretty much everything. I was never really keen on math but I think one of the weaknesses of the parochial school system at the elementary level was that most of the teachers were nuns. They were very dedicated but they didn't have terrific training in things like mathematics. So in things where you could do a lot of the work on

your own, English and history, for example, I did very well. Not that I didn't score well on math but we did not get a lot of support in math or science.

*Q: Well then where did you go to high school?*

McGUIRE: Bishop Loughlin Memorial High School in Brooklyn.

*Q: What was it like?*

McGUIRE: It was terrific. It was the academic scholarship school for the Brooklyn Diocese which included Queens, Brooklyn and most of Long Island. So we had really bright kids from all over the area. All the students were Catholic but in addition to the kind of ethnic diversity we had in Jackson Heights we also had a number of African America and Hispanic students. The population was still largely white but there was a significant minority presence there.

*Q: Was it all male?*

McGUIRE: Yes. In those days yes it was.

*Q: What subjects did you particularly like?*

McGUIRE: I did a lot of language there and in looking back that certainly helped prepare me for the Foreign Service. I got credit for five years of Latin. They had a fantastic Latin program and they pushed you to do all that you could manage. The "extra" year of Latin included Livy, Juvenal and Catullus. In French, I had credit for four years of work. We actually had a Christian brother who came down from Quebec to teach our advanced French class in our senior year. Everything was in French. We would go out for walks with him to talk about practical things, cars, houses, gardens, et al. It was a terrific experience. We read French plays and did skits. I remember L'Avare (The Miser) and Le Médecin Malgré Lui (The Doctor In Spite of Himself). The plays were amusing and certainly got our attention. And who could forget Francois Villon once exposed to him. We had an advanced studies history program that was great. It took us beyond the New York Regents' requirements which were formidable, and included regular discussions on current events. Academically we were pushed every day, in language, in social studies, in math and science. There was a writing club for people who wished to develop their skills and a full array of extracurriculars. We had strong athletic programs as well. I ran track. We had an excellent team. We were the track and field champions of New York City when I was a junior. I learned a lot about life from participating in sports; about teamwork and preparation, and how to handle winning and losing. It was a terrific school and I still contribute to them every year. The program has changed in many ways. It is now almost all minority, and it is no longer supported by the archdiocese, but they still have 99.9 percent of their seniors go on to college. They still have 90 percent of their seniors winning scholarships of some kind It is still a very intensive experience for somebody who wants to learn. I was back there for my fiftieth anniversary and what they are doing is stupendous.

*Q: Did you get much while you were in high school, get much in the way of current events, the cold war was big in those days. How did the world appear to you?*

McGUIRE: If you were in the advanced program you got to do all kinds of things. I think it was in American history that we did the whole year curriculum in the first semester to satisfy the Regents' requirement. Then the next semester was all current events. The textbook was Newsweek and Time and the New York Times and there was regular class discussion. Our teacher was a Christian brother. We thought he was ancient; he had a keen interest in the world and he imparted that interest to all of us. It was a great introduction to the issues of the day.

*Q: Well did you find yourself interested in any particular developments in any part of the world?*

McGUIRE: I was always interested in Europe, but I wouldn't say that I started thinking in terms of one particular area. It was more of a broad interest in what was going on in the world.

*Q: Did you find yourself sort of internally challenging some of the stance of the Catholic Church?*

McGUIRE: That would have been later, not in high school. In high school I pretty much went along with what we were being taught. We had religion every day but it was a very short class. I don't ever recall the feeling that we were being indoctrinated (which we were in a sense), but there wasn't a disproportionate focus on religion.

*Q: What about girls?*

McGUIRE: They were around. In primary school I was in the all boys' class, but there was a mixed class and a girls class, so there was plenty of social contact. Bishop Loughlin was a male school, but we had lots of contact with girls from all over the area. There were many opportunities to meet and date young ladies.

*Q: Did you ever run across something called the Foreign Service diplomat?*

McGUIRE: No. The Foreign Service was a secret until much later.

*Q: Then you graduated from high school when?*

McGUIRE: In 1960.

*Q: Did the election of 1960 grab you? I mean John Kennedy running against Nixon.*

McGUIRE: It did for the usual reasons. To most Irish Catholics of course JFK was a hero. His immediate background was different than ours and he had money but

nonetheless here was a young man, a war hero, who was coming from basic roots that we shared. And for Catholics generally, there had never been a Catholic elected president. My mother and other relatives shared stories about discrimination in New York City against Irish-Americans and Catholics during their lifetimes. So there was real enthusiasm for Kennedy. Nixon, of course, was not an endearing candidate. I can't recall getting involved in volunteering to help in the election campaign. Of course I did not have a lot of spare time. Going to school and running track absorbed my time in the winter, and I worked full time every summer from the age of fourteen. I had a variety of interesting jobs, including in a lipstick factory, a cemetery, delivering furniture with UPS, as janitor of the lingerie department at Bonwit Teller on 5th Avenue, and cleaning airplanes at JFK Airport.

*Q: What did you do in the Cemetery?*

McGUIRE: Cut grass and buried people. It paid better than working in the lipstick factory. When I was in college I managed to get a summer job loading and cleaning airplanes. That was big money for a kid and in fact I took a pay cut to come into the Foreign Service. But that is jumping ahead a little bit.

*Q: What did you do in the lipstick factory?*

McGUIRE: I was a shipping clerk. I started there when I was 14, first job I ever had, and I took it seriously. I wasn't there too long and they started giving me other things to do. I was invited to work on weekends which meant time and a half loading trucks and things like that. Then they asked me in addition to help out in the accounting department and I would run up tallies and then present the results to the accountant. Then they started using me to take fairly large amounts of checks into New York to make deposits. So it was an interesting experience and involved exposure to many different kinds of people. Some were migrants, some were people who hadn't had a chance to get a decent education and minorities that I really hadn't had much close contact with. It was a very good growth experience.

*Q: From what you said your brother was doing pretty much the same thing four years ahead of you.*

McGUIRE: Yes, although he never worked in a lipstick factory or cemetery. He ended up working in an Italian restaurant in New York when he was in high school. A neighbor hired him. He deeply respected my brother. He loved the effort he put in and the talent that he had. Many years later, after my brother had long graduated from college and moved away, Mr. Audino asked "How is Frank" every time I saw him.

*Q: Well when it came time to go to college what happened. This would be 1960?*

McGUIRE: I graduated from high school in 1960. We didn't have much in the way of money. My brother was at Holy Cross. He had gotten a scholarship from Union Carbide and a guaranteed summer job and an eventual permanent job. He did very well and loved

Holy Cross. I was torn between staying in New York where most of my friends were going to college, maybe to Manhattan, Fordham or St. John's. But I got into Holy Cross and I received a half scholarship. My mother really urged me to go there despite the fact it would be more of a financial burden on the family. With that encouragement I decided to go to Holy cross.

*Q: So this was '60 to '64.*

McGUIRE: Right.

*Q: What was Holy Cross like in those days?*

McGUIRE: Well it was an all male school with a very strong academic reputation. HC's sports teams were still playing top teams in football, basketball, baseball and track and field. It was a very disciplined place. In fact, there was a bed check every evening our freshman year, I think it was at 11pm.

*Q: So you roomed on campus.*

McGUIRE: Yes, most of us lived on campus. There were some students from Worcester who lived at home. We were required to go to mass every weekday morning my freshman year. But the "in loco parentis" system was to evolve quickly during my time there, and many of the long-standing restrictions were dropped. From my perspective the education was terrific. If you wanted to get a bachelor of arts degree you had to do Latin for two years and a modern language for two years. If you were doing a bachelor of science degree you didn't have to do the Latin but you still had the modern language requirement. It was a very strong liberal arts education. We had some very talented professors in history which is what I decided to focus on. Perhaps the best feature of the education was excellent professors who were very approachable and very interested in the students. And Latin worked for me; it had a very practical application for someone who ended up working in French, Italian and Greek.

*Q: Were all these faculty members in an order?*

McGUIRE: In terms of the History Department I can only think of one Jesuit whom I had in class. The Philosophy and Theology Departments (you had to take courses in both) were largely Jesuit. The English and Math Department were mixed. In science it tended to be lay teachers. I avoided math and economics. This is ironic since I ended up doing advanced math and economics later while in the Foreign Service. I will get to my conversion in that regard. A great experience which had a major impact on my life was doing two courses in political geography with Professor Emeritus Samuel Van Valkenburg, a famous cartographer who had worked all over the world. His courses were inspirational. He taught about the real world, and although I didn't see it at the time, his classes were a great preparation for a Foreign Service career. When I graduated, however, I had in mind a career as a history professor. Which is why I applied for a master's degree program at a several schools I thought I could afford, and ended up choosing

Indiana University. They had a very good History Department and they also had affordable fees. Perhaps the most important aspect of my stay there, however, was meeting my wife Kay. I also met a fellow who was longing to join the Foreign Service.

*Q: Well let's take Holy Cross and Indiana in history. Was there any focus in your history studies?*

McGUIRE: My intent was to focus on European history. But I found myself drawn in a number of different directions. So looking at my Holy Cross undergraduate days and my graduate work at Indiana University I ended up with about a 50-50 mix of American history (including U.S. diplomatic history) and European history with a little bit of the Far East thrown in as well. I found all of my courses fascinating. I am not sure what area I would have chosen had I ever gone on for a doctorate. It was a nice quandary because whether it was the history of the Hapsburg Empire, or Russian studies, the lead up to the U.S. Civil War, or 20th century Germany, I loved it.

*Q: Did you get much of a look at the Middle East?*

McGUIRE: Some, but it was not an area of primary focus for me.

*Q: I was wondering sort of being in the New York area and all with such a large Jewish population there, I would have thought this would have been sort of thrust at you again and again.*

McGUIRE: Well, New York had many different strands in its social make-up. And we are talking about a period just after World War II. It makes me feel old to reflect that I started college just 15 years after the war ended. Questions about the rise of Hitler and Stalin, and the disintegration of order in the Far East were still very much on people's minds, and rightly so. As it turned out my background in history was excellent preparation for my career. I was very fortunate to have first class professors along the way.

*Q: Well speaking of history this was all happening during the '60s and a lot of history was happening in the United States at that time with civil rights and the Vietnam War and general changes included in the Catholic Church. How did all these hit you?*

McGUIRE: Certainly it was a dynamic time. I have to admit to being preoccupied with my own future. As I have pointed out the family did not have much in the way of financial resources. I worked hard to earn money to keep afloat, and I worked hard at school to enhance prospects for a good career. I had part time jobs at school, and frequently worked two jobs simultaneously during the summer vacation. Kay and I met at Indiana University in 1964 and we decided to marry before going to Australia in 1966 on my first assignment. We were gone for three years and American society changed dramatically during that time. It was by far our most difficult return home. Opposition to the war in Vietnam had spread throughout society. And relationships between people had changed. There was an edge to virtually every kind of cross racial transaction in the

Washington area. It was a very difficult time. If you look back at what existed before that time the inequity was terrible; and it was largely accepted as a way of life. I have memories of driving through the south in 1964 it and being exposed for the first time to formal segregation. It was striking in a way that just reading about it couldn't be.

*Q: I remember there was an expression people used to use rather blithely I am free, white, and 21, I can do what I want. But when you break that down into what they are saying isn't it awful.*

McGUIRE: Absolutely. I have tried to bear that in mind during my career, and my life in general. I have been involved in the effort to make the Foreign Service look more like America; we will get into that later.

*Q: How did you feel about the Vietnam War?*

McGUIRE: I started off appreciating the reasons for it. World War II was not far in the past. The triumph of the Red Army in China and the ruthless policies put in place there caused enormous concern. The Korean War was even more recent. The communist regime in North Korea had attempted to take over South Korea through brute force, with the help of Mao Zedong. The struggle in Vietnam seemed similar. Initially I agreed that the U.S. Government needed to do something to support South Vietnam; I think most people did. But the inability over the years to put a conclusion to the destruction, the spread of the war to neighboring countries, the deaths of Vietnamese and Cambodians and Laotians and our own non professional troops from every part of the U.S. became a heavier and heavier weight to bear as time went on. By the late 1960s many young Foreign Service officers joined fellow citizens attending anti-war demonstrations on the Mall. And when I got my call to go to Vietnam on assignment I answered "I may have to resign." My personnel counselor had heard this before and was unimpressed. So I started looking for another job, and found one on Capitol Hill. Before I could act on the offer I was told the Department was winding down the program; I did not have to go. I ended up staying in the Foreign Service. Much later I had the opportunity to study the war at the National War College. I suppose it accomplished a variety of positive things. It did provide a certain bulwark in places like Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore. You could say it helped stave off takeovers in the region by forces that were trying to impose communist regimes. But the cost was huge. At the War College we focused a great deal of time on strategic decision making, the need for clear objectives, the identification of resources to support the attainment of security goals, and the need for a clear exit plan. We did not excel on these items in dealing with Vietnam and we have not always done well on them in subsequent conflicts.

*Q: Well much of what you said I echo. A very difficult time. When did the Foreign Service appear on your radar?*

McGUIRE: When I was in my first semester of graduate school at Indiana University I became very good friends with a fellow student who had decided that he wanted to be a Foreign Service officer. He had served in the Navy, spent some time in Japan, and had

some friends in the Foreign Service. He was so enthusiastic he convinced me to take the written exam. We both took it in Bloomington, Indiana in December, 1964. We both passed the written exam. The following summer I took the oral exam at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations and passed, much to my surprise.

*Q: Do you recall any of the questions?*

McGUIRE: I recall the old exam system well, partially because of a brief assignment to Recruitment in 1969. The Board of Examiners team shared our office space; they were all very experienced officers and a number of them had served as ambassadors. One day they had only two examiners available, so they enlisted me as the third examiner, despite my lack of experience, to avoid cancelling the day's interviews. Apparently I did a credible job because after that they asked me a number of times to sub. The exam was free flow. The examiners had your file, they would ask you questions about your professional experience, your interests, your education, your knowledge of the U.S., and of American culture, including knowledge of minorities. Usually one question was aimed at giving the candidate an opportunity to speak on a topic he or she was familiar with. One question I was asked as a candidate was one you just raised. What kinds of things had I read as a kid and what as an adult? I remember one question in particular that was keyed to my study of Latin, "How did the Romans spread information about the Empire to its far reaches." I talked about roadways and I talked about the way in which the empire was administered and about Roman administrators on the local scene. One examiner kept probing and it seemed that he was disappointed that I had not mentioned coins. They asked, as you did, about my educational experience, why I had chosen history, and some questions about American history. Of course the exam has changed a great deal over the years.

*Q: I was on the board of examiners at one point. It was free flowing. You would know where the person came from and you would look for weak spots and strong spots.*

McGUIRE: In some ways the old system was much better than what is done now.

*Q: It is very arbitrary, very stylized. Maybe to prevent suits.*

McGUIRE: Exactly. At any rate much to my surprise I passed. I had taken the oral as a lark. Passing put things in a totally different perspective. So I started thinking about the Service and reading about it. And I reflected on my not very good financial situation and the fact I was starting to get a little bit tired of school as well.

*Q: You were married weren't you?*

McGUIRE: I wasn't married then, but by that time Kay and I were pretty serious and got more serious the following semester and decided to get married. So she became involved in our research on the Foreign Service. There was a staff member at IU who was a retired FSO. We went to talk to him and he provided some other contacts. We thought this might be something interesting to do for a few years and it would give us the opportunity to

save some money (which showed my naiveté about Foreign Service salaries). So we decided to give it a shot; I indicated that I would be available for appointment right after finishing the work on my master's degree in January, 1966. Lo and behold I got a call during the fall of 1965; I was offered a spot in the entering class of February, 1966. All the medical and security clearances were completed in time for me to take my first ever plane ride, destination Washington.

*Q: Let's go back a minute. What was the background of Kay?*

McGUIRE: She was born in Bloomington, Indiana. Her folks were both educators. Her father was an administrator at one of the high schools in Bloomington and her mother taught first grade. Then her father was offered a job as principal of Warren Township High School in Indianapolis, so when she was 14 they moved there. She had gone to junior college in Denver and then came to IU to finish her degree. She sat in front of me in Modern German History my first semester at IU, and was very bright and very nice. One evening we both went separately to a Norman Thomas lecture. There was a standing room only crowd and I was leaning against a door in the back. Kay opened the door and I fell out. That got things rolling.

*Q: He was a socialist. Probably the only known socialist in American history.*

McGUIRE: Right and I believe he got more votes as a third party candidate than anybody in our history.

*Q: My father voted for him.*

McGUIRE: Is that right? IU had a wonderful speakers program in those days. I am not sure the same kind of thing could be done today. For example, George Wallace had spoken there a few months earlier, when he was still a strong segregationist. Thomas represented views which were regarded by some as controversial, but students came and listened and learned.

*Q: Well you mentioned Bloomington. What did you find out about Bloomington? I am always interested in getting snapshots of different cities and different towns.*

McGUIRE: It was an attractive, comfortable town, once very much associated with limestone quarries. In my time there it was dominated by the university. In those days it had a central square and a lot of shops around it. There was not too much in the way of fancy suburbs although that has changed in more recent years. There is a movie called Breaking Away which captures Bloomington of the 1960s very well.

*Q: Oh I have seen it, sure.*

McGUIRE: It said a lot about Bloomington. The local people were wonderful as far as I was concerned, friendly and nice. But as in most college towns there were sometimes some tensions between town and gown. I remember there was a bar off the usual student

beat we started going to because of the country music. Listening to the music did not lead to trouble but we probably should not have asked any of the girls to dance. After shots were fired we decided to take a break from that particular watering hole. And African American students didn't always feel they were welcomed in some places. But don't get me wrong. I am not trying to put Bloomington down. I got to know the town fairly well. I earned money doing odd jobs off campus and I had a broader exposure than most students because Kay still had family there. I enjoyed my stay there; and Bloomington's shortcomings were American shortcomings of the time. As for IU, the school was terrific. They had an excellent History Department, which of course was my main concern.

*Q: Slavic studies was a big one.*

McGUIRE: Slavic studies was…

*Q: Top grade.*

McGUIRE: Absolutely, and I did some course work in that area. Latin American Studies was strong. The faculty in U.S. and European History was very talented and the professors were very accessible. The music school was first class, as was the journalism program. They had some special science programs like hydrology that were excellent.

*Q: Don't they have a writer's program too?*

McGUIRE: They did in my day and I believe that is still true. In fact one of my classmates from Holy Cross came out to work on a graduate degree at the same time I did and he was very involved in that. He ended up getting a Ph.D. and he stayed in the English Department in Bloomington for his whole career. It was a wonderful place. We went back from time to time because Kay still had family in Indiana.

*Q: What happened to your friend who wanted to go into the Foreign Service?*

McGUIRE: Ed took the oral four times and he didn't get in.

*Q: What do you think the problem was?*

McGUIRE: The exam is tough, the percentage of people passing the oral is low. Ed is a very serious guy and he ended up with a PhD in Chinese studies. He has had a very successful career. So the talent is there. I have no idea why he didn't pass. The one thing that has occurred to me is that he wanted it so badly. Being relaxed for that kind of ordeal is valuable. I lost track of him for 45 years but located him two years ago. He went on to teach Chinese studies at the university level and then got involved in organizing trips to the Far East. He was very interested in my career and where I had gone and what I had done. He is a first class person.

*Q: It is interesting. The selection process is very iffy. They usually keep trying to come up with formulae that do not apply. The one thing I have noticed about the Foreign Service*

*is people go in with a let's give it a try. It is like a fly trap. They never come out. Once you get into it very few people leave.*

McGUIRE: It took me 40 years to retire, and I continued to do projects for State for 10 more.

*Q: I am working on 60 years now.*

McGUIRE: Yes, there is a very low dropout rate. The exam is imperfect and has been changed many times to make it better, or more fair, or to produce results which reflected management decisions on the type of intake they would like to see. There was a terrible period when the examiners could not look at the candidates' background files, so a good test taker might be favored over someone with a proven track record. But whatever the imperfections, over the years I was very impressed by the Foreign Service people I had a chance to work with, serious people, smart people, conscientious people, good communicators, courageous people. That is one of the things that keeps officers in for long careers. You have a chance to work with really good colleagues and be part of a team that is doing important things.

*Q: I know there was a book that came out about the old Foreign Service and the title was "A Pretty Good Club." In a way it is pretty apt; These are very smart people who are dealing with serious problems and they are really a lot of fun to be with.*

McGUIRE: It is interesting you should use that term because my son gave me a fairly recent publication that is about Ambassador Dodd, a college professor who was sent to Berlin during the period just before our entry into World War II.

*Q: Yes, <u>In the Garden of the Beasts</u> by Erik Larson.*

McGUIRE: The author uses the term in a very negative fashion. Of course that was a different Foreign Service, but I thought the author skewed the book in favor of a very naive political appointee who was in way over his head. It is true that there is often some tension between people who come in from the political side and people who are within the system. Ambassador Dodd had very strong feelings that he was looked down upon and not listened to because he was from the outside. A fair reader might conclude that Dodd was just a very poor chief of mission.

*Q: So we are talking about you going into the Foreign Service in 1966.*

McGUIRE: Yes.

*Q: Did you have any preference about where you wanted to go?*

McGUIRE: I did. I had done French language and culture in my studies so I asked for an assignment to a French language post. I asked for nothing other than that. I was told you have to name three countries. So I looked at the bid list they had given us and chose

Belgium, Beirut (where French was still a valuable commodity) or Senegal. Three different continents, three very different societies, so they assigned me to Australia. I had no complaint. And at that point I was not thinking in terms of a career. This was an assignment that would be fun and would enable us to save some money and then go back to university, or at least so we thought.

*Q: You took a basic officer's course, the A-100. What was your class like?*

McGUIRE: Oh, great people. I started from day one impressed with the people in our class, with the officers running the orientation program and with the speakers who came to brief us. I was 23, the second youngest of our class of about 40 new recruits. I think the average age was 27. Several people were well launched on careers and some had PhDs. There were not many women, perhaps eight in the class. There was one person with Hispanic roots but I don't remember any other minority representation. USIA was still a separate agency at that time but their new officers went through the A-100 program with State FSOs. We had about a half dozen USIA officers, all very nice, very capable people. Some of our group had already acquired areas of expertise, either in language, regional knowledge, or substantive specialization. We had one fellow who was an expert in Russian affairs who ended up as DCM (deputy chief of mission) in Moscow later. Another, a bit older than the average, had a strong background in economics and advanced very rapidly. Another had a science background and ended up serving in scientific and environment related positions. There were also a couple of class members from the business/banking world. Most of the 40 stayed for a full career. We had five in the class who went on to serve as ambassadors, and we had many who went on to become deputy chief of mission, consul general, office director, etc. Mary Ryan served as chief of mission and also as assistant secretary for consular affairs.

The class was run by Alex Davitt and Ralph Jones. I don't know if those names mean anything to you. They were very experienced hands, very nice men and very effective in making the experience meaningful for us. It might be appropriate to mention that my son David joined the Service about 30 years after I did. His class had about 70 new officers, half were women and more than 30 percent were minorities.

*Q: What was your job going to Australia?*

McGUIRE: It was a rotational job. In those days the idea was to take new officers and send them overseas for two years, with six months each in the political, economic, consular and administrative sections. Officers were expected in the course of their career to do whatever job was required in whatever area. The term "renaissance man" was commonly heard. So I started in the administrative section and then I moved into the political section. I also was responsible for the small amount of consular work done at post.

*Q: Where were you?*

McGUIRE: We were in Canberra first, at the embassy. After a year I was asked if I wanted to carry the pouch to our consulate in Adelaide, South Australia. We are talking old technology now, but you would understand. Non urgent correspondence from Washington was flown into Canberra in the diplomatic pouch. Material for the constituent posts was rebagged and then delivered by embassy staff. It was a good way to keep in contact with the consulates and the decision makers and issues of those regions. By chance there were some major events the consulate was involved in during my brief visit and I was included. After I returned to Canberra the consul, Tom DeHart, called and asked if I would be interested in transferring to Adelaide to be his vice consul. I would be responsible for the consular and economic/commercial work. It sounded exciting job-wise and we would see another part of Australia. So Kay and I discussed it and then I talked to our deputy chief of mission. Ed Cronk, the DCM, was a great boss, and he always had his eye on the development of his younger staff members. He thought this was a great idea and the re-assignment was done quickly. So we had two very different kinds of experiences in Australia.

In Canberra one of the most interesting things that happened during our year there was a presidential visit. Lyndon Johnson came out not long after we arrived. This was a totally new world for people just out of school. So Kay and I were very excited;. we thought this was wonderful. We were surprised to discover that the veteran FSOs at the embassy (and their families) had a totally different reaction. Our new general services officer was typical. He had just worked on a presidential visit in The Hague and he said it was the worst experience of his professional life. We are going to set up a wonderful program, he said, and advance teams and people in Washington will second guess like crazy and change everything five times. At the end everyone will agree that the program we initially proposed was correct; but no one will give us credit and we will have wasted huge amounts of time. All of this turned out to be right. But it was very exciting being there, being involved in the preparations (Kay was hired temporarily to help out) and actually meeting the president. In later years I was the control officer for two presidential and one vice presidential visit. The presidential visits were to Seoul (President George H.W. Bush) and to Naples (President Clinton at a G-7/8 Summit). Vice President Quayle visited Seoul. There is nothing quite like such events to get the adrenaline going.

Our deputy chief of mission made sure the young officers at post had lots of learning opportunities. I remember him taking me to a press conference that the ambassador was doing. The Australians had bought some F111s, then a state of the art swing wing fighter-bomber. The aircraft developed wing cracks, which drew an enormous amount of media attention. Washington assured that there was nothing fundamentally wrong with the aircraft and they would be repaired quickly. At the press conference the reporters honed in immediately on this topic. Ambassador Clark was a folksy, voluble Texan who always wore a yellow rose in his lapel. It was a half hour press conference. He talked about everything under the sun except the cracks in the F-111. When the press conference was over the DCM said, “What did you think about that?” I said, “I thought it was terrible. He talked about a lot of things but he never engaged on the one question the Australian press was most interested in.” He said, ”Well you are right, he didn’t answer any questions on F-111s, but I want you to think about this a little.” There was nothing in the media the

next day about F-111s and Washington was soon proved right about the quick fix. Clark refused to get drawn out on something that would have gotten a lot of negative press. Instead he provided copy on other topics, and bought some time to allow for a satisfactory solution. I might add that one reason he was able to do this was because the Australians held him in very high esteem. He was a businessman, a friend of Lyndon Johnson. When Clark was appointed in 1964 the Australian, the nation-wide daily, termed him an oil rich buffoon. When he left in 1968 the same paper apologized for the story and said that Clark was the best representative of any country to serve in Australia. People routinely referred to him as Uncle Ed. There was an outpouring of affection for him as his departure date drew near, in news stories, in letters to the editor, and comments on the street to U.S. officials.

*Q: Who was the DCM?*

McGUIRE: Ed Cronk. He has done an oral history for you. He was later ambassador to Singapore. He was also a deputy assistant secretary in the Economic and Business Bureau. Over the years when I ran up against professional problems, a knotty issue or handling a difficult personality, I would asked myself what would Ed do? He was a very talented, very decent man with a great deal of common sense, and he treated everybody with respect. He and his wife did a great deal to foster good morale; they were great examples to follow. Kay and I still see him from time to time.

*Q: Let's go back to Canberra. What was it like. This is fairly early in its blossoming as the capital.*

McGUIRE: It was. There were only 90,000 people there at the time and Lake Burley Griffin, the artificial lake in the center of the city, had been filled only three years before we arrived. We lived in what was regarded as the outer suburbs in Hughes, which is now part of the city center. There were two good restaurants. One had a bar attached. We went to that restaurant soon after arriving. As we approach the door to the restaurant, a side door from the bar opened and a young man walked out with a stein of beer. He walked right in front of us to a car that was parked at the curb. The window rolled down, and his wife or girlfriend reached out, took the mug of beer, rolled the window back up and he went back into the bar. Women, we discovered, weren't allowed in certain bars, and this was one of them.

*Q: Oh yeah, very misogynist.*

McGUIRE: It was very different in many ways from the U.S. In those days people used to say it was 40 years behind the U.S. in terms of conveniences like in central heating and air-conditioning, dishwashers and appliances, and in some social attitudes. But you could not help but love the Australians. We were only in Canberra for a year but it was an easy place to make friends. Canberra was a small but attractive town set in a beautiful area. It was a splendid place to live for newlyweds just starting an adventure. Canberra is located in the very scenic Snowy Mountains, and we explored the region thoroughly. We went skiing in the winter and to the beach in summer. Professionally, it was an invaluable

learning experience; I certainly needed the tutelage. Fortunately I had bosses and more experienced colleagues who pointed me in the right direction. When I went to Adelaide I had a chance to apply what I had learned. In fact, I had more of a challenge than I had expected. Not long after our arrival Tom Dehart, our consul, was asked to fill the consular section chief job in Hong Kong because the incumbent was departing on an emergency basis. Tom was a consular expert with very good Chinese. So there I was: 25 years old, with very little experience, and I had my own post. It was heady stuff. We had access to anyone in South Australia. We were invited to get together informally from time to time with the South Australian premier and his wife (just the four of us), we went to small dinner parties with members of the federal parliament, we knew all the leaders of the state parliament, and saw in the New Year with the political leadership of the state from the town hall balcony, an event hosted by the mayor of Adelaide. We knew prominent business people and university professors and student leaders. Top officials of the state labor movement would invite us out, even took us on a tour of the famous Barossa Valley wineries. One well known labor leader from the steel industry explained to me one day how to organize a successful strike. I don't say this to focus on the social side of things. All of these people were valuable contacts for the U.S. The state prime minister was a good example. He was a dynamic young member of the Labour Party. I think Kay and I really did hit it off with him and his wife on a personal basis; but I think he also wanted to demonstrate that Labour could have close relations with official Americans. This was just 20 years after World War II and Americans were very popular. But it was striking that in the Australian American Association in Adelaide the many political figures in the Association were all conservatives. One Labour Party member of the federal parliament whom we knew well came to see me one day and asked if I would object to his joining the Australian American Association. He said that he did not want to put me in an awkward spot. I encouraged him to join and he did. Others followed. Guests would sometimes remark that we had the only parties in town where the left and right mingled.

*Q: Well the Battle of the Coral Sea for us was a minor little carrier skirmish.*

McGUIRE: I don't think I have ever heard that characterization of the battle. For Australians it was most certainly a very big deal. My main point is that both Kay and I had great contacts and because of that I was able to do a lot of good reporting, reporting on elections, on attitudes towards the U.S., and on identifying emerging political, economic and social leaders. And we had opportunities to discuss American views via speeches, radio and TV appearances, and USIA programs we worked with Canberra to organize. In those days we had very strong outreach programs, a very effective diplomatic tool later undermined by myopic budget cutting. Some of the worst offenders subsequently complained after 9/11 that State had failed to get America's message to the world.

*Q: What was the attitude in Adelaide regarding the Vietnam War? Australia had troops. I remember they had some artillery there.*

McGUIRE: This was the late 1960s. There was growing concern but not many demonstrations in Adelaide. We had one at the consulate not long after Kay and I arrived. The consulate office was small. There were 30 or 40 protestors who crowded into the reception area chanting slogans. They threw a Vietcong flag over our American flag. Tom Dehart had fought at Guadalcanal and other places as a Marine. He calmly walked through the crowd and folded up the flag and captured it. It was the only Viet Cong flag that was taken by U.S. forces in Australia. Tom kept it until he died. I went out and had a couple of beers with the organizers of the demonstration the next day. They were nice young people. We talked about the war and about the U.S.-Australian relationship. There were no more demonstrations at the consulate, but just as at home there was growing concern. When LBJ came out in 1966 there had been a demonstration along his travel route. There were none when he came back a year later to honor Harold Holt, the Australian prime minister who drowned off the coast of Victoria. I suppose you could find some symbolism there; the basic relationship with the U.S. remained rock solid.

*Q: Well part of it was I think, and you can speak to this, although they are part of the British empire, the Brits kind of used the Australian troops badly you might say. You consider the Malaysian campaign and all, the Australian troops performed very well. The Brits weren't the canniest of leaders of colonial troops.*

McGUIRE: The relationship with the United Kingdom (UK) was fast evolving at that time. Australians of British heritage who were planning a trip there would say they were going home, even if their family had been in Australia for generations. ANZAC Day, commemorating the Gallipoli landing in particular but Australia-New Zealand military support of the UK in general, was a major commemorative event. But the British were clearly looking at possibly joining what was then called the European Economic Community (EC). Such a step would have serious economic implications for Australia. It was also clear that the British were putting their own economic interests first and were willing to accept a more distant relationship with Australia and New Zealand. The realization was sobering and caused serious reflection about the future.

*Q: How about with the Aborigines there? What was going on at that point?*

McGUIRE: Attitudes were changing. There were some indigenous Australians who had emerged as public figures. Lionel Rose, the boxer and later a successful business man, was immensely popular. Yvonne Goolagong overcame prejudice to become a world class tennis champion. Both ended up getting a lot of publicity for aborigine rights and more equitable treatment. You didn't have to go far to see the plight of the aboriginals. It was not so evident in the major cities, but in places like Alice Springs the problems were striking. In terms of immigration from abroad there was still a white Australia policy in effect in those days. Some loosening had begun for southern and eastern Europeans, but attitudes on relaxing ethnic and racial immigration restrictions were not very forthcoming. Australia is a different place today. We visited our son and his family in 2014. He is an FSO assigned to the Consulate General in Sydney. There are all kinds of different ethnicities and races represented on the streets. The white Australia we knew is gone. They decided that if they were going to be part of the world and an important

economic entity in an Asian environment they really had to change. Policies on indigenous Australians have also changed. Much has been done to try to address serious problems and an open discussion of the issues exists.

*Q: Did you have any impact in Adelaide of American military on leave in Australia.*

McGUIRE: No, if you were coming out of Vietnam and going on vacation in Australia you didn't need any help. I suspect that the vast majority of servicemen who visited went to Sydney which would have been easier to reach and had a reputation as the liveliest of Australian cities. We had one A-100 classmate who visited us in Adelaide after his tour in Vietnam.

*Q: I know I was consul general in Saigon between '69 and '70 and issued a lot of passports to young men who were going to Australia. It was interesting because the word was the Australian men didn't realize what they had right in front of them. They didn't pay attention to the girls. They were mainly interested in beer and talking about sheep or something. But the American guys they just had a ball.*

McGUIRE: It is hard to imagine not having a good time while on vacation in Australia. While in Adelaide we heard for the first time of the Battle of Brisbane during WWII. That was between the American troops who were stationed there and the Australian men who were not off fighting overseas. The main focus was, we were told, the affections of the Queensland ladies.

*Q: Well did you get good tutelage in political reporting and all?*

McGUIRE: Yes, as I said earlier the DCM was a terrific mentor and the officers in the political section were also committed to training young officers. When we were departing to go back to Washington the then head of the political section told me I had submitted the best reporting from any of the constituent posts. Since two of the four other consulates were large and had experienced officers handling political affairs I was very pleased. Tom Dehart, the consul in Adelaide, for the six months we overlapped also took his responsibility for my development seriously.

*Q: How did your wife like it?*

McGUIRE: She loved it. We were footloose and fancy free. She had the chance to teach in Adelaide and enjoyed that. We had an interesting circle of friends and acquaintances and she had some experiences that were unique. For example in December,1968 Adelaide hosted the Davis Cup final. Arthur Ashe led the American team. Other members included Stan Smith and Bob Lutz. Donald Dell was the non playing manager. So we had the biggest names in American tennis over on Christmas Eve. Kay decided we should do something Christmassy for them and so she organized on her own a buffet dinner. Their appetites were a bit larger than we expected and they also brought some last minute guests with them. Never have we seen a buffet spread disappear so quickly, and the record still stands. (They went on to win the cup.) She proved herself a great hostess, and

repeated that time and again in all our assignments. We traveled far and wide. We put a lot of miles on our VW bug exploring the areas from Sydney to Adelaide and many points in between. We hitched a ride to Tasmania on a military plane that was going down there for a Battle of the Coral Sea celebration. Kay also managed the social side of the first visit to Adelaide of the new ambassador and his wife. What a nerve wracking experience that was. Tom DeHart had departed, so I was responsible for the planning and execution of the visit. It was one of those unusual times when Murphy's law got suspended. Despite my inexperience everything went well. The ambassador met a lot of important South Australians, he had an interesting and informative time. He and his wife had enjoyed their stop. So they asked us to join them on their next leg, to Perth. I explained that I had to issue visas to some people the next day who had made plans to travel to the U.S. right away. He said, "Okay, when I go to the Antarctic I am going to call you and ask you to come with me." We had scientific cooperation agreements with Australia and New Zealand and the ambassador in Canberra always made such a trip in those days. And he delivered on his promise. Can you imagine? The ambassador had invited several prominent Australians along. One was Thomas Keneally. He wrote Schindler's List and a host of other best sellers, a very highly regarded Australian novelist. He and I walked alone from the McMurdo Sound base a mile across the sea-ice to Hut Point which served as Scott's main camp and the one he left from only to die on his trip back from the Pole. Our group flew to the Pole itself and got a look at the scientific installations there. What an experience!

*Q: Well this is probably a good place to stop. We will pick this up the next time when you left Australia. Let's put at the end where did you go?*

McGUIRE: We came back to Washington.

*Q: OK, today is 20 August 2014 with Kevin McGuire, and you have just left the South Pole and are on your way back to the States. When did you go back to the States from this Australian tour?*

McGUIRE: We left Australia in February, 1969, and we made a quick stop in Alice Springs before we went back. We had the unusual experience of seeing it rain. They had had two inches of rain in the previous seven years. Two and a half inches fell the night we arrived. It was an astonishing sight. The barren landscape with reddish hills and empty creek beds changed overnight and a green haze took over the landscape within hours. The Todd River almost overflowed its banks. It had been an absolutely dry creek bed at 4pm; by the time we got up for breakfast it was very close to the top of its 15 foot high banks. Australia is a very beautiful place and has a very different kind of beauty. And so we went back to Washington.

I was going to the Recruitment Office, which is not something I would have chosen. My efficiency report from Adelaide emphasized that I was a good public speaker and that I had worked successfully with university students. The Foreign Service (FS) exam had been suspended due to budget cutbacks and now the Department wanted to start attracting candidates again. There was just one senior level officer and myself and two

staffers in the shop. The rank order register was low and new funding was expected, partially to help fill positions in Vietnam. We had a very hectic couple of months getting everything ready, publicity, speaking tours by mid level officers to campuses, and generally getting word out that the exam would be given again. The effort had interesting aspects. One of my duties was organizing a paid summer program for a group of about 40 interns. Half were top candidates on the rank order register. The Department wanted to keep them interested at a time when there was temporarily no money for intake. The rest were minority prospects, African Americans, Hispanics and some Native Americans. The Department was trying to do some things to improve minority recruitment, but without much success for a variety of reasons we can discuss later. The group was impressive and the reviews from their supervisors were outstanding. One side effect from that program was our pursuit of permission to have interns come in and work for free. The idea was approved and over the years the decision has allowed a huge number of young people to sample the Foreign Service. Once the sign up deadline for the exam was passed (the exam was only offered once a year then), I was switched to other things. I was put in charge of the administrative side of bringing people on board, the central point to ensure that clearances were done on time and medical information was submitted in a timely fashion, and that people were entered in the pipeline correctly so the A-100 course could be organized. I didn't find that particularly interesting, or career enhancing. You may remember that tenuring and coning were being applied for the first time in that period. In order to compete for promotion in the political track one needed experience that was relevant; I had been put in an administrative job. You had a very limited time to get promoted and tenured or you were out. Junior officers in general were up in arms at the sudden change in the rules of the game. We had passed two difficult exams, been screened carefully by medical and security staff, and waited patiently for appointment dates. And now it looked like the Department was putting another set of requirements into effect. Skip Gnehm, Roger Long and I won election as the head of the Junior Foreign Service Officers Club (JFSOC), a group affiliated with the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) specifically on a platform of protesting the new system. We put in a lot of time and effort and won wide spread support from our colleagues but failed to win a cancellation of the new rules or an exemption for those already in the Service. As it turned out the new rules were applied in a way that was much less harsh than we expected.

*Q: Well you mentioned there were some things the State Department was doing in recruiting to get more diversity. How did you see that?*

McGUIRE: State had come under criticism for not doing much to recruit minorities. There were some efforts underway at this time. They were not very successful. Not much had been done in this area earlier. Recruitment efforts had traditionally been restricted to publicizing the exam in one short period before the written exam. Prime targets tended to be international affairs and political science departments at a limited number of universities. The recruitment budget was minuscule. I will talk about this later because I volunteered to go to Howard University as diplomat in residence much later in my career in order to become involved in minority recruitment.

*Q: Did you have any dealings with the way the Foreign Service dealt with minorities that had been recruited once they got into the Foreign Service. My impression was at the time I didn't even know what mentoring was. I look back on that and I realize there are things I should have done that I hadn't done.*

McGUIRE: Who heard of mentoring when we were young officers? You identified some more senior officers you respected and you used them as a sounding board for advice but there was no formal mentoring program. Your question is on target. Establishing a mentoring program was one of the first things I did when I took over as director of the Rangel International Affairs Fellowship Program. Mentors were assigned to help the Rangel scholars get on track for a successful career. But again, this is something I will speak about much later.

*Q: How about women and the Foreign Service at this time?*

McGUIRE: My class had about 40 people, including about seven women. Serious impediments had been removed. Women no longer had to resign if they married. At that time most of the people coming into the Service were white males. But attitudes were beginning to change.

*Q: I recall talking to some people at Howard when I first started this oral history program. They really were down on the Foreign Service. They were talking about a different Foreign Service. They were maybe 20 years behind the time.*

McGUIRE: You are absolutely correct. And some of that feeling still lingered in the late 1990s. Not to dodge the question, but I will get into that in detail when we talk about my two years as Diplomat-in-Residence (DIR) at Howard in 1997-1999, and as director of the Rangel International Affairs Program in 2004-2005.

*Q: What was the Rangel program?*

McGUIRE: Well we will get to that. You don't want me to jump ahead 30 years and ruin the suspense. But I was very much involved in laying the groundwork for the Rangel Program when I was DIR, and then I ran it for a year, and I am still doing selection panels for them. For the moment let me say that the Rangel Program focuses on reaching out to people that otherwise would not have a level playing field for getting into the Foreign Service.

*Q: After this recruiting business what did you do?*

McGUIRE: I talked to my boss in the Recruitment Office, Owen Roberts. I said it had been a good learning experience for me, but I was in an administrative position while competing for a promotion and tenure in the political cone.

*Q: Owen and I were in the same class; class 1 in 1955.*

McGUIRE: His two boys were killed just before I went to work with him.

*Q: What happened?*

McGUIRE: They were in a Volkswagen on a trip to Florida and they had a collision; both of them were killed. They were the only children and he and his wife were absolutely devastated. Owen concurred with my request and my assignment was curtailed by mutual consent. I received an offer right away to go to the Operations Center, the 24/7 nerve center of the Department. It was one of the great learning experiences of my life; you felt like you were in the middle of everything. You monitored traffic from all over the world; you saw almost everything that was going on. This was a period without cell phones and email. If there was a crisis somewhere in the world we were expected to facilitate communications. We prepared summaries for the Secretary and the rest of the 7th Floor twice a day on significant developments. They went to the White House and other agencies as well. We notified bureaus of flash and immediate messages so action officers were aware of urgent problems. The war in Vietnam, of course, was still going on. The Op Center team included a military representative (Mil Rep) and we worked very closely with the Mil Rep to make sure important information from Defense got disseminated quickly.

*Q: You say Mil Rep?*

McGUIRE: Yes, they were usually army colonels. The most exciting part of the job was the exposure to the main foreign policy issues of the day; a random sampling would include things like the breakup of Pakistan, the election of Allende in Chile, the terrorist activities of the PLO and the Tupamaros, and opening doors to China. My favorite Op Center summary item was one done by a colleague entitled "Ping Pong, China Calling."

*Q: The Ping Pong diplomacy dealt with one of the first steps in opening relations with Communist China.*

McGUIRE: Yes. It was fascinating to see from the cable traffic all the things that were going on. After regular State hours you were frequently helping connect people in the field with senior officials on urgent maters, sometimes via secure phones. Obviously we weren't making any decisions but we were making sure that communications actually worked, that the right people had the information they needed to address problems world-wide.

*Q: Well did you feel that getting to the Op Center was a good career move?*

McGUIRE: It was a great opportunity for a junior officer. In later years I helped a number of outstanding young officers who had worked for me to get jobs there. The exposure to major issues, and to senior players at State, is a definite career boost.

*Q: How did your family react to this job because it certainly absorbed your time?*

McGUIRE: I remember asking the Op Center director before I accepted the job about this angle. He said, "We have three shifts a day and you have an eight hour shift. When that eight hours is over you are gone, and the next shift is on duty. You don't take any work home with you. It is not your responsibility to solve issues. Your responsibility is to make sure information gets into the right hands." My recollection is that we worked two days from 8:00am to 4:00pm, and then two days from 4:00pm to 12:00am. Then you had a day off and then you did midnight to 8:00am twice and then you had the equivalent of a weekend. We had a young baby at the time, so I was around a lot during the day. Kay could go out without having to take the baby with her. We got to go all over Washington without the huge crowds that you usually face on a normal weekend. I think if you had older kids it would be a lot more difficult. I had a very interesting time with really impressive colleagues.

*Q: Did you get any feel for the top echelon and who were the top echelon in the State Department at the time?*

McGUIRE: Yes. We dealt regularly with the top people in Secretary Rogers' office, like Ted Eliot and Bob Brewster. Organizationally we were part of the Secretary's office. We had frequent contact with assistant secretaries and deputy assistant secretaries. Our ambassadors overseas called in fairly regularly after hours and sometimes very senior foreign officials or non-governmental organization leaders would call in to contact State leadership after regular hours. Bill Macomber was the head of management. He was quite a personality. We got to know him very well. In career terms, we also got to know country directors and desk officers. Even the desk officers were senior to most of us in the Op Center. We were helpful to them and many of them remembered in later years when we might be bidding on jobs in their areas.

*Q: It went around that Macomber had quite a temper. Did you see that at all?*

McGUIRE: Absolutely. I saw two sides of him. Just one example of his temper, he came in one night and said to me, "Last night the watch officer didn't have the right telephone number for me and I missed a call. I am really pissed off. If someone calls me tonight and you screw up your ass is grass." That is very close to exactly what he said. He asked, "What number am I at tonight?" I was the assistant watch officer and I had the whereabouts folder in front of me. I said you will be at such and such number. He said, "Well don't you forget it," and stormed out. We had a technician who worked with us, and he said, "I hate to tell you this but we were just about to put in this evening's numbers, you gave him the one from last night's list. And by the way it was provided by his office." Macomber was famous for his volatility and what one might call verbal abuse. But I also saw him in a different setting. I referred above to JFSOC and our attempt to engage in a dialog with the Department over the tenure and coning rules put into effect around this time. Junior officers were angry about the abrupt change in the rules of the game. We did not win our attempt to have the new rules abandoned but Macomber actually sat down with us personally and listened to our views. He was more knowledgeable and understanding of our position than we had anticipated. At the end of the process the new rules were applied in a way that avoided the draconian result we

feared. And he treated us with respect, no tantrums, no threats. He seemed genuinely interested in junior officers.

*Q: Nixon was president at this time.*

McGUIRE: Yes.

*Q: And Rogers is Secretary.*

McGUIRE: Right. And Henry Kissinger was the National Security Advisor.

*Q: Did you have recall of any feeling that you might have had or any of your colleagues might have had about our involvement in Vietnam?*

McGUIRE: Yes, there was an informal, high energy group I was invited to join, perhaps a dozen officers, that met once a month to discuss policy issues. Dave Bilchik was the leader. We met at his apartment on Connecticut Avenue. He later left the Service and became the head of an international affairs focused non-governmental organization. The group submitted views confidentially to the Department on Vietnam and other issues. I can't recall whether the Dissent Channel existed at that time, but the idea was the same. The material went to the 7th Floor directly and was not made public. Eventually the group morphed into the Open Forum Panel. The group had a lot of concerns about policy in Vietnam and the area around it and had access to express those views to policy makers. Public opposition to the war had grown enormously by this time, and there were frequent marches. Many young officers participated in demonstrations. This was anonymous, as part of a crowd. I recall that a group of Foreign Service officers sent a petition of protest to the Secretary, I believe it concerned the bombing in Cambodia. It was supposed to be an internal document but it leaked out. There was dismay on the part of the Department's leadership when it got in the newspapers. That was not the intent of people I knew who signed the document. But others went further still. John Marx was a classmate who did a tour in Vietnam and then had a stint in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. He resigned and then published Cult of the CIA with Victor Marchetti, which is highly critical of U.S. foreign policy and policy making.

*Q: Well did the problems in Chile with the overthrow of Allende happen while you were there?*

McGUIRE: No, the election happened. There was great interest in it. As I recall the two candidates from the center/ right both insisted on running so Allende ended up becoming president with just above one third of the vote. The overthrow came after I had left the Op Center.

