The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training  
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project  

AMBASSADOR RICHARD M. MOOSE  

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy  
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INTERVIEW
[Note: While Ambassador Moose was able to review this transcript, he was unable to edit it in detail before his passing on September 25, 2015.]

Q: Today is March 20, 1997. This is an interview with Richard M. Moose. This is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. Dick, when and where you were born? Tell me something about your family.

MOOSE: I was born in Little Rock, Arkansas, on February 27, 1932. My family on both sides were natives of Arkansas for some generations. My father’s family had traveled around a little bit.

MOOSE: The Mooses and the Stevensons were on opposite sides in the fray. [Civil War?] I was raised in Arkansas. I grew up near Little Rock, went to school in Little Rock schools. Then I went to Columbia for a year and came back to Arkansas and completed my undergraduate education at Hendricks College in Conway, Arkansas.

Q: What was your father’s business?

MOOSE: He was born into the Army, as my grandfather was a chaplain in the Seventh Cavalry and he, too, was cavalry man as well. He was educated at Mississippi State College with a degree in veterinary medicine and agronomy. He went into the cavalry and stayed until midway between the two World Wars and then, as the Army was reduced in size, he was a reserve officer. So, eventually, he got out. I don’t know whether it was by his own choice or whether they just squeezed a lot of people out—in those years the Army became quite small. He then became a vocational agriculture teacher and a farmer, but in the height of the Depression, he lost the farm just after I was born. From there, he went into the Civilian Conservation Corps [CCC] as a supervisor, and then went into the Soil Conservation Service. He worked on various kinds of what we’d call environmental problems today. Those were years in which there was a lot of work done on erosion control and crop cover and stock pond building. He worked at that until he retired. Later he was a city treasurer in a tiny little town called Heber Springs, Arkansas, in north central Arkansas, where he lived until he died.

Q: What was elementary and high school like for you?

MOOSE: It was uneventful. I started grammar school in 1938 in Little Rock, Arkansas, at Mitchell School and Centennial School. My family then moved to Batesville, Arkansas, during WWII, but returned to Little Rock for my last year in junior high school. Then I went to Little Rock High School, which became famous years later as Little Rock Central High School. It was a very good school, amazingly good. This enabled me to get a scholarship to Columbia. At the same time, my wife, Maggie, who also grew up near Little Rock and graduated from Little Rock High School in the same class as me, went to Barnard.

Q: Were you getting anything about foreign affairs at Little Rock High School or before from friends and neighbors, and so on?
MOOSE: No. The first textbook that I remember in my life was my geography book in the fifth or sixth grade. It was orange. It had a kind of outline of the globe and the lines of longitude on it. I remember being very interested in that subject, probably the first subject in school I was ever interested in. I had a relative who was in the Foreign Service. He was my father’s first cousin. We knew vaguely of him, but I had no more idea about what he did than I do now about nuclear physics.

Q: *Was this the Moose who was a Middle East hand?*

MOOSE: Yes. His peers knew him as Jimmy (James S.) Moose, Jr. He was one of the Foreign Service’s first highly-trained Arabists. Quite a linguist, he served his entire career overseas, with the exception of one tour as an Inspector. This was before Wristonization.

Q: *Were any of your high school teachers encouraging people to get involved in international affairs?*

MOOSE: No, not really. My strong teachers in high school were those in math and history. I went to Columbia with the intention of becoming an architect or an engineer but I fell away from that. Colleges at that time were actively discouraging students from going into engineering and architecture. Schools like Columbia thought that they were doing you a favor to persuade you not to do that. Enough schools and universities worked hard at this so that, 10 years later, there was a great shortage of engineers in the United States, although I suspect not of architects. It was only when I went back to Hendrix to college that the dean there, William C. Buthman—who also taught English history—put the idea in my head of taking the Foreign Service exam. Another of his former students had gone into the Foreign Service after World War II, not by the examination route, but in the special programs through which the State Department took in veterans. Buthman encouraged me to take the examination for the Foreign Service. I really didn’t have much of an idea what I was doing. I had a little more idea then than I had earlier, but it was pretty vague. I took the exam after my junior year and, to everyone’s—including my own—astonishment, I passed the exam. But then when I graduated, I got a scholarship to Columbia and I decided to go to there to graduate school. Therefore, I deferred the business of going into the Foreign Service, didn’t pursue it further, and didn’t take the oral exam. I then completed graduate school at Columbia in international affairs with the probable intention of teaching. At least that’s what I told the people who gave me the scholarship. When I got out of graduate school, I had been deferred from the draft throughout my college days and during graduate school, so I owed the draft board … and so I went in the Army for two years.

Q: *You went into the Army when?*

MOOSE: In July of 1954. The Korean War was winding down. I had never been under a lot of pressure from the draft board. Our county in north Arkansas was so poor that anybody who got the opportunity to go into the Army would do so in a hurry. The draft board was run, as many country draft boards were, in the kind of patrician manner. They
rounded up young men who they knew wanted to enlist in the Army and they sent them into the draft instead. The effect of this was that nobody in our county who didn’t want to go into the Army ever had to really. Getting into the Army was the best job they could ever get. It was so poor up there it was beyond belief.

Q: You mentioned you took the Foreign Service written exam and you were thinking about being an engineer and architect. You must have been doing a lot of reading. I took the Foreign Service exam in ’53. I was in the Air Force. It was a three-and-a-half-day exam. You have to have a pretty broad range of knowledge, although maybe not very deep. What were your reading and study habits?

MOOSE: They were unimpressive. I took American and English history, mathematics and literature. Maybe one of the reasons why I did well enough in the general sense was because I also had that other side of my background—the mathematics and science, which was probably stronger in that than a lot of people who took the examination. For years, I was insufferably proud of the fact that I had passed “the old (three-day) written exam.”

Q: You went into the Army from ’54–’56. Where did you go in and where did you serve?

MOOSE: I went to Fort Jackson, South Carolina, and then to Ford Gordon, Georgia, where I took infantry basic. I was standing around the orderly room in the company headquarters one day and something came down from higher headquarters directing our sergeant to select two candidates for counterintelligence school. I volunteered and ended up at Fort Holabird, Maryland, in the southeast corner of Baltimore, a member of the Army Counterintelligence Corps. I tried very hard to get myself assigned overseas. I even tried to trade assignments with married colleagues who couldn’t take their families with them. But it was all to no avail, and I was assigned to Fort Sam Houston in San Antonio, Texas, from whence I was further assigned to Little Rock, Arkansas. When I got back to Little Rock, people thought I was AWOL. They couldn’t figure out what I was doing back home wearing civilian clothes.

Q: How many spies did you catch in Little Rock?

MOOSE: Not a one, of course, spies being in very short supply in Arkansas. I was soon re-assigned to Pine Bluff, Arkansas, near a Chemical Corps arsenal, at that time the center of biological warfare development for the Army. The workers who built and maintained it, the honest farmers and towns persons of Jefferson County Arkansas, referred to the place as “the Arsenic.” They knew something pretty spooky went on there, but they really didn’t know—or want to know—anymore. I ran background security investigations on employees. We never caught any spies, but were kept busy with allegations that this employee or that was a hog thief (in one notable case), or philander or an alcoholic—and serious charges like that.

The Army at that time took a few scientific people in the draft and assigned them to places like this, although there weren’t many places that were similar. Those groups,
because they were filled with intellectual types, were hotbeds of irreverence, which in the atmosphere of 1955 and 1956 was cause to question their loyalty. From them I learned more than I should have about the goings on at the Arsenic. Curiously, the experience with the biological warfare plan led, in later years, to my success in persuading Senator Fulbright to resurrect the Geneva Protocol on Gas Warfare of 1929. Those hearings led, in turn, to the biological warfare convention, but that’s another story.

Q: We’re talking about the high McCarthy period.

MOOSE: Yes. If you wanted to discuss Das Kapital, you became the subject of a complaint investigation. I had a couple of those.

Q: About this time, I was in the Air Force. We were getting lectures that the United States has the highest standard of living. I said, “Well, I thought Sweden did.” I practically ended up in the brig. You weren’t supposed to say that.

MOOSE: That was a highly-intolerant atmosphere. I spent a year and a half carousing around with law enforcement officers in southern Arkansas. It was one of the most amusing times of my life. There was another investigator about my age and no more serious. We provided the external security support for the Arsenal, if you can imagine. It was a hoot. I learned my own state much better than I would have ever known it otherwise.

Q: I’m sure you did. I take it this was not a time when you were getting much of your thought process fixated on foreign policy.

MOOSE: No, I wasn’t. I wasn’t married and I few obligations of any sort. We just ran up and down the road from Pine Bluff to Lake Village across eastern and southern Arkansas. I became interested in the history of that part of the Arkansas. For example, Arkansas was the site of one of the relocation centers—a nice name for it—for Japanese-Americans during World War II. On the flimsiest of pretext, I located and interviewed people in the community where the camp had been located in order to learn their recollections; this was purely out of my own curiosity. Another interest I developed was in the experimental farms created by the U.S. Department of Agriculture in the 1930s. These were created at the initiative of Henry (A.) Wallace, Franklin Roosevelt’s first the Secretary of Agriculture (and 33rd Vice President of the United States).

The experiment in Arkansas was located at a place (it is hardly a town any more, if it ever was one) called Swan Lake. One might describe Swan Lake as an attempt at a cooperative or utopian community. They took really poor farmers and put them in houses of a kind they had never lived in before, complete with electric lights and indoor plumbing, and fully equipped the farms. The idea was to elevate farming practices and to address the welfare of the rural poor in the South. I had never heard of anything like this and became interested in tracking down people who had been in it. Again, I used the pretext of conducting someone’s background security investigation. I did learn a lot about Swan Lake. I’ve often wished that I had written something on this at the time because
I’ve never seen a story about these places. But clearly, the McCarthy era was no time for spy catchers to be writing about neo-socialistic experiments. I now understand there were five or six such farms around the South. They are fascinating experiments in pure cooperatives—all funded by the federal government. I ran down the man who had been the last manager of the farm. I said, “In retrospect, what do you think of this?” As he described the experience: “Considering how poor we all were at the time, it was a pretty good idea. The problem was, the first two years we had good cotton crops and made money. We didn’t save anything or start repaying the government as we were supposed to do. Instead, we distributed all the money we made off the cotton. Everybody spent it. We did that for two years. Then we had a bad year. There was nothing put by (saved), so that everything was a mess. It might have been a good system, but if you ever were to do that again, you’d want to put somebody in charge that would run the whole thing with an iron hand.” The fellow didn’t understand the irony of his views. If you’d scratched this fellow and asked him what he thought of the Soviet system, he would have begun denouncing it. It was wonderfully amusing. He was a total innocent, like so many of the good people I grew up around.

Q: After this sojourn in middle America, in ’56, you got out. Then what?

MOOSE: I began to worry about that in the spring of ’56, since I had no idea what I was going to do after the Army. I applied to a number of law schools, including Dartmouth—which doesn’t have a law school. Out of the blue, I got a letter from the State Department saying, “We noticed you passed the Foreign Service examination a long time ago and we never heard from you again. Are you still interested in going into the Foreign Service?” In fact, the Department hadn’t contacted anybody in that period because for several years they didn’t take in any new classes.

Q: I was in the first class that was taken in and started in July of ’55. I don’t know how long the hiatus had been.

MOOSE: At least a couple of years …

Q: Yes. And those that came in were sort of like infantry replacements. They were brought in. There wasn’t a class. They were just sort of sent out to the field.

MOOSE: So, you came in in July 1955. I came in in July a year later, in ’56. I’ve always thought that I was in one of the first classes that came in.

Q: Did you have a class number? We were Class One.

MOOSE: I don’t remember what our class number was. They didn’t take in classes every month, perhaps every two or three months.

Q: We got out in October of ’55 and there was not another class.

MOOSE: So, maybe there was one or two more before mine. Somehow, four or five
sticks in my mind. We were over in the old building on C Street before it was torn down.

Q: You passed the written. What about the oral?

MOOSE: I took that while I was still in the Army. It was administered down in Dallas, Texas. I am a stutterer and I was in a particularly bad phase of stuttering in those years. I was paralyzed by the idea of going before the examiners. By then, I had learned a little bit about the Foreign Service. In fact, I had met a man in Arkansas, Walter Trulock, who had come into the Foreign Service right after the WWII. He worked for Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell (‘Beetle’) Smith. Trulock had left the department as the McCarthy era became more and more oppressive He just hated the whole thing and left. We became quite close and he told me a lot about the Foreign Service. As it turned out, I learned later that Trulock was quite well remembered and highly regarded by many people in the Department. He went to the Geneva Conference of ’54 on Indochina with Smith. He worked with Ambassador Chris Van Hollen, Jeff Kitchen and some other people of fairly recent memory in the Foreign Service.

From Trulock’s stories I sensed that some awesome experiences awaited me in this oral examination. This did nothing for my stuttering but, fortunately, I had started working with a speech therapist. We talked a lot about this challenge that I had ahead of me in taking the oral examination. We worked out a strategy. As it turned out, I was the last person whom the Examiners interviewed over a two-day stretch. While I was in the waiting room, I got to talking to the secretary who was traveling with the examiners. She cheered me up with the news that the examiners had flunked 10 out of the previous 11 candidates. This information completed the process of petrifying me.

