

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training  
Foreign Affairs Oral History Program  
Labor Series

**JOSEPH MINTZES**

*Interviewed by: Morris Weisz  
Initial interview date: May 8, 1992  
Copyright 2026 ADST*

**INTERVIEW**

[Note: This interview was not edited by Mr. Mintzes.]

*Q: Today is May 8, 1992. This is Morris Weisz and I am interviewing my old friend and colleague Joe Mintzes. Joe has read a whole lot of material about the Marshall Plan period that I have given him and is kind enough to prepare notes and in typical careful fashion has prepared for this interview much better than most people who have been interviewed. Joe, will you begin by giving us a little bit of your background, social, political, academic background as an introduction to what you'll be saying.*

MINTZES: Well, going back to the Great Depression, I was in high school and my first exposure to labor or radical thought or ideas came during a course in economics at Central High School in Philadelphia. I was given the task of reviewing Bernard Shaw's famous *Intelligent Woman's Guide to Socialism and Capitalism*. It had a strong impact on me. This was right at the time of the Depression. Just at the same time I was recruited into the—

*Q: Well, I never knew you were a YPSL [Young People's Socialist League].*

MINTZES: My orientation was towards economics even then, although I had—

*Q: Let me interrupt for a moment because each interview is discrete and separate from others. As a researcher you have to define the terms. The is the Young People's Socialist League.*

MINTZES: I had interest in economics but also in labor. The locale where they met like so many others the work encircled the facilities. This was shortly, I guess the height of my activity there was the campaign of 1932 with Norman Thomas. I was quickly made educational director of the local unit. I had an academic interest in the subject of socialism, Marxism, and found that I got involved in going to various branches discussing this. Discussing issues mainly related to the election, Depression, and what was the general outlook.

*Q: This was long before you had the right to vote even.*

MINTZES: That's right. I was all of fifteen years of age then. The contact with the labor movement, the trade union movement was pretty close because many of the socialists in the community who were our mentors were either labor lawyers or officials in the unions, and there was the interaction that took place. This of course was the time of the New Deal and the growth of the industrial unions in the big industries, and of course Philadelphia, being an industrial city, there was quite a bit of activity then.

I graduated, but did not go to college at that time. I went to work. I guess there is a lapse of around three or four years. I took the exam in the Post Office as a substitute postal clerk or something of that sort.

*Q: You had delayed entering college for something economic or you were like some of the modern kids who feel like they need to experience life before they go into college?*

MINTZES: It was economic primarily, although I had an uncle who was ready to support me to go to college. I turned that down and decided there weren't that many opportunities for those who went to college. I took my chances and awaited the revolution I suppose. I had a sense that ultimately there would be some correction in the economic system based on one's own philosophy at the time. Moving on, in the Post Office I guess I had some activity in the union. I was on the grievance committee that went down to Washington. I forget who the postmaster was. It was after Farley left. It was the one to whom we presented our grievances.

*Q: By now we were in the latter part of the '30s*

MINTZES: This is around '36-'37. Then I went to Temple, majoring in economics and social studies and completed my coursework just when I was drafted in late 1942 early 1943.

*Q: Were you going in the evening now or did you leave your work and go during the day?*

MINTZES: I was going in the evening. It was quite a struggle because I would work from six at night to two or three in the morning and then hit a nine class. It was a pretty rugged schedule as I recall. Subsequent to that, I got into the army at this time. I was in the signal corps but was sent to a training program in foreign language into French. This was for a nine month period, and then shipped out to China by way of India and Burma. Evidently the European situation had changed and there was less need for French interpreters. Although in China I served very close to the Indo-Chinese border and there were some French troop movements that came out of Indo-China at that time in the Kunming area where I eventually served, moving to Shanghai when the Japanese surrendered and staying in Shanghai until the spring of 1946. Then I returned and was demobilized. I had teaching credentials so initially I did substitute teaching in economics

and social studies for a brief period of a couple of months.

*Q: Where was this again?*

MINTZES: In Philadelphia, back home. I went down to Washington to look for work, and had a good friend in the BLS [Bureau of Labor Statistics]. He introduced me to Faith Williams, head of the foreign labor condition staff. Interestingly enough we were discussing, well I suppose after expressing my interest in the work of the program, she asked me if I had any paper to show. I said I just finished college before I went into the army and really had no research papers stretching back to when I was in college, but I happened to have written a report in French as my final report in the army program. It was on the French textile industry. I was immediately hired. In any case, as was wont at that time, Ewan Clague interviewed every new employee, the commissioner of labor statistics. He welcomed me there, and I felt I should tell him that this is the Bureau of Labor Statistics and I have had very little statistics in my background, some educational statistics, none really worth mentioning. He said, never mind. I haven't had any statistics. In any case, working in the Foreign Labor Condition staff I did research on the impact of the war in real wages in all the main industrial countries among other things. My job there was heavily on the economic side, although I did political analysis as well working with the other area specialists.

*Q: Were you an area specialist yourself?*

MINTZES: I became an area specialist. I suppose I started off as a general economist but there was a RIF [reduction in force]. I had military points so I was saved. As the area specialists were fired, I acquired an empire. I started with France and got the British Empire as well and did research across the board. It was relatively thin at the time, although there were a few people who were there, Oscar Weiger and Ted Lit. There was a woman from France for a while, but she left, Jane Palmer. I can't think of who the deputy to Faith Williams was. You probably remember her. Her husband, was he a demographer? But, in any event, it was in 1946 that I started, in 1947 with Kravis.

*Q: He was the fellow who encouraged you to come down?*

MINTZES: Right.

*Q: I want to get his name in because for any future researcher they might want to look at his own work which was very interesting in his field.*

MINTZES: Yes. Irving Kravis was a close friend that I knew from high school in Philadelphia. He had gotten his doctorate at Penn.

*Q: Excuse me. Was the name Flexner?*

MINTZES: Flexner. Gene Flexner was the deputy at the time. In any case, Kravis and I

did a study on the Soviet Union on wages and prices at the time over the war period. He had gone back to Penn starting his teaching career. He had left BLS, and I was left behind when the publication came out. It hit the front pages of the *New York Times* because this was the first study of anything on trends in the Soviet Union of this type especially over the war years. We had done other countries. I had done Canada, which attracted some attention. It was, here again this hit the press in Canada, and I had various journalists coming in raising questions regarding it.

*Q: The basic source of information on the Soviet Union during the war period. Did you have access to documents?*

MINTZES: We had access to reports by correspondents. This was an unclassified report, by the way. We used open material. The Russian published material plus any embassy reports that were unclassified, and the reports of journalists which were very useful, not only American journalists but European journalists. We had one Russian expert who had language experience on our staff. He did some translating of the Russian sources. We used the Russian prices and rations to establish a cost of living index which the Russians never had, never published anyway, and developed this study which received wide attention. I suppose the one aspect that came out of a critical sort, we took great pains to indicate the extent of war damage in Russia and its effect on standards of living, the huge loss in lives and physical destruction in an effort to put it into its context. And in response to questions to give some indication of what it means in terms of living standards of Russians, we devised a scheme of saying how many minutes a Russian had to work to buy certain essential foods.

*Q: Was this the first of those? Because later on Nash did so many of them.*

MINTZES: This was the original. We had a lot of caveats around that. However, it was picked up particularly by the USIA [United States Information Agency], who spread it all over the map without the caveats and using the U.S. as the comparative example. That we objected to but our objections were overruled because obviously it was used extensively. We pointed out if you looked at the French figures or the Italian or German or Austrian or even the Dutch, the impact of the war was almost as great. That is, we rated about a third loss of real earnings by the Russians. We pointed out that the distortions occurred because the Russians with the same income had affordable rents. It may be poor housing, but housing at a very modest cost. Also, they had free medical care and free education, higher education, so we said that those should be introduced to balance it out. They never were. But, in any case, this is to give you the history. The other thing was the Russians spent about 80 percent of their income on food compared to our 25 percent and maybe 40 percent in most of the European countries. So we tried to halt the use. Kravis was gone but I was still there.

*Q: To limit the use. You didn't want to halt it; you wanted to limit it.*

MINTZES: No, we wanted the thing to be introduced in a balanced way as we explained

it so that it wasn't used for unwarranted propaganda purposes, which it was. There is no question that it was widely used for those purposes. As a side note, Kravis went on after he left BLS to become interested in some way of measuring differences of purchasing power in different countries and developed the purchasing power parities with the OECD, particularly with Milt Gilbert who was with the OECD.

*Q: You don't mean OECD; you mean OEEC.*

MINTZES: OEEC [Organisation for European Economic Cooperation], that's right. The Marshall Plan organization. By the time that occurred I was in Paris. I'm getting ahead of myself, but I had some interest in that when I worked in the labor division in Paris with colleagues in the OECD. In any case the work in the Foreign Labor Conditions staff extended over a period of roughly two and a half years. We did work on productivity, on manpower comparisons, the whole range of labor issues, many were published in the *Monthly Labor Review* or *Labor Abroad*, which is a publication of the BLS. The other interesting aspect of that time, the Marshall Plan had evolved just then, and the Foreign Labor Conditions staff was trying to determine what role it should play. I was called on to do a handbook on the French labor situation including a field trip to Paris, to France, in August of 1948. There was also a labor conference there.

*Q: By labor conference you mean labor attaché conference?*

MINTZES: Yeah, labor officers, labor attachés and the ICA or whatever the ECA [Economic Cooperation Act] at that time. Labor officers from the various European capitals where we had representation. And I guess Phil Kaiser was the Labor Department person who was there. I guess I was associated with him in coming over to the conference. However, I stayed for a month after this to do my study. I, of course, worked with Dick Eldridge who was the labor attaché. Dick was helpful in indicating who were the principal actors in—

*Q: This was Richard Eldridge, a long time labor attaché for many years after the war in the embassy in Paris.*

MINTZES: He indicated who were the principal actors in the trade union movement and also suggested what would be the best regional center I could go to to get a good feel for the labor situation after I described the scope of my study. The one problem we foresaw was that the embassy had cut off all contacts with the CGT [General Confederation of Labor], the communist led organization, and this was a general application to him and everyone else in the embassy. He said he doesn't know how I might handle that question and suggested that I was not working out of the embassy; I was working out of the Labor Department, and I would move freely wherever I could obtain information.

*Q: Did he indicate whether he was violating that in any way?*

MINTZES: No he didn't. However, when I said that I was going to proceed in that

fashion, he said he would like very much to get the information that I obtained. I promised to do so and eventually did. I had contacts with all the main labor centers, and in the specific area of the CGT, I had interviews with the chief economists. I forget the names at the moment. I'd have to look back at old records to refresh my memory. The principal officer that I saw was a chap who identified himself as a socialist, but was obviously following the CGT line pretty closely. One of the main items that I obtained from visiting the CGT headquarters was getting a feel for the activity that went on there because this was in the middle of a series of demonstrations in support of the independence movement, if you can call it that, in Madagascar. The Malgache as the French would call the local people. During my interviews, there was constant flow in and out of different people reporting to my interlocutor on developments in demonstrations, so it was a rather discordant interview.

*Q: These were demonstrations against the French occupying force in Madagascar.*

MINTZES: Yes. I guess the strongest support for the Malgache was from the CGT unions at the time.

*Q: Before you get off of politics, was this before Irving Brown became involved in the political aspects of the trade union movement in France? Because it would be interesting to know his position on the Malgache. Later on, of course, he was very supportive of the independence movements in North Africa. I wonder if he was involved at that time?*

MINTZES: This was I believe he was, sure.

*Q: But not openly favorable to the independence movement.*

MINTZES: Not that I am aware of; this is something you might want to check out. In any event, we discussed membership in the CGT in the principal industrial unions and he showed me figures.

*Q: This was your CGT interlocutor?*

MINTZES: The CGT representative. That was contrary to the published figures in the press. I took notes on these. He showed me the documents. Incidentally, I identified myself as an economist working for the Bureau of Labor Statistics. This is in French of course. All my interviews were in French at the time. I think he treated me as though I was not in the government. I made no attempt to—

*Q: You didn't disabuse him.*

MINTZES: I didn't disabuse him, no. In any event, the information that I was able to in turn use in my report was very helpful. I think that we had all sorts of different estimates. These were actually trade union dues membership as contrasted with the soft membership of people who they claim were adherents but were hard to identify as such.

*Q: Was there any practice you could notice of paying the membership of certain—like I found out later in India, they got money from other sources and paid in the membership of individuals.*

MINTZES: I don't think so. I think here they were using the figures for serious purposes, because obviously they used the figures for propaganda purposes. I was indicating that this was for basic scientific research and he was providing that. We got into this conversation not as the main purpose of my visit but incidentally, so I don't think he recognized my very strong interest in the figures particularly. I also spoke with the economists; this was a time when there was a communist minister of labor. I'm not sure whether this was before or after that period. In the Labor Ministry in France, this persisted over a period of time because when I went back when I served in France in the Marshall Plan office in France, I had to be very cautious in dealing with the Labor Ministry because so many people had been located there when communists controlled the ministry.

*Q: Does the name Rosenthal mean anything to you in the Labor Ministry? Later on he was a very informed source in the Labor Ministry.*

MINTZES: This was well before that time. In any case, on the basis of the information I drew up, I developed a report on the French labor movement, both economic and political, and this was widely circulated in the government. It was classified for some strange reason, just to make it look important I suspect. There was nothing in that except for my conversations with someone in the communist labor movement. I also went to Lille to do the regional study and also dealt with all the labor centers there. I got a good picture of the economic situation, but in dealing with the communists CGT at the time or talking to them, they on economic issues had not yet come into conflict with the authorities of, say, an insurrectional type. There were strikes later on which moved in that direction in the next year roughly. I'd have to refresh my memory on that; I'm not entirely certain. There was an interest in improving the productivity in France, that the position taken by their chief economists was, you might say constructive from the point of view of French requirements at the time. The emphasis on accelerated training to rebuild the infrastructure which I suppose began right after the war when there was a coalition government which included the communists, these were points that were well taken by the leadership there with no attempt to put in a political line with respect to those issues.

*Q: A political line would naturally begin only after the Marshall Plan began to have its influence. This was just at that point.*

MINTZES: Well actually the spring of, didn't Gorbachev speak at the fifty—what was the anniversary of the Fulton speech by Churchill?

*Q: The Fulton speech was '46, wasn't it?*

MINTZES: Forty-six yes. But wasn't it the spring of '48 when the Russians turned down? This was still in the interim period before the party line was clarified to deal with the Marshall Plan. There was general opposition but it wasn't as organized as it became later on.

*Q: But your study was before '49, wasn't it?*

MINTZES: Before '49, that's right. The BLS used my study to sell the project of writing handbooks for all the countries of the Marshall Plan, the ECA at the time. When I came back, I helped out on some of the other handbooks. While I was in Paris, I met my old friend, Dave Safehoss. I knew him, incidentally while I was working in the BLS.

*Q: He was rooming there with his wife. You rented a room in his house.*

MINTZES: That's right, I rented a room in his house. I became acquainted with a lot of the labor community in Washington during that period.

*Q: We have to mention the fact that Dave Safehoss, who had also been at the BLS, became sort of an assistant to the Marshall Plan Labor Division.*

MINTZES: Yes. And of course, I met the staff, Shishken and the others there.

*Q: Shishken was the director within the Marshall Plan office in Paris, the director of the labor division, and very highly placed in terms of relations with Harriman.*

MINTZES: Yes. I returned to Washington and continued working with the others. I still remember working with those who were so completely labor politically oriented, it was difficult for them to do the political analysis. They never saw a statistical table, or when they saw one, they were greatly offended.

*Q: You mean it was difficult for them to do the economic analysis? You said political.*

MINTZES: I meant the economic analysis. They were fine on the political, but they had trouble doing the economic, and I assisted Oscar Weiger and Ted Lid on the German because they were quite at a loss. Since these were requirements in the handbooks to do a labor force analysis, wage-price. They were very good on industrial relations, union structural materials.