*Q: Did you find yourself learning quite a bit about the Soviet Union at the time?*

McGUIRE: The Cold War was in full swing; the threat of the Soviet Union was a daily reality for those in our generation. The Soviets had crushed the Prague Spring with tanks

in 1968 so there were no illusions about their intentions in eastern and central Europe. And they used their Cuban clients to stir up trouble in the Americas and the third world. There was a lot of media attention to the relationship and a lot of cable traffic that related to it. On the positive side, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency under Gerald Smith was busy negotiating with the Soviets in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). In a more personal sense, I was assistant watch officer the day of the Simas Kudirka incident. If you remember, Kudirka was a Soviet merchant seaman who tried to defect in U.S. waters, but was turned back over to the Soviets by the Coast Guard vessel Vigilant. Ultimately it turned out that Kudirka had a claim to American citizenship and in the mid 1970s was able to migrate to the U.S. The well publicized case illustrated close to home Soviet brutality and the Coast Guard's need for better training on asylum procedures.

*Q: Then where did you go?*

McGUIRE: I was given an offer I couldn't refuse to go to Vietnam. We have already talked about that so I won't repeat the story. Just before leaving the Op Center I was told I was off the hook. So I was without an assignment. My original plan had been to go into the Foreign Service Institute's (FSI) six month economics training program. I had realized while in Australia that although I had a very good background for a career in foreign affairs I had a void in economics, an area of critical importance in the second half of the 20th century. I had been accepted to the economics course but that was cancelled because of the Vietnam assignment. So I tried to get back in. The course was full, but Personnel came up with a suggestion that I do a temporary job in the Public Affairs Bureau (PA) and then go to study economics. So I became the Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Public Affairs. Now I have always thought in the Foreign Service that the length of the title is inversely proportional to the actual importance of the job. But this would get me back into the economics course. I said, "OK, sold." So I went to a work for Bill Blair. He was the principal deputy assistant secretary in PA. We had an acting assistant secretary named John Richardson. He was assistant secretary for cultural affairs and spent most of his time there. Blair ran the day to day activities of the bureau. The two of them worked well together and once again it was a great learning experience. We had close relations with all the bureaus in the Department. The 7th Floor was interested in what we were doing. The press office in those days was separate from PA. But we had a lot of outreach programs, publications, speakers programs, an intern program, and the Historian's Office, an important element in those days for the release of sensitive information. This was well before the internet and these programs were well done and had a real impact. Again I had exposure to hot issues, but this time from the perspective of dealing with the public. It was fun, and Bill Blair used me as if I was someone far more senior than I was.

After six months in PA I entered the economics program. It was a remarkable experience. John Sprott ran the program and he had pulled together a first class group of FSI staff, university professors and practitioners to teach us macro and micro economics, public finance, international trade, international finance and a host of other subjects. John Harrington got us involved in quantitative analysis, which meant starting with calculus. I

had never really mastered that kind of math, few of us in the class had. John was a gifted teacher. By the end of the course he had us building small econometric models. They promised that after six months we would have the equivalent of a bachelor's degree; they were correct. The program provided a terrific foundation for economic reporting; for understanding and analyzing economic developments in the host country; in my case it also served as good preparation for work in international energy and trade. I agreed since I was the only non economic cone officer in the course to an economics assignment. I ended up being assigned to Athens and had a chance to put all my new learning to use. That is where I first met you, on a Saturday as you were walking with a basket, a relief package, for an American who had been hit by a car. It was inspirational to see a consul general so personally engaged, so committed to the people we serve.

*Q: Well this economic training, did you really use it later?*

McGUIRE: Not to get ahead of myself, but I enjoyed what I did so much in Greece that I decided to switch to the economic cone, and spent the bulk of my career in that area. So I used the training every day for most of my long career. I was the most junior officer in the economic section in Athens. We had a counselor, two FSOs who did commercial work, and a small Greek staff. I was in the economic reporting officer slot and also did some commercial work. I learned a tremendous amount from both Milner Dunn and Dick Benedick, the two economic counselors I worked under there.

*Q: You were in Greece from when to when?*

McGUIRE: We got there in 1973 and left in 1976.

*Q: OK, what was the situation when you got there in '73?*

McGUIRE: Papadopoulos was still in power.

*Q: He was one of the colonels.*

McGUIRE: He was, and Henry Tasca was our ambassador. Things were not going very well for Greece. The colonels had overthrown a democratically elected government in 1967. The king was in exile and ultimately the colonels declared a republic. Papadopoulos and his partners were unpopular at home and abroad. The economy was not doing well; tourism, a major element, was way down. Europeans governments didn't want to hear anything about Greece joining the EC, or about recovery assistance. European tourists refused to travel there.

Most Greeks hoped and prayed that there would be a change, but people did not expect it to come the way it did. In November, 1973 rioting at the Athens Polytechnic University ended with intervention by the army. Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannidis and other army officers overthrew the Papadopoulos government. In mid 1974 they tried to stoke some nationalistic fervor by unleashing EOKA-B, a Greek Cypriot paramilitary organization in Cyprus. The Greek side very quickly got trounced. It wasn't just the Greek Cypriots

against the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Government intervened and sent in forces and crushed the Greek Cypriots. The Green Line still stands dividing the two sides of the island. The improvement in Greek-Turkish relations that had built slowly after World War II was squandered by Ioannidis. Ambassador Tasca had very strong feelings about what was happening and thought the U.S. should intervene to stop the Turkish advance. He decided to challenge Henry Kissinger, who by that time was Secretary of State. Kissinger was against intervention and he was not amused by the Tasca's challenge or by the way he posed it. The ambassador was pulled out of Athens very quickly.

Nothing is simple or straightforward in Greece. Having created a disaster the Ioannidis government finally did something right. They decided on a return to democratic rule. They invited Konstantinos Karamanlis, a highly respected political figure in exile in France, back to set up an interim government. Kay and I and our two small sons were eating in Costas, a very popular open air restaurant north of the city center. The first public announcement was a Greek TV news flash, Karamanlis was about to arrive. So we quickly finished our dinner and drove downtown. You couldn't imagine the scene. There were people hanging from every balcony with Greek flags. The traffic was backed up for miles, barely moving in the direction of the center. Nobody cared. Everybody was waving and screaming, people were handing out little Greek flags on the street. The atmosphere was electric. Karamanlis did arrive and he did set up a democratic system. Greece has continued to have its problems with good governance but democracy continues to muddle along.

*Q: Well let's talk about again you had a look at the economy at that time. What was going on? Greece never struck me as being a powerhouse in the economic world. It is a small country, but it also didn't seem to use whatever it had in very efficient form.*

McGUIRE: One of the big things they missed out on during the years of the junta was tourism. The potential for foreign exchange earnings and job creation were fantastic. There were a lot of empty hotels and empty tourist sites. People just weren't coming. That all changed after the restoration of democracy. If you went to Crete in 1973 or early 1974 there was no one around. You had your pick of the best hotels and prices were very reasonable. By the time we left in 1976 Greece was filling up. Germans, Scandinavians and western Europeans in general were everywhere, and American tourism had picked up as well. Transport sector revenues, for example airline and tour ship revenues, were way up. That helped stimulate the economy. They had magnesite and some other minerals that earned foreign exchange. One of the big changes was the prospect of greater market access for them in the EC. The French in particular wanted to help Greece economically, in part because of France's interest in a strong EC agricultural program. The Greeks had in the beginning of our stay a lot of surplus fruit and seasonal agricultural products. They would end up sending a lot of that production to Eastern Europe under a barter system. What they got in return was shoddy commercial products from behind the Iron Curtain. The re-establishment of democracy meant they suddenly had much greater access to the Common Market; they rapidly got association status which enabled them to receive development funds. Of course eventually they were granted membership in what is now the European Union. The economic situation for the people improved markedly over

time. Unfortunately the Greek government never really came to grips with matching revenue to expenditure, or to making structural reforms essential to a truly strong economy. That is something they continue to battle with.

*Q: Were you at all watching a slippage you might say caving in to union pressures to boost wages commensurate with the trade balance?*

McGUIRE: I don't recall that trade unionists had much influence during the junta. Karamanlis came back in mid 1974 and we left in 1976. I wouldn't say that there were excessive demands on the economy from unions at that point. I think it was after the rise of Andreas Papandreou, a flat out demagogue, that Greece went seriously off course.

*Q: Did you find yourself looking at any particular sector? I mean did you have sectors?*

McGUIRE: I assume you are talking about commercial areas. Most of the commercial work was handled by the two officers who had primary responsibility for that side of the house. But I did have some sectoral commercial responsibilities. I handled the mining and power sectors. We worked with the Export Import Bank (Exim) and I was the liaison point at the embassy for that. The politicians who are opposing Exim right now have no idea about how the international trading system really works. In Greece Exim financing helped sell big ticket item mining equipment and commercial aircraft. The interest rate savings to the customer offset concessional financing from competing suppliers. At the end of the day there is no cost to the American taxpayer; Exim actually makes money. In a theoretical world such programs would not be necessary. But until all nations abandon concessional funding programs it makes no sense for the U.S. to unilaterally drop ours. If your question refers to economic reporting, however, I was responsible for the embassy's overall program. I did reporting on macroeconomic issues, GNP and balance of payments developments, and on the general climate for American companies thinking of doing business in Greece. I prepared a quarterly unclassified report that was shared with the American business community in Athens and in the U.S. by the Commerce Department. I should mention somewhere, so it is clear to your readers, that we were working in an environment that included some serious anti- Americanism. For example, I don't remember if you were still in Athens when….

*Q: I left just before the CIA chief was killed.*

McGUIRE: You read my mind.

*Q: We had a bomb go off, a fairly small bomb, go off in our car.*

McGUIRE: And there were other Americans, particularly from the U.S. Air Force facility next to the airport, who found explosive devices under their cars. Kay and I were always careful. Our security officers instructed us to always look underneath our cars. Some Greeks blamed us for all of Greece's problems. There was a marvelous book, Rainbow on the Rocks, by British journalist David Holden about Greek politics and Greek society

and how the Greeks were a terrific people but it was not part of their makeup to admit that they were responsible for anything negative.

*Q: You know the difference between Italy where I served later and Greece, the Italians would say boy we screwed up and the Greeks would say you caused this problem. Britain had been the problem maker prior to the United States took over the role.*

McGUIRE: Yes, that is absolutely accurate. So we were held responsible by many Greeks for the 1974 Cyprus crisis, which the Greeks and Greek Cypriots in truth brought on themselves. It defied rationality, but nonetheless there it was. So embassy personnel faced a strange social situation. I think basically the Greeks rather liked Americans. I remember a cab ride one Friday night. We lived in Chalandri, a wonderful but not very fashionable neighborhood north of the center. I got into the cab, and provided my address. For some reason I spoke Greek with a German accent which has always mystified me because I don't speak German. The cab driver said in Greek as they always did, "Oh, you must be German." I said, "No." I was tired and didn't want a tense ride home. "Then you must be English." "No." So finally he said, "Well, what are you?" I said, "Americanos." Two stop lights later he said in Greek, "Kissinger is a bastard." I said, "Well I can't disagree with you on that." That changed the whole tenor of the conversation. By the time we got to our house he invited the whole family to their little country place that weekend for their first wine tasting of the season. It always struck me as odd that this could happen.

And there were demonstrations. I was the duty officer one night when one of the first demonstrations was forming. The new ambassador called and said, "How would you feel about going down to the embassy so we have an officer down there." I said, "I was the demonstrations officer at State when I was in Public Affairs so I guess I can do that." I thought to myself a second later what am I saying. I went downtown and walked through the gathering crowd. In those days I had very dark hair and was taller than the average Greek but not by much. I was slender and had a dark five o'clock shadow and spoke Greek well. Nobody paid any attention to me. I made a quick rush to the door when I got to the embassy. Later the demonstrations got nastier, during one the consular section was torched. I remember one Saturday when Kay had driven downtown. A demonstration had broken out nearby and there had been no warning about it. She got back safely but it was a very scary experience, especially since our cars displayed plates clearly identifying us as American diplomats. In December 1975 Richard Welch, the CIA station chief, was assassinated by a Marxist terrorist organization outside his home. To show the other side of Greece, the day after the murder a number of our Chalandri neighbors, whom we knew well, waited for me to come home from work and asked to talk to us. They said that they wanted us to know how terrible they felt about the killing and that we should seek help from anyone of them if we ever had security concerns.

Notwithstanding security concerns, the embassy's relationship with the Karamanlis government was very positive. As a moderate committed to restoring democracy, stimulating economic growth and providing stability he had a strong incentive to cooperate with the U.S. and with the European Community. One of the most interesting

things I did in Greece was to work on a U.S. balance of payments support package for the new government. It was designed to help Karamanlis with his economic plans and also as a sign of political support for his efforts. I don't recall the exact sum, perhaps $100 million which in those days was actually money. It was a terrific experience. I did all the leg work on it and got to know the U.S. officials at Defense who were actually providing the money, the people at State who were engaged on the political side of it and then a number of senior Greek officials as we organized details. Our economic counselor was Dick Benedick at this time. I had fully expected him to step in when the final negotiations started in Athens and to take over. He came to the first round of talks and I was the one actually discussing the issues with our Greek counterparts. I knew the subject matter well. When we left he said, "You are on top of this. You can do it. If you need any help I am here, but you run with it." So I did. It was one of the things that convinced me that I should stay on the economic side of the house. So when the time came to bid I requested a year at Harvard to do graduate level economics. At the end of the day personnel offered me the head of the political section at the embassy in Cyprus or to go to Harvard for a year. It didn't take a second to decide.

I should say a word about language as well. Greek is a difficult language and usually the FSI course lasted eight months. I had four months available between jobs. Personnel said that since I was not going to a language designated position and there were no other students for the class they would not fund a tutorial for me. Soon after I received a call reversing the decision. The Army had decided to send a staff sergeant out to the military attaché office in Athens so Defense would pay for four months of language training for him, thus I could join the class. The sergeant quit after a few days. As a result, I had a four month tutorial paid for by Defense. That was a good outcome for me but what a terrible policy. State did not have money to train an important part of the diplomatic staff but the military had money to burn on someone who would never use Greek. The course was excellent and put me in a position to do very well once on the ground. I don't know if you remember Ismini. She taught Greek at the embassy; she was the best language teacher I ever had. I did Greek religiously, three days a week for an hour with regular study at home. I made absolutely sure I got to those classes. By the time I was there for a year I was speaking well and with confidence, and ultimately I was very comfortable in it for use with Greek officials. In Greece in those days very few people spoke English, especially outside Athens. We travelled widely and the people invariably responded very favorably to foreigners who took the trouble to learn their language.

*Q: What was your impression of the influence of the shipping owners? Onassis and Latsis and there were others. But as a class did they play a positive role or a negative role or what?*

McGUIRE: Obviously they were a very powerful group, within Greece and internationally. They certainly played a very important role in the Greek economy. They were not above dealing with the colonels. For that matter they also dealt with governments before and after the colonels.

*Q: Was Tom Pappas still around?*

McGUIRE: He was.

*Q: He was in petroleum.*

McGUIRE: Yes, Esso Pappas. He was a Greek American and had close ties to the Nixon White House. He reportedly had dealings with the colonels.

*Q: What about Turkey? Wouldn't Turkey be a natural trading partner with Greece? Was this completely cut off? What was happening with Turkish Greek relations in the economic sense?*

McGUIRE: I can remember in my first year in Greece many Greeks talked about rapprochement with Turkey. The old days were gone, they said. Turkey was a NATO partner, the Turkish Government was also interested in economic development. The real threat to Greece's security, people said, was from the communist bloc countries just north of Greece and from the Soviet Union. But that all changed when Cyprus exploded. The relationship with Turkey nose dived. Both countries mobilized and they almost went to war. Even the very balanced, very internationally savvy Xenophon Zolotas, the chairman of the central bank, commented that Greeks were prepared to die to the last boy.

*Q: I mean of all the people they thought to be their leader in Cyprus, Nikos Samson, was sort of an amateur assassin. You know I attended a 25 years after or 20 years after the 1974 Cyprus crisis. It was a Greek American event. Person after person got up and made speeches and not one mentioned the Greeks started the whole damn thing.*

McGUIRE: They just refused any responsibility. They probably did not mention the assassination of our ambassador in Nicosia either.

*Q: It was just incredible.*

McGUIRE: The tensions were tremendous. We had scheduled a Christmas trip to visit some American friends in Istanbul. This was just after Dick Welsh was assassinated. As we got close to the Greek-Turkish border in Thrace we discovered we were being followed. It was scary. We weren't sure whether these were people bent on more assassinations of American officials. We had our red diplomatic license plates so everybody could see we were from the American Embassy. We finally stopped in Alexandroupoli next to a policeman. By this time I was sure it was Greek security. I went back and said in Greek, "What is this all about?" They were four guys in polyester looking sheepish. They said they were there for our protection. So I said, "If you are protecting us why don't you go ahead of us." Well they weren't interested in that; in reality they were making sure that their American friends weren't spying on their military preparations. They followed us to the Evros River. You could see the tanks on both sides of the border. There had been demonstrations in Athens. There were demonstrations in Istanbul as well and I would swear that some of the same pictures of atrocities in Cyprus were used on both sides of the border.

*Q: Later in Yugoslavia this was a common occurrence. Croats and Serbs you know.*

McGUIRE: That was the mentality for the latter part of our tour. The Turks, of course, refused to withdraw from northern Cyprus. They are still there and they have paid a price with respect to economic relations with the European Union. It was tragic because both countries would have benefitted from focusing on cooperation and on development opportunities for their people. And that went down the tubes because the Greek military decided to drum up support by fomenting strife in Cyprus.

*Q: OK, well I think this is probably a good place to stop. We will pick this up the next time when you didn't go to Harvard but went to Cyprus.*

McGUIRE: No, I went to Harvard.

*Q: So we will pick this up when you go to Harvard. This is what year.*

McGUIRE: It was one year. I was there in 1976-1977, for the academic year.

*Q: OK, Today is 4 September 2014 with Kevin McGuire. Kevin, we have you off to Harvard for a year, 1976 was it?*

McGUIRE: I would like to backtrack for an instant, Stu. Most people who read this kind of rambling monologue are not going to have Foreign Service experience, and might well ask the question what was so important about having American diplomats in Greece at that time. I wanted to add that the reference points for this and every assignment I had were the very real interests of the United States; I am sure you could say the same thing. The mid 1970s were a time of great uncertainty. The Cold War was raging; the USSR was well armed and aggressive. There was serious concern about the viability of the southern tier of NATO. How would Greece evolve? And how might that evolution impact on other European allies like Italy and France, which were experiencing their own serious political problems. The junta had introduced a whole new range of complications. During my time in Athens the embassy's most important accomplishment was working with the Karamanlis government to get Greece pointed in the right direction, in political and economic terms. The effort was largely successful both in terms of Greece (although they continue to have their problems) and larger security interests. And we did this at a time when the threat from terrorists was real and close by. We don't always share thoughts like that with the public.

*Q: No, but I think it is important because there is a tendency when we talk about it or other people talk about it you talk about what the living is like and where is the vacation spot and when you are working; you are working.*

McGUIRE: And working hard.

*Q: Kevin, this might be a good place. We were talking off mic before, could you talk a little bit about the role of spouses in at least the old Foreign Service which was changing by the time you were coming in, but how did you see the contribution they were making?*

McGUIRE: Just fantastic. My wife was a real partner in this career. Despite the fact we had young children in Athens and she had her hands full with them, she found time to organize frequent representational events. Our guests were Greek officials, business people, economists and others who might be helpful to me in my job. Inviting host country nationals to your home really breaks down barriers and helps develop closer relationships. Information is easier to get and problems are usually easier to solve. This is critical to what we do in the Foreign Service. I will backtrack just a moment. In Australia the last half of our tour was in Adelaide, and for most of that time I was the only officer at post. We had many events at our house. We had a very meager representation allowance, but Kay made it go far because of her own hard work. This was a major reason that we got to know so many key people there, in virtually every important sector. In those days people spoke of Australian rules for social events, i.e. women in one area, men in another. Kay was quickly made an honorary gent and would come home after social functions with valuable insights on changes in political strategies and upcoming business opportunities. She also taught part time at a South Australian school, which afforded a different type of interaction. As I say it was a partnership and it remained that way through my whole career. I think that slowly but surely over the years that ceased to be the way the Service operated. I think spouses play much less of a role now. And that is great loss.

*Q: It is a different world, but no it is absolutely true, and not much credit is given. In a way the whole thing was sort of thrown out for something called equal rights. I think the baby was lost with the bath water.*

McGUIRE: Yes I would agree.

*Q: All right, we are off to Harvard. How did Harvard strike you? Did you have any contact with it before? Now obviously you did, but how did it strike you compared to what you had heard about, and let's talk about what you were up to.*

McGUIRE: Well I had an M.A. from Indiana University in history, so graduate school wasn't anything new. I was familiar with Harvard, who isn't, partially because I had gotten my undergraduate degree in Massachusetts. I was well aware of Harvard's reputation. Near the end of my tour in Athens I was offered either Harvard to do a year of graduate economics, or Cyprus as the political counselor there, which would have continued my association with that part of the world. I enjoyed my economic assignment in Athens very much. So Kay and I decided that we would head off to Harvard for a year. It meant switching permanently to the economics cone, but that was fine. My program was entirely economics although the degree is a Master's in Public Administration (MPA). That is the way the Kennedy School handled people in their special mid career program. One difference about going back to graduate school with a decade of Foreign Service experience was that the professors were very interested in us. There was a small

group of economic officers there from State. To give you a specific example of the reception we got, two of us approached a professor who was an expert on the politics of international energy. We said we wanted to do a program with him in this area but no course was being offered that semester. He was delighted; he set up a program just for the two of us. We did readings on everything from the Canadian tar sands to pipeline development to coal slurry. It was a great course and it turned out to be incredibly useful to me when I ended up a little bit later in the energy office at State. I did public finance with Professor Richard Musgrave, one of the pre eminent public finance experts in the world. In fact when he wasn't in class he was advising governments on how to revise their public finance systems.

*Q: Speaking of public finance did you get any discussion or readings about Greece? I mean the thing that struck me about Greece at the time was there was tremendous avoidance of taxes, avoiding responsibility of any sort.*

McGUIRE: No, in that course there was nothing that involved Greece. It was not so much country specific as general principles. However I did international finance with Richard Caves, a terrific lecturer. I did a paper on my experiences in Greece that had to do with exchange rates. We had a long discussion about the paper. So there was some practical flow from my experience in Greece to my academic year at Harvard. I had a very good course in applied micro economics. Now most people fall asleep just at the mention of the label micro economics. But this was applied and again this was by a professor who was half in the academic world and half in the nitty-gritty world of international economics. He was in the process of doing an analysis for the Singapore government on how to control traffic flows and derive greater revenue while reducing congestion in the city and addressing environmental issues. We looked at externalities, not just narrow cost and return of projects but other considerations like the environment. It was fascinating and again something that was highly useful to me in the course of my career. That was also true of the development course I took; it was very useful to me in my assignments to Africa and to my UN related job. We had a program on economy in society that had some very well known professors addressing us. It looked at the importance of economics to every aspect of society. It too proved very useful to me over the years.

*Q: What was the student body like and how did they fit into the system?*

McGUIRE: Probably the most impressive thing about Harvard was the quality of the student body. The professors were great and the facilities were too. The students were all super bright and committed to learning. You almost learned more from the students than you did from the professors because the discussion in the lecture room and outside it was at such an elevated level. And yet the atmosphere was friendly and cooperative.

*Q: Did they use sort of the case method or one always thinks of the movie the paper chase and all that. Was there some of that type of case studies?*

McGUIRE: In the micro class I was talking about yes. The other classes I mentioned above, international finance and public finance, etc. there was none of that. A class on the Soviet economy was a lecture course, but in a sense was a gigantic case study of the Soviet economy and its problems.

*Q: It is a little hard for somebody in our time to think back where there are a significant number of people who cultivated mainly the Soviet Union and its allies were on the right road to peace, happiness and all that. I never felt that way but there was a body of knowledgeable people who thought maybe they have got something there.*

McGUIRE I ended up later getting a fair exposure to the developing world. Many African countries, for example, managed to forfeit a generation of opportunities and development by opting for eastern bloc approaches to development. It turned out to be as disastrous there as it did in the Soviet Union and in China. I have some examples in fact to talk about as we move forward. You are right, it is hard to imagine that so many willingly followed the Soviet example.

*Q: Did you sense a political bias or leaning or anything that dealt with economic policy of the day.*

McGUIRE: A political bias, no. Harvard was very open. Our fellow graduate students were mature and already had a solid academic foundation. They were not good targets for propaganda. Many professors had experience in government, some with Republican administrations and some with Democratic. Marty Feldstein was a good example. He had a conservative bent and became one of Reagan's economic gurus. Students lined up to get into his classes not because he argued politics but because he was a brilliant economist, and a thought provoking teacher. John Rawls was a good example on the other side of the political fence; he was an equally brilliant social philosopher. You ask if anything dealt with the economic policy of the day. All of my classes had relevance to economic policy making, but not in the sense that judgments were being given on a partisan basis. After class the intellectual experience continued. There seemed to be an infinite menu of speakers and discussions. Our micro professor, for example, hosted visits by Canadian policy makers and he was always happy to have an FSO in the room. Kay audited a class on African American Literature from a Marxist lecturer, and he was always an interesting person to argue with over dinner or drinks. You could go to intellectually stimulating events every evening if you wished.

*Q: How did you and your wife find life there?*

McGUIRE: One of the negative things about the Foreign Service is the physical process of moving. In this case we had to find a place on short notice, and deal with all the packing and unpacking. Kay got stuck with the brunt of that. We had a wonderful time at Harvard but a one year assignment, particularly when you have two young kids, is really disruptive. With respect to the children, you have to yank them out of one school, put them in another and hope their psyches are not damaged too much by having to leave their new friends after just a year. So that aspect of it was not so good. We had family in

the area and that was a big bonus. Boston was an interesting and pleasant place to live, although we were surprised by less than enlightened views on racial issues by part of the population. The winter was a challenge.

*Q: What were you angling for; what were your dealings with Personnel?*

McGUIRE: At this point I wanted a solid mid level economic job. When the assignments list came out one possibility that appealed was Dublin. That is a very pleasant post, and the competition for it is usually heavy. It was the kind of place the family could enjoy. And from a professional point of view it would put me in charge of a small but busy economic-commercial section. Much to my surprise it worked out. So we went from Boston to Dublin. Kay and I both had family roots in Ireland, although Kay's were more tenuous than mine. I was interested in experiencing a society from which both my father and mother's families had come many years before. It was very different from what I had expected, but very pleasant. I am not sure there was any place where we made more friends than in Dublin. Language was no doubt a factor. We arrived there on 7/7/77 which just had to be auspicious. We met Ambassador William Shannon and his wife Liz right after we arrived. Shannon was a journalist from Massachusetts. From day one through the whole of our tour we found the Shannons to be terrific people, and he was for me very easy to work with. The Shannons did a lot of representational entertaining, and they included relevant staff in such events. Whenever they did anything that involved the economic side of the house, Kay and I were included. That was a terrific help in meeting very senior Irish officials, which helped me to do my job. And fun as well.

*Q: You were in Dublin from '77 to when?*

McGUIRE: 1980. It was a busy time for me. For Kay too. In addition to caring for the kids, keeping the house running, seeing the country, and handling our own representational events she was president of the Irish-American Women's Association. She organized a lot of very useful events for the American community in Dublin on Ireland, its culture, history and politics. It was good two way people to people diplomacy. She got to know many prominent women and through that effort I got to meet many good contacts, both female and male, who were useful in my work. The Irish appreciated visitors who took their country seriously and we earned a spot on the good list.

*Q: Were things changing woman wise in Ireland as far as politics and all that?*

McGUIRE: Yes, they were, but slowly. Women were becoming more prominent in politics, in government service, in university circles and in the business community. I can remember an evening at the Shannons up in the Park. (The ambassador's residence is in Phoenix Park, along with the residences of the Irish president and the papal nuncio. Liz Shannon wrote Up In The Park about their experiences). The guest list had the usual array of ministers, intellectuals and community leaders. The women took over the conversation and turned it to this topic. Both the Irish and American males around the table took a bashing.

*Q: What was happening economically in Ireland? It has always been considered a pretty backward state.*

McGUIRE: At that time Ireland was known as the European locomotive. Now this was said in fun by many within the EC as it was then known. The decision by the Irish Government to join the European Community had a very positive influence on economic development. One of the things it did was to provide support to the Irish agricultural sector. Of course, the French and the Germans have regarded as sacrosanct over the years the EC's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The U.S. has been reminded of this every time we have tried to work on international trade liberalization. The Irish were benefiting from the CAP enormously. The rural segment of the community had a major income boost. The rising income in rural Ireland increased consumer demand throughout the Irish economy. And overseas companies began to see opportunities to produce goods in low labor cost Ireland and sell them in more affluent EC partners. So at that point in time Ireland's GDP growth rate was impressive. They had gone from being an economic backwater to a country where incomes were going up, and unemployment was down to levels that hadn't been seen in generations. Emigration from Ireland that has played such an enormous role in Irish history, and in the U.S. and in Australia and other places stopped. In fact people who had migrated were starting to return. That is how well the economy was doing.

American companies were getting interested in investing in Ireland. It wasn't an interest in sending production activities offshore in general. It was an interest in getting into the EC market by producing in a low cost member state. We helped many U.S. companies who came in and wanted to know where to get information and whom to talk to to set up an enterprise. This meant working closely with American banks located in Dublin. We were also involved in a variety of sales promotions for U.S. products. One of the very first things I was involved in was an in store promotion. I don't know if you remember the concept. They used to be done fairly frequently. We had an agreement with Clerys Department store. Clerys was the most important department store in Ireland. Clerys had agreed to do a promotion of American products. Container loads of furniture and women's apparel and a wide range of other consumer items arrived from the U.S. We contributed public affairs support for the promotion, including a moon rock exhibit. In those days (1977) that was hot stuff. The event went very well and it helped us in terms of organizing other kinds of opportunities for American suppliers.

Civil aviation was another important area for us. In those days you may recall that U.S. airlines wanted deregulated trade, or at least a more equal playing field. They had some very good reasons. Government airlines like Aer Lingus had access to major U.S. airports but American carriers faced serious restrictions in Europe. Aer Lingus was allowed to fly into New York, the one approved U.S. carrier to Ireland only to Shannon, not Dublin. And government airlines in those days were usually heavily subsidized. All over Europe that was the case and American carriers were disadvantaged. This was a contentious issue in our bilateral economic relationship. We did not prevail and the battle for a more equitable arrangement continued long after my departure.

*Q: Did you get involved in farm issues? The EC was seen as putting great emphasis on French and German views in this area. Did we use Ireland as a point for pushing liberalization?*

McGUIRE: In a sense. One of the most interesting things during our time there was the conclusion of the Tokyo Round international trade negotiations. The negotiations began in 1973. By the time we reached Dublin it was clear that agriculture was going to be one of the main difficulties in dealing with our closest allies. Agreement was slowly emerging on manufactured goods, on tariff levels and other kinds of trade restrictions like standards. But the Germans and French, in particular, showed little interest in changing the EC's Common Agricultural Policy. There were economic considerations and political and security reasons as well for their stand. The Cold War was a reality and political stability in Western Europe was a high priority on both sides of the Atlantic. And the Irish, who had recently started deriving great benefits from the Common Agricultural Policy, were very much inclined to agree with the Germans and French. To go back to your question, in the EC in those days each member took a six month stint in the EC Presidency. The Irish assumed that position just as the Round was reaching its conclusion. There was a huge surge in activity as offers and counter offers flew back and forth. Much of the work continued to be focused in Geneva and Brussels but the Irish were drawn into this because of the presidency role, and so were we at the embassy. So rather than just dealing with the Irish on a bilateral basis we were suddenly playing a broader role as a conduit for exchanges with the EC. We made frequent demarches urging progress on agricultural liberalization. There were some gains made in the negotiations. The U.S. got some concessions on beef and other items, but not the kind of broad agreement to slash agricultural subsidies that the U.S. had hoped for. Some of the Europeans could have competed very well internationally without the heavy subsidies. And everyone would have benefitted from significant reductions in government expenditures in this area, the U.S., the Europeans and the developing world as well. The overall results of the Round were very positive and very much in U.S. interests. But an opportunity to do even more was missed because of the EC position on agriculture.

That was a very busy time for us. We handled a tremendous volume of work. Just as the Irish Government was tiny, so was our embassy. I seemed to spend half of my long days at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs delivering demarches on the very wide range of economic issues in the U.S.-EC relationship. I spent the other half reporting responses back to Washington. The Tokyo Round was only one of the issues we dealt with during the presidency period. The Irish handled the role in an impressive fashion. They are a small country and have a very small foreign ministry and finance ministry. They did a terrific job in part because of the exceptional quality of their diplomats; first rate people, people like Patrick O'Connor, later to be an ambassador several times. I should mention that Ireland's entry into the EC had real potential for contributing to a solution to the tensions between the north and the south. We were there during a period that was relatively quiet until the end of our stay. But it was scary going through Northern Ireland where we didn't have diplomatic status. We were just there as tourists. In Belfast and Derry the religious divide (some say tribal divide) was readily apparent. The famous sign painted on the remnants of an apartment building "You are now entering Free Derry"

reflected the sympathies of the Catholics living in that area. If you went along Shankill Road there were all kinds of signs up about no popery here and references painted on the walls of houses to Old Red Sox, a term used by Ian Paisley, an evangelical minister who symbolized complete opposition to a political reunification of the island.

*Q: Oh yes I know who you mean.*

McGUIRE: Old Red Sox. Paisley was talking about the pope. It was straight out of the 1600s. There was an unhealthy stew of communal hatred, economic stagnation and political impasse about the future in the North that troubled British leaders and posed a threat to internal stability. U.S. policymakers were concerned for a variety of reasons.

*Q: Did you feel later when the sister of President Kennedy, Jean Kennedy Smith, got there she sort of adopted the so called Irish cause of the lost four counties or six counties.*

McGUIRE: There are four historic provinces in Ireland. Ulster is regarded in the South as the lost province. You are correct in saying six counties. I really can't comment on Ambassador Smith since I had no contact with her or her staff during her tenure. I would note that she took a lot of criticism for advocating for a visa to the U.S. for Gerry Adams of Sinn Fein. In retrospect that contributed to a cease fire and ultimately to great progress on political cooperation in the North between Catholics and Protestants.

*Q: Did Bill Shannon fall into this trap or was he able to keep the embassy neutral?*

McGUIRE: In terms of the daily operations of the embassy he focused on his role as ambassador in Dublin, and of course Northern Ireland was part of the United Kingdom not Ireland. I can't recall any public statements which put him cross wise to official U.S. policy while I was there. There is no question that he was very interested in the problems of the North. He engaged in discussions with a lot of people he thought might contribute to an improvement in the situation, for example, John Hume who was the founder of the Social Democratic and Labour Party in the North and later was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. I had a close professional relationship with Shannon, but it revolved around the economic and commercial activities of the embassy, so I won't pretend that I had a close read on his views in other areas. But I think it is safe to say that he would have liked to see a more direct involvement by the U.S. in trying to find ways to end the violence. He had died by the time President Clinton tasked Senator George Mitchell with assisting Northern leaders to find a way out, and before Clinton's visit to Belfast and declaring that terrorists were "yesterday's men." I believe Shannon would have been very pleased.

As a side note, I have always thought that good economies solve a lot of political and social problems. Ireland is a good example of this; membership in the European Union has meant economic progress in both the North and South, and economic cooperation has brought benefits to both. People are getting on with their lives, and there is hope that will continue and will lead to a total end to the craziness that has gripped the island for centuries.

*Q: Did you have any personal experience with the craziness? I mean one way or another.*

McGUIRE: We didn't witness any violence directly, but when we went to Northern Ireland, I remember we were in Derry and we were driving our car which had Irish diplomatic plates. Kay was sitting next to me, and we had the two boys in the back. A lorry turned the corner right in front of us and it had six or seven British tommies in the back. They had their heavy weaponry up pointed right at our windshield. They couldn't have cared less if we were a family in a car with diplomatic plates. They were just aiming those weapons right at us. We slowed down, but they stayed in front of us for ten blocks and then they turned off. There were security gates everywhere in the center of Belfast. The inner part of the city was totally fenced off and you had to go through a turnstile which was easily stopped by the security people if they felt they needed to. That is all long gone now. There were bombings and killings on a fairly regular basis in the North towards the end of our tour. And sometimes there were reflections in the South. A prominent British journalist drove a car similar to ours. It was a very popular vehicle for IRA carjacking. The journalist was going to see a fellow in Dublin who was reputedly IRA about a story he was writing. He went out to drive to the meeting place and his car was gone. So he showed up an hour late and apologized, explaining that his car had been stolen and he had to find a cab at the last minute. So the fellow said, 'What kind of a car do you drive?' The journalists said, "We have a Ford Cortina." The interviewee said, "That is very interesting. Where do you live?" So they did the interview and the journalist went back to his own office and when he got home that night his car was in the driveway. So he called the guy and said, "My car is back." He replied, "I am very happy to hear that. Isn't that a coincidence now." In the South the vast majority of the people longed for a peaceful solution. And during this time it was clear that more and more Northerners wanted the same thing. There didn't seem to be any antipathy between Catholics and Protestants in the South. That just didn't seem to be an issue.

*Q: How about the influence on the embassy and your work there socially however you want to put it between the Irish Americans coming and politicians particularly. I mean they seem to carry on because it is profitable for them vote wise to put on a show or something.*

McGUIRE: That is an interesting question. There was a certain ambivalence about Irish Americans. Sometimes it grated that people would visit from the U.S. and assume that they knew everything there was to know about Ireland because their last name was Irish. And sometimes there was an air of superiority projected. I remember one Irish diplomat telling me that there had been some question when I arrived that I had been assigned on the mistaken assumption that an Irish American would have an advantage in dealing with government officials. I don't want to make too much out of this ambivalence. In our case, we made more friends in Ireland than any other place we served. This included people from the government, the labor movement, the business and banking communities, academia, the arts, families from our boys' school, our neighborhood, et al. In fact I had some Irish friends who asked if I had "signed the book." Under Irish law if you had one grandparent who was born in Ireland then you were entitled to Irish citizenship. My two maternal grandparents were both born in Ireland. So I remember getting ragged by some

of our Irish friends about why don't you go down and sign the book. Are you anti Irish or what? I said, "Look, how can I do that. I am an American. I have total allegiance to the United States. I am even representing the United States here in Ireland. How could I possibly divide that allegiance." I think my leg was being pulled but I am not entirely sure.

*Q: Did you run into any professional politician, professional Irish American politician? I can imagine they can be a pain in the ass.*

McGUIRE: Yes, we had some folks from the Congress who came out because they wanted to report to their constituents back home that they had been to Dublin. In Greece we had a similar phenomenon. In Athens one politico from Philadelphia came out and immediately cancelled all of the appointments that we had put together. All he wanted was a photograph in front of the Parthenon to put in his newsletter. I was delighted a year after his visit that he was indicted and ultimately went to jail. I must say that I am very much in favor of having members of Congress get out and visit our posts because they usually learn a lot. You provoke me to mention a congressman from Youngstown, Ohio. I probably shouldn't say his name.

*Q: You can mention his name.*

McGUIRE: We'll call him X. We were at a staff meeting and the DCM said we have Congressman X coming out here again. There were groans. I was the newest guy on the team so he said, "Congratulations, you've got him." When I picked him up at the airport he was stewed to the gills. I brought him to his hotel. We walked in to register and he demanded in a loud and offensive manner the presidential suite. The owner of the hotel placated the congressman by offering him the hotel limousine. X insisted on going out in it. I helped him into the car. Just as we were getting in a taxicab pulled up in front of us to discharge passengers. There was a large crowd in front of the hotel who heard X yell, "Move your f@#ing cab. I am a U.S. congressman." He finally fell asleep and we got him back into the hotel. My memory of that experience remains vivid. On the other side of the ledger I should refer to the occasional visits of Speaker of the House O'Neill. The Tipper charmed everyone and had substantive discussions with senior leaders. I will be talking later about some congressional visits to places like Korea and Namibia where important business was conducted by very serious people from the Congress who had traveled not on a junket but who had real interest in the issues that were out there.

*Q: Well then is there anything more we should discuss? Were there any particularly knotty economic situations Americans got involved in?*

McGUIRE: You mean in a negative fashion?

*Q: Or positive, anything.*

McGUIRE: We had an active commercial program to assist U.S. companies interested in selling in Ireland. There was American investment coming in to take advantage of Irish

membership in the EC and the Irish were delighted. I wouldn't describe any of that as knotty. I can't think of anything I would describe as knotty other than the international trade negotiations and civil aviation differences that I have already mentioned.

*Q: Were the Japanese investing then, or I think later they…*

McGUIRE: They had a very low profile there in my day. Actually one thing that was interesting on the diplomatic front, as you know generally we had very little contact with the Soviets. They didn't want to be in touch with the U.S. Embassy. The only two places I served where that was not true before the USSR collapsed was Australia and Ireland. In Ireland they hosted a get together for our staff at which they served up good food and Georgian wine and films that were partly cultural and partly propaganda. The central message was how dangerous the Chinese were and that we needed to be cozying up to the Soviet Union. One group the Soviets cultivated was the labor movement. There was a very left wing element within the movement. Not long after the Soviet event I filled in for our political officer at an All Ireland Labour Conference. There was a luncheon on the program that was organized to honor myself and the Soviet labor attaché. Now I was only standing in and I didn't know anybody at the conference. They told me later they intended to give me a roasting at the lunch about the U.S. not being sufficiently pro union. However the day before the luncheon I tried to get around to meet everybody. I was surrounded by delegates and one asked if I wasn't a Queens McGuire. I said yes and I noted a look of disappointment. I said "How did you know I was a Queens McGuire." The answer was, "A lot of you Irish Americans turn Protestant." I laughed and said, "No, I am from Queens, New York and I was a member of the Transport Workers Union (TWU) there." (Mike Quill was a famous Irishman who led the TWU for many years). Suddenly delegates were lining up to shake my hand and there may have been some rounds of beer consumed. For the rest of my tour in Ireland every time I saw these guys they treated me as a friend. As for the luncheon the Soviet official had all kinds of things that he wanted to say about the great Soviet economy and the socialist model for doing things. The Irish trade unionists, however, spent the whole of the lunch grilling him about Soviet economic problems and poor human rights record. I was free to eat my meal and share a Guinness with them. But it was one of the few places that I saw Soviet diplomats actually out and about and trying to spread their view of the world.

*Q: That is interesting. Americans are hard to read because our names may imply one thing and we may come from actually a different background. Charles Stuart Kennedy would appeal for the Scottish Cause and all. Well then how were relations with the British embassy?*

McGUIRE: I had very little contact with them. I knew some of the people who did the same kind of work I was doing but they were on a much different plateau. The Irish and the British economies were pretty intertwined. The Irish and British pounds were linked when I arrived there. The Irish, however, very much wanted for both economic and political reasons to hitch their wagon to the EC star.

*Q: Yes, to detach themselves from this too close relationship.*

McGUIRE: For example there was talk about breaking the currency link. Maybe this is a good example of how diplomats work. I had many contacts at the finance ministry, the central bank and commercial banks. I picked up information that indeed the break was going to happen, and it was going to happen soon. So of course I wrote a report on it. Not that Ireland is a huge player in things that affect the U.S. economy. But I think it is an interesting example of when you are working in a host country knowing the right people can get you information that can be of value to the United States. The DCM looked at my cable and said, "They have had this link for eons. This just doesn't seem to ring true." I said, "It is going to happen." He finally shook his head and said, "OK, send it out but I really think we are going to look foolish on this." So I sent it in to State and sure enough within two weeks the Irish had broken the link. Ultimately they, of course, joined the Euro, further solidifying their commitment to the European Union (EU). But this is part and parcel of the kinds of things you can do within the context of traditional diplomacy. It dismays me that there seems to be an inclination these days to think that information covertly acquired, i.e. by intelligence operations, deserves closer attention than information overtly acquired. There is a high dollar cost and a big risk factor to covert operations. Sometimes there is no alternative. We have gotten caught out badly in recent years, however, using covert techniques where they weren't necessary instead of relying on open and aboveboard contact work. And budgetary and staffing decisions have greatly favored intelligence agencies over State.

*Q: Absolutely. It is seen as you put a top secret label on something and all of a sudden it is hot stuff.*

McGUIRE: Yes.

*Q: Where did you go from Ireland?*

McGUIRE: While I was in Ireland I had a call from one of the senior officers who served in Australia at the time we were there. He had just been named ambassador to Sierra Leone. He said, "How would you like to come out as my DCM. I think you would enjoy it and it would be a really good job for you." So Kay and I talked about it. It would have entailed leaving Dublin after just two years. As you know when you are mid career a DCM job is really a big stepping stone. In the end we stayed in Dublin, but a seed was planted. When the next bid list came out, we bid on a range of places as one always does. It came down to two that we were really interested in. One was the economic chief in Helsinki, and the other was the DCM in Libreville, Gabon. So we talked about it as a family. To our young sons I said, "If you go to Helsinki there would be a lot of skiing. I understand we would have a house that is right on the water and a sauna and it would be really interesting but pretty cold." I said the second place is Libreville which is right in the middle of a jungle. Our son David, who was seven, immediately said, "Jungle, why didn't you say so. I want to go to Libreville." (I should add that 30 years later Dave and his family went to Embassy Helsinki on assignment.) You know how the DCM committee works. Your name goes in. The committee selects several candidates and the ambassador gets to choose. The wait was bit nerve wracking but word finally came

through that Ambassador Arthur Tienken had chosen me. So when we finished in Dublin we packed up all our effects, most of which went into storage; we went home for home leave; and then headed out to Libreville; picking up along the way a Ford Bronco with 4 wheel drive for use on an African adventure. I never regretted the decision to go to Gabon. In fact my oldest son, Kiernan, was talking with some friends during a visit recently, and somehow the subject of Gabon came up. He said, "That was one of the best times of my entire life. That was just a fantastic adventure." He was about 11 when we went out in 1980. It was a totally different place to live. I was going to have the lead on the day to day operations of the embassy which I thought would be a very interesting experience. We also had responsibility for Sao Tome, a very small nation 150 miles off the coast of Gabon. In those days Gabon had the highest per capita GDP in sub Saharan Africa and Sao Tome one of the lowest. Gabon was affluent thanks to natural resources, was a former French colony, and was still friendly with the French and the west in general. Sao Tome had been a Portuguese colony and was left in political and economic disarray when the Portuguese departed. Their relations with the Portuguese were poor, and they had established close ties with the USSR, with Cuba and with China. So we had a very interesting contrast to deal with.

*Q: I think this would be a good place to stop. So we will talk about both Gabon and Sao Tome and the situation there. You went out when?*

McGUIRE: That was in 1980.

*Q: 1980, we will pick it up then.*

McGUIRE: OK.

*Q: All right today is 10 September 2014 with Kevin McGuire. Kevin, we left you when you left Dublin. When did you leave?*

McGUIRE: We left Dublin in the summer of 1980, and we were on our way to Libreville. So the first stop was home leave back in the States and then the second stop was to do the DCM training program. The program was an interesting one. It covered a wide variety of situations that one might encounter as a DCM. As you know but some of your readers who are not in the Foreign Service might not know, the DCM plays a critical role no matter what the size of the mission. He is supposed to be the alter ego to the ambassador and runs the day to day operations of the mission.

*Q: He is like the executive officer.*

McGUIRE: Yes. And if you have a person in that job who is not on the ball it will affect the performance and morale of the entire mission. The training program was useful. I got a lot out of more senior participants who had already had DCM experience and were going to large posts. Their observations, guidance and comments proved to be on the mark and had greater value than case study exercises put together by the contractors who organized the sessions. We had some special programs, one at the CIA to try and build

some rapport with the agency. (The world wide State-CIA relationship is an interesting subject but this not a good vehicle to examine it. There were lots of tensions, lots of friction and sometimes frankly it was dismaying to see the CIA's high handed approach to doing business.) Of course I did all the calls that you have to do with people knowledgeable about your country of assignment, the assistant secretary, the desk officer and the points in between, and relevant officials at other agencies and in the business community.

*Q: Did they bring up the problem that has come up a number of times in the relationship between ambassadorial political appointees and career DCMs under them. I mean it can be a tricky relationship. Do they work with you on how you would as a DCM deal with a political ambassador?*

McGUIRE: I was the head of senior assignments later in my career and that would be a perfect spot to talk about this issue. The short answer to your question is they tried to provide some guidance in this area. In terms of where I am in my history I would say the ambassador who was on the ground when I arrived in Libreville was a great person to work for. Ambassador Arthur Tienken was a crusty veteran of the Foreign Service and a very experienced Africa hand. He had served as DCM himself. He was demanding; he wanted things to go right; and he wanted everyone to understand he was the boss. You had to get on the same wavelength with him, but that wasn't difficult. I guess the one problem was that he smoked a pipe and the pipe rarely left his lips. So sometimes you had to ask him more than once what it was that he was saying. We hit it off immediately. The alter ego element is incredibly important. There was nothing that happened on the ground that Art didn't share with me. So I was totally in the know. On occasions when for one reason or another he was out of town (there were no cell phones in those days) he felt very confident that I would know how to handle issues that might come up. It was a good learning experience for me on how to train and delegate to subordinates.