But when I went in, I followed the strategy that my speech therapist and I had developed. They recited a few particulars about me, and then asked “Is there anything else we should know before we start your examination?” “Yes, I said, there is. I am a stutterer. A little bit of pressure on me can sometimes bring this on and I feel, frankly, quite a lot of pressure right now.” They looked a bit surprised but laughed sympathetically. We started the interview. I didn’t stutter once. I didn’t really know it was going to work, but it did. I didn’t stutter at all. We came to one point where they said, “What was in terms of dollar value the leading import into the United States last year?” I knew that the answer to the question was “coffee.” But the minute I thought of the answer, I knew I couldn’t say it. It’s the block kind of thing that I had. It’s totally irrational. It had no pattern to it at all. I looked the lead examiner in the eye and I said, “Sir, I know the answer to that question, but I am not going to be able to say the word.” They looked at each other like I was something nuts. While they were looking at each other, I said, “Coffee” and they all broke out laughing. And that broke up the interview. They never regained their composure after that, nor did I. I went out of the room and I thought I had really probably blown it. It was in the Adolphus Hotel. I went downstairs to the bar. I had stopped by my room and picked up my cowboy hat. I hung out with rodeo cowboys a lot in those days (my girlfriend’s father had a trick horse act and performed at rodeos across the Southwest). I went down to the bar and ordered a whisky. The waitress looked at me and said, “Cowboy, I don’t know where you come from, but we don’t sell liquor by the drink
here in Texas.” So I had my first Heineken. I went back upstairs and they called me in and told me that I had passed. Then they said, “What is this stuff about stuttering?” So I told them about my strategy and how it helped to take the pressure off of me. That is how I passed the oral exam.

Q: You came in when in ’56?

MOOSE: In July of ’56. I started at the old FSI on C Street. I remember the first time Burt Franklin was the dean. Harold Boies Hoskins was the director.

Q: A very florid man.

MOOSE: Indeed. He was part of the Cannon Mills family. The first time I saw Burt Franklin, he was standing on his head on his desk. He had stayed too long in India out in the sun. It is very difficult to carry on an interview with somebody standing on their head.

Q: Could you describe your class?

MOOSE: I was the next youngest. The youngest was a woman who became part of the first-class action suit against the State Department because her career didn’t go as well as she would have liked. The majority of the members of the class had been in the armed services. The class was almost entirely men. There were only three women in the class of 20-some odd. You think about it afterwards and the women, the wives of the Foreign Service officers, were every bit as qualified as they were. It was an interesting class. I was a little intimidated by it. I was probably the least sophisticated member of the class, or at least I felt I was.

Q: I know I felt Throughout my Foreign Service career, I’ve felt somebody was going to uncover me sometime and say, “What are you doing here” when rationally

MOOSE: Where did you grow up?

Q: The thing was; I went through a fancy school system as a scholarship student. I went to Kent Prep School, Williams College. But then I had spent four years as an enlisted man. That brings you down. I felt like an enlisted man. I didn’t feel like any elite.

MOOSE: That doesn’t hurt.

Q: I agree with you.

What was your impression of the State Department types that you were meeting really for the first time?

MOOSE: I don’t recall we had very much contact with them, but to the extent that we did, I found them impressive. Upon the graduation of our class, in that session where they read out the assignments about where you’re going to go, I was assigned to the Battle
Monuments Commission in France. I was indignant. I was outraged. If I had had any sense, I’d have kept my mouth shut, gone off to France and had a marvelous time for two to three years. But I didn’t. I felt that the assignment was an insult. I was humiliated. I stood up and objected to it and said I wasn’t going to go. I immediately became a problem. So, they broke the assignment and assigned me to the staff of the Foreign Service Institute, which I thought was almost as bad. As it turned out, it was probably one of the most fortunate things that could have happened to me.

I was assigned as program assistant to Bob (Robert) Rossow. He was creating the mid-career class on foreign affairs. This was the first advanced-level training course that State Department offered. Rossow was a rare individual, a bit of a philosopher. He, too, had spent a long time in South Asia. Rossow put together this incredible program. One of the factors behind it was the Wriston Report, which had led to the consolidation of the old “Departmental Service” and the Foreign Service. The move was very controversial. The old-line Foreign Service officers (like Jimmy Moose) felt that the Foreign Service was being* mongrelized.” They believed it was the end of the world, that they were going to bring all these people in there who clearly were not qualified, not up to it. In truth, many of the departmental people really didn’t want to join the Foreign Service and many of them had not the inclination or, frankly, the aptitude to do it but were compelled to do it anyway.

A number of unfortunate things that happened as a result of Wristonization, many of which I would come to grapple with later in my career. But as they were trying to meld these two groups together, somebody had the wit to use training as part of it. Bob Rossow’s course was specifically designed for mid-career Foreign Service officers who had spent their entire careers outside the United States and had really lost contact with the American public. The idea was to get them back into the United States to see what was going on. Bob put together an extraordinary program, extraordinary for the times. We had lecturers like Albert North Whitehead, arguably one of the greatest philosophers that America has ever produced; Norbert Weiner, a pioneer in cybernetics who early on did the things that led to computers; Joseph Campbell, author of The Hero with a Thousand Faces; just an amazing collection of people with all these old men (my age now) trying to figure it out. Rossow used to take the classes a lot to the old Army remount station at Front Royal, Virginia (My father had been there once).

We spent a good deal of time out there living in a dormitory-type environment. I hung out with these “old guys. I was the errand runner, like to the bootlegger I was the bartender every night. I’d stand there behind the bar and from all these old guys I learned things which I hadn’t learned in Arkansas, that whiskey is really scotch and that bourbon is bourbon and that if you open a new bottle of gin for some old guy who’s spent half of his life out in India, you always shake the bottle hard before you open it in order to shake up the fusil oil which otherwise would poison the drinker—or so they told me. In the process, I also learned a lot about how a young person should conduct himself around these characters. It was good for me. I needed that. I got to drive the speakers to and from National Airport out to Front Royal. So, I’d have three hours to talk with people like Weiner and Campbell.
Q: World-class figures.

MOOSE: It was wonderful. So, we had some very good experiences with that. Finally, I was very restive to go overseas, to get about being a Foreign Service officer. I had been in for almost three years by that time and I had barely seen a foreigner. So, I was pestering John Thomas, who was the administrative officer of the Foreign Service Institute, to try to get me an overseas assignment. John one day came in and said he had an assignment for me. It was in Mexico City. Well, that wasn’t exactly what I had hoped for, but I was going to take any place at that point.

So, how that came about was, the Foreign Service Institute had opened a Spanish-language training school in Mexico City. The Embassy had been providing administrative support for the institute. This is interesting in light of my experiences later on with administrative support. As a consequence of what the Embassy had done for the Spanish language school, FSI owed the Embassy $38,000 that John said he didn’t have in his budget, but he was going to send me down there in lieu of the $38,000 and he’d go on paying my salary, but I’d be assigned to Embassy Mexico. I would look after the Foreign Service Institute there as a sort of payment in kind. A few months after I got down there, something terrible happened to the General Services officer [GSO] in Mexico, so I became acting GSO, which I remained for over a year. In that capacity, I supervised more people than I ever did again until I was an Assistant Secretary of State. It was one of the best things that ever happened for me.

Q: You went down there when?

MOOSE: I went down in the fall of ’57. I had been at FSI a little more than a year.

Q: How long were you in Mexico City?

MOOSE: I left in December of ’59.

Q: Who was the ambassador when you were there?

MOOSE: “Roberto C. Healay,” Robert Charles (Bob) Hill. He was out of New Hampshire and was a protégé of a powerful Republican senator from New Hampshire named Styles Bridges. Robert Hill’s wife, Cecelia Bowdoin Hill, was from a well-to-do old-line New England family. Hill always told everybody that he had entered the Foreign Service at the very bottom as an unclassified vice consul in India during World War II, which was true.

Those were the years when Castro was stirring about in Cuba. John Foster Dulles was Secretary of State. Roy R. Rubottom, Jr. was Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America. There was also in Central America a couple of rather political appointees of very conservative persuasion like Hill. One of them was Whiting Willauer, who served as ambassador to Costa Rica (1958-1961) and earlier in Honduras (1954-1958). Willauer
had been one who organized the Civil Air Transport in China with General Claire L. Chennault years earlier. These two would get together with some others down there and would express great alarm and dismay over the gathering Red Menace in the region and campaigned against Rubottom and Mel Osborne, who was the country director for Cuba.

I got to know Hill well because of an event. There were eight junior Foreign Service officers assigned to Mexico at the time I went down there. They all were very talented people and they all were deadly bored by their jobs. They were in things like the one who was assistant dispersing officer. Most of the rest of them were in the visa mill, one place or another. Two of them resigned in succession. The DCM was very concerned about this. He called me in one day because he was not too far from leaving the country. It was the end of his tour. Joseph Gray was his name. He was from Tennessee and had served with (Secretary of State) Cordell Hull. Gray called me in because he wanted to sell his Oldsmobile and I was supposed to get him an exemption from paying tax on it because I was the acting General Services officer. He called me in and we finished doing the business about his Oldsmobile and he asked me why my colleagues were resigning. I said: “Well, a most of them were very unhappy. They don’t feel that their careers are being developed. They just don’t approve of much about how they are managed.” He said, “Well, what kinds of things?” I knew then this was a conversation that I shouldn’t have gotten into. I dodged around and he asked me to write a paper, which like a fool, I said I would do. I guess at the time I said it to get out of his office. But then I didn’t really think about what it was going to be like to write the paper. So, I ignored it and he kept reminding me of it. Finally, one day, I got on an elevator. When we stopped and the door opened—it was him and I was trapped in an elevator with him. He told me that he wanted the paper by the end of the week; that Washington was after him because they wanted to know what was going on in the Embassy. So, I started writing the paper. I got my colleagues together, the others assigned to Mexico. We put down a whole lot of stuff and then they all decided that I’d get in trouble if I submitted it, so I again tried to duck Gray. I couldn’t and I finally had to give him the paper. I signed it and said: “But, please, let me talk to you again before you do anything. I don’t think you’re going to like the paper. For God’s sakes, don’t show it to the Ambassador.” He promised me solemnly that he would do ask me asked. The next day, I got a call from my boss, the administrative counselor, who was also a political appointee but who was my friend. He said, “What have you done?” I didn’t know what he was talking about. He said, “The Ambassador is in a great rage and he’s told me to get you to come up to his office immediately.” So, I went up. Hill was there. He had my paper in his hand. Here was Joe Gray sitting off to the side. It was apparent to me very soon that Gray had not told Hill that he had asked me to write the paper and that Hill thought it was an unsolicited piece of impatience about how poorly the Embassy was run. What we asked for was very simple. We wanted a junior-officer rotational program. There was not one at the time. We had said: “We’ll all get together and we could swap around jobs. We’d all like to do this. We’ve discussed it. We all think we can.” Hill said: “Who’s running this place, you or me?” He goes on. He rants and raves as only he could. Finally, he made some remark about, “Well, you knew that there was a member of my family who is in the Foreign Service who is very important. I thought I could get away with anything.” I said, “Mr. Ambassador, I don’t have to take remarks like that, thank you, Sir.” I turned around and walked out of the office. Hill was
very angry. He told the administrative counselor he wanted me out of the country in 24 hours. The administrative counselor (and his wife, with a bottle of champagne) came over to my home that night to tell me, but he couldn’t work up the nerve to do it. Instead, we all got drunk. The next morning, the Ambassador called the administrative counselor and said, “Have you told Moose?” and my man said, “No, I couldn’t work up the nerve to tell him.”

Hill said, “Good. I’m going to give him another chance.” I thought my career was ruined any way. Years later, Hill told me what caused him to reverse his decision. He had taken my letter home and showed it to his wife. She told him that I was right and he was wrong! About a month later, Hill threw his staff aide out of the country for some imagined dereliction of duty and put me in his job, which I figured was out of the frying pan and into the fire.

As it turned out, we got along okay. I was staff aide for almost a year. These were the months when Castro had come to power. There was a steady flow of well-heeled refugees out of Havana and many of them seemed to beat a path to Mexico City. They would come to the Embassy to tell their story to Hill, who was only too happy to hear them. Often they brought “tribute” in the form of good Cuban cigars. When our son was born, Hill gave me a chest of 100 H. Upmann Panatellas to distribute in celebration of the event. When the word got around, a surprising number of men dropped by my office to congratulate me on the blessed event.

**Q: How did Hill run the Embassy?**

MOOSE: He had no idea what went on in the Embassy. He meant well. He was well intentioned. He never learned to speak any Spanish. The DCM ran the Embassy, which normal, of course. Hill’s political counselor was a good, conventional political officer, but the real power in the Embassy was the CIA station chief, Winston (M.) Scott, who had an enormous staff and a huge budget. He had been in Mexico for a number of years. He had the whole thing wired, literally and figuratively. He and the Ambassador were very close. The station chief was well tuned to political attitudes—both Mexican and American. His main target was the Soviet-bloc diplomats. Not much of consequence went on in U.S. - Mexican relations during those years. Our relations were good, but reasonably uneventful. President Eisenhower visited President Lopez Mateos down at Acapulco and we had the first naval ship visit, the first in many years. We had 12 consulates in Mexico then.

**Q: Was there any talk about consolidation?**

MOOSE: No, but most of them are now closed. I used to take the non-professional courier run around the country. So I saw all of them. Hill traveled a lot around Mexico and Central America. He liked the Mexicans and the Mexicans liked him. I often accompanied him. Our naval attaché had an airplane, so that helped. Maggie got to go with us sometimes.
Q: When did you get married?

MOOSE: I went down there in the fall of ’57 and came back in December of that year and was married. My wife and I then drove back down to Mexico. We had one child, Jeffrey, born in Mexico City right before we left.

Q: Did you have much contact with Mexicans while you were there or were you pretty much involved with the Embassy?

MOOSE: My first year I was the acting GSO, I had contact with practically nobody but Mexicans because I ran the huge FSN labor force. I learned all my Spanish over in the warehouse and the motor pool, not the best place for grammar and diplomatic vocabulary. But then as the Ambassador’s staff aide, I would see his visitors and Mexican officials when we traveled around the country. So, I saw a fair amount of Mexicans. Maggie, my spouse, worked in the visa section as a part-time employee.