*Q: I thought Weiger had a pretty good economic background. Was I wrong on that?*

MINTZES: He may have, but it was probably institutional, academic, and also he had on doing the type of statistical analysis required. After all, he was up in years then, and it was a long time since he had to do that. He always was in a high executive position in the labor ministries in Germany and then when he went to Turkey where he was an advisor to

the government. In any case, while in Washington, I was queried by Dave Safehoss whether I would be interested in coming over. I had hinted at it while I was in Paris and having recently been married, having been evicted from the Safehoss residence when they moved to Paris, I married. It was shortly after that I was recruited for Paris and considered our honeymoon to Paris. In any event, before leaving Washington, from the point of view of relationships in the labor movement, I had close relationships with the State Department at the time, particularly Val Orwin and Dan Horowitz. I know that when I did my labor handbook, I interviewed Val, and he made a number of useful suggestions. I guess it was later on I met Dan Horowitz. In any event, the labor advisers in the State Department were really in a way our customers as well as suppliers of information for the work in the labor condition staff.

*Q: Again, because this may be examined in discrete fashion, we have to identify Val and Dan Horowitz as being labor oriented political officers in a group within the State Department who were concerned with following worldwide labor developments.*

MINTZES: I was hired by Boris Shishken. He gave me the title of labor statistician, which was okay with me, but it was hard to define, and it threw a lot of things at me because I was the only statistician in the whole Marshall Plan organization at the time. So that when the OEC was interested in getting an American statistician, there was a statistical office in the Marshall Plan, but since I was identified as a statistician and of course I had worked in the BLS and had done statistical studies, they often came to me for advice which sort of was beyond my main functions. I became closely interested in what turned into the purchasing parity study, our parity study on international comparisons.

*Q: Was Loren Wood there?*

MINTZES: Loren Wood, yes.

*Q: Wasn't he a statistician, or was he in the French mission?*

MINTZES: He was in the French mission, although I had a lot of contact with Loren. I guess my work with the Labor Division there was quite varied. I sort of had an office next to Jim Stern who had come over from the UAW [International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America]. I guess his major concern was on productivity issues, and we recruited a common staff which we both used. I recruited Serge Froid who was a statistician and remained on for years and years.

*Q: Through my service, through Chuck Stewart's service, and many others. Yes.*

MINTZES: Then a couple of Americans who were either at the London School of Economics or elsewhere who were in Europe, we recruited them on the staff. Ken Lebick was one. He became very active in productivity work.

*Q: Both he and Jim Stern were engineers weren't they?*

MINTZES: Ken studied at the London School of Economics. Jim Stern had both economics and engineering. He got his doctorate eventually in economics, if I'm not mistaken, but he had engineering before. The various tasks—first of all Saul Ozer was the economic advisor for Shishken in Paris. Saul and Boris didn't get along; they didn't speak the same language shall we say, so Saul was pretty much on his own. I think he and a sort of triumvirate of senior economists, Bob Oceans was one. There was another chap I don't remember. I also joined the group, and we sort of developed some of the ideas regarding productivity that eventually found its way into a cohesive program on productivity. However this was really not the origin. A lot of people were dealing with productivity, therefore Jim Stern—Jim was also in this, by the way—the major idea of the productivity program was a growth out of teams visiting the U.S. and experts visiting Europe. There was a consensus that Europe, even if it were to come back to its pre-war position, had lost out in developments which affect productivity, the argument being that there are going to be limited resources, and if your productivity is low, you are going to be making limited use of those resources. So, if Europe is really going to recover, in addition to investment, they have to improve work methods, scientific management, cost accounting, a whole range of middle management skills were very evident in the American scene but not common in Europe. There, the traditional employer, it was really a family business. It was looked upon in much more relaxed terms than the usual American entrepreneur. This was not altogether true. There were islands of productivity, but you had that in many of the heavy industries and manufacturing.

*Q: I wonder if you could develop an analysis of the differences between the Shishkin group on this issue and your group. Some of it I realize was personality and things like that, but I should mention that since we have given his name and he was such an important player in all of that. Boris Shishkin came from the trade union movement. A highly trained economist, I thought, in the trade union movement, and was hired by Harriman. Harriman had great confidence in him, but his analysis tended to build into it a trade unionist reaction because his power base at home was the AFL [American Federation of Labor] itself. I'd like you to develop an analysis of the differences between the two groups in terms of one, power bases back home, AFL versus CIO [Congress of Industrial Organizations] and things like that, and the suspicion of the basic trade unionist to any productivity analysis as a substitute for trade union power. Speak about that if you will.*

MINTZES: Well, I don't think there was a sharp dichotomy as you are defining it, as sharp as that. I think there was a communication problem, particularly between Saul Ozer and Shishkin, that Saul tended to be overly academic.

*Q: I've asked Joe to develop the problems in the productivity program because of my personal interest as well as academic research of how it worked in the Marshall Plan. I'm interested in getting another view from one of my own interviews.*

MINTZES: Yes. I think that in all fairness to the development of the productivity program, you have a variety of views of what it was or should have been. I guess one almost goes back to the elephant and the six blind men, it depends on where you stand as to how you identify it one way or another. Some of its origins came from the work of the productivity divisions in BLS. I had contact with them before I came to Paris. I knew Duane Evans particularly, who was sort of the theoretician behind the development of productivity statistics and the type of investigations their divisions carried out at that time, which has varied over the years. Jim Silverman was also there. He was less of a theoretician if you want to use the term and more of a missionary type, promoting productivity on the basis of the analysis done through statistics. There was much interest in Europe in this field. The idea of productivity was not an American invention. Everyone had an interest in it; it goes back for a long time. But, in any event, because of the American success during the war period and the competitive advantage in the post-war period, America was looked up to as a successful application of productivity. The measurements carried out by the BLS, productivity trends over time, were of much interest to the Europeans. At that time in the OEEC, as part of the American initiative to encourage the Europeans to come up with a plan or a program for the utilization of Marshall Plan funds, there was a great interest in getting a statistical basis for making decisions. The main emphasis was on the gross national product, which was a useful tool in economic analysis. There was a major project, the British particularly had outstanding economists and statisticians working in this field, and America had a number. The idea of also looking at productivity became of much interest in the OEEC.

As someone from the BLS, I became a focal point funneling information in both directions. One of my principal contacts was Jim Silverman, who came over frequently to meetings with the OEEC people. It evolved that we developed a number of missions looking at productivity statistics, and unlike the gross national product statistics, it was more difficult to come to a single approach on productivity statistics. One of the main impediments were the British. The reason for this at that time was a change in government in Britain from the Labour Party to the Conservative Party. You remember before the war was over really, the British had their election after VE [Victory in Europe] day. I was in India just at the time of the election. I remember I was in a very small American unit, but there were large groups of British troops. The troops were voting too, and I attended meetings where the issues of where Britain was to go in the post-war period were discussed very actively by the troops, and on any basis of prediction, it was quite clear the Labour Party was going to win from what I saw among the troops. Of course this was not a representative sample.

*Q: By the way, this is a matter of interest. Did the officers try to impose a different judgment on them or were the officers also pro Labour?*

MINTZES: I didn't notice that. I saw no sign of that. Certainly with regard to the independence movement at the time. Gandhi was jailed at the time. The officers that I ran into—I was an enlisted man, I was a sergeant at the time, but when I rode on the train, I

went first class and met the British officers. Their view was very colonialist. There was no doubt about it, and their behavior towards the Indians was abominable. It struck me and other Americans universally. I was just coming out of college, so the first contact I made in Calcutta was at the university, and it was off bounds because the military couldn't travel, but we managed to get there. I remember discussions there. I was particularly interested at that time in both economics and sociology. The Indian students and faculty members I met there were very strongly oriented toward independence and anti British very strongly. They had a view on the war that was much different than the war we saw at least in the Far East.

But getting back to the subject of productivity aspects and the British view of our productivity statistics, the British, Rostas, was a Hungarian refugee, and was the chief proponent of productivity statistics in Britain. In conversations with me he explained the chief problem with productivity statistics in Britain at the time, which I think was quite valid. Demonstrating poor productivity in any industry would clearly make that industry a subject for nationalization. So, it was quite clear that no one was going to develop statistics of that type. However, the type of statistics they liked were the industry surveys where you could compare progress of given divisions of the firms in the same industry. That is a useful engineering tool to improve productivity in a given enterprise, and that is what they were promoting. They didn't stand in the way of the other kind of statistics, but they tended to neglect them, benign neglect shall we say. I'm not sure what the situation in Britain is now, whether the productivity statistics are in tune with the same kind we have or not. Their use of these general types of total GNP [gross national product] and use of the labor force are sort of useful general measures, but they are not very useful tools for micro economic programs where you want to improve productivity in a plant or an industry.

So, the statistical efforts for Silverman, who got wide acceptance in Europe—that is, he was a missionary, he went around and advocated teams coming to the United States and vice versa and so forth—, developed a market for the productivity idea. It was not very specific. It had the usual generalities and emphasized statistical tools to measure it. I may say that he was always going on labor, that is the idea that relations, positive industrial relations is an important element in it, and he spoke through trade union and management groups. I made many of the arrangements for him, and I used to go with him and we had many private discussions. I don't think the productivity program centered around this. I think that this was a contributing factor to the development of what eventually became a fairly well-defined productivity program.

By this time, I should mention—I'll try to complete the productivity and come back to other activities that were going on in Paris because in many respects, they were equally important in the development of the Marshall Plan—the productivity program got a big boost from industry people, particularly Joyce, the shoe executive. I forgot what his first name is, but he was very active as an industry man in the Marshall Plan. Ozer made converts. I think Bob Oliver in Washington was a CIO official. He worked with Clinton at the time, I believe. I think Bert Jewell was sympathetic to Saul. Saul made some

converts among the labor people. I think if he was painstaking in presenting his case and didn't hit the wrong buzz words that he would have done better. He used Clinton's book a lot. I forget the name of—

*Q: Clinton and Wootenberg.*

MINTZES: Yeah, that referred to union experience that was positive to relations and had a good impact on the industry. This was made an important element in the productivity program. He was constantly reiterating. The industry guys would say private enterprise and you also almost like damn Yankee said free trade unions. There was no getting away from it and some of them even believed it. I wouldn't say all, but some of them did. The idea of constructive industrial relations, this had an institutional problem in Europe because of the nature of industrial relations we are all so familiar with. Many of the Americans, and this was not only the CIO side, it was the AFL side as well I have to say, were not adjusting their message for the European scene.

As an aside, I often had private conversations with European trade union people, leadership as well as their staff people, that criticized what they felt were not useful messages. Well, they are not sophisticated. I think one of the problems was the Americans, not all of them. I think this is the difficulty of generalization, a number of them just didn't make the adjustment feeling that the same pattern of collective bargaining and industrial relations there would produce the same results. I suppose one can't separate it out from the political problem that in certainly France and Italy where the strong communist and I suppose you can go across the map, there are varying degrees of concern about communist influence particularly in the trade unions. Their feeling was that if you could shift the movement away from their political concerns, then you will help meet the problem of communist inroads. This ignored the fact that the predominant movement in the trade unions was the socialist movement. They felt that was worthy of sacrifice for the higher ideal. The idea of putting out a formula, and this was developed in union circles of sharing out productivity benefits, these were points for negotiation. Formulas were of dubious value. Many things had to be taken into consideration. There was lip service paid to it, but rarely followed. That was one of the major problems I think in the productivity program.

*Q: Lip service to the concept of some of the gains going to labor?*

MINTZES: Shall we say how to structure that. Is it automatic? Do you have access to the books? I mean this is the other thing. So many of these things particularly in a period when Europe was down pretty low, and your major concerns were getting the infrastructure back, getting manufacturing, getting supplies. The Marshall Plan was of critical value of bringing in raw materials for foreign exchange which they didn't have otherwise, or they didn't have enough of. So these were elements that can come into the argument. At the time, I was not only working on productivity, I was working on other economic issues, so that I was able to bring in some of those other things into my discussions particularly with the trade union leaders. They were more interested in what

U.S. trade policy was than what our trade union people were coming telling them about collective bargaining. They said they can take care of their collective bargaining; we can't take care of your trade policy. This occurred quite often with their economists too. I forget, Kinsel—

*Q: Heinz Kinsel, the Austrian.*

MINTZES: The Austrian. I remember having conversations with him frequently. Hans Matoff of the German DGB [German Trade Union Confederation] economist.

*Q: Both of them later became very prominent in government.*

MINTZES: Yes.

*Q: You know Kinsel is the head of the Austrian Diet now.*

MINTZES: The Scandinavian and British too. We had excellent interplay because of the OEEC structure. They came down for meetings of the trade union advisory committee. There was also opportunity to talk to the management people during these meetings because they often had joint sessions. The process was excellent from the point of view of the work of the Marshall Plan in Paris. It was a unique opportunity in a sense. You had a strong feel for what interests the unions had and what could work, and what couldn't. They were a little dubious of the productivity program. The thing that attracted them to the productivity program were the institutional aspects of it. This came later on. I may be jumping ahead of myself because some of the developments of the productivity centers which evolved subsequently were very useful to the trade unions in the course of their work on the country's economic policy as it affected labor.

Now, I'm not altogether systematic in approaching the productivity program. I was trying to indicate the Silverman impact, the Ozer impact if I can use that somewhat differently, and the trade union impact of trade union people like Jim Stern. I tried to wed these into some sort of economic pattern in developing proposals. We never had a real program. This was a period in which we were shuffling memos around, each expressing views. I don't think we ever settled down to an agreed format. But it was a period not only on the productivity program, but on other issues with which we were involved in. I think it was the high point in my government career in terms of intellectual stimulation that was not repeated after that really. The ideas and the people who presented the ideas and the interchanges in the labor as well as the other fields was really remarkable.

*Q: Joe, let me ask you at this point if you can refer on the tape to documentation. You have papers on this; what happened to them? We are all getting older. Are you giving them to somebody? Can we put on the record where they would be available to a researcher?*

MINTZES: Starting first of all on the handbook on the French labor conditions. That, I

have a copy of. When I was in Paris the second time, I came back. I guess I'm jumping the gun. This was in '57, and I wrote the paper in '48, so it was nine years later. There was an inquiry from the Labor Department. They are interested in a labor conditions handbook on France.

*Q: Updating your—*

MINTZES: No, no! They say by Mintzes, and they think the embassy might have a copy. Dan Horowitz was then labor attaché and he thought I was muscling in on the embassy's domain. We had excellent relations, and he says he has action on this cable, and he says what is it all about? I said I wrote this thing and you should remember because we discussed it some time ago back at that period. I guess he replied to the Labor Department in the message. They probably have it in their files of the labor conditions staff, but if they need another extra copy he would Xerox it for them, and that I was the author back when I worked for the BLS. That was one paper you can get a hold of, and it may be of some interest.

*Q: What's happened to all your personal documentation, your papers, things like that? I don't want to be ghoulish about this.*

MINTZES: Well, I think the only place to get them is in the archives because traveling around, I didn't hold on. The only papers I have now are papers I did, research I did after that period. There was one paper I did on the labor aspects of the Schulman plan which for some reason was classified official use. When I went back to Paris in the second term in 1957, I got a security violation because somebody found it in the bookcase. It was there since '51 when I left. It was a study on the Schulman plan that I did the labor aspects for Boris Shishken. Those are papers to relate to.

*Q: Well, let me offer you the opportunity if you want to deposit anything.*

MINTZES: Let me see. There are some things I did since retiring that touch on labor. You can have copies of those.

*Q: Okay. So long as you know that—as the French say, we would be happy to have them. We would give them to one of the universities, Georgetown or the Meany or the Reuther Archives with a cross reference in each of them saying these materials are available. Okay, go ahead Joe. I'm sorry I interrupted.*

MINTZES: In any event I hope I've covered the various facets. I felt the question you asked about the trade union sensitivities about the program and the differences between the AFL and the CIO. I think the CIO was more directly involved in the program mainly because Clinton and Oliver picked it up and ran with it more than Jewell. Jewell was more passive, although he supported it. I think that when Shishkin encouraged Saul to return to Washington, Saul found a spot with Jewell. So—

*Q: Jewell was the AFL representative back in Washington. Was he from the railroad union?*

MINTZES: I believe so. In any case, when Saul left, Boris made me his economic advisor, and I had already more or less been serving in that capacity before. This is getting away from the productivity and becoming more general. We can go back to the productivity; it comes in again later on when I go back to Washington, and I can review some of the issues, some of the things I did in that role. First of all, you remember the labor division represented the U.S. on the OEEC manpower committee, and the manpower committee mainly was concerned with finding places for displaced persons if we could. I did some studies. We had one chap on the staff, McElvey, who was a very pleasant chap.