As I said earlier, Gabon and Sao Tome were two very different countries, so it was a very interesting contrast. We didn't have anybody on the ground in Sao Tome so I would go over every two or three months to try to keep the lines of communication open. It was tough sledding at first. After the precipitous withdrawal of Portugal the Sao Tomean Government had followed the Angolans and Mozambique down the path of socialism and close relations with the Soviets, the Eastern European Bloc, the Cubans and the Chinese. The Gabonese had stayed very close to the French. They had the benefit of a long standing wood industry, some minerals, and struck oil as well, so they were in a totally different situation from Sao Tome. The French left things in reasonable shape. There was an educational system in place and the Gabonese Government was committed to trying to educate their young people. So a student who went through secondary school if they wanted to continue on at university level could go to the local university or they might end up going to France or the U.S. This was all free, so they had a real advantage over most of the rest of sub Saharan Africa with respect to developing a literate population. Sao Tome was hanging on by the skin of its teeth, with an uneducated population and a very weak economy. I guess the main issues for us in Gabon, again this is the cold war period, was to maintain good ties, show our interest in a western oriented nation in a

difficult neighborhood, and to get support and votes at the UN and elsewhere for programs or positions that we were advocating. One of the things that was quite important not so much for Gabon (which was involved in the international market place) but for Sao Tome was our effort to try and stimulate interest in using the market to promote development, something the Soviet Bloc model was not capable of doing. We also had some special areas of cooperation with El Hadj Omar Bongo. I don't know if that name resonates with you. At one point Bongo was the longest serving president in sub Saharan Africa. The democracy that they celebrated wasn't perfect but by and large Bongo had the support of the people, and part of that was related to the tribal divisions within Gabonese society. The Fang were the most numerous and I believe they still are. The other tribes had banded together to make sure the Fang wouldn't dominate every aspect of Gabonese society. They were successful in doing that, and Bongo was the man of choice, so he served for many years. We had very good access to Bongo and to the foreign minister and other ministers. They were always friendly. The French were still very influential in that part of the world to the point where many said that Gabon was a chasse privee, i.e. that the French were still in control of the economy, which was not true but they still had serious influence. One of the more important economic developments while we were there involved putting out bids for oil leases. U.S. companies were concerned that they were not going to get a fair shake, that the system would be skewed towards the French, but in fact we got good results. The embassy had made clear to the government that the U.S. expected fair treatment. There were American companies that ended up going in and exploring and actually producing in Gabon.

The official French community was quite cooperative to the embassy. They had their own reasons for doing so, again the Cold War was a factor for all of us. So being friendly was useful to them. There was a French military contingent located in Gabon. They could not have been more friendly or cooperative. They were very good in terms of welcoming our military attaches, who were resident in Kinshasa and who came in from time to time. One item of mutual concern was the Soviet presence in Sao Tome and intelligence activities that went on there, and I will get to that in a bit. The Soviets were monitoring coastal traffic out of their embassy in Sao Tome and providing communications support. The French garrison is still in Gabon, and I believe it has been used for efforts in troubled countries in west Africa. In these days of destabilizing terrorist attacks I am glad that is true.

In addition to the presence of American oil companies we had a commercial sales program in Gabon, and American companies were able to sell products there, but usually on a very small scale. Air Gabon operated a 747 during those years, and that was significant for Boeing. Lockheed also did some aircraft business there. We had a Peace Corps contingent located in Gabon. They did some really good work in rural communities, and as always the volunteers were enormously popular. They also helped with health programs. Malaria was a special problem. Our Peace Corps doctor was a great asset. Our cultural affairs program was active and one especially welcomed event was a visit by zydeco musicians from Louisiana. Zydeco, of course, shares common roots with west African music. One aspect of diplomacy that I had not been familiar with before was ship visits. We had three, two in Libreville and one to Sao Tome. They all

achieved their purpose of generating good will with the local community. The Gabonese public was excited over the chance of visiting an American destroyer and the local media gave a great deal of attention to the visit and to the strong relationship between Gabon and the U.S. The whole time the ship was in port we had people visiting it. We had soccer games and other kinds of person to person contact that went over quite well. We almost lost the Belgian Ambassador over the side but a quick grab by our administrative officer prevented a diplomatic incident.

In Sao Tome, we had a very different situation, including on ship visits. The Sao Tomean acceptance of a ship visit was the first sign that they were interested in changing the relationship. We were stunned that they said yes to a pro forma offer. Our access to Sao Tomean officials was much more restricted than what we experienced in Libreville. When I first visited in 1980 there was not much warmth in the greeting that I received. The Soviets had a huge embassy and so did the Cubans. The East Germans had a small technical assistance program. But even at that point, the developing world was beginning to see the limits to what they might expect out of cooperation with the Eastern Bloc. Over the two years that I was at the embassy there was a definite shift and the government became much more positive towards the U.S. I negotiated the first U.S. aid agreement with Sao Tome. It was very small in scope. It had to do with agricultural development. They had some fisheries, they had coffee and chocolate that went back to the colonial period, and there had been disruptions in all those sectors after independence. The program was designed to help them get started in putting the agricultural sector on a firmer footing, also some small things on education. The Sao Tomeans really did de-emphasize their relationship with the Eastern Bloc in the period after my departure. One unusual dimension to our visits over there, I would always get an invitation to dine from the resident Chinese chargé. He hated the Soviets and disliked the Cubans. He seemed to genuinely enjoy briefing us on how things were going in the Sao Tomean-Soviet and Sao Tomean-Cuban relationships. Or it may have been related to the whisky we always brought him. Sao Tome is a beautiful place, and of course now they have struck oil. I hope they will prosper.

*Q: How did President Bongo deal with the tribes? I mean how does this tribe thing work?*

McGUIRE: There was a sharing of the wealth so each tribe was kept in the process. There was a lot of money available particularly once oil revenues came on stream. There were projects for health care and education. There were people from the various tribes represented in the government. And in companies and the military. At the end of the day the system was designed to prevent anybody from becoming terribly disaffected. There were no political prisoners in the time I was there. If somebody got a little bit troublesome, they might end up with a plum job in Paris or someplace else where they would be away from the action and not be able to stir up what Bongo viewed as competition. On a personal note, the president was very short and he was very sensitive about this. So whenever you went to the opulent palace to see him, you went into his receiving area. It was quite a large room. His table and chair were located on a platform in the front of the room. So no matter how tall you were, when you came in and he rose to greet you he would be taller than you were. This was important to him. I was chargé

d'affaires there for about seven months. I saw him from time to time and he was always helpful so if he wanted to sit on a platform that was ok by me. I should mention that we had a change in ambassadors while I was there. Art Tienken left and Terry McNamara arrived. I don't know if you knew Terry.

*Q: I know Terry pretty well.*

McGUIRE: Terry is another fellow with a lot of African experience and spoke French very well. He was very pleased to be there. He established a good relationship with the president. Terry had a talent that he picked up while attending the École Nationale de Paris. He would open champagne bottles with a saber. I don't know if you have ever seen that done. It scared the heck out of me, and I always dodged the initial glasses of champagne that he inevitably served at the residence. He would take the saber and strike the top of the bottle neck just below the cork. There is a ridge and he would hit it there taking the cork and the top of the bottle off. This was something that the French military had perfected I was told. The Gabonese had the highest per capita consumption of champagne in the world. So they loved this. It was a feature of any of Terry's representational events.

*Q: As a sword did he use his Nepalese kukri?*

McGUIRE: He used what he called a cavalry sword…

*Q: He used to talk about his kukri. I remember he had that at one point.*

McGUIRE: It was a short sword, I don't recall any special name for it. At any rate we had a very active embassy while I was there. One regret I have is that I did not get to travel as much as I would have liked in Gabon. Most of my official travel was to Sao Tome. We did have some great family adventures, for example driving to Lambaréné (home of the Albert Schweitzer Hospital), to the border with Equatorial Guinea, trips to the beaches north of Libreville and across the estuary, and canoe rides down the Ogooué River. Sao Tome was beautiful; the capital was tiny but the sea coast was lovely and a high mountain with a tropical rainforest dwarfed everything else. Going back to the Cold War aspect of this period even on the Equator in Africa, one of my trips to Sao Tome was on their national day. I was seated, apparently as a message of some kind, with the KGB chief from the Soviet mission. We spoke French together. I had no choice but to make the best of the situation. When the festivities ended and we were leaving via a narrow pathway I said, "After you." He said "No, after you. You are the honored guest here. While we are the masters (nous sommes les maitres ici)." This very interesting Putinesque view of the world turned out not to be the case for very long.

*Q: You were there from when to when?*

McGUIRE: From 1980 to 1982.

*Q: So this was before the '89 beginning of the real collapse.*

McGUIRE: Yes, it was.

*Q: But did you have a feeling that the Soviet interest in Africa or ability or money or whatever was running out?*

McGUIRE: As I said the Sao Tomeans, who were pretty desperate for assistance of any kind, had come to the conclusion that the Soviets, the Cubans, the East Germans and the Bulgarians weren't bringing anything of real developmental value to them. Chinese projects had not worked out well either. That was a key factor in why they decided to look to the west to develop relationships that would be more beneficial to them. The Cubans had a very active military involvement in Angola during this period, sponsored by the USSR, and continue to this day to maintain relations with Lusophone Africa.

*Q: Well what about in Gabon. The neighbors were essentially the Congo (Brazzaville) and who else, Cameroon?*

McGUIRE: Yes, the Congo, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, and a little slice of Angola. It was of interest because of the conflict in Angola at that time.

*Q: You are looking at the map at ..*

McGUIRE: Cabinda. After the departure of the Portuguese there was strife among various contenders to take over the government of Angola. It is a complicated story, and this is not the place to tell it. Later in my career, when I was in Namibia I had a closer look at the conflict that had occurred in Angola. The South Africans and the Cubans were very much involved and the prolonged fighting delayed Namibian independence. My reason for mentioning Angola here is that it illustrated President Bongo's rather surprising interest in international problems; surprising given the small size of Gabon. He maintained good relationships around Africa and provided financial backing to various people. Angola was one of his interests. I remember Chet Crocker coming through. I don't know if you remember him. He was assistant secretary for African Affairs during the Reagan administration. He came because Bongo volunteered to use his good offices to try and be helpful in sorting out the conflict in Angola, one of our most important priorities in southern Africa at the time. And he did try. It didn't lead to anything palpable, but he did at least try to be helpful.

*Q: Were the Cubans either in Sao Tome or in Gabon?*

McGUIRE: I don't recall any Cubans at all in Gabon. Nor were the Chinese represented there. Bongo's orientation was towards the west. There was, however, a North Korean Embassy. While I was chargé I would get invited to diplomatic lunches and some of my colleagues would put me next to the North Korean knowing full well that we were both under instruction to avoid talking. It proved to be a non issue since his French was very poor and his English nonexistent. I have already alluded to the Cubans in Sao Tome. They were there in number and had a large embassy. As you know this was a heyday for

Cuban adventurism. They had sought ways to engage in Ethiopia and Zaire as it was called at that time. But it was in Angola that their involvement in Africa peaked. They acted as surrogates for Moscow with a large military presence in support of the MPLA's Agostinho Neto. Fidel Castro had a strong interest in using Angola as an oil rich base for spreading the Cuban revolution in Africa. The Sao Tomeans were heavily influenced by the Angolans, and the Cubans used that connection to involve themselves in advocating for Soviet style political and economic structures.

Usually when I went over to Sao Tome I took the administrative officer, Peter Spalding, with me. We would have appointments laid out for us before we arrived, organized via the Sao Tomean Embassy in Libreville. We would have to stay up on the mountain top above the city in a smallish hotel built during the colonial period. The government was not eager for us to get around the city below. It was a long road and there was no public transport, so once you were up, you were up. The taxi services were told, at least in the beginning, if these guys try to contact you don't bring them back down the mountain until their official appointments start. I remember one time we had been invited to dinner at the Chinese Chargé's. How were we going to get there? So Peter struck up a conversation in Spanish with a fellow who had dropped somebody off the hotel. He agreed to drive us down. It wasn't until we were right at the bottom of the hill that he finally thought to ask where we were from. When Peter said we were from the American Embassy in Libreville the driver almost had a stroke. It turned out he was from the Cuban Embassy. The Chinese provided transportation to go back up the hill. The Sao Tomeans reduced some of those restrictions later. Our ship visit marked a turning point.

*Q: What ships visited?*

McGUIRE: There was a program every year at that time of U.S. Navy ships which did goodwill visits in western Africa. We had three during my assignment. The Radford and the Pharris were two of them, the other name escapes me. Two visits were to Libreville, and one to Sao Tome. The ship that came to Sao Tome stopped first in Equatorial Guinea which didn't have much in the way of facilities and where the authorities were very suspicious of them. In Sao Tome, we were doing an experiment. Overall it went okay. There was a soccer game. The Sao Tomeans love to play soccer and the American crew wasn't very good at it. So Sao Tome won the soccer game and the local folks were quite happy. It was symbolic. There were changes that were taking place, and we were no longer getting the cold shoulder. It was an interesting experience. The visits in Libreville went very well. Of course the Gabonese had much more experience in dealing with these things. Bongo, when I went to see him about one of the visits, started talking about security concerns because he did not trust the Congolese Government. He said he was concerned about possible encroachments by the Congolese on Gabonese soil. I pointed out to him that what better symbol of the friendships that he had around the world than to have an American naval vessel clearly sitting in Libreville's harbor. He liked that idea.

I would like to go back to our earlier review of things like USIA programs, ship visits, the Peace Corps, et al. and how they contribute to building bridges. It occurs to me that I failed to make an important point about cultural programs. They can be incredibly

important in getting our message across, and in understanding where other nations are coming from. We had great programs in Australia and we still had some in Gabon. There were those in Congress who thought this kind of activity was a waste of time and money and that USIA should be done away with. Eventually these people succeeded in dramatically reducing this kind of activity. After 9/11 the same people in many cases who were so vociferously opposed to programs of that kind were asking questions about why weren't we getting our message out. The funds dried up for visitor grant programs. The funds dried up for cultural exchanges. The funds dried up for information programs, and in many other areas where we should have remained very active. Things have improved but the fight for funding continues. I think funding is somewhat better now that USIA has been subsumed within State. I don't know about your experience but it killed me to see what happened in the 1980s and 1990s to our ability to explain ourselves.

*Q: I remember sitting here doing these interviews during the demise of USIA and although some of the programs were picked up a good number were thrown out the window. We do a lot of stupid things and this was one of the most stupid ones. But there we are.*

McGUIRE: I think that more or less sums up the main thrust of our experience in Gabon. One thing I would add relates to family considerations in the Foreign Service experience. As I said earlier there was a question of health. You had to be very careful in Gabon because of tropical diseases. We had two young sons. The schooling was unconventional, an international school funded in part by State and in part by companies that were active in Gabon. The school was very small, about 20-25 students. Kay had a degree in education and some experience and she was asked if she would be the headmistress. She agreed to do it and I think had a really good time running the program and recruiting some good people to teach there. She was highly praised by one and all for her work. I think our two sons ended up having a really good educational experience. They were at an age where they could be intellectually self reliant. Both of them became great readers and writers, something that continues. They were always ready for adventures, to go snorkeling along the coast where giant okoume logs float at high tide, for a ride down the Trans Gabon railroad or to go on safari. They took away a tremendous amount from the experience.

*Q: What was your relationship with the State Department there?*

McGUIRE: Well Ken Brown was the country director and we had regular contact. We would get instructions to do demarches often. We would send back reporting on the political situation or the Gabonese take on some international issue. I don't think people in the Department stayed until 8 or 9 pm waiting for our flash cables to come in, but we had good guidance and they got good service. The desk officer came out while we were there on a familiarization tour. So we took him around and he got to see a little bit of the country and get a greater understanding of what was going on. The relationship was good.

*Q: How did you find the staffing, because sometimes you have just one consular officer in a small embassy and he is brand new. This could be a problem of expertise in many fields.*

McGUIRE: Yes. It was just as you say. The consular officer was on his first tour, no experience. Fortunately we had a pretty good Foreign Service national who knew the ropes and was able to make sure that the routine work was done well. The consular officer realized he was inexperienced and would seek guidance. Consular work is so important and most people don't understand that unless they have had some kind of crisis overseas. I remember a young man from Harvard who was out on an internship in the interior drowned. His family was absolutely distraught. Our consular officer had to go down to the site and make sure that all the preparations were done for getting the body back to the U.S., not an easy task in central Gabon. We had a fantastic economic officer when I arrived, and he was very helpful to the oil companies in getting a fair shake on leases. He was followed by a young fellow who had no experience as an economic officer. It was very difficult for him at first but I was able to help him develop. We had a good admin officer. As you know in places like Gabon that is very important just to keep everything running. The USIA staff was very professional and the Peace Corps director was good as well.

*Q: Were there problems with fishing, because many of these small equatorial states have lots of fish off their coasts and the Japanese and Koreans and Russians and all would come in and swoop them up. They had no way of controlling it. Was this a problem?*

McGUIRE: Not in 1980, no, I don't recall any problems related to that. Later that certainly was true on the west coast of Africa. In Namibia years later there was an issue of factory ships zipping in and hauling huge amounts of fish out of coastal waters before the Namibians could intervene. But I don't recall anything during our days in Libreville. The fish there, by the way, were superb. The shrimp were about as good as any shrimp I have had anywhere. The sea bass and other kinds of fish were absolutely delicious. You were never disappointed if you went out for a fish meal.

*Q: What about Gabonese society? How did the Americans and the Gabonese mix. How did you find them?*

McGUIRE: The Gabonese are very reserved and it was very difficult to establish the kind of social contact that you would like to have. You could do cocktail parties and people would come or there would be government hosted receptions. There would be companies that would host things or national days and things like that and people would turn out. But it was difficult to have the kind of settings that are probably the most productive, that is dinner parties or lunches at home with family members involved where you got to know people well. That was something the Gabonese were not so interested in doing. We did get to know some young professionals who had experience studying or traveling abroad, and they were more inclined to be open with foreigners.

*Q: Well then you were there two years, then what?*

McGUIRE: I was invited to go to the National War College. In those days that was a big deal. It meant that people were looking at you as a candidate to rise to the senior levels of the service. The program had a fantastic reputation. The War College for those who may not be familiar with it was founded in 1947 by Harry Truman and George Marshall in the aftermath of the war. The objective was to take people with high potential from a variety of different government sources and mix them so that they were comfortable dealing with people in other agencies and in particular to bridge the civilian-military divide; and most important to prepare them to work together on national security strategy. We had about 150 in our class. Probably 70% were military officers, colonels and lieutenant colonels, commanders, and captains. The largest civilian group was from State and USIA but there were people from other agencies, including the CIA and NSA. The whole focus of the year was on national strategy and the way decision makers can arrive at good decisions. The quality of the participants was outstanding. A high percentage of the people from State became ambassadors. A high percentage of people on the military side went on to become generals or admirals. One of our class members rose to chairman of the joint chiefs. Another became head of the European Command with the rank of four star general. The program started out with some psychological studies. So we had tests like the Myers Briggs. I don't know if you are familiar with that. It is supposed to look at personality types and how different types of people absorb information and how they make decisions. This wasn't for the files of the State Department or the Army or whatever. There were a number of different instruments used, not just Myers Briggs. The idea was to help you as a leader to understand yourself and to understand others. It was very insightful. I don't think that a day went by for the rest of my career that I didn't think back to information that I picked up in that part of the program.

In more general terms, part of the program was lecture based. We had experts speak on a wide variety of different topics, from economics to the Soviet Union to the Vietnam war to nuclear disarmament. We had prominent news makers, like former President Gerald Ford, visit with us. One of the most interesting aspects were our core seminar programs. We had perhaps ten seminar groups whose members changed regularly so you got to share this close quarters learning experience with everybody. There was a very heavy reading schedule, and the discussion in the classroom was led by a very good corps of instructors. The students brought very different perspectives to the table. Of course in order to really participate you had to do the readings and everybody did. It was a very intense and rewarding. We had electives towards the end of the program, so if you wanted to do a class on economic development, on intelligence issues, on energy, et al. you had the opportunity to do so. The evolution in the participants was really incredible. I remember on alumni day which was towards the end of the year there were presentations made by various class members to visiting alumni. One Navy commander in our seminar on economic assistance and development had been totally opposed to any kind of aid program. It was throwing money down a rat hole. He was selected as one of the presenters to the alumni. He delivered a brilliant presentation on why economic development assistance is important not just from the humanitarian point of view, but also because it provides the U.S. with some leverage, some opportunities to assist countries that might be able to contribute to regional stability, and that might have real

development potential. It was a great statement. The individual could not have presented a view of that kind when we started the program. We all came away with a much greater understanding of the strategic challenges facing the U.S. and about the quality of the people from each of the services and agencies participating. I went on to do some jobs that required close cooperation with our military and the War College proved invaluable to me in places like Korea where I was DCM and when I assisted on the establishment of a new military command, AFRICOM.

At the end of the year we had several special experiences. We had a week long war game exercise. We were broken up into 10 or so teams. The threat was Soviet troop movement through the Fulda Gap. Our team had to respond to ongoing communications from the faculty control team with action decisions. We had to take into account political considerations, contacts with allies, resource constraints and military capabilities. For some reason never explained I was named U.S. president for the exercise. It was a very challenging week. We had the opportunity to apply much of what we had learned during the year. Our team did well, and I enjoyed being president. We also were required to do lengthy research papers. You could either do it alone or you could team up with others. I thought given the nature of the place that to do a paper alone would be missing part of the experience so I teamed up with one classmate from the Navy and one from the Air Force. Our paper was on cooperation with Australia on SLOCS, sea lines of communication. We each brought a very different perspective to bear; we wrote a paper advocating specific action recommendations. We won third place out of all the group papers that were submitted not just from National War College students but from the three individual service colleges as well. As an economics officer I was proud that we had done so well in an area in which I had no expertise. I was also pleased when in 2014 we went to visit my son Dave and his family in Sydney (he is at our Consulate General) to learn of enhanced cooperation with the Australians in ways consistent with what we recommended in 1983. So our group was far sighted.

We had a trip at the very end of the year. There were seven or eight trips and your trip was selected by lottery. So I got my last choice, the trip to India, Pakistan, and Bahrain. But after the trip I wouldn't have changed it for anything. It was a fascinating experience in a part of the world which I knew very little about. The trip almost turned my career in a totally different direction. I decided to seek out assignment to Indian affairs but at the last minute I went back to economics. War College assignments became less sought after in the 1990s. The Foreign Service was so short staffed that stretch assignments, assignments above a person's grade level, were numerous and many people started looking in that direction instead of getting leadership training. Colin Powell changed that. He was firm believer in strong institutions and in the importance of training of this kind. He restored the luster to War College assignments, and rightly so.

While at the War College I accepted a job on energy policy in EB (the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs) as it was then called. I became the deputy director of the Office of Consumer Country Affairs. I had never focused on energy policy in my previous assignments but I had done graduate work at Harvard on energy policy, oil issues, alternative sources of energy and so forth that proved to be very useful. The most

interesting part of that job was dealing with the potential crisis in oil supply because of the Iran-Iraq war, and attendant fears of very serious global market destabilization. Much of our work was done in conjunction with the International Energy Agency (IEA), an offshoot of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). One major policy question of that day was to what degree the U.S. should use governmental mechanisms to get us through a Gulf War-caused supply disruption. This was during the Reagan administration. There were two camps on this question. One side insisted that we should do nothing to interfere with the market; that only prolongs crises and creates confusion. Although there may be some short term problems the market would correct itself. The then Under Secretary for Economic Affairs at State adhered to this position. The other camp argued that it is fine to say that the market will sort out problems in the long term but what about disruptions of indefinite duration that might bring industrial economies to their knees. That side argued very cogently that a strong strategic petroleum reserve and close cooperation with our IEA allies was something that was essential to our interests. It was a very interesting philosophical difference, and of course in many ways the question whether or not to intervene to deal with real world problems in the market is still with us today. One very current example, although not of the same importance, is the argument over the Export Import Bank. Some very conservative congressmen argue that a program like Exim disrupts the market. They ignore the fact that the market operates in the real world. It is not theoretical; the real market is not the perfectly free market discussed in school in Econ 101. There are disruptions that exist all the time. Exim enables American suppliers to compete in the real world despite the support that many other countries make available to their industries. So do you really want to take an academic approach to something that is a very practical issue and involves the lives and jobs of many Americans? The same principle was true back in the early 1980s as to whether the government should take measures to insure that we could get through a major oil supply disruption. There were many discussions in the IEA, and I had an opportunity to go to Paris to participate. But the most critical discussion was within the U.S. Government. It finally took a cabinet meeting for President Reagan to decide that indeed the U.S. would increase dramatically with its IEA partners national strategic petroleum reserves, and cooperate with those partners on an SPR draw if necessary to buy time to find alternative sources should the war in the Gulf necessitate such steps. This would be an insurance policy against a disruption that otherwise could have caused havoc. It was the right decision. There was great relief from our allies when EB's assistant secretary traveled to a major conference of the IEA and delivered the talking points we had prepared for him on the Reagan decision. The SPR is still out there. Its existence has been very helpful over the years. We also worked on energy projections, both supply and demand. There was a lot of work going on then about alternative sources of energy. Many of those issues are still with us. The U.S. has been too slow to adopt policies that would have reduced our dependency on OPEC oil much earlier. Many IEA members reacted much more quickly. We have, however, made progress in this regard in recent years. Allan Wendt was deputy assistant secretary for energy in EB during my days there. He played a very important role in getting the SPR decision on track.

*Q: What did you feel this was going to do for you career wise?*

McGUIRE: I had decided that I really loved doing economic work, and this job added a totally different dimension to my experience. My preparation and my background to that point put me in a relatively good position to try and focus on large economies, which is what happened the next two times I went overseas. I was in countries where our relationships covered the whole range of economic issues. So this job was very good preparation. Energy was a very hot issue in those days, and I wanted also to establish myself in EB. That was the place to be in Washington for an economic officer. It was also an introduction to multilateral diplomacy, which is a totally different animal from bilateral work. Becoming a deputy office director meant serving in a supervisory role. And finally, the job entailed involvement with other U.S. agencies, which was a broadening experience.

*Q: EB always has been important.*

McGUIRE: When I was finishing the energy job, I wanted to stay in EB. There was an opening as the head of the developed country trade division. This was at a time when there was a great deal of friction between the U.S. and our European allies and the Japanese and Koreans on trade. The Reagan administration was convinced that we weren't getting a fair shake and that we needed other industrial countries to live up to their responsibilities in the post war period. The Congress did as well. The United States had spearheaded recovery after World War II. We had borne the brunt of making sure that the free world was secure and in reasonable economic shape. The Europeans and the Japanese had been allowed special advantages because of their economic fragility. By the 1980s U.S. leadership thought the time had come for "a more even playing field," as an expression of the day went. The Europeans and the Japanese resisted change in practices they saw as beneficial to them and tried to find ways to head off U.S. retaliation for their protectionist practices. As one very small example, the Dole Fruit company had at one point marketed fruit cocktail all over Europe and North Africa. European Community agricultural subsidies were one of the main pillars in the early days of the Community and that was still the case in the 1980s. Subsidies to fruit growers slowly but surely pushed Dole out of Europe, and then they were pushed out of North Africa. Dole finally asked for protection under section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act because they were even being pushed out of the market in the eastern part of the United States. There was a trade case brought under the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The Europeans lost so they discontinued those subsidies. One could say that justice had prevailed. But what they did was to eliminate the subsidies to the growers and replace them with subsidies to European processors. This is just a small illustration of the frustrations then faced by American companies. So the decision was made to move forward aggressively against unfair trade practices by our trading partners, and to also offer to engage on a new round of global trade negotiations more ambitious than the Tokyo Round of the 1970s. The Round would address industrial tariffs and a whole variety of other practices that restricted trade, including subsidies and non tariff barriers for agricultural products. One of the first dramatic steps in advancing this plan was the decision to proceed with a free trade agreement with Canada (FTA). So while we were working on 301 retaliation cases against the Europeans and Japanese we were also marching ahead with negotiations with the Canadians. This was a fascinating endeavor.

Our trade with Canada was enormous; two way investment was enormous; but the idea of moving towards a much more united market was going to take that relationship much further. Of course trade negotiations are always difficult because vested interests may conflict, producers and consumers may disagree , and governments in the end have to make choices to benefit the nation that may not be popular with everyone. Our division (the Developed Country Trade Division-DCT) was very much involved with the U.S. Special Trade Representative's Office (USTR), the primary trade negotiating agency in the U.S. Government. We helped staff out the Canadian negotiations and served in a liaison role between USTR and State. I had the opportunity to go to Canada to participate in the FTA talks. We did a lot of support work and helped keep Assistant Secretary McMinn and Secretary Shultz appraised of what was going on (in these talks and on other issues). The talks were difficult but ultimately very successful. The tenor and results contributed to decisions to move forward on the Uruguay Round and became the basis for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). These were very big steps in terms of liberalizing the global marketplace and raising standards of living. There is still second guessing on whether or not such agreements were desirable. If you look at the statistics, the job creation, the growth in trade, the growth of investment and the growth of GDP in participating nations, USG decisions to move forward on the Tokyo Round, the FTA, NAFTA, and the Uruguay Round were absolutely correct. There were a number of other trade actions that were taken to get the Europeans to be more forthcoming on trade issues. I mentioned Dole. Another example was the EC's attempt to renege on concessions we had previously negotiated with Spain and Portugal when those two countries acceded to the EC. That led to a trade skirmish with various threats of sanctions and counter sanctions by both sides. I became part of a three person team traveling to EC member capitals, with senior officials from USTR and the Department of Agriculture. After intense discussions a temporary solution was found pending final resolution in the Uruguay Round. DCT was involved in a variety of other contentious issues. Perhaps the most difficult task was convincing the Japanese that the time had come to pull their own weight in the international trading community. I really enjoyed my time in DCT. The issues were very important, I was running my own shop, and we had a strong team, people like Reno Harnish, Bryan Samuel, and Patricia Haigh. EB valued us. I remember being called up to Assistant Secretary McMinn's office one day. I don't remember the issue. He said, "What do we think about X, I just was asked by STR." I gave a quick reply, and he called the head of STR and said, "This is what I think we should do." DCT was a great experience and it prepared me well for my next assignment.

*Q: Where did you go after this?*

McGUIRE: The experience in EB, in particular in DCT, led to an assignment in Korea. EB was adamant they wanted somebody as economic minister there who had strong trade negotiation experience.

*Q: We will get to Korea but to mention a part of that, did you see any, did you make out any patterns of how certain countries negotiated on trade?*

McGUIRE: I was going to address that when talking about Korea but perhaps it is best to discuss it here. It perhaps will give some context to what I have to say about Korean policies. One of the biggest headaches we faced during this period was with Japanese resistance to liberalization. The Japanese adhered to an export led growth policy for many years. The idea was to raise incomes by selling a lot overseas. You and I remember the evolution of the Japanese auto as a symbol of that policy, starting with really cheap unimpressive models in the mid 70s which by the 80s had turned into well finished automobiles; and now they have a reputation for excellence. They were very aggressive in their export attempts, particularly towards the United States given the size of our market and the advantage Japanese firms had from much lower wages. We are talking about the 80s now. There was very little Japanese willingness to give on any issue. They simply dug in their heels. Any American dealing with Japan on trade issues at that time remembers the MOSS Talks. This was going on as preparations for the Uruguay Round were starting. The Canadian Free Trade Agreement negotiations were underway. So there were some hopeful signs on the horizon. MOSS stood for Market Oriented Sector Specific, but it came to be known in EB as More Of the Same Stuff. We had one person in DCT who spent full time on Japan. When I say full time when the MOSS sessions took place these talks would go on from 9:00 am until 2:00am. There were some deals cut, it is true. I remember there was one on Japanese imports of certain kinds of American wood. This was hardly a threat to Japanese industry. This sector was cited as one of the successes of the MOSS talks. I remember reading the papers in Seoul perhaps a year later. The Japanese Government had announced that unfortunately the deal on American wood wasn't going to work out because there were too many knotholes per board feet. So this laboriously arrived at deal was agreed to, signed and sealed with fanfare and at the end of the day it did little to improve access to the Japanese market. That was the way the Japanese negotiated. It was infuriating. But the other side of the coin was that the Japanese were absolutely essential to our security interests in that part of the world at that time. So we had a divided State Department and U.S. Government on how tough to be on the Japanese on trade issues. And the Japanese were masters at lobbying within the U.S. Government. In many ways this was a good lesson for me. I think that is one of the reasons EB was interested in seeing me go out to Korea. They knew that I was very committed to bringing back results. And we did.

*Q: So the fact that we had all these security concerns, did that inhibit us so much that we had to give away the store in trade negotiations?*

McGUIRE: Early on in the aftermath of World War II we did give away a lot. Some of the problems that we were facing in the 1980s went back to that period. For example the question of Europe's heavy subsidies to agriculture. But in the period soon after the shooting war the Cold War was raging. Italy and France were tottering, Greece almost went under. Communist parties were very strong. The Korean War demonstrated a willingness of Communist regimes to use military force, and Red China was a hulking presence. Were we going to be able to have a secure and growing Europe as our allies or were we going to end up in a situation where our allies were so weak there was no way to hold off the Eastern Bloc? In those days we didn't know that ultimately the Soviet Union was going to cave in so soon because of their economic policies. I shouldn't be so

simplistic but that was one of the major causes. In the 60s and the 70s it wasn't so evident that would happen. Certainly with the massive military posture of the Soviets in a sense we did go easy on countries that were still weakened by the war and were absolutely key allies. Over time the Europeans got stronger, and by the time we are talking about in the 80s it wasn't so much that we gave away the store but that we had very difficult negotiations with countries that were starting to look internally more and more. I think that is one of the things that has been a bone of contention between Europe and the United States over the last quarter century. The EU has become much more introspective, much more focused on consolidating its gains and expanding. It is very much in our interest that there is a strong Europe. However, I think many of us would like to see the Europeans more willing to take on greater responsibilities than they have sometimes in the past. I think one can say that American policy in the post WWII period despite flaws and despite some setbacks really was an extraordinary thing. If you look at the Marshall Plan, what it did, the potential it created; if you look at the way we worked with the Germans and the French to bring about rapprochement; work with the other Europeans to try and foster a budding European Community; all of this was a fantastic achievement. The vision of people like George Marshall, Dean Acheson, and Harry Truman was extraordinary. That imagination, that creativity, got us all through 50 very challenging years. It has put us in a totally different situation than we would have been in otherwise. So despite the fact that one can be disappointed at some of the outcomes I think the record is very impressive. In Japan, and Korea for that matter, we have seen a total transformation of political and economic systems in the last six decades. Taking nothing away from our allies east and west, all of this is in large measure due to the U.S. desire to build a better, more integrated world economy and a more secure world. And, to go back to your original question, there has been a great deal of progress since the days of the Tokyo Round in the 1970s with respect to a freer, fairer trading system.

*Q: I think so, the United States has been very successful. Despite how you slice it we still come out number one. It is not by sitting back and resting but by various policies carried on.*

McGUIRE: That is true. I think we have provided good leadership; not always perfect; sometimes faltering. I think that our leadership really in many instances was the only thing that stood between the free world and disaster. I think all of us who were involved in late 20th century diplomacy should feel very good about the quality of the service we delivered.

*Q: Ok we are picking up one little slice of what we were up to. You are off to Korea as head of the economic section.*

McGUIRE: Yes.

*Q: What years were you in Korea?*

McGUIRE: I arrived in '87 and left in '90.

*Q: OK, well we will pick it up then.*

McGUIRE: Good.

*Q: Today is 8 October 2014 with Kevin McGuire. Kevin, I will let you pick up the story now.*

McGUIRE: OK, fine, we have talked about my experiences up to 1987. I see 1987 as a dividing line in my career. I had stepped into a senior level job in a major embassy, and was responsible for sorting out some very knotty, high profile economic issues.

*Q: OK, and what was your rank.*

McGUIRE: I was the economic minister for the first two years, and I was also the deputy chief of mission for almost all of the last year. The economic side encompassed a very wide range of responsibilities, but especially the solution of trade issues. As DCM I ran the day to day operations of the embassy.

*Q: Before we get into it I wonder if you can give an overview of how things stood with Korea at the time, and then I will let you take it.*

McGUIRE: Great. You read my mind. I think that is critical to understanding the things we were involved in, and the degree of difficulty in achieving results there. South Korea as you know from your time there was devastated by the Korean War and even before the war it was basically an agricultural society. In the Korean War the North Koreans went all the way down to the southern tip of the peninsula, to Pusan. What infrastructure there was in the South was destroyed. People fled their homes. Families were separated. It was chaos. Had the U.S. and the UN not intervened the North would have succeeded in seizing the South. We arrived in 1987, one generation after the invasion. At the time we arrived Korea had moved to number 17 in terms of the size of its industrial sector, 17$^{th}$ in the world. Korean families were totally committed to bettering the lives of their children. Education was first and foremost in terms of what you needed to do to help your children get ahead. The government agreed on the importance of education and also put a great emphasis on industrial development. By the time we arrived Korean society was evolving very rapidly. The economy was doing exceptionally well. Movement towards political freedom had lagged behind somewhat but the situation was starting to change very dramatically, and social change, for example the status of women, was also changing. Women were starting to take more desirable positions in the work force. Things were happening overnight at that time, it was a society in transition and transition in a very positive sense. The relationship with the U.S. was frayed a bit around the edges. As political evolution was happening there were fewer restrictions on freedom of expression and newspaper coverage so feelings that had been festering for some time started to emerge, feelings that the United States was interfering too much in Korea. On the economic side there was a great deal of concern that Korea was being expected to take on greater responsibility for upholding the international trading community, i.e., liberalization of very restrictive trade regulations. Many government officials and people

felt that because of Korea's difficult past they deserved a bye. They believed that they did not need to open their own market. They were perfectly content to follow a policy laid out by the Japanese of export led growth. That meant keeping your market closed and exporting as much as possible. As I described above, in 1987 the Japanese were still battering us, fighting us every inch of the way against liberalization. The Koreans felt this was a pretty good example and that they should do the same thing. On the political side we were also criticized. Our pressure for increased democratic practice and greater human rights was condemned by some as pushing too hard, and by others for failing to push hard enough.

We have talked about family issues as well as professional issues and maybe this would be a good point to talk about this subject as we start our days in Seoul. For those reading this to get an idea of life in the Foreign Service it might be of particular interest. Kay went back to school during our 1972-77 stay in Washington. She got a Master's in Counseling and began working in the Maryland Public School System. We bought a house in Silver Spring. Our youngest son John arrived. Our two older sons were doing the things kids do in a typical American community. And now we were heading off to a very different culture. Kay had to give up a job she really loved. We had reached a point in our family life where our oldest son, Kiernan, was going off to college so he would be on his own while we moved halfway around the world. That was the first time we had tried leaving a child behind. It was tough. There was no e-mail, telephone contact wasn't convenient. I think it is one of the things that anybody looking at a Foreign Service career needs to understand. Our second son, Dave, was very unhappy to be dragged away from his high school and friends in Silver Spring. He was totally opposed to going overseas and let us know about his unhappiness frequently. Ironically he is now a Foreign Service officer. Our youngest son John was three years old when we left. He came upstairs to the kitchen one evening. The news was on in his play area. He said, "Aren't we going to Seoul?" We said, "Yes." He said, "Well Seoul is on the news. The police and the students are throwing things at one another." Well they were indeed and they did that for the first year we were in Korea. We learned what the smell of tear gas was like. It is not much fun to get caught in between police who have tear gas canisters and students who have paving blocks that they want to throw to protest the political situation. It is even less fun when you have a youngster or two in the car. I just don't think that many people understand that you live with things like these when you are in the Foreign Service. It is not because you are getting paid a lot of money; it is because you feel that you can do important things for this country. I just wanted to put that on the record. A lot of Americans have no idea what we do or the hardships and dangers we face.

*Q: It is not going to reach everybody but this oral history program is about this type of thing.*

McGUIRE: Yes and that is one of the reasons I was enthusiastic about joining the effort. Moving to a different facet of all of this, our relationship with Korea at that time was incredibly important from a political point of view. As I said the evolution of society was unleashing democratic forces, a wonderful thing to see. Even the students and soldiers gradually stopped exchanging tear gas and paving blocks. But as much as we were

delighted to see this change the unleashing of democratic forces complicated life for us. Increased freedom of expression brought more open criticism of the United States. On the economic side every time we had a trade dispute there were headlines. Some Korean political leaders opposed to liberalization used the media to whip up public opposition to it. So part of what we were doing was to get the message across that a more open market was in Korea's interest. This was a big challenge. Good communication was extraordinarily important to this effort, communication with the host government, communication with Korean society as a whole, and communication within the embassy. People without Foreign Service experience may wonder what communication within the embassy refers to. It means you have different government agencies represented at the post, and strange as it may seem to the uninitiated sometimes different agencies have different perspectives on how you should be doing things, and sometimes you can operate at cross purposes unless you take the time to ensure that your entire mission is focused on achieving common objectives. That sometimes can be more difficult than it sounds. Clear communication with Washington is absolutely essential. On economic issues you have the Special Trade Representative's office, State, Treasury, Commerce, and the Department of Agriculture. Then of course you have Congress looking over your shoulder. We had frequent visits from Congressional delegations. So our situation in Seoul was an interesting illustration of the kinds of things that you need to do in an important post where you have major issues at stake.

*Q: By the way, who was the ambassador?*

McGUIRE: Jim Lilley was the ambassador. The day I arrived I woke up at 8 am. We had gotten to our house at 3 am and I couldn't sleep. I decided I would go down to the embassy and do the administrative things one has to do and arrange a call on the ambassador as soon as his schedule permitted. Lilley was a career CIA officer with a great deal of experience in Asia. He became our ambassador to China after leaving Korea. (Don Gregg, another CIA career officer, followed him.) Before I got to do anything on my list, however, just after I walked into my office the telephone rang. It was Washington, the Special Trade Representative's Office. The assistant special trade representative, Peter Allgeier, was on the phone. He said, "Kevin, I hate to do this to you but you need to go immediately this morning to call on the senior economic advisor to the president at the Blue House," the Korean equivalent of the White House. He said that the Koreans had 30 days to show substantial progress on a trade dispute that involved access to the insurance sector. I was familiar with the background on this but the fact that we were so close to a trade dispute was news to me. So I had to make an appointment to go over and see the senior advisor. I hadn't slept, I hadn't called on the ambassador, I hadn't had breakfast, but I had to go over and see the advisor and tell him the news. He was not terribly pleased. He was a very bright guy and had studied in the United States. He understood that the time had come for Korea to make changes in its trade policy. This was an unusual start to an assignment, and to a relationship with a senior host country official. We did manage to get far enough in 30 days that there was not trade retaliation by the U.S. and ultimately a satisfactory agreement emerged. This was not a typical day for me, but close. I lived about a ten minute walk from the embassy, and every day I went down wondering what new crisis are we going to have today. We had all kinds of

disputes. Name the sector, and we had it. As I said, there was a perception by many Koreans that Korea deserved special treatment, kid gloves treatment and they should not be required to do anything to act their age so to speak within the international trading community. I was well known at all the economic agencies around town. I won't say that people necessarily ran in the other direction when they saw me coming but when I appeared people knew there was an issue to settle, and that it would be difficult.

One of the things that we did right from the very start of my tour was to get ourselves organized within the embassy for what everyone expected to be a contentious period. I headed the economic section. We had the Foreign Commercial Service from Commerce, an agricultural office, and a U.S. Customs presence. Some embassies have a formal umbrella organization; in Rome I was the economic minister and I was tasked with coordinating all the economic agency representatives. In Seoul we didn't have that kind of organization in a formal sense, but the DCM looked to me to play the role informally. We all agreed that we needed to maintain very good relations internally so that we were all marching to the same beat. We were recognized as a cohesive unit both by Washington and by our Korean counterparts. We had a really good team. Both the agriculture and commercial offices were headed for most of my tour by good people who understood the need to cooperate together. The economic section was first rate the whole time I was there. When I arrived we had Chris Hill, who went on to become an ambassador a number of times, as our economic reporting officer. He did superb reporting, which was important so that State and the other Washington agencies knew where the Koreans were going in terms of development, in terms of growth, and their possible willingness to make concessions in areas that were of interest to us. He was succeeded by Anne Derse, who also reached ambassadorial rank. People like Jim Gagnon and Patricia Scroggs were other examples of excellence. We spent a lot of time on section 301 cases; these were threatened when all other entreaties to get fair treatment for U.S. companies had failed. (301 was a provision under law that provided authority to impose retaliation against countries imposing unfair restrictions on U.S. companies.) The embassy also suggested to Washington increased efforts to engage quietly senior Korean officials in a broad discussion of liberalization and why it was in Korea's interest to start liberalizing their trade. All of these efforts won very substantial improvements in market access. We won some very significant liberalization measures from the Koreans. Our exports increased three fold from 1987 to 1994. So we really did have an impact. Some problems related to investment rather than trade. We had one issue for example that ended up with the label "going public." The Koreans passed legislation that obliged companies on the Korean stock exchange to divest themselves of a certain percentage of their equity in order to build up the local equity market. In so far as this involved domestic companies it was not a matter for the embassy. But it also impacted foreign investors. There was suspicion on the part of American businessmen that the new legislation was an attempt to force American companies, or foreign investors generally, to give up majority ownership of joint ventures with Korean partners. Many joint ventures were based on a model of 51-52% ownership by the American investor and slightly less than 50% for Korean partners. The reason for that was to enable American companies to maintain control, including over proprietary information and intellectual property rights. There was great concern on the part of American companies that the new

legislation would result in takeovers by Korean investors who would gain access to this special information. This was a very live issue and the American subsidiaries in Korea came to us saying what can you do? Their home offices went to the Special Trade Representative's office in Washington and to State as well. So we worked very closely with the companies on the ground and with the Korean government officials to work out an acceptable settlement. Washington was involved of course but most of the action was in Seoul. It took months but we finally reached a fair settlement.

Sometimes negotiations took strange twists. Perhaps the strangest involved an instance near the end of my tour in which we had negotiated a deal with a very senior official at the Ministry of Finance. It took a lot of time and effort. We finally got the deal in place, and the day it was supposed to be signed I got a call from the Foreign Ministry. The assistant secretary there who dealt with economic affairs said, "Could you please get me an appointment with the assistant special trade representative in Washington because I need to go and renegotiate this agreement." All I could do was laugh. I said, "There is no way. This is not going to be renegotiated." He said, "Nonetheless, I need to go to Washington and I am sure that I can get them to renegotiate." So I called USTR and I explained the situation. I said, "You guys are nuts if you renegotiate. I would like to be able to tell him hell no." I was told to "Play it as you see fit. We are not going to renegotiate." I then called the very senior official at Finance with whom we had worked and explained the situation. I said, "I will tell you straight out I just called Washington and said no way should we do this. " He was amused; "Can I give you some advice?" He said, "I think you should let the assistant minister go to Washington. It is a nice trip. He will enjoy it. Have him go see Mr. Allgeier at USTR, and Mr. Allgeier should then say no. The second page of the assistant secretary's instructions say ok, show me the agreement and I will sign it now." This was extraordinary. At that moment I felt my time in Korea had been a success. It suggested to me that we had made real progress in explaining to senior Korean officials what we were trying to do, and also suggested a level of personal trust had been established.

In addition to agencies at post that dealt with trade or economic issues, we had a very close working relationship with USIA. In the late 1980s in Korea we still had a strong USIA program to complement our aggressive negotiating efforts to fight unfair restrictions on U.S. economic interests. For example we had a touring speakers program on economic and trade issues. We placed articles in the media, we would explain everything from the reasons for intellectual property rights protection to why we wanted to see liberalization in the Korean agricultural sector. We would meet with all kinds of groups and explain where we were coming from with generally good results. You must bear in mind Korea's history to understand the resistance we faced. I remember one evening as the event drew to a close a rather large Korean farmer stood up and said to our agricultural counselor through the interpreter, "We really appreciate you coming down here. But the truth of the matter is if you weren't a diplomat I would really like to punch your lights out." He was very honest at least (he didn't punch anybody's lights out). On intellectual property rights we talked to professors and students and retailers about copy rights for text books. There was a Korean saying that the contents of a book should be shared freely; this suggested that intellectual property rights had no validity in Korea. If

you had a book it should be given to anybody that wanted that book. There shouldn't be any money going to the writer or publisher. There shouldn't be money going to inventors. On computer software there were rip offs everywhere. You would sit down and explain and explain, but a lot of people just didn't want to hear the message. So we ran a public affairs campaign on all of these things and I believe it really did have some impact on public perceptions. And it helped with senior policy people who were responsible for negotiations to understand that the time had come for Korea to change partially because we demanded a fairer trading relationship but also because they were at a point technologically where it was in their economic interests to do so. It was around this period that Korea was going from marketing inexpensive running shoes and apparel to high fashion clothing, autos, and quality electronics. So some people had started to understand that unless they played by internationally accepted rules they weren't going to be able to export these high value products. I was in Pusan right after I arrived in 1987. They still had Quonset huts filled with young women who were gluing innersoles into sneakers and things like that. By the time I left this kind of production had moved to other Asian countries.

One reason for this evolution was a strong work ethic. Another was the high premium put on education. Schools were excellent, children and parents were committed to using education as a stepping stone to a better life. I was asked to join the Harvard Club by a government minister. I got to know him reasonably well because of this connection. One day I said, "Minister, I am just curious, what made you select Harvard?" He said, "Oh that is easy. I couldn't get into Seoul National University." Seoul National was the best university in Korea and a veritable pipeline into government service and high level positions in the private sector. The emphasis on education, the interest in the U.S. and Europe meant that society was changing, attitudes were changing. There was a growing appreciation of the need to pull Korea into modern society, so it was a very exciting time to be there.