We lived the first six months in a compound with a Mexican family. There was a mother who built houses for her children but none of them wanted to go live in the same compound with their mother, so she had to rent the houses. The compound was high on the Toluca road, outside Mexico City. So, we were very close to that Mexican family. Then after I got busier and busier, we decided we’d better move into town, and lived on Shakespeare Street. We lived in a purely Mexican neighborhood. Our friends mostly were Mexican. So, we were immersed in the community.

Q: Were you getting any feel for the official or non-official attitude towards what was happening in Cuba and Castro?

MOOSE: Castro enjoyed much sympathy in certain quarters in Mexico, especially among labor, which was trying to organize itself, especially in the oil fields. During my tour First Deputy Premier Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, an Old Bolshevik and a Soviet statesman in the period running from Lenin to Brezhnev came on a visit. He was then the Number Two or Three in the Soviet Union. He tried very blatantly to agitate the Mexican oil workers and in the process offended Mexican pride, which is not hard to do. Of course, the government was scared to death of anything like that since it was quite a reactionary, repressive kind of government—not repressive by current standards, but certainly not very democratic.

There was still the old resentment of the United States. The President of Mexico, Adolfo Lopez Mateos, went to the United States while I was there. This was considered a brave thing for a Mexican president to do. I remember a cartoon in one of the Mexico City papers picturing Mateos selling the Mexican flag to the hated gringos.

The Embassy in Mexico City then was on the Paseo de la Reforma, over Sanborne’s department store, about half a mile from where it is now. On the corner outside of Sanborne’s were a number of newsstands and shoeshine persons. Every morning, on my way to work, I would stop, buy a couple of newspapers, and have my shoes shined in
order to listen to the Mexicans who were also having their shoes shined, reading the papers and exchanging the morning’s political gossip. I was very well informed about the views of the man in the street—but Embassy political officers had little use for that variety of intelligence, especially as relayed by the acting GSO!

My shoeshine companions were people of reasonable means. They had jobs downtown. They were not well off, but they had jobs and felt they were on the way up. They were very different from my cadre of local employees from whom I got a very different take on what life was like in Mexico. When I left Mexico and for many years thereafter—and I still haven’t given up on the idea—I thought that the disparity between rich and poor in Mexico would get worse and worse, as indeed it has continued to do. I used to say that Mexico, having been the first country in Latin America to have a genuine revolution, would also be the first one to have a second revolution. That’s what I thought of the place when I left. So far it has not happened, and perhaps it will not. Maybe immigration to the U.S. has been the safety valve. It kept the lid on it.

Q: This being your first assignment and you being a GSO in a large Embassy, did you gain any impressions about the care and feeding of the American official community?

MOOSE: Yes. You don’t see the best side of your colleagues when you’re the GSO. Since I ended up my career as the GSO of the entire Department, it didn’t change very much. I had a wonderful time in Mexico. I loved the local employees. They worked hard and most of them were very good. When I left, they barbecued a goat in the yard of the Embassy motor pool and filled me full of pulque—fermented cactus juice—so that I was at least half drunk when I went over to Ambassador Hill’s office to get my certificate.

Q: In 1959, you left Mexico.

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Today is April 14, 1997. Dick, in 1959, you are off to where?

MOOSE: We were off to Yaoundé, Cameroon. My wife and I elected to have our son born in Mexico before we left, so Jeffrey Menifée Moose was born in the Las Americas Sanitorium. Two weeks later, Maggie got on the airplane to fly and take her home leave in Little Rock, Arkansas, and I drove the car out and joined her.

Q: The forced integration in Little Rock Central High was the focus of everything in the United States in ’57/’58. What were you getting from your colleagues when you came back?

MOOSE: It was very interesting. Margaret had gone home to Little Rock during the school controversy to work with the people who were endeavoring to keep the schools open. She carried petitions door to door in behalf of that effort, on behalf of the school board that had voluntarily offered to integrate and was blocked from doing so by Governor (Orval) Faubus. But as we traveled on that home leave, especially as we went
through Europe and so forth, and for years thereafter, when people would read our passports, they’d see “Little Rock, Arkansas,” and that would occasion some comment. In the Department, most people who were not from the South or not from Arkansas in particular didn’t understand the real complexity of the history, which was that citizens of Little Rock of their own free will had had over a period of years elected the school board, knowing that they were a school board that had the intention of integrating its schools. But the complexion of the entire event was changed by the intervention of Faubus to block the black children from arriving in the school and the subsequent mobilization of the Guard and the dispatch by President Eisenhower of the 101st Airborne Division to Little Rock, which the latter action wiped the ground out from under the moderates in town—those who were still trying to make peace and keep the schools open. So, we the citizens of Little Rock felt we had been much put upon, first by our own governor, and next by the President and the 101st Airborne, although we understood that President Eisenhower at that point probably had very little choice. We felt he had had choice earlier and had he moved earlier and made clear his intention. By the time the President came to the point where the 101st Airborne appeared to be the only remedy, then the federal courts had acted and there was the compulsion of a court order. So, I spent a lot of time trying to explain this to people who I thought for the most part really didn’t want to listen to it, but had a preconceived notion that everybody south of the Mason-Dixon Line was a racist pig. So, that got a little tedious sometimes and I may not have always been in the best humor about that. That experience was very painful for people who had tried to stay in the middle. What we were standing up for at that point—which was a gradual one year by one year integration of the school system—was something that we had done voluntarily, and Little Rock was the first school to attempt to do that.

Q: You were in Yaoundé from 1959 to when?

MOOSE: I didn’t arrive until about January of 1960. I took home leave in Little Rock and then went to Washington for consultation. One of Maggie’s parents was ill and our son was not quite ready to travel yet. She followed me a little later. She probably didn’t come out until April or so. Then I stayed until May of 1962. She had been hospitalized in Germany sometime before that. She didn’t leave at the same time I did.

Q: What was your impression of the Africa Bureau? This was before the Kennedy Administration came in, and (Michigan Governor G. Mennen) “Soapy” Williams. Africa was on the cusp of all things happening. As a junior officer, you wanted to get in where the action was, but what were you getting from the Bureau?

MOOSE: I went to see Joe (Joseph C.) Satterthwaite (the first Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, appointed in 1958) when I came back. I had—by dint of the episode which I recounted earlier in Mexico City, where I was the spokesman for a group of dissatisfied junior officers who wanted to have what amounted to a rotation program—become a little notorious by the time I got back to Washington. I naively had not expected that. But I had a series of interviews with people. I wanted to talk about going to Africa and they wanted to talk about what happened in Mexico City. I spent more time talking about Mexico than I did about Africa, although I tried to get things
together. As I look back on it, I think the people were somewhere between being overwhelmed and not really understanding what they were leaping off into. They certainly did not prepare me, at least psychologically, for the adventure of going in and trying to open an Embassy and the logistical problems, financial supply problems, and everything that would go along with it. They were depending very much on—

[gap in interview] I wonder if they even had a map of Africa. They were supporting Yaoundé out of Leopoldville [Kinshasa], the Belgian Congo. So, they had worked out an arrangement that Leopoldville would support Yaoundé. Well, the only way to get there was, you had to go across the river to Brazzaville on the ferry and then get on an airplane that stopped four times before you got to Yaoundé. So, there was a lot of talk about the new posts that were going to be opened. We were sort of viewed as pioneers. I think we viewed ourselves that way. Walt Cutler had just come back from Yaoundé. He had been replaced by Allen Holmes. Walt actually opened the post as a consulate general before Cameroon got its independence in January of '60. Allen had replaced Walt. There was not a Chargé yet out there. There had been one. I think his name was Moore. But he was gone. Then he was going to be replaced eventually by Leo Cyr, but Allen and I had it largely to ourselves while Allen was a consular officer.

Q: Had the famous trip taken place where Loy Henderson went around in a DC-4 with a bunch of people from the State Department to look at all these new countries and try to figure out what was going to be done with them?

MOOSE: Yes, that had already taken place earlier. I recall Allen describing that to me; in fact, his father had gone there. His father was Julius Holmes. That had already taken place, so we didn’t have that joy. But I was there when “Soapie” Williams came on one of his famous trips. That was one of the more memorable moments of that tour.

Q: We’ll pick that up in a minute. Had the Cameroons been under French rule?

MOOSE: The clue to the answer lies in the fact that you were astute enough to call it “the Cameroons.” It was plural because there were several of them. There were three discontiguous pieces called the Cameroon. Cameroon before World War I had been one territory under the control of the Germans. After World War I, it became a mandated territory under the League. Two pieces of it over against the Nigerian border had been given—one of them to France to go along with the main body of Cameroon, and the other one, a small piece closer down to the coast, was the so-called British Cameroon. Those two pieces had been converted to trusteeship territories after World War II and the advent of the United Nations. But those two pieces were still being administered by the colonial powers under the trusteeship by the time we got out there. There was a plebiscite held while we were there to determine the wish of the peoples of those territories as to where they were going to go. The French hoped that it would all come to them. The result was surprising and not at all what anyone expected. It was sort of illogical. The northern part, which was ethnically tied much closer to northern Cameroon (there were Fulani people up there), voted inexplicably to go with Nigeria. There were Fulanis that were there as well, but the Administration had been conducted in French and all of that, so there was
some confusion about that. The southern Cameroon—which had been administered by
the British and was full of English-speaking people—opted to go with the body of
Cameroon, which was a French-speaking country, probably in order not to be swallowed
up by the Nigerians. They didn’t think they would be well treated there. There was some
ethnic business, too. They were closer to those ethnic groups that were in Cameroon than
they were to the ones that were across the border in Nigeria, so they opted to come there.

The Cameroonian were very upset about the results of the plebiscite. They initiated an
appeal and a protest in the United Nations and sent their foreign minister over. But they
were really humiliated by the eventual vote that took place in the UN. They were just
clobbered. The government organized some protest marches; tried to blame other
countries for having rigged this. They created a crowd which came over to our Embassy,
which was up on the hill where most of the government buildings were. The crowd
marched over there at lunch one day. I was slow leaving for lunch and was caught; I was
the only American left in the Embassy. The crowd of 20-30 with some government
manufactured signs came out in front of the Embassy. Allen and I consulted on the phone
about what to do. Allen said, “Well, you ought to go out and see what they want.” So, I
did, but not before my senior FSN had gone out and asked them please not to stand in the
flowerbed. So, I went out. They said that we were responsible for this terrible thing
having happened, that is to say the northern Cameroon having voted to go with Nigeria. I
told them that I had heard their protests, that we had nothing to do with it, and “Thank
you very, very much,” and went back inside. They marched on down to the main part of
downtown, where they collected a much larger crowd over to see the British Embassy,
where they tore down the flag and threw rocks at the building. The ambassador ran out
under a hail of stones and ran the flag back up and became the hero of the diplomatic
community. The mob then marched on up to the American Ambassador’s house, but they
didn’t see it because it wasn’t really completed. I don’t think we had an Ambassador
there yet. Right near where our residence was, was the residence of the Liberian
ambassador. The Liberian flag has some resemblance to the American flag. They
surrounded the flagpole there and were going to tear it down, but the wife of the Liberian
ambassador affixed herself to the bottom of the flagpole and told them that they must go
away in no uncertain terms, whereupon they went out to the Nigerian’s house. It was a
long way out there and it was hot. By the time they got out there, they had lost all of their
enthusiasm and the whole thing petered out. That was really the end of Cameroon’s
protest about the UN plebiscite on the Cameroons.

Q: When you arrived there in early 1960, what as the situation as you saw it? What were
American interests there?

MOOSE: The American interests there, such as it was, was a part of this whole
enthusiasm for encouraging and supporting African independence. It was not much more
formed than that. There was a low-grade insurgency in the country, which had its base in
a disaffected ethnic group, the Bamileke, down in the south near the British Cameroon.
That group was supported, we were told, by the East Germans, the Poles, and various
others. So, in some small sense, we thought we were perhaps a part of the Cold War
there. The main import of that outside supported insurgency was really its effect on our
security. There were a series of serious terrorist incidents both in Douala and in Yaoundé. There were random shootings, bombs, and a hand grenade thrown in a movie theater. No European or American I ever knew ever went near one of those theaters. But a lot of people were killed. There was a curfew at night which most of us welcomed because it meant that you got to go home at a reasonable hour from deadly diplomatic receptions. There was no business. There was no trade. Nigeria was just becoming independent. Up country, nobody knew what in the world—[gap in interview] There was nothing going on in Chad and the part of the Central African Republic that abuts Cameroon in the west was among the least developed and most sparsely populated and heavily forested part of that. So, there was really not anything much happening in Cameroon or nearby except this insurgency. The only American businessman in Cameroon or ever known to be there was a fellow who collected wild animals. His business practices were not the best. He was an occasional embarrassment to us.

Q: What was your job when you arrived there?

MOOSE: When I was in Washington, the expectation was that I was going to be the consular and administrative officer. It quickly became apparent though that there was more work to do out there on the administrative side than they realized. (H.) Allen Holmes kept that portfolio and I was the full-time administrative officer. It had been decided—kin the wake of the Henderson visit and all of the enthusiasm—that Cameroon was to have an aid program. It eventually had a Peace Corps program. We got a military attaché. The place was going to be built up. The offices were very small. So, we had to find new quarters. We had to secure housing and all of the things that go along with building up a post. Our administrative support was meant to be out of Leopoldville, which was hugely impractical. I went back and forth to Leopoldville and did some temporary duty down there, including at the time of the upheavals that took place in July of ’60. I was just going flat out the whole time I was there, doing leases and supervising the acquisition—the construction—of houses. We couldn’t find any place to move ourselves into. We were getting so large and had so many unusual requirements that I eventually negotiated the deal with some local entrepreneurs and we did a lease purchase on a building for which I designed and supervised the construction. It is still the American Embassy to this day. It cost very little. It was a great bargain. I did those kinds of things.

Q: Did you feel any change in work, spirit, etc., when the Kennedy administrative came in in January ’61? They had made a great thing about Africa.