*Q: Graham McElvey. Not an intellectual.*

MINTZES: No. He was aware of his limitations and leaned heavily on whatever professional talent he could get. He was good at making contacts, and where trade union credentials of a direct sort were useful, he used them. In any case, the issues we concerned ourselves with on the manpower committee were movements of labor in Europe as well as overseas, finding opportunities for the displaced persons problem. Also, we were concerned and did studies on the situation in Europe in that period. Unemployment was quite significant in Germany particularly and in other countries as well.

*Q: You were our representative on the OEEC manpower committee.*

MINTZES: I think McElvey was officially the representative. I went along and did most of the substantive work that related to these issues.

*Q: Was this before we got into the free flow of manpower idea to parallel the free flow of money and materials?*

MINTZES: No, that came in too. It was part of the displaced persons thing. You had to find places for these people. I have a point to make that my assessment, maybe when I get back to Washington I can touch on that, because the Dave Christian, Elanor Finger situation is different than you interpreted it. The reason Stassen "Stassinated" them was that McCarran was out to get anybody that knocked the immigration policy he was advocating. Both of them were very active in trying to get the U.S. to increase immigration of these and others.

*Q: For McCarran's purposes in Nevada.*

MINTZES: That's right. He only allowed Spanish shepherds to come in or something like that.

*Q: Was it Portuguese or Spanish?*

MINTZES: Basque shepherds.

*Q: Basque Shepherds. He was quite a bastard.*

MINTZES: That was my interpretation. Incidentally, when we were in Washington, we went to bat during the Stassen period for a lot of people who were out in the field and couldn't do much. I remember working on Dave's case and found out the cause in his case as well as Elanor Finger. She was in Washington and was also cashiered at the same time.

*Q: That was related to the McCarran pressure?*

MINTZES: Yes.

*Q: That's an interesting difference in our interpretations and a valuable one. Christian's analysis, which was reflected in mine, was they were after him, or the excuse they used, was the security thing of him being in the same room with this guy Remington at the Brookings Institution or something like that. That was his analysis rather than mine.*

MINTZES: This one was tracked down. Stassen had McCarran's recommendations which related to people who worked in this field.

*Q: That is why he said to me he didn't have to explain why he was doing anything. I'd like to ask you a little about the non-manpower work of an economic advisor to the labor division. Do you remember Ethel Detrich?*

MINTZES: Yeah, sure.

*Q: She was on trade policy. No, no. Treasury was Max Oakes?*

MINTZES: Havlik.

*Q: Havlik. Right. Now those people had an interest in European economics. What were their attitudes toward the labor program and your working with them? I didn't have them very much except a very friendly relationship with Ethel. Ethel Detrich was the first person that ever mentioned at a staff meeting that I remember, "Look you people have to start worrying about what happens when these people get world economic power that we are trying to build up here. They will be a rival to us." I remember her saying once that, "It may be at some point in the future, they will be real competitors of ours and that our balance of trade that is now so overwhelmingly in one direction, might go in the other direction." She was the first one who mentioned that. Did you have any relationships with them on this type of question?*

MINTZES: To some extent. I guess the first I worked with Shishkin. Shishkin did things with Harriman, that is Harriman's staff. He had an agenda that was broader than labor, shall we put it. Taking an issue that related to labor, he also wanted to demonstrate his own prowess over the economic background relating to it. I was working with the economists in the various divisions in connection with labor impact. Do you remember this was the period of the use of counterpart funds? We had counterpart meetings including field trips to each of the missions discussing how the counterpart was to be used because the U.S. had a power over it which it could exercise. It rarely did because the negotiations usually came around to meeting the situation.

I'll give you one example merely to show you the nature of this. The one to Germany. Erhard was the economic minister who later became chancellor and Adenauer was obviously the chancellor. Germany had an enormous unemployment problem at the time. They had a lot of counterparts, and I had advocated to the committee, I touched base with Boris and so forth, and he gave his blessings on this and said he'd bring it up in the Harriman committee as well. They have this enormous unemployment problem; they are sitting on this counterpart. Why can't we insist on a release of credit for infrastructure, public works to employ these people? The group that I was with, even the treasury man in my group, Jim Brooks was the Treasury man, he is a close friend because we met again in the Congo a number of years later; our families knew each other over the years. In any case, he went along with it as did the people who were representing the program offices and so forth. Erhard and company resisted. There was still the specter of inflation of the post World War I period. The recommendation stood. It just happened that a few months later the Korean War broke out, and all restrictions on Germany were loosened, and they finally released the billion deutsche marks or whatever it was. This was an example.

You worked on these groups. I went, I remember, to Austria, to Greece, to each of the countries. You had similar problems. The role of the labor economist was useful because you got to know your colleagues. When you got into the country, you made sure the trade unions were represented on the hearings of the committees that met so the idea of divorcing economics from labor, at least in that sense, the labor political from labor economics is not very useful because in each case the unions themselves felt their role was enhanced by this interaction in a way. I remember in Greece, the Greek trade unions, I forget who it was, came down to meet me on the plane. It was the first time he had an opportunity to talk to the government on economic issues. They discovered there was a labor guy coming down on this mission. I filled him in on what things would be useful from his side. You know, it varies from country to country.

*Q: Was this political trade unionist Makris, or the economic Laskaris, or don't you remember?*

MINTZES: I think it was Laskaris.

*Q: With a big beard? Yeah. He was a wonderful man whose son later became a labor minister. It is interesting that it was Makris, he was a political leader being financed in*

*large part by Irving Brown through funds.*

MINTZES: I'm not certain; you really have to check. I remember that there was a labor guy coming in on that flight.

*Q: This was his first opportunity to participate in something so vital because the Americans had sent someone. Fascinating.*

MINTZES: It was an American on the mission that came down.

*Q: Well, that was very interesting. What the Hell possessed you to leave a job that was as fascinating and rewarding. Now you are saying—*

MINTZES: Well I just wanted to point out a couple of the other things. In addition the other things that I was concerned with in my work there. First on the ECE [Economic Commission for Europe] that met in Geneva. Paul Porter represented the U.S. there.

*Q: You will notice that I have had a long interview with Paul.*

MINTZES: Yes. I would go down occasionally to meetings. One that I am very familiar with was one in which—this was early in the Marshall Plan and the Soviets and the Eastern Bloc were accusing the U.S. of exporting unemployment to Europe. I developed a response to that for Paul Porter. Doing a statistical analysis and showing the USAID [United States Agency for International Development] program could not be accused of anything of the sort. Just taking our economic aid for supplying materials to keep factories running. And the use of counterpart for constructive purposes was completely false, and the statistics showing what was happening to employment contradicted this. However, Paul Porter never used this because the British representative, Mayhew—I don't know whether you remember Mayhew. I think it was Gromyko who represented the Russians at the time and made this bombastic propaganda statement.

*Q: This was in the Geneva meetings of the ECE.*

MINTZES: The European Community for Europe.

*Q: The Russians were members?*

MINTZES: Oh yes, it was a UN [United Nations] body. That was one of the few areas within the UN that both sides met. Mayhew made such a remarkable reply that Porter didn't need the speech. The other thing I used to get involved in ILO [International Labour Organization] meetings. Clay drafted me because he didn't have money to send anyone from BLS, so I went to the international labor statistical meetings of the ILO—

*Q: On Marshall Plan counterpart funds?*

MINTZES: Probably. I don't remember how it worked. I remember Clayton himself came and I came there. This was the first time I would really have to follow instructions because I was covering the family living studies. Coming from a Marshall Plan background I said, "Gee the Europeans are starting to do these family living studies; why can't we supply them with background in what the BLS does?" In the course of the meeting I said, "I'm pretty sure that the U.S. would be happy to provide technical assistance with the respect to development of family studies." At lunch I met Clay; he turned white. He said we have to get clearance from the Budget Bureau before we can even make a statement like that. We just don't have the budget for it. So, I had to backtrack at the next meeting.

*Q: Subject to availability.*

MINTZES: Yes. It was embarrassing. After that I was very cautious. The other aspects, the counterpart investment and the work with the trade union advisory committee which I already mentioned, now we can go back—

*Q: Wait just a minute. The trade union advisory committee, we didn't define it. This was an advisory committee to the Marshall Plan and it was made up of representatives of the free trade unions, Catholic and socialist unions. Was that headed by Skevinals the trade union side?*

MINTZES: Yes. Skevinals was there at the time. He was there when I came back. Cruikshank came into Paris during this period. Shishkin had left, going back to the CIO. To the AFL I mean. Nelson Cruikshank had come in to take the position. I continued the same relations.

*Q: Did Joe Heath come in at that point?*

MINTZES: I think he came in later, didn't he?

*Q: I don't know. He was there when I arrived.*

MINTZES: Yeah, I think he did. He may have, because Cruikshank didn't stay there very long.

*Q: No, he didn't. He stayed there long enough to hire me and then leave before I came.*

MINTZES: Yes because I left and then he left shortly after. I think Joe Heath may have been around, in and out from Greece.

*Q: Joe, I was serious in my question about this fascinating assignment. What made you want to leave?*

MINTZES: Family. That was the only reason. I was ready to stay. We were ready to start

a family. We had just been married before we came over. We came back at that time, not trusting the European medical establishment I suppose, which was probably unwarranted.

*Q: So you came back even before Sapas.*

MINTZES: Oh yes, sure.

*Q: Then you came back, which would have been about '51.*

MINTZES: Fifty-one sure. It was in December of '51.

*Q: December of '51 is when I came to Paris and also was intrigued by the idea of getting there. Yes, go ahead. You came back to the BLS.*

MINTZES: Yes, I came back, but not to the BLS I came back to the Marshall Plan. The BLS offered. Trent Williams was very anxious for me to come back, but I preferred to stay in the Marshall Plan. I came back and came to work for Saul Ozer in the Labor Economics Division it was called. Saul didn't stay very long. He was busy there promoting the productivity program. He had Bob Oliver, who was a great advocate, and I became. This picks up the productivity program where we left off. I worked backstopping productivity programs in Europe at the time, activities really, not programs. Oliver approached me on how to develop legislation to put more teeth in the productivity program. This was as you recall, the Korean War had developed. In the productivity program there was a provision for using counterparts for military production in the Marshall Plan counterpart program.

*Q: This is tape two of the interview with Joseph Mintzes. Joe, you will continue where you left off before.*

MINTZES: Just to recapture our discussion before, I was trying to describe the different views of the productivity program depending on where you sat in the structure. The activities were varied, as I think I mentioned, heavily on middle management type of skills, including personnel relations and industrial relations depending on the particular industrial setting in which these activities took place. I think that the productivity program tended to be exhortatory. There were very little actual resources except for what one might call technical assistance. The activities which could have been called productivity or could have been called something else such as teams visiting the United States or experts coming over. There were a wide variety of interests involved. Often these were designated as productivity; sometimes were defined otherwise. The specific activities in the statistical field perhaps aroused the most interest among the governmental people, that is to some extent the public as well as the industry, labor and otherwise, other elements in the community. I'm thinking particularly of the work of teams that went to the BLS to see how U.S. statistics were developed on productivity I guess much in response to field visits by Jim Silverman who was a very effective missionary on the BLS statistical methods. In addition, Jim often discussed what are the factors affecting

productivity, the analysis that the BLS often did with regard to trends and their periodic releases on productivity statistics.

I think that the use of the data was uneven in Europe; that is my experience which ultimately evolved over a number of years. Unlike the U.S. traditions on the collection of statistics where you had assurance of anonymity and identification of sources, there was some suspicion in Europe that the governmental authorities couldn't maintain this. I think this is one of the elements that affected the slower development of these indicators. Of course there was also a budgetary matter; statistics are expensive, good statistics in any case. That was really an ancillary element in what one might call the evolution of the productivity idea.

I think the other aspect which I mentioned was the strong interest among the economists, the program officers, the other officials within the Marshall Plan structure, in productivity from the point of view that you distinguish productivity per se from capital expenditures, the whole range of assistance the Marshall Plan offered, financial assistance. That you were going to get more bang out of your buck if you also improved general efficiency, work methods, attitudes, and a whole range of related questions. There were informal working groups which I participated in in Paris. I think I mentioned Saul Ozer, who was really my immediate superior, Bob Oceans—

*Q: Oceans was not on the labor side, was he?*

MINTZES: No, he was an economist or a program officer. And one or two others. It was sort of a floating crap game. You had different people coming in with different orientation and interests. The industry people were much interested in seeding the idea of middle management. The MBA [Master of Business Administration] idea got a strong boost. I think during the period, many of the people who came to America for studies, went either to get MBAs or sort of refresher courses at the Harvard school provided for senior executives. In the OEEC itself, there were seminars relating to these issues. I make these distinctions at this period, I think I pointed out Bob Oliver sort of picked up the idea of the program among the labor people within the Marshall Plan and was most active in promoting it. There was a considerable controversy regarding his position and the traditional trade unionists within the labor movement.

*Q: The traditional one being the suspicion.*

MINTZES: That's right, and I suppose trying to recapture the atmosphere of the time some of it was the AFL versus CIO positions; that is you had the industrial unions being more open with respect to the use of productivity statistics, not as concerned, as opposed to the AFL. So depending on where you came from, you had some of that as an undercurrent, although both Clint Golden who was very positive on this and Bert Jewell who accepted it, did not reflect this dichotomy. It was more I say among trade union staffers than trade union leaders. I think the particular staffers who represented the different currents argued these things out. Clearly some of it was a valid type of debate; it

was not altogether polemics of a propaganda sort. There were questions raised among European unionists too because one of the basic ideas being promoted was the idea of sharing out productivity gains. This would be a marked change from the usual collective bargaining patterns in Europe, while accepted among American unions. This was the time that the UAW particularly was using the productivity issue in its collective bargaining.

*Q: Joe, I wonder if you would comment on a few things that go beyond the purely technological difficulties in preparing statistics accurately and giving a good base for economic comparisons and things like that to a few factors. One of them was the sort of institutional defense on the part of trade unionists who came into the Marshall Plan to push something within the Marshall Plan for their organizational benefits. You and I both know that Clint Golden was genuinely in favor of this, of productivity in sort of a forward looking collective bargaining posture. Bert Jewell came from an old AFL connected railroad. How much of a favorable attitude of his might have been related to the fact that he had this job. It would help his position within the organization not to be a negative factor.*

MINTZES: Yes, I suppose so, and I always felt from my contacts with Jewell that he was more passive about these things, that is he didn't, after all he was up in years at the time. So was Clint Golden for that matter, but Clint was always more of an active person with respect to his role there. Not that it was a sinecure in any sense, but he looked on it as representation, at least in my view, to reflect the goodwill of the American labor movement, and do what he could do to facilitate the operations of the Marshall Plan in general with the goodwill of the American labor movement. They were with it, and this would carry weight with the Europeans who would cooperate more in the Marshall Plan. I don't think he got into the nuts and bolts in that sense.

*Q: I'd like you to comment on a couple of other things. One of them is to what degree is this factor important that to the extent we had these exchanges, you were in Paris and back in the Marshall Plan in this period. I was in the BLS receiving these teams or sending out teams participating in it. To what degree was this exchange business encouraged by the simple desire for international travel? That might have a negative and also a positive effect. I remember a guy named Jean Fouristier, a very famous Frenchman came over, and Ted Fletcher came over. We sent people like Bill Gomberg and Barkin from the trade unions. To some degree was it a professional cum travel interest in getting acquainted with other things and having the benefit of international travel, was that a factor first? And secondly, did that have some subsequent usefulness in terms of international relations on economic issues?*

MINTZES: Well, I'd say yes to the general observation that there was a lot of interest merely in international travel and exchange. You have to recognize the travel and the whole exchange business, not only to cover the cost of making the travel, but these were arranged trips, and these people really got excellent treatment in the United States, and the cooperation of the unions incidentally was one of the major factors, so that it had that substantive payoff. There is no question that it also enhanced the status of the people. I

heard of, maybe this is unique in Italy, somebody putting up on their shingle, “Visited the United States under a Marshall Plan team visit.” This added some qualifications to his services.

*Q: It may very well have a future industrial investment pot.*

MINTZES: Yes. The thing is these were not really part of an organized productivity program we could get into later when we come to the legislation which set up actual money that went into it. I tried to make the distinction between the program before it got money and the program after it received financial support from the Marshall Plan funds. I happened to be in on the beginning of this program and its termination. I was in Paris the second time when there were severe budget cuts, and one of the programs to be cut was the trade union and other visits back and forth. There was a feeling that there was some decline in their usefulness, and there was a certain amount of I wouldn't call it political manipulation, but giving trips to favored people and so forth. That is always an issue that comes in.