Unfortunately my comments are disjointed. Korean attitudes were definitely starting to change and the U.S. was contributing to those changes. But we faced a huge workload of trade disputes. On civil aviation we had serious problems. Korean Air was flying to the U.S. and they had very nice terminal access in the places they flew into. But the American airlines flying into Seoul were assigned second rate passenger, baggage and cargo facilities; it seemed part of an effort to steer business to the Korean carrier. In sea transport we had the same issue, U.S. operations were relegated to an inferior terminal storage area which impeded business. Intellectual property rights was a particularly tough area. I have mentioned several problems in that area but I want to go to the movie industry. Korea had a movie industry of some renown. The movie makers totally controlled the market place. One of the things we asked for was an opening to show a limited number of American feature films. It was like pulling teeth. The Korean industry was totally opposed. They were not producing first class quality, but Koreans loved movies, and they went to the theater. The business was good. So the Korean industry absolutely opposed any kind of opening. We finally got a very limited agreement. I want to say one of the Star Wars movies. That may not be right, but it was a movie like that, a real blockbuster came to town. The reaction was sensational. Long lines formed of people

waiting to get in to see the show. The second day people showed up but the screen had been slashed by goons. So things were put on hold. We went back, we revisited. We got new guarantees. The Korean government did crack down and try to provide surveillance to see that the agreement was not undermined by thuggery. But think of yourself in a dark theater. It is an exciting movie that is taking your full attention, and suddenly you feel something around your ankles. Yes, the goons came and brought bags of snakes into the movie theater and released them. You can imagine the results. That theater emptied out in record time. Everything was a battle to get any degree of progress. We persisted. Ultimately we prevailed on this issue. But every time I go into a movie theater I think about those snakes. We also had congressional visits, and this is a good place to talk about the impact that congressional visits can have sometimes. I think we tend to complain because sometimes these people are not serious.

*Q: Yeah it is just a jaunt.*

McGUIRE: Yes. And in a sense Korea was a stop on the way to some other exciting places in Asia, and a shopping stop because Itaewon is located quite close to where the embassy was located.

*Q: Oh yeah, you can get clothes made.*

McGUIRE: You could in those days have clothes made at a fraction of the price of what you would pay in the United States. Maybe your wife would like a Gucci purse or some other accessory with a famous name. Well you could get them in Itaewon. Gucci never saw these when they came off his assembly line because they were made in Korea. They were rip offs. You could get fancy looking watches that were inexpensive. So again intellectual property rights were hanging out there at all times.

*Q: When I was there, I mean this was way back, the Congressmen would sort of ignore the embassy and head for Itaewon.*

McGUIRE: That could happen. I am going to talk in a couple of minutes about presidential visits and other high level visits. Visitors can get into real trouble buying in Itaewon. When President Bush came out just after taking office in 1989, Secretary Baker came with him. His wife was photographed waving goodbye to people on the steps of Air Force One in the company of the President and Mrs. Bush and her husband while holding a "Gucci" purse that was still in the cellophane that she had purchased it in at Itaewon. That was a mistake that drew unfavorable reaction from the American press and detracted a bit from a very successful presidential stop. But we did have some very good visitors out there. I think the best congressional visits that I experienced in my almost 40 years in the service came from Dan Rostenkowski. Do you remember him?

*Q: Yeah, he was from Chicago.*

McGUIRE: He was from Chicago and he unfortunately ended up going to jail for I think franking violations. I don't recall exactly, but he did go to jail.

*Q: Was it banking?*

McGUIRE: He was Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee at that time, and he was very interested in trade, and in the U.S. getting a fair deal. He visited perhaps six months after I arrived in Seoul. He had some senior people from his committee, a mix of Republicans and Democrats as I recall. We sat down in my office. He said, "OK, what do I need to do? What do you want me to say?" We had all the right appointments set up for him. I said, "Mr. Congressman if you could say X, Y, and Z, and I just happen to have a copy of suggested talking points." He looked at it and said, "Done. Let's get going." He used those talking points everywhere. We had him say things like "This is what we need to see progress on. I come every year to Korea. If we don't have progress on these things, it is not going to be a good thing. So please do your best to work with my friends here at the mission and give us some results that we can be mutually happy with." It was terrific. The Koreans knew that he meant what he said. Again it was a question of coordinating to make sure that everybody from the U.S. Government was sending the same message. There was no back door, no way to get off the hook. It was very effective. I know some colleagues have very negative views on congressional visitors but for the most part I found them useful. And Rostenkowski and a number of others were very serious and did an excellent job.

Let me shift gears a bit here. About a year and a half into my time in Korea the DCM called me up to his office. His name was Stan Brooks. I don't know if you have ever run into Stan. After Seoul he became the head of our operation in Taipei.

*Q: American interest section.*

McGUIRE: AIT is the American Institute in Taiwan. Because of the complicated relationship with China we don't have an embassy in Taipei. Stan didn't have the formal title of ambassador but he was in charge there. In Seoul, Stan was a fantastic DCM; an absolutely terrific guy, seemingly very laid back in terms of dealing with the staff. I never heard him yell, never heard him denigrate anybody. He was very even tempered but he knew exactly what he wanted and he knew exactly what the mission needed to be doing at any given time. The mission was quite large, and thanks to Stan extremely well run. Everybody respected Stan and would knock themselves out for him. We also had very high quality people at the mission. There were 180 Americans, plus a military advisory group. That is why I say mission rather than embassy. And of course we had a liaison role with the U.S. Army, including with the four star general who was in command of our troops on the ground out there. They were not under chief of mission authority because it was a combat zone. Cooperation was very close. Anyhow Stan asked me to come up to his office. He said, "No one knows this yet, the ambassador is leaving on such and such a date. I want you to be the acting DCM as I assume charge of the mission. I said, "Well you know there are other more senior people in the mission. Maybe you want to look at someone who is more senior, or perhaps at the political counselor because of the importance of the liaison with the U.S. military." He said, "No, if you will do it, you are the guy." So I said, "Yes." It turned out to be a fantastic ride, one that lasted over a year.

As you know the DCM runs the mission on a day to day basis. I also continued to be the economic minister, so I had a really full plate. Not too long after this conversation Stan called me again to his office. He said, "Well you are one lucky guy. I have just gotten a message that the president is coming. And you will be the control officer."

*Q: Which president is this?*

McGUIRE: George H. W. Bush. You know what a presidential visit is like.

*Q: I have heard it described as the equivalent of a major earthquake.*

McGUIRE: My initial reaction was we hardly have any time and that is bad. I had been through a presidential visit in my first post in Canberra. We had a fair amount of warning and it was a nightmare because you had all these people coming from Washington telling you the wrong things about what the president wanted. It turned out that most of their advice was off target. For us in Korea the visit was a tremendous amount of work, but it came at the perfect time. From my point of view as economic minister we had so many things percolating on trade issues and a word from the president could give those efforts a real boost. But one of the things I haven't mentioned was that within a few months of our arrival there had been a presidential election. A retired military officer won. His predecessor had been an active duty general, and the military had been in control for many years. Roh Tae-woo was elected, but one of the most interesting features of the election was that the vote was split three ways, and each of the three candidates, two of whom were widely respected political figures, got about 30+% . Well there were outcries from various quarters. The students went on the war path claiming that the election had been cooked. Nonetheless, there was a feeling in the country that there really was movement happening. When elections were held for the National Assembly a few months later the opposition parties announced a week before the election that immediately after the announcement of the results, they were going to organize massive protests and shut down Seoul. When the results were announced, the opposition parties were no longer the opposition. They won about 70% of the vote! This was the Korea we experienced over and over again. Nothing was static. Turn the page and start anew because you have a whole new situation. So President Bush was coming out in an environment where change was really happening at a phenomenal pace. It was perfect timing for him to deliver a message about our continuing commitment to Korea's security but also about wanting to see more progress on democracy and freedom of expression and opening of markets and so forth. It was a great visit. It was short, 3/4's of a day but packed with quality events. And everything had gone like clockwork thanks to our incredible team. I don't think I have ever felt so much relief in my life as standing at the airport and watching Air Force One take off. It was a very intense experience, and not my last experience in doing that kind of thing as it turned out. I should finish where I started. We had sent a draft itinerary to Washington very soon after receiving word of the visit. The reply said we don't like that, change it all around. Some days before the visit we tried again and this time Washington accepted our advice and what we had originally proposed.

The high fives had barely ended over the success of the presidential visit when we got word the vice president was coming. He was going to stay for three days which is a totally different kettle of fish. As you know it means nonstop efforts setting up everything and then hoping that the glue holds together that long. Dan Quayle did not have, let us say, the best of reputations. There were suggestions that he was not particularly bright and not particularly briefable, and not particularly likable. That was not the case in Korea. He was very thoughtful and very nice to the staff. With one exception he did everything we suggested that he do. Press relations was one area where we were really scared to death because he had a reputation for not always saying things in the best fashion. And the improvement in freedom of the press made any press appearance an opportunity for misinterpretation. But he was terrific; he handled himself well. Again it was a very good visit, and again we all felt it reinforced the messages that we had been giving.

*Q: I would like to close at this point. For the next time I would like to talk about particularly the trade negotiations. Was China at all a factor? We will talk about that. Also were there any areas where negotiations either in agriculture or manufacturing or something else faced almost insurmountable obstacles? We will go on from there. Also while you were DCM, how we felt about the North Koreans.*

McGUIRE: Great.

*Q: Today is the 29th of June, 2015 with Kevin McGuire. And Kevin has been off for about six months getting medical treatment but now is back in full fiddle. And when were you -- we're still talking about your time in Korea right now as acting DCM.*

McGUIRE: Right.

*Q: When was this?*

McGUIRE: That would have been early in 1989. So for most of the last half of my tour I was doing two jobs. And it was challenging. Very busy days.

*Q: Well, you talked about George Bush, George W. Bush as a -- I mean George Herbert Walker Bush.*

McGUIRE: Right.

*Q: Coming on a visit. And of course he was an accomplished diplomat.*

McGUIRE: He was.

*Q: And had been in the area in China. How about, how did the vice president's visit go?*

McGUIRE: The Quayle visit went very well. I talked about it last time. He did a very good job with the Koreans. The Korean press at that time had been freed to write

whatever they wanted after many years of restrictions and of course the opposition parties were in full bloom at that point and were in control of the National Assembly. There were questions thrown in his direction that were a bit pointed and reflective of the very complex relationship we have with Korea. On the one hand there was enormous gratitude for what we did during and after the Korean War, on the other hand, a certain -- hostility is too harsh a term -- but a desire to not have a big brother who was quite so close.

*Q: And fair enough --*

McGUIRE: Fair enough, yes. There were small things that occurred that showed this ambivalence. For example, during the Seoul Olympic Games in '88, the Koreans wanted a perfect show where nothing went awry, everything was orderly and neatly done, and according to plan. And at the opening ceremony when the Australian team came in -- of course their team was small -- they didn't march in in neat rows according to Korean desires. They were all over the track and waving to the crowd and taking pictures and things like that. And the Canadians did the same thing a little bit later. Then our team came in and we had a very large team. They did the same thing the Canadians and the Australians had done. They were all over the track. I remember track star Carl Lewis going over and shaking hands with people in the stands (they loved it) and a lot of "Hi Mom" signs, and pictures being taken. Frankly it was great. But for some Koreans this was disrespectful. Objectively, there was nothing disrespectful about it. But this got a great deal of attention in the newspapers and it generated a lot of short term criticism of the U.S. One American newspaper writer said this was a meeting of Korean hypersensitivity and American insouciance.

I am just using this as an example of how innocent things could trigger a very negative reaction. Quayle got some barbed questions and he had far more time with the press than President Bush did. He handled this very well and the Koreans were rather pleased. He was very respectful and well informed on the relationship and gave good answers.

*Q: Well, on trade relations I know I made a note a year ago to say what about trade negotiations or anything dealing with China at the time. Was there anything of that nature?*

McGUIRE: Well, not directly. Not in the sense of negotiations. We had many bilateral negotiations, formal bilateral negotiations with the Koreans. And then of course the Uruguay Round was happening. But the Chinese weren't party to either of these categories. And so in a formal sense, no, the Chinese didn't figure in our work. But you know, I think everybody involved in international economics and diplomacy was hoping that one would see a softening up of the hard line policies of the Chinese communists by virtue of some growing affluence. And that had started. The Chinese and the South Koreans didn't have diplomatic relations at that point, but business was booming. And we would talk with Korean businessmen who had just come back from China. I forget where the airport transfer point was. They went to Thailand or Singapore, I don't remember, and changed planes and then went straight into China. There were no blocks on their entry and there was tremendous business going on. And of course that has continued and now

the political relationship has been normalized. There's a lot of Korean investment in China and the economic relationship is fairly close. South Korean businessmen also tried to open doors to North Korea. That was not so successful.

*Q: Well, at the time you were there what did the trade -- although there's no official agreement -- consist of?*

McGUIRE: The Koreans were investing in China and some other Asian countries to take advantage of low wage rates. Korea was moving into more high value products at home and moving the production of cheaper goods offshore. There were also purchases of raw materials from China. So Korea was playing a real role in the economic transformation that was happening in China.

*Q: Did you see any change in Korean society as it got more prosperous?*

McGUIRE: This was a society that seemed to change every day. It was incredible what was happening. I have told the story about how just before our arrival our three year old son noticed on the TV news that the soldiers and students were fighting in Seoul. After our arrival more than once we were trapped in traffic jams caused by these clashes. The students were demonstrating for democracy and human rights. The election of President Roh marked a turning point in Korea's political history. He had announced that he wished to promote political reform and to the surprise of many he stuck to that goal. The National Assembly elections soon after Roh's election gave the democratic parties control of the legislature, and established a democratic path for the nation. A free press and improved civil rights accompanied the change. This was a remarkable transformation. And the demonstrations ended; the student-soldier strife disappeared. There were other signs of change as well. We had some civil aviation negotiations in Seoul as all these political changes were occurring. The American delegation arrived. And they were all women. Any trade negotiations received ample media coverage, including TV and newspaper photos. Young Korean women started stopping me on the street. (I walked to work every day.) For a month after the talks young women would come up to me and say, "You're from the American Embassy. We saw your delegation and we want women on our delegations. We have to get fair treatment. You need to tell the Korean Government that they need to do something about this." About seven years after I left Korea I was at a UN conference and I saw the Korean diplomat who had been the assistant secretary for economic affairs at the Foreign Ministry. We had clashed many, many times, but we managed to maintain a friendly relationship despite the differences on substance. He told me with great pride that his daughter was the first woman brought into their diplomat service. He went on that there were more and more women who were coming into professional positions that formerly they would have not had a shot at. And of course now the Korean president is a woman.

*Q: Yeah, the pictures I've seen, they have no relationship to what I saw both in the middle of the war and then I saw it again 25 years later. But now it's just incredible.*

McGUIRE: Yes, the city has changed tremendously. People always said that the city of Seoul transformed itself every five years. Kay and I flew out to see our youngest son and his wife who were engaged in development work in Cambodia. We transited Seoul. The airport used to be a wreck that dated back to --

*Q: I want to say Kimpo.*

McGUIRE: -- the '50s. Kimpo, yes. They kept throwing additions on it, but the building was just terrible, with no amenities. They now have a new airport at Incheon that ranks with the best airports in the world. You have to admire what the Koreans have achieved. And I would add that the U.S. has played a critical role in South Korea's evolution. A quick comparison of the North and the South speaks volumes about the Cold War era, and the clash of systems that it represented.

*Q: Well, you left there when?*

McGUIRE: In 1990.

*Q: And where you'd go?*

McGUIRE: I went to Rome -- you had another interesting question.

*Q: OK, good.*

McGUIRE: You asked whether there were any areas where there were almost insurmountable obstacles. Well, some days it seemed like almost everything fit in that category. But as I have already indicated we made a lot of progress in a lot of areas. But agriculture in particular was very, very difficult. Like the Japanese, the Koreans wanted to keep their small rice paddies and their traditional approach--

*Q: I suppose the Koreans' stomach wasn't compatible with Arkansas rice.*

McGUIRE: Well, that kind of thing is always an excuse. But it hasn't been just the Koreans and Japanese who have been difficult in this area. You know the Europeans have also found numerous excuses for restrictions in agricultural trade. Part of it is economic but social considerations are also important. We did get some market openings in Korea for things like beef, fruits, and tobacco products but most important we started a process that yielded good results over time. Our agricultural sales continued to grow and reached respectable levels. Our agricultural counselor was George Pope, an outstanding representative of the U.S. I should also mention George Mu, our Commercial Counselor, for his work on general commercial promotion and on intellectual property rights and other negotiations.

*Q: Well, the Korean government under Park Chung-hee had done a really remarkable job in supporting the farmers, as opposed to most countries under dictatorships where they, you know, basically take the bread from the farmers and pass it onto the city folks*

*so they won't demonstrate. And the farmers are left holding an empty sack. But he arranged that they were getting fair compensation. I mean were the farmers -- was good trade with the United States on the farm side hurting the farmers?*

McGUIRE: Farmers were held in reverence there. Historically they had been the backbone of South Korea. At the time of the Korean War there was little industry in the south. It has only been since the war that there's been the development of an industrial society and the building up of large companies. Korean administrations in the aftermath of the war didn't deserve any medals for promoting democracy. But they did understand that there were things that had to be done to promote the economy and build an industrial base; and they wanted a strong farm sector as well. So one could understand Korean attitudes in the late 1980s. But you cannot have an international system in which some countries keep their markets closed while taking advantage of countries which open their markets. We were not demanding a complete immediate opening of the Korean economy or the agricultural sector overnight; just asking for progress towards the proverbial level playing field. A very small example, there was no justification for Korea to block wine imports in order to protect non competitive local production.

*Q: Well, in terms of energy, how stood the Koreans regarding nuclear energy?*

McGUIRE: The Koreans had decided that nuclear power was an attractive alternative to fossil fuels. They didn't have any natural resources and had enormous pollution problems. We were trying to work with them on becoming more responsible in terms of protecting the environment. They learned a very interesting lesson in 1988 when they hosted the Olympic games. The atmosphere in Seoul was foul; the emphasis was on development and there was no wish to incur additional costs by cleaning up the environment and making companies burn less sulfur laden coal and oil. For the Olympic games the government was very committed to having a success story. And they finally realized they had a problem. If you drove over the airport bridge many days you couldn't see the Han River perhaps 150 feet below because the pollution was so bad. So they put on very strict controls on what kind of fuels could be used for the month before the Games. Some factories were closed down. At the end of the month of regulation there was a dramatic difference in air quality. After the Games the government kept some of the prohibitions in place; some were modified. An environmental movement actually started up during that period, because people saw what could be done by some relatively simple measures. And I understand they've continued to be much better about this. One of the things they did was to emphasize nuclear energy, which offers some real benefits. Of course there is a downside as well, which no doubt explains why they have not pushed dependence on nuclear to the extent once planned. I believe they have leveled off at about 40% of electricity generation. Cleaner fossil fuels, like natural gas, are very important now.

*Q: Well then, maybe it's time to go to Italy, is it, or not?*

McGUIRE: Yes. We spent a lot of time on Korea.

*Q: Well also, I encourage you to expand, embellish, and all that. Get everything you can think of into it.*

McGUIRE: Korea is a really important part of my story. I'm not talking about me, but I mean --

*Q: No, overall --*

McGUIRE: To show what the Foreign Service does and how important what we do is, and how important foreign affairs is in the life of our country. Korea is a wonderful example, a wonderful success story. The efforts during the Korean War, the assistance program that was put in place after the war, the encouragement that was given to the South and the security buffer that was provided against the mad men in the North, and the nurturing of a society that had enormous potential and now has realized that in economic terms, in human rights terms, in social terms, and political terms. This story speaks highly of what a developing country can do when it gets solid assistance. And it's a wonderful example of what the U.S. can do. There are so many wonderful stories out there that people have forgotten. They forget about Europe and the recovery after the war. They forget about the recovery of Japan. They forget about the Cold War. And some of us forget why it is important to play a leadership role in the world, or worse yet forget about international affairs at all.

*Q: Well, I just came back from my sixty-fifth college reunion, my class. Graduated in 1950, early June 1950.*

McGUIRE: *(laughs)*

*Q: I think if somebody had run around and said, "Where is Korea?" I mean it's like saying, "Where is Andorra?" or something like that. They had some college students helping out for the reunion and at least two guys -- I mentioned I was in the Korean War and served in Korea -- said, "I was born in Korea." They were Korean students, and this is at Williams. You know, one of our top small colleges. I mean there's a tremendous tie between these two countries.*

McGUIRE: Yes

*Q: There's only one drawback I feel about the Koreans. I served as consul general in Seoul and also in Saigon. And Korean food is no match for Vietnamese food. At least in my opinion.*

McGUIRE: Well, we still go to get our kimchi fix and some bulgogi.

*Q: Well anyway, you left Korea when and where'd you go?*

McGUIRE: We finished Korea in 1990. I guess I should say again, I'm doing this for individuals who might be interested in the Foreign Service who want to know what the

career and the life are like. During my last year in Seoul I was asked by the people in the European Bureau to bid on Paris as economic minister. The Uruguay Round was picking up a head of steam. The French were difficult on trade issues, especially on agriculture. I had a very strong trade background; knew the main players in Washington; and had excellent French. When I was asked if I would go to Paris I said that would be my first pick. And so I thought everything was set, and the embassy in Paris thought so too. But we discovered late in the selection cycle that there had been a class action suit and that one of the people in that class action suit had been promised the economic minister job in Paris. This was a person without French and without a trade background, but the job had been promised to her. When something like that happens late in the assignment process, as you know, that puts you at a big disadvantage.

*Q: Oh yes.*

McGUIRE: I raised some questions and the European Bureau said "We want McGuire." The embassy in Paris sent in a strong cable. I didn't have friends there; they were just people who knew me professionally. They argued that it made no sense to assign someone without key credentials, especially when I had exactly what was needed. The Personnel Bureau resisted. I don't want to go into the ins and outs of this class action suit. The point is that one should not have high expectations about the way the system works at State. Overall I don't have much to complain about on assignments. But that one would have been a dream job for me. Then I got a call from the DCM in Rome who said, "I hear you're not going to Paris. Why don't you come to Rome as economic minister?" I hesitated. First, I didn't have any Italian and second, I didn't think the Italians were going to be central players in the Uruguay Round negotiations. So I said, "Let me think about it." Kay was very enthused about Rome. And from a personal point of view who would not be? I had worked for Dan Serwer before and liked and respected him. We heard from other colleagues from past years who encouraged us to join the team there. So we did. And it worked out well. So if you join the Foreign Service family do so with the recognition that strange things may happen to you and you have to take it in stride. Don't let it wreck your morale and don't let it ruin what is a marvelous experience.

So we started gearing up for Rome. I came back to do a quick course in Italian and some other things at the Foreign Service Institute. But we didn't take home leave because of the way the timing was working out. Rome was headed by a political ambassador; Peter Secchia. You may have heard other people talk about him. Peter knew very little about foreign affairs before his appointment. He did contribute a lot to Republican causes. He was very enthusiastic. His instincts were good and he was a real asset on contact building. He had his own fortune and didn't have to worry about a small allowance from the State Department to do representational work. So he and his wonderful wife Joan entertained all the time. He was one of the best ambassadors that I ever encountered in terms of including staff in functions where they could expand their contacts. And as you know, that's the name of the game. In Italy it is most definitely the name of the game. And as I go through my experiences there, there were so many times that contacts made the difference in getting decisions that were positive in terms of American interests. We had a very good staff from State. I supervised directly an Economic Section and a

Science Section, both headed by Foreign Service officers, Bob Deutsch and Reno Harnish, superb officers who went on to reach very senior positions. The other agencies in the economic umbrella group I headed included Treasury, Agriculture, the Foreign Commercial Service, Customs, and the Federal Aviation Administration. Not all the stars were from State. Steve Wallace was one. He headed our FAA office which did a great job on aviation safety and security, not just between the U.S. and Italy but in a very large region. Very few Americans have any idea of the varied jobs embassies do to protect their interests. Nor do they understand how government cutbacks and closures can undermine their own well being.

The range of issues that we covered was what you might expect in a country with a GDP and a population equivalent to France and the UK. They were very much involved in all of the major economic issues that were at play. In fact, when I arrived the Italians were in the chair of what was known then as the European Community. When you're in the presidency role you have six months where you play a particularly important role not just within the EC but also in EC's relationship with the U.S. The Uruguay Round was really heating up at that point and we worked with the Italians to get them to be flexible and to maybe counterbalance the French within the EC a bit in terms of willingness to open markets. Italy's membership in the G7 meant they were involved in a very broad range of issues in that forum, everything from cooperation on fiscal and monetary policy to environmental problems. They were also members of the IEA, so around the time I arrived, thanks to the Gulf War…

*Q: This is in Sudan?*

McGUIRE: No, the Gulf --

*Q: Oh, the Gulf War.*

McGUIRE: Yes. I was not involved in the joint political/military efforts then underway but in cooperation on oil supply security, an issue of great concern. And so there was agreement with the Italians and other IEA member countries on the use of oil stocks if necessary. Another economic security issue involved sensitive technology. The Soviet Bloc was disintegrating. There were grave concerns about the leakage of very sophisticated products into states that would not or could not protect the technology. And so COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls) put a spotlight on the problem. There was an attempt to prevent the flow of things like super computers eastward. This technology could be used in a variety of ways that could be inimical to western security. The Italians had strong trade relations with the Soviet Bloc, and the Italian Communist Party, which was still in existence, had close political ties there as well. New legislation would be needed by the Italian Parliament to put in effect the new COCOM procedures. When I went to speak to the key leaders in both of the houses of the parliament I was told that it would be virtually impossible for the Italians to put new legislation in place, even though the government agreed with it in substance, because there wasn't sufficient time in the session to get the legislation passed. The only way that they could do that would be by fast track consideration. That meant getting the

Communists on board, and that just wouldn't happen. Well, I had some good contacts with the Communists. I went to one of their shadow ministers; he understood exactly what we were trying to do and was very sympathetic. He asked for one day and delivered Communist Party support to fast track legislation. The legislation went through and the Italians acted in concert with the other COCOM members. Washington was very surprised; they thought it was mission impossible.

Another example of the broad range of issues we covered was space cooperation. The Italians were very interested in this area and had developed a high level of expertise in it. They were convinced of the scientific value of the International Space Station. Our science counselor worked especially well with them on organizing a test via the Space Shuttle of their tethered satellite system for producing electricity for use in space. He facilitated an arrangement with NASA ; they agreed that this would be a valuable experiment. The Italian Government was very pleased, and the Italian public was jubilant that this highly publicized test would occur. This particular experiment did not succeed but I understand later ones did. This was an interesting illustration of the breadth of our relationship. While in the sky I should mention that we worked very hard on liberalization of civil aviation, and on helping to get some improvements for American carriers in Italy. And we supported McDonald-Douglas in their successful efforts to sell five commercial aircraft to the Italians.

I talked about intellectual property rights problems in Korea. The Koreans were not the only bad actors in this area. The U.S. Business Software Alliance (SBA) approached us and said that they were seeking U.S. trade retaliation against Italy because of the tremendous amount of pirated software that was being sold and used in Italy. We suggested that perhaps a better way would be to work with us to put together a program to solve the problem. The SBA was enthusiastic about trying that. And so we did an all-out blitz. We started with Italian producers involved in software/hardware related equipment; they had the same concerns. They were very eager to participate in trying to put together a program that would get new laws and new enforcement in place. And so we went to the foreign ministry and the prime minister's office and we talked to party leaders. And we got the BSA and their Italian colleagues to come up with specific draft legislation that would help solve the problem and also suggestions on how enforcement could be increased. Then we went in and we sold the package to the parties in the coalition government. The package of legislation was passed. New enforcement techniques were put in place and I think it was the Carabinieri that was tasked to help police it. And it was so successful that the BSA, instead of bringing a special 301 action against the Italians, had a resolution passed in the U.S. Congress praising the Italian government for its activism in dealing with this problem. I remember getting phone calls from contacts in the Italian government saying, "You're a real pain in the neck. I've got the Carabinieri in my office looking for pirated software." It was an interesting example of how an embassy can be an activist in putting together programs and putting together coalitions to help solve serious issues for American companies.

Disney heard about the success on software. They had avoided coming around to see us. They had decided they would just address their film piracy problems through the courts.

They said “The BSA is very happy. Can you help us?” And so we sat down and we plotted out a slightly different approach, but using the same players in the Italian government, starting with the foreign ministry and the prime minister’s office and going to the parliament, and working with law enforcement agencies. We got Disney and other moviemakers who had been affected by the piracy, to sponsor seminars for judges and supervisory police officials to try and educate them on the nature of the problem and ways to get rid of it. Once again we found strong support for action. One factor was that the proceeds from many of the pirated videos were going to organized crime, the Mafia and its equivalent in other parts of the country.

*Q: Yeah. They have heavy fines, 12 years of prison, I mean as a top figure. That’s big stuff.*

McGUIRE: I assume these prevention programs are still going. The Italians really tightened up on every aspect of the film piracy problem. Things used to happen along the following lines. A courier would come into the country. He would have a sealed bag with copies of a first run movie. They were supposed to be delivered the next day. The Mafia would pay the couriers off. They had warehouses set up with hundreds of recording machines, so they could make thousands of top quality copies overnight before the film was released. And they would have vendors out on the street selling these things immediately. That was just one aspect of what they were doing. The police put additional people on the monitoring side. Laws were tightened. Judges started to hand down heavy punishment for violations. It was another example of what a good embassy can do when confronted with a problem.

*Q: Yeah.*

McGUIRE: Very few Americans know about these types of accomplishments. The BSA people were very gracious privately and publicly in their praise of the embassy. The head lawyer from Disney was not very forthcoming in this regard. So the ambassador got a brief polite note, that was it. That seemed a bit light given the magnitude of the IPR problem, which approached one billion dollars a year, and the fact that we had invested a large amount of time to create and execute a successful plan. A letter to the secretary of State might have been nice, or even something in the media. That’s one of the reasons that the public doesn't know how much we do, because that information doesn't get shared very far. My staff, however, gave me a Mickey Mouse tee shirt for my birthday. I think, but I have never been sure, that it was a reminder of the anti-piracy efforts.

I have to share a memorable moment, not because it approached the importance of the last examples. But it speaks in a humorous way to the kind of role Ambassador Secchia played in my area. One of the U.S. airlines had a problem getting approval for a new security company that they wanted to use at Fiumicino Airport. Our FAA people assured us that the company was a good candidate. But the airline couldn’t get the necessary clearances in place. We tracked it down and the key player was the prefect of Rome, who had the power to yea or nay this company’s application. We just couldn't get him or his staff to respond to our inquiries. The ambassador was having a Christmas reception. I

noticed on the Christmas party list the prefect's name. So I said to the ambassador, "Look, this is not a huge problem, but it's one that's impinging on the operation of an American airline, and we'd really like to solve it. I can't do it because I can't get access to the guy that can solve this. He's coming to your Christmas party. Can you pull him aside and ask him if he can do this?" Sure enough, the prefect arrived and the ambassador greets him, grabs him by the tie, and he leads him over behind the Christmas tree. And he's waving to me madly. I went over there and Ambassador Secchia said, "We have a problem, and Kevin will tell you all about it, but I would really personally appreciate it if you could sort this out." I gave the prefect a 30-second summary. And he said, "Why don't you come see me?" I said, "We've tried and tried and we can't get an appointment from your staff." He replied, "Ten o'clock on such and such a date. Be in my office. I'll have the signed document for you." So we went over. We were offered a cup of Italian coffee. We got the signed document and the assurance that this new company could go to work. In Korea there was decision making by committee, so you were never quite sure if you were talking to the right person. In Italy if you got to the right official it was frequently possible to do business quickly.

I have mentioned that Italy was a member of the G7, along with the U.S., Germany, the UK, France, Canada, and Japan. This added a dimension to the embassy's work that did not exist in Seoul. We had an ongoing role assisting in exchanges between Washington and Rome on related issues, especially as the annual Summit for heads of state approached. When a country hosts the Summit the task becomes even more complex. U.S. input to the host country on the agenda topics is more extensive, and logistics considerations come to the fore given the attendance of the president. In mid 1993 our chargé and I went to see Prime Minister Ciampi to talk about the Italian plans for the 1994 G7 Summit. Ciampi was probably the best prime minister in Italy's post war era. Ciampi ran over an outline of where the Italians hoped the Summit discussions would go. He volunteered that he had decided to do the Summit in Naples. He added that the few Italian officials he had shared this information with had tried to dissuade him. This was at a time when political activists in the wealthy north were talking about splitting up the country, and jettisoning the link with the much less affluent south. He wanted to make a strong political statement that Italy was one nation and must remain so. During the six months leading up to the Summit we had a constant flow of demarches to deliver and a steady stream of high level visitors from Washington, including the U.S. sherpa and sous sherpa. The G7 traditionally had focused on economic issues and the talks included discussions on jobs and growth, but also included focus on trade, the environment, the developing world, and nuclear matters, and there was a parallel forum on political cooperation. And the decision was made to include the Russians for the first time in a separate context, the G8. Everybody was hopeful that the Russians were going to start playing a more positive role. The experience provided a very interesting window on very high level policy considerations. The sherpa gave us high marks for our assistance in the run up. And then of course we had responsibility for the support of a presidential delegation. I had a fair degree of experience in handling such visits by this time but this one was very complicated. First, the president had just done a visit to Rome to mark the D-Day 50th anniversary. Second, the visit was three full days. Third, the first lady came out and had her own program. Fourth, it was done in Naples, and this was the biggest

challenge of all. Naples is not an easy place to do something like this because of its lack of infrastructure. There were about a thousand Americans who streamed into Naples including the press, the technical support staff, senior advisors, advisors to the senior advisors, et al. Naples had nowhere near the hotel capacity to support such an influx. The residence of the consul general was chockablock with visitors, including me. We had people all over the area, in Ischia, Capri and down the coastline far south of Naples. We had people coming in on ferryboats every morning and we hoped the boats would run on time.

*Q: Where were you holding it?*

McGUIRE: The Summit talks themselves were in central Naples. The Italians closed the center of town off and there's a Bourbon palace that --

*Q: I think Nelson used to hang out there.*

McGUIRE: Yes, I believe that is correct.

*Q: And when he was visiting the wife of the British representative, Mrs. -- what's her name?*

McGUIRE: Hamilton.

*Q: Buddy Hamilton.*

McGUIRE: The palace is very nice, not a wildly ostentatious place. It was very convenient, very well laid out, and it accommodated the meetings well. And then they used…..

*Q: Yeah, it's sticking out into the bay.*

McGUIRE: It's adjacent to the bay and very close to the Castel dell'Ovo. The Castel was used for the initial G7 dinner. In fact, I remember that site very clearly. I was standing at the doorway of the president's hotel which was joined to the Castel by a short walkway. President Clinton arrived and he and I were chatting while he waited for the signal to cross the bridge. He got the green light and we both stepped out of the door. Suddenly a Secret Service agent grabbed the president and pulled him roughly back inside. Now I'm still standing there alone wondering what is going on. There is a quick exchange on a walkie talkie, the Secret Service agent said, "Sorry, Mr. President, it's OK to go now." I asked the agent, "What was that all about?" He said, "Well, you wouldn't believe it but one of the Carabinieri who's up at the top of the Castel decided he wanted to get a really good look at the president, so guess what he used? The sight on his weapon."

*Q: Oh God. Oh God.*

McGUIRE: I thought, even with all the security precautions, this guy would have had a clear shot if he had been so inclined. But the other thing that crossed my mind -- not immediately, but soon thereafter -- was that I had been out there in the middle of the doorway. So if somebody would have been hit, that would probably have been me. These things are an enormous amount of work, there are so many details to be nailed down in terms of substance but also in terms of logistics. I have to mention the site of the final Summit event, a dinner held in Caserta. I don't know if you ever have been there.

*Q: Oh yes. You know, I was consul general in Naples. I mean Caserta, I used to take people up there and I'd say, "It's a little bit like Versailles except bigger."*

McGUIRE: Yes. And just as opulent. What a place, what a fantastic setting. It was not usually open to the public while we were in Italy. The Italians did a fantastic job of sprucing the place up for the event. Caserta is a bit of history that will not, should not return. But beautiful nonetheless. The Clintons seemed happy with our support. The meetings were judged a success, the Russians made encouraging noises that unfortunately did not last, and PM Ciampi got his wish that the choice of Naples would help reinforce Italian unity. As for the U.S. Mission, as you can imagine, two presidential visits in the course of a month, one to Rome and one to Naples is plenty. And I had the honor -- if that's the right word -- of running the second one and departed shortly after it was over.

And it might be appropriate to finish my time in Rome by returning to the Uruguay Round, which concluded in 1994. This was one of the things that preoccupied American economic diplomacy for almost a decade. We spent a lot of time on the issue, but played a modest support role in Rome. We liked to think that our efforts contributed to moving the talks in a positive direction.

*Q: Well, did you ever -- during this time I mean I realize you were terribly busy, but did you ever get the feeling of what the French were up to? Because the French, particularly when you get into economics, particularly agricultural but on everything else too, we always seem to take the opposite side.*

McGUIRE: The French are tough defenders of their own economic interests. I had the opportunity to see that personally while I was working on the Tokyo Round, on civil airliner subsidies, on the Spanish-Portuguese accession to the EC, on restrictions on U.S. meat and gluten feed and on the Uruguay Round, et al. The French always during my career were aggressively looking out for their own agricultural sector. And you see the results. When you travel in France you see a prosperous countryside and those enormous modern tractors that are all over. They managed to keep subsidies that distort trade and resource use in place. We fought hard to get them removed or significantly reduced. And they're very clever about moving subsidies around so that it's tough to win a decisive battle against them. And now they seem preoccupied with the EU and their status within it. But there is always the element that they are strong political allies and have been very important ones for many, many years. I am not thinking back to independence (one might), but in the struggle to keep the Soviet Union under control, the French were very good about maintaining a significant military force.

*Q: How'd you feel the final outcome was?*

McGUIRE: Of the Uruguay round?

*Q: Yeah.*

McGUIRE: We talked about that earlier so I won't repeat myself here. We didn't get enough on agriculture; the rest of the agreement was pretty good. And you know, the Doha Round was another attempt to address this problem, and the Doha Round never got settled. Interestingly, when I was in Namibia years later and the Doha Round was struggling, the Namibians saw that it was very much in their interest to get agricultural liberalization to reduce the subsidies and the trade distorting restrictions of the EU. So a small developing country with some agricultural production recognized that it was in their interest to see a deal cut. And they were very interested in the proposals we put on the table because they saw them as benefiting Namibia as well. And that was true in a variety of developing countries.

I might say a word or two about family before leaving Rome.

*Q: Yes.*

McGUIRE: Because I've tried to do that in other places. You know, again, if you're in the Foreign Service then you're going to end up with some family separations that maybe you don't like. We sent two of our sons off to college during those years when we were in Korea and then in Italy.

*Q: Where did they go to college?*

McGUIRE: Kiernan, our oldest one, went to Holy Cross College. He went the month that I went out to Korea. Kay stayed behind to get Kiernan in school. So David, our second son, and I went out to Korea and Kay and John came out after dropping Kiernan off. So he was in Worcester on his own for four years. That is a major family separation. We dropped David at Providence College in 1990 and Kay, John and I got directly on an airplane and flew off to Rome. So Dave too was on his own for four years.

*Q: Did he go to school in Seoul?*

McGUIRE: He did.

*Q: Where'd he go?*

McGUIRE: Dave went to the U.S. Army school on base. And John started school at --

*Q: Seoul International?*

McGUIRE: Yes.

*Q: It was run by missionaries, at least started that way?*

McGUIRE: I don't remember missionaries. He started kindergarten there.

*Q: Oh I see, yeah.*

McGUIRE: Then he went to Marymount in Rome, which he enjoyed. Kay had earned a Master's Degree in Counseling when we were in the States. She had to give up a counseling position she really liked when we went to Seoul. She became involved in English language tutoring there which brought her into close contact with some very interesting Korean ladies. She landed a very good job working for the U.S. Army doing counseling, including marriage counseling. In Rome it was very difficult to do that. The Italians had restrictions which the spouses of Italian diplomats did not have in Washington. So she was an independent counselor and she did some projects including some very innovative things which FSI used for years on cultural adaptation. I think we probably paid more in the taxes related to her independent employment than she took in in revenues. So these are elements on the negative side of the ledger about the Foreign Service. I don't say that as a complaint at this point in my life….

*Q: No, but it's the price.*

McGUIRE: Anybody reading this should bear these factors in mind. Of course living in Italy was a fantastic experience; the Italians are great; the country is beautiful; the food is great; and the wine is wonderful. It was a great experience and it was the only place that we ever extended. We stayed a fourth year there.

*Q: Well, during the time how would you evaluate the power of the unions?*

McGUIRE: Traditionally Italian unions were very powerful. When I was going out I was told the two words I absolutely needed to know were "sciopero," which is..

*Q: Strike.*

McGUIRE: Yes, strike. And amore, which needs no translation. But in fact during our time I can't remember a lot of strikes. I remember going down to Naples where I visited a major fashion house. I got to know the managing director fairly well in Rome. I went to his office and I said, "You know, I read that there's going to be a strike that will shut you down." He laughed and said, "Don't believe everything you read." He said, "This is all choreographed. The union wanted raises, and they have a very good idea what we can pay without going broke, but they chose to ask for far more than that." The union leaders announced their demands and the managing director announced what the company was prepared to pay and explained that anything further would jeopardize the viability of the company. And so this went on for two weeks; there had to be a show, "So we closed down for two days." Both sides were eager to end the strike; the union wanted to get their

people back to work again. And so a settlement was reached "Which was exactly what we each knew was going to be the answer before this whole business started. So very Italian." There were times in Italy's history when strikes we're crippling. But this was a time of affluence in Rome and the days of lead and other forms of radicalism had ended. There was a fair amount of social stability. The north was doing incredibly well. That is a first class economy. There had been money poured into jobs in the south, in some instances not very sensibly. The unemployment rate by Italian standards wasn't bad while I was there.

*Q: Well, one of the things, when I was in Naples, Naples is apparently the center of the world's glove industry production. And there's not one single registered glove factory in Naples. I mean it was all being done sort of on the gray market.*

McGUIRE: Northern Italy and southern Italy are vastly different places. The sophistication of the northern Italian economy was very impressive. And the south was struggling. There had been government led attempts to establish industrial concerns in the south. The Fiat attempt to build autos was one, a huge steel plant in Taranto another, an oil refinery in Sicily yet another. There was job creation, but sustainability proved a problem. And corruption and criminal activity had left monuments to waste. At that time if you visited Sicily you would see flyways all over the Palermo area, concrete flyways to nowhere. I think the situation with respect to the Mafia is vastly improved. When we were there assassinations of judges in the south were not usual.

*Q: How would you say Italian American relations were at the time? I mean were they dubious about what we were up to, or not, or what?*

McGUIRE: The relationship was close. The Italians came in quickly when George H.W. Bush announced that we were going into Iraq to reverse the invasion of Kuwait. The security they provided during that period to the embassy was outstanding. I have talked a great deal about cooperation on economic issues. One refrain I heard from time to time was Italy needed close ties with the U.S. to provide a counterbalance to the Germans.

*Q: Well, then you left there when?*

McGUIRE: We left in '94.

*Q: And I think this is a good place to stop.*

McGUIRE: Yes, I think so.

*Q: But where did you go next?*

McGUIRE: We came back to Washington. I was asked if I would take a job in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO) as office director for economic, social, and human rights affairs. I had never thought about doing UN related work, so this was a departure.

*Q: Mm-hmm.*

McGUIRE: Some of my trade experience was multilateral, but not UN based.

*Q: Yes.*

McGUIRE: In the world of trade you have a group of countries that may have different views, for example we may disagree with the French on liberalizing agricultural trade. But the French accept as we do that we need a strong international trading system. The major players are eager to make the system work. Whereas in the UN system there are vastly different views, sometimes completely different views about institutions. The usefulness of the Human Rights Commission (HRC) was a good example in those days. We thought the HRC should be doing a much better job protecting basic human rights. The Cubans thought it was a great place to do propaganda, and Gaddafi thought it was great if he could buy a slot for his delegation and a leadership role for the African region to pervert the focus of the institution. So this was a totally different experience and the most frustrating one that I had as a diplomat.

*Q: OK, well we'll pick this up when you're off to IO in '94* --

McGUIRE: Right.

*Q: Today is the 10th of July, 2015 and Kevin McGuire, and Kevin, I think you're off to IO* --

McGUIRE: Yes, IO.

*Q: In '94. How long were you there?*

McGUIRE: Three years.

*Q: OK. Well, first place you might explain what IO does and what you were doing.*

McGUIRE: Well, could I start in a slightly different spot?

*Q: Absolutely.*

McGUIRE: Because one of the things that you encouraged when we started out was to include a bit about family.

*Q: It's very easy. Please do.*

McGUIRE: You try to combine the personal side with the requirements of the Foreign Service. We had been out for seven years as I finished up in Rome. And we wanted to go

back to the States. Our youngest son was ten years old and had spent most of his life overseas. We wanted to go back as we had with the two older boys to Americanize them.

*Q: Yeah.*

McGUIRE: And to try and make sure that John had firm roots. We were looking first and foremost for a job that would take me back to Washington. Our older sons were in the U.S. Kay was also interested in resuming her career. But I think the first and foremost consideration was aging relatives, parents in particular. I've been trying to put in the pros and cons of a career that I really loved. And one of the cons is that your folks get to a certain age and it's very difficult when you're overseas to have the kind of contact you want, or that they need. My mother died when we were in Athens in fact and she hadn't seen much of us for the two years before she died. And that's tough to take. It's easier now where you have much better means of communication. Back in the '70s, you didn't have an iPhone you could pick up and send a message off. So those things were on our minds.

Melinda Kimble, who was then deputy assistant secretary in IO for global affairs visited me while on a trip to Rome in early 1994. The global affairs side of IO dealt with the UN's economic, social, human rights, specialized agencies, and so forth. Melinda asked if I would be willing to come to IO to head a new office they were pulling together, the Office of Economics, Social, and Human Rights Affairs (ESA). I had serious reservations. I was very impressed with Melinda but international organizations, the UN, was a totally different beast for me. I had been deeply involved in multilateral trade negotiations but multilateral negotiations in the UN system is a different kettle of fish. As I was saying when we quit last time, when you're negotiating in the Uruguay Round, you might disagree with the French or the Japanese on certain issues but there is a general agreement that international trade is beneficial to everybody and that cooperative economic relationships among major trading nations is very important. When you're talking about the UN system, things are very different, just simple things like agreeing on fundamentals. From the very beginning of the UN the Communist bloc had opposed us on economic issues, they certainly didn't buy into the notion of improving human rights. They had a different ballgame in mind, and a lot of it was propaganda. The developing world, the third world, had long been in an anti colonialism mode. So if the British or the French or someone in the west said, "This is good," they would frequently be inclined to reject the notion on principle. Many of them had adopted very centralized control of economies; human rights were not well respected; regular and fair elections were not necessarily a priority. And even developing countries with a good record on these things were reluctant to criticize bad performers out of third world solidarity. So you had a shaky foundation to work from. That troubled me.

*Q: Well, did you see this as a challenge?*

McGUIRE: You bet. And despite my inexperience in this kind of work my background was a very good fit, which was why Melinda had come to see me in the first place. I had a very strong background in economics, on development issues, on negotiating in tough

circumstance, and supervisory experience. But when I started preparing for our conversation today I got a headache. It was just so complex. And the problems were not just with the imperfections of the UN system, or the difficulty of dealing with some of the other members. It was not just a question of some countries refusing to accept basic principles about democracy, human rights or the value of the market. It was also the difficulties inherent in the relationship between State and a mission headed by a member of the U.S. Cabinet. But the most glaring problem was the divide in the United States that existed at that time. There was a small but influential minority in the Congress that did their best to thwart U.S. operations there. You may remember back in the '90s, there were those who wanted to bring the UN down or to get the U.S. out. They were very difficult on budget issues, their tactics included trying to bog the executive branch down on inconsequential issues. You remember the rumors of black helicopters and the creation of world government. They succeeded in making it much more difficult for us to use the UN system, which admittedly was a flawed tool, in an effective fashion.

*Q: These are in America.*

McGUIRE: Jesse Helms, for example. The Republicans made him Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1995. He was originally a Democrat but switched parties over civil rights legislation. His knowledge of foreign affairs did not compare with that of some Republican colleagues, like Richard Lugar of Indiana. Helms was preoccupied with axing the UN budget. He never seemed to understand that the institution was capable of doing a lot of good things, or that weakening it was not in our interest, or that there was nothing to take its place. Opponents spread a lot of half truths about our involvement in the UN that left an impression on the general public. But even with that, polls done back in that period showed that a very strong majority of Americans believed in the UN; believed that the institution was in our interest; believed that its existence contributed to peaceful conflict resolution; contributed to growth, social development, and the promotion of human rights. One very serious misperception concerned the cost to the U.S. When asked about the contribution of the U.S. to the UN, people invariably thought that we were contributing many, many times what our actual contribution was. I remember one poll by the University of Maryland which asked how much the U.S. should contribute per capita and the result suggested we should be spending multiples of what we actually did. We do not put enormous amounts of money into the UN system, either absolutely or in comparison to our expenditures on our military. And I am not saying that reform wasn't needed, it was. We worked on that.