MOOSE: There was a sense of anticipation about that; that that was going to add impetus and importance to what we were doing out there. They were paying attention to us. I think for the most part the sentiment in the Embassy was very much pro-Kennedy. I recall, election night, we rigged the shortwave radio at our house and we into the early hours of the morning listened to the reporting of the returns and when it became apparent that Kennedy had won, we began to celebrate. We drank up everything in the house, including the bottle of rye whiskey that I had bought for Mr. Dulles in Mexico and had been in my liquor cabinet ever since.
Q: Did things change? Did you see a quickening of the pace?

MOOSE: Yes. The AID buildup became much more rapid and much larger. We got a Peace Corps contingent. I negotiated the Peace Corps agreement. More houses had to be found for various other elements that were coming in. There was more activity requirements out of the Bureau. The Bureau had been formed by that time. There was a greater sense of activity, but we were so far off the beaten path. You couldn’t fly directly into Yaoundé from anyplace but Douala. So, very few visitors ever really got there. That continued to be the case and was still the case when I was Assistant Secretary for Africa 17 years later. It was still hard to get people up to Yaoundé. You couldn’t land the airplane up there. There was enough height and the runway was just short enough so nobody of any importance with an airplane could land up there. They couldn’t land anything but bi-motor planes.

Q: How about dealing with the government? What was your impression?

MOOSE: The politics were interesting. Cameroon had attained limited self-government under a provision that (President Charles) de Gaulle had announced. I think it was called the Loi Cadre (the law passed in 1956 by the French National Assembly which provided for universal adult suffrage for all African subjects in French colonies). They were a part of the French Union. The French retained foreign affairs and defense and controlled the money supply through one of the regional West African franc arrangements. So, the French had wanted to have someone whom they could control. The president of the first constituent assembly (there was an elected constituent assembly, pre-independence) was a man from Douala, a member of the Douala tribe. Douala was the port. We had a consulate there for a long time; closed it. The president of the assembly was a very talented, unusual individual named Paul Soppo Priso. The French had done a deal on him. Had there been a completely honest, open election, most people felt that Soppo Priso would have been president. Instead, the French managed to install Ahmadou Ahidjo, who, while he recognized what he owed to the French, was never the French mannequin or puppet that they obviously had hoped for. He was not controlled by French advisors. He was very largely his own person. The Cameroonians are, now that I know a lot of other Africans--

In each of the countries, most of the ethnic groups have their own particularities. That of the Cameroonians, that they are one of the most ethnically diverse countries in Africa. Only Zaire, which is many times larger, is more diverse than Cameroon. For reasons of ancient ethnography and history, a lot of smaller tribes were concentrated in that area. It is on the dividing line between the Bantu-type people in the south and the Muslim people in the north—the Fulani and the Housa. The compaction of all of these ethnic groups together I always felt made the Cameroonians a more withdrawn, suspicious, and less outgoing people. They were always looking over their shoulder to see what other group was there. They kept to their own parts of the town. There were ethnic subcomponents, not unusual. But there were more of them in Cameroon and the Cameroonians tended to be suspicious. They weren’t very friendly and outgoing. The exception was the former
British Cameroonians—the English-speaking ones—over in the west. They were much easier to get along with and were sort of lighthearted people. But the rest of the characters were pretty difficult. So, it was not easy to deal with them. I mentioned earlier the problems. They had a tendency to blame us for anything that happened in the UN that they didn’t like. It served their purposes to do that. We often felt the French exercised undue influence. At that time, I didn’t have any basis for comparison. In subsequent years, I learned that the Cameroonian were probably the most independent minded of all of the French African nations.

It was not easy to deal with them, but there were not big things that we were trying to do, that they couldn’t. We often wanted them to vote with us various kinds of ways in the UN and they were usually very difficult about that.

**Q: What about the French? Were they looking at you sideways and wishing you weren’t there?**

**MOOSE:** I think so. I think they were suspicious of us, but they had their own in and the Cameroonian were very adroit at playing us off against them. There were no immediate tangible stakes. So, the relations between us and the French were always civil. We exchanged social calls and things regularly. The French ambassador was approachable. But we eyed one another.

**Q: Had the Cold War penetrated the area?**

**MOOSE:** There was this terrorism which was thwarted from the outside. There were forays when there would be intelligence that would tell us about some terrorist incident of some sort. The other sense in which we had some awareness of the Cold War would be [gap in interview].

We were aware of what was going on in adjacent areas. But we were awfully isolated up there. Cameroon and our Embassy made a contribution to the space program. Most of the early chimpanzees that were used in the space program came out of Cameroon. One of the very memorable adventures while we were there had to do with the Air Force sending a plane in to pick up a load of chimpanzees that they had bought from this American wild animal dealer. We knew nothing of this transaction until one day I went down to the PTT to pick up our telegrams written in ballpoint pen on little folding forms which I would then have to take back to the Embassy and usually we’d have to decode on the one-time pad. I got into one of them and I thought it said that there was going to be an American Air Force plane arriving from the Azores. By the time I worked my way around to figuring out the date and time, I discovered that the airplane should have been landing almost at that moment. It was the height of the rainy season. Rain just came pouring down. The airport runway was not paved. I rushed out to the airport, heard the Americans on the radio saying, “My God, it’s a dirt strip.” They managed to land the airplane. They were almost out of fuel. They had no diversion alternative. There was no place they could go. The airplane stayed on the ground for weeks and weeks while the dealer, who did not have the chimpanzees that he had sold to the Air Force, endeavored to collect them. Then
he tried to sneak all sorts of things on the plane. A couple of the airmen got thrown in jail. The government thought they were terrorists. They couldn’t speak any English and account for themselves and yet they seemed like military. It was a long-running adventure. But we were always very proud of our contribution to the space program.

The next most interesting thing that happened—I guess because of the effort that was being made in Africa—was when Louis Armstrong came.

Q: Satchmo.

MOOSE: Satchmo came to Yaoundé.

Q: Why don’t you explain who Louis Armstrong was?

MOOSE: He was a famous jazz musician, a trumpet player of great renown, one of the best-known Americans in the world. So, he came to Yaoundé with an entourage. His base player was a musician whom my wife had known in New York when she was in the theater. So, we thought that we had a special relationship to Louis Armstrong. He played in the soccer stadium. It was one of the biggest events that occurred while we were there. Then we did receive a visit from G. Mennen Williams, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. That was a big deal.

Q: Could you talk about your impression of Soapy Williams coming to Africa at that time?

MOOSE: Well, the Cameroonians, who were the only people that I knew in my part of the jungle, were very excited about it and very pleased. They were a little puzzled. They could understand Louis Armstrong. G. Mennen Williams they didn’t quite understand. But they knew it was important somehow. We were at pains to tell them just how important it was, but then they caught on. He had been to other places and the news had gotten there. He had tweaked the nose of the French enough so that I think the government found it useful to make a big deal out of Williams coming. We had an Ambassador by then and a proper residence.

Q: This was Leo Cyr?

MOOSE: Yes. This was still Leo (G.) Cyr. I was one of those who was serving as an interpreter for Williams. I remember the reception. I referred earlier to the former British Cameroon and to the proximity of the dissident tribes of Bamileke down there who were thought to harbor the terrorists. The government had just before Williams’ visit extended an amnesty to the terrorists down there. There had come out of the forest an extremely attractive man named (Théodore) Mayi Matip. He came out of the bush, out of the terrorist area of the country, and created quite a sensation. He was invited to our reception. None of us had ever set eyes on him before and when we heard he was coming, this was a very big deal. He didn’t entirely trust the government. Mayi Matip came with a wraparound African kind of skirt-looking affair that many of them wore in
certain parts of the country and an oxford cloth button down shirt. Around his neck he had—he was the son of a chief—a necklace made out of the teeth of the panther. He was a very attractive man both in appearance and manner. These teeth around his neck gave him a striking appearance. He spoke French in addition to his own language, the language of his tribe.

I was the one who made the introduction of him to Soapy Williams. I had a moment just before I performed the introduction, while Mayi Matip’s attention was directed elsewhere, to whisper very hurriedly to Governor Williams that this was the returned terrorist who had come in under the amnesty, that it was the first time any of us had seen him, that it was a very big deal for him to be there, that he was reputed to be the leader of the terrorists. I managed to get all this out in a rush to Williams, who had been told about the person and had been given briefing. But Williams had demonstrated that he didn’t have quick powers of attention and understanding about these things, so I didn’t want to take any chance that he didn’t know who he was dealing with. So, Mayi Matip comes around. I make the introduction. Williams reaches out, to my horror, and he fingers the necklace, which is obviously not something that he should have done. He says to me, “Tell him that I can see that he must be a very dangerous man.” I thought, “Oh, shit! How stupid can you get?” So, I made the translation, “Governor Williams says you obviously are a very important man.” Whether he understood any of it or not, we didn’t know. They exchanged some minor pleasantries and the reception, which was just mobbed with people, was a great sensation. Mayi Matip had brought some of his people with him. It was a very big deal that they had come out. I guess they felt reasonably safe coming to the Americans.

I then went down to Douala, the port city, with Williams. I was the one to take him through the market in the port. He was a great curiosity to people in Douala, who were much more open and friendly, as people who live in seaports are often more worldly than those who live in the jungle or the forest. We walked him all around. The head of the market, as it was, at one point gave him a very flowery, wonderful speech. Williams responded in kind and then the head of the market turned around and handed Williams an enormous fish that must have been at least five feet long. Williams stood there with the fish in his hands for a few minutes, looking at it, and turned around and handed me the fish. That was the visit to the market. It was a big success for us and it made us look good.

Q: Did you find Williams well keyed to African things?

MOOSE: He wanted to do the right thing. He was keen about it. He was not terribly well informed. But he obviously was enjoying what he was doing and he managed to convey a sense of that to the people whom he was visiting. They could see that he was a well-intentioned man. He didn’t act stuffy like a Frenchman of the same rank would have been. They liked that. The Africans have always liked that. They are much more approachable than we usually think of.

Q: What was your impression of this initial batch of Peace Corps people?
MOOSE: They were among the first Peace Corps groups to come to Africa. We had been able to put through this agreement very quickly. The French had been very unhappy about our Peace Corps agreement. They told the Cameroonian that they were spies and I suspect they probably believed it themselves. But we got a very early group. They went to the English-speaking Cameroon. It was easy to get them installed and in place up there. Those were very nice people, those Cameroonians. It was exciting. In retrospect, it’s a small thing to be excited about, but Cameroon was terribly isolated and obscure, and to have something like that happen and to be a part of it was a very big deal.

You asked me a moment ago about the Cold War intruding. There was another sense in which it did. The French were at some pains to keep the East Bloc countries out and I think did. For the longest time, there were none of them there. Eventually, I think, a couple came in, but we didn’t have the really bad ones like the East Germans. There was a contest between the Chinese—the Taiwanese and the PRC. Taiwan had sent an ambassador early on. He bought a nice little house right across the street from our embassy and he used it both as office and embassy. He was an enterprising fellow and he was very sociable. He had an excellent cook. He grew vegetables and raised ducks and things all around his embassy. He set the best table in town. The most coveted dinner invitation in town was not to the presidential palace, but over to the Taiwan embassy. If you were lucky he would fix one of his famous duck dishes. I took very good care of him. He was right across the street. So, Maggie and I were favored to dine there more often than our other colleagues and they were very jealous of us.

Q: While you were there, were there any developments (earthquakes, etc.)?

MOOSE: The chimpanzee expedition and Soapy Williams and Louis Armstrong and the plebiscite on the trusteeship territories are the things that stick out in my mind. The OAU [Organization of African Unity] held one of its meetings there, so some of the famous figures of Africa of that period came—Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana; (William) Tubman of Liberia; Mobutu (Sese Seko) did not come because he wasn’t on the scene yet, nor did (Patrice) Lumumba, who was around. We had a few famous figures. Haile Selassie came; that was very exciting. One of the Embassy local employees managed to get the butt of Mr. Tubman’s cigar, which is about as big around as the handle of a baseball bat. He counted himself lucky for that. The outside world really didn’t penetrate into our part of the forest very much. It was pretty quiet. The AID buildup continued. They got very large. They didn’t ever do anything while I was there, but they negotiated a lot of agreements. I suppose they eventually did something. But it was a pretty quiet time.

Q: In 1962, whither?

MOOSE: In early ’62, Maggie had gotten amoebic dysentery and malaria. We had taken her down to the missionary hospital, but that didn’t work. We couldn’t get Washington to issue orders for evacuation, which taught me a lesson which I recalled very well when I came back to the Department in other positions. Jeff and I stayed in Cameroon. Maggie was in a hospital in Frankfurt. We eventually got loose and went up there. I was assigned
to the Operations Center, which had just been created earlier in ’62. So, I was assigned to the Operations Center, a piece of good fortune that I attribute to the fact that the inspectors, when they came through, had been very generous about my performance. I think the thing that really got it though was, while the inspectors were there, they were out at our house for dinner one evening and there was one of these occasional attacks of the terrorists. They came out of the jungle, which began literally on the other side of the road from our house, and fired some weapons. The army came running around. There was a lot of shooting and flare going on. We all got under the table for a while. For some reason, the inspectors were impressed with this and wrote nice things about me because otherwise I was quite an obscure administrative officer, FSO-6 [old system; contemporary FSO-4]. So, I got assigned somehow to the Operations Center, which nobody really knew what it was about. It was in the process of creating itself when I got there.

Q: You were doing the Operations Center from ’62 to when?