*Q: Wanting to discuss first the development of the Moody Plan and its usefulness.*

MINTZES: Yes, well before we leave Paris the first time, I think I did mention some of the things the labor office was doing and what I was involved in. I think I told you that I was involved in support for Boris Shishkin's participation in the senior staff meetings with Harriman and company, and also incidentally I supported the various missions particularly in my work on counterpart where the economic analysis teams that went out. I was always on these as the manpower man, and used these opportunities. I cited the example of my visit to Germany where it was a critical requirement for handling problems of unemployment. One of the other things was the interaction with the labor information people. You mentioned the structure there. I contributed to materials. They had a publication, I think it was called *Transatlantic*. I tried to locate my copy, but I couldn't do it. I thought it would be of some interest because it indicated what the labor information people were doing. This publication was widely distributed among American trade unions. Part of it was to facilitate interest in American unions to welcome foreign teams and participate.

*Q: I'm glad you mentioned Transatlantic because I just saw a copy in connection with something else and I'll throw it into the hopper. I have a copy.*

MINTZES: Well, this particular issue was one issue that affected my relations with trade unions considerably in Europe. I wrote an article called “Trade, not Aid” as an advocacy of opening up trade opportunities so that the Marshall Plan could reduce its direct involvement in the economies of Europe. I wrote what one might, a standard economic appeal indicating, I'm sorry I don't have a copy because I have some interest in looking at it. I wrote it just as something for a popular audience, not as an economic treatise. It essentially presents the case for expanded world trade. This led to a cover sheet picture of traders unloading ships or whatever. It gave it some realistic pitch. It was one of the

things I got the most comments from European trade unions. It was not only staffers but others who felt yes, this is the direction we must go. American unionists, I had some concern. I have a feeling that this identified me as a free trader at the staff of the AFL, particularly because years later, this was after I retired, the State Department nominated me for some job in the ILO. This required clearance with the AFL-CIO. I forget the name of the woman in the staff there who—

*Q: Elizabeth Yeager.*

MINTZES: Elizabeth Yeager. Elizabeth Yeager, I was told, blackballed me on this. She said I was a free trader. I don't know if it stemmed from this, but later on I was labor advisor for the Bureau of European Affairs at State, and one of my most active duties there was contact with trade unions, particularly staffers on economic issues concerning labor. One of the points I always made was not to relay the views of labor to the State Department and the views of the State Department back to labor, but I would try to get in informal settings, meetings between our trade people and union people and myself without trying to move in getting the U.S. position established. This was a free for all discussion of the pros and cons of trade policy. I'm pretty sure I had meetings with Liz Yeager and Matt Goldfinger. This was when the AFL-CIO position had shifted to more protectionist. I'm certain about Liz Yeager's decision, because I asked her once about this. She denied that she really blackballed me, but she said yes she thinks that I am really a free trader. Curious that she made remarks like that to the State Department on the position.

I think that I have covered the high points of the Paris first period when I was there. I think I mentioned that we produced some background things for Transatlantic, but also worked within the—I'm going to give you some of this material if you are going to use it for the archives. Let's go now to Washington. I returned in the summer of '51 when you came to Paris.

*Q: No, I came in '52. I came in '51 for the labor attaché conference, and then in '52 I came to take Sapas' place.*

MINTZES: Well, in any case, I came back to Washington and was offered a job in the labor office under Clint Goldman and Jewell was there at the time. In '51 I'm not sure when some changes might have taken place. Bob Oliver may have come in by then. I think Bob Oliver was there, yes, and Nelson Cruikshank.

*Q: Wasn't he in Paris?*

MINTZES: Yes he had gone to Paris from Washington at the time I returned to Washington. In any case, there was a Labor Economics Division in the setup under Ozer, and I was given, I forget whether it was Western Europe or some area responsibility, and this was dealing with programming for the various countries. Among other things, my job was to look at labor manpower implications of the various programs. This was to deal

with the program officers within the Marshall Plan ECA in Washington as well as communicating back and forth to the field. In a way it was the counterpart of what was happening in Paris to a large extent except you had the OEEC as the instrument through which there were broad discussions on European policy among the countries

*Q: What was your position at that time in the economics division with respect to the labor politics? Was John Mescanin there and what function did he perform against yours?*

MINTZES: Mescanin was there.

*Q: Under Jewell?*

MINTZES: Yes. He replaced Jewell later. I guess Oliver replaced Goldman. Well, John's activities were uneven. He had a lot of energy. So did Bob Oliver. I guess Oliver was more disciplined than Mescanin was. One had to recognize that Mescanin was in private sessions, I always felt, aware of his limitations. He leaned very heavily on advice. He was willing to separate himself from a trade union position. I think however in public, he would take a stance of being very militant, often table pounding, which is not an uncommon characteristic of people who come up the rough way in trade union relations, trade union activities, the politics of trade unionism.

*Q: He had an interest in intellectual issues.*

MINTZES: Yes. He was often underrated by his critics because they saw the bombast and didn't realize he had a brain and he took advice well. That is, he understood, and he knew the limitations. I found it was easy to work with him really. He didn't turn on his public stance often in the private sessions. Bob Oliver also, I had excellent relations with both of them. Ultimately, Mescanin was the one that remained after the "Stassenation" period. Prior to that, there were important developments in the productivity program that I should go into. I think somewhere before I mentioned the development of legislation for providing funding for productivity activities.

*Q: But you didn't go into the particulars, and I'd like it.*

MINTZES: Yes. There was a continuation with Saul Ozer and others in Washington. I'd say this was those who inspired the productivity program in a way, and I participated in that too. There was a development of memoranda and papers. I don't know if any of them are still around in the archives, where various positions were developed. Oliver, at that time, I don't know where the idea started, but we were always concerned that in order to give this thing real impetus, you had to put funds behind it. Generalizations about promotion of productivity, free enterprise, and free trade unions, most people just paid lip service to that, and it didn't greatly affect the operations of the Marshall Plan as a whole. Oliver asked me to look into legislation, and I developed a proposal based on how military assistance was promoted by the Marshall Plan counterpart. I guess somewhere in your discussions, you will be going into counterpart and its intricacies. In any case, as

you know from your own association with the Marshall Plan, the aid in dollars was in most cases matched by the recipient country putting up local currency over which the U.S. government had some control. It varied from country to country.

*Q: Over which it had some control in terms of having to approve its use. They couldn't use it themselves.*

MINTZES: Right. The U.S. couldn't use it. There may have been some exceptions, program activities that required local currency. There were a set of guides for counterpart use other than what the country was using it for, but that was a very small amount.

*Q: Travel and things like that. And usually limited to some proportion.*

MINTZES: In any case, as I told you earlier, with respect to investment teams that looked at productivity in the various countries, coming out of the Harriman office in Washington, those investment teams in which I participated, on the legislative side there was some concern on how one might use productivity. One of the uses that was established early on after the Korean War broke out was the promotion of more military production in Europe to support the requirements. That legislation was in effect about a year or so when I used it as a model for developing an authorization of a similar sort for supporting productivity programs in Europe including activities of the OEEC which was an important element because that established support for the productivity program in the secretariat of the OEEC.

*Q: It gave us quite a bit of clout at the European side where I was at that time.*

MINTZES: But on the history of how this legislation developed, Bob Oliver told me he was having a meeting with then Congressman Javits at the Capitol and asked me to put down on paper my thoughts on legislation regarding financing which I had discussed with him. I hurriedly typed out a memorandum which spelled it out and put it in my pocket and went along with Bob Oliver. We met Javits on the Capitol Hill steps, and Bob started giving him his spiel on the importance of productivity, that something should be done on the legislation on this. Javits said, "I guess you have a piece of paper don't you, Bob?" Bob pointed to me and I had this memo in my pocket, and I handed it over to him. Javits introduced that in the House legislative bill. I'm not sure that—

*Q: Was this on the appropriations bill?*

MINTZES: It may have been on the appropriations bill. In any case, Javits also passed it onto a few senators, Moody being one of them. I guess the timetable in the Senate was a little more rapid than in the House.

*Q: Identify Moody as to where he came from.*

MINTZES: Senator Moody came from Wisconsin or was it Michigan. I don't remember.

A midwest Senator, a Democrat. His name was attached to this, the Moody Bill really the Moody Amendment to the foreign—

*Q: Moody Amendment. I remember the number ten for some reason.*

MINTZES: In any case, both Bob and I sat in the Senate gallery when the bill was being debated. The administration was unhappy with this proposal. It was another barnacle they claimed which was unnecessary on the foreign aid bill and that the secretary of state sent the letter up to the Senate requesting that the amendment not be supported. It was unnecessary. It was a positive letter in supporting the ideas, however, we feel that we shouldn't be constrained by these restrictions. We will fulfill the basic ideas.

*Q: Specificity is uncomfortable.*

MINTZES: In any event that got little support because various senators rose and stated that these ideas have been tossed around a long time and nothing is really happening unless action is done. They were well briefed on the subject. The amendment passed without even a vote, by acclamation rather than voice vote. In any event, that became legislation and immediately it started enormous activity in Washington and in Europe because everybody wanted a piece of this money. It wasn't a lot of money, well, a hundred million dollars was the amount of counterpart. One has to remember that it—

*Q: It wasn't U.S. Treasury money.*

MINTZES: Yeah. The dollars came out of the regular appropriation and went to the countries. The only condition the countries could use the money was if they set aside a counterpart for the program. At that time every country needed the dollars badly. There were immediate efforts to find out what this was all about. There was enormous cable and people traveled between Washington and Europe. I know I was there in that period going across. I remember meeting you in Paris on these occasions. In any event, on the Washington side, each of the offices, the country desks had to evolve proposed guidelines to the field. It was in these guidelines that we set down ideas that affect labor as well as the other aspects of the productivity program, and in turn, the field made changes and comments and so forth, and eventually the programs were established.

I think the idea of productivity centers was one of the main themes that came in. There was a feeling that in addition to the productivity center in the OEEC, and this was to be, I don't know whether the ILO idea of tripartite nature was embedded in the productivity program from the start, but it was an important consideration, that in each of the countries one of the things put into the guidelines was the establishment of productivity program on which government, management, and labor would sit. You know, depending on the countries, obviously in a country where the labor movement was a strong established position, that was no problem, generally accepted with great ease; although, I think there was considerable wariness by governments about the interference that this represented. Up to now the Marshall Plan aid, the conditions were more general. It was government to

government and related to accepted plans which went through the OEEC process, country reviews, and so forth. In this case, there was more bilateral negotiation on the terms, and it involved factors which affected institutional structures in the countries, perhaps most important collective bargaining. The wording usually implied direct collective bargaining on the benefits of increased productivity among labor, management, and the public as lower prices to the consumer was also included.

*Q: The issue of dividing it among the worker, the consumer, and investment in some form.*

MINTZES: Yes.

*Q: Is there a parallel here between the conditions placed upon a dollar appropriation with respect to meeting the Moody amendment requirements to the present time when certain types of grants to and advantages given to foreign countries are conditioned upon human rights issues? It just occurred to me that's an interesting parallel.*

MINTZES: Yes. It is, that's true.

*Q: However there is no such specificity with respect to human rights. It is a range of ignoring human rights in China to requiring some in other countries.*

MINTZES: Yes, in this case the specificity varied from country to country. That is, you are depending on the clout of the respective participants obviously. In the UK [United Kingdom], one treaded very gingerly. In the case of France the issue of what trade unions would be represented on the productivity program was an important issue.

*Q: There was a case that I mentioned in something I wrote, but not in my interview I don't think, where an Italian employer at a session where I gave this talk about the need to divide the benefits of productivity among the labor, management, and the investment, an Italian management representative said to our assistant labor attaché, our friend Bruce Miller, "This guy is ridiculous. He wants us to give up something to our"—how did he refer to it—"to our enemy, you know the trade unions." He just couldn't conceive of the idea. Go ahead.*

MINTZES: Well, the productivity in Washington, Saul Ozer left, by the way, at one point, and I inherited his job a second time, this time in Washington. I should mention we had a very interesting staff in this Labor Economics Division. Paul Fisher, who handled one of the areas, he may have handled Europe after I moved up to heading the division. Jake Pearlman was on the staff.

*Q: Oh yes. He had been in Greece and came back to the States.*

MINTZES: Yes. And Golda, I forget her name.

*Q: Standa.*

MINTZES: Yes. Golda Standa was there too. Actually each one was an independent, what shall I say, professional that handled their own activities. The only time there was coordination necessary was if there was a congressional presentation or situations of that type.

*Q: But they were divided not in subject matter but in area.*

MINTZES: Area yeah. Jake took Latin America. Ben Haskell was there too. I don't remember whether there was anyone else. In any event, the staff worked with—the structure in Washington was that you had the basic authority at that time primarily in the desk officers in the regional offices. These things change from time to time. Whenever there is a reorganization your shift is back to the functional office and the regional is sublimated and vice versa. But, at that particular time, it was important to deal with the country desks in developing this, so in working there was a very well operating system we had in dealing with each of the country—

*Q: Was Herb Long there at the time?*

MINTZES: I don't remember him being there, no.

*Q: It was later. The circumstances of Ozer's leaving, he went off to another job or was he encouraged to leave?*

MINTZES: I forget. I think he was encouraged and found the opportunity, yeah. Saul was unusual. I felt that once you tuned in to Saul, he was an interesting and very thoughtful person. I think he just didn't know how to deal with trade union people, and always came up with the wrong buzz words which set them off. I think with Mescanin in particular that was bad because Mescanin had a considerable amount of self-pride, and you couldn't tell him he is mistaken quite as bluntly as you would like to at times. Saul missed the boat on that as he did in Paris with Boris Shishkin. The only person he really got along with was Bob Oliver. Bob thought the world of Saul and listened to him, but everyone else, he seemed to rub the wrong way unfortunately, because he was a very thoughtful person. I respected him from that point of view.

The Washington operations, let's see, I'm trying to think of other things. The productivity program was a very absorbing activity, and it involved all aspects, labor, political, and labor economic issues that we had. Another program which was painful I may say looking back, was the offshore procurement program. This one was where in connection with our defense production activities, we were trying to steer defense contracts in Europe which provided for offshore procurement. I suppose the countries toward which it was oriented were France and Italy. In other countries the communist trade union problem was not significant in this respect. The situation in France, I don't think caused many problems. I think the application of this principle was done with considerable finesse and not in any way looked upon as serious interference. In Italy, it was done in a

way which caused considerable criticism. Tom Blaine, the labor attaché, who compared to most labor attachés, was much more directly involved in the trade union postwar development; one might say the cold war within the trade union movement. This was another tool which he used openly in a way which offended most of the, well I say it offended the Italians to a considerable degree, even the trade unions had at least on paper benefited nominally from the application of the offshore procurement principles.

*Q: Now was the shipyard business connected with that at all because he was very active in Lego norvano, he was trying to, as I recall, manage something there.*

MINTZES: Well, you have the counterpart of what happened in Marseilles I guess. There was on the French side avoiding obstruction of the Marshall Plan shipments.

*Q: It had something to do with construction.*

MINTZES: Yeah, but it didn't spread out over all Italy. There was defense production. There was a big program really in Italy. I guess I was trying hard to alter the approach, that is to urge Tom to go easier on this and to see what the limitations were and consider in a country with so much unemployment, to deny contracts in certain places for political purposes didn't go down well. I didn't have that much influence. I have to admit the ambassador in Italy was very sympathetic, Madam Luce at the time. I remember going over on a field trip to review the program with instructions to try to help bring about modification that was more reasonable. It went through Paris and there was a certain chap by the name of Murray Weisz there who I remember mentioning to me, I was the man carrying the ax on Tom Blaine, who I assured I had no such power. All I was going to try to do was to convince him to act more reasonably. In any event, when I got there as I used to when I went to Italy from Paris before, I'm trying to think, I met Bill Muzzacco who was a good source for what the current political currents were in Italy including those in the trade union movement. He was one of the best informed people on Italy that I ever met.

*Q: Who was he?*

MINTZES: He was the program officer I think, in the AID mission. He seemed to have excellent contacts all over. We had a meeting with the ambassador at her residence, I remember, and we were dancing around on the subject. Between complementing Tom on how well the work was done, I tried to insinuate the issues we were concerned with. I didn't feel there was much sympathy for that, so our discussion got into small talk as I recall. The one thing that remains in my memory was that she was suffering from some sort of cold or other and attributed it, this is a very old house her residence, to the ceiling in her bedroom must have had paint that had lead in it or something. I'm not sure this should be on the record.