I had 10 officers working for me in ESA. We had a huge array of economic, social and human rights issues on our plate, and dealt with a large number of U.S. Government entities inside State and outside. In many ways we were a coordinating body. We worked closely with regional bureaus and with functional bureaus like the Human Rights and the Economic and Business Bureaus and the Legal Advisor's Office in the State Department. We worked with the White House, the Special Trade Representative's Office, the Commerce Department, the Treasury and with nongovernmental organizations. The work never stopped. You had to be on top of the issues, you had to be on top of the contacts,

and you had to be able to pull together briefing materials at the drop of a hat that were high quality for use in a whole variety of negotiations.

I should highlight the importance of our UN Missions in New York and in Geneva. I have alluded to one of the great anomalies in our system, the fact that our permanent representative to the UN in New York is usually included in the Cabinet. Madeline Albright was in New York for most of my stay in ESA. And Cabinet membership creates a very different dynamic in the relationship between State and the typical post in the field. If you're serving in a bilateral mission, the ambassador is in charge, but if there's a dispute on policy State will listen to what the ambassador has to say but the final decision is made in Washington. The IO assistant secretary doesn't have that kind of control because of the permanent representative's relationship with the president and his staff. So there were sometimes tensions between our staff and Albright's staff. From a distance of many years the tensions seem smaller and the cooperation greater than they once did.

Some of the fora that we were deeply involved in were recurrent. The General Assembly, the Second and Third Committees, the Economic and Social Council all were central to our work. In Geneva, the Human Rights Commission met annually. We gave the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the regional economic commissions a special focus related to UN reform during this period. And then there were special conferences we were involved with, some of which were ground breaking, like the Cairo Conference on Population, the Beijing Conference on the Status of Women, and the Copenhagen Social Summit. And then there were some smaller ones, like the Columbus, Ohio, Conference on Efficiency and Trade, which was smaller in scope but very labor intensive since we were the organizers. One of the things that was a little difficult to get used to was that progress tended to be by the inch. But it was possible to make progress on very important issues. And a couple of examples. The Beijing Conference on Women. Now, this is in the '90s. And --

*Q: This is the one Hillary Clinton went to.*

McGUIRE: She did. And was much criticized by one segment of the U.S. political spectrum. But for most Americans and observers world wide world the conference had an electrifying effect. ESA was very involved in the preparations and the back stopping. The amount of media coverage that the conference got, even in places where women's rights were not particularly high on the list of governmental priorities, was amazing. And I don't think the impact has dissipated yet. It was truly a remarkable conference. It could not have happened without the U.S. pushing for it. It was good example of the UN's ability to have a positive effect on social developments. And Hillary Clinton did a fantastic job in --

*Q: From all accounts she really did.*

McGUIRE: Yes.

*Q: She knew her brief and --*

McGUIRE: She knew her brief and she pushed it and, and it is not too much to say that it changed the world, or at least started to change the world. There were other special conferences we were very involved with-- I don't think any that would be quite as impactful as Beijing. But there were others like the Copenhagen Social Summit, which put a focus on the human dimension in economic development, that is the betterment of individuals was what economic development should be about. The Copenhagen Conference came at a very interesting time. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the soviet style economic model presented some interesting thoughts for the developing world about economic policy, and social policy as well.

The Human Rights Commission, my headache is getting worse just to think about the Human Rights Commission. This was a body that was set up with the best intentions but was very deeply flawed. It frequently had very progressive items on the agenda, but the way the country participants were selected doomed it to questionable results. The selection was done on a regional basis. I remember one year where Gaddafi simply bought inclusion for Libya. He insisted that Libya should have a leading role for the Africa group. We spent a lot of time trying to avoid situations like this, but developing countries frequently would refuse to criticize bad performers or oppose bad actors from winning influential places at the table. The Cubans always managed to be very active there and they used this forum shamelessly for propaganda purposes. They worked hard to block any resolutions suggesting that Cuba should democratize. So it was a very frustrating experience. The Commission met every year and it was a phenomenal workload. We were at the office every night for three weeks until 10:30 or 11pm getting instruction cables out and sending cables to win the support of the European Union or the Canadians, the Australians, or other nations who believed in democracy and human rights. Some time after I left IO the system collapsed and a new body was created. I'm not sure how much better it works now than it did in the 1990s. I think probably it would have to work better.

We had a policy of sending out as delegates to the annual Commission meetings people who were mostly from outside government. Many of them were very bright and very willing and hardworking. But most had a limited range of interest and very little experience on how to actually produce results in that kind of setting. I always thought that we should have put a lot more emphasis on the use of career people. I am convinced that the results would have been better. But the core problem was the structure of the HRC. Had third world countries taken seriously the idealistic notion that only governments respecting human rights should be chosen for the annual meeting the results would have been very different. But even with all the negatives, I think it still was a bully pulpit for the United States. We were able to get on the table the right kinds of ideas about what countries should be doing to enhance human rights, to inculcate a democratic culture, and to ensure that civil society was able to operate freely in advancing the rights of citizens.

In other areas there were some positive developments that showed an evolution in the thinking of developing world countries. Soon after I arrived in ESA, we had a UN

symposium on trade efficiency that was held in Columbus, Ohio. The idea was to bring representatives of developing countries to a conference that would address modern ways of doing business, including modern telecommunications. The entire focus was on using the market to generate trade and promote development. Ten years earlier this would have been a total flop. But by 1994 circumstances had changed, and it was a huge success. I don't remember the number of delegations, but it was around 70 or 80. They came to Columbus and sat down with experts on a whole variety of trade related issues, experts from the private sector and from Washington. Vice President Gore had a teleconference with the participants. There was a lot of interest in the subject matter and there was real appreciation for our hosting of a conference that focused on nitty gritty elements of development and designed to help the developing world come to grips with use of the market.

UNCTAD, the UN Conference on Trade and Development, is not well known in the United States. It's very well known in the developing world. Developing countries regarded UNCTAD as their economic agency. It was designed, as the name suggests, to help promote development through cooperation in the areas of trade and investment. In the United States and most of the western world, UNCTAD became a symbol of the failures of the UN in the economic area. UNCTAD was overstaffed, and tended to encourage developing countries to follow a model that emphasized tight centralized government control of the economy and distrust of private enterprise; it was not seen as a useful or dynamic institution. UNCTAD IX was held in South Africa; and in fact was the first UN event ever held in South Africa. Nelson Mandela was the new President of South Africa, and the apartheid system had ended. The South Africans wanted very much to host the conference as a symbol of their new place in the world. As you know, Mandela was an inspirational character and his interest in promoting development was very strong. His desire to see the private sector act as a really important engine of growth was clear to the delegations that attended. This was one of those instances where one hoped for that inch of progress, that you might achieve a little bit in terms of encouraging governments to back away from old ways and look at the future. But we had no idea what was going to happen.

We got to Midrand, close to Johannesburg, with an absolutely first class delegation. Our people had been carefully selected; they were totally briefed, very articulate, and had excellent economic and trade credentials. Our backup in Washington was equally strong. And we had a member of the delegation we had dragooned from USTR who of course was going to push the market at any opportunity. It became clear after a day or two that we had far more support from developing countries' delegations for liberalization than we had dared dream. Cooperation with other developed countries was very close; the EU delegation coordinated with us on a daily basis. (The EU delegation operational head was a very talented Italian diplomat whom I knew well from my days in Rome.) Close to the very end of the conference there were excellent draft resolutions that had been prepared on opening markets and on attracting foreign investment and a variety of related issues; it was hard to believe how good they were. The conference was supposed to end with a pro forma session on a Saturday morning. But there were two holdouts, the Indians and the Egyptians. The heads of these two delegations refused to sign off on what had become a

tremendous vote of confidence in the market system and on the need for making real reforms in individual economies and in UNCTAD, streamlining the apparatus to reduce cost, but also to increase the relevance of what UNCTAD was producing. The Egyptians and the Indians were adamant. And so there was a negotiating committee that was put together. It had Melinda Kimble from the U.S., the heads of delegations from India and Egypt, and then a number of the major developing countries. The talks went on for 14 hours. It wasn't until 2 am that the Indians and the Egyptians finally caved -- not just because of pressure from the U.S., but because of the pressure that their colleagues in the developing world applied, that the time had come to change. It's fascinating that the Indians, who were so adamantly against the changes, if you look at what has happened in their economy since that time, by embracing these principles they have managed to do a tremendous amount to promote economic development. That is what the conference was supposed to be about. As I mentioned we had a great delegation. Melinda Kimble deserves special recognition for her overall leadership and for her sheer determination in those last hours to ensure no roll back from the great progress we had made over more than a week of intense talks. Soon after returning from South Africa I had a call from Senator Helms' office. I went up to see the staffer who had summoned me. He started the usual speech about how useless UNCTAD was and how we should stop funding it and that the conference had been a waste of time. I said, "Well, have you read the resolutions that came out of it?" He said he had not. I said, "Well, I'll tell you what. I just happen to have a copy of the results. Maybe you could read a couple pages of it now, or read it later and give me a call after you've digested it. See what you think." So he took it and he started reading and he got to page three and said, "This is really remarkable. You guys did a great job out there."

Clearly we were pushing hard on the door to reform at the right time. Attitudes were changing; and there was nothing probably more convincing to the developing world that they needed to cooperate on market oriented reforms than what had happened to the Soviet Bloc and the economic collapse there. As with UNCTAD we increased focus on the regional economic commissions. Each region had its own commission. And they had a reputation that was very similar to UNCTAD's. I went out to several of them. In Africa the new chairman of the commission was a very experienced former international banker who understood exactly what should be done in terms of reducing barriers to trade and to attract private investment -- domestic and foreign. He was encouraging member states to do more to use the internet to improve trade opportunities for their people. My visit was mostly designed to show U.S. support for his efforts to do the right thing.

For the Asia/Pacific commission, I went out to Bangkok and discovered a situation similar to what we had experienced at UNCTAD IX. As soon as I started talking with delegates I discovered a great deal of dissatisfaction. Many of the members thought the commission was doing very little of practical value on trade and investment and churning out instead the old rhetoric and studies that were totally useless. The delegate from Fiji was especially critical of the Indian domination of the commission, and offered to work with us to promote reform. He said, "You know, if we stick together, Fiji and the United States, two strong partners, we can collect a nucleus of countries and we can vote a big change in this organization." Pakistan was happy to join us, although perhaps for

different reasons, and more general support built quickly. Once again, the votes were taken and there were changes that pointed the commission in a different direction.

I also went to Santiago, Chile for a meeting of the Latin American/ Caribbean Commission (ECLAC). Before I went I talked to the French delegate, the French ambassador to the Organization of American States, resident in Washington. He was a very experienced diplomat who was dying of cancer, and this was his swan song. He was going to Santiago by virtue of French possessions in the region, so we compared notes and found we were in agreement about reform and most of the agenda. As soon as we got to Santiago we talked to other delegations that wanted to see greater emphasis on the private sector and on practical measures to promote development in the work of the commission. I remember we were meeting in the Raul Prebisch Conference Room. Prebisch had been a leader of third world activism in the UN, at UNCTAD and ECLAC. ECLAC economists, for example, had exerted great influence on economic decision making in Cuba after Castro seized power. A major element of what we were trying to do at UNCTAD and the regional commissions was to get away from sterile third world rhetoric and failed models of the past to help harness the opportunities offered by the marketplace. So it was ironic that we were meeting in that particular room. Again, the vibes were very different from what one would have had a few years earlier. At some point the Cuban representative started to talk on the glories of Cuba's soviet style economy. The Frenchman raised his flag on some procedural issue. He said, "I wish our Cuban colleague would stop repeating nonsense from the past and let us get on with useful work here." And you could look around the room and see everybody nodding. The Cuban plodded along for another minute or two, stopped and didn't utter another peep.

I am not suggesting that our efforts solved all the problems of the UN in ESA's areas of focus. But many good things were happening, happening slowly, but real progress towards a more efficient use of resources, a much greater emphasis on the market, an abandonment of old soviet style notions of central government control of economies, and a greater focus on the status of women. We were all happy to be a part of that.

*Q: Well, you know, as you're talking here, I think first on women's issue. I have the feeling that gradually women are assuming their rightful place, and maybe taking over. And you see signs also on the economic side. A more rational view of the world is taking place. Did you have the feeling that you were part of the oil on the hinges of change?*

McGUIRE: Yes. Positive change in the world doesn't usually happen quickly or without effort. And it certainly doesn't happen quickly in the UN system. But there were good things happening at this point in time. American engagement is critical if the UN is going to realize the kind of results hoped for by the visionaries who designed it. With respect to women there was a great deal going on in the UN system. I have talked already about the Beijing's Women's Conference and the Copenhagen Social Summit and the focus they put on equal rights for women. On the nitty gritty side I might mention the encouragement given to innovative ideas like Grameen banks. They enable rural women to borrow money and start small businesses and improve agricultural production techniques. It really is an astonishing phenomenon. Much has happened in terms of

education. In turn this enables women to play roles in traditional societies that they couldn't have done a decade earlier. I'll talk about this when we reach my days in Namibia.

*Q: I have a feeling that the world is really changing and the United States has been doing its part to change it.*

McGUIRE: I would agree with you. I probably said somewhere in these tapes already that I am very proud that I got to serve the U.S. as a Foreign Service officer. The general trend in the 50 years since I came into the Foreign Service has been very positive in terms of results. Think of the progress we have contributed to on some of the issues we have been talking about -- global growth, economic development, improved human rights, advancement of women, and education and health care. Clearly we have made mistakes, and clearly there are lots of problems that still need to be resolved. But even in places where supposedly we're at loggerheads, with respect to China for example, I don't think young people today appreciate how far we have come in that relationship since we were their age. As you and I know, Mao Zedong was perfectly happy to slaughter millions of his own people --

*Q: We're talking about 40 million people, of his own people.*

McGUIRE: He encouraged the attempt of the North Koreans to invade South Korea, and then jumped in to save their bacon when the invasion failed. Today we have a much different China. The economic opportunities provided by participation in the international trading system have had a profound effect. It's been my belief for many years that if you can promote economic development that is a big step forward in making progress possible in other areas. Not to suggest that one shouldn't encourage democratization while development percolates. The Indians proved years ago that you don't have to have economic development to have a working democracy. But they are a rare example. I think it really does help and a country like South Korea is a very good example of a country that has moved from disaster to a dictatorial regime; as their economy improved and educational opportunities improved, they moved into a whole new stage.

*Q: Things move very slowly. But when you look at what's happened in the last half-century, the changes have been absolutely profound. And we've all been part of it.*

McGUIRE: We have been part of it. The expectation -- maybe expectation is too strong a word -- the fear when I was a kid was nuclear war. We did drills at St. Joan of Arc for protection. But getting under tables and moving to hallways or basements would not have done much to protect a bunch of kids in New York City in case of nuclear attack. We still have concerns about global violence but it's much more segmented and less dangerous. That's not to say that the turbulence in the Mid East and elsewhere isn't dangerous.

*Q: You haven't talked too much about the political controls of our delegation at the UN. Did you -- I mean were they all on board, or were there divisions, rifts, problems?*

McGUIRE: I did allude to it. The permanent representative in New York usually has a seat in the Cabinet, so there's a direct tie to the president and to the National Security Council. The assistant secretary for IO was therefore at a disadvantage in playing the role that most assistant secretaries at State have. There was something of a role reversal. And this affected our relations with the people we dealt with in New York. One other dimension of this unusual relationship was the presence of political appointees in key positions below the permanent representative. In our other missions political and economic counselors were career people. And for good reason. So the unusual personnel arrangements at USUN sometimes complicated the chain of command. There was also a person on the staff in New York who was feeding information regularly to Senator Helms' office. The objective seemed to be to put people who were trying to make the UN work in a bad light. It was reprehensible. In one instance this individual sabotaged an election to a key seat on budget arrangements because the U.S. official nominated did not share Helms' bleak view of the UN. So the seat went to another nation.

*Q: Are we talking about Bolton, is it?*

McGUIRE: No, the time frame was different. Bolton had been in IO and then later he went to New York as our permanent representative. It was someone at a lower level.

*Q: That gives a feel for the situation. So you had a variety of players on the U.S. side and some had different motives and different thinking.*

McGUIRE: I wouldn't want to leave the impression that I felt we in the executive branch were all out of step or in disagreement on major issues. I didn't feel that way. We were stretched very thin with an enormous work load. I think some additional personnel would have helped a lot in achieving U.S. objectives, and I think the use of career people in very senior positions in New York instead of political appointees would have made our efforts more effective. The elimination of the USUN staffer working for Helms would have helped. The permanent representative in Geneva should be a career position, and delegations to organizations like the HRC should be heavily career people.

*Q: I would think with the Europeans, and internally with our own stand in the United States, the problem of farm subsidies would screw things up every time.*

McGUIRE: Well, that was certainly a major complication in the negotiations under what was then called GATT and is now the World Trade Organization. It was a very major issue in the Kennedy Round, the Tokyo Round, the Uruguay Round, and it ended up throwing sand in the gears for the Doha Round. But that subject didn't come up very frequently in our talks within the UN, that wasn't the right forum.

Let's see. Maybe I've shot my wad on the UN. It was a very different experience. I was not eager ever to go back to that kind of diplomacy again. It really can be very frustrating.

*Q: Any particular delegations or people that were particularly frustrating in your mind?*

McGuire: I am talking about ESA's side of the UN. The Cubans were terrible, really terrible. Their whole objective was to block any criticism of Cuba, and to block any strong resolutions on democratization and human rights. On the economic side they were still spouting rhetoric about the glories of Cuban socialism. It was all very negative and it was all in the service of a government with a disgraceful record. Cuban diplomats were generally well trained and relentless. For a small nation they caused a lot of mischief. The Libyans were very unhelpful in the Human Rights Commission, and some Arab world countries used every opportunity to attack Israel. The Indians were very difficult on economic issues, which I have illustrated above. But within a few years they had adopted many of the things we were advocating, and the impact of those changes has been dramatic. The EU was generally quite cooperative. Again, we're talking about ESA's side of the UN. On reform, the Germans were initially a bit slow to get on board in terms of supporting stricter controls over UN spending and to make sure that there were better results coming out of the system. The French and others in the EU pushed them hard and they came along. Moving from individual countries, the process itself was difficult and there were so many issues you were handling, a specific delegation might be very good on one set of issues but not so good on others. The issue of reducing the U.S. proportion of payment for the UN was very difficult, but ESA was not so much involved in it.

*Q: Where do you think we were bad?*

McGUIRE: We were stretched very thin and the lack of support from the Congress was a real problem. I don't think we covered ourselves in glory with the way we withheld payments, on arrearages, and the constant negativity that came out of certain parts of the Congress. And again I refer to Helms and his allies. I don't think arrogance and ignorance should be part of our foreign policy deliberations. Do you remember the black helicopters?

*Q: Oh yeah.*

McGUIRE: Supposedly if you fund the UN there are black helicopters that will go around watching everything you're doing; I mean crazy stuff. The UN is going to take over and set up an international government and we'll lose our sovereignty. What kind of ill-educated lunatics believe that kind of nonsense?

*Q: Well, you have to realize as we speak today there's a movement afoot to keep the American Army, the American Army from holding maneuvers in Texas.*

McGUIRE: I saw that.

*Q: Because that's -- somehow or another they're going to use that as a pretext for taking away all the Texans' guns and putting them in concentration camps or something.*

McGUIRE: And people believe this stuff. People who are in the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives should be disabusing their constituents about this kind of tripe.

There is lot of demagoguery and some politicians play on fears and that's exactly what Helms was doing. He had been in the Senate for a long time. And not to use him as a whipping boy, but I think he deserves a lot of blame for this kind of --

*Q: Oh, absolutely.*

McGUIRE: -- nonsense. This guy was elected by the people of North Carolina. I guess he did good things down there for his constituents, I don't know. But certainly when he was selected as the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee over Senator --

*Q: Lugar.*

McGUIRE: Lugar. Lugar knew the international scene well, the issues, the players, and the importance of international bodies like the UN. When the Republicans selected Jesse Helms to be the chairman rather than Lugar, that was shameful. Nothing less. Unfortunately we still have a lot of that kind of nonsense --

*Q: With a certain amount of thanks to the benevolence of our deity, Jesse Helms is no longer with us. He's passed to, as they say, his reward, which we hope will be fitting.*

McGUIRE: Will be fitting, exactly.

*Q: Well then, shall we move on?*

McGUIRE: We can move on --

*Q: And put here at the end, where do you want to pick it up?*

McGUIRE: I went from IO to Howard University where I was the diplomat in residence.

*Q: OK.*

McGUIRE: I did two years there and went from Howard to head the seniors' assignment operation in Human Resources (HR). And from there to Namibia. And then I assume it would be good if I talked about some of the things I did after leaving Namibia. I retired in 2004 but I did some other stuff for --

*Q: Oh yeah,*

McGUIRE: -- for State. I came back to Howard for a year to run the Rangel International Affairs Program, which is like the Pickering Program. And I've done some things for the AF Bureau and for the Office of the Inspector General.

*Q: I don't consider, you know, retirement from the Foreign Service --*

McGUIRE: As the end of life?

*Q: As the end of life, no. So we'll pick this up when you left IO.*

McGUIRE: Right.

*Q: Which was when, in 19 --*

McGUIRE: That would have been 1997.

*Q: OK, we'll pick it up then.*

McGUIRE: OK. The next session will be at Howard.

*Q: I would think this would be a very interesting -- because it's an interesting school and --*

McGUIRE: It is. There was not much happening in terms of recruitment for the Foreign Service when I was asked to go up there. And it was --

*Q: Well, it's had a anti-Foreign Service bias.*

McGUIRE: Yes and no.

*Q: Well, we'll talk about that.*

McGUIRE: Exactly.

*Q: Today is the 4th of August, 2015 with Kevin McGuire. And Kevin, there's a long hiatus, but you were moving into -- you spent two years at Howard University.*

McGUIRE: I did.

*Q: And we haven't talked about that. So do you want to tell me, what years were you there and what were you doing?*

McGUIRE: Yes, 1997 to 1999. Can I do a little prelude?

*Q: Absolutely.*

McGUIRE: It might be useful to back up for a bit. We've had a long break because of my illness. I talked about my first assignment in Washington after being overseas in Australia. I came back in 1969 and I was assigned to the Office of Recruitment. One of the things that was going on was an attempt to attract more minorities to the Foreign Service. This had been a problem for a variety of reasons. We had a paid internship program that summer and there were roughly 40 paid interns, half of whom were minority. It was a very impressive group, a mixture of African Americans, Hispanics, and

some Native Americans as well. I don't think any of the minority participants pursued a FS career. I can remember some conversations I had with the African Americans who felt that they had other responsibilities. There were so many domestic issues facing African Americans that they really didn't think they could consider a career in the Foreign Service. The Native American interns were also a talented group. Their answer was, "We're the rising generation. We will be expected to run the tribal council in 10 years. So it's unthinkable to go overseas and leave behind our responsibilities." That was the late '60s. Let's jump to 1997. I was wrapping up an assignment in the IO Bureau. I was asked if I would be interested in going to the U.S. Special Trade Representative's Office. I had spent a lot of time doing trade, loved it, enjoyed negotiating, enjoyed the give and take involved, and I knew and respected the people I would be working with. The paper work took a long time. USTR is very small, their administrative apparatus is slow. While that was going on, I had a call from the State recruitment office. They were looking for somebody to be diplomat-in-residence (DIR) at Howard University (HU), someone who might help create a meaningful recruitment program for African Americans and other minorities. Howard, despite its proximity to State, was not figuring at all in recruitment results. Nobody was taking the exam. People weren't applying for internships. I was told, "There's really nothing going on. We want to see if we can solve that." Because of my experience in Personnel so many years earlier, I had remained interested my whole career in this question. State had made efforts to recruit people from minority communities, but never had much of a budget for things like this. They had a very small recruitment office. For a variety of reasons there was not a whole lot of success. The DIR job sounded very different, a real challenge. And so I talked to several people who had gone over there as diplomat-in-residence. One of them, an officer I knew well said that in fact that the chair of the political science department tried to have him run off campus as an undesirable intrusion of the government into the Howard community. The chair did not succeed, but he tried. (This story was later confirmed to me at HU). This was only three or four years before I went over. Another officer who was at HU for a year told me, "You're just not going to find many people with the tools to make a success out of a career in the State Department." So I decided to apologize to USTR and go to HU.

*Q: Well, Howard is considered to be sort of the preeminent --*

McGUIRE: HBCU (Historically Black Colleges and Universities).

*Q: Yeah.*

McGUIRE: No question about it. It was known as the Mecca. All the HBCUs had new challenges to face because of changes in American society. And HU had perhaps more than the others because of its prominence. Not so long ago, Howard was a total power house because of the effects of segregation. African Americans weren't admitted into Ivy League and other top schools and at HU they had professors like Ralph Bunch and many others of that caliber. The best and brightest of African American youth went to Howard University. Now, African American kids go off to Harvard or Yale or a full range of universities nationwide. And so schools like Howard are in a much different situation.

And financially they have been struggling. But HU still had some very good programs and some very good students when I was there, and I am sure they still do.

*Q: One of the things -- I know I've picked up from people who've been around Howard and all, saying that there was a very -- they felt a very definite anti-Foreign Service bias within some of the faculty.*

McGUIRE: I just provided an example that could lead to that conclusion. But times change and so do circumstances. The HU I experienced was very different from what I was led to expect. I arrived at the Bunche Center, which is where I was going to be headquartered, at almost the same time that Horace Dawson arrived there as the new director. Horace was a career USIA officer. He was appointed ambassador to Botswana during the Carter years. Now, as you know, that goes back to a time when very few African Americans ended up becoming a chief of mission. That speaks to his abilities very clearly. Here's a guy who can do it all. He retired from the FS some 10 years before the period we're talking about. He served for several years as the special advisor to the president of Howard University, who at the time I arrived was H. Patrick Swygert. The Center was a very nice place to hold conferences, or smaller meetings with students. There were no courses offered by the Bunche Center. It was a facility to provide extracurricular opportunities for students interested in international affairs. On the way there on my first day I remember thinking to myself how am I going to do my job here. How am I going to convince people that they should be interested in the Foreign Service. How am I going to get that message out and how is this thing possibly going to fly? Within five minutes of sitting down with Horace I knew that we had a total joint commitment to making this recruitment effort work. He knew exactly what I was talking about. He himself had been trying to encourage people to look at the Foreign Service. So we had a real partnership from day one. Horace knew everybody, I mean everybody in the university by virtue of his period as special advisor to the president. If there was somebody he didn't know, he could pick up the phone and talk to President Swygert and say, "I need to get at such and such." I don't know that that ever happened, because Horace's contacts were so wide. So we sat down and we mapped out a general plan, so I could get on my feet on the ground, start to introduce myself to people, and we could look at doing programs that would bring students to the Center. One of my first stops was to the outward placement office, which helped Howard students find jobs. The gentleman I talked with had been in his job for a long time. And we talked about the career fair that was going to be held in a month or so and how we were going to have a booth and hand out information. And I said, "Well, do you have any other kind of advice? I'm brand new here." He replied, "OK, you've asked me so I'm going to tell you. You people from the Foreign Service come over here one day a year and you think everybody's going to fall over themselves trying to sign up. Nobody knows about the Foreign Service here. If you want to attract students to this kind of a career, then you've got to go out and you've got to talk to everybody on campus. Every department that's relevant, you need to go and call on the chairman and the professors, you need to get invitations to the classrooms." That was terrific advice. And I did exactly that. I started making the rounds. Academia is a world onto itself. People don't know exactly how to deal with you if you don't have a title that says doctor or professor or something of that kind. I hadn't been an ambassador

at that time and so I couldn't use that. So I was just Mr. McGuire going around knocking on doors. But I had a master's in economics and a master's in history and the equivalent of a master's in national security issues, so I had respectable academic credentials. For the most part, the meetings were very friendly, and provided good bases for further contact. And I asked of course at each stop for help in getting the names of students who might be interested in a Foreign Service career or who might want to just come by the Bunche Center and talk. And the first round went really well. People were very nice.

You asked about an anti-Foreign Service twist. I discovered in attracting students to programs and to lectures and things like that, we didn't get very many political science majors, which was a puzzlement because the Foreign Service has always done well in that area. In fact one of the problems with traditional State recruitment efforts was that area was the only part of the university spectrum that really responded to Foreign Service advertising. So it was a strange that we were starting to do well with history, economics and social work students but not with poli sci students. So I went to see the chairman of that department again. We sat down and I said, "You were very kind to see me before and I really appreciate that. But I notice that I'm not getting anybody from the department to participate in programs and this is one area where I really expected to see some interest. And I'm not sure what I can do." The chairman's reply went back to my experience in Personnel in the '60s. " We have -- we the African American community -- have a huge number of issues in the United States. And I don't feel comfortable telling my best students that they should be heading off and pursuing a career in the Foreign Service. They should be here, they should be working on issues that are important to the community." I said, "I see your point of view, but shouldn't it be up to the students to decide what they want to do? It's their lives. I represent something different. I'm here to help make the Foreign Service look more like America. I'm going to push on an open door, because I really do think it's time and I'd like you to help me to do that. And I think it really would be beneficial to you, to me, to your students, and to society as a whole if bright young African American political science students see this as a possibility." He called me the next day and he said, "OK, I'm sending some students down to see you. It should be up to them."

The Department of Communications was strong and I had called on a very bright professor. I don't remember whether he was the head of the department or perhaps head of the Honors Program. But again, I had gone to see him and he couldn't have been nicer, he couldn't have been more friendly. But nobody from the Communications Department came down. There seemed to be no interest at all. As you know, this was an area that fit well with the work of USIA, now the public diplomacy cone within State. So I went back to see him and I explained my surprise at the lack of interest. Finally he said -- and he was about my age -- he said, "Do you know what I wanted to do more than anything in the world when I graduated from college?" He said, "I wanted to be a Foreign Service officer, that's what I wanted to do." And he said, "It became very clear as I tried to get in that there was absolutely no interest in having me there." I said, "Well, that's terrible. It really is. But I can't address that. What we maybe can together do is to get today's students opportunities to get into the Foreign Service." He said, "OK. We'll give it a shot." The Dean of the School of Social Work was very helpful. I went over to see him

about some special programs that the Consular Affairs Bureau had and I thought some of his students would be interested. He was very positive. He said, "I went off to Africa in the 60s on a precursor program of the Peace Corps. It was an absolutely fantastic experience. I'm happy to work with you." It wasn't until 2015 I learned more of his story. He had wanted to be a Foreign Service officer. He took the exam in Alabama. "There were several African Americans who went in to take Foreign Service exam. We went in and there was a nice facility, fully air conditioned, very comfortable. But they took the African American candidates and they stuffed us into this small room with very poor ventilation." He did not get in.

*Q: When was this?*

McGUIRE: This goes back to the '60s. This was still a very vivid experience for him in 2015. I like to think that there was a real change in attitudes toward the Foreign Service over this two-year period. Horace Dawson and I certainly worked hard toward that goal, and we had great assistance at the Bunche Center from Gretchen Cook and Howard Hardy. We saw everybody on campus who might be a recruit. On the State side I did the same thing. I stayed in close touch with State's recruitment people. I worked with regional bureaus to find internship possibilities. I worked with the Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA) to include HU students in their paid work study program. We had virtually zero interns from Howard before I got there. It seems to me the first year we had ten interns who went out for the summer program overseas at embassies and consulates. And it seems to me it was 15 or 16 the following year. We got the Cox Foundation to provide stipends because a lot of these kids really didn't have any resources. There were some paid internships at State besides the CA program, and State was helpful in getting some of that money pointed in our direction. I remember the first group of interns coming back from overseas. The word started to spread that the Foreign Service was really interesting. The returnees were better salespeople than I could have ever been. They were all over the campus talking about their experiences. And we hosted some briefings using them because they were so exuberant.

And you know, in general the young people preferred to talk about internships, et al. to fellow students that they knew and respected. There was a student named John Kelley who had graduated. He was going over to study in France for a couple of months. And so Horace Dawson hired him to help out at the Bunche Center in the period before his departure. And he ended up working with me a lot. He was a campus leader. There were people coming over to see John all the time to ask him advice on this, that, and the other thing. He was a tremendous help around the Bunche Center. And when he was leaving we went out to lunch. He said, "You know what? I've decided what I want to do. I want to be a Foreign Service officer." This is the kind of thing that really makes an impact on campus. He ultimately won a Pickering Fellowship and ended up being the Student Council president at the Kennedy School before coming in.

I'll guess I'll switch to the FS exam, because John is an element in all this. I don't think Howard had anybody coming in through the exam system for the 10 years before I arrived. And I don't remember the statistics exactly, there may have been one or two

people who took the test over those ten years, but that was it. But we had four passers. People couldn't believe it, either at Howard or at State, four passers of the written exam. John Kelly was one of them. The written exam was difficult, the oral even more so. In those days the pass rate for the oral was like 14 percent.

*Q: If that. When did you --*

McGUIRE: This was in the late '90s.

*Q: Because I used to be one of the examiners in the late-ish '70, and I did it for two years. We didn't pass too many people.*

McGUIRE: And it was supposed to be aimed at getting really excellent people.

*Q: I'd like to just make a comment on the exam and the selection process. I mean really we're talking about some very talented people who take the exam and yet out of that 10 percent pass or something like this. We're telling people who've always been praised by their teachers, no thank you. And this leaves a lot of bitterness.*

McGUIRE: It does.

*Q: And this is one cause of our trouble with Congress. Because a lot of the staff members have tried the Foreign Service and have been turned down. And of course their feeling is not that they didn't pass, but that these stupid oafs at the State Department didn't appreciate their work.*

McGUIRE: That has sometimes been an issue. My recollection of this time in the '90s was that perhaps 20 percent of the people taking the written exam would pass. It is much higher now.

*Q; It's changed.*

McGUIRE: Yeah, but it seems to me at this time maybe 20 percent of the people passed the written exam and then maybe 14 percent -- that sticks in my mind for some reason -- passed the oral. A primary reason for the existence of the written exam, and I say this not for you but for eventual readers, was as a screening device to get the numbers down and to make sure there wasn't political influence in getting to that set of people who were going to take the oral exam. They were the real target. The recruitment system and exam delivered bright young people but it didn't succeed very well in terms of diversity, and I'm not just talking about racial diversity but diversity in the kinds of skills that the Foreign Service needed. The exam has been tweaked a variety of times now in different ways with that problem in mind. But perhaps I am getting off track. What I am really trying to do is to explain the kinds of things we were doing at Howard to boost minority interest in the Foreign Service, and greater diversity in intake.

*Q: And I know that at one point we weren't getting as many women as we wanted, and they figured out a more gender balanced approach, and they put a little more emphasis on that. You know it's just an instrument. It's not, it's not this is the way it should be, but this is what will produce --*

McGUIRE: Right.

*Q: -- a pretty diverse group.*

McGUIRE: There's another aspect to this. On the oral exam it's not just that the individual parts are difficult. It's a question of being clear about what the test is designed to elicit. I thought long and hard about how do you get somebody ready to go in and take an exam when he or she is competing against kids from Georgetown and Harvard and Princeton (and many other schools) where there are classes that are held in getting ready for the Foreign Service exam. Georgetown would send in those days 60 people to take the written exam, and 40 would pass that and they also had a high percentage passing the oral exam. And sure, the kids from Georgetown are really bright, but there's also an element of preparation involved. So I called a friend, a retired Foreign Service officer. And I won't name the school because I promised him I never would divulge his assistance. Anyhow, I called him and I said, "I'm in a quandary." And I explained. "We have four kids here from Howard who have passed the written exam. They're really good kids, they're really bright. I want to give them a fair chance, I want to give them the same kind of chance that X university gives its students. Can you help me?" He gave me a big package of material to use to that end.

So we organized some classes for the four kids that had passed the written exam. Two of them passed the oral exam. The university couldn't believe it. The HU president was deeply interested in what we were doing. And anything that he could do to help he would do. So we had exam passers, we had overseas interns with stipends, we had students working for pay in the Consular Affairs Bureau. We had long term work-study program participants where students could actually work after university hours for a year or longer. We had young people who were looking at going into support staff, like security, budget and fiscal, and general service officer positions. And we had events going on all the time, good events. We had a constant stream of ambassadors coming out to speak at the Bunche Center. And we got good turnouts. We had special speakers like Ambassador Ruth Davis.

*Q: Ruth worked for me in Naples.*

McGUIRE: She is known far and wide. And if Ruth says something, then it's right and people are going to pay attention to it. The first time I asked her to come it was for a conference on women in professions. A couple of hundred people attended. It was a terrific event and it inspired more students to use the Bunche Center. After that, Ruth came over regularly to make presentations and meet with students and I would occasionally send people over to see her at FSI.

We heard that Rubens Ricúpero, the head of UNCTAD was coming to town. I knew him from my days in IO. UNCTAD was well known at Howard because of its focus on development. All the students involved in political science, international affairs, economics, et al. knew about UNCTAD. And so Horace Dawson sent an email to President Swygert saying Ricúpero is coming. The president said he would host a lunch for 100. Ricúpero came; it was a wildly successful event. Most of our DIR events were done at no cost, but sometimes the University, as in this instance, picked up the tab. We did have contributions from outside from time to time. I mentioned the Cox Foundation earlier. The Korea-U.S. Economic Council hosted a seminar/luncheon on the North/South political divide and on the South Korean economy that went over very well.

One major event came about unexpectedly. Dan Serwer had been my boss in Energy Affairs and was our DCM and chargé in Rome (where he did a great job). He was just about to retire from State and he came over to help us raise foundation money for the Center. He suggested that we invite Secretary Albright to speak. He started the ball rolling and much to my surprise she agreed. What an impact! Both on what we were doing on recruitment, and on the longer term goals of raising the level of interest in foreign affairs and establishing a lasting tie between State and Howard. To be honest I was a little concerned about how the event might go. There had been widely publicized demonstrations at the University of Michigan (I think) against Secretary Albright only a week before the meeting at Howard. But we had none of that. Instead a packed house asked serious questions. Some aspects of American policy were challenged, but in a respectful fashion. Albright's answers were excellent and reflected that she was taking the students very seriously. The feedback from students and professors was outstanding.

Another very important aspect of what we were doing was to find financial support so competitive students could afford the graduate and overseas experience to get prepared for the Service. I tried very hard to recruit people to compete for Pickering Fellowships. A Pickering is worth a lot of money; a two year graduate degree, a stipend for training programs held in the summertime, travel to and pay for internships at embassies. And then you come into the Foreign Service on a provisional basis. You have to pass the oral exam and get good performance reviews to stay in. There had never been a Pickering from Howard. In those days, there were two programs. One started in junior year, the other in the first year of graduate school. A young lady who had talked with me a number of times just couldn't decide whether she wanted to go into the Foreign Service or whether she wanted to be a lawyer. She came from a not-very-well-off family. She was very bright, very personable. She finally decided to apply. She got one of the appointments. Word spread like wildfire. People suddenly knew what a Pickering was. The next day I walked out of the Bunche Center and bumped into the provost, the number two person at Howard. And he said, "You know, this is fantastic news." Horace Dawson had sent an email to the president and others as soon as we found out. The provost said, "Is there anything I can do to help you? Because this is great for the university, and great for the students." I said, "Well actually, there is something. We have another competition. This is for the Pickering graduate program." The deadline was fast approaching. I said, "I've got a problem because we have a very tight deadline to get in applications for the graduate program and I'm getting zero response. I think that Howard can win another

Pickering this year. There are students out there that are very good. But professors have got to be involved because they've got to write recommendations and there's not much happening. Would you be willing to send a message around to all relevant departments to try and light a fire?" He said, "You draft it for me and 15 minutes after I have it it will go to everybody you think it should go to." So I went back in the building, wrote an email for him, sent it to him, and sure enough, he sent it out to the chairpersons and professors of a variety of departments. And we got in several applications before the deadline. I think we had two winners that time. I don't recall in the two years I was there, it seems to me we had five people who won Pickerings. There was a professor in the graduate school of political science who was always a bit offensive when I talked to him. He was actually a Greek Albanian who was very interested in Africa, which is why he was on the faculty. He always found some way to suggest that people in the Foreign Service were not really very serious. And he would throw in the word "mechanics" occasionally. You know, we're mechanics, whereas people in academia are the people who really think things through clearly and who have strategies and so forth. Some of his students had suggested that I should come to their annual banquet. It was the end of the year and enough of them had suggested this that finally I called the professor and I said, "Several of your students have invited me to the banquet, what do you think?" He said, "No, this is closed to the department and it wouldn't be appropriate." I said, "OK, that's fine." But just before the dinner, I got a call from the president of the student group and he said, "Now, I've cleared it with the professor, so you're supposed to come." So I got there and I'm suddenly asked to speak. Well, I looked over at the professor. He wasn't happy that I was there, but I thought he was going to have a stroke when they asked me to get up and speak. So I got up and I started to talk briefly about the various programs that we were running. And I said, "For example, we have the Pickering Program. You guys are too late for it because you're already in graduate school, but if you know undergrads in political science or in other faculties, it would be great if you would mention this program to them; because it's worth 200,000 dollars." The professor piped up and said, "What's such a big deal about a 2,000 dollar grant?" I said, "No, *200*,000 dollars." That was the last time I had any problem with the professor.

When I went out to Namibia several years later we had one young man from Howard who was doing his Pickering overseas internship assigned to the embassy. And we had people from Howard either doing internships or who were already in the Foreign Service in a variety of countries around us, in South Africa, in Botswana, in Swaziland, and Angola." They were students that I knew from my days at the Bunche center. What a great feeling. I joined the Foreign Service expecting to have fantastic experiences overseas. But I never expected to have something like my two years at Howard become such an important part of my life.

*Q; One of the things I regret personally is that when I was in the Foreign Service supervisory Foreign Service officers had no duties involving mentoring. And not just African Americans.*

McGUIRE: Right.

*Q: I mean people who needed some help didn't get it. The Foreign Service has always been a sort of sink or swim organization, which I think is wrong.*

McGUIRE: I agree.

*Q: Have you seen a change in this?*

McGUIRE: Yes. In general State has tried to establish mentoring opportunities. One of the places I'm heading with the whole experience at Howard is that this turned into a prototype for the Rangel International Affairs Program. What we started in terms of attracting people to FS careers and preparing people for the exam helped lead to the creation of the Rangel program. After I retired in 2004 I was asked to come back to Howard to run the new program because they were having all kinds of problems. Ambassador Dawson was still at the Bunche Center and he wanted me to get the program on the right track. And one of the things that I did very early on was to establish a mentoring program for those students already selected. Everybody got a mentor. Most were youngish middle grade officers. For a few we found officers with a lot of experience. I remember one who was very bright but seemed to be uncomfortable with oral presentation. His mentor was a very successful senior officer with strong skills in this area. The Rangel scholar in question completed the program, joined the service and has done very well. That is just one example of what we tried to do. I should add that Ambassador Dawson and Ambassador Davis have both provided informal support to many of the Rangels. I agree with you 100 percent. Mentoring can be the difference between success and failure. I understand that the Rangel Program continues to give strong emphasis to mentoring.

I was going to draw the segment to a close on the note that we proved beyond a doubt that you could reach out to attract minority candidates. I did a paper called, "All You Ever Wanted To Know About Being a Diplomat-in-Residence But Were Afraid to Ask." I don't know if it was ever read by anyone, but a number of the ideas in it were adopted by recruitment. The kinds of activities that applied to attracting minority students also applied to reaching out to special educational areas, i.e., the business school, the school of social work, places where traditionally the Foreign Service had not done a good job in recruiting candidates. You can make a dent if you differentiate your efforts, and you don't just put ads in the paper. If you have your diplomats-in-residence, and we have a dozen or so now, if you have them doing a good job reaching out on their own campuses and neighboring campuses, you can really have an impact. And now electronic dissemination of information is so easy. We ended up as an information supply house at Howard by the time my DIR tour ended. I was responding to questions from minority students from all over the U.S. They said they trusted the Howard connection. As a result, we had a Harvard student come down to do one of our FS briefing programs (he passed the exam), we had a Stanford student do a semester at Howard to prepare for the FS, et al.

*Q: I know, you know, we've had this -- for a long time we've been going after African Americans, but what about -- do you have any idea how we're doing on the Hispanic side?*

McGUIRE: Better. The numbers are better for minorities in general. The Rangel Program is relevant to that question as well.

*Q: OK.*

McGUIRE: We were at a much different place in 2005 than was the case when I was in Recruitment in the 1960s. And the momentum continues today.

*Q: Well, let's stick with the Howard experience. Did you find faculty there supportive? Or did you find, you know -- there's always been a disconnect between the academic world and the Foreign Service.*

McGUIRE: Well, I have given some examples on the disconnect part of your question. But in general it was a great experience and the faculty was very supportive once I got established. One of the things that really helped me was that I had programs to offer to their students. That helps. There's nothing like money to get you respect. But one of the things I had to overcome was how I fit into the campus world. I hadn't been an ambassador, I didn't have a PhD. I was just Mr. McGuire. That was resolved in an unexpected fashion. One day the telephone rang and it was the chairman of the history department. He was one of the faculty who had been responsive in terms of sending students my way from day one. He said, "Can you come see me." The professor of diplomatic history was in the office when I got there. The chairman said, "We have a problem. Professor So and So is entitled to go on sabbatical, but we don't have the money to pay a replacement to teach diplomatic history. Would you be interested in teaching?" I agreed and suddenly I was Professor McGuire. I would swear that there was a different attitude from the faculty after that. Suddenly, I was a colleague. One history professor started arguing with me every time we met over foreign policy issues. I would argue right back. Because I was now a professor I was his equal and we could have these arguments in front of anybody, and that was fine (and without rancor). One day I bumped into the president He said, "I always enjoy seeing you, Kevin, because we're the only two older people on campus who don't have doctorates. And it's a relief to see there's somebody else here besides me."

I found that if you really made the effort to get out and meet people you could overcome a lot of conventional wisdom. In addition to all the events we did at the Bunche Center I would accept almost any invitation that came my way. I would give guest lectures in classrooms, I would stay late if there was a professor meeting with a group of students and they wanted me to be there, or maybe an extracurricular event students invited me to. I was determined to see if there couldn't be some kind of breakthrough, some kind of a breaking of the mold, that you can't do such and such, you can't recruit African Americans, you can't recruit minorities generally. You can't establish a tie with Howard University. By the time I left Howard we had events going on all the time, we had students all over the Department, in all kinds of programs. We were also cooperating with the White House, USAID, USTR, the Peace Corps, OPIC and other agencies finding internships and career opportunities for HU students. I think the experience had an impact

on a lot of lives, some who came into the Foreign Service (far more than anyone dreamed possible in 1997), some who became interested in foreign affairs for the first time. And it had a profound impact on the relationship between State and Howard. It certainly impacted my life. It was among the best professional experiences of my career. And our efforts contributed to the creation of the Rangel Program.

*Q: Could you explain -- are we at the point where the Rangel Program is -- should we talk about it now or --*

McGUIRE: Whatever you think.

*Q; Well, could you explain kind of what is it?*

McGUIRE: OK. The approach we took -- I mean Horace Dawson and myself at the Bunche Center -- was very much a shotgun approach We were trying to do anything we could do to interest students in foreign affairs and the Foreign Service. Maybe you'd get somebody who's really talented to take the FS exam and come in. Or maybe you'd get somebody who would end up teaching at a university or in some other walk of life who was more knowledgeable about the Foreign Service and would talk about it to young people. We believed we could address the lack of knowledge about the Foreign Service in the HU student body and help State to find creative ways to recruit minorities. At the time I left in 1999, we thought we had produced great results; but it was clearly only a start. I went to Human Resources and then to Namibia. By the time I returned from Namibia the Rangel Program had been going for two or three years. It was funded by State and housed at the Bunche Center. There were two aspects to it. One was to identify a dozen or so undergraduates who were promising and have them participate in a summer program at Howard that exposed them to what the Foreign Service was all about, and provided some added preparation in things like writing skills and knowledge of world affairs. The second and the far more important aspect of the program was a two-year fellowship at a major university to study some field that was pertinent to the Foreign Service. It might be political science or international affairs. It might be economics. It might be a field that led into consular affairs or administrative management, or PD work….

*Q: Public Diplomacy.*

McGUIRE: The program was aimed at promoting knowledge of the Foreign Service in communities where participation was low, and at talented candidates with very limited financial resources. So the awards were designed to give bright students who might not be able to go on to graduate school because of financial issues a chance to acquire the tools needed to be competitive in the FS. Young people come out of college these days with huge debts. Two years ago was the last time I served on one of the Rangel Program's selection panels. You see young people coming out of undergraduate school with 40, 50, 60, 100,000 dollars in debt. In most instances it was the only way the applicants for the program could get a chance to go to college. Some of these kids come from nothing. One young man accepted to the program was born in Mexico and was

adopted by a couple in Texas. While he was still very young the father dropped dead. The wife never recovered from that. She just went to pieces. There were three kids they had adopted, all from very poor backgrounds. So they ended in foster homes. The young man applied for the program after graduating from the University of North Carolina. He had gotten a merit scholarship -- not a needs scholarship, but a merit scholarship. Going through high school he worked three jobs at a time. Otherwise he wouldn't have had anything to eat. He went through UNC working several different jobs trying to keep body and soul together and had straight A's. He didn't explain much of this in his application. In a recommendation from his academic advisor, the professor wrote, "You have no idea what this young man has been through. And in fact, he never even had a new set of clothes until his senior year. And that was because somebody helped him out with getting it." The professor was the one that provided so much of this other background about the number of jobs he'd worked and poverty that he had faced. The student had even managed to participate in some of internships, including overseas, acquiring language skills in the process. It was an astonishing story. His interview was just terrific. He did not wring his hands about the problems he'd faced. He focused on his interest in the Foreign Service and what he thought he could bring to the Foreign Service. He blew our panel away. What courage and strength. You know getting into the FS is very different than when we were young. People coming in are older, candidates have graduate degrees and all kinds of internships and overseas experience. If you have parents who can help you out, if you have some money in the family, it is possible to acquire such experience without much difficulty. The Rangel Program is helping excellent people who don't have those kinds of resources to compete to come into the Foreign Service and, you know, I think they bring an experience that is special. If you look at a picture of the people in the Rangel Program, the diversity is very clear. There are whites, there are African Americans, there are Hispanics, there are Asian Americans.