MOOSE: I did the Operations Center beginning in May of ’62. In November of ’62, I was picked up as part of the first group from the State Department that was brought in on the Cuban Missile Crisis. I was sent over to the National Military Command Center [NMCC] as the first State Department liaison rep over in the NMCC. I stayed over there through the Missile Crisis into early ’63. When I finally got loose from over there, I came back and did not go back to the Ops Center, where I had been. In addition to being watch officer, I had been editor of the top-secret summary, the morning summary. It was written in the Ops Center in those days. In early ’63, I came back and was assigned to SS/S, which was the Executive Secretariat line that staffed the Seventh Floor offices. But I had good times in the Operations Center. It was an interesting time to be there. In those days, there were two watch officers, one of whom was the editor of the summary on the midnight shift. Then a writer came in at some point to help you put the summary together. But most of the time, there were two officers on the desk and we were just at a single desk—for a long time just with two telephones, two separate instruments, and a window that looked east at the Capitol. There were those two lines. In ’62, the kind of business we’d get would be, the Russians would pull the tanks up on the Autobahn and close the access to West Berlin. We’d have a tense evening over that. We’d call Secretary Rusk on occasion about that. I’ve often thought the contrast between then and now; if it was today’s world of the CNN. In those days, you’d have between midnight in Washington until the noon briefing the next day; our government would have that period of time to figure out what, if anything, it would say. Now, if the same thing had happened, the TV cameras would be on the Autobahn when the tanks rolled up there. You’d have a split screen and one correspondent with a shot of the tanks and the other one in front of the White House demanding to know what the U.S. government was going to do about that tank that was going up there. But we had plenty of time in those days.

Q: Before we get to the Missile Crisis, were there any other particular issues or crises that you got involved in?

MOOSE: Oh, somebody was trying to overthrow (Haitian dictator) Papa Doc Duvalier.
The Embassy called in one night and wanted to know if they could give him refuge. I had to wake up George Ball and ask him. He said, “Well, we take everybody else in. Why shouldn’t we take him in?” In the event, Duvalier didn’t materialize at the Embassy then.

In ’62, we were barely hearing about Vietnam. You’d hear a little bit about it, but not much. It wasn’t a big deal. That was still in the offing. There is nothing else that sticks out much in my mind.

We had an accident one time at an air base someplace in Turkey. The initial indication was that there had been a nuclear weapon uploaded on the aircraft at the time it had had its accident and that sent everybody scurrying in all directions.

The occasional defector here and there. Those are the only things I remember. I was so busy trying to get the summary out. It was such a struggle every morning that I don’t even remember what we wrote about.

Q: What about the Cuban Missile Crisis? We’re talking now about October of ’62.

MOOSE: When I first went over to the Pentagon, I was briefed by (William H.) Bill Brubeck and (Benjamin Hur) Ben Read, the Executive Secretary and Deputy. I went over to the NMCC and was given access to the innermost things that were over there. They had the group that knew about the problem with the missiles compartmentalized. I was in with them. We sat in a separate room. The chiefs would come down and have special briefs. But we watched the whole thing develop, the movement of the ships and all of that, the ongoing reconnaissance and photography. My job was to make sure that the State Department knew everything as quickly as possible that chiefs knew. We had a secure telephone for that. It didn’t always work very well, but we used that. It was very tense. We never owned a television set. My wife did not have a very clear notion of what was going on. I was very good and didn’t really tell her. But we bought a television and we did eventually talk about what to do in the event of a real emergency. In the atmosphere that I was working in, I believed that there was a very real chance that we would have a nuclear exchange with the Russians. It was quite real. I remember working, talking, with Air Force people. It seems remarkably unsophisticated, but I remember a discussion about targeting cities and which cities and pros and cons on targeting strategy; the kind of thing that would have been unimaginable to be discussed at that level in that way in later years but was very real then.

The most vivid memory that I have (I get goosebumps right now just thinking about it) happened one night. As the moment of truth was approaching, the North American radar, the NORAD, picked up and signaled to the military command center that the Russians had launched missiles. There was a period of about the first 20 seconds—we later reconstructed it—but it seemed like an eternity at the time, when all of the people in that command center knew that it might be a false one because we had false ones, but they had been within a matter of seconds overridden or nullified, but this one ran on. We were all expecting it to be nullified, but it didn’t. When it ran on approaching half a minute, it was extraordinary. It went on long enough for there to have been a calculation as to the
probable impact area. The probable impact area was calculated to be the Panama Canal. That was all too plausible. That would have made a lot of sense because the U.S. was in the process of shifting a number of units from the Pacific into the Caribbean and the Canal was full of American warships going through, a movement that at that time was still secret. It was quite a moment. It passed. Then my next recollection is of being actually in the tank with the chiefs as the Russian freighter was coming up on the line with our ships that were on blockade. At one point, the UN Security Council was in session and I was on the phone with an open line to (Ambassador) Adlai Stevenson for a period of time as that was unrolling. Stevenson was very much afraid of being caught behind the curve of what was happening up there and that was the way that we had of ensuring he wasn’t because I was in the place where as much as was known in any one place in Washington was right there in the NMCC. They were actually in voice contact with the skipper of the U.S. ship that performed the interception, so I was listening to them listening to him on a speaker. I had Governor Stevenson on the other line.

Q: You left that in early ’63?

MOOSE: Yes. I went to the line, where I was staff officer first for Africa and for International Organization Affairs [IO] and then in the rotation of assignments. The head of the Secretariat line at that time was Mrs. Jean Davis, who was a legendary character on the line for many years. She helped establish the Secretariat and was as one of the people who pushed the modernization of the State Department at that time in order to make them more coordinated internally and to improve their interaction with the NSC and the other national security agencies. She was very farsighted in that regard. She was a civil servant. I came in and started working on Africa things. Then after six months or so, my assignments were shifted and I became staff officer for European Affairs, which I stayed at for another year or so.

Q: We’ll end at this point and pick it up next time.

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Q: Today is June 5, 1997. We’re now in early ’63 and you’re coming to the Secretariat. How was the Secretariat organized at that time? Hadn’t it been revamped because of the Cuban Missile Crisis?

MOOSE: It had been revamped a bit; I think probably as a result of President Kennedy’s and National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy’s desire to see the State Department “to be more responsive.” They put a political appointee in the Executive Secretary’s office. I don’t know whether that had been done before or since. It was clearly the response to a feeling in the White House that they wanted to move things along a little more briskly. They put in a man named Bill Brubeck. His deputy was also political, Ben Read, who later succeeded me as Deputy Under Secretary for Management. He was himself the Executive Secretary after Brubeck. It was through Brubeck and the Executive Secretariat that there was much tighter connection to the White House, to McGeorge Bundy and that unusual NSC staff that they had over there at that time. Brubeck used the line as a means
of trying to keep the Bureaus in line, the Assistant Secretaries in line, and to move the business of the Department.

There was unhappiness with the Bureau of European Affairs, in particular, because there was a faction within the Bureau of European Affairs run by a man named Schatzel, who was a Deputy Assistant Secretary. He was the leader of a group of Atlanticists who pushed proposals like the Multilateral Nuclear Force, which was an attempt to be an answer to the French desire to have an independent nuclear deterrent. They were going to have these multinational forces. It was a visionary idea. McGeorge Bundy and Kennedy didn’t think much of the idea. These fellows were real enthusiasts. They kept pushing the thing. Brubeck was riding herd on it and trying to put down this kind of “cabal.” But it involved a lot of very good people who continue to play important roles in the Department for years after that. So, I was made staff officer for European Affairs. One of my jobs was to make sure that we really knew what the Bureau of European Affairs was doing and that it was in line with the President’s program.

Q: This is called a “spy ..."

MOOSE: Yes. I was pretty open about it. At any rate, it was. You could call it a spy or you could say that the President had a right to have his policy carried out in a way he intended to have it carried out. Dean Rusk was a little passive in the front of all this. Rusk was mainly concerned with Berlin in those years. Those were the years after the blockade, when the Russians would close the Autobahn and we’d have some very tense times over that. So, he thought a lot about that. (Rusk used to have small groups of journalists in in the afternoon on Friday. Sometimes they’d talk to him), “Queen Elizabeth I remarked that if they were to open up her heart after she died and looked to see what was there, and it would say, ‘Calais.’” Rusk said one time to somebody that if you opened up his heart, you’d find Berlin. I never forgot that. I didn’t get to Berlin until about three years ago. I’ve often thought of the stories of the blockade in the years and the time we spent up there and how all of that came round. I eventually decided not to pursue European affairs, although that’s what all ambitious Foreign Service officers wanted to do. I decided that, after a couple or three years in the Secretariat working on European affairs, it was going to be a deadlock in Europe for many years and that there wasn’t anything much going to happen, that it was going to be static and it would be boring and I would rather get out of it. But for a couple or three years there, it was interesting.

While I was there, Kennedy was assassinated. In fact, the day he was assassinated, we were preparing for a visit for Chancellor Adenauer, who was coming and I had finally extracted from EUR the briefing memorandum for the President. Everybody was always slow in getting the paper out as far as the Seventh Floor was concerned. I had finally gotten the Adenauer briefing memorandum up and it was on my desk and I was just starting to read it. One of my colleagues came by and said, “Let’s go over to Georgetown for lunch,” and we went out. By the time we came back, John Kennedy was dead and the memorandum never went forward.
Q: Could we return to talking about the Atlanticists and the cable? This has been a consistent American policy, of promoting European affairs, but some people promoted it more than others. Was George Ball in the State Department at that time?

MOOSE: Yes. Ball was there and he was somewhat the protector of these people. He was not a dissident exactly, but he was close to them. There was Schatzel, Henry Owen. I can’t remember who the others were. Kennedy and Bundy didn’t like it because they foresaw political problems on the Hill with the thing—were we going to give, or share, our finger on the nuclear trigger? In those years, the concept of the nuclear trigger was not an abstraction. So, that was not an abstraction. Bundy and President Kennedy saw these people as trying to draw the United States into a degree and a kind of involvement, complexity, that they didn’t think was in the interest. They were always trying to damp down the pressure.

Q: Obviously, you were a relatively junior officer, but at the same time, you had your marching orders. How were you received by the Europeanists?

MOOSE: Wearily. They realized after a time that Brubeck—and through Brubeck, me—we were trying to suppress what they were doing. One day, I was in Schatzel’s office and he had on his desk a genre of communication called the “airgram,” which was a very slow moving piece of paper and was usually reserved for unimportant things. I saw in the middle of Schatzel’s desk an airgram, which itself caught my eye if only because Schatzel felt he was a very important person and no very important person would be caught with an unclassified airgram in the middle of their desk. It was like having a dead mouse there. When I saw it was an unclassified airgram, I thought, “What in the world is it?” Like all good staff officers, I had learned to read upside down. So, I read the serial number of it. It was A320 from Strasbourg. I still remember it. So, I went right back and got A320 from Strasbourg. It referred to another innocuous airgram and I got the reference on that. Then I discovered that they were convening a conference of all of these people all over Europe who believed in this apostasy of the multilateral nuclear force and I exposed their meeting to Brubeck, who told Bundy about it, who had a fit. They squelched the thing. They never found out that I was the one who knew about it.

Even on less dramatic issues than this struggle with the President and Bundy over this Atlantic issue, the line in those days was used to exert a lot of discipline from the Seventh Floor—to move the business of the Department that it was decided on the Seventh Floor ought to be moved and to maintain a kind of quality control. We were urged to be very intrusive and aggressive about things. We were and we were not very much liked. On the other hand, some officers in the Bureaus would realize that if they would work with us, we could get their stuff through and we could move their paper for them. I always felt that those were the more intelligent fellows.

Q: Did you sense that Kennedy had a certain suspicion of the European Bureau per se?

MOOSE: Like so many presidents, he had misgivings about the Department itself. He thought it really didn’t understand his political problems—his perspective—as the
President, that it was slow, convention bound, and the usual kinds of things the White House feels about the Department, I’m afraid. But he didn’t think that they really shared his agenda. We didn’t think—and this became clearer to me in the years afterwards.

There was an interesting kind of mismatch in Dean Rusk, who really wasn’t John Kennedy’s kind of man. You would have expected a more energetic and modern outlook of a person than Rusk, but he was very conventional. He had studied in Germany between the wars and had been in China and seen the Chinese communists up close, so he was very conservative.

Q: How about Ball? Did he play much of a role? I would have thought he would have been almost the person who would be dealing with you more than Rusk.

MOOSE: We did a lot of business with Ball. He was as interested, as anybody on the Seventh Floor was, in Africa. The European Bureau still had a lot of influence on events in Africa, mainly because of Portugal’s membership in NATO, our desire to keep the Azores, and to avoid offending the Portuguese on anything having to do with Guinea, Mozambique, or Angola. The British and the French [were still engaged former colonial powers?] So, Ball’s staff, with the assistance of the then-legal advisor, Abe Chayes, really ran a lot of interference on African issues. I never thought Ball himself had any particular issue. Chayes and Ball were close and I think that probably has as much to do with it as anything. Ball was very interested in economic affairs. He may have been Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. He was very interested in the Common Market and the European Coal and Steel Community. He was close to the Atlanticists and he probably was more sympathetic to them than not. On the other hand, he was more political than others up there.

I had occasionally to deal with Harriman, who was Under Secretary for Political Affairs. With Rusk, it was mainly Europe and NATO. I generally made the NATO ministerial trips. I made four NATO ministerial trips with Rusk. It was such a contrast. When Rusk traveled, the Department didn’t travel with him the way it travels with the Secretary today. The reins really were handed over to Ball and we worked there. I worked a lot with Ball’s staff. He always had very good staff. They were more activist than Rusk’s staff. Rusk’s staff was colorless and transparent and that’s the way he wanted it. They didn’t mess with policy. Ball’s did. It was in everybody’s policy all the time.

Q: What was your impression of Dean Rusk interacting at these NATO ministerial meetings?

MOOSE: He was very formal. He carried the weight of the United States domination of the alliance with great seriousness. He rarely seemed to unbend. He seemed humorless. He wasn’t—because on a few occasions informally, he had a sense of humor—but he was all business. He reminded me a lot of Warren Christopher.