*Q: That's all right. Did you have any inkling at all at that time—*

MINTZES: I met Bruce Miller, by the way, at that time.

*Q: The assistant labor attaché?*

MINTZES: Right in one of the industrial centers someplace, Milan probably.

*Q: Of course he came from a different background and had a different analysis of what was going on. At that time, was there any indication to you, certainly I didn't know anything about it, from Mrs. Luce say, that other interests in the U.S. government, the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] specifically, were financing another push from another direction to increase the cold war aspects of Blaine's activities?*

MINTZES: No, that didn't arise, although it was widely known that Blaine had other activities than this that were involved.

*Q: But if I were involved, I was just wondering if the ambassador, who must have known about this.*

MINTZES: It didn't arise in our discussions as I recall.

*Q: Well of course not. It wouldn't in open discussions.*

MINTZES: No, but these were private discussions at her residence.

*Q: But no effort was made at all to deal with the anomalies of having one part of the embassy act in one direction to ameliorate that effort on the other side. That's interesting. I don't know when we will ever get that out in the open.*

MINTZES: I don't know. That depends. After all the Soviet Union information is coming out. They may have had their agents in Italy writing memoranda that are now in the Russian freedom of information act. Who knows?

*Q: I gave a document that says there is some research going on about Moscow gold going to all these things.*

MINTZES: The other major activity other than the ongoing review of major programs, congressional presentations, and during the "Stassenation" period the people who were being fired. I did mention our view from Washington of the Dave Christian situation.

*Q: Did you put that on the record? It is important that your analysis of the McCarran influence.*

MINTZES: I think that Stassen was receiving, shall we say, advice from various political sources on how to clean up the foreign aid agency. This was in the midst of the McCarthy period, and there was a certain lack of courage as well at that time, so that facing up to

McCarthyism, any type of accusation that some politically-significant person made with regard to personnel in the foreign aid program received attention. Now, it may have been weighed out; I'm not sure. Stassen went through this ridiculous testing of everybody, and used it as a sign of objectivity in his reduction in force. Essentially the information, I don't know how we got it. I think there was a focal point where decisions were made under Stassen and there were contacts made in order to find out what was bugging them. If it was a hopeless case, you don't waste energy trying to defend the situation; you go through it nominally to help the guy in the field as much as you can, but recognize that under the circumstances, you just don't have the power to do much about it. In the case of Christian—

*Q: Wait! Before you get to that, Stassen did have congressional authority to discharge people without giving a reason, without respect to Civil Service rules and like that. So he had this authority, and the question was pressures were put on him?*

MINTZES: That's right. So that, I forget, it was about 25 percent of the staff. It was a sizable reduction. I mentioned to you that in the case of both David Christian and Elanor Finger, both of them who worked on immigration policy had run up against Senator McCarran, and—

*Q: On the basis of something specific with respect to immigration or just general policy?*

MINTZES: It was on the legislative proposal, the McCarran Act or whatever it was. They wrote the State Department position objecting to it or wrote within the State Department. I think they may have gotten as far as the State Department actually endorsed the position, although it would be unlikely because McCarran was so powerful. The State Department would have backed down before then. McCarran probably knew what was going on at State and recognized that—

*Q: What was their basis to the opposition to that particular part of McCarran's Act?*

MINTZES: Well, it was a restriction on immigration from Europe, and the big concern was the displaced persons. When I mentioned earlier the work we did in the OEEC was heavily manpower oriented toward labor mobility, particularly with respect to opening up opportunities for displaced persons, this was an enormous problem at the time. Dave Christian, who was in Paris at the time, and Elanor Finger, she was not in the Labor Economics Division, she was parallel as an advisor to Oliver and Mescanin.

*Q: I want to get into the theory on this. Our theory in Paris was that you had to remove restrictions on the free flow of manpower roughly parallel to the free flow of money and materials, trade, and finance. Why did McCarran specifically oppose that position taken?*

MINTZES: That wasn't what he opposed. He opposed their opposition to his act, the McCarran Act. The European thing was incidental; I don't think that was the cause of it.

*Q: It had nothing to do with his desire for the Spanish exception?*

MINTZES: No, not that I know of. I remember because in Elanor's case we knew very specifically because she was very active on the Washington side, on the legislative side. Now, I don't remember Dave, when he was in Washington. When was his last job in Washington? Was it the NSRB [National Security Resources Board] before he came to Paris?

*Q: Before he came, yes, the NSRB. That's where he was a roommate of this guy who—*

MINTZES: Well, it is possible that when he was in NSRB and Elanor, he was part of the network that was trying to oppose the McCarran Act. So Dave and Elanor, although I think she was in close contact with him afterwards, they must have had correspondence, and he was identified with her position. All of us were in the division itself. It was a State Department matter primarily because the State Department had immigration policy. We came into it from the requirements of the DPs [Diplomatic Programs]. So that was one of the, I'm indicating what the activities were in the labor office we were involved in, that was an important one in addition to the OSP and the productivity program. They were all very active requirements. The other field that I got into backstopping Paris was the scientific and technical personnel aspects, proposals that were being worked out, backstopping Dave and you in Paris. In that respect, I guess I inherited the network that probably existed when Dave was in the NSRB. John Hilliard was contact point in NSRB. The Labor Department, I forget who it was that I was in contact with. But the development of scientific manpower affected a wide range of domestic agencies. We had the NSF [National Science Foundation] in it. The reason that the focal point was on the ICA was that we had money. The others didn't have any money and didn't have international terms of reference that would enable them to get involved. The issues stem from the analysis of the rapid development of Soviet technological progress and the enormous increase in the number of scientists and engineers that were being graduated in the Soviet Union. This was the famous numbers game of how you analyze the Soviet strength vis-à-vis ours. Before we really got involved, the academic community was involved. There was a strong campaign to improve education in the United States, to raise the number of scientists and engineers.

*Q: This was even before Sputnik. It was Sputnik that gave it the push.*

MINTZES: Oh yes, this was well before Sputnik. I had to make the case to the AID, I guess he was ICA or NSA [National Security Agency] director at the time who was an engineer. Foster I think was his name.

*Q: William C. Foster?*

MINTZES: I guess. He followed Stassen as head of the AID program. I may not have it directly. But, on this, I had this interagency group that we participated in, and we did an analysis again of the basic position of the U.S. and of the European countries. The main

issue, the U.S. the efforts were already established trying to improve education. I think that case had already been made. But, the case for Europe needed to be made, and Foster resisted. First of all, he wondered why foreign aid was involved in this. I had to explain it was an economic consideration for the reconstruction of Europe and our interest in Europe, and some money should be set aside to stimulate as a catalyst for efforts in Europe similar to those in the United States. This involved among other things the proposal that Dave initiated in Europe. I put a money price on it as I recall, a round figure of one million dollars as a start with matching funds to make it as palatable as possible for legislative action. This was again drafted as proposed legislation along these lines. We had constant communications and correspondence with Dave. Foster said no in different ways. We made our case in different ways two or three times until finally we had the intervention of the other agencies at a higher level. The various members of the working group pushed it up. It went up high enough that Foster finally agreed to put it through. This was the origin of the scientific and technical personnel program. That occurred around 1956 or 1957, '56 I think, was the legislation.

*Q: Not earlier? Christian left in '53, and I thought he was still there. I became the representative of the manpower committee in '53 as I recall. It might be '54, but you say as late as '56.*

MINTZES: Yes, the legislation took a long time.

*Q: But even before then, Stoke started coming.*

MINTZES: You may have had the committee set up, but you didn't have any money before then. I think the committee was set up earlier.

*Q: You people sent Stoke over. This was professor Stoke who became the American representative to the—*

MINTZES: He was president of Queens College at the time. I had contact with Stoke over a long period of time beginning with his association with this program. Even after I retired, the families are close friends and I had a daughter in Seattle where he lived, and would visit occasionally. He was remarkable. In any event, the development of the scientific and technical personnel, STP we'll call it, led to my being recruited to replace a certain Murray Weisz and Barney Taylor who were leaving Paris roughly at that time.

*Q: That was '57. And you and Ben Haskell came out at the same time to take my and Barney Taylor's place. I covered that in my interview a little bit without talking about his last visit to Paris while I was there, we were talking about who would replace us. Mescanin reported to me that there was considerable pressure to send Haskell over as the second person with some different division of responsibilities. He mentioned the fact, which I'm putting in my—I'm telling you because I forgot to put it in my own testimony, that he just couldn't see the opposition to the idea that there would be two Jews replace me and Taylor. I thought that was very interesting since he had a great liking for you. He*

*was objecting to Haskell coming over.*

MINTZES: Well, I guess Haskell had the support of the ILG, which—

*Q: In any event, you both came over, and you continued with your second tour in Paris. Are you going to comment on that?*

MINTZES: Yes. The second tour in Paris involved considerable activity in getting the Europeans to match the funds that had been approved by the legislation. I guess that was one of my prime requirements, and that took most of the first year. It was a major emphasis. I touched base on the other aspects. We had Pat Knight who was on the staff at the time. I guess there were people in the OEEC at the time, Americans who had come over on the productivity program who were on the staff of the Labor Office. That was a very helpful resource and interchange that we had during that period too.

*Q: What about your relations with the productivity division of the Marshall Plan office? Pat Knight who had been there transferred to be a member of my staff and then your staff. But, there were people there who had a broader productivity— What was that, the productivity division that actually had its office at the OEEC. You don't remember that at all? Maybe they had left by then?*

MINTZES: I think they had an office in the same building with us at the same time as I recall. They may have had some liaison arrangement.

*Q: Oh, you mean at the Talleyrand?*

MINTZES: At the Talleyrand, yes. Because most of the mission had moved to Faise Andre but our division and the productivity division remained behind. I think there may have been some others too. In any event, my relations with the productivity program were pretty peaceful, compared to what I had heard. One of the things is I had come with a strong productivity background in the sense that I had been involved with the program since its creation. There were people there, particularly I guess Ken Levick was there at the time.

*Q: Yes, and he was a positive influence. How about Sherback? Was he there?*

MINTZES: Sherback was there. I felt we had pretty good relations with productivity. One thing we did which may have soured relations, but it was mostly with the productivity program in the OEEC, we insisted that the STP program be separate from the productivity program. You remember King and who was the other guy? There was a Frenchman who were co-heads of the productivity program. I forget the Frenchman's name. In any event, they suggested in the new secretariat for the productivity program that King become the director and he be included in the productivity program and he be co-director with Mr. X, the Frenchman. We objected. We felt there should be total separation, funding separate, personnel separate, and so forth. There should be

coordination where needed, but we claimed the orientation of the two programs was so different that it would distort either.

*Q: Was that a Frenchman or was that Ron Gass who later on—*

MINTZES: No, Ron Gass was King's deputy in the productivity program. King and Gass were very loyal to the productivity program. I felt they didn't have as much faith in the STP moving ahead as rapidly as it did for one thing. They felt they had a scientific program in the productivity program dealing with cooptive research in Europe. That was their main interest, and they felt this STP would be an adjunct to that. We felt it was a separate program since it was so heavily oriented toward the education and science ministries you would have an entirely different clientele you'd be dealing with, and it would cause considerable confusion if it was in the productivity program. This position was developed in consultation with Washington, obviously. It would have created considerable problems in congressional presentation for one thing, which the Europeans didn't appreciate, also the philosophy of the two programs was such that it would be disparate.

*Q: Who then ran it for OEEC?*

MINTZES: King. He then separated from the others and became director of the scientific and personnel program.

*Q: Did he maintain his supervision over productivity?*

MINTZES: No because the Frenchman was the director of that. The name will come back to me at some point. The other guy was a French senior civil servant with very good credentials coming from the *école politique* [political school] and so forth. In any event, I don't know how much you want to go into the STP program. It was somewhat different from other labor programs. I subsumed that under manpower but really it was just another hat that I wore, but really not the same as the labor thing. I got involved deeply on the labor side in a number of activities which I can go into. The only thing I may state on the STP program, I had to go to various countries in order to stimulate their interest in supporting funding for the European share of the STP program. I had no real contacts in these countries. In some of them, they had science advisors. I don't think the science advisors had arrived yet. I had to find somebody as a contact point. In most cases it was the economics section or the cultural section or somebody dealing with education and economics, and I tried labor guys. My first instinct was if a guy is interested, it would be just a one shot affair, and these are people that I know and would take on the task too. Now I was in Paris, and it wasn't necessary in Paris. There were people in the embassy falling all over themselves trying to get the French to participate. In some of the countries it was difficult. Germany was one case. At that time, Irwin Tobin was the labor attaché, and I called Irwin, and he said this is a Godsend, and he'd be happy to help on that. He was very helpful. This is how Irwin got into science. I don't know whether you know, he later moved into the general area in Foreign Service and was—

*Q: Deputy director in INR[Bureau of Intelligence and Research]?*

MINTZES: No he was in EUR [Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs] dealing with NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] matters. He was a NATO officer, and NATO had a science program too, and he got involved in the NATO science program.

*Q: Both the NATO manpower committee and the OEEC manpower committee became involved in scientific manpower with the NATO people emphasizing the need for specific manpower for defense purposes.*

MINTZES: So, Irwin was very helpful for making the necessary arrangements when we came in to talk to the key people to effect German participation. I think the German situation was complicated because of the federal structure. You had to get the lender on deck. It took time, but it was successful. Of course all of it was. I think the STP program is something where there should be an evaluation somewhere along the line, because I think retrospectively that it was one of the most successful endeavors that the U.S. government led.

*Q: Did you have any problems in Norway? I raise that because that was the first place that I had to contact in connection with the NATO manpower committee on scientific manpower. You don't recall any?*

MINTZES: No. Just a moment I want to see. Okay the only thing on the STP that the requirement of getting the Europeans to come up with matching funds was accomplished just the same time the Sputnik went off. The holdout country was the United Kingdom. Every other country accepted immediately. The United Kingdom, their budget bureau of course, Whitehall, was very reluctant. I don't know how many trips I took up to London. Dan Margolis, you probably remember him, was the interlocutor for—

*Q: He was the political counselor wasn't he?*

MINTZES: I thought he was economic; maybe he was the political counselor. In any case, he and I and Stoke came up a number of times, but it was finally settled by Sputnik.

*Q: Was Clay Ford, who was the British representative in the manpower committee when I was there, was he active in this? He opposed, privately he felt this was important, but of course the government position was not too helpful. Did you know him at all?*

MINTZES: Oh yeah, sure. Do you remember Lloyd Davies? He is here in Washington, you know.

*Q: Oh really?*

MINTZES: I'll get to it later when I get to the American Union, the Institute for Learning

in Retirement. He's teaching courses there, and I was leading a seminar too. We sort of reminisced, our paths having crossed back in the Marshall Plan.

I just want to finish up on the STP. In addition, after the passage of the legislation there was enormous activity throughout the period I was in Paris from '57 to '62. I was there for five years. This was one of the major preoccupations, but since it is not as closely related to the usual labor field, I'll move on to the other things. The activities with the trade union advisory committees were quite important, especially in relation to the productivity program with which our office was still very actively concerned. There was one special project that got me to Brussels quite often. I inherited a contract on a movie. Do you remember that? There was a Hungarian who was responsible for the movie. I looked at the contract and felt that this was an impossible movie and that we should try to negotiate ourselves out of the contract because—

*Q: This must have been a different movie from the one on housing that I did.*

MINTZES: Oh no. This one was about a Hungarian refugee who goes to Ghent and gets a job in a productivity—had a lot of messages in it. Zambodi, who was Hungarian, gave me a copy of his book. He died of a heart attack a few years later as I found out. This exposed me to the movie industry. I don't know if it was seventy thousand dollars on his contract for a full length movie. The title was *Someone Knocks at the Door*. Nothing had been done on it. The script had not been approved. I thought, Well, it hasn't started so how much could it cost to disengage? We'd pay off whatever was required because it didn't look like it was going to go anywhere. But, he was very ingenious in meeting contract provisions just on time. I went to Brussels, and he had the script ready, and then each of the contract provisions subsequent, he had them ready. This was a movie where the basic idea—this was after the Hungarian uprising as the Soviets called it, and many of the refugees came into Europe. Zambodi, who was in the movie industry, was one of them. He lined up an international cast of prominent actors because I knew of one of the French actresses. She was one of the starlets that was very popular in French movies we used to see when we were in Paris. In any case, this got me in contact with the ICFTU [International Confederation of Free Trade Unions]. Who was the chap?