*Q: How do you spell it? W --*

McGUIRE: No, it's after Charles Rangel, the congressman.

*Q: Oh Rangel.*

McGUIRE: R-A-N-G-E-L. It's not as well known as the Pickering Program and has a somewhat different focus. I understand the Rangel budget recently went from a million dollars a year to two million, which translates to 20 fellowships rather than the original 10. The Rangel Program has been very successful; the young people go through a very rigorous selection process, which includes passing the FS oral exam. It's been small enough that the director has been able to keep a really tight grip on quality control. I guess we're already deeply into the Rangel Program so I'll just continue on that. There were a whole variety of problems when I got there in 2005. First of all, it was brand new, it wasn't well known, there were candidates who were successful in coming in based on a rather small group of applicants. I don't mean to suggest that they weren't good, not at all. But the program needed to be widely publicized. The numbers have grown enormously. The word got out quickly. The number of applications skyrocketed. There's a very high minimum GPA. You have to have extracurriculars that show a commitment

to academic excellence and community service, you have to have outstanding recommendations. Your essay must be a strong statement on what you might bring to the FS. It takes a while to do the application, and I think that that has tended to scare people off who are not really highly competitive. So the word went out that this is a really good program and that the scholars were going off to Harvard and Yale, the University of Pennsylvania, the Fletcher School, Georgetown, University of North Carolina, NYU, University of Denver, Syracuse etc. The Rangel fellows all get into very good schools. And they are getting great support from the Bunche Center. Patricia Scroggs is now the director. When I was asked by Ambassador Dawson to take over leadership of the program in 2005, I said I would do it but not long term. There were a lot of problems to be addressed. I spent a year trying to do that. I arrived in November and the applications were due in January. So we really had to scurry to get the word out. But we managed to get some excellent applicants and I think everybody was very pleased with the fellows selected. Then we started working on things like the mentoring program, organizing the security clearance system so that it worked with a certain amount of speed for the overseas internships and for entry into the Service for those who were completing the program. There were a whole bunch of administrative problems. Howard was responsible for support, and so staffers there were required to deal with State and with other universities to handle financial flows in ways new to them. So there were a lot of problems in getting that to work smoothly. I had told Horace that I was not going to spend a long time there. What I wanted to do was retire.

*Q: Yeah.*

McGUIRE: And so I looked hard to find a successor. Patricia Scroggs had worked for me in Korea. She was a second tour officer and was a star. She was just fantastic in terms of contact work, in terms of her ability to organize herself and anything else that needed to be organized, in terms of communications. you name it. People just loved her. Whenever we went to the Economics Ministry, they always checked all of our IDs very carefully and then we had to sit down and wait for 15 minutes for somebody to come down and pick us up. But when Patricia went over there, she didn't even stop at the front desk. The guard would jump up, run around, push the elevator button for her, and then hold the door. That's Patricia. When I was made control officer for the presidential and vice presidential visits to Korea I made her number two on the control team. She decided to retire early from the Foreign Service. I recommended her strongly to Horace and he, as director of the Bunche Center, took it from there. So she took over and she's still there doing an incredible job. The administrative staff is very small and State is very pleased with this streamlined approach of running a program. The relationship between State's Recruitment Office and Patricia is very direct and very close. And the Howard dimension is very important. I noted earlier when I was DIR that minority candidates felt very comfortable dealing with Howard, and that was certainly true with the Rangel process; I am sure it is still true. The main thing is selecting and preparing these young people to become successful Foreign Service officers. After completing the two years of the program, which includes their graduate studies, a summer internship on the Hill and one at an embassy or consulate they get their assignments to go out. Of course they have to get the usual security and medical clearances as well. The Rangels are required to serve

five years, and if they pass the oral exam and get good performance ratings they can stay in.

*Q: Get any report from the field of people who've been in either the Rangel or the Pickering program, how they've done within the service?*

McGUIRE: Well, I left the Rangel Program in 2005 so I can't pretend to be up to date.

*Q: Yeah.*

McGUIRE: But I do have anecdotal information. I talk to Patricia Scroggs from time to time, and she's very happy with the way the Rangels have performed. And I have served on Rangel selection panels from time to time and conversed with representatives of recruitment. As I understand it the reports that are coming back from the field are excellent and the Department is very pleased with the results. Ambassador Dawson was a great asset to both the Rangel and Pickering Programs and had a great deal of contact with people in both programs. He still is in touch with many of them despite the fact that he too is long retired. He has positive reports as well. Ambassador Ruth Davis served as Director General, as you know, and was and remains very interested in both programs. I believe she is very happy with the results they have produced and I know that she has emphasized the need for the Department to monitor retention rates carefully from both programs. Again my understanding is that the rate is very healthy. As you know retention rates for FSOs is generally very high. I also talk from time to time with alumni of both programs and their comments have been very positive.

*Q: I'm looking at the time. I think this might be a good place to stop.*
McGUIRE: Yeah.

*Q: And we'll pick it up when you left Howard.*

McGUIRE: OK, that sounds great.

*Q: And you left Howard when?*

McGUIRE: In '99, in June.

*Q: And then what?*

McGUIRE: And then I became the head of Senior Level Assignments (SL), which is kind of a peculiar story in and of itself.

*Q: OK, we'll pick it up then.*

McGUIRE: All right.

*Q: OK, today is the 10th of August, 2015 with Kevin McGuire. And Kevin, you pick up where we left off.*

McGUIRE: We talked about my days at Howard University in 1997-1999 and the creation of the Charles Rangel International Affairs Program, which I was asked to get on a solid course after my retirement in 2004. But we did those things together because they fit so well conceptually. So now we're jumping back a bit in time. When I was at Howard University one of the things that I did was to sit on a panel for the Pickering Program selections in 1999. While I was up in Princeton I had a call from the director general's office. I was asked if I would -- when I returned to Washington -- if I would go see the director general, Skip Gnehm. Skip was an old friend of mine. We had been co-revolutionaries as members of JFSOC. I don't know if you remember JFSOC --

*Q: Oh yes.*

McGUIRE: The Junior Foreign Service Officers Club. We talked about this elsewhere. I went to see him. And he said, "I want you to take over as the head of senior assignments." I said, "Skip, you know me. Is this a joke? I've never been very wild about the way the personnel system works. I don't even submit a bid list anymore. Why would you ask me to take that job?" He said, "Because we're trying to do some things to make it better. A lot of people feel the way you do and we need to get better performance out of that shop, and I think you're a person who could come up with some new ideas and make a real difference." I said I'd think about it.

One of the things, to be honest, that was appealing about the offer was the family aspect. We had a problem with illness and old age of parents. It would have been very difficult to go back overseas at that point. In addition, Kay had managed to reclaim her career in the Montgomery County School System, something she had given up when we went to Korea. She had gone back to work and was really enjoying what she was doing. Our youngest son was high school age as well. The opportunity to stay in Washington was a significant factor in deciding to accept the offer. Plus it's always nice to be wanted. So I finished up my last few months at Howard and then shifted over to what was then called Personnel, which has a nice clean unambiguous ring to it. During my time there the name was changed to Human Resources. And the thought was that --

*Q: To Human Resources.*

McGUIRE: To Human Resources. This lent more dignity apparently to the folks in the ranks. And it has, some say, a warmer, fuzzier ring to it. Well, change I suppose is sometimes good.

*Q: Some people think otherwise, but OK.*

McGUIRE: I think Skip was absolutely sincere when he said he really wanted to make improvements. Senior assignments is a really important area. Many officers had lost confidence in the system. I don't know how you felt about it, but as I said I didn't have

any faith in it. I took a look around and I thought, first of all, we have to staff up. The office had serious gaps in its ranks because of illness, early departures, things like that. And my impression was that for some years these jobs were regarded by some as pre-retirement perches. When an office has that kind of reputation you don't attract the best folks and you don't get the best kind of performance. I could cite examples from the time I arrived, but I won't. We managed to put in place some stopgap measures to fill the ranks so we had enough good counselors to actually do the job. One of the things that I spent a lot of time on was recruiting, and by the time a year had passed we had a really good group of counselors on board. One major acquisition was due to the fact that USIA had been absorbed by State. I'll get to that as a major issue in a moment. But we ended up getting Betsy Whitaker who went on to be a deputy assistant secretary. She was perfect for the job and --

*Q: What was her job?*

McGUIRE: She was one of our career counselors. But she also had special responsibilities for the absorbed USIA personnel. I'm sure you remember those days. There was a lot of consternation on the part of the career people at USIA. They felt they had been screwed over, to use a highly technical term that we employed in Personnel all the time. You know the story as well as I do. USIA was detested by some ultra conservatives, and Jesse Helms was one of the ones who tightened the screws at every opportunity.

*Q: I frankly thought it was a horrible, horrible mistake.*

McGUIRE: The gutting of the function was. In many ways the bureaucratic realignment necessitated by the cuts was a plus, in my opinion. With respect to the gutting of the function, it was infuriating that the very people who cut off funds for USIA complained vociferously after 9/11 that America hadn't gotten its message out, i.e., that America's diplomats had screwed up. I have already talked on this subject earlier in our conversation. At this point I was involved in organizing the orderly transition of USIA's senior officers into State's ranks. Some resigned or retired. The vast majority stayed. They had a very skewed array of personnel at that point, because they did not have the money to bring in new officers. Consequently, the average age of people in USIA went up and up. When they had to eliminate positions, they eliminated the ones at lower levels. Usually the personnel pyramid has a broad base that narrows as you go up. But at the end USIA's was upside down. And individual grade levels did not always match up with State standards. I raise these points because there were some serious problems for us to address in Senior Assignments. It was a very difficult time for people who had spent their careers in USIA. They were concerned about their futures; they were concerned about how the functions they had performed would fare; and many believed that they would not have a fair shot competing for jobs and promotions at State. They foresaw more and more people from State going into what were now called public diplomacy positions, and basically forcing out the people from the old USIA. This was not really the design at all. One of the things that we were tasked with in Seniors was to make sure that people who were coming over had a fair shot at jobs and professional development. In theory the new

arrivals were to be given a fair shot at DCM and ambassadorial level jobs, something that happened very rarely for USIA people in the old system. I say in theory because very few of our new colleagues thought it would actually happen. Betsy arrived as USIA disbanded and was dropped into the center of this mess. She was invaluable. She reassured and educated people about their new system, about how they would get a fair shake, and about opportunities.

We actively recruited other outstanding officers who ordinarily would not have come to counselor jobs. Rusty Hughes, a former ambassador, joined us and I'll talk about his activities at length because of the particular set of responsibilities he had with respect to the D Committee. This is the top level group which recommended career ambassadorial nominees to the secretary. It was a very difficult job that had to be done just right. It had a high level of visibility and required great fairness and close adherence to the principles of equity, of nondiscrimination and transparency. We had people like Mike Habib who unfortunately died recently. He was a veteran of 35 years and had served in a variety of very senior positions overseas. He wasn't really interested in doing this job. I had to do a sales job. But he was exactly the kind of person we needed, somebody who really knew the service and knew about competition for important jobs. He understood that above everything else you had to be a straight shooter with the people you were counseling: about their credentials, about their performance, about what they could aspire to. One of his clients started calling him Uncle Mike. It fit perfectly. His colleagues put a new name plate over his door. I could go on with other specifics but maybe I shouldn't have mentioned anybody because --

*Q: No, I like to get the names.*

McGUIRE: because in my second year there they were such a good group. They really cared about the people they were counseling. And they got all kinds of accolades for the job they did. In addition to the counseling of individuals, we had several processes that were very important to the advancement of people in the senior ranks, and very important in terms of meeting the needs of the Department to get the best people in critical jobs. I've mentioned the D Committee. I'd like to go on at some length about this, because I didn't know what to expect. I had the view that career ambassadorial assignments were cooked by a small group of people and that it wasn't really very open, very scientific, if I can use that term, or very fair. None of those things proved true. We worked very hard to make sure that every possible candidate was treated fairly. We had very good communication with the seniors themselves. A great deal of time and effort went into trying to keep in touch with potential candidates for jobs, jobs of any kind, but particularly for ambassadorial and DCM jobs. But it doesn't stop there. It's not just the individual candidates, it's also about the jobs. So the D Committee process demands, if you're going to do it right, that you have a good understanding of what the bureaus are thinking and what the bureaus need for particular ambassadorial positions. We worked closely with the executive offices and with the PDASes in the various bureaus…

*Q: PDAS --*

McGUIRE: principal deputy assistant secretaries. The number two official in each bureau usually was the person who oversaw the critical personnel decisions for each bureau. There was a great deal of preparation for the D Committee every year. The first thing was to confirm the posts that were coming up. Sharon Bisdee, another terrific SL asset, was responsible for liaison with the White House regarding political ambassadors. We were not involved in their selection but they were included in various processes, including pre-assignment briefings. The D Committee process would start at mid-year, or maybe a little bit before depending on what kind of year it was. The year 2000 was going to be a transition year because of the presidential election, so we started a little bit early to make sure there was enough time for the D Committee to complete its selections before the election was held. The first step is the cataloguing of what posts are going to go to career officers, and which to political appointees. I'm not sure how they do it now but in those days about two-thirds of the ambassador positions would go to career people. The posts were on a three year cycle and usually the same posts would go to either the career or to the political types. Adjustments were decided early on, so you knew in advance what posts would be available for career officers. The selection process was much more open than I had expected. We catalogued the posts that were going to be coming up. We worked with bureaus on what the main qualifications might be for a particular post. In many you'd want somebody with a lot of experience in that region. It might be that the post was such that you needed somebody with a strong economic background. There would be places where language was absolutely essential. So you'd work with the bureaus to obtain such information and work it into the materials for the D Committee in a very clear and succinct fashion. The bureaus also provided suggested candidates. What officers did the bureau thing would make a good ambassadorial appointment for this particular post? But it wasn't just left up to the regional bureaus. Functional bureaus sometimes made recommendations. Individual officers could put themselves forward. We had a constant stream of officers visiting us when we were preparing the books for the D Committee. Each one was sure they would make a great ambassador. Some were people who had really performed well. They were interested in a particular post for one reason or another, were strong candidates but for one reason or another they had not been put forward by a bureau. On the other hand some people had an inflated opinion of themselves. And of course we had access to all of the efficiency reports that were done on people. So corridor reputation did not rule. We went through files as appropriate. We checked out credentials and the final lists of candidates were well done.

The USIA dimension I've already alluded to. Many of these people were not well known to the bureaus in the Department. So we made a special effort to try and make sure that group got a fair shot. I'm going to save an anecdote on the subject for a couple of minutes. One of the other things that we were very careful about was the inclusion of diversity in the preparation of lists. I'm not talking about doing that in order to check a box, but rather in a sincere effort to make progress in that area. All three of our excellent director generals during this period (Skip Gnehm, Mark Grossman and Ruth Davis) were committed to the task. The number of minority or female ambassadors we had at that point was low. We were aggressive about this in senior assignments, and the results reflected that effort.

*Q; What about mentorship? Because one of the things that I've always felt from my interviews was that staff jobs were essential to get on the D list, which makes a certain amount of sense. I mean it familiarizes people who are working at the upper end. But it's not, it's not an executive job by any means. It's, it's, you know, getting papers signed, that sort of thing. And how did you find that?*

McGUIRE: You could cite examples where people went from staff jobs to chief of mission positions. Jerry Bremer was one, he did very well as a staffer for Henry Kissinger. Craig Kelley was another. But both were exceptional officers who performed very well in very difficult jobs that were far more complex than getting papers signed. In my time in seniors being a mid level staffer on the 7th Floor was a helpful element in building a strong record of accomplishment, but not a quick ticket to an early ambassadorial appointment. You are correct about the value of contact with those who have influence on the ambassadorial decision making process. I always advised candidates for ambassadorships to call on the director general, on the relevant assistant secretary or PDAS, and at least one member of the D Committee, especially the under secretary responsible for the field the candidate was in.

*Q: I thought there was a lot of sitting around on the upper reaches of the State Department, a kind of guys that had -- gals -- who've got various staff jobs. Well, we got to do something for X. Well, this ambassadorship, let's give it to her or give it to him. You know, which is done for doing a good job as a staff assistant, which is not -- has very little relationship to being a good ambassador.*

McGUIRE: I wanted to talk about the process because I don't think many people understand how it works. I can't really address anything other than the two years that I was head of seniors, of course. The materials for the Committee were very carefully done, including impartial information on all the candidates. The materials were very carefully read by members of the Committee. The discussion of candidates was very open, very fair and decisions were made very carefully. I can't remember a single instance of the chairman (Deputy Secretary Talbott) or any other member of the Committee saying let's ignore the selections put forward by the system and give this position to a staffer.

*Q: Sure.*

McGUIRE: But one of the most interesting aspects of the job was that I became a resource at the D Committee meetings. The D Committee consists of the deputy secretary and the under secretaries. The dg has a seat -- I'm trying to remember whether the dg has a vote. But it wasn't so much votes anyhow. Decisions were by consensus. I attended the meetings which is how I could comment on the high quality of the discussions and the attention the briefing books received. I sat in the back of the room; I was the only person there without exalted rank. They posed good questions. The last D Committee I attended had a special wrinkle. There had been a great hullabaloo about security and there had been a couple of things that were --

*Q: Laptops.*

McGUIRE: Yes, there was a computer that had disappeared from INR.

*Q: But it was found in a conference room and --*

McGUIRE: Well, there were a number of things beside the missing laptop which happened around the same time. Our ambassador to Israel got into big trouble because he was working on very sensitive documents on his unclassified laptop. A DCM in the middle east did the same thing. Somebody left a highly classified briefing book in a room where representatives of an unfriendly power were sitting. There were series of these things. And people on the Hill jumped on this. Not necessarily wrongly, even if hypocritically since the Hill leaks so much information. Cries arose for senatorial blocking of any ambassadorial candidate with security violations.

*Q: Security violations.*

McGUIRE: Marc Grossman was one of the three director generals when I was in this job. Marc created a motor vehicle administration based point system. If you're caught speeding and you're 10 miles over the limit, you get so many points. If you got a parking ticket, no points. If you went through a stop sign it would be so many points. Congress bought into this idea. So if somebody got a top secret violation you got so many points. If you left your safe open overnight, you got a whole lot of points. So this became part of the D Committee process. I mention this because the D Committee took this very seriously. They had no choice. Mark had found a way to proceed with the Hill's agreement. I would frequently get questions from the D Committee members about candidates. Sometimes about a detail on their background or on their security point rating. There were cases of excellent officers who were not selected because they were right on the margin of having too many points. But occasionally it was more than that. The Committee was looking over candidates for a European post and someone asked about a woman on the list. No one had any comments to offer and they suddenly looked at me. I said, "This person is fantastic. You don't know her because she was at USIA, and she gets absolutely rave reviews. People love to work for her. She's got a great record. We put her on the list because we thought she deserved to be there. And you know, she's a woman and we are working to make the system more fair." So there was a little bit of talk around the table and the undersecretary who handled public diplomacy said, "Kevin is right." And boom, she got the job.

I was most impressed by what I saw. I felt very good about the process and the way it worked. The third and last D Committee I was involved with was at the end of the Clinton presidency. Almost all the Committee members would be leaving. And some people asked why bother doing this because the next administration will come in and perhaps everything would be thrown out. But the process went on; selections were made. We were summoned sometime in November. Colin Powell wanted to talk about the selections, and he wanted to look at our briefing book. Powell called Marc Grossman up

maybe a week or two later and he said, "These are my nominations. These are all really good people and we're going with them."

*Q: Did you have any input at all, I mean State to the political appointees?*

McGuire: No. None.

*Q: Did you hold your nose I mean or -- because some of them are pretty awful. Some of them are pretty good.*

McGuire: We didn't have anything to do with selecting them but we did include them in programs, the ambassadorial seminar and things like that. Ultimately we had contact with them on personnel issues as they ran their posts and we had contact with them as they selected DCMs. As you say, some were very good, some were just okay, and some were downright awful. And then we would occasionally get stuck in problem cases. There was one ambassador who will remain nameless who was a political appointee and basically refused to leave post. You know, you have three years and then you're out, whether you're career --

*Q: I think if you go to our website you'll find something about Nepal, the lady who was there, I mean it's just pretty awful.*

McGuire: Well, Nepal is not the one I am thinking about. So we explained that she had had her three years and that was it. And the explanation she gave was first, that she was so important to the bilateral relationship that the host government just wouldn't understand if she left. We explained to her that yes, that government would understand. And then somebody in her family broke an arm and so she needed an extra month to stay on, and I think we said a week and she still refused to go. And finally we had to enlist the White House. So we had experience with the non-career ambassadors. Some of it quite happy.

*Q: How about the matching the DCMs to -- these would be the professionals who would in a way give, give guidance to an ambassador who wasn't used to the job. Would you try to -- I mean they have the ultimate choice, but did you try to make the selection make sense?*

McGUIRE: I was going to talk about the DCM committee. I knew a little bit more about this than I did about the D Committee because I had been a DCM at that point and so I knew that there was a committee that met and they vetted the names and prepared the lists. That was a very interesting experience. Of course there's no differentiation, there are no political DCMs. So you covered the whole landscape, every post. And so SL supported that effort in a fashion very similar to the D Committee. The upcoming DCM jobs were advertised on the bid lists. People bid on them. The names were pulled together. As with the ambassadorial selection process the bureaus were asked for their input. At the end of the day, as you suggested, it's the ambassador who makes the decision from a list of names chosen by the DCM Committee. The bureaus were very

cooperative because they saw this as an excellent way to make sure -- particularly where there was a political appointee -- that the posts would be well run. So seniors was in close touch with the PDASes and the bureau executive offices. A series of meetings were held, perhaps five or six in the course of the fall and early winter. The relevant regional bureau would be represented. The DG would be there. I was there. The consular bureau was represented. Depending on the post, you might have the PDAS from EB. And if there was some other bureau that had a particular interest in this post then they would be invited as well. Again it was basically a consensus process. Some of the bureaus were very active. Mary Ryan was the assistant secretary of consular affairs. She wanted to make absolutely sure consular officers got a fair shot at DCM jobs. I didn't mention this when we were talking about diversity in selection of ambassadors, but it was true there as well. We tried to make sure that outstanding consular officers and admin officers received fair treatment. That was a big difference from 20 years earlier when basically it was political cone officers and the occasional economic officer who were selected for theses jobs. But it was interesting to see the difference in the roles the functional bureaus played. EB, which was my home bureau, was very disinterested. I told the assistant secretary that to his face one day. He wasn't very happy and he didn't do anything about it. I went to see his successor. The successor took that role seriously and became much more active. If it sounds like I was being partial towards economic officers, I thought that Mary Ryan had it right. At any rate, the discussions about who should go on the list were very serious. And you asked the question, was there an attempt made to try and make sure that the best people got on the list. I can assure you, that was the case. When the ambassador was a career officer, a lot of times they had a pretty good idea of individuals they wanted to consider. I remember a few instances where an ambassador was interested in a candidate that didn't make the list. And this didn't make the ambassador very happy. I recall one case where the ambassador refused the Committee's list and insisted on a candidate the Committee thought was a bad choice. Eventually the ambassador prevailed. It turned into a disaster.

*Q: Well, on both the D Committee and the DCM thing, let's talk about diversity, women and minorities.*

McGUIRE: I have tried to weave that into my comments. In my tenure in seniors we tried very hard to make sure that minorities and women were taken seriously into account. When I say we I don't mean just me or the counselors but the whole apparatus, including the dg's office and the members of the D and DCM Committees. I don't remember the statistics but in terms of selectees, the numbers were respectable and up from the past. And there were instances where we went back to bureaus and pushed to make sure that good minorities and women were being included on candidacy lists. And we got kudos from various quarters for our work in that regard. Ruth Davis was the dg when I departed. She has been a pioneer in the effort for fair treatment. I know she was very pleased with the way things had gone in these committees, and with the work of senior assignments in general.

*Q: Well, let's talk about recruitment.*

McGUIRE: Let me stop for a moment. In a DCM Committee discussion we had an instance where a woman was being considered for inclusion in the list for the DCM position in a very conservative Islamic state. There was a debate about whether or not this was viable. One person around the table -- and I can't remember, I think it from the regional bureau -- was talking about the fact that this would not be met in a very positive fashion by the host government and that it would be difficult for the officer in question to do her job. She would be excluded from certain all male events, for example. Our position in seniors and in HR was, "We're not selecting DCMs in accordance with the customs of country X. We're selecting candidates based on the expectations of the United States of America. And the time has come to do this."

It made me recall April Glaspie. I don't know if you remember April. She came into the Foreign Service in the same class I did. And she made it clear right from the very beginning she wanted to go to the Arab world and that's where she wanted to spend her career. There was hemming and hawing but somehow she managed to engineer a first assignment to Jordan. I remember hearing stories from somebody who served with her during the time that she arrived and there was a great deal of eye rolling and unhappiness that this new junior officer had come out, a woman who was going to have very limited access and wouldn't really be able to do the job. Within two weeks there was a staff meeting and they were trying to ascertain the views of one of the senior members of the government on X, Y, or Z, I don't remember. Nobody knew and the ambassador said, "Well, somebody get over and see him right away." And April spoke up and said here is what he thinks. And there's silence around the table and the ambassador says, "Where does that come from?" And she said, "Well, I was at the pool at the club and we struck up a conversation and we started talking about various things, and he confided to me that this was what he thought." That was in 1966 and the assignment of the officer I was just talking about was 30 years later so some advances were in order. By the way she got the job and served as ambassador at least once since in the Arab world.

*Q: Well, I have to say, I've been doing this program for 30 years this oral history program. And when I started out, I was scrambling to try to get senior women who'd retired and could do an oral history with them. There just weren't many.*

McGUIRE: I'm sure.

*Q: But I'm also -- I'm -- I sort of have the feeling that I'm on the cusp or something where women are beginning to take over. I mean achieving frankly their rightful place, and they're going to be the better for it.*

McGUIRE: Well, we will all be better off for it. I think that there was still in the days I'm talking about, in the '90s, there was still a reason to push for equality of treatment, I think that need still exists. Some of the old ideas are gone, the notion that women can't do the job or that African Americans can't do the job or Hispanics can't do the job, I think there's been a big change in perceptions. I'm not saying this country has finally come around from being….

*Q: Right now we're going through an election process where some of the prime contenders on the Republican side are casting aspersions on the ability of women to deal rationally, you might say.*

McGUIRE: Maybe in one sense this is progress, because I think if you went back 40 years those views would not have been regarded as unusual or disqualifying. Mentalities have changed tremendously. I'm proud this excellent group of officers and some of the staff personnel as well in seniors took their responsibilities very seriously to look for the best, to make sure that everybody got a fair shot, and to make sure that groups previously disadvantaged got included. I certainly came away with a much different view of HR at that point than I had when I reported for duty there. I thought we made a difference.

You were asking about problems associated with political appointees and their DCMs at one point. We talked a little bit about political appointees who refused to leave when their time came but we didn't get much beyond that. Many political ambassadors do a fine job. But there were some who were hard to believe, and they occasionally got media play that was downright embarrassing to the U.S. There was one in Europe who came close to destroying the whole post. He didn't want a DCM, didn't want any kind of hierarchy. He would sit down and decide political reporting based on comments he had picked up from questionable sources, had no regard for the people who were on his staff, and was extremely difficult to deal with. The bureau sent out senior level people to talk to him, and eventually asked the White House to intervene. He had fired his DCM, who had tried to be a moderating force. The ambassador saw the writing on the wall and resigned very early. There was a political ambassador in the Far East who seemed to have no idea what ethics were all about, and started accepting expensive vacations and other kinds of gifts from the local community. I mean total contravention of the rules and regulations of the Department. The DCM tried very hard to convince the ambassador to stop. She ordered him out. That ambassador also left early under pressure. I could go on….

*Q: If you had somebody like that DCM, did you make a special effort to get that person a good job somewhere else?*

McGUIRE: Yes, we did. In the last case I mentioned the perfect job opened up immediately and the ex-DCM landed on his feet. He ended up very happy. Sometimes it took a little longer because of the assignment cycle. But we took care of situations like that. But the problem cases weren't always so clear. We had another political appointee in a Latin American country who had spent limited time there. He was no foreign affairs expert but had good business and some political connections. The DCM was really well versed in the issues of that country. He had been there, he had served in the country directorate, and was a very bright guy. What happened, I'm not sure. It was a combination of things, but it really didn't work. And so we had to bring the DCM back. He was dejected and concerned his career was over. I told him this happens, you have an excellent record, and you're going to get through this. We found an office that was delighted to get him and the last I heard he was doing fine. I don't recall that there were any problems with the next DCM. Sometimes the dynamics just don't work. Remember the importance of the alter ego dimension of the ambassador-DCM relationship.

*Q: Sometimes I hear stories of a political appointee comes in, is briefed by the desk officer, and so intrigued by the desk officer he says, "Oh, I have to have that person as my DCM," which usually doesn't work because it's usually too low in rank and --*

McGUIRE: Yes, that happens.

*Q: And the desk officer may seem all knowledgeable but doesn't have the kind of experience and judgment and ability necessarily to deal with issues at a high level.*

McGUIRE: The DCM job is just so critical and involves so many skills and so much experience. After I retired I served as a senior inspector. I had a call asking if I would go out to post X because of management issues. They had poor morale, problems with junior officers, bickering between the embassy and a constituent post. And I said, "I don't have to go out. These are things the DCM should be dealing with." The importance of the DCM job explains why we invested so much time and effort to produce good results in the DCM Committee. Even for smaller posts, what they called the SEP posts, Papua New Guinea and places like that there was a very hard look taken at the credentials of the people who were candidates for going out as DCM.

*Q: Mm-hmm.*

McGUIRE: For the most part SL ran more smoothly than I had anticipated, despite the fact that we were both filling jobs for the Department and hoping to place people in jobs they were enthusiastic about. There was a saying that comes close to the truth that the counselors spent 90 percent of their time on 10 percent of the people. In general the Foreign Service has outstanding people who are highly dedicated, very intelligent, really want to get the job done, and are easy to deal with. But then you get that small minority, some of whom are talented but they're very difficult deal with, some of whom are not so good but think they're really super, and are demanding and totally unrealistic about their expectations. But you have to work with everybody, you have to help people realize their potential and you've got to help them realize what their expectations really should be.

*Q: How about recruiting?*

McGUIRE: Recruiting for?

*Q: The Foreign Service. Did you get involved in that?*

McGUIRE: Well not at this point -- I have already talked at great length about my adventures in the Recruitment Office back in the late 1960s, and my days as DIR at Howard and as the director of the Rangel Program.

*Q: OK, well --*

McGUIRE: It was just senior officers from 1999 to 2001. But I should add that I still get occasional calls from prospective FSOs and I am always happy to talk to young people about careers.

*Q: Well, after this job -- I think it's probably a good place to stop -- but where did you go so we'll put at the end here?*

McGUIRE: Perhaps I could take a moment to talk about how I ended up being chosen to go out to Namibia as ambassador. It doesn't fit the usual mold.

*Q: Sure.*

McGUIRE: I didn't mention relationships with the people above me in HR, and I should have. The deputy assistant secretary we worked with was Gretchen Welch that second year, when the office was really performing well. She was very talented and I worked closely with her. SL was getting a lot of kudos from many different directions. In fact, the deputy secretary and the other members of the D Committee gave me a standing ovation in honor of the people in SL who had done such outstanding work on the D Committee. (I note here again that Rusty Hughes was at the center of those efforts). And we kept one eye on the horizon. Marc Grossman commented in a staff meeting one day that Jesse Helms was threatening to go slow on the appointments of new ambassadors but he was also ready to criticize the administration if ambassadors who were ending their tours were allowed to leave on schedule, with resultant gaps at posts. (Summer was the usual change over period and the disruption of the process was purely political.) Marc said, "We've got to start contacting our ambassadors in the field." We had foreseen the problem because Helms' threats were in the media every day. So Sharon Bisdee and I had gone out with email messages alerting career and political ambassadors scheduled to depart, asking people what their plans were and expressing hope and expectation that they would stay at post as long as possible. Marc was very pleased. We gave him our results and he was able to brief Secretary Albright immediately. The problem was averted, at least SL's part of it.

Vincent Battle was the head of assignments, my immediate boss. I don't know if you know Vincent. He was a consular officer, had served as DCM in Cairo and would go on to be ambassador to Lebanon. He had held my job as head of seniors some years earlier. It is difficult to supervise somebody who's in a job that you have done; it could lead to all kinds of headaches; he did a good job of it. Where am I going with this you may be wondering? I have talked at length about the ambassadorial selection process. Very occasionally, in unexpected circumstances, it plays out differently. Vincent and I were in a meeting with Marc Grossman and I explained that we had a problem on the ambassadorial front. One political appointee had never gone to his post, a career officer had serious health problems and needed to return to the U.S., and now our ambassador in Namibia had been offered a very important job at USTR. We needed to find some candidates immediately to get those posts filled in the current cycle so full three-year assignments would be possible. And so we agreed on an emergency process to get the job done. Word was put out, the relevant bureaus were consulted. My ability to go back overseas had changed dramatically with the death of my very ill mother-in-law. Vincent

strongly encouraged me to throw my hat in the ring. I talked to the African and East Asian/Pacific Bureaus; I had ties to them and both were willing to support me for vacancies. A very small D Committee meeting was held, small because most new undersecretaries were still awaiting confirmation, and made selections for the three posts, including me for Namibia. So under unusual circumstances the selection process I described at length bends a bit. But something much more dramatic was to happen. As I was getting ready for my hearing on the Hill, I was doing briefings in AF/S, the country directorate for southern Africa. The office is on the south side of the State Department building. Somebody turned the news on because there were rumors about a plane crashing into the Trade Center in New York. The preliminary reports were coming in and then, as you recall, the second plane hit. As we watched the TV screen someone looked out the window towards the Pentagon, which is a short distance away on the other side of the Potomac, and we saw the dark smoke billowing up. This was a very difficult day for all Americans. It was stunning. Everybody felt a surge of horror, a surge of patriotism, a surge of unity, a surge in the desire to do what you could for the country.

*Q: OK, well we'll pick this up the next time. We're talking about 9/11 and sort of the reactions of people and all. And then, and then what you're up to.*

*Q: OK, today is the 18th of August, 2015 with Kevin McGuire. And we left at a very inauspicious date.*

McGUIRE: We did.

*Q: September the 11th, 2001, was it?*

McGUIRE: Yes, exactly.

*Q: When the planes are crashing into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.*

McGUIRE: Right.

*Q: And that's where we left it. Did things change? I mean it changed in a way for everybody, but how did this affect you immediately, and your colleagues? What were you up to?*

McGUIRE: People were distraught. One of the staff in AF/S had been in our embassy in Nairobi when it was attacked and 9/11 brought back vivid images to her. (You will remember the bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998.) State was closed down for the day and people wondered aloud whether it was safe to use Metro. Cell phones were not everywhere at the time, so concerns about family members were on everybody's mind. Jumping forward a little bit in time, when I had my swearing in ceremony on the eighth floor of the State Department building we had a terrific mixture of people. We had friends, we had family, we had colleagues from the State Department and other agencies. There was a large contingent from Howard University, led by President Swygert. A lot of students, professors and my colleagues from the Bunche Center turned up. I pointed out

in my remarks that just a few weeks before, from the windows that were behind the crowd, that you could have seen the smoke rising from the Pentagon building. It seemed to me that this very diverse group, in terms of age, race, religion, political persuasion and walk of life was unified in a way that had not been the case on September 10. I think we all felt that way. In general, people on the street seemed to be friendlier, more helpful, and one saw all kinds of signs with messages of unity, and American flags all over. And again, regardless of station of life. It's unfortunate that we've allowed that to slip away and here we are almost in September of 2015 and the goodwill and unity has been undermined by those who prefer bickering and division.

*Q: Well, what did you -- I mean did it change anything for you?*

McGUIRE: In a very practical sense it did. First of all, for those who don't know much about State, going up to the Senate for vetting is a challenge. You have to be well prepared; you want to leave a favorable impression. They can ask you anything they want about your background, about the issues that affect the bilateral relationship, or anything else. And if a single senator doesn't like what he hears you could be rejected. And so it's a little daunting. I don't want to get too bogged down in the complicated clearance process that goes on between the approval of your name by the D Committee and the President's announcement of your nomination. The State Department has to look into your background again, notwithstanding the fact that you might, as I had, been in the Foreign Service for 35 years and had been subjected to a detailed security check every five years. Your finances had to be examined (again) and you had to show that you had never hired anybody to help in your house who was not paying taxes, who was illegal, a whole array of things. Once that was done and the secretary had signed off on the name going to the White House, there was another process over there. The president signs off after the White House review, and only then is the nomination made public. There is also contact with the host government (agrément). So the host government is given the chance to comment. Is there any reason why the nominee would not be acceptable? On Capitol Hill, staffers will talk to you about your background, why are you qualified for this assignment? What are your views on X, Y, and Z? And then there has to be an interview with the relevant subcommittee in the Senate. Ambassadors usually serve for three years and then start coming out. So in the summer of 2001 people were actually packing out to go on to their next assignments. Virtually all the new nominees had completed all of the process described above except the final step, the Senate appearance. And so in light of 9/11 it was deemed essential by one and all that we needed to get people out to post at this really critical time. My own appearance was speeded up to the point where I was a bit concerned that I hadn't had enough time to do the background preparations that were probably going to be essential. But there was great pressure to move quickly. There were a number of precedents broken in addition to the accelerated time line. The day I went up there were nominees not just for African Bureau posts but also from some of the other bureaus. And Senator Feingold was running the hearing for all of us. A very unusual approach. Generally speaking you'd have a limited number of nominees from one particular region examined by senators who were involved with that region. The hearing worked out well, and the full Senate approved us more rapidly than usual. There was good cooperation between State and the Hill in this instance. But the whole process,

beginning with the D Committee and ending up in the Senate, is enormously time consuming and laborious. No other country has a system like ours.

Another post 9/11 element was great concern about what was going to happen next. Security was on everyone's mind. A security enhancement plan was already in the works for our chancery building in Windhoek. A great deal of attention was going into strengthening our buildings worldwide. Budget considerations meant that progress in this area would be gradual. In addition to physical security upgrades people were wondering what could be done to improve our image, to explain better what the U.S. was all about. This goes right back to the great USIA programs that certain elements in Congress had destroyed. What could be done to bolster countries in the developing world that might be bastions of stability? Namibia was one of those countries that was trying to do the right thing in terms of education, in terms of developing democratic culture, in terms of avoiding corruption, and in terms of using the market as an engine of development. The irony was that our support for those kinds of policies in Namibia was based on a five-year commitment that was approaching its end. And so here I was preparing to go out to a place that was doing the right things, and among my early duties would be the task of explaining that the U.S. would shortly end its assistance. Even more striking, you'll recall that southern Africa was particularly hard hit by HIV/AIDS. Namibia, Botswana, South Africa, Lesotho, and Swaziland were among those countries with the highest incident rates in the world. This was another area where our rather small program was scheduled to end. We had a small ambassador's self help program that could be used at the discretion of the ambassador to assist local programs that might advance the status of women or promote education or help local projects likely to create jobs in areas where jobs are few and far between. The money had been committed to projects on the ground by my predecessor. It was now going to be taken away and used for other purposes. In particular, the money was to go to projects in Nigeria. I was astonished. Although less serious than the general question of discontinuance of the AID program, it seemed a petty reneging on something already agreed to and the shifting of a small amount of money from a country where it would have an impact to a place where it would have no impact at all. So I went to see John Bolton, who was then in an under secretary position, and was the person responsible for the cancelling of the small ambassador's fund grant to Namibia. Bolton had a very different view of the world than I had. He still does.

*Q: He was renowned for his disdain for many of the niceties of diplomacy.*

McGUIRE: Indeed. I think somebody once referred to him as a walking insult when he was assistant secretary for international organizations, a strange job to assign him to. I went up to see him expecting to have a not very pleasant discussion with him. I went in and he got up, came around his desk, gave me a friendly welcome, and he said, "You're going to Namibia. That is fantastic. You're going to love it out there." I think it was 1989 when the UN supervised elections were held. Conservatives were very concerned that there was going to be a phony election, that a Marxist SWAPO (South West Africa People's Organization) would be the beneficiary of very poor monitoring; and that Namibia would be handed over to that group. Bolton actually went out as a monitor. He was astonished by what he saw. A strong majority voted for SWAPO. Bolton said,

"There was no question in my mind that this is what the Namibian people wanted." You wouldn't believe the distances people travelled to vote, but they came by bus, car and on foot. One gentleman came up to ask if an electoral official could come to their village. The man said, 'My father is dying and he wants to be able to vote for the first time in his life.'" It wasn't possible, so the next day the man came back and they had the father on a litter that they carried for 30 miles to get him to the balloting place. Bolton said this was absolutely inspirational. He said, " The SWAPO people were elected fair and square, and they seem to be doing things the right way, and they seem to have abandoned Marxism." I may be putting words in his mouth, I'm trying to capture the spirit, that was a long time ago.

I said, "I'm glad that you feel this way because the reason I wanted to see you, in addition to hearing your general thoughts, is that we have a problem. There were promises made based on cables from the Department of small amounts of money that were going to go to projects here and there. And now I'm told that that's all been overruled by you and that this money's going to be taken away." He admitted that was the case, and commented that there was no point in throwing "fairy dust" around, small amounts of money with little impact. I pointed out in a place like Namibia it might affect the view people have of the United States. It might help in terms of creating some jobs. In Nigeria it would never be noticed. He said money was limited and he was sticking to his decision. It turned out that within a couple of weeks a decision was made at a higher level that this transfer of money would be a big mistake. It wasn't just Namibia, it involved a number of programs. The notion of taking all the nickels and dimes from small countries and packaging them and sending them off to a place like Nigeria was overruled and we got the money after all. I tell this story because I think it illustrates a couple of points about Namibia and it made me convinced that the first thing I had to do when I got to Namibia was to look into the question of the about to be terminated assistance program. Should we just walk away from assistance on projects that were really important in Namibia and which seemed to me to contribute very directly to the notion of having stability in places like southern Africa. You recall there was a lot of question about what was going to happen in South Africa at that time. Was it going to just blow up entirely? We're talking 2001. And was Mandela going to be able to hold things together and move forward? Zimbabwe was right next door and Robert Mugabe had gone nuts and his decision to confiscate property, particularly farms that were owned by white farmers, was having a terrible effect on the Zimbabwean economy, and was eroding the principles of democracy very quickly. Angola was just emerging from a terrible civil war. Was it not in the U.S. interest to have a state in the region that seemed to be doing the right things standing up as a beacon for others? I was brand new and I wasn't in much of a position to go and argue at that point. I did go and get briefings on all of the programs that AID was involved in. When you're going out as ambassador you talk to everybody who's got any interest or involvement in the host country.

Just before I went out to post, I had the pleasure of meeting Diana Swain, the USAID director in Namibia. Sometimes you sit down with somebody that you have a professional connection to and you know right away that this is going to be a very productive relationship. Diana was clearly topnotch. She had the same concerns that I had

about ending the AID program. I said when I got to Namibia and finished the initial things you have to do, present credentials and start calling on ministers and businesses that might have relevance to the United States, that I wanted to get a handle quickly on the AID program. With Diana's help that is exactly what I did. Once I arrived I was promised by the foreign minister that my credential presentation ceremony would be held very quickly. He delivered on his promise. An ambassador has no standing until he presents his credentials so I used that initial week to get to know my staff and our programs. I was very pleased. We had a small mission. We had about 25 Americans, total staff of a little over a hundred. That included USAID, and a military attaché office, which ended up making a very important contribution to the fight against HIV/AIDS. In addition, we had the Peace Corps; they had a thriving program of about a hundred volunteers who were extraordinarily popular in Namibia. We added soon after a Centers for Disease Control office (CDC). I had a call just before I went out asking if I would support setting up a CDC operation that would focus on HIV/AIDS.

I remember one of my earliest appointments was with the minister of education. As I got to know him, I discovered that his first visit to Windhoek had been as an indentured servant. He was from the north and came from one of the smaller tribes. He was hired to work in a hardware store. He traveled by train from the north to Windhoek. He had to wear a badge that was tied around his neck and go to live in segregated workers quarters. This goes back to the days of South African apartheid of course. Black Namibians had argued at the UN during the fight for independence that South African had no right to be controlling Namibia, given the fact Namibia had been a League of Nations mandate and then a UN mandate, and that the South Africans had applied their racist policies there as if Namibia was formally a part of South Africa. The minister's experience was not unusual; I heard the same story from a variety of Namibian leaders. (Many others had fled the country without documentation and ended up fighting for independence in the bush). I was struck by the fact that no one seemed to wear this kind of story on their sleeve. They all seemed genuinely concerned about the future without acrimony over the past. The minister wanted that day to talk about education, not political history. His job had been complicated by the decision of the newly independent government to make English the national language. English was selected partially because the British presence in the area meant a fair number of people used it, partially because SWAPO leadership wanted to link in to the dominant world language, partially because it would have been difficult to choose among the tribal languages, and finally because the language probably spoken more than any other was Afrikaans, which was not politically acceptable.

*Q: Yeah.*

McGUIRE: So English it was. Namibia would be better tied in to the world marketplace and this would over time advance Namibia's chances for development. One of the problems was that in some areas, like the far north, few people spoke English. So young children started instruction in their local language and then shifted to English after two years. This was a significant hurdle to bringing education down to the grassroots level.

*Q: And I take it the Peace Corps was very much involved in --*

McGUIRE: Yes. The Peace Corps volunteers were mostly in schools helping out with English and other subjects. Their director was excellent and the volunteers did a remarkable job. I can still remember the minister's comment that Namibia was doing everything possible to devote resources to education. The percentage of the national budget that went to education was one of the highest in the world at that time. He said, "This is a massive issue, because educational opportunities were not there for the majority during the South African regime. We have a lot of catching up to do." He said, "I know that we're getting to the end of the American assistance program. Is there anything that can be done to extend it; we are using this money really well. It's having a dramatic impact." And that's when he said, "You've got to go see for yourself." Which I did without anybody from the Namibian government there. AID set up a program in the north. And I went to a couple of primary schools, together with Diana Swain. You could not be anything but impressed by the interest of the kids, the interest of the parents, and the dedication of teachers who were not necessarily well educated themselves, but seemed totally committed to their students. I remember going to one school, and the local people who were at subsistence level insisted on providing a communal meal in honor of my visit. I tried to turn that off, but they insisted. They wanted to show off their kids; they wanted to tell me personally how much this program meant to them. I like to think I have a certain amount of skepticism in me. I thought this was absolutely sincere and illustrated what these people were trying to do with their new country.

*Q: You know, we had so many examples of, of countries, particularly in Africa -- other places too -- but going sour. The great man has taken over and robs the place blind or runs a personal fiefdom, and you know, things aren't making sense. What was -- did you ever figure out what you thought was making Namibians tick?*

McGUIRE: That is an interesting question. There are a number of ways to handle it. The short answer for the period 2001 to 2004 is that the government leadership was doing a pretty good job without the kinds of problems you allude to. With respect to what made Namibia tick, I got to know many Namibians well. I traveled everywhere and I tried to have really good relations with ministries, with non-governmental organizations, civil society, the media people (there was a free press there), local officials, academia, the military, et al. I heard so many times that Namibians had learned from what happened in places like Zimbabwe. Mugabe had been regarded as a demigod. During the fight for independence Mugabe had done everything possible to help SWAPO. But I heard over and over again that Namibia could not afford to follow his example. Zimbabwe had so much promise but had turned into a disaster. One of the advantages of Namibia was that it was sparsely populated. Despite the fact that apartheid had existed, everybody knew everybody else. If you came from the country side you knew everybody from that area. Towns were small, with a few exceptions. So one did not see the kind of impersonal hostility that existed on the streets in South Africa, or the hovels of major South African cities. I'm not saying there was no poverty or that income distribution wasn't a problem (in fact there was a very large gap between high and low income groups). There were places that were pretty poor, Katutura in Windhoek, was an example. The absence of a post independence revenge factor I found striking. I shared the story with you of the

education minister. I had just arrived and I was chatting with three ministers at a reception. By way of conversation I asked when the minister had first visited Windhoek. After he told his story one of the other ministers said that was his experience as well. These were dynamic individuals. They had been looking to better their lives. To get jobs in the market economy of then South West Africa they were put on trains with id cards around their necks, they were put into a huge barracks and they were segregated by tribal group. The only time they got out was to go to work. And then they might have some interaction with whites or blacks from other tribal groups. That was the way things worked. There was no question of civil rights. Black families allowed to stay in Katutura resided in small houses marked with their tribal group. The point is the Namibians were looking ahead with hope and not backwards with hate. The minister of education didn't say, "I've been mistreated, life has been unkind; we have the country we're going to get revenge." Not at all. It was, "We're here together, we are what we are, and we have to build on that." Incidentally, the barracks building where the minister stayed was converted into a youth education center where young people were studying in a variety of areas, including information technology and the arts.