Q: When did you leave the Secretariat?
MOOSE: I stayed on and was made the Deputy Director of the Secretariat of the line of the staff. It was called SS/S. The head of the line was a remarkable civil servant named Jean Davis. She had been there for many years and trained many Foreign Service officers about how to get things done. So, I was about a year and a half on the line. Then I was the Deputy Director. Then something happened with the Director, and I became Acting Director. I wanted to get out of there by that time. You can stay too long. On the Seventh Floor as a junior officer, you make too many enemies or get too supercilious.

So, I had discovered something called the American Political Science Association (APSA) Congressional Fellows Program. There had been a few fellows from other government agencies, but never one from the State Department. I thought this was a good idea to have Foreign Service officers who knew more about the Hill. So, I applied for it. I got it. Then Read asked me to stay another year to run the line, so I stayed another year. That was almost four years up there by the time I left.

Q: That is really remarkable. Normally, a person will go in there and in about a year and a half, they’re burned out.

MOOSE: Yes. At any rate, I finally escaped to the Hill. I went to the Hill with every intention of coming back to the Department.

Q: You went to the Hill when?

MOOSE: I went in the fall of ’65.

Q: And what happened?

MOOSE: You kind of competed; you went around and interviewed. It was kind of like rush week at the fraternity or sorority. You tried to get to work for the congressmen who were the most popular.

I was very lucky. I was picked to work with Morris Udall of Arizona, who was the finest Member of Congress I’ve ever known. Our deal was: he was interested in foreign affairs; I was interested in domestic affairs. I didn’t want to work on foreign affairs. He said, “I don’t have much, but I’m interested in getting into a few things, so you work on those. Then the rest of the time, you can work on my other things.” He was interested in environmental issues. He was on the Interior Committee. He was on the Post Office and Civil Service Committee. He was active in the Democratic Study Group. I worked for Mo for half a year and then I moved over to the Senate side and worked for Senator Fulbright in his Arkansas office, not in the Committee office. While I worked for Udall, the Democratic Study Group got interested in the Vietnam issue. I became the resource person to do their research for them on that. During the time I was there, they got off the first letter to the President from the Hill about the war in Vietnam. It was not “Get out,” but it was: “Our objectives are not clear. We’re not sure that the way we’re going about the war can be won. If it can’t be won and this is the only way we can go about it, hadn’t we better rethink the thing? There are a lot of abuses. We’re concerned about this.” It was
a kind of dithering, worrying letter, but it was signed by 50-some odd Members. It was the first kind of collective act from up there. That was 1965.

Q: Were you involved in drafting that letter?

MOOSE: Yes. It was Mo and (Jim) O’Hara (Michigan). I can’t remember the others. They were mainly liberals. I was involved in drafting it. Moreover, I was given the letter to carry down to the White House. I thought I would leave it with a guard at the gate, but I got down there and after a [gap in interview]

I was shown in to see McGeorge Bundy and I was very distinctly uncomfortable about this letter, because he read it while I was sitting there. He fussed at me a good deal about the letter. He was not happy to get it. That experience was kind of the beginning of a decade of involvement that I spent on issues in Indochina, although I was very interested in the stuff Udall was doing. He was trying to get a new interstate agreement for the division of the waters of the Colorado River between the western states. He was very interested in some early consumer product things. He was trying to get women’s cosmetics to be made subject to the jurisdiction of the Food and Drug Administration—something that has never happened, the reason for which totally eludes me. Mo was a remarkable Member of Congress. He had been a professional basketball player, even though he only had one eye. He flew his own airplane. I flew with him a lot. He had a wonderful sense of humor. He decided that we needed an income tax increase in order to ward off inflation and he proceeded to write a series of newsletters to his constituents. His newsletters were very famous. They were literate, well-reasoned, simple, honest, direct. One he headed “A Letter from a Crazy Congressman to His Constituent: Why I Think We Should Have a Tax Increase.” But he was remarkable. It was a great opportunity to get to work with him.

I had some Arkansas friends up there on the House side, an old judge who was Number Two on the Rules Committee. He used to take me to watch Judge Smith. I had a good time at the House. I always enjoyed the House more than the Senate. It was a livelier place.

Q: Let me go back to this letter. Who asked you to draft it? Where did you get your information?

MOOSE: Well, I hadn’t paid any attention to Vietnam much in the Department. In fact, up to that time, the Vietnam issue rarely thrust itself on our consciousness very much. So, we used the newspaper some. I discovered Bernard Fall, read Street Without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina. I read other things that [Fall wrote?]. At the time, there wasn’t that much literature. There was a very good series of newsletters from some kind of overseas study group. We just grabbed information wherever we could. It wasn’t the great industry it became later. We scoured over government documents. We just grabbed it wherever we could, mostly out of newspapers.

Q: Were you able to task the State Department to give you the rationale?
MOOSE: Well, they had their policy papers. Of course, they were up testifying all the time. It was beginning to get controversial in those years. Fulbright started his hearings about that time. So, that brought out a lot of material. But one got the standard position papers out of the Department. They were just very straightforward—“This is the communist menace,” and so forth. I was very conditioned to accept what the Department said. I thought they were generally always right about things. One day, in Udall’s office, it was the wintertime and he came in (I was early in the office) with a letter in his hand. He said, “Dick, read this and let me know what you think about it. The author is a friend of mine.” It turned out the author was a law professor at the University of Arizona [Charles Ares?]. The letter was about European policy. I read the letter over and sat down at my typewriter and started pounding out a response to it. Then for some reason, I stopped and I said to myself: “Wait a minute. Mo didn’t ask me to write a response. He asked me what I thought.” I read the letter again and looked at what I had written and I realized that I had written the standard State Department position. Then I said to myself, “Well, what do I think about the issue that the author raises?” Then I realized to my consternation I had no independent idea of my own. Then I thought, “This is a very sad thing.” I had been working on European affairs for two or three years and I didn’t have any views of my own. All I knew was: the State Department, the talking points. I thought, “This is not good.”

This is one of the most important moments of my life. My ultimate decision to get out of the Department had a lot to do with that moment of realization that I was the kind of a person whose mind was too easily captured and led in a predetermined way, and that I’d never been expected to think for myself. Lots and lots of wonderful people didn’t have the same defect that I had and they stayed in and did think for themselves and the Department didn’t bend their mind, but I knew that I was too susceptible and I needed to get out. The Hill was very exciting. It was nowhere near as involved in foreign affairs as it is today—much over-involved by my view—but just beginning. This effort on the part of this group that were trying to educate themselves [on Vietnam?]

Q: This was one of the House Members.

MOOSE: Yes. They were all Members of the Democratic Study Group, which was not an ultraleft group. It was rather mild by today’s terms. There were 50 or so of them. There was Jim O’Hare (AFL-CIO). There may have even been a couple of Republicans in there.

Q: When you were putting this letter together, was this what you were doing or were there others involved?

MOOSE: I did a draft of it, but Mo did a lot of the writing. The others discussed it at great length. It ended up being a Committee document expressing concern about the course of affairs: the conduct of the war, the destruction, the killing, the doubt as to whether our ends could be obtained, and weren’t there other ways to try to secure our objectives?
Q: Did you see any discernible effect other than McGeorge Bundy not appreciating your coming by?

MOOSE: No. It was ironic. A year later, after I had spent the next half of the congressional year with Fulbright, I accepted a job for National Security Advisor Walt Rostow and one of the things that I was put in charge of was keeping track of what people on the Hill were saying about the war. I was well qualified to do that by the time I got down there.

Q: As you were looking at this, this was way out of your area of knowledge. You were looking at Vietnam in about 1965. From your reading and your gut feeling, what did you think about what was happening in Vietnam?

MOOSE: I, like so many of our generation, learned a lot by studying Vietnam. From the earliest time, I felt that there was a substantial body of grievance and unhappiness on the part of the Vietnamese people, principally their desire to get out from under the influence of foreign powers. I feared we were viewed by the Vietnamese people as the successors to the French. I felt that the civilian side of the war—the impact of the military effort on the people of Vietnam—was apt to be counterproductive, that the answer lay not in the application of more military force, but trying to get at the underlying desires and aspirations of the people. That meant trying to give them a decent government; the quality and character of the government in Saigon was suspect, to say the least. These were the years of (President Ngo Dinh) Diem and the shortcomings of that government were all too apparent. Also, when one looked at it, there were parts of the portrayal of the historical record that were troublesome, too. Early on, reading Fall probably and there were some French people who wrote, one had the impression that the idea of Vietnam and China and Russia all being aligned was somehow wrong, I knew from my reading that the Vietnamese hated the Chinese and the idea of the Chinese using the Vietnamese—Rusk believed this, but it simply was never true. I didn’t believe it.

Q: You were getting to read and understand your way into this new element of American concentration as foreign policy, at that point, while you were in the House, were you able to tap into any Foreign Service officers who had served there? There weren’t many at that time.

MOOSE: No, there really were very few. (William) Bill Trueheart had been DCM in Saigon. He was very good. He is mentioned in (David) Halberstam’s book. Halberstam thought a lot of Trueheart. He was later in his career Ambassador to Nigeria. There were very few at that time who you ran into. I began to disbelieve my government during that period. I realized that my government sometimes said things that, if not untrue, were highly dubious. So, I went through that transformation of being on the inside and being the defender and the repeater of everything, to the beginning of what was to be a lifelong skepticism about what the government did and said.

Q: Did you find that you were finding divided opinion?
MOOSE: Yes, there were divided opinions. One of my colleagues on the line, (William G.) Bill Miller, now our Ambassador in Ukraine, staffed the Far East Bureau [FE]. Ball’s staff was interested in Southeast Asia to some extent. Bill had worked with George Ball on Ball’s memorandum about Vietnam. I had been aware of that and had read a couple of drafts of it.

Q: Ball was the House skeptic about Vietnam.

MOOSE: Yes. I think that probably legitimized to some extent my own skepticism, but there was a handful of people who—

There was a brilliant guy in INR who was there for many years who wrote a lot of really good material that was counter to the current. I used to try to get Rostow to read it in later years. I had a great argument with Rostow one time when I tried to get Rostow to send some of it up to Johnson to read. He (the INR staffer) was very smart, very brave, and it was good that he persisted. However, nobody paid any attention to him, so it didn’t really make a lot of difference. There were some divided opinions, but no one could foresee at that time what this issue would become.

Q: Then you moved over to-- Initially in this internship, you spent half a year in Fulbright’s office.

MOOSE: Yes. The pattern was, you’d spend half a year on the House side and half a year on the Senate side. So, I was very attracted to domestic issues. I was by no means sure that I wanted to make foreign affairs my life career at that point. So, I was still trying to get more involvement in domestic affairs. When I went over to Fulbright’s office, being from Arkansas, I said, “I want to work on Arkansas issues.”

The main thing that I worked on that half year was, there were pending at that time in the Congress amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act which would have applied the minimum wage to certain categories of agricultural workers. This was a big issue in Arkansas. The rice, soybean, and cotton farmers didn’t want to have to pay the minimum wage. There were dire predictions on the part of the opponents of this in Arkansas as to its effect on the state, and particularly on the black population. I was in favor of the extension of the minimum wage, as was Fulbright. His constituency though—especially his larger contributors from eastern Arkansas—were unalterably opposed to it. They claimed that this would lead to the final exodus of black labor from the rural South. They were largely right about this. It did precipitate a new flight of black labor to the North because it led to the mechanization of agriculture and large-crop agriculture in the South in a few years. So, I worked on that a lot. There was an instance—the Civil Rights Act of ’65 was passed. In ’66, there was still some issues. There were some votes that came up. The key parts of the Fulbright staff was always trying to get him to vote for a civil rights bill or for a civil rights amendment because it was the right thing to do. He never quite did it. Fulbright always fought the NASA appropriation. He put me in charge of finding arguments against appropriating money for the space program. He thought it ought to be spent on educational exchange programs. He was opposed to foreign aid even then. But I
managed to stay out of the foreign affairs things and really work on Arkansas issues almost all the time. At the end of the year, they offered me a position on the Foreign Relations Committee staff. Udall offered me a job in the House. The year while I worked for Fulbright was the year he gave his speech on the Dominican Republic, which was [on the 1965 coup and U.S. intervention]. Lyndon Johnson had sent the troops into the Dominican Republic and made on TV or radio an address. He said he’d had a phone call from the Ambassador, who was hiding under his desk while the Embassy was being shelled or something of the sort. It turned out it wasn’t true. But Lyndon probably believed it was. Fulbright made this speech about the Dominican Republic in which he called into question the credibility of the Administration. He was beginning his long struggle on Vietnam. He made the Dominican Republic speech about the arrogance of power, one of the series that he did. He did that as his contribution to a filibuster. This was overlooked, but it was a civil rights filibuster. He was never ready to vote for a piece of civil rights legislation, but he was plenty uncomfortable about the whole thing. So, he made his contribution in the speaking rotation one day. He also during this time put together his last memorandum that he wrote to Lyndon Johnson, trying to get Johnson to change his mind on the war. Everybody had worked on that a little bit. But it was mainly his own idea. Carl Marsis and some other people on his staff [gap in interview]

I remember the day that Johnson took the memorandum, Fulbright went down to the White House to meet with LBJ and we all were very hopeful that he would come back for some positive report. We thought this brilliant memorandum would sway Lyndon Johnson. It was very naive that we should have thought so. Fulbright came back and we were all hovering around, hoping he would call us into the office and tell us what happened. He knew we wanted to know. He finally called us in and he was agitated and aggravated. The chief of staff said, “Well, what happened, Senator?” He said: “Nothing happened. He gave me a glass of Diet Dr. Pepper and a long lecture. He didn’t listen to an [expletive deleted] that I said.” He was very disgusted with Johnson because he wouldn’t engage in a conversation. He just wanted to lecture him.

The Tonkin Gulf episode was being looked into at that time by a Member of the Foreign Relations Committee staff who was a former naval intelligence officer and knew how to read the stuff that he was given.