*Q: Skevinals?*

MINTZES: Not Skevinals.

*Q: Goldenbrook?*

MINTZES: I'm trying to think. He was

*Q: Baquri?*

MINTZES: The name doesn't strike a bell at the moment. He was Belgian. Well, in any event, he had close contacts with ICFTU. In part, my frequent visits there were in

connection with meeting the contract provisions, I was unable to delegate. I wanted to delegate this to Pat Pike, but she couldn't sign for the money and all that sort of thing so I had to do it. I kept Pat involved in it, although she left somewhere in between. I forget what time because the movie—

*Q: About '58 or '59.*

MINTZES: The movie took a long time to come through, and it was in about a dozen languages, everybody speaking their own language and being dubbed in on the universal track which had their own languages. Since it was playing, it had its opening in Brussels. Commercially, it wasn't a great success. There were too many messages in it, all about productivity, about oppression in Hungary by the Soviets. It was done by good professionals. It had excellent actors and so forth, but it was mostly shown in union meetings. They had this thing distributed all over. I guess USIA helped out and so forth. I don't know what the fate of it is. *Quelqu'un Frappe a la Porte* (Somebody is Knocking on the Door). It was the French title. It had a little love story too.

*Q: Somebody is Knocking on the Door. I didn't mention it in my interview on the Marshall Plan, but we had a similar experience with respect to a housing film, which turned out again very prominent actors and actresses, a smaller budget than I think the one you mentioned, but I don't remember the amounts. It was finally finished. It played in union halls and not much else. We were very disappointed at the lack of audience for it. But, it was pushed by the trade unions at least in this case, and our housing expert, Don Munson who just died a few months ago— Again it's an experience in which somebody is pushing an idea which is an attractive idea, and it gets a whole lot of support beyond what it possibly deserved. In my case, I supported it whole heartedly because of my housing background and Don's pushing. I wouldn't say it was a waste of money, but it wasn't used well by the people we were producing it for.*

MINTZES: Yeah, probably similar to, but mine was a full length movie which I thought was impossible to produce. He had all this volunteer help and so forth.

*Q: Ours was an hour movie.*

MINTZES: Well, moving on, this was the productivity program and the trade union activities were very important during this period. I don't know whether I should move through that to the end because this constituted my activity over the whole five year period, and very close contacts with the TUAC [Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OECD] and management groups too. The other aspect was the relationship with American unions. Meany stopped in Paris on all his trips to Geneva for the ILO meetings, and I would set up sessions with of course the ambassador, Tuthill, during my period, and with others. Tuthill was an Atlanticist. He was very active in support of the common market and so forth.

*Q: And long after his retirement.*

MINTZES: He was very closely interested in the labor program. I felt that he was one of the easiest people to deal with, knowledgeable people. There were others. There was a fellow by the name of MacArthur who was there before him who I felt was very good on the scientific and technical personnel program. He came from the movie industry. He was excellent on that, but the labor thing he was a little uneasy with, you know. He couldn't understand how I was juggling both balls, the STP and the trade union thing. In Tuthill's case, we would invariably set up a meeting with Monet. I forget Monet's assistant, a Frenchman who later became the economist representative in Paris.

*Q: Monet in what capacity?*

MINTZES: Well, Monet was pushing for rapid acceleration in the common market. I guess he was trying to do it purely to get British—

*Q: But what was his capacity? Was it a common market capacity or—*

MINTZES: No, Monet was an individual, an elder statesman. He was interested in European unity and a number of issues. I felt those meetings with Monet and Meany were high points. Now one of the things that Monet was trying to do was to reduce the animosity between the British TUC [Trade Union Congress], the Labour Party and the German DGB and the STP. This was one of the major things he wanted Meany's help on, and Reuther's too.

*Q: Tape three of the Mintzes interview. You were speaking about the meetings.*

MINTZES: The meetings with Meany.

*Q: Meany and Monet. What a different combination of backgrounds. I imagine they got along.*

MINTZES: Yeah they got along. There were two occasions that I think were very notable. Number one, in which Meany indicated very strong support for European unity and what Monet was pushing for. Monet indicated to him the importance of getting the British labor movement more amenable first to the common market and particularly to stop their German bashing I suppose he put it or the equivalent of that.

*Q: Meany agreed with that. He was very anti-British for other reasons.*

MINTZES: This one he agreed. I don't know how much influence he could have exerted on the British at the time. I think Reuther might have been more influential.

*Q: When you speak of Reuther, you mean Victor rather than Walter?*

MINTZES: No. I meant Walter.

*Q: Walter? Really! Because at this time were both Victor Reuther and Irving Brown there for their respective organizations? Because this was after unity and I thought that—*

MINTZES: Wait a second. I was thinking of the first time Victor and Irving were both there. I don't recall. Irving may have been back in New York at that time.

*Q: Conceivably, and Victor certainly was gone.*

MINTZES: That's right. But anyway, these periodic visits of American labor people, particularly relating to the TUAC, and the meetings in Paris were very useful in establishing interest in Europe in general in what was going on, that is in the labor field, but also in the common market. I usually ran a reception when Meany came in, and he usually came with a delegation of trade union people. It was a very useful occasion for me to get people other than the labor people exposed to labor people. I felt that this enhanced the operations in the labor section enormously, because I got feedback from it that was very positive. I got people from the OEEC in since I dealt with both the labor people and the economists and the productivity people and so forth. There was a network that didn't often speak to each other that was involved and got exposed to American labor, which I thought was quite useful. One incident where you know you have the stereotype of the chap traveling abroad and doesn't understand the local customs. You saw the apartment that I had in Paris. It was ample but not too large. We had to move furniture around to make room, and it was a problem what you do with coats and hats. It's not like you didn't have a coat closet in Paris that would hold more than three coats, so we would bring in a rack and check it. I forget who it was. He was a guy in the carpenters union, an old timer, and he wouldn't let go of his hat. He felt he'd never get it back. It caused quite an uproar because here we had this French gal checking this stuff at the door, and he was holding on to his hat. He wore it throughout the reception. He says he has enough experience with France. I think it was the carpenters union guy, a big fellow.

*Q: Hutchinson? Hutchinson was the carpenters union guy.*

MINTZES: It may have been Hutchinson. The other meeting, and I'm jumping a few years, was 1960 and the Berlin Wall. Meany had Lovestone and Irving Brown.

*Q: The Berlin Wall was not '60. It was '61.*

MINTZES: But in any case another memorable meeting of this sort. It was shortly after the Berlin Wall, June of '61? Roughly then because the ILO meetings would come off then. Meany was very strong on our moving in and breaking it down. Move the tanks in and have a showdown right then. Monet of course, was restrained; war again in Europe and so forth. He was restraining Meany and interestingly Lovestone was restraining him. Meany was taking this position that was stronger than Lovestone. Of course, everyone wanted to put economic screws on and continue to supply Berlin and so forth like the

airlift. But Meany's was running the trains in. I think there were roads that gave entry into Berlin and so forth.

*Q: Well, this is a very interesting thing, because later on when Lovestone had been exciting Meany about the terrible things that had been going on in the ITFCU with the lack of adequate, from Lovestone's point of view, response to the terrible things the Soviets were doing. He worked Meany up so much that Meany finally quit the ITFCU and had the AFL-CIO withdraw. That is the last thing that Lovestone said, he said it privately and said it publicly too. He opposed the idea of pulling out from the ITFCU. The differences between Lovestone, well, not real differences because Meany made them policy, resulted from Lovestone and that whole group's continual feeling that this was the name of the game. The theoretical and polemical differences with the communists which they lived through before Lovestone left or was kicked out of the Comintern [Communist International] even. The polemics of it was the name of the game. This was the thing he enjoyed, and to the extent that either a wall was created in this case that you mentioned or in the case that I mentioned, the ITFCU would be split, no that's not what they wanted. They wanted to be in there fighting polemically because that was the game they were engaged in.*

MINTZES: This confirms that in a sense, but it was a very interesting session. I think of it as a highlight.

*Q: Lovestone did not, however, contradict Meany at the meeting.*

MINTZES: No. He came silent and withdrew, and Brown pretty much seemed to follow Lovestone. He didn't indicate any separate view.

*Q: Your relations with Brown generally in this period?*

MINTZES: Yeah, Brown always looked upon me as an economist, as a staffer. You know, union sympathies but he'd feel that I had a political ax to grind. I think in a sense, Victor looked at me in that way too. I tried to take my own position. That is, there were things I differed with. On Yugoslavia, for example, I felt the position was mistaken about isolation of the labor side, and I felt later on on the Spanish situation, which I'll go into later because this was a very important facet on the trade union politics, labor politics that I was involved in. I can't think of anything more than the fact that I tried to bring the labor people into contact with others rather than those who agreed with them necessarily, particularly where there is economic policy involved. We had issues which touched on trade which were particularly acrimonious. You know, the differences tended to become greater and greater over time. I wanted to point out one thing, on the productivity program, I encouraged contact with the people.

I guess one should stop for a moment and explain the OEEC's labor and manpower operations. I guess, in a way, I helped recruit Saul Barkin. It wasn't—

*Q: You are now talking about the OECD.*

MINTZES: That's right. This was—

*Q: Why don't you lead from the transition from the OEEC to the OECD.*

MINTZES: Okay. I think I covered most of the things up until the 1960 period. I don't know whether you want me to go into the NATO manpower committee activities or not, the NATO manpower planning committee.

*Q: I would hope that you would cover that, because I don't think I did very much.*

MINTZES: Yeah, because there was an issue that I got involved in which I should mention. At the same time there was an activity with the NATO science committee and of course all of the productivity committees, so we had a large territory to cover, and we used everybody. I had then handled the manpower as much as possible. There were certain problems which made it difficult for him to have useful contacts with some of the trade union people. Playback wasn't too good, and as long as Pat Knight was there, she was handling the day-to-day relationships with people in the trade union program in the OEEC.

*Q: Let me say that it is interesting that both Pat Knight and Ben Haskell had trade union backgrounds and support, but this is illustrative of the fact that there were great advantages and some disadvantages to having trade unionists doing work for the U.S. government to the extent that they might have been involved with the wrong side of an issue and that turns out to be negative. That may have been the case with Haskell.*

MINTZES: Yeah. I felt that this was something I had to do very delicately, since Ben seemed to have some interest in the manpower and followed it, and particularly with the assistance of Serge Froid, the chap I recruited about seven years earlier, it worked out fine.

*Q: And who remained on during my second tour in the mid-seventies.*

MINTZES: Yeah. Certain institutional continuity there was supplied by Serge. Now, there was a lot of traffic of trade union people back and forth under the OEEC productivity program and the labor part of it, and we were involved in that one way or another. The thing that I tried to encourage was to get more activity related to economic policy that affects the unions as a way of maintaining a dialog between the U.S. and European unions. My view all along was that much of the trade union representation tended to be a sort of goodwill type of facilitation. I mentioned that article I did on trade, not aid. I found trade unionists coming to me who had read it and raising questions, actually just bringing that point of view out, they were very sympathetic to it. I tried to continue that. Some of them were strictly productivity, but there was one meeting that was of some significance I felt. This was in 1960 in which the principal trade union staffers in addition

to those who, I think Stanley Rootenberg, came over. I can refresh my memory because the report of the meeting, Phil Arno who was in the Labor Department at the time wrote me a note and said he'd read my report. I sent the report through the regular reporting system of State. I'll come back to that later. I had been absorbed into the State Department in 1959 since the State Department claimed that our work was representation of a diplomatic sort and was no longer foreign aid. Only the productivity program itself was still under ICA by that time or AID. My operation, my particular task, was considered diplomatic, and I was made an FSR [Foreign Service Reserve] in the State Department.

*Q: FSR 2?*

MINTZES: FSR 2. I later converted to FSO [Foreign Service officer] on home leave by taking an oral exam with a panel and so forth.

*Q: But Haskell and Knight and those people?*

MINTZES: They remained in since they dealt with the productivity program which was still under my direction. None of my functions was changed, although AID offered me the opportunity of retaining my AID status when my tour was up, and actually had the State Department not absorbed me as an FSO, I would have gone back to AID at that time. I did not request transfer to State at the time. I felt that what I was doing interested me. I think it was Jim Taylor who urged me to take the exam when I came on home leave, and it turned out, however, I had to make a condition that I would not accept a reduction in rank that they were trying to foist on everybody who was taking those exams. I was prepared to stay on at AID if that were the case.

*Q: Your predecessor, Barney Taylor, was offered a job as a 3 and took it as an FSO. I was offered one as a 3 and rejected it to go back to Labor. They tried to use that transfer as a device for lowering the grade.*

MINTZES: Yeah. Well, then I don't know whether we should digress into these panel exams except that I felt it was of some interest because Jim Taylor was on the panel. There were a few ambassadors. I forget, Stibbins, I think, was the chairman. These were spit and polish Foreign Service types. After the meeting, after I came in, Jim congratulated me, of course, and he said that I wowed them. He said they were expecting some trade unionist, and here we were discussing trade. I'm pretty sure that some of them didn't know enough about trade to know the significance. They tried to stump me on one question: Can you tell us about this new international league? I happened to have read the sports pages. Evidently at that time, maybe I had the names mixed up, there was a new baseball league that was being suggested. It was given the name International League since we already had an American and National League. I was able to answer that one. How the hell did— Then they asked me questions on music and literature and so forth. Jim came back and he said that they didn't know some of those things evidently, which was interesting. You know they were pressing me about diplomatic history. I found it an

interesting engagement because I was very relaxed about it. I felt I had a job and this wasn't necessary you know. From a career point of view, I didn't take it that seriously. Getting back to the convergence of OEEC to OECD, a major stumbling block was Spanish accession as full participants, particularly in labor and related activities. There was a strong push for them to be recognized. They wanted to join TUAC, to sit at the table as a legitimate—that the Falange union structure of Spain would be represented as a union.

*Q: You mean that the Falangists wanted to get into the TUAC?*

MINTZES: Yes.

*Q: Who was the head of the TUAC? Was the secretary still Skevinals?*

MINTZES: Yes, Skevinals was still there.

*Q: And they opposed this of course.*

MINTZES: Yeah, they opposed it. American unions were less hardened in that respect, at least that was my impression. They felt that some face saving device had to be involved, and we developed one. The Phalanx would sit with the Spanish government observers at joint TUAC meetings but not the members of it. There was a lot of back and forth. This was one of the sticking points towards the end of the negotiations. It was getting close to the deadline.

*Q: This is the negotiations on the creation of the new OECD from the OEEC. I want to get it on the record, the difference being the United States was not a member of the OEEC but would become a member of the OECD.*

MINTZES: Yes. This way the U.S. had a direct responsibility for its position other than the informal type of relationship in the OEEC. Eventually there was public expression of dismay over the requirement of getting the Spanish in one way or another, but in private, everybody finally relaxed about it and felt that the order of how the tables are organized at the meeting was satisfactory.

*Q: That stage was completed.*

MINTZES: I remember this made a great impression on the people in the delegation who were biting their nails out worrying about—

*Q: The U.S. delegation?*

MINTZES: Yes. I think that this was one of the last stumbling blocks. It was considered minor up until then, and then suddenly it loomed. No problems ever evolved as a result of this. It worked out. The Spanish never even spoke. They may have had a couple of people

who sat with the delegation. One didn't know what their position was. I used to speak to them occasionally and find that first of all, most of them didn't speak English or French so it was hard to see how they followed what was going on, but in any event, there were one or two I was able to talk to. The Spanish ambassador, I felt, was instrumental in smoothing it over. He was quite good in this case.

*Q: He was also anxious to get in.*

MINTZES: Yeah, I know, but he did it effectively, because he had to present the public stance and privately accede to pressures. The other problem, which came later on, and this dealt with the trade union teams, there was a budget cut in the productivity program, and one of the things we were focusing on was the costly exchange programs. I had always indicated to Skevinals my unhappiness with how that thing was evolving. There were private understandings on who would get what. The quality was not the greatest. I contrasted this because I knew how useful these teams were. One of the things I didn't mention, when I was in Washington, I used to interview trade union leaders who had gone through the American visit. Invariably I was impressed. This was not to make a case with me. They knew that the AID or ICA was supporting this and they were trying to build additional support for it. But, in our conversations on the more subtle aspects like discussing race relations and their understanding of this in America, it made a deep impression that the stereotype of America was not warranted. In particular, there was one Norwegian who was well up in years, a very senior guy. I don't have any notes or the name, but he came back and he said that his only regret was that he hadn't done this earlier. He was in the left wing in the Norwegian labor movement, and they had the idea of the capitalist ogre of America. He said that if he were younger, he would go back and shape things up. He said that he is close to retirement, and it's a battle for younger people. He would do his best, but he was most grateful for that exposure. He got an open treatment, and with him I raised the weak points, the race relations, the problem in the urban areas, and so forth. They aren't as serious as they are today, but they were bad enough then.