*Q: How about the whites in the area?*

McGUIRE: Whites constituted six to seven percent of the Namibia population, mostly people of Afrikaner, British and German origin. There was still a strong white presence in the agricultural sector. The area around Windhoek, which was very good cattle country, had been held by the Herero tribe until the arrival of the Germans. They were driven out into an area that was less suitable for agricultural production or cattle raising. But the area around Windhoek was excellent. The Namibians are regular suppliers of beef and other meat products to the European Union. I'm looking to see if --

*Q: There's a map behind you.*

McGUIRE: Well --

*Q: We're pointing out a map of Africa.*

McGUIRE: And this is Namibia. The land that we're talking about is here and --

*Q: It's sort of the interior of Namibia.*

McGUIRE: Yes. The terrain, climate and availability of water around Windhoek makes it very good for grazing cattle. The area radiates out from Windhoek but conditions gradually worsen, especially with respect to water. And there's a fence, I don't know whether it's still there, it may be gone now. But when I was there a cattle fence that predated independence went across northern Namibia. It was build for disease control. The area south was better land, basically owned by whites. They had pedigreed herds, full veterinary services and inspection of the cattle that they raised. Because they could certify the quality and health of their animals they were able to enter the world market selling their beef. Quite lucrative; the people owning that land did very well and the

sector created jobs and brought in foreign exchange. There was some call for expropriation of that land in the lead up to independence. That idea was abandoned, partially because of what the Namibians saw happening to the fabric of Zimbabwean society. And so the policy put in place was willing buyer/willing seller. If white owners decided they wanted to sell their land, the government would help organize buyers; the price would be set on a market basis. There wasn't much turnover in the time I was there, and there wasn't apparent pressure on the white community to sell. I think this was partially due to economic factors, partially due to a genuine desire to have a stable society, a country in which all of its tribes would feel comfortable, including the white tribe. It was perhaps linked to the notion of allowing society to evolve in a way that would bring everybody together. There were interesting things happening in urban areas. Now, urban, you're talking Windhoek, you're talking Walvis Bay, Swakopmund, a couple of other towns of not great size. In Windhoek you could see young people associating with one another regardless of what tribal group they were from or racial group they were from. There were things happening that were important in terms of building a community in a positive fashion.

One factor in what was happening perhaps was that Namibia was very different in terms of the educational level of government leaders after independence. This was a side effect of the illegal exodus of SWAPO leaders from apartheid. There were young people who were convinced things would never change unless there was some kind of organized resistance to apartheid and to South Africa. Some early activists like Andimba Toivo ya Toivo ended up with Nelson Mandela on Robben Island. Others who couldn't travel legally just disappeared abroad. There were a couple of ministers in my day who had gone to the same secondary school; one for talented blacks located outside Windhoek. They had fled across the border. There were any number of people who ultimately did this. Some ended up in the bush fighting the South Africans, some went overseas to school, some did both with SWAPO's support. For example Hage Geingob, who was the prime minister for most of the time I was in Namibia (and who is now the President), went to Fordham University and then to The New School to get a graduate degree. Hidipo Hamutenya, who was the foreign minister for most of the time I was there, went to Lincoln University in Pennsylvania and then to graduate school in New York. The minister for public works had been a teacher in Brooklyn, after studying in the U.S. The speaker of the National Assembly was another one, a very talented, kind gentleman who did a tremendous amount to try to inculcate the notion of a democratic culture. These are just some examples of the future leaders who came back very well educated, and very familiar with the United States. A few also ended up in Eastern Europe. SWAPO had been regarded as Marxist in their orientation. And so the minister of environment had been educated in Moscow, the minister of health in Poland. The army chief of staff had actually spent some time in North Korea. So one of the few things he and I were able to chat about was our Korean experiences. At any rate, I do think that this educated group came into office with an understanding of what was going on in the world, including mistakes made by other newly independent countries, and this made a difference. They had maintained a presence at the UN for some 10 or 12 years before independence, because of the mandate situation. So they knew their way around the world; they had practiced diplomacy. They had a vision way beyond we're going to seize power and then

we're going to milk this for everything we can get for our families. Although the Namibians never criticized Mugabe publicly, I know that many of them were greatly concerned with what he had done in Harare.

*Q: What about Namibia and the merchant class? Because I think of so much of Africa, either Lebanese or Indian or something. I mean what was the situation and how were they fairing?*

McGUIRE: Well, businesses were faring pretty well. The government was committed to the market. Foreign investors were interested in things like diamonds, zinc, uranium, hydrocarbons and tourism. There was no confiscation of private property. There was no attempt to impose onerous constraints on the business community.

*Q: Who were they? I mean were they --*

McGUIRE: Ah, if you are talking about local retailers, service operations, things like that more than anything else they would have been English speaking whites and Afrikaners at that time. Especially in the larger towns. But this was changing somewhat. I joined the local Rotary to get to know people in the business community. The number of black members was increasing during the three years I was in Windhoek. In fact, I guess the answer to your question depends on what you mean when you say merchant class …

*Q: Maybe shopkeepers and all?*

McGUIRE: To a certain extend it depended on location. There were a lot of black shop owners in the far north, for example, but I am talking very small scale. And there were commercial centers that didn't fit the usual mode. For example, I'll go back to the map for a second. I went with the minister of defense up to his home area, which is up here.

*Q: Up along the Angolan border.*

McGUIRE: Along the Angolan border. There's a town right here on the Angolan border, Oshikango. Angola, by that time, had put its civil war behind it. But because of the war, there was a devastated infrastructure and there was a lack of consumer items, meat, vegetables, construction material, you name it, you could buy it in Oshikango. This was a market town pure and simple, and many of the merchants in evidence were blacks from the north. The minister took me up there to see it and he said, "I hope you have your dollars with you because you can't use Namibian currency here." There were trucks everywhere; the trucks headed north were absolutely full, and coming south absolutely empty. It was a remarkable scene. So as I say, it was a little unconventional. And speaking of unconventional you had the diamond industry. The main center of exploration, to go back to the map, was down here.

*Q: It's down about two-thirds of the way.*

McGUIRE: Diamonds were first discovered around Lüderitz, perhaps three quarters of the way down the coast. But the principal center now is at Oranjemund right on the Orange River which is the border between South Africa and Namibia. The product that Namibia is probably best known for in the United States is diamonds. Their diamonds are alluvial, which means that they wash down the Orange River and then when they hit the coast the action of the waves buries most of the diamonds in the sand there. A certain amount is carried further north, and then eventually they're very small and they get washed up on the surface of the sand. An early German settler noticed that at night when the moon was full there was a glint off the earth: diamonds! They then tracked south and discovered that the source was the Orange River. That whole area for many years was a forbidden zone. You couldn't go in there without a special permit. The mining that went on at Oranjemund was very tightly controlled. De Beers basically controlled the operation. Now there's a partnership between De Beers and the Namibian government. So you can see why I asked what you meant by the merchant class. The joint venture is run by black Namibians, but De Beers is a key player. But again, that's not a very conventional aspect of the merchant class. There were plans for some diamond finishing operations in Namibia to increase value added; I am not sure if they actually were established. That was just…

*Q: You just pointed on the map to Amsterdam and places like that.*

McGUIRE: Yes, most diamond finishing is done in a few places like Amsterdam, New York, and Israel. It is very expensive material and a perfect finish requires great skill. And Namibian diamonds reputedly are among the best in the world because of their alluvial nature. So there is a premium on skilled finishing.

*Q: How did you find the De Beers presence?*

McGUIRE: Muted. Historically they were very aggressive in South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia. In Namibia with independence the decision was made to form a partnership. So there is a considerable amount of money that flows into the Namibian economy from the production. There is a close relationship now. De Beers seems to be content with being monitored closely in order to continue what is a very profitable business. One of the things that the Namibians were very helpful on, an area where we worked very closely with them, was in the Kimberly process to control blood diamonds. They were among the leaders in efforts to get an international agreement to prevent the sale of blood diamonds. They had some excellent black Namibians working in their diamond commission.

Let's see. I backed into diamonds because you were asking about the makeup of the people engaged in business. Let me go back to where I was talking about assisting on education. We worked closely with the speaker of the National Assembly and many other people in the political sphere to help with the development of civil society. We were involved in helping a variety of organizations that were working on democracy and advocacy. This is a sensitive area; an active civil society is essential for good governance but can be a pain in the neck to governments. There was progress being made; individuals

and groups actually were stating their case and putting forward suggestions to the government in areas like the environment, women's rights, changes in the way government did business and so forth. AID rendered some good support. The government, to its credit, understood the need for this type of thing if they really were serious about developing a democratic culture. There was very good presence from the National Democratic Institute in Windhoek. It's representative worked closely with the Speaker of the National Assembly. One of the projects that the speaker had started was an outreach program. Every year he would take a group from the National Assembly and they would visit a different area of Namibia. They had a bus with computer capabilities. He invited me to go out on one of these trips. They'd have a big turnout of people who had very good questions about what the government was spending money on and talking about local issues and what they needed in terms of schools for their children or better this, better that, what have you. People were invited to come in and use the computers to send messages to the president or the prime minister or their own representative. The bus would then proceed to the next area to be visited. And there were computers that were left behind in all these places so that people could use them. The idea was to get citizens involved in the political process. Computers were getting to be a more important feature of Namibian society as young people were getting more educated. It was a noble effort to try and promote grassroots democracy. AID had a small but good program to help.

And on the economic side, we were doing a variety of things to help the Namibians use the market to try and develop. One of the things was to take advantage of AGOA, the African Growth and Opportunity Act, which provided access to the U.S. market on a concessional basis to African countries that were below a certain level of development. We helped train people in terms of seeing what kinds of products could qualify for inclusion and could be used to help promote development. It looked as if AGOA would give a terrific boost to job creation and exports when a Malaysian firm invested in a large plant to produce apparel. After I left the project, which had been going well, broke down over environmental concerns.

The community based natural resource management program deserves special attention. It was underway when I got there. This was funded in part by AID. The World Wildlife Federation was the contracting agency. As most Americans know, there's a terrific problem with the elimination of wildlife in Africa. We read every day about poaching of elephants and rhinos, the shrinking areas for the big cats. And in most countries there's not a whole lot being done that's successful. Namibia, on the other hand, has been incredibly successful. The program resulted in such growth in the elephant population that they export elephants to Angola where the herds suffered by virtue of the civil war. Namibia is one of the most successful places for protecting and researching cheetahs. When I arrived, if you went through the sparsely populated area of Kunene, you didn't see much wildlife. Three years later you could see the resurgence in elephants, giraffe, antelope class animals like kudu and oryx; even the rhino were doing very well. The central element of the program was to turn over control of animal resources to local people. The people elected boards to oversee conservancies. In the Caprivi Strip, for example, there were a number of tribal groups that had historically spent a lot of time struggling with one another. One early visit I did to a conservancy was to that area. They

were having a semi-annual meeting of all the region's tribal groups. The focus was on protecting animal life and cooperation on tourism. One of the first people I met was a park ranger. I noticed that a chunk of his arm was missing. He said, "That goes back to the old days. At the time of independence there was nothing going on economically here. I got shot by poachers. They were looking for elephants; they got me and then they got the elephant." I said, "What's the situation like now?" He said, "It's night and day. Everybody here (perhaps 70 conservancy representatives and some staff) knows that tourism is the most important thing that we having going for us. And what are visitors coming for? They're coming to see elephants. They're coming to see giraffes. They're coming to see" -- he went through a list of the animals in the area. " There is some hunting that's allowed." There are permits issued. It's controlled by the conservancy, in conjunction with the government. And in Caprivi, if one conservancy is interested in granting a permit it's got to be cleared by the other conservancies in the area. There will be an identification of a particular animal, perhaps a very old bull elephant. The revenues are shared, the hunt is conducted by professional hunters/ guides. It is beneficial to everybody. Most of the tourism is camera tourism, some fishing, some just seeing the countryside, there are a lot of interesting things to see. "If there are suspicious people wandering around I get a call and we go out and investigate. If there are people who are trying to poach they're not going to get away with it. Poaching has pretty much ended here." As in other parts of Namibia the local people had bought in. They were practicing grass roots democracy, and cooperating in the region to everyone's economic benefit. I was struck by the fact that women were being elected to the conservancy boards and taking on responsible staff positions.

I was at a different conservancy in Kunene and was being shown around by the chairman of the conservancy board. And all of a sudden an elderly gentleman drove up, got out of his car, came over and asked if he could speak to the chairman. Another conservancy member explained: the old man had lived in the area his whole life. He used to be a guy who, if he saw an elephant, would shoot first and ask questions later. He provided a translation of the conversation, which was taking place in Afrikaans. What he's saying to the chairman is, "That goddamn elephant is back on my land again, and he tore down my water tower. Don't give me a lecture. I'm not going to shoot him." (This conservancy had a hotel they were part owners of, which created jobs and brought in revenue through a bed tax). The old man finished, "I know what you're going to say. The conservancy is really important to us. I just wanted to tell you that they're coming out to repair the water tank on Monday and I'm sending them over here for payment. You better have the money in your till to pay." The chairman nodded. My interpreter said, "That's the way things are now. It's totally different than it was 15 years ago."

*Q: How about -- I take it that's an area where the Bushmen, the pygmies, or -- is that an area, the Kalahari area and all that?*

McGUIRE: You're very well informed on this.

*Q: No, no.*

McGUIRE: You're just generally a bright young guy.

*Q: Just a bright guy.*

McGUIRE: All right, I'm going to go back to the map, all right? The San people in Namibia are centered up here, in the northeast (not counting the Caprivi strip).

*Q: It's right on the Angola border, yeah.*

McGUIRE: Close to Angola. The San also live in adjacent areas in Botswana. Their numbers were small, perhaps 20,000 to 30,000 in Namibia. The area is arid, but with fairly dense bush. In terms of education and economic well being they are way behind the Namibian norm. Attempts were being made to improve their circumstances. Problems included malnutrition, excessive use of alcohol, and a breakdown of traditional culture. There was an attempt being made to get the San out of more urban areas and back into a more traditional setting. There had been some success in terms of finding outlets for them to earn income. They do beautiful carvings and handicrafts like that are sold in cooperatives. There have been attempts to help them produce local grain. Efforts have met with some success but there is a long way to go. We visited the camp of a professional hunter from Germany. He operated in a conservancy. Buffalo are very numerous up there, and elephants and carnivores as well. The hunter paid something like 200,000 U.S. dollars a year for a license. The license was let competitively, so it wasn't always the same person, but this hunter had been there for a couple of years. Each hunt required a permit. A hunter was coming in the following week to take down an elephant. They knew which elephant they were going to be hunting. It was an old male. The government had signed off on it. The camp had a staff of San people; an interesting match of traditional San skills and a modern economic phenomenon. The World Wildlife Federation was involved in making sure the parameters were done in a way that made sense, that herds wouldn't be damaged, and that local people benefited. Conservation of animal life is something the Namibian government takes very seriously, and it's a grassroots cultural phenomenon as well. Incidentally, some readers might doubt the ability to identify a particular elephant. I went out a couple of times with trackers where a routine rhino survey was being conducted. The park rangers keep detailed records on the rhinos. Once we ended up on foot. And I'm wondering now what I was thinking. It's a long story why we were doing that; in short, AID was assisting in the whole wildlife program. It was a question of going out with the rangers to see how they did their jobs. The rangers took detailed notes about the rhinos and how they were doing, where they were, etc. All the rhinos had names, and records of identifying marks, and the information was shared from conservancy to conservancy.

*Q: Well now, the neighbor is Botswana.*

McGUIRE: Right.

*Q: And Botswana has, at least from the accounts I've read, quite an enviable reputation about good government and all.*

McGUIRE: Yes, that is true.

*Q: I mean did Namibia and Botswana kind of share a brotherly concern?*

McGUIRE: You're talking about animals or you're talking about in general?

*Q: Well, just in general.*

McGUIRE: Yes. The relationship between the two countries was excellent. Botswana is famous for the wetlands formed at certain times of the year from flooding of the Okavango River, which runs into Botswana from Namibia. Huge numbers of animals migrate there to enjoy the water and the new grass. The two countries had a tremendous shared responsibility for animal resources and strong tourist sectors because of the animals. Although they had somewhat different experiences during the colonial era they had governments that were standouts in sub Saharan Africa for trying to do things in a democratic fashion. They had excellent records on human rights and on corruption. They had a free press. Their economies were doing reasonably well and they shared some similarities like cattle raising and diamonds in addition to tourism.

*Q: How about with South Africa?*

McGUIRE: There was a good relationship, but sometimes policies diverged. Let me as an illustration shift to the final area in our AID program. The HIV/AIDS pandemic hit southern Africa particularly hard. The governments' attitudes in Namibia, South Africa, Lesotho, and Swaziland was one of denial as late as 2000. Botswana benefitted from a Gates Foundation grant and was moving on HIV/AIDS a few years before I got out to Namibia. But one of things that happened in Namibia shortly before I came was a change of heart on the part of Sam Nujoma, the then President of Namibia. He had rejected the notion that HIV/AIDS was a serious issue. He suddenly changed course. It was a tremendous step forward for Namibia and ultimately had an impact on other parts of that region and beyond. One of the things that made it very apparent that he was serious about addressing the problem was the appearance of billboards all over the place. There were several different ones; the most striking was of the president with a small child on his knee, and the text "HIV/AIDS is threatening our children." Big, big step forward. Nujoma was revered in Namibia and in many parts of southern Africa, and many parts of the developing world, as someone who had fought long and hard against apartheid, managed to successfully take over government, and then do a credible job of governing. The South African Government was still refusing to buy into this change on HIV/AIDS. I don't want to get too far ahead of myself. But I'll mention once again, I'm supposed to have a good relationship with the host government; I'm supposed to be assisting in promoting a positive view of America; I'm supposed to be trying to build relationships that will make the development of terrorism in the region less likely. How can we walk away from helping in education, from helping develop a stronger democracy? How can we walk away from helping the Namibians keep their focus on a market economy? How can we say we're going to stop assisting one of the most successful programs ever

devised in terms of conservation of wildlife? But most important, how do we tell the Namibians at a time when they're going through a national health crisis and the president has now taken this on that we're walking away.

*Q: I was thinking this might be a good place to stop.*

McGUIRE: Well, it might be because I have a lot to say on this subject.

*Q: And I want you to say it.*

McGUIRE: The evolution of our AID relationship is worth focusing on. It demonstrates how an engaged embassy can work with Washington to change policy decisions.

*Q: Today is August 25th, 2015 with Kevin McGuire. And Kevin, you'll tell us where we are.*

McGUIRE: We started on Namibia by looking at one of the major issues I discovered when prepping for my appearance at the Senate. That was whether the small USAID program that had been established several years earlier would phase out on schedule while I was in Namibia. I have talked about the reasons for my concern. In a nutshell, Namibia was really making good use of the small amount of money involved. They were serving as a good example on efforts to promote democracy, respect human rights, use of the marketplace, the fight against HIV/AIDS and a variety of other things that coincided with U.S. interests in the region.

*Q: Wildlife preservation.*

McGUIRE: Yes, wildlife preservation. Of course HIV/AIDS was the most important issue there. I've talked about my initial reactions in looking at these programs on the ground. What I didn't mention in our last session was that around this time President Bush made a policy speech in Monterey, California. He emphasized that post-9/11 we should be looking carefully at what we could do to help countries that were trying to do the right thing, countries that would help fight terrorism by promoting the kinds of ideals that we like to think we stand for. So I have laid out the background on our assistance program. I will return to it in a bit. Before doing so I thought it would useful to talk a little bit more generally about the relationship with Namibia. Again, I'm taking the point of view that these remarks are basically for people who are not that familiar with the Foreign Service, who aren't familiar with the way Washington and embassies interact, or what embassies do. So let's go back a little bit and talk about the general atmosphere when I arrived.

We had a correct relationship with the Namibians. It was not warm, it was not chilly, it was correct. A basic reason was the perception that the United States had delayed Namibian independence. I talked a bit about that earlier. Again, in brief, Namibia was a German colony called Southwest Africa. It became a League of Nations mandate after World War I. It was transferred to the UN when the League of Nations went out of

existence. South Africa was the administering power and wished to absorb South West Africa. Namibians resisted over the years and the United Nations refused to cede the territory to South Africa. The situation was complicated by civil war in Angola and the intervention of a substantial number of Cuban troops, with the encouragement of the Soviet Union. In the shooting war between Angola and the South Africans, SWAPO aligned with the Angolan MPLA faction and the Cubans, with a Castro style commitment to revolution and Marxism. The U.S. Government spent a lot of time trying to work out a peaceful resolution to what we saw as a Cold War conflict, one that would include the departure of the Cubans from Angola. Namibian independence would flow from the settlement of the war, as far as the United States was concerned.

*Q: I've had a number of interviews with Chester Crocker on his efforts.*

McGUIRE: Chet Crocker came to Libreville to talk to President Bongo when I was there. Bongo loved to involve himself in regional issues behind the scenes, and he had offered to be helpful with the Angolans. Crocker had discussions but that effort went nowhere. The conflict dragged on for years. Crocker's efforts were not appreciated by the Namibians. The names Crocker and Reagan came up from time to time during my stay in Windhoek, never in a favorable context. They were held accountable for the long delay in independence. This calls to mind Jimmy Carter. I had a hour and a half with President Carter at the airport in Windhoek. He talked about the fact that it frustrated him that there had been many attempts to contact Sam Nujoma. He said, "We could never find him. He was always in the bush and you couldn't even get a message to him." Certainly Nujoma and many of the people whom I was dealing with as senior members of the government had been in SWAPO and had been in the bush, engaged in the conflict. The foreign minister came over for lunch periodically. My original residence burned down; I went into a temporary residence and then finally to a new residence that we bought. The minister said when he was in the bush people always said he was difficult to find; he couldn't sleep in the same place every night. He said, "But you're almost that hard to find. Every time I turn around you're in a different residence."

Sam Nujoma was a very interesting individual and he was the driving force of SWAPO. He had been an employee of South African railways. And that meant despite tight restrictions on travel by blacks he went all over Namibia, and into South Africa. He used that as a base for developing contacts and spreading ideas about the fight for independence. And eventually he went into the bush. Unlike many of his SWAPO colleagues he did not go overseas to study or work at the UN. He was always mindful of his reputation in the developing world as liberator of Namibia. After independence SWAPO was voted into power; Nujoma was the first president. And he remained in control for the rest of his political career. Even after he retired shortly after my departure he continued to be a force in SWAPO's decision making. He preferred to keep his distance from the U.S. And that was part of the reason for my describing the relationship as correct but reserved. He was highly respected throughout sub-Saharan Africa and in the developing world generally. Part of his stance was to remain consistent to that perception of his role. So there was a PR aspect to it. At his core, however, there was an absolute commitment to fight what he saw as the forces of imperialism. You could never

be sure about what he might say in public. To give you an example, there was a UN conference on sustainable development that was held in South Africa while I was in Namibia. It was held at the time we were pressing Washington to change the decision to phase out the AID program in Namibia. We had spent a great deal of time and effort reporting on the value of the program. At the summit, there was an attempt by some African heads of state to defend Robert Mugabe. Now, this was defending the indefensible. Zimbabwe was sinking fast and Mugabe's politics were the opposite of what he should have been doing in those days. Sam Nujoma was scheduled to speak. The Namibians felt they owed Mugabe a lot because of his support of SWAPO. Nujoma defended Mugabe and he said something along the lines of, "And if that statement upsets western governments, well, western governments can just keep their assistance funds and we'll be fine without them." Within 24 hours I got a personal note from the head of AID. It said, "Kevin, we've been reading your cables with great interest about the desirability of continuing our AID program in Namibia. Does Sam Nujoma agree with you?" I was a fair target. Nujoma knew that we were pressing to try and get these programs extended, and he in fact had asked that it be done. Nujoma was flying the flag of third world solidarity, as usual. The other side of the coin --

*Q: But wait. We might not take statements of leaders seriously, but if somebody says they don't want our AID, that's money. We take that very seriously.*

McGUIRE: He was counting on the fact that there were other representatives from the developing world who stood up to defend Mugabe as well. He made the statement as support for an old friend, one who had provided strong assistance when SWAPO greatly needed it. He did not believe his remarks would have serious repercussions in Washington or other donor states. I am not defending him; but our recommendations were based on what we thought was a good investment from the perspective of U.S. interests. But let me go on, and we can talk more about that aspect. When the PEPFAR program, the president's initiative on HIV/AIDS, was just in its infancy, it was still politically controversial. Many conservatives felt that this was a bad idea, that it was pouring money down the drain. A group of senators, Republicans, came out on a three or four nation PEPFAR fact finding tour. It was led by Bill Frist, who was then majority leader in the Senate. They were going to South Africa, to Namibia, Botswana, and perhaps one other affected nation. At this point PEPFAR was up and running in Namibia. It was still early days but the cooperation with the Namibian Government was absolutely outstanding. We had an excellent AID director (Diana Swain), and CDC director (Tom Kenyon). The Namibians were totally committed to this program. The Senators arrived in South Africa and they were told by the minister of health that HIV/AIDS was not a problem, that it was a myth, that…

*Q: The President of South Africa was on that -- I mean that was his stance, wasn't it?*

McGUIRE: Yes, it was. The successor to Mandela. The newspaper reports spread fast and far. In fact, the minister refused to meet with the delegation until a farewell ceremony. She spent the time there criticizing the U.S. for not having enough women in the U.S. Congress. Which may be fair enough, but it wasn't particularly relevant to the

purpose of the visit. Her message was total denial. (There were some programs going on in South Africa that were run through the provincial governments at that point). So here you get a group of senators from the side of the aisle more likely to be skeptical about the program to begin with and they are exposed to this kind of nonsense in one of the largest nations in Africa and one with an enormous HIV/AIDS problem. I got copies of the newspaper articles and I sent them to the minister of health. I called her up and I said, "Look, I wanted you to know that this is what the delegation encountered in South Africa. I know that's not the attitude here, but I thought you should be aware of the reception they received. They will want to know if Africans want our help." This was only 24 hours before the delegation arrived in Windhoek. The planned schedule was that we would take them right after they got off the plane, and we would go for a 15 minute meeting with President Nujoma; he would be the only one there. And then they would go to the Ministry of Health, and there was a full program visiting clinics and hospitals and various places. I was out at the airport waiting for the senators and I got a call that the minister was on her way. This wasn't in the program originally. She arrived maybe 20 minutes before the plane did. And she said, "Would you mind if I rode in their bus and briefed them on what we're doing." Well, this wasn't originally part of the schedule either. She added, "And we're going to have to delay some of the schedule because the presidential meeting's going to be somewhat longer. And I said, "Well, that's great." That is what I said but one of the things on my mind was what is Nujoma going to say? I've just given an example where he walked out on thin ice in order to put forward liberation politics. I knew that people at the ministry of health would be great and at the hospitals and the doctors that they met with, that everything would be great. But I was very fearful that Nujoma would say something like the statement he made at the UN Summit. The senators and their wives were very interested, a very serious group. The minister gave them a great briefing on the bus about what was going on and the closeness of the cooperation between Namibia and the U.S. We got to the presidential palace and we went in and it wasn't just the president; the place was jammed. There were TV cameras and every nook and cranny was filled with people working on HIV/AIDS. And Nujoma started the meeting by saying how much he appreciated the senators coming, but more than that, how much he and Namibia appreciated the assistance that the United States was giving to Namibia, that Namibia was committed to doing everything in its power to try and get this terrible disease under control. But Namibia could not do it on its own. The problem was just too large. He was effusive in his praise of the U.S., of the program, of the cooperation. And he said, "And I have got everybody here, we've got several presentations we're going to make about things like mother-to-child transmission and nutritional programs, and a variety of the things that are very relevant to fighting HIV/AIDS." And he said, "You know, I want you to interrupt any time if you have questions, but I just want you to know how much we appreciate U.S. assistance and how committed we are to use our own resources to fight this scourge." There were a lot of people with tears in their eyes about this very strong statement. Now, this is a guy who maybe a year and a half before that was still in denial. And here was…

*Q: You mentioned a child sitting on his lap and --*

McGUIRE: Yes, on the billboards. As part of the effort he went up to the national university. This was after the senators' visit. He went up to the University of Namibia and there was an absolutely packed house. The speech was mostly about HIV/AIDS. He started out by saying, "We have a terrible challenge to face. And there are things you have to do. I would encourage you abstain from sex." The place went wild. The students were howling with laughter. And he said, "I know, I know. I knew I was going to get that reaction. But if you have to have sex, if you can't be chaste, then have safe sex and be absolutely sure." And he went through a variety of things that students should be doing. This was unheard of in southern Africa at this time.

*Q: Well, when the senators came, did they raise the question, say, "Well, Mr. President, two years ago you were making these denial statements. I mean -- or, or at any other time, was he able to talk about his conversion on his way to Damascus?*

McGUIRE: I don't recall any public explanation. One of his sons died from AIDS. And it was thought that might have been a tipping point for him. If you travelled to small communities in those days you could see the new graves in every church yard. The local minister would explain if you asked and it was usually young people dying of AIDS. I don't recall that the senators raised any question about why the president had changed his mind. PEPFAR was already moving forward. The decision was made to include Namibia in the original 15 countries partially based on material we had been sending in about continuing the AID program. Several visitors had come out from Washington on quick visits to look at what was happening on HIV/AIDS. There was a special counselor from State and then we had someone from the White House. So questions about past denial was perhaps behind the power curve. The senators did have good questions and they got good answers. The meeting went on at some length. And it was very substantive in nature. I think all of us on the American side were very impressed by the fact the president had gone right to the core of the problem and had made an eloquent statement about their appreciation of American support. I will talk about the way the program went later on. But Namibia was a leader from the get-go in terms of getting a really good program together really quickly, of having projects identified that money could go into right away, and they continued through the whole time I was there to perform in that manner. The Namibian program was thought by the administrators in Washington as one of the best, if not the best, and a sterling example to everyone for the quality of what we were doing. Very recently I led an OIG inspection of the PEPFAR apparatus here in Washington. Even after all these years Namibia is still up there at the front of the pack in terms of their program. In addition to saving people they have undertaken major responsibilities on the fiscal side. Countries like South Africa have abandoned denial and have followed the trail blazed by Namibia.

I would like to talk a little about the political relationship. Though the president would sometimes make statements that we didn't like, we had access to him any time we needed it. I remember one statement he made saying all he could do was tell the Namibians they had to be more like Americans, work hard, respect one another, don't waste time and let's get things done. When the Columbia shuttle went down he came personally to the embassy to sign the condolence book. 9/11 commemorations were attended by senior

officials. It was sometimes interesting what he did not have much to say on. At that time Iraq was a very hot issue. The privately owned newspaper The Namibian went after us almost every day on that topic. Nujoma very infrequently would refer publicly to Iraq. The same was true for senior members of the government, the foreign minister included. If he was asked a direct question by the media he would say something along the lines of "We don't agree with American policy there." (In private some of the ministers I knew best would underscore that they had no desire to defend Saddam Hussein but the U.S. intervention without UN support and against the advice of its closest allies was an unfortunate example to the world.) Although senior officials stayed relatively clear of the subject, government TV news programs would criticize us, and some talk shows would go after us on Iraq. Our DCM, Jonathan Moore, was a periodic combatant on such shows and did an excellent job. Namibian cooperation on security for our mission in this post 9/11 period was excellent. The Namibians did not have a whole lot in terms of security forces, but they went to great pains to make sure that our chancellery building was protected, shut down car traffic on our street, and had police who were stationed at a discreet distance but who were alert to possibilities that there might be problems. We had good intelligence exchanges with them on possible terrorist activity from outside Namibia (there was no threat from within Namibia; but their borders were porous).

With respect to public affairs we had a deliberate policy of accentuating the positive, with considerable success, and frequently with the cooperation of the Namibian Government. We were doing a lot of programs and we had some very innovative things going on, some of which still surprise me. One example was the brain child of John Warner, our excellent economic officer. There was a flood crisis up in the north of Namibia and many people were forced away from their river dwellings because of the flooding and there was a crisis in getting blankets and a whole variety of things. AID was able to help on that, but there was also a question of a shortage of grain because of the flooding. John managed to organize a shipment of PL-480 grain. The bureaucratic hurdles were formidable but somehow he made it work. So not only were we able to provide some assistance to people who were very short on food, but in order to avoid upsetting the market the grain was sold at market value. The proceeds went to the HIV/AIDS program that was underway. The press coverage on this was absolutely fantastic. I am not suggesting we did it for press coverage.

*Q: Well, no* --

McGUIRE: It was a humanitarian program, but the point I'm trying to get across is that the U.S. got tremendous public credit for this and other programs. Notwithstanding our demarches and our press releases, we had no control over how people might react to things like the war in Iraq. But we wanted to make sure that the Namibians knew what the U.S. was doing in country. I frequently had photographs with ministers as they were saying very positive things to reporters about U.S. programs and that got us front page and television coverage. I think it really did have an impact on Namibian perceptions of the United States. And it helped in terms of some programs Namibia might have chosen not to participate in previously. Namibia had an international airline and an international airport. They served hubs in Europe and South Africa. Aircraft security was deservedly

getting a lot of attention. One concern was beefing up smaller airports that fed into major airports to prevent terrorists from using them to slip dangerous devices into Europe or the U.S. The Namibians were among the first in the developing world, as I recall, certainly in Africa, to accept our offer to help them upgrade their security procedures and their security equipment. So we provided up to date equipment that helped them with surveying cargo and passengers, and gave them training which they took very seriously. They got high marks from the FAA for their cooperation. Our PAO (public affairs officer) got involved with setting up American Corners. I don't know if you recall that concept.

*Q: Yeah.*

McGUIRE: And I think they're still doing it.

*Q: An area in local libraries and other places --*

McGUIRE: Exactly.

*Q: -- that had books and internet connections, I mean the whole --*

McGUIRE: Right. Sam Nujoma was from the north, a fairly populous area by Namibian standards. He wanted to set up a regional center as part of the University of Namibia so that students up there could do programs that would lead them to the main university in Windhoek. AID provided some funding to help with the set up in the form of some experts from Indiana University. Our PAO came up with the idea of doing an American Corner at this university extension. It was at Oshakati, very close to the Angolan border. There was a strong and growing interest in tertiary education all over Namibia. The Corner included a modest library, with a special but not exclusive focus on the U.S., and 20 or 25 computers. There was a librarian who was hired and trained. President Nujoma opened the extension and the American Corner, and I was invited to go along and was on the stage with the president, who gave us full credit for our involvement. The success of this first American Corner led to several others.

So we had a constant stream of good things going on in our bilateral relationship, and that helped allow a good exchange of views in the multilateral arena. Sometimes we disagreed but we managed to find some things that we could cooperate on. For example, Liberia had experienced a terrible civil war and the situation finally ended with an agreement and a new government. The U.S. was trying to encourage African countries to provide military monitors to help UN efforts to ensure that the situation didn't blow up again. I went to see the foreign minister as soon as we received the instruction from Washington. Without hesitation he said, "Yes, on this we are as one." It wasn't the eloquence of my request; they had just decided themselves that this was desirable. And we sought to work with them in fora like the Human Rights Commission. They were respectful of human rights at home, too often third world solidarity prevented much cooperation with respect to the Commission.

*Q: Did you find that the support of the HIV/AIDS business and all had an effect on their relations with South Africa?*

McGUIRE: I'm sorry, the…

*Q: In other words, Namibia was taking a much more positive attitude towards programs to get rid of HIV/AIDS in South Africa at the time. And that put us both on the same side.*

McGUIRE: Right.

*Q: What does this do to South Africa?*

McGUIRE: I don't think there was a negative effect on Namibia's relationship with South Africa. Ultimately developments on HIV/AIDS in Namibia and other PEPFAR states had a major impact in South Africa. After I left Namibia, the central South African Government switched its policies. The success of Namibia's program was a powerful message. Botswana was another RSA neighbor included in the original PEPFAR group. And provincial governments in South Africa cooperated with PEPFAR from the start. The 2014 inspection that I mentioned showed that the central South African Government followed the Namibian example on accepting not just the reality of HIV/AIDS, and the PEPFAR program, but also on assuming more and more of the financial costs of program. As you know PEPFAR has expanded enormously since my days in Windhoek because of its impressive results. The original pioneers helped set a tone for the whole region.

*Q: What did they call HIV/AIDS? Did they have sort of a nickname for it, or not?*

McGUIRE: The definition of AIDS is acquired immune deficiency syndrome. It is caused by the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).

*Q: Because I was told some place they called it the sleeping sickness, or something like that.*

McGUIRE: No. There is a disease of that name in Africa. It is pretty rare. HIV/AIDS is a very important subject for Americans. I should emphasize that the U.S. leadership on PEPFAR isn't just about compassion for the Namibians or other countries benefitting from the program. This is a disease that if it is not controlled, contained, and hopefully solved, there's always the potential for an explosion that reaches the United States. And of course it is here, although it is not the --

*Q: Well, it came here from Africa apparently.*

McGUIRE: Yes, it seems to have originated in Africa. I remember our CDC director, when asked by a visiting congressman why were we doing this for the Namibians, responded this is for America as well and explained at length how dangerous it could be for us if left unchecked. When the congressman was leaving he was very grateful for the

insights that he'd picked up in Namibia and said he was going to support every effort to fight the disease. In fact PEPFAR has been supported on a non partisan basis since that time.

To go back for a moment I was trying to capture some of the flavor of working with Sam Nujoma and his ministers, the climate in which we worked. I think that the relationship improved over the time I was there. Every ambassador likes to think that's the case. I know that at the ministerial level we had very good relations. Nujoma appreciated what we were doing and was willing to speak out about that publicly from time to time. Towards the end of my stay I was invited to the president's seventy-fifth birthday party. Being invited was not a great achievement since it was a big celebration. I gave the president two books, both on George Washington. And I wrote him a note wishing him a very happy birthday and noted that George Washington was regarded as the father of the United States and that Nujoma had the same distinction in Namibia. I also pointed out that one of the things that people admired most about Washington was that after two terms he stepped down although he would have been re-elected by acclimation. The reason I did this was that Nujoma was the first president of Namibia. It's a long story and centers on the fact that another term for Nujoma would have violated the constitution. Rumors started circulating that he had decided, as so many other developing country leaders had decided, to stay on for the good of the country. He never said anything publicly that he was going to run again. Had he run, they could have changed the constitution easily. Several of the senior ministers became very active in suggesting to him (privately) that this would be wrong, that it would tarnish his legacy, and that he really needed to step down and allow someone else to lead the country. And much to the relief of those who hoped Namibia would emerge with a stronger democracy Nujoma ultimately decided he would not run for another term. I have imagined him reading my letter and thinking McGuire says I should be like George Washington so I'm going to do the right thing. An interesting fantasy. He and his SWAPO colleagues made some very farsighted decisions for Namibia over the years. They abandoned Marxism, they held fair elections, they sought to build a viable state for all Namibia's tribes, and avoided the kind of excess we have seen in so many third world countries, including close by Zimbabwe. And the decision not to run again was among those decisions.

*Q: I have a -- absolutely not in the sequence, but I'm looking at the map -- why is there that peculiar border, I mean that line that goes over to Zimbabwe?*

McGUIRE: The Caprivi Strip?

*Q: Yeah.*

McGUIRE: About this line here?

*Q: Yeah.*

McGUIRE: That goes back to the German colonial period. The Germans thought it would provide a good connection to German East Africa. They cooked a deal with the British

and acquired it. It did not turn out to be very useful. And of course the Germans were booted out of the area after World War I.

*Q: In Tanzania?*

McGUIRE: Yes, a connection to what is now Tanzania. The area is different in terms of the tribal or ethnic makeup from the rest of Namibia. It's a different kind of environment. Obviously it's very narrow, but you have the Zambezi River to the north, and the Chobe River, which is actually a backwater of the Zambezi, to the east. So there is a natural border to the north and east. One non essential but interesting note is that it means Namibia has penguins in the south around Lüderitz, seals to the west and hippos and fresh water crocodiles in the north. And then you have all the land dwelling animals mixed in.

*Q; Speaking of which, there'd been an awful -- in recent decades, there'd been a lot of research done on the origins of man. And Namibia I think is one of the places where mankind started, wasn't it?*

McGUIRE: Not that I recall.

*Q: With genetics and all that?*

McGUIRE: I thought that most of that was further east, and in South Africa. But I can't pretend any expertise.

*Q: They found remains, but I think they've been -- I've seen it traced more to kind of the bushmen.*

McGUIRE: The San people certainly have a long history in Namibia. There are cave paintings and artifacts that go back far into pre-history. They were the first people to inhabit the region. The San are fascinating, so attuned to nature, and their ability to survive in areas that you wouldn't think possible are phenomenal. Some of their vivid pictures have survived in the rocky areas in the arid western part of Namibia showing giraffe and other animals whose presence suggests a much wetter terrain.

*Q: Thinking of that movie "The Gods Must Be Crazy."*

McGUIRE: Yes. There were two of them, and we saw them first when we were living in Libreville. They were very amusing, and portrayed the San in a positive light. The star was from Namibia and died while we were in Windhoek. That inspired a lot of media coverage about him. And it was a sad story, he died after numerous health problems that had to do with his not being able to make the transition into a modern society. And that captures the plight of the San generally. We did talk about current conditions earlier.

One of the areas I wanted to talk about today relate to family considerations. And this might be a good place to touch on that. I went through the circumstances of my selection

as ambassador. It did not fit in neatly with the family situation. We have three sons. John, the youngest, was about to go into his senior year in high school, not a good time for a move. And so we decided that Kay and John would stay home for my first year in Namibia and that John would come out for his next summer vacation and then he would be off to college. Kay would stay at Magruder High School as head of the counseling office. This is one of those decisions you encounter in the Foreign Service. Assignments don't always fit very smoothly with what your own personal needs are. So you have to make choices, some of which are difficult. And in this case, we decided that we would go ahead and take the ambassadorial assignment. We'd have a year of separation -- well, not quite a year because there would be visits. Not the best arrangement. When John did graduate, Kay was asked by Magruder to stay another year. So she didn't actually come out full time until the third year. She came at vacation times, as did John. When Kay did come to Namibia she was really interested in doing something worthwhile. She asked about things in the area of education that she might do and ended up volunteering at a school in Katutura, which is in the poorest part of Windhoek with a totally black community. Not long before my arrival the government had established this special school to help black students to do well and perhaps get to university. The school was named for then Prime Minister Hage Geingob. Kay was a trained school counselor and teacher and had even run the International School in Libreville. The principal of the school was delighted to have her as a volunteer resource. Kay set up a number of programs for the students. She ended up organizing an exchange program with her school in Maryland. And so there was actually a visit to Magruder High School by the principal, a teacher and a student, their most outstanding senior. There was also a return visit. The principal of Magruder High School and several students came out to Windhoek. They stayed in Namibian homes and had a chance to travel a bit. Hage Geingob hosted an event for them. It was a great experience and person-to-person diplomacy at its best. I don't think anyone who was there will forget the principal of Magruder High leading the student body of the Hage Geingob School in a rousing performance of "This Land Is My Land," with slightly different geographic references.

*Q: Widespread influence.*

McGUIRE: Kay's efforts there got a lot of attention. One interesting part of all this related to the student who had visited Magruder. She went to Kay and said she wanted to go to university in the U.S. She came from a poor part of Namibia; the family had very little by way of resources. She was a very impressive young lady and she had handled being dropped into American culture with aplomb. The students and teachers loved her. The prom happened to be coming up. They insisted that she go and they got her a gown. There was great outpouring of affection. Kay explained to her how difficult it would be to get into an American college and the cost involved. Ingelore was not deterred. Kay helped her register for the TOFEL test, the English language requirement for foreign students. She also helped find a school which had ties to Namibia, Pacific Lutheran University in Tacoma.

*Q: German connection.*

McGUIRE: Actually a Norwegian Lutheran connection. The university received some support from the king of Norway and the Norwegians were interested in Namibia. There had been some scholarships that had been given to Namibians. Ingelore passed the TOFEL test and she was accepted by PLU with a full scholarship, tuition, room, and board. It seemed like an impossibility. We provided some financial assistance and so she was able to afford to travel from Namibia to Seattle, and we were her home base for vacations and things like that. She got a job, a legal job, as you can if you are on a student visa at a university. She graduated on schedule with quite good marks. She went back home during the global economic crisis. Jobs were few and far between. She had majored in economics and also done some environmental studies. She succeeded in getting an internship with the World Wildlife Federation, and parlayed that into a permanent job. She's doing extremely well, was just selected recently for a program at Yale and visited us. She has a special focus on wildlife preservation and the financing of wildlife preservation efforts. I dwell at length on this story for several reasons. First of all, there's the human dimension and the importance of a young life. Ingelore's experience shows the importance of education anywhere but especially in the developing world. It shows how a bit of assistance from us can empower young people to soar. In Namibia she is a sterling example to young women of what they can achieve, what they can overcome. She travels all over Namibia in her job and I can only imagine the impact she is having, in fact we have heard reports from young Namibians passing through Washington. To me she's a symbol of what can happen in a developing society if things go right. There are immense talents out there that can be unleashed. It's a heartwarming story…

*Q: And thanks to your wife too --*

McGUIRE: Well, it is hard to imagine this outcome without Kay's deep involvement.

*Q: Oh great, well this is a good place to stop I think.*

McGUIRE: I think so.

*Q: And do you want to put at the end here where we'll pick it up?*

McGUIRE: I'd like to go to the HIV/AIDS program. I think it's unfortunate that most people don't know the tremendous impact the United States has had in places like Namibia, in much of Africa and in other places as well.

*Q: Well, one of the things that I understand that George W. Bush has been -- the liberals in the country really are down on him for so many things, but he's been responsible for quite a bit of increase in HIV/AIDS relief and development assistance to Africa is my understanding.*

McGUIRE: The PEPFAR program is truly remarkable. And the other element you mention was the Millennium Challenge Account program. Americans just don't know about these things. I went to a foreign affairs symposium last February and the organizer talked to me about a segment they were doing on health. It turned out the entire focus was

on the Ebola crisis. I pointed out that the PEPFAR Program is the biggest global health effort in the world. It is a great success in terms of results on the ground, in terms of the level of cooperation elicited around the world, and is one of the few things the members of the U.S. Congress support on a non partisan basis. But the presentation hardly mentioned PEPFAR and I had the impression the chairman of the panel had no idea what it involves. The Millennium Challenge Account was introduced to put a certain amount of our assistance funding on a different basis. Instead of using USAID for close administration of programs in countries that were good performers, money went in a more direct fashion to those governments. It did initially increase funding levels. So the central notion was to reduce overhead costs and give local governments more autonomy in running programs. Namibia's per capita GDP was too high to qualify in the initial rounds so I never had firsthand experience in dealing with the new system. I did encourage the Namibian finance minister to pursue inclusion as soon as the GDP threshold was raised, which they did successfully. The new approach had some merit, but I was more inclined to see a strengthening of USAID. Whatever system we use our level of development assistance is shamefully low, and Americans don't know that.

*Q: All right, OK. Today is September the 3rd, 2015 with Kevin McGuire. And Kevin, we'd left off, you were talking about efforts on HIV/AIDS?*

McGUIRE: Yes.

*Q: And that this had major repercussions for the United States. And yet, somehow the program is not very well known here. You wanted to expand some more on that.*

McGUIRE: Yes, I did. It's one of the most impressive international health programs ever undertaken. We have bounced around from subject to subject. I just want to make sure that we get a good focus on the topic.

*Q: What was the program called?*

McGUIRE: PEPFAR, the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. As I mentioned to you, I was at a major foreign affairs conference recently and the segment on international health issues hardly even mentioned PEPFAR, despite its size and significance. This program illustrates so many things about decision making and about how international cooperation can be forged. It illustrates the humanitarian aspect of some of the things we do, and that humanitarian efforts can also be very much in our self-interest. In this case the world is dealing with a pandemic, one which has already had some impact in the United States. There were great fears going back to the start of this century that an out of control HIV/AIDS problem in Africa could lead to severe repercussions here at home and in other parts of the world. So the Bush administration conceived an extraordinary program. The initial funding passed by Congress in FY 2003 was 15 billion dollars over five years. Funding to date is now up over 60 billion dollars. So it's really a huge program, and many participating states and other donors are contributing, so there has been a major multiplier effect from our contributions.