I gradually got pulled into foreign affairs things. I really tried to stay out of it, but I just gradually got more pulled into things. One time, Edgar Snow came to the United States. Edgar Snow author of Red Star Over China.

Q: A version of Mao and his _________ in Indiana.

MOOSE: He had been with him on the Long March for a long time. He had been all over Asia, too. Fulbright was always fascinated by a free thinker who would appear somebody who had a different and unusual point of view. So, he invited Edgar Snow to lunch with Richard Russell, then chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, a very powerful senior senator from Georgia. The conservative southerners were very skeptical about the Vietnam War at that point. They felt we were being dragged into something that
was none of our business. It had not yet turned and become the great patriotic crusade.

Russell and (John C.) Stennis [D-Mississippi]—who was next in line to Russell and who succeeded him in chairmanship—were at that time in ’65 about to turn against Johnson on the war. Johnson knew that if he lost them, he could never maintain his support in the Senate, that they’d take [gap in interview] the beginning of a liberal opposition and these fellows were sort of isolationists. He knew that was very serious. Fulbright was trying to get across to Russell and to Stennis that this war was none of our business. He was walking a narrow line. There were a lot of things that Fulbright believed that Russell and Stennis wouldn’t believe, but he was trying to find common cause with them and staying out of a war that was none of our business. At the last minute, Fulbright invited me to come along. I sat there just fascinated by this dialogue. Snow went on about Mao and the Chinese and how the Chinese and the Vietnamese hated each other and what the Vietnamese were like and the depth of their commitment and where the whole Vietnamese movement had come from. After listening Russell said, “You make it sound like these people will never give up.” Snow said, “That’s right.” Russell said, “But we don’t have to win. All we have to do is to get out.” Then he paused and said, “With honor.” Snow asked, “With honor?” Russell said, “That’s all. Just get out with honor.” Snow said, “I doubt if that will be possible.” There was a long silence. It was a moment I’ll never forget. It was as close probably a moment as Fulbright ever had of really turning the tide. That was early ’66. If he had turned Russell and Stennis, I don’t know what would have happened.

Q: Did you have any feel towards the relationship between Fulbright and Rusk? They were both southerners, but for many people, they thought that Fulbright should have been Secretary of State and not Rusk, who was sort of brought in from outside. Did you get any feel about that?

MOOSE: Fulbright thought that Rusk epitomized the unthinking nature of the Administration. He thought that he was dogmatic and close minded and he did not have intellectual respect for him. I never sensed any personal animosity. I heard him a lot on the subject of Rusk, but it was just that he felt he was close minded and dogmatic and an ideologue.

Q: This might be a good place to close.

MOOSE: I completed the year. I was in a great quandary as to whether I was going to work for Fulbright or Udall. Then Ben Read called me from the Department one day and said: “Things in Walt Rostow’s office are in such a mess. We cannot get any decisions or paper in and out of there and relations between the State Department and the White House have gone downhill. Would you consider going over and working for Rostow?”

Q: Rostow at that time was what?

MOOSE: He was the national security advisor. He had succeeded McGeorge Bundy. After Kennedy’s assassination, Johnson kept Bundy for part of the year, but he was never
comfortable with Bundy. Bundy then resigned, went back to Harvard. Johnson didn’t replace Bundy at first. An interesting story: There was a great struggle I learned later from Bill Moyers in the White House. Moyers wanted to succeed Bundy as national security advisor and almost did. He came very close. Johnson, for reasons that the people closest in still don’t understand, at the last minute decide against Moyers, who had no foreign policy experience at all but who wanted it and who was very ambitious and very close to Johnson. He turned to Rostow, who was the chairman of the Policy Planning Staff, largely on the advice of the Establishment, and he brought Rostow in. I read the transcript of the press conference. It was a very demeaning introduction: “Here’s Rostow. He’s not going to be another McGeorge Bundy. He’ll be a kind of utility infielder, and we’re not going to have all this powerful White House staff and the rest of this kind of stuff.” Johnson just didn’t want that. So, all of that had taken place. Rostow had been there for a few months. There was real chaos in there. I said, “Ben, I’ve already decided to resign from the Department.” I had put my papers in. “I’m resigning. I’m going to stay on the Hill.” He said, “Well, you can still go over there.” But in the end, I talked to Fulbright and to Udall. Both of them said: “You ought to go downtown. You might be able to have some influence. You might be able to do some good. Besides, you’re a young man and ambitious and you ought to go and work in the White House, but please don’t forget about us up here.” I stayed in touch with them. I used to try to get them down there to see the President. I succeeded a couple of times. But it didn’t do any good whatsoever. So, I went from Udall and the letter of the 55 and Fulbright in his early efforts against the war, down into the land of the devil.

_Q: You were with the National Security Council under Walt Rostow from when to when?_


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_Q: Today is October 23, 1998. Dick, you go into the NSC from ’66 to ’68. How did that job come about?_

MOOSE: In 1966, earlier in the year, McGeorge Bundy had resigned and Walt Rostow had—after a delay on Johnson’s part in deciding what he wanted to do with the position—been named the new national security advisor. That was a very interesting interlude. There were a number of people vying for that job. The most interesting one was Bill Moyers. This was not known at the time. It was only gradually known. Francis Bator, a deputy to Bundy on the National Security Council staff, ran the meetings and ran the staff after Bundy left. Bundy was the last of the important Kennedy people whom Johnson kept close to him there in the White House, along with McNamara and Rusk. He had kept Bundy. Of course, Bundy was viewed at the time as having usurped—or that power had gravitated—to the NSC staff. Bundy was enormously competent and confident. He had assembled a very talented staff over there. People that were on the Bundy staff kept showing up for years thereafter in foreign affairs all over other places in the government and the Defense Department. Word was that Johnson was uncomfortable
with Bundy, that Bundy attracted a certain amount of criticism. So, when he finally left, Johnson said he wasn’t going to replace Bundy, meaning they weren’t going to replace him in kind with somebody so powerful because of the reaction of the influence that Bundy had accumulated. When he introduced Rostow, it was a very demeaning sort of introduction. He said he wasn’t going to be another Mac Bundy that he was going to be a kind of “utility infielder.” Whatever it was, he was not a well-organized individual. The State Department was encountering increasing problems in trying to move even its routine business that had to go through the NSC through the Rostow staff. They concluded that Rostow needed some help over there to try to run his office. Ben Read, who was the Executive Secretary of the Department at that time and for whom I had worked in the Secretariat, knew that I was coming to the end of my congressional fellows tour on the Hill and urged me to consider going to work over on the NSC staff as assistant to Rostow, mainly to try to help the State Department get its business through the NSC. Read and others persuaded Rostow of this. Rostow called and I went down and interviewed. He offered me the job. I was torn. I had accepted a job with Mo Udall and I had practically told Fulbright that I would come back and join the Foreign Relations Committee staff and I had to go tell Fulbright that I was going downtown. Fulbright’s reaction was characteristic. “Well, you should go on downtown, Dick, because that’s where all the power is,” he said sarcastically. But he wasn’t angry about it. He was very nice. Mo was very generous as well. I decided not to go on detail because I had already decided I was going to resign from the Foreign Service. I went through with that and insisted that Rostow hire me on the complement of the NSC. I had always been worried about the details from State over to the NSC. There was always something about it that worried me a little bit. It continued to through the latter stages of my career.

Q: What was your concern?

MOOSE: I felt that you couldn’t serve two masters. I felt the tension between the State Department and the White House even then. It was nothing like it is today. I felt this quite strongly when I was head of the Africa Bureau and I felt it very strongly later on, that the Secretary of State deserves—unless the President indicates that he wants a different role for the Secretary of State—to command the Foreign Service and they ought to work for him. If the White House wants a cadre of people over there, then they ought to recruit them and get them over there, but you shouldn’t put Foreign Service in that kind of situation.

I felt progressively over the years that I watched it, that the Foreign Service has become overexposed to the political vicissitudes of the Capitol, and that the business of having Foreign Service officers over serving the President in the White House is not a good thing. I disapprove of the very notion of an extensive and powerful NSC staff. I think it has blurred the lines of authority and responsibility in the foreign affairs area. I felt that before I ever went down there and, when I came out of the experience of working for Rostow, I felt it even more strongly. When I went back and worked for Henry Kissinger for six months, if I had any doubts remaining in my mind, they were [gap in interview].

Q: What about the military in this? They are even more of a disciplined service. You need
their knowledge and expertise. Can you do something when you talk about military force. You really need somebody who knows if it will work or not.

MOOSE: Your question is a very interesting and good one. When I went back the next time to work at the White House, one of the people who arrived there at about the same time I did was Al Haig. We saw what happened with Al Haig in the White House on the staff there. He conspired with military commanders in the field to conceal in the official records of the Department of Defense military operations going on in Southeast Asia—which were concealed incidentally not only from parts of the chain of the military command but concealed from the Secretary of State and from the American Ambassador [Bunker] in the country in which they were going on. This is a result of putting a senior military officer in the White House and allowing military operations to be run out of there. I think it’s very good to keep these lines of responsibility and authority quite clear and that that was a time when we were way over the line and we saw some more of that when we had Colonel North over there in the Reagan Administration. I think these things can be very dangerous and I just like to keep those lines clear. It’s not clear who’s responsible if you’ve got people over there second guessing the Secretary of State. It’s the President’s prerogative to use the Secretary however he wants to use him or her, but I have my concept of what’s better.

Q: During the time you were there, how did Walt Rostow operate?

MOOSE: He became increasingly and ultimately almost entirely consumed with the Vietnam War. He began early in the morning by reading raw intelligence from the field, digesting that after a fashion and sending his reports to the President and downplaying or simply not sending material from the intelligence community that I thought was important, including most importantly some excellent stuff that came out of INR at the time. INR’s lead analyst on Vietnam was probably the last best really good person inside the government writing an objective view of things. Walt routinely suppressed that when I tried to make an issue of it, to get some of it up to the President. I cannot remember the man’s name. He is a very important person. He just wrote some wonderful stuff. Walt was all over the place, on top of everybody’s chain of command, except maybe (Defense Secretary Robert S.) McNamara’s. He didn’t dare put paper on top of McNamara’s memos.

Q: Was Rostow a true believer in the Vietnam effort or was it more that he was responding to what the President wanted?

MOOSE: Walt was a true believer. He was one of the most passionate of the true believers and assembled a staff of true believers around him to write speeches and papers for the President. He brought (Robert W. “Blowtorch Bob”) Komor over there. He really did deeply believe in the worldwide communist conspiracy. He shaped the flow of information and material that went to the President. I came more and more to feel that that was a disservice to the President.

Q: What was your job?
MOOSE: I was Walt’s assistant. I tried to pick up and keep order around Walt. In addition, I had some specific duties. I gradually became the person who coordinated the daily press line between the White House, the State Department, the Defense Department, and USIA, in Washington. I started out by immersing myself in what had been written and said overnight, the Congressional Record. I did that for a while. The press gradually consumed more and more of the time. I would consult early in the morning with the President’s Press Secretary, Bill Moyers at first, and then George Christian. We’d talk about what were the troublesome stories of the day. We’d have a conference call in the morning. I initiated that process of a conference call. We would often hook in the MACV briefing out in Saigon and we would decide how the chief press stories of the day were going to be handled. Sometimes we could decide that ourselves. Sometimes there would be issues that I’d have to go to Walt about. Occasionally, Walt would have to go to the President on them. But that became a major part of my duty. I worked more and more with the White House press office in that regard.

Q: It’s a big world out there. Were you all becoming more and more focused on Vietnam by the time you arrived?

MOOSE: By the time I arrived that was well on the way. By the time I left, it was only rarely that anything else really broke into that. Obviously, things like the Six Day War; the B-47 that went down in Greenville with a nuclear weapon on it; [this may be a reference to a nuclear armed B-52 which crashed in Greenland in 1968] the famine in India; other things would arise, but it was increasingly Vietnam from dawn 'til dark.

Q: Was there a change in the atmosphere, particularly as the media began to turn around this time? Was there a sense of being besieged?

MOOSE: Both literally and figuratively. My wife and my children were out marching around the White House in demonstrations against the war. In 1967, Lyndon Johnson found it very difficult to make public appearances here in the U.S. Our travel was mainly to military bases. Because of the close working relationship that I had to have with the White House Press Office, I became closer to the people really close to Johnson than I would have been ordinarily. I became a part of the usual advance party for trips and traveled with Johnson both in the United States and overseas because of that. We were always on the Vietnam issue one way or another, and we’d go to Fort Bragg or to El Toro Naval Air Station. We could go to military bases because there the crowds could be controlled and the President wouldn’t be under attack. He took quite a lot of foreign trips. They didn’t have the same problems there. But it was a siege mentality. The press was against us. It was very hard. We had a stable of flacks who were grinding out stuff and speeches for people to use—Ben Ladenberg and a group of people down there whose job was to crank out speeches and Op-Ed pieces and send them to the Hill or anyplace and find people in the academic community or elsewhere who would speak up and say things for the President. Walt worked at that quite a lot.

Q: How about with the academic world? Also, was it more difficult to find supporters
there?

MOOSE: Yes, it was. And Johnson became very sensitive about the academic community. One night, I was there late. The State Department was particularly anxious to try to get some list of Ambassadors through the approval process over at the White House, something that I saw a lot of later on in other jobs. So, Ben urged me to try to find out where this piece of paper was. So, as I tracked it around, I eventually traced to Marvin Watson, who was the President’s de-facto chief of staff. If you wanted to get something done, you had to go to Marvin. He had been president of the Lonestar Steel Company down in Texas. He was the guy to see. Marvin was very gruff and fierce and intensely loyal to President Johnson. So, I tracked the piece of paper to Marvin Watson’s office and I got in to see him. He was annoyed enormously by this whole business because he didn’t like the State Department. He thought there was a very suspect group over there, because they dealt with foreigners and the idea that we were going to appoint these Ambassadors and go over there. One of them had an academic background of some sort. It set Watson off. Watson went on a long tirade that was Lyndon Johnson-like about the academic community, but he listened to my argument about the Ambassadors. He said, “I’ll show you what this is like.” He takes me with him into President Johnson’s office with the piece of paper, whereupon Johnson set off on pretty much a carbon copy of the tirade that Watson had gone through. I remember Johnson saying as he looked at the list of Ambassadors, many of whom were political appointees: “None of these people should be Ambassadors. If only I had 25 jobs that I could put people like these into, I could put them someplace and they wouldn’t do any harm. The country would be a lot better.” I came to agree with that very much later on. He didn’t care for the [academic community?] They were always getting together and signing letters and calling on him to stop the war. It just drove him up the wall.