*Q: I had similar reactions from French trade unionists who came back that we interviewed in Paris. What was the impact? They had the same comments. Sort of a surprise, we heard this was so, especially since they were under the influence of the communist opposition in the union movement. Was this Norwegian trade unionist's name Norbaltt or something like that?*

MINTZES: It could have been.

*Q: Because his daughter was working for the ITFCU and became a very well-known person.*

MINTZES: I don't remember the name, but at the time, it was well known. We just had a meeting, the two of us. He felt this was the end; he was about to leave, and he felt he had to tell it to somebody.

*Q: That's interesting. You were on the transition from the OECD.*

MINTZES: With the transition, the productivity program had to change somewhat, the financing and so forth. I was explaining that this was a position that was unpopular with the trade unions. They felt it was a type of advantage they had that they would like to exploit. I made the case that you have to provide evidence that it is really doing what it is supposed to do and whether in effect it might not be demoralizing the trade unions. One could argue that in the early post-war period, lack of contact over the war years, we have international organizations. These people meet at the ILO. You get to the States to attend as fraternal representatives in various trade union meetings, so the contact argument isn't valid anymore. In a sense, it may be a little degrading. I convinced Skevinals. He was the toughest in a way because this was something that he had direct advantage on because he was very influential in directing where it was going.

*Q: He could throw the visits.*

MINTZES: That's right. But, in any case, particularly American union staffers found this a useful device because they didn't get the opportunities that the trade union politicians did to get to the various international meetings, although some of them were often seconded for these by their seniors, certainly the top trade union types. Did I finish on this one meeting union views on fair labor standards in foreign trade? This is a conference; I don't think I finished. I think I mentioned that Phil Arno sent me a note and said that he'd like to take advantage of one of these excellent reports he gets from the State Department from the various labor attachés and labor officers. He asked if he could use mine with very little editing in the *Monthly Labor Review* which he made as one of the lead articles. This was the debate on fair labor standards as this is a copy that came with the *Monthly Labor Review*. You can keep it with the things if you want to.

*Q: I will Xerox that part of it and return the article. I think you will want to keep that.*

MINTZES: I think it is very useful because I thought it was a considered assessment. There weren't the polemics you had in these, and the people were pretty good who came. I'm trying to refresh my memory. Vermeulin of course was there from the staff.

*Q: This was the staff of the productivity section. Vermeulin was the Dutch trade unionist who came over to Paris to head that staff.*

MINTZES: And then on the American side was Art Tepler of the ILG. Levinson, he was with one of the secretariats, metalworkers wasn't he?

*Q: Either that or was he still working for the CIO? No, I guess not.*

MINTZES: Wasn't it the metalworkers in Geneva at that time?

*Q: I don't think it was the metalworkers. Well, in any event.*

MINTZES: Edward Casslow.

*Q: Then with the UAW or the IUD.*

MINTZES: No, he was with the CIO at the time. Friedrichs, wasn't he with the Austrian or the German?

*Q: I don't know.*

MINTZES: In any event, this was an abridged version of the report. Did I cover the period when I came back in '62?

*Q: You mean you came back to America in '62.*

MINTZES: I came back to America in '62.

*Q: With the OECD having been formed with our participation in the formation process.*

MINTZES: I came back to become labor advisor for the Bureau of European Affairs who ran manpower too, because I still backstopped the scientific manpower program and dealt with the people around town who had an interest. I continued some of the same network.

*Q: Basically you came into the State Department proper in Washington for the first time.*

MINTZES: Yes, not in the Foreign Aid program. I was in the regular State Department. I had been an FSO since 1959 when I was on home leave and came in as an FS-02. During this period, I took on the duties of labor advisor.

*Q: Before you go into that, you were succeeded in Paris by Arnold Zempel very briefly and then Chuck Stewart the following year.*

MINTZES: Yes, but in the EUR job there were a number of crises in addition to the regular business of handling labor attachés.

*Q: Excuse me for interrupting. You were the labor advisor for the European Bureau but the SIL or the job that became the SIL, that is the head labor person for all of the area advisors was who, Dan Horowitz?*

MINTZES: No, that was before. Phil Delaney was SIL at the time.

*Q: Phil Delaney being an old trade unionist who came into that job as a nominee of the AFL.*

MINTZES: So there was a lot of activity in justifying and establishing labor attaché positions. We worked very closely with Jim Taylor of the Labor Department during this period, the staff, the people who were concerned with international labor affairs or labor conditions abroad, the BLS people as well. That was an ongoing regular operation.

*Q: And the selection of labor attachés also.*

MINTZES: The selection of labor attachés and doing something about labor reporting from the field which was part of the task. In addition you had periodic labor issues, periodic crisis issues you were involved in. One of the major ones was British Guyana, which had not become independent yet and was part of the European area. There was a problem between Birnam and Jagen, cold war aspects in an LDC [least developed countries]. The big issue was a general strike. I remember I would advise the assistant secretary at the time, Tyron was then assistant secretary, and the under secretary or deputy under secretary, I'm trying to think of his name, who was in charge of political affairs at the time. These were quite frequent meetings because this was a crisis situation and they wanted to keep on top of things. I also had contacts with the INR people who handled labor at the time. I'm trying to think, was it Ben Martin in there then or was it, I forget who was the labor guy in INR. There was a political guy too whom I had contact with later. In any event, I'll come to the names if they have to be resurrected.

*Q: Eric Willens?*

MINTZES: Eric Willens, yes. He was the other person. In any event, there was great alarm about what a general strike would do. I took the position that a general strike in an industrialized country is a great calamity, but in a pre-industrial society, they are going to manage. There is a large part of the society that is subsistence. While it is true that they are going to have troubles in getting enough oil and transport and so forth, they will muddle through for a much longer time than would be possible in a larger industrialized economy where there is so much dependence.

*Q: Was it an additional factor that so many of the workers were government employees over whom the government had much more control than in private industry workers? Was that a factor at all?*

MINTZES: This was before independence of British Guyana, and I think the plantations were all foreign owned and the bauxite was foreign owned and so forth, the sugar and bauxite, the earnings from that. But, in any case, the general strike fizzled. This was not my unique observance. It was just that I had read enough about the less developed countries and what the labor movement means in those countries. First of all, they weren't that powerful, and second of all, the economy is not the kind that would be that greatly affected by a political general strike. It might hit specific industries and hurt the bauxite and sugar, but that was just money. The rest of the country ran and hobbled along. It was hobbling even before. In any case, this is one of the things that took up a lot of

effort and required contact with the senior policy people. The other major crisis sort of thing, well there was a series of insurrectionary strikes in France just when I came back. I reported on that. That was one that Tyler, the assistant secretary, was much interested in, dealt with the French desk and so forth. So I got the feel for how the State Department operates very soon on when I was in the job. The other great crisis was there was a shipping strike on the Great Lakes. Hal Banks, the American, I guess the Seamen's Union was organizing a boycott of Canadian ships in American ports. There were a couple of bombings and unpleasant activities. This was my exposure, I felt, in handling a problem that involved domestic labor and international labor. One doesn't realize how many meetings one gets involved in, but there is always the head of the Canadian unions coming down to Washington to the Canadian embassy expecting us to intervene in the State Department, and the whole range of relationships that were quite interesting. First of all, my understanding of how American labor operates was an asset because I could tell whom I should call right away as to what the situation was and the role of the Labor Department, which was very important. I'm trying to think who was in the structure then. There was George Weaver, but who was the secretary then?

*Q: Goldberg and Wirtz.*

MINTZES: Goldberg and Wirtz. I am trying to think, maybe it was Wirtz that was then secretary. That's right.

*Q: By mid '63 Wirtz was secretary and Goldberg was on the Court.*

MINTZES: Right. So the thing that had to be done quite clearly, and there were very savvy legal people, legal advisors in Labor and also in State. I got to know the legal profession as it operates in government, which is an interesting sidelight. I felt that the job as labor advisor at State, particularly EUR, was a very exciting one. I had strong tentacles out in the economic bureau because of my own background and interest in trade policy and used the opportunities in bringing people in the trade union movement with an interest in trade issues together with the staffers.

*Q: Is that where you first met Leonard Weiss? He was on trade at that time I think.*

MINTZES: No, I didn't meet Leonard until I came back from Africa.

*Q: Well, how long did you stay at this job?*

MINTZES: I stayed until '65. Incidentally, the situation on the Great Lakes petered out. The main thing that was necessary was to make sure the Canadian authorities understood where the decision had to be made in the courts, and that all we could use on the government side was good offices. We did that openly and frequently, wringing our hands publicly and so forth. But, they knew what the situation was, and that was essential to get that message across.

*Q: Can I interrupt? Okay, Joe, will you continue.*

MINTZES: One of the questions you raised earlier which might be of interest at this point was about people in the labor field moving up or moving out or parallel, depending on how you interpret it. First of all, the reaction of other labor guys. I got a promotion to FS-01 in '64. That was about two years after I came back. I don't know if it was because of what I was doing, I think it was more of what I was doing in Paris because I got very good marks, I think, for being at the right place at the right time rather than for any extraordinary accomplishments, which I think is one of the elements in the Foreign Service.

*Q: But it's true. When I was appointed in '65, I also got an FS-01, but for other reasons.*

MINTZES: In any event, I remember Dan Horowitz got his FS-01, but he was a political officer at that time. Where was he serving?

*Q: Holland.*

MINTZES: That's right, he was in Holland.

*Q: You were among the first to become a 1. I think Tobin did, didn't he?*

MINTZES: I don't think he had yet. Maybe he did. Shortly thereafter, I guess the promotions come out around February or so, and in the spring, I was offered the Senior Seminar possibility, which was conveyed as a transitional thing. When you move from a senior job you go into a more general corps I guess.

*Q: That Senior Seminar was '64-'65?*

MINTZES: That's right. It was the seventh Senior Seminar. They are up to their thirty-fifth. invited to their commencements as an alumnus I guess. I just noticed it was thirty-five so it is a way of measuring time. In any event, due to seniority, I was elected president of the class.

*Q: Seniority in what terms? Grade?*

MINTZES: Grade.

*Q: I thought you had seniority from your Post Office experience.*

MINTZES: No, this was in grade because I was the only State Department FS-01. Most of them were FS-02. I don't think the other agencies got into that voting. The ambassador was a spit and polish ambassador, who only recognized that diplomacy was a function of the State Department, not of other agencies. That was a guy by the name of Jones who was ambassador to—he's since deceased—he was ambassador to Tunis or something,

and a few other places. But, the Senior Seminars was a wonderful experience, and my labor background was very useful there because they looked upon me as a labor resource. I don't know whether you've attended any of these sessions or know about the structure.

*Q: I've attended a couple of sessions.*

MINTZES: Anyway, that was a remarkable sabbatical year, really. Our class still has lunches twice a year. We decide all the international questions, how well or poorly they are being done, mostly the latter. The program gets you all around the country. We visit labor unions in Detroit and New York.

*Q: You also had a foreign trip out of that near the end, didn't you?*

MINTZES: Yes, in fact the paper I wrote, part of the program is you have a research project which entails foreign visits. What you do is you select a part of the world you haven't been to or are not likely to get to. I decided Eastern Europe would be the appropriate place since I hadn't seen it. Also, I was interested in East-West relations. I did a paper on trade relations between the Comecon countries and the common market countries. There was a chap, I forget where he was, maybe the Labor Department, named Murray Weisz who got a hold of the paper and sent it to Brookings. Brookings' Joe Peckman liked it. He asked me if I'd be interested in taking a year off and writing a book on the subject as long as the State Department funded it. I guess they do. This is part of what they call academic years given to senior Foreign Service officers who want to pursue special research or educational opportunities. I felt that since I had just spent a year away, it would be unwise to—

*Q: That's too bad. By the way, it was not in my capacity as a Labor Department employee that I turned it over to Peckman. We had a very famous car pool, and I gave it to him in the car pool and told him to think about it.*

MINTZES: In any case, the exposure to Eastern Europe was great. I went to three countries that had different regimes, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania. Romania was completely Stalinist except for foreign policy. Hungary was the most advanced in its reforms, and Czechoslovakia was in the midst of an enormous intellectual stimulation from exposure to the West. This was before the "68."

*Q: You never did anything with that paper at all, the one I gave Joe?*

MINTZES: Well, later when I came back to the INR, this is after I came back from Africa that I went to INR, I had under my wing East-West economic policies.

*Q: I see. Well, I don't want to skip the African thing, so continue on.*

MINTZES: The Senior Seminar, just in passing, was a real eye opener from the point of view of looking at the American economy from the vantage point of having foreign

experience and getting such remarkable exposure on it all. Among our lecturers were Kissinger, who was then at Harvard, and Brzezinski, who was at Columbia. In fact, Brzezinski, I went up to Columbia to discuss my East-West paper with him. He made useful suggestions. He was then head of the Columbia Eastern Soviet affairs program and so forth. That was a remarkable opportunity. But, in any case, the attendance at the Senior Seminar opened up the opportunity for a general assignment, and I was assigned economic counselor and director of the AID mission in Leopoldville which later became Kinshasa and the Republic of the Congo became Zaire. I think these occurred during the period I was there.

*Q: That period being '65 to—*

MINTZES: Well, actually I was appointed in '65, but didn't actually get there until January of '66, and left in the fall of '67. My main function then was to bring off the monetary reform in which the International Monetary Fund was involved, and AID was helping finance the underwriting. That took a lot of negotiation and bringing around the regime. We had direct contacts with eminent personalities of the time including the guy whose longevity in the job was most surprising to me, Mobutu. Also, the labor background that I had was very useful to me.

*Q: At the end of this, after you go through the series, I want you to comment in some detail if you wish, on the relevance of your labor work to your future work, both in terms of Kinshasa and anything else you might want to say. You stayed there just under two years.*

MINTZES: Just under two years. I think the only reason I didn't renew, it was considered a hardship post. Your normal tour was a year and a half before home leave. I forget how it worked out. I decided, and this was again a family decision, because the children, my older daughters, were about to go into high school, and it would mean separating. She'd have to go to Europe to go to high school. We didn't feel like doing that. The experience of others on the Foreign Service with that type of arrangement was not too healthy. I decided we'd take our chances and come back at that period. But, to get back to being in Kinshasa and the situation, Hank Cohen who is now assistant secretary for African affairs was a labor attaché and labor officer. I had very good contacts with Hank. Over the years we still kept in touch. I guess it's now quite some time since our last being in touch with each other but we had some interesting chats together regarding the labor and political situation.

*Q: He was not under you was he?*

MINTZES: Oh no. He was in the political section. But he was a young officer.

*Q: Incidentally, he has some very interesting comments he has made about the relevance of his labor work to his future. Excellent progress.*

MINTZES: Yeah. Well, he was an exceptional person as such. I think that Hank was quite talented and understanding. I think that the labor situation in Zaire represents the sort of thing that develops in a one-party structure where the labor institution's structure is completely subordinated. Later on after I retired, I did an evaluation of the AALC [African American Labor Center] programs in Africa under Irving Brown. I have a copy that I'll pass on to you. The program there was one of trying to move the economy away from an emergency crisis situation to a stabilized one. One of the basic things you have to do is to stabilize the monetary pattern. There was an enormous black market. There was an enormous loss of revenue through smuggling and income that way, and practically the destruction of the agricultural section as a result. The job was a very taxing one to say the least. There were so many variables you were dealing with, but I felt the progress we made was quite good and it was possible to have a successful monetary reform that lasted longer than most people expected. The big problem with those things is that unless you have the political will, it is bound to fail, and the head of state, as you know, was not likely to maintain that.