*Q: What sort of things do the allocations cover?*

McGUIRE: I'm going to get into specific programs in a minute. I mentioned that when I arrived in Namibia USAID was intending to end their entire assistance program in Namibia. Not because the Namibians weren't doing a good job with the money they were getting, but rather, it had been set up as a five-year program and the five years were up. One of the aspects of the program was HIV/AIDS assistance. We decided to challenge the close out decision, to fight to keep the entire AID program going. We laid out a whole variety of arguments why things like the HIV/AIDS program, the education program, the wildlife conservation program, et al. were very much in our interest, our long term interest and should be continued. Washington finally accepted our recommendation. As it turned out that contributed to Namibia's selection as one of the 15 original countries in the PEPFAR program. Since that time the number of countries participating has grown enormously because of its success. I believe there are 100 countries now either in the core program or getting various kinds of technical assistance and training programs and things like that. So this was a huge initiative. Nobody had ever done anything like this before. It was extraordinarily complicated to organize. The effort illustrates the role that an embassy can play and the role that the Department of State plays in innovative answers to difficult questions. In Washington, there were a variety of organizations besides State that were involved in putting the program together. USAID, of course, CDC, Health and Human Services, Defense…

*Q: CDC* --

McGUIRE: CDC, Centers for Disease Control. And as you know from your experience, when you have a number of different executive branch agencies involved the task of organizing something coherent is difficult. And the Congress of course played an important role. And then in the field, in Namibia, we had a mirror image of the variety of U.S. agencies involved, State, AID, CDC, and the military (Defense, and the European Command). And of course the host government is the most important element of all. Because if the host government is not eager and organized and focused, then you're not going to have too much success. And beyond that, you have international organizations, you have non-governmental organizations on HIV/AIDS in southern Africa. One of the biggest partners we had out there were churches. The Lutheran Church is the dominant church in Namibia. They had some of their own hospitals, and they were very much involved in the effort. Catholic Relief Services was very much involved, as well. So even before the legislation was actually passed and the program was funded, the people in the field were pulling together the elements of a program that would really have an impact. We at the U.S. Mission and the Namibian Ministry of Health were under tremendous time pressure to get a plan in place that would enable us to start the money flow and actually begin to see results on the ground. The kinds of programs we had in the initial plan included anti-retrovirals for those who were already in the AIDS phase together with nutritional supplements. Prevention of mother to child transmission was a top priority, education about the reality of HIV/AIDS and how to avoid catching the virus were high on our list, as were testing and counseling services. Institution building was a must, establishing adequate skill levels in doctors, nurses and pharmacists, clinics in areas

where hospitals were distant. The list was a long one. Condom use was recognized as a useful element in the fight. Even Catholic Relief Services, if you went into their office, had a big jar of condoms in the entry way, available at no cost. We were able to put together programs with the academic world to get the word out to students. And we traveled all over, including me, but especially our staff and the ministry staff who were working on it, talking with village leaders and elders and people in the traditional society, as well as with local government officials.

I'm going to talk a little bit about the Defense Department. DoD was very supportive. And the initial military attaché we had was terrific. He was totally on board in terms of channeling resources. In this case it wasn't huge amounts of money, but it was used very effectively. Even before Namibia was included in the PEPFAR program, the Namibian Ministry of Defense and the uniformed services were very eager to cooperate with our people on HIV/AIDS. They realized early in the game that this was a tremendous problem for them in terms of staffing and in terms of losing trained personnel. And the military can be involved in the spreading of HIV/AIDS as they move from assignment to assignment. So the minister of defense and chief of staff of the armed forces decided that they really needed to get proactive. Our military attaché found DoD funds for a movie, "Remember Eliphas." It was about a sergeant who was close to his wife and his kids. But he'd had some extramarital affairs and began to notice some symptoms that might be associated with HIV/AIDS. And getting counseling was a really, really tough thing for a Namibian to do at that time. Number one, it flew in the face of the notion that this was all made up and didn't really exist and that you should just ignore it. There also were practical economic problems. If you had life insurance people were concerned that they would lose it if HIV/AIDS was detected. So people didn't want to go, they didn't want to get counseling, they didn't want to consider it, they just wanted to forget about it. They certainly didn't want medical examinations. Well Eliphas thinks about this and finally he confides in his wife. They decide he's got to get counseling, he's got to get a medical exam. He does it. And he does have HIV but it hasn't turned into AIDS. He seeks advice on what he should do next, and he acts on it. This very realistic presentation had a serious impact on military personnel. Soldiers began to get counseling, medical exams and to follow recommendations. The movie was such a hit it was picked up by the ministry of health and by the Namibian Broadcasting System. About every month it would come on at primetime, and it got great coverage.

*Q: What about deniers? I mean we go through these phases in the United States of -- for political reasons, people are denying that President Obama was really a U.S. citizen. I mean there are these things and they get very set in on their ways, and I would think there would be that type of opposition.*

McGUIRE: Namibia was changing but it was still a traditional society. One would hear individuals deny that HIV/AIDS existed, or that the west was behind it (an old black propaganda ploy of the Soviets). I remember a tribal elder complain up north that the young men in his area simply would not listen. But change was happening, and happening quickly. Young women seemed to get the message more readily than young men. And advertisements appeared advocating use of female condoms. One big

advantage was that the government was strongly behind the change. The opposition parties were not against it. So there was a pretty unified political approach. One of the things in the program was the establishment of clinics in many parts of Namibia with free services for people who wanted to come in and talk about symptoms or get assistance. One U.S. military financial contribution was a youth center in Walvis Bay. Walvis Bay is a port and if you have HIV a port area is a good place to spread it. The very modest donation was used to build a structure that would be multifunctional. Part of it was to educate youth in an area where unemployment was high, things like basic studies and IT, part was a modest sports facility. As we moved into the PEPFAR program, more and more programs to fight HIV/AIDS moved there. There was a counseling center, free exams for people who would be willing to take them, nutritional supports for people who were diagnosed as needing them, workshops on how to avoid the virus, and eventually a center for anti retrovirals. I was at a function with the mayor of Walvis Bay, whom I knew well. She said, "You know, I thought this place would be a white elephant. I've never seen anything like it. The support in the community for this place is sky high. The people are coming because they trust this place to deliver on things like counseling and exams, and people really suffering from symptoms of HIV/AIDS are getting help. It's like a miracle." Under PEPFAR, the Walvis Bay Center served as a model for clinics in a variety of towns around Namibia. I would usually go to the openings with either the minister or the deputy minister of health. The word spread very quickly that these clinics were a good place to go if you were troubled about HIV/AIDS. The original clinic had so much use the EU contributed money to double its size.

Stu, you know what a busy place an embassy is. You always have a thousand different things going on. Our staff devoted a tremendous amount of attention to this program (on top of our usual responsibilities) because it was so important to every aspect of the goals I cited above. I mentioned humanitarian concern for the Namibians, U.S. interests in preventing the spread of the disease, and our desire to build a stronger relationship with the Namibian Government. We had a mission action team that met every week to ensure we were all on the same page. When I say all I mean within the U.S. Mission (the various sections in the embassy, USAID, CDC, the military attaché and even the Peace Corps). Obviously we also stayed in close touch with our counterparts in the Namibian Government and our colleagues back in Washington. When the legislation for PEPFAR was passed we had a very brief period to get money flowing by January 2004. Our main action people worked like crazy through the Christmas period. Christmas in Namibia is sacrosanct. There's about a month when things just close down. But the minister and her key staff stayed too. Remember, this is something nobody had done before. We got a program pulled together and sent off -- it was just before New Years. At that point the Namibians were still a little doubtful about the results this process would yield. I remember calling the minister sometime in mid January saying we'd received a green light, there would an interim amount flowing immediately. I think it was seven million dollars, not a lot but it was a start. One of the things we had done to try and maximize the trust factor was to locate our tiny new CDC office physically in the ministry of health. So the minister saw the CDC people hourly and very quickly came to regard them as her staff. We had a very talented and experienced CDC director named Dr. Thomas Kenyon. He had worked in Botswana on HIV/AIDS programs there. The plan we had worked up

with the Namibians was, we were told by Washington, a model for the way to do the job. We had such a good team working on this. I alluded to the fact earlier that there are always a lot of tensions in Washington between different agencies, and within PEPFAR there were sometimes tensions between AID and CDC units in other embassies. Tom Kenyon and AID's Diana Swain spearheaded our efforts in this area and they were a great example to everyone on how to work together.

*Q: Kevin? OK, you've got all this counseling and all. What little I know about HIV/AIDS, and particularly at that time, wasn't much you could do about it. I mean if you got it, I mean you were just, it was sort of almost a death watch. I mean what was there that was in a way positive other than hand holding?*

McGUIRE: You can do a lot actually. Think of Magic Johnson for a well known example in the U.S. The first step is diagnosis. So counseling and testing is critical. And even if you get a positive diagnosis that you have the virus, if you take the right steps you can lead a normal life of long duration. Good diet and exercise are very important, and anti-retrovirals can be a very important tool for those infected. You are correct that a cure has not been found. But PEPFAR has bought quality time for millions of people while work continues on a cure. But I'll give you an anecdotal response. I think I mentioned to you that I was on TV and in the papers frequently. I was also known because my house burned down in a spectacular fashion, but that is a different story. At any rate my face was known. Once the PEPFAR program got going I was stopped frequently. Namibians would tell me variations of, "My husband (or wife, or uncle) was sick, we thought he was about to die. He finally went and got tested. He has HIV/AIDS. But he's now taking anti-retrovirals. He's got a special diet that he's got to follow, and we've got some assistance from a clinic. And the doctors say that he's probably going to live another 20 years. He's back at work, he's involved with the children again. And we know what America is doing for us and we are very grateful." I mentioned the CODEL led by Senator Frist. When the group was leaving we discussed the results of their visit. I had missed a stop they had made to a hospital in a small town outside of Windhoek. They started to describe a meeting with a group of new mothers infected with the virus. In all cases the transmission of the virus to their babies was prevented by the use of medications. I never got a full description from the CODEL because they choked up trying to describe the expressions of thanks to them and to the U.S. from the mothers.

The number of people using the new facilities was a testament to the effectiveness of the programs they were offering. The number of communities that were asking for assistance to set up similar programs far outstripped the amount of money that we had. That was addressed as I was leaving because we got a significant increase from Washington in our budget. I called the minister of health to tell her that the program would get 37 million dollars for the next year. She was in the north and was on a cell phone. I told her about the increase and the phone seemed to go dead. I said, "Minister, are you still there?" She said, "I'm still here and I'm not going to be able to sleep tonight."

*Q: Did you see any effect on the Namibian economy?*

McGUIRE: The disease was a personal disaster for those trapped in it without hope before the program started. Beyond the personal dimension, HIV/AIDS was a social and economic issue of major dimensions. I mentioned that the military was in the forefront of efforts to fight the disease. They were among the first to recognize what the loss of trained personnel would mean to the institution. The estimated HIV/AIDS incidence rate was over 20 percent at the time. So you can project the enormous losses throughout the economy, in every sector, had actions to check the effects and further spread of the disease not been taken. I haven't referred to the terrible problem of orphans, and I won't go into that in detail. The program checked the rate of parental deaths and also provided attention to the needs of those young people already effected. This is just one example of the potentially destabilizing social problems related to the pandemic. So Namibia was able to stay on a stable course because of the program. I believe that without PEPFAR the social and economic impact of HIV/AIDS would have been severe.

*Q: Did you have any cases of members of your staff acquiring AIDS?*

McGUIRE: I don't know of any instances. But the probability is strong, given the incidence rate, that some of the Namibian staff may been infected. Our staff was very much engaged. Some people were engaged because it was their job to be engaged, but the whole staff were apostles for fighting HIV/AIDS. Every year there was an HIV/AIDS Day, with a program organized by the local staff. The first time through it was a little shocking. I remember there was one fellow in the admin section who came to the meeting wearing a condom on his head. It was a very stretchable. And young ladies had samples of female condoms that were on the market and questions about information that they might share to encourage women to take care of themselves. They had speakers. I remember someone who was working in rural areas on HIV/AIDS who came in to talk about his experiences. He spoke of the misconceptions and problems he faced every day. So our Namibian colleagues really wanted to help spread the word. They all seemed very proud of the fact that the mission was so much involved in the effort. I don't think any of us expected that Namibia was going to be included in the PEPFAR program. We were fighting hard just to keep a very small program breathing. To suddenly be in the middle of the biggest thing that was going on fighting HIV/AIDS was overwhelming. We all felt blessed that we had an opportunity to be there and to contribute.

*Q: Did you get any feeling -- I mean you have the administration of George W. Bush who was not well thought of in the United States by many. And yet, he was responsible, his administration was responsible for this very major effort. Who were the instigators in this within the administration?*

McGUIRE: I was not at all involved with the planning stages, so my word is not definitive. Condoleezza Rice was apparently one of the original advocates of such a program. Colin Powell and Secretary Thompson of Health and Human Resources were major supporters. In the White House Josh Bolton and Gary Edson were much involved. A key player was Dr. Anthony Fauci of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, with his associate Mark Dybul who later became the head of PEPFAR (President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief). From every account I have heard or seen

President Bush was a prime mover in making the program happen. My personal engagement began with visits by staffers from State and the White House to Windhoek before the program was announced. But our main interlocutor was Randy Tobias, the initial head of PEPFAR, once the implementation phase for the original 15 countries began. He was a former CEO of Eli Lilly. I thought he did a remarkable job building an operation from the ground floor up. I really haven't given you a good enough idea of how complex the challenge was. Senator Bill Frist, who led his CODEL out to see us much later, was one of the members who worked hard to secure funding, a key requirement for any program to see the light of day.

*Q: Face time is terribly important. And here we have a chance, the ambassador and staff members, to talk to members of Congress and explain what your situation is and why you're doing what you're doing. So many of these men and women from Congress really get to see the situation on the ground. There's a lot of boondoggling and going on shopping tours and all that. But behind it is some real work.*

McGUIRE: I have talked about CODELs elsewhere. With respect to visits to Namibia, the Frist visit included Lamar Alexander, John Enzi and several other members of Congress. They were a good example of a group that was really interested in substance and open to a learning experience. I mentioned the CODEL led by Bill Thomas of California which provided a very useful opportunity to talk with good effect to some House members who were unfamiliar with PEPFAR and with Africa in general. Then Representative now Senator Jeff Flake was very interested in and well informed about HIV/AIDS and was very helpful to our mission after his return to Washington. Representative Ed Royce, now Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, was extremely well informed, and very interested in our work and in our ideas. On the other hand we had perhaps the worst visit by a member of Congress I witnessed anywhere. Sheer demagoguery, dishonesty, and possible venality are not traits one hopes to see in a member of Congress. The electorate ultimately ended that career.

*Q: So I was just wondering whether this covers pretty much what you had to say about Namibia?*

McGUIRE: Pretty close. I'll just throw in one extra thing. I've tried to address myself to people who don't know too much about how embassies operate or don't know too much about foreign affairs. I hope my comments are helpful to these readers on how an embassy operates, why embassies are important, and why the Foreign Service is a national asset. If they come away with the impression that we need a larger, better funded Foreign Service that would be great.

*Q: Well, when you left Namibia in what, 2004, and what did you do?*

McGUIRE: I went from Namibia to the job search program. There were 100 people in the program, and they asked toward the end of it what people were going to do next. When they asked, "Who's going to just retire?" there was only one hand that went up. I said, " I'm done." It was a fantastic career, but as you move up it tends to become a 24/7 job. I

thought it would be great to just relax and do nothing but think great thoughts. And so, of course, I ended up back at work again within about three months running the Charles Rangel International Affairs Program, which we've talked about. I did that for a year. I have done occasional projects for State since then, mostly as a senior inspector.

*Q: Why don't we save that for one final meeting-*

McGUIRE: Yes, it was a very different experience from what we've been talking about.

*Q: All right, we'll stop. And I'll leave this on so that any questions we have -- we have three interns here who are -- if you could identify yourself if you have a question -- and this is their first exposure to the process here.*

*CHATTERLEY: Colin Chatterley. I just have a couple of quick questions. The first one that I was thinking of is from a little bit earlier in the conversation. You mentioned that you -- you mentioned a number of areas that the PEPFAR program targeted, including education for young people, the military, and things like that. I was curious, what are the key measurables for what success looks like? And then how did you think about that data?*

McGUIRE: Hard statistical data was hard to come by at the beginning of the program. For example, one key element was the incidence rate. The rate we worked with was a calculation that was done based on examinations of women who were doing prenatal care. There was no existing structure to collect data on the disease in Namibia on a scientific basis. So the experts were working with extrapolations that were rough estimates. It wasn't a rough estimate, however, to see that people were dying and the disease was spreading.

*Q: As you were reporting, the cause of death was often misreported in Namibia or -- you know, there was no standard for what caused the death.*

McGUIRE: That is true. And the proximate cause of death might well be attributed to some other illness, pneumonia for example, even if HIV/AIDS was the real cause. By the time I arrived in 2001 the government had a reasonable idea of the size of the threat. Data on the incidence rate, imperfect as it was, provided valuable insight into the scope of the problem, and it didn't take much effort to get anecdotal data. I led an inspection of the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator about two years ago. Incredible changes had occurred, including much better data collection. I found it interesting that the estimates that we had worked with in 2003 and 2004 were not bad as a starting point and gave a reasonable picture of the state of play. You asked about key measurables. The ability to speak of precise, quantified targets and achievements is far beyond where we were a decade before. One of the measures of success is a decline in new cases. In fact, a major goal is a generation free of HIV/AIDS. I have already talked about some of the main focal points to accomplish this: education about the threat, counseling, examinations, prevention of mother to child transmission, availability of supplementary nutrition, anti viral medication, training of doctors, nurses, and pharmacists, building of clinics are

among them. Our people who are working on these issues in Washington and at our missions in the field are helping create miracles every day.

ANONYMOUS: I didn't have any questions, but thank you for speaking. It was really interesting.

McGUIRE: You said you had several questions. So --

CHATTERLY: Yeah, I did. Do you have a question first? I can ask my --

ANONYMOUS: Go for it.

CHATTERLY: Tell me about how you dealt with cultural dissidence in Namibia. I'm curious, like, what the role of native religion or Christianity in Namibia or what have you. How did you overcome entrenched ideas in order to transform mindsets and actually get across the points that you needed to get across?

McGUIRE: Namibia is largely Christian and largely Lutheran, and the churches were very active allies out there. The Lutherans had hospitals, they had pastors all over. And they were very supportive of trying to get the word out and trying to control the disease. We worked closely with them and with Catholic Relief Services and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that had religious affiliation. Religion was not a problem, not even on things like condom use which might have been controversial in a different setting. (There was one offer from an NGO to distribute a purple condom named "The Ambassador" but fortunately that did not happen). Ignorance and carelessness were core problems. Education about the disease was a basic problem in Namibia. They were making progress on education generally but the apartheid system had ended only around the time of independence. There wasn't any organized opposition to fighting HIV/AIDS. We funded outreach programs to help with the knowledge problem. I should emphasize that the Namibian Government was working hard on this. I have talked about some of their efforts in this regard. I don't want to leave the impression that somehow we were active and they were not. I should mention that our Peace Corps volunteers were a great asset in the fight against the disease.

*Q: Speaking about condoms, at least in central Africa one of the top brands was called Prudence, and there were posters saying, "Use Prudence." Well, our head of Central African Affairs at the time was Prudence Bushnell (laughter).*

McGUIRE: Anyhow, there was no organized opposition to the fight against the disease. The dominant party, the opposition parties all were in favor. And church groups as well. HIV/AIDS is a very scary disease and you could see its effects up close in a country like Namibia.

*Q: The Foreign Service hires bright people-- and I've been on the selection panels and all. I'm trying to find flexible people. OK, this situation is such and so, what would you do? Well, change it, reverse it, you're on the other side, what would you do? One thing*

*we're looking for -- and it's very important -- I mean here is Kevin, not an expert on AIDS. He arrives and whamo. Obviously having to become an administrator of a medical crisis is a challenge. And it gives you an idea of what we're up against. Another place you can find yourself up against a controversy on fishing rights or it could be the Serbs and the Croats don't like each other, or what have you. I always liken it to parachuters who end up landing on the ground and then finding out what the problem is. Because it'd be quite different at different times in the Foreign Service, which makes these interviews interesting. Makes the service a hell of a lot of fun.*

McGUIRE: It's absolutely true, and you never get bored with what you're doing because there's always some new crisis to deal with.

*Q: OK, I'll turn this off now. Today is the 22nd of September, 2015 with Kevin McGuire. And Kevin, I think we've reached the point where you're leaving Namibia. We've talked a lot about AIDS. There may be something else --*

McGUIRE: We did talk a lot about HIV/AIDS. Perhaps too much, but I am always surprised at how little Americans know about what we are doing to help solve a very major problem.

*Q: I think it's such an important subject --*

McGUIRE: It is.

*Q: One question came back. I may not be remembering correctly, but this did cause, HIV/AIDS and maybe other factors, a lot of tension from South Africa during the time you were there? Was South Africa a friendly brother or was it sort of a burly bystander, or what?*

McGUIRE: Namibians would say mostly friendly brother. But South African was the largest, most important country in the region and therefore had the biggest say in matters of common interest. I don't recall any particular tension over the differences in policy over HIV/AIDS during my stay in Windhoek and ultimately the South Africa Government did align with the PEPFAR Program. There were some instances where the two governments' views did not coincide, at least it appeared so from my vantage point. In 2003 efforts began to negotiate a U.S.-SACU (Southern African Customs Union) free trade agreement. The Namibians seemed enthusiastic about the prospect. We had been working with them on technical issues related to entry into the U.S. market of fruits and meat products. They had explored sales possibilities and saw an agreement as beneficial. The South Africans were concerned about certain provisions of a possible agreement, mostly related to intellectual property rights I believe. The South Africans prevailed and the talks were suspended. (Some years later a limited agreement was reached.) Likewise on the World Trade Organization's Doha Round the Namibians seemed very interested in U.S. proposals on agricultural liberalization. The South Africans did not share that enthusiasm. The Round ended up stalled because of opposition by bigger players. In general the relationship between the two countries was close. Of course, the leadership of

both countries were linked by common experiences under apartheid.

*Q: In Namibia, was there any of the problem that seemed to be rather almost endemic in South Africa of lawlessness?*

McGUIRE: No. People jokingly referred to Namibia as "Africa light" because of the presence of infrastructure, nice climate, beautiful scenery, animal life, and the ability to travel easily even on your own. That's not to say it was crime-free, there was some theft, pickpockets in the towns. But Namibian society was very different from South Africa. It is a large country, sparsely populated, and until recently largely rural. And so people knew one another. Whether black or white or mixed race you knew the people in your community. So the kind of impersonal violence, carjackings and murders and so forth in South Africa, just didn't exist. I traveled all over Namibia and unless it was on official business I would drive myself. My family wasn't there part of the time, and I would just get in my car and take off. I never had any incidents at all, with the single exception of my house being broken into. That is a long story with special circumstances.

*Q: Well, they didn't -- these special black enclaves that had been forced on by the white South African government, I guess these sort of bred crime and resentment and everything, so we'll never take it away. I mean you had quite a residue of disaffected citizens.*

McGUIRE: The impact of apartheid lives on. I talked about this earlier. The gap in income levels was an issue, and the gap in education was directly related. Namibia had one of the highest income disparity rates in the world at the time I was there. So you had whites who were living in the towns or on ranches who were pretty affluent. A growing number of blacks fit into that category. But a lot of people didn't have the educational tools to take advantage of opportunities in a relatively modern economy. I have talked about some of the things we were doing to help the Namibians in their attempts to work together to make Namibia successful.

*Q: OK, well this -- do you think we should go on to what you did after Namibia?*

McGUIRE: I think the plan was that I would talk a little bit about post-retirement and what I did in the Foreign Service then. We already did a segment on the Charles Rangel International Affairs Program. The other thing I was involved in was the Office of the Inspector General (OIG).

*Q: OK.*

McGUIRE: And that led to a project that was outside of OIG's scope. I was borrowed from OIG by the African Affairs Bureau (AF) to work briefly on the establishment of the new U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). In brief, African issues had been handled out of the European Command (EUCOM), but Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had decreed that a separate entity be established. I was asked to come back because it was a critical time in organizing the new command, AF was short staffed and I had considerable experience in

dealing with the military in Africa and elsewhere, and I could put an "AMB" before my name.

*Q: Let's do the African military command thing.*

McGUIRE: OK.

*Q: Can you explain what the situation was and what you did?*

McGUIRE: I was asked to go out to Stuttgart where EUCOM's College of Colonels, as they called it in jest, was working to try and establish the parameters for the new command, the Africa Command. Up until that point the Defense Department's military relationship with Africa had been handled out of EUCOM. This meant that the deputy commander of EUCOM had among his responsibilities monitoring military activities in Africa that might have some interest for U.S. security, and for running some programs that involved dedication of resources in Africa. Involvement with that latter area is how I became familiar with EUCOM activities. In Namibia we had a number of programs we did in collaboration with EUCOM. I went through some of them with respect to fighting HIV/AIDS. We had programs funded by EUCOM that had a deep impact around the time we were moving to the implementation of the PEPFAR program. These provided a very good example of how military services can cooperate on something that, strictly speaking, had nothing to do with military operations or weaponry or anything of that kind. We had other kinds of training programs both with respect to military operations, but also some very important programs that had to do with the relationship of military authorities and democratic governments. (These training programs were valued by the Namibians, and provided us with useful contact with the officer corps there. Unfortunately John Bolton managed to find a way to turn off the funding.)

The original idea for the new command came from Secretary Rumsfeld. Unfortunately, when he launched the notion and tried to turn it into something concrete, there was not a lot of communication with State, nor was there a lot of thought given to the kinds of relationships that needed to exist on the ground. In most instances our ambassador has chief of mission authority, and by law is the cornerstone of foreign policy coordination in their respective countries. In some areas of the world where we have combat troops military commanders have authority to act with respect to those forces. Korea is a very good example. We have a chief of mission who is in charge of foreign policy issues and the embassy, but there is a four-star general there because of the troops and the potential for conflict. There are other examples but you get the idea. In most places it's the chief of mission who clearly is in charge. If there are military units, for example, military attachés or military assistance teams present at an embassy they are under chief of mission authority. The ambassador, extraordinary and plenipotentiary. This long established concept became very blurry in Rumsfeld's plan. One of the reasons for this was the assignment in the aftermath of 9/11 of certain kinds of assistance programs to the military, for example, in Afghanistan and in Iraq soon after combat. The military ended up actually in charge of initial programs to restore infrastructure, roads, water, and things like that. As the situation progressed, AID more and more was put back into managing

these operations. But a lot of money came from military channels. And so there was a blurring of the sense of who was responsible for these things. Was it the chief of mission? Was it the military commander on the ground? And this confusion carried over to the initial concepts for setting up AFRICOM. Who was going to be in charge of an expanded military presence and role? There were things said before Rumsfeld left DoD that suggested the military would have their own assistance programs, development and humanitarian assistance, and that this would be somehow put under the auspices of the commander of AFRICOM and whomever his representative might be in country. This new military presence would be equipped with their own aircraft and they would travel from hubs to wherever they wanted to go without country clearance from the ambassador. This did not jibe at all with the traditional way of operating. And one of the things that I was asked to do was to go out and meet with -- I referred to the College of Colonels -- the 40 or 50 colonels who were at the center of the model building for AFRICOM. So I went to Stuttgart to work with the colonels as they tried to move forward. I was surprised that State did not have a permanent person on the ground at what seemed a critical point in the process. The individual earmarked for that assignment was awaiting approval from the military side. I wasn't sure what to expect, whether I would be welcomed with open arms or whether there would be strong resistance to somebody coming from State. It was the former. Most of the colonels had never had any experience working on the ground with State. A few had been military attachés, but most were completely unfamiliar with how U.S. missions operated. I discovered immediately that they were very interested in getting insights from somebody who had been an ambassador, somebody who understood the kinds of programs that EUCOM had operated in Africa, and that my ideas would be welcomed. I had a constant flow to my office every day of colonels asking about this or that, most of them very good questions. I was invited to key planning meetings and was treated as a valuable asset. The fact that I carried an ambassadorial title, had been a chief of mission and also a DCM in African countries, had been DCM in Korea, where many of them had served, and was a graduate of the National War College meant that I was somebody to be listened to.

*Q: The way they would check ribbons --*

McGUIRE: Yes.

*Q: One of the things that surprises me is this aid business of AFRICOM, because I would have thought the main emphasis would have been on supplying airlift to African forces, French forces, put down things. I mean we had the airlift.*

McGUIRE: Well, the original Rumsfeld idea went way beyond providing occasional airlift support. They were talking about actually situating the command in Africa. Kenya was one of the places that was looked at. So the general heading AFRICOM would actually be situated in a headquarters in Kenya, or some alternative in Africa. They would have aircraft, they would have people assigned in various parts of Africa, kind of regional hubs. And all of this in the minds of some would be without any kind of regard to the embassies that were located in those countries. This of course was not something the State Department was happy about. Nor should State have been happy about it. Think

about it. Having military folks traveling from country to country on their airplanes in a region where there was -- and continues to be -- real suspicion about American intentions. This is political dynamite. I remember thinking after a couple weeks that I really was communicating with the colonels. They got the message. And my thought was suddenly confirmed. We had a conference with the head of EUCOM, the four-star general in charge. There was a report given about a team of military officers going -- I can't remember what country they wanted to go to -- to look to see if that would be a good place to set up the new AFRICOM headquarters. And so he said, "Well, what happened with that team that went out?" And the officer in charge of the colonels said it hadn't gone yet, that there was a clearance cable but it hadn't been approved by State yet. And the four-star said, "Who the hell cares? Send those people out and let's get them on the ground." And the colonel replied, "But General, we can't do that. We're operating in a context here of chief of mission authority and we can't just fly out a bunch of military officers and drop them on the ground there." The four-star general was taken aback-- I myself was astonished, first of all, that a four-star would say that, and secondly, that this colonel would stand up and say we can't do that because we have to do it the right way. I thought that the cost of sending me was justified by that brief exchange. And we had a later episode of something similar with the same four-star. The question of chief of mission authority came up again. And this, again, was a teleconference. And the four-star said something like chief of mission authority, that's not really important. State doesn't care, and State's not really involved in this at all. The colonel in charge said, "But you know sir, we have Ambassador McGuire here as a resource and maybe he'd like to address that." So I said, "General, I don't know what you're being told there in Brussels, but I can tell you that this is a very, very big issue and there's a lot of concern at State on how this is going to get sorted out." And he said, "Oh, OK. Then we'll have to get it sorted out back in Washington." I discovered that there was a small group at DoD which had been pushing very hard to make sure that DoD was in the ascendency on the ground in Africa in setting up the new command. Not to dwell on this at length, the upshot was it all worked out pretty well. The command was created but stayed in Stuttgart. It is still situated there. It was the right decision, rather than trying to create a lightning rod for negative sentiment in Africa. I was able to share State cables with the colonels showing what the Nigerians, South Africans and many others really thought about setting up a controversial headquarters and hubs with a lot of people that would also be a target for terrorism. The new commander of AFRICOM turned out to be a reasonable man who understood chief of mission authority.

Probably the most important thing I did was to make clear to State that they needed someone there full time as soon as possible. State accepted my recommendation and put the heat on the military to get the clearance needed to accomplish that, and the new State representative arrived just before my departure. It was a very interesting experience. As usual, it was a pleasure to work with our military brethren. I was asked to stay on for a much longer period to work on the issue on the Washington side. But I didn't want to make that kind of commitment. One of the things that this story illustrates is that the State Department is so understaffed that the lack of resources can have a serious impact on the ability to get the right results. Was it Robert Gates when he was secretary of defense who commented that he had more people in military bands than Hillary Clinton had in the

Foreign Service? The problem needs to be addressed, but it's not being addressed satisfactorily, either at State or at USAID.

*Q: Could you talk a little bit about the, sort of the negative reaction within Africa to the start of this? I mean I -- one can understand this, but some of the countries and how one combated this.*

McGUIRE: I had been gone from African for several years at the time this was going on, so I was not personally on the scene. Rumsfeld's plan was unrealistic and didn't take into account the realities of our relationships in Africa. There's a residual sentiment in many parts of Africa that the U.S. lined up with the colonial powers, which is true -- in the aftermath of World War II. I don't think we really had any choice given the priority of reconstructing Western Europe. So there is a certain mistrust that exists, toward the U.S. and the west in general. And it's one thing to have military cooperation with the U.S. on a small scale, especially when it is run out of Europe with no significant troop force on the ground. It's quite another thing to start talking about a big headquarters with large sums of money available. As I say, one of the things that was talked about publicly was a fleet of aircraft that would be used to ferry U.S. military people all over Africa. The Nigerians and the South Africans are very influential African states which are not eager to see creation of a potentially large foreign military presence in Africa. Now, it's true that in some parts of Africa there has been cooperation, the French had small garrisons in places like Gabon and they were involved in Mali fighting terrorists. But a new super power force of indeterminate size located in Africa drew quite a negative reaction. There were reports coming in from our missions all over Africa about the negative reactions they were seeing. Why would that be a surprise? It wasn't surprising to me; apparently it was surprising to some of the people who were pushing the Rumsfeld plan. Anyhow, that's probably enough for AFRICOM.

*Q: Did you find with the military that -- I suppose you're talking mainly about Air Force and Army weren't you?*

McGUIRE: You mean in terms of AFRICOM's operation. That would be true. There were ship visits that took place, but those were really outside of EUCOM or AFRICOM.

*Q: Well now, with the inspection corps, what were some of the high points of your inspection experience?*

McGUIRE: You retired in 19 --

*Q: '85.*

McGUIRE: 1985. You would appreciate the ups and downs of OIG over the years as an effective agent of change. It has frequently done a good job of improving efficiency and the careful use of the tax payers' money. You would recall also some of the low points, things that went on in which certain members of the Congress tried to use OIG in a very negative, politically motivated fashion towards State and the Foreign Service. I am sure

you remember Sherman Funk. I believe that you published an interview with him recently. His statement suggested he was just a good public servant. I don't think anyone who was in the Foreign Service during his tenure would agree. At the time he seemed a man given to self promotion and if that meant demeaning hard working people within the Service so be it. He seemed driven by a political agenda aimed at tearing down State and the Foreign Service. I can remember, in fact, it was not long after Funk took over as Inspector General (IG) we had an inspection team come to Korea. I was the acting DCM at the time the inspectors came. We had a chargé -- and I'll name him, Stan Brooks -- who did an exceptional job as DCM and as chargé. In terms of his standing at post he was one of the most highly respected officers I encountered in my almost 40 years on active duty in the Foreign Service. Stan didn't say things to hear himself talk, very thoughtful, totally committed to making the relationship work at a very difficult time in U.S.-Korean relations. He was just incredibly liked and respected by everyone.

*Q: Who was this?*

McGUIRE: Stan Brooks. He went on to be head of the American Institute in Taiwan after leaving Korea. If you were an outsider you didn't necessarily see the dynamism of his leadership unless you looked close. If you were lucky enough to be part of his team it was obvious. Anyhow, the inspection team arrived and the leader of the team came to see me shortly after they arrived. I still get angry when I think about the conversation. He said, "We appreciate all the materials the embassy prepared. And I just want to tell you that we're going to get Stan Brooks. He's no leader, he's no manager. This is something we're not going to put up with and we're going to really write him up in a very negative fashion." These aren't the exact words, it captures entirely the meaning. I said, "You have to be kidding. You haven't even started the inspection and you're telling me that you're going to get Stan Brooks." I said, "I can't believe that you got anything other than a very positive read about what this post has been doing from your consultations in Washington, and I can't believe that you're going to attack one of the best guys I've seen in the Foreign Service. And I'll tell you something else. Everybody feels the way I do. And if you do this, you'll be distorting the truth and my bet is you won't make it out of this post alive." There was never any mention of this again. And no, they did not go after Stan Brooks; he got high marks for leadership and the post got a superlative report, one that it richly deserved. They did take a shot at our excellent consular chief but by the time the report was finalized our protests won out. I can't tell you that Sherman Funk told the inspection team leader to go after Stan but that was exactly the spirit at OIG during his tenure there. As a final irony, the consular inspector who was critical of our consul general called him six or eight months later. She had landed a good sized consular assignment and she wanted his advice on how to do the job! I'm using this story to illustrate what a very bad time that was for OIG; I swore to myself that I would never associate myself with that group.

And I can remember the next time I was inspected overseas. At that point I was economic minister in Rome. I told the lead inspector the story about Korea, and I said, "That's my last experience with an inspection overseas. And I understand that things have gotten a lot better and that the reports are being done on a much fairer basis, but I want you to

know that I for one will be will ready to stand up and scream if there's any unfair treatment of people at the post." He accused me of being anti-inspector, but I'm glad I said it. Just for the record I never had any problem with bad inspection reports. But the Korean episode was after you retired.

*Q: Just after.*

McGUIRE: Just after you retired was a really bad period. Sherman Funk.

*Q: He was known as a junkyard dog.*

McGUIRE: He took pride in that title. To me, a junkyard dog is a beast without much of a brain who's just savage. I don't want your readers to think that I'm just defending the Foreign Service and dismissing any need to do oversight. Because I'm not. But given my experiences I thought I would never get involved in doing inspecting. When I was in Namibia we had an inspection, in 2002. I'd only been there for a brief period of time. The interior of the chancery building was being redone for security reasons. And so we were in temporary quarters. My office was like a closet. My secretary was right outside. The Foreign Service National who was the main deputy to our regional security officer was right next to her and the budget and fiscal chief and some of his staff were in the same work area. (We had a tiny communal area elsewhere for classified materials.) And so we got word that the inspectors were coming. I remarked how much worse could life get. I discovered quickly. The inspectors arrived and I had a small reception for them so they could meet the staff. I left for the far north (the Caprivi Strip) almost immediately after it. While I was gone the residence burned down. Fortunately no one was hurt but I lost my clothes, my books, all my mementoes, everything. So how much worse could things get? With the fire, a lot worse, it turned out. But not with respect to the inspection. What I was leading up to is this team was great. They looked at the operation, we were a small mission, a lot of the American staff were relatively junior, we had a first time DCM and I was a first time chief of mission. The team had some very good ideas on consular work. We had a first tour officer doing that work. They had some good suggestions for him; they had some good suggestions for our administrative staff. We had a planning document we had to do every year and they had some good suggestions for the DCM and myself on that. It was all conducted on a very respectful basis. There was no "I'm going to get so and so." It was all about how can we help you improve efficiency? How can we help you cope with the challenges you face? It was terrific. The report they did was fair and we all felt it had been a useful experience. When I retired, I got a call asking me to become a lead inspector as a WAE. That is a retired person who comes in periodically and is paid when actually employed. I thought about retired Ambassador Robert Barbour and his colleagues on the inspection team in Windhoek. I thought if this is the look of OIG now why not. I had almost 40 years of experience. I loved what I did. I learned a lot about how a mission or bureau can run effectively. So I said OK. I would do it. I then unexpectedly ended up running the Rangel Program so I really was not available for a long while.

I received a call in 2007 asking if I would undertake a rather unusual project. I won't

mention the country or any of the people involved by name, but basically an ambassador in a large post in a difficult place had asked his regional bureau if they could help him solve some problems at his post. The problems involved bad communications with a constituent post, and poor morale and divisiveness at the constituent post. I talked with Bob Peterson who was the number three person at OIG at the time, a very smart, nice, honest guy who worked hard to improve State's operations. And he explained that the project was not an inspection, it was an informal advisory effort. There would not be the usual unclassified report issued, which is why I am hesitate to say too much about what we did. This was something that OIG didn't do very often and maybe they should be doing it more often. The idea was a quick, low cost visit by a small group to look at some specific issues and see if there were things that could be done to solve them. Ordinarily you look toward the ambassador and the DCM and then to the bureau for answers to questions of this kind. But they had requested help. Bob asked if I would go out. I said ok. Two people were assigned to come with me, one with a lot of personal experience at consulates, which was important in this case, and the other person from the security side of OIG. There was uncertainty right up to the point in time that we left whether OIG should be involved. The inspector general when we sat down with him asked me why I felt we should be doing this! (Inspector General Krongard, I discovered, had a reputation for abusive treatment of his staff. I had no problems with him but once again I wondered how this kind of person could be selected to do the job. He did not last long). I said, "You all have asked me to come and do this. So the real question is what do you think is the value?" Finally a decision was made, OK, we're going to do this. After just a couple of days in country we had identified the main problems. We ended up making some very strong recommendations, including that an experienced manager, preferably an ex-ambassador, be sent out immediately to serve as interim consul general. That was done quickly. Our recommendations for solving immediate problems were followed out. But there were some fundamental issues that we really couldn't do anything about. As the head of senior assignments several years before I discovered that extremely difficult places frequently were hard to staff. Good people with relevant experience avoided them so you had people filling jobs several grades above their level, or were in positions they had no preparation for. This was certainly central to the problems of the post at hand. I remember one of the people in a really important administrative job had been a courier three years before. Nothing against him, he was a nice person and he seemed bright enough. But he had absolutely no experience. This gets us to several different issues, one of which is the very small size of the Foreign Service. Second, the personnel system has a lot of defects, one of which at that time was that it was almost impossible to make a tough assignment stick. You had little power. I thought that the way to deal with this was through large positive incentives in terms of remuneration, and there were some but the amount wasn't great enough that it would ensure adequate, qualified bidders on jobs in posts like this one. Things have gotten tougher, as you know, and I'm out of the loop. It seems to me that now we have a system that works not on pay rewards but on punishments if people don't or can't accept jobs in Afghanistan, Iraq, and places of that kind. I think we've got a distorted system right now and I don't think anybody's found the right formula. But I do think OIG was correct in their attempt in this case to be a proactive problem solver.

*Q: Do you think your -- were you able to make recommendations to get to the heart of the matter?*

McGUIRE: Yes. Our recommendations on immediate problems were seen as valid and accepted by the bureaus (there were actually two involved), and by the post as well. Steps were taken to address them. OIG was very happy with the result. But there was the large systemic problem of ensuring that qualified people ended up on the staff there. We could identify that as a problem but the solution lay in the central assignment process.

The next assignment I accepted was a much larger operation, an inspection of the Education and Cultural Affairs Bureau (ECA). We had a dozen people on the team. And it's worth talking about. ECA had been part of USIA. It is the bureau that runs exchange programs, Fulbrights and a whole host of others, including some unheard of in our day. For example, there were work programs so young people from abroad could work temporarily in the U.S., provided there was a cultural element involved. If you go over to the Maryland or Delaware shore you'll find a lot of young people who are there on J visas.

*Q: Lifeguards and --*

McGUIRE: Yes, exactly.

*Q: -- fast food places and all. It seems like it's -- seeing kids from Bosnia, Latvia, and all that, you know, working very hard but really getting to know the United States.*

McGUIRE: It's a terrific program, and that aspect of it is fantastic, but there are other darker aspects that I think were not recognized by many. Just before we started the inspection there was a newspaper story out of Hershey, Pennsylvania where a group of students were working in a warehouse. The implementation of the program was handled by contractors, and they were supposed to follow strict guidelines on pay, housing, and cultural experiences. It didn't happen in Hershey and some other places.

*Q: I remember.*

McGUIRE: It turned out that there were a lot of problems. We had a terrific inspector who handled that aspect of what we did. She took the lead coming up with a whole variety of recommendations, including a wholesale reexamination of this program and the development of a very clear set of guidelines for the way the program should be restructured. On a different note, we found that ECA had never really been completely absorbed into the State Department. It was really quite astonishing. They were running as if USIA still existed; and that policy guidance from State was not necessary or desirable. There was not enough interface with State bureaus; in some instances programs didn't conform well with 7th Floor desires on new directions. We found a basic issue was a need for much greater communication between the 7th floor and ECA, and regional bureaus and ECA, and a need to improve communications within ECA itself. The assistant secretary and her front office had already been engaged in trying to reform the

bureau before we arrived and they were completely cooperative and welcomed our recommendations. I remember at our debrief the assistant secretary said of our report, "This will be my Bible." It was a very interesting experience and I believe we had a real impact on the bureau's work. Our team won a CIGIE for its work. The U.S. Government-wide Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency presents awards every year for outstanding work by inspectors throughout the government. It is regarded as a big deal in the inter-agency inspectors' community. We were all proud of that. And we did our best to treat individuals with respect in the process.

*Q: Well, I think too that the inspection thing, I wrote a history of the consular service, and back in the turn of the 19th to 20th century they created inspectors out of the consular post, called Consuls General at Large, which --*

McGUIRE: At Large?

*Q: -- which sounds like a bunch of convicts.*

McGUIRE: It sounds that way.

*Q: But the fact is that we're all over the bloody globe, you know, and we have our office in Washington. But you have to be able to have effective people going out and getting everybody to work together, and finding disparities, major problems, minor problems, and providing a certain amount of psychiatric help.*

McGUIRE: Right. The next inspection I did was related to HIV/AIDS. I was chosen for that because I'd had so much experience on the subject in Namibia and knew a lot about the program and the way things worked. Before I go into that, however, I should mentioned that OIG is an instrument for the Department of State to improve effectiveness, to avoid waste, fraud and mismanagement, and generally serves as a reality check on State operations. But it has another function, and that is it reports to the Congress. So there is frequently a tug of war going on, and that includes the selection of the inspector general. It explains in part how figures like Sherman Funk get selected and how partisan politics sometimes gets injected into the OIG process. When Hillary Clinton was secretary of state there was tension with the Hill on such things. So retired Ambassador Harry Geisel was chosen as acting OIG, and remained there for about five years. Harry was highly respected and set an impressive standard for fairness and decency during his tenure. I didn't agree with his approach in all things. I thought that too much emphasis was given to negatives in the inspection reports. Obviously these reports are about improving operations so a clear flagging of problems is a top focus. But the reports were carefully scrubbed to cleanse them of praise, even if the praise was exceptionally well deserved. Bear in mind the reports were unclassified, went to the Congress and were easy accessed by the public. So misperception about the quality of the inspected unit's performance was highly possible. I understood the explanation for doing things this way. Some elements in Congress demanded reports that focused on the negative; and the OIG would be criticized for being soft on the State Department if truly balanced evaluations were submitted. Still, this was much better than the bad old days

when minor infractions were turned into an excuse for skewering upright people. So Harry had reasons for the guidelines he used.

*Q: Ambassador's wife is using the car for shopping --*

McGUIRE: In the Sherman Funk days a minor infraction could put you on a widely circulated list of names of malefactors, bad people guilty of waste, fraud and mismanagement.

*Q: Gotcha.*

McGUIRE: Exactly. The gotcha theory of inspecting. So I felt uncomfortable with a total downplaying of the positive. The idea was to produce a concise report, forget the positive side because the people being inspected were just doing their job in that case; and write up the problem areas. Let me give as an example the report that we did on the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator (S/GAC). I had two experienced hands from OIG with me on the inspection team. We were fair and I did not have any reservations about the problems that we identified, or the suggestions we made. Action was clearly needed in some S/GAC areas to boost efficiency and effectiveness and we brought fresh eyes to the process. However, I could appreciated from my own HIV/AIDS experience in Namibia how monumental S/GAC's accomplishments were, and how difficult the challenges were. We followed faithfully the guidelines that we were supposed to use. We had explained those guidelines in advance. Nonetheless the global coordinator was clearly shocked when he read our draft report. (Their leadership at the time was not career government service and did not have much experience on this type of thing.) At the end of the day an important part of inspections is getting a buy in on the recommendations made. I think it is much more likely that you will get enthusiastic compliance rather than defensiveness if the report is seen by those inspected as balanced. In this case S/GAC also had a legitimate concern about how a report focused on the negative would play on the Hill, which was looking at S/GAC's future funding at that time. One other difficulty was the limit imposed on comments in the report that go beyond the State Department. The restriction is understandable. But in this case we were prohibited from writing anything about the perception throughout the Washington community involved with HIV/AIDS that the leader of one agency was actively trying to sabotage the leadership of the global coordinator. We could not touch that in our report. But there was nothing to stop me from going to the 7th floor at State and reviewing this problem with senior people there. I was told you are totally right and we really appreciate your raising this with us. The problem goes beyond this single program. We are looking at ways to resolve things. Shortly after we concluded our report a new global coordinator was selected (the departure of the previous one was unrelated to our report). We had had a number of discussions with the new selection during the inspection and she seemed to be in sync with the thrust of our conclusions.

That was it for me in OIG and at State. Since that time our family has had to deal with some serious health issues. Fortunately we are doing better now. I decided to send in a letter asking OIG to take my name off the rolls. A half century of service is probably

enough. I have so many friends who spent their professional lives in jobs that they didn't really like. I feel sorry for them. You only have one lap to do. Kay and I have been very active in retirement and we'll focus on that dimension of our life now. But the Foreign Service is still with us. Dave, Virginia and family will be here in July on the way from Sydney to their new tour at Embassy Harare. John, DJ and family will also be here on home leave from Pretoria, where they are engaged in development and democracy issues. We look forward to getting back to southern Africa soon.

*Q: I'm working on my sixtieth year now.*

McGUIRE: Well, I won't catch you. But it has been a great 50 years.

*Q: Well, you're going to have an editing job obviously when you get this. And we urge you to expand rather -- and to, you know, maybe make it more pointed or examples and that sort of thing. But after you finish all that, you know, Kevin, if you're interested, we can always use some volunteer interviewers.*

McGUIRE: Well, that might be very interesting. Let me get through with the editing work. My hat is off to you for what you've been able to accomplish. I think doing some interviewing would be fun. One of the problems is we're in Florida for part of the year.

*Q: Well, there are people down in Florida.*

McGUIRE: Maybe that's the way I could help you.

*Q: You've got to hurry because Florida's not going to be around much longer.*

McGUIRE: Well, I think --

*Q: The tide rises.*

McGUIRE: -- the evidence is there. We just came back from a trip to Iceland, which has huge glaciers that are melting fast. Our condo in Florida is about 30 feet above the ground. So I figure we are safe for our life expectancy. But we may have to invest in a rowboat.

*Q: OK, well I thank you very much.*

*End of interview*