*Q: He had a political will, but it was more inner directed.*

MINTZES: Well, it was interesting. I had a memorable breakfast meeting with him and one of my colleagues. Mobutu was no dummy. He might just have a high school education, but by this time he had a great deal of political savvy in the street sense. I remember explaining to him the impact of monetary reform. One of the things you are going to do is to end licensing and you have a convertible currency. You no longer owe your cousins and your friends. We are not going to get these very ruminative licenses. This was going to be a political problem. Are you going to be prepared? We are going to ease the situation by bringing in a lot of things before it starts. That is, there is going to be a lot of food and raw materials and whatever is necessary. The first several months are going to be a relatively easy transition, although prices will skyrocket immediately because you are going to change the value of the currency to about a fifth of what the official exchange rate is now. He responded to it, and he said he was strong enough to take care of it. This wasn't a problem. The head of the National Bank, he however was educated at the University of Paris and had a good grasp of the situation. He later ran afoul of Mobutu and escaped safely to the United States. I haven't seen him, but I understand he spent some time up in the Boston area.

In any case, from the trade union side most of the orientation was Labor Ministry types of things. This was pretty much an ongoing program. The technical assistance, since this was a French-speaking country, it was hard to recruit Americans who spoke French, and the UN provided an enormous technical assistance program which we helped finance. Five million dollars of our program went to pay for UN-recruited experts, and many of them were in the labor field. Dave, the ILO director general, Dave Morris visited at least twice while I was down there. ILO had an important program going there. This was true of other UN agencies. The other aspect was what one might say the labor, economics, manpower aspects of what one was doing in foreign aid, which were an intrinsic part. The education aspects, we did a lot to support these, but again the direct involvement of

Americans was minimal because of the language factor. We had consultants come over. I think Paul Fisher came over in manpower, and the AELC had people coming in and out, but that was under a separate grant.

*Q: What about the Russian labor program? Did that have any effect on the American labor program? For instance, did they make a big push for bringing over people to Lumumba University, or were their relations such that they didn't do that?*

MINTZES: There were some, but I think that most of those didn't, the Soviets had broken relations with them. The Bulgarians represented Soviet interests. But, there were other places. I think the Egyptians were active. They were trying to offset the Israeli influence in Africa, so the Egyptians had a number of people. There were all types, labor and others, visiting Egypt and getting trips to Russia from Egypt. The Soviets financed that. I remember there was one economic advisor to the president who was thoroughly indoctrinated and was quite a hazard as I recall. That really was a channel.

Then the activities of the specialized agencies were the main sort of contacts with the outside world. There were a number of Haitians interestingly enough who spoke French of course who came in in the technical assistance sphere, and they were useful because they came from an economy that was similar. These were well educated; many of them educated in France, who did work under UN auspices in the specialized agencies. The situation in Zaire, there were endemic insurgencies during the period. One coincided with the monetary reform so we were able to. There was a curfew on and the airport was closed. They were afraid of insurgents coming in of one sort or another. It was really the mercenaries that Mobutu had hired that went on the equivalent of a strike because they weren't paid. They were pretty powerful militarily, so Mobutu was worried, and things were pretty rough in that sense. But, it happened to coincide with the monetary reform just when this thing went through, so that the labor minister—I had the USIA guy come to my house, and we did a Voice of America interview with the governor of the bank who was explaining the monetary reform, what's going to happen. This was after it went into effect. Now these prices are affected by the monetary reform, but you have to recognize there's insurgency going on. He was able to toss this off on the insurgents which had nothing at all to do with it.

I came back to Washington in the fall of '67.

*Q: Okay you came back in '67 without a definite assignment and had a number of irons in the fire.*

MINTZES: Yeah. I could have gone back to AID depending on what was available. I didn't pursue that. I wanted to stay on the State Department side since I had moved in that direction.

*Q: On the economic side really. In State on the economic side.*

MINTZES: Yes.

*Q: Not in Labor.*

MINTZES: Yes. I guess the expectations were that I would return to Zaire. I couldn't do so for family reasons so I had to make some adjustments. One position opened in INR, and I went for an interview. They were interested in my taking on the senior advisor position to the director.

*Q: With an emphasis on economics. The senior advisor with an emphasis on economics.*

MINTZES: Yes, economic advisor or something equivalent. A special assistant, I think, was the terminology they used. At the same time, I was called by Jim Grant who was head of the Vietnam bureau who strongly urged me to take a position as defined something like manpower czar in Vietnam when the policy was oriented toward getting the South Vietnamese to take on more of the military burden as well as to carry on the necessary economic burdens of the civil war that was going on. I expressed little interest in the subject and explained that type of function doesn't really represent my professional capabilities, and that I didn't think this was the answer in Vietnam in any case. I told him that I wasn't very sympathetic, and that I had an alternative assignment where INR is trying to have me jack up their economic activities, which I think is much more appropriate in view of my more recent experience. I said my manpower experience was more on economic policy, research, and policy oriented, and this sounded very operational. That wasn't in my talent and wasn't something I was sympathetic toward in any case, so there was no sense in having me go there, although Grant listened to me. He is now in the UN as head of the—

*Q: A very different type of assignment.*

MINTZES: Yeah, and I think underneath it all he was sympathetic to my response, but he had the thankless task of recruiting people for the jobs there.

*Q: They used the argument that it is better to have a guy like you there than somebody else.*

MINTZES: I understood the significance of that, but in any event, resisted the urges. The upshot was this chap in INR made me sound indispensable, and I got that assignment. There, of course, I served as economic advisor, but soon found out that one of my tasks was to jack up all of the regional offices as far as their economic capabilities were concerned. I found their talent was uneven and that the regional thing was not very useful since most of them were being put on second priority by their directors who were politically oriented. Particularly the Soviets, the Soviet economic affairs are so important. I took a paper I had written and said they should be looking at this and not showing what the CIA was showing about economic developments. In any case, it wasn't before long, I was urged to reconstitute an office of economic analysis for INR, which I did. This, I

guess, was around '68 or thereabouts. It was hard to recruit people. I wanted to recruit people from the outside, but I had to take on a number of Foreign Service officers who were on rotation. They were bright people, but they couldn't stand up to Treasury people or Commerce on trade or monetary affairs or with the CIA on other issues. It was a battle, although I think we made some headway. That office is still operating as an independent office over the years. I was there until December of '71 when I retired. They explained that I—

*Q: You didn't go to Germany for any brief period at all?*

MINTZES: I was in and out of Germany, but not on assignment. From Paris, Germany, England, and Italy were—

*Q: Oh no. I— Somehow or other I thought you were there with Leonard Weiss but—*

MINTZES: No. I didn't meet Leonard until, well, he was in INR at this time.

*Q: I see. That's where—*

MINTZES: He was brought in after I was there for some time, after I had established this office. He was not put into the office. He was made a special assistant. He covered what were called the functional areas of INR.

*Q: Then Irwin Tobin was there too at the time.*

MINTZES: I thought Irwin—was Irwin in INR or was he in EUR?

*Q: I thought he was in INR.*

MINTZES: Maybe he was. I had the feeling he was on NATO affairs in EUR and he was very busy with the NATO science committee.

*Q: Well, that was earlier. It was later that I thought he was— You retired in '71 then.*

MINTZES: Yes. My decision on retirement was not on casing the situation on the pros and cons of retirement. It was that I felt I had stayed long enough in INR, and unless I got another interesting assignment, I could do things on the outside that were more interesting.

*Q: Do you want to go briefly over the things you have done since you have retired, especially in the labor field?*

MINTZES: Yes. I have done a few things in the labor field since retiring. One of the earliest things I did which might be of some historical interest since we are now back in the ILO was to do a feasibility study on a major research project for the State

Department. I was a consultant to the State Department, and up until last year, still was all this period, although I rarely put in chits for the work I did because it would be subtracted from my pension and I would have to pay extra taxes on it anyway. After I reached the limit, I still continued my consulting, but didn't get paid for it.

*Q: You could have done it under contract.*

MINTZES: I did some under contract too, but this one I did under consulting. It was shortly after I had left, and I still had a margin I could do. The State Department in its appearances before congressional committees always claimed that the ILO provided labor standards in countries where it raised labor costs as a result of introducing these standards. This was repeated year after year and accepted with religious faith.

*Q: Without any reference to the facts.*

MINTZES: That's right. One year someone in the committee insisted on doing a study on this and seeing if this is really so. A sizable amount of money was set aside, maybe a few hundred thousand dollars. State Department before opening, wisely decided, and I as a consultant suggested that too. I said that I know the labor field, and I know ILO, and I know what the statistical problems would be in doing such a study. Before you do this thing, do a feasibility study which would cost you a fraction of what this major study would do, and tell you pretty much the same thing. I forget who was the labor advisor, in SIL it might have been—who I think felt that something could come out of it, but he recognized that since the INR ran this and not the SIL, he had to prove to them that it was worthwhile doing, and since I had the labor background, he agreed that I would do it too and expected the outcome to be somewhat different as it came about.

*Q: Was this Horowitz?*

MINTZES: No, it wasn't Horowitz; it was some other guy.

*Q: About what date was this?*

MINTZES: This is dated '73, so it was in '73. I forget who it was. It was after Horowitz. The guy was a seasoned chap. I think most of his service was in other places than in Europe though. In any event, I did the study, and I'll leave you with this copy.

*Q: Tell me with respect to each of these if they are copies that you want me to duplicate, or are they extra copies you are giving me.*

MINTZES: This is an extra copy. I think this would be useful for you.

*Q: What is the title of it?*

MINTZES: The title is *Research into the Effects of ILO Labor Standards on Labor Costs*,

which was right to the issue. I did a fair amount of work. Much more than I got paid for on this. I was fascinated by it. I had correspondence with ILO. I think I had occasion to go through Geneva that year and saw people in the ILO on my own. I think it may have been— It was something I felt was a real challenge from a research point of view and from my own interests. I looked at all the conventions and recommendations and drew up a list of those which were most likely to affect labor costs, and tried to get the best case scenario to see what happened. Japan looked like the best prospect, the first industrialized country where labor costs are relatively easily traced compared to other countries, and a few other countries that identified either recommendations or conventions. I have a table of it in here.

*Q: What were your general conclusions?*

MINTZES: The general conclusion was that other factors are so much more important, you can't detect it, and the evidence of enforcement is really lacking, even when you send in missions to look at it. My conclusion was that it didn't pay to spend any more money on this; you are going to come out with the same results. The State Department followed the recommendations.

*Q: That was my experience in India. The standards of the ILO were inapplicable. They were not applied.*

MINTZES: India was one of the countries in here.

*Q: Okay that is a good reference, and I'll put that in the pile of ones that I can keep.*

MINTZES: You can see that these less developed countries signed everything more or less.

*Q: That's the point. But, I will say one thing about it. When I raised this question from your point of view without any research, the Indians said it doesn't matter if they put it into effect. The idea that we in the staff can push the government to adopt it has some sort of an effect on it. We can always point out we'll be embarrassed in international circles if we do that.*

MINTZES: Yeah, it was useful.

*Q: Okay this I'm putting in the pile that I don't have to return. This is the pile that I have to Xerox.*

MINTZES: Yeah. This is something that I did when I came back from Paris. I gave a talk to the employment security people on the scientific manpower problems in Western Europe. That's an extra copy too. This I brought for some interest while I'm at it. This will remind me to get back to where we were. This was something the Labor Department put out. The only reason I bring it here is when I became president of our—this is the

commencement of our senior seminar, and that was the end of my remarks to Rusk on the year. But, the note underneath, it didn't mention that I was a Foreign Service officer.

*Q: Yes it says you are a senior Foreign Service officer who has served in various labor assignments.*

MINTZES: Yes, but they mention the Labor Department.

*Q: Yes, former Labor Department. I want to look at it. Let's go through the rest of this material.*

MINTZES: This is the article on Soviet Union prices, ratios, and wages which made—

*Q: This is not an extra copy.*

MINTZES: No. You can Xerox it. This is a follow up. After I was in Paris I did a follow up, sort of extracurricular— This is one I did on the French. Let me give you the handbook. This is the handbook on the French labor situation.

*Q: Now this is something you are willing to put into the file.*

MINTZES: I'm willing to. You can have that. I imagine one could resurrect out of the archives. I don't think—you know it is historical. It was really written over a period of time and had appendices added. I didn't mention that it was used by ECA mostly. These were things I did while I was in the Labor Department. This was done with Gene Flexner on the European labor force. I did articles in the encyclopedia for Ewen Clague. He always paid me for them. I got a check.

*Q: Well, with respect to all of them, I think I'll Xerox them, because you'll probably want them back.*

MINTZES: No, not actually. You look at them and see how important they are. See if you need them. This is a thing I did back in the first time in Paris looking at the labor, manpower aspects of the Schuman Plan.

*Q: And it was restricted and then declassified. This again is something you want back?*

MINTZES: No. This is my MA [Master of Arts] thesis. What I did—I had done a series of studies on the cost of living indexes in the various European countries, and I did an analysis for academic credentials. That is an extra copy. I have the printed copy here, so I don't need that. This is one of the things I did after I retired. It is an evaluation of the African-American—

*Q: That I am very interested in having. This again is something you want back?*

MINTZES: No, that's an extra copy. Some of the things I did since I left that concern labor—I did this for the Aspen Institute, indirectly for the State Department, *Domestic Implications of U.S. Technology Transfers to Developing Countries*. Now, this is something you'll be interested in from the work you did in the Labor Department on the same subject. This is an extra copy. This is a summary report of a conference organized by the triple A-S that I worked on. I was the rapporteur. Here again, I did most of the recruiting of the participants, but you'll see some of the people: Helen Kramer of the IAN. I'm trying to locate the labor guys. There are several, Mike Gahot whom we know, Mark Anderson who was a—

*Q: Who is still there.*

MINTZES: Jake Clamen, Elizabeth Yager, she was a pain. Edward Kasalow, yeah Edward was there, Stanley Wootenberg. We had a pretty good—

*Q: I want to get the—oh yes, Science and Technology for Development, Organized Labor's Concerns. With respect to this, an extra copy?*

MINTZES: Yes. This is something I did, I'm not sure, as an example of using some of my labor background at a pilot project.

*Q: I'm inclined to put all of these in the pile, and we'll see.*

MINTZES: This is something I did for Leo Kramer. It is *Implications of Energy Costs for Labor and Industrial Relations in Selected Manufacturing Industries*.

*Q: Okay, any other documents?*

MINTZES: Well, this is the East-West trade thing.

*Q: My inclination with respect to all of these things is if you are willing to give them up, put them in a pile.*

MINTZES: That's extra. Now this is something I did on—you see the work I was doing on science, mostly the international implications of science and technology.

*Q: Again all of these things I'd like to take at least temporarily if you are willing to give them up.*

MINTZES: This is something I ran for State Department, but it is through the National Academy of Sciences, *Foreign Competition and Science and Technology Implications on U.S. Policy*. I prepared one paper and was the rapporteur as well.

*Q: By the way, there is nothing that either of us has put into effect, I haven't mentioned it so far, that time our expenses were paid just to listen to a conference on the evaluation of*

*the Marshall Plan in Holland. Do you remember that?*

MINTZES: Oh yes.

*Q: Now both of us were there just to listen and comment.*

MINTZES: Did they ever do anything with that?

*Q: Not that I know of. At any rate, that was interesting.*

MINTZES: What you said about the British view of the Marshall Plan was exactly the same thing there. You had—

*Q: That the British were coming in there.*

MINTZES: They were revisionists. Right. This is a major study that I did for the National Science Foundation. I actually did two studies. I did one before this which more or less was a contract study for a cabinet committee that was looking at U.S. competitiveness. That was done on Japan, France, Germany, and the UK. Then they had somebody else do the manpower on Japan, and I did with the other fellow, do you know William Tasch? Tasch, mostly he worked on education problems, and we collaborated on this.

*Q: This is an NSF document, Comparison of Scientific and Technical Personnel Trends. Good. And what I'm going to do is put a little rubber band around these that I want to copy and return.*

MINTZES: Yeah. The others you are certainly welcome to for the archives.

*Q: Now Joe, I am a little limited, and I wonder if you could just make some sort of summary comments that you might have on the value or lack of it or limitations or advantages of people with labor backgrounds, labor education, or trade union or something like that, but backgrounds in the labor field for use in other areas. In fact, I think yours you have given a whole lot of examples where your basic interests from your high school days really, turned out to be—maybe I'm doing the talking about this getting my reactions which is that your initial high school interest in changes in society through the labor movement gave you a career in labor which then came to be of great use in terms of other work that you have done beyond the labor field or aside from the labor field.*

MINTZES: Yeah. I think that is really the nub of it in a sense. I think you are sensitized, if you can use that term, to issues and developments that almost come instinctively when you come from a labor background. I think more broadly, the social implications of economic policy and political policy in the broader term.

*End of interview*