Q: In the NSC, was there any effort to say that we should pull out? Were there rational plans of action?

MOOSE: No, until the so-called “wisemen’s exercise,” there was never any effort that I knew of to put, or to allow alternatives to be put, to Johnson about what to do. They all thought they knew what he wanted to do and that they (Rostow, Rusk, and the CIA) never seemed to entertain any doubts. I leave McNamara out of this because at some point along there, he parted company with them, but that was not at all obvious at the time. The knowledge of that was very closely held. It was interesting. It was during the period that I was there that the Pentagon Papers project was created, which was the first effort I ever saw to try to assemble a record an objective view of what had happened. I thought it was entirely historical. That’s how I first met Leslie Gelb, who was over at the Pentagon. Les introduced himself and came over to seek my assistance in trying to get certain kinds of appears to make them a part of the historical record of the Pentagon Papers. What the Pentagon Papers did not succeed at getting a good picture of—and this was not specifically what Leslie was looking for at the time—was the pieces of paper that Walt put on top of the memorandum of things that would go to the President.

Q: Was the raw data that was coming in calling into question the basic government of
South Vietnam?

MOOSE: Their staying power would be questioned or the political vicissitudes of the moment would be examined, but it’s quite surprising in retrospect how the shortcomings of the Saigon regime or the ARVIN or its commanders—what to many were blaring shortcomings never really resulted in fundamental questions being posed. In the first place, Rusk wouldn’t have it. Rostow wouldn’t have it. The CIA was conflicted to some extent, but by and large they supported what was going on in the policy alternatives. There was the interlude there where there was the great controversy over the NVA-VC order of battle, where you had one part of the CIA maintain that the NVA-VC order of battle was far larger than MACV, or the rest of the CIA believed it was or that Walt Rostow wanted to believe it was. There was great controversy over that. We had meetings in the Situation Room. Walt and George Carver at the CIA succeeded in suppressing most of that. I’m not sure much sense of that ever got to Johnson or got to him coupled to any sort of analysis that says: “If A, then B. If it really is that big, then what does it say about the pacification effort? What does it say about our ability to deal with the situation there?” I don’t recall that it ever resulted in that going to Johnson. It was internal only.

Q: If you have a leader who has a policy, the apparatus around him begins to support the policy and makes it even worse not to understand the questions.

MOOSE: Exactly. The Presidents don’t get ______ to ______ frame the questions. It just never happened.

Q: Prior to early 1968, was there a feeling of optimism or that there was light at the end of the tunnel within the NSC staff down at your level?

MOOSE: It would go up and down. They would work very hard to try to see some light at the end of the tunnel. They would grab on almost anything. Anything that would constitute positive news, Rostow couldn’t get it up to the President fast enough. He had all these people out there who were looking for good things. From time to time, they believed that they were getting the thing under control. To Rostow’s credit, in a limited sense, the morning of Tet, January 1968, I was called in during the middle of the night. We went in as the attack mounted. I remember just as dawn was breaking, we began to talk about what the White House would have to say about it when it had to say something first thing in the morning. Of course, if it were today [with] CNN, you’d have to think about standing out there in the front yard of the White House in the middle of the night and having something to say about it, but in those days, you could get away with not having anything to say until sometime later in the morning. The President was going to have to have something to say by briefing time, if not before. Walt believed fervently that Tet was going to constitute a great victory for the Americans and the South Vietnamese over the VC. He believed that in defeating the attack, turning back the attack, the VC would have been decimated. We know in retrospect that their losses were absolutely horrendous, that in fact they were very badly damaged. In that sense, Walt was right. The only reason why I don’t give him more credit is, Walt wanted to see a victory in almost any engagement that occurred. Therefore, I couldn’t see beyond the absolutely
devastating public relations scene of the firefight and the Embassy and all of the rest of that. With some difficulty, we persuaded Walt to send up a different kind of a draft statement to the President. He wanted to send up a victory statement. None of us thought that would work.

*Q:* It was fairly early in the game anyway. There was the fact that the Viet Cong was exposing itself and this made it a lot easier to knock them off.

MOOSE: That’s what Walt said. He said: “They’re out there now. We can see them. We couldn’t see them before. Now we can destroy them and we will.”

*Q:* But early on, we were still taking some pretty heavy licks. Our Embassy was being attacked.

MOOSE: And other actions across the country.

*Q:* Hue, all sorts of things.

MOOSE: Yes. That went on for several days. There was no way to go out and claim it was a great victory. But I had already told Walt by that time that I wanted to leave. I had, by virtue of having to read most everything that was written in the press about the war, come to place much more faith in a selection of reporters than I did in what we got out of the Embassy or MACV or the intelligence community.

*Q:* Was there a concern within the NSC about what I gather was somewhat split reporting? On the military side, you had these hamlet evaluation reports, which were a military thing which—according to the military context—its promotion depended upon your having good hamlets. There was an exaggeration. The Embassy officers without that career problem of going out and reporting something different. I don’t say they were that far apart, but there was a real discrepancy. Was that apparent by the things that were coming in to you?

MOOSE: That kind of reporting at that level from the field and the Embassy would not normally get to Rostow. If it got to him, it wouldn’t get through him. I got sent a fair amount of it by friends over at the Department. There was less of it than you would imagine. If you go back and look at who were the chiefs of the political sections and the DCMs and Ambassadors at that time, there was no great tolerance for that kind of stuff.

*Q:* Did Rostow go to Saigon?

MOOSE: No. I don’t think Rostow went. I think the only time that Rostow went during the time that I worked for him was when the President made the surprise visit to Cam Ranh Bay in the course of a stay in Manila for this SEATO conference in the fall of ’66. We went to Manila for SEATO and then did some other travel in the area. We were trying to round up more flags for Vietnam. We flew in to Cam Ranh Bay. I don’t remember Rostow going. I may be wrong about that, but I don’t think he did. I used to say—and I
quit saying it because I wasn’t really sure it was accurate on the Rostow side—that it was ironic that neither Fulbright nor Rostow ever went to Vietnam. Walt may have gone, but I don’t think so.

Q: The cards were always stacked, but there wasn’t a possibility of talking to people without going through the Embassy or MACV filter.

MOOSE: You had to work at it very hard, as I discovered later on when I worked for the Foreign Relations Committee from the end of ’68 through ’76. I did repeated reporting trips to Vietnam and the rest of Southeast Asia for the Foreign Relations Committee. Jim Lowenstein, another refugee from the State Department, and I developed our own approach to doing that. But you really had to work at it very hard, much in the same way that journalists did but, with a little better access than they had. But it wasn’t easy to do. In the later years that I went there for the Committee, in the early ’70s, I did rely a lot on the Foreign Service officers in the field who would allow me to see things for myself. I remember visiting any number of places, usually people that I knew, but sometimes not. Frank (G.) Wisner (II), for example, I visited down in the Delta someplace. While Frank was a true believer in the war, at the same time, he was an honest reporter, as many of the other Foreign Service officers were. If you’d see them out there someplace, as usual, the further you got from headquarters the more apt you were to see things as they really were. But at that time, with the Administration as embattled as it was, it was rare that you got an opportunity. I remember Robert Chaplin, who wrote on Vietnam and Southeast Asia matters for The New Yorker for many years, I was a devotee of his reporting—his “Letter from Saigon;” long pieces of reportage about what was going on. A much more multifaceted picture of politics, Army intrigue, operations, and activities. Chaplin believed in the correctness of the war so that always at the end of his piece, he would say that things hopefully were going to get better, that this was the right thing to do—we ought to do A rather than B because it was more apt to bring success. I remember once arguing with Walt that we ought to get Chaplin in to see the President. Chaplin was a true believer like Walt was, but Chaplin had a lot of fine-grained details that the President might find interesting. I was naively believing that if you could just get some keen observer, a truth teller—someone who could understand the situation, then they’d make a different kind of decision. In this case, I succeeded in getting Chaplin in to see the President. The President asked me one question and Chaplin was probably not more than two paragraphs into an answer before the President cut him off and then proceeded to lecture him for the better part of half an hour. Chaplin left and never had the chance to say anything.

Q: How soon after Tet did you leave?

MOOSE: Tet was in January. I couldn’t leave in the immediate aftermath of that. Then the B-52 went down. Then they took one of our boats into Cambodia, the Mayaguez incident. So, there was just a string of things that happened early on.

Q: The Mayaguez happened later. [May 1975]
MOOSE: Maybe so. At any rate, a couple of things happened. I had come to the point where I had been extremely skeptical about the war when I had gone, but I believed that it could be prosecuted in a more humane way, wound down, that we could get rid of the bad elements, and that there was sufficient political strength of legitimacy in the South, if we just found the right combination. I increasingly despaired about our finding either politically or militarily the right combination, that it was impossible to do. After the whole experience with General (William) Westmoreland coming back and all of that, the way Lyndon Johnson overpowered Westmoreland to keep him from making a request after Tet that Johnson couldn’t grant, and just all of this, I couldn’t work with Walt anymore. I couldn’t be loyal to the President or to the Administration. I wasn’t going to stay inside and be disloyal. I just couldn’t stand it anymore. I wasn’t about to go out and join the protest or anything of the sort, but I knew that it was untenable to stay there. So, I told Walt that I wanted to leave. Walt gave me three copies [of his book The Stages of Economic Growth]. My first day I worked for Walt, he gave me an autographed copy of The Stages of Economic Growth with a very warm inscription in it: “To Dick on joining the fun.” This is revealing of the way Rostow looked at it. At some midpoint on some occasion, maybe Christmas, Walt gave me another copy with a slightly more restrained inscription in it. When I left, he gave me an autographed copy of the book, forgetting that he had already given me two copies of it. So, I have three copies of The Stages of Economic Growth.

Q: Did you see a change in Rostow? Was he closed?

MOOSE: No, he thrived on it. I remember the morning of Tet that I was referring to a minute ago, Walt with his shirttail out in the pre-dawn hours rushing upstairs. He said, seeing the consternation of others around him, “Don’t moan. Organize.” I’ve often remembered that. He seemed to thrive on being [in a crisis?]__________.

Q: So, he didn’t become more beleaguered the way Johnson did.

MOOSE: No. I don’t think he ever doubted.

Q: You were talking about Moyers. Let’s go into a little more detail about his role.

MOOSE: Bill Moyers in the interregnum between Bundy and Rostow was quite interested, was becoming increasingly interested in foreign affairs. I was aware of that, but I did not know until Francis Bator, who was Rostow’s assistant, told me one time later that Moyers would, from time to time, actually convene meetings of the NSC staff and other meetings down there and that Moyers really wanted the job; that indeed at one point Johnson promised it to him and Moyers was in fact on the way down. They were going to announce that day that Moyers was going to take it over and Johnson changed his mind. I always knew that that was a very close thing. I didn’t know that it really came that close until last year. One time up at Harvard I was talking to Francis Bator about those days and he recounted that to me and said he was absolutely sure that that was the case. Francis stayed on as Walt’s deputy. Moyers, George Christian, some of the other political advisors closer to Johnson like Harry McPherson or a couple of other people up
there, had very serious doubts about the war and were increasingly disturbed and uncomfortable with it. But it made no appreciable impact on things.

One of the interesting things that I remember is the occasion of McNamara’s departure. It was apparent to us inside that Johnson wanted McNamara to go. McNamara clearly couldn’t stay. The people who knew of McNamara’s views—not a very wide circle of people—were pleading with him to resign over the war, make an issue of it, but he would not do that. I watched the inside of the elaborate ballet by which Johnson worked it out with George Woods at the World Bank that Woods would resign and that McNamara would be chosen as the successor. It was a case of McNamara [gap in interview].

I always felt McNamara by that time fully understood the burden of his responsibility for Johnson having gone as deeply and stayed as long as he had in Vietnam. Johnson had more confidence in McNamara than anybody else in the Cabinet. McNamara had always told him that he could do it. McNamara knew the responsibility that he bore, couldn’t bring himself to resign on Johnson on the issue of principle or his disagreement, and Johnson didn’t dare fire McNamara because of the firestorm that that would have created. So there was a very peculiar balance that evolved there and they had to work out a way for McNamara to go without having an impact on the surface of things. Gradually, it was worked out that in some way Johnson would become aware that McNamara would like to have the Bank job and would accept it if it was offered and that it would be offered—but they had to put all that in place. I watched that through the eyes of Moyers and Christian.

Q: Do you think it would have made a difference if Moyers had become National Security Advisor?

MOOSE: I think he would have raised questions that Rostow wouldn’t have. If you put questions, hard questions, back to the bureaucracy and back to the military and to the intelligence community, you would have gotten a much more mixed picture of things. Johnson would have understood earlier than he did that the war was unwinnable.

Q: What about the press corps not out in the field but at the White House? Did they understand what the situation was?

MOOSE: They were not a lot of deep thinkers there. But there were a few and they were very interested. The ones who stand out in my mind were Peter Lisagore of the Chicago Sun-Times, not a well-known journalist to the public at large, but very respected by journalists and by the White House press corps, a fiercely independent, highly intelligent, man; and Hugh Sidey, who was the Time-Life correspondent. Hugh became much more conservative later on in his life. Many of us do. But at that time, neither Hugh nor Peter were anti-war. They didn’t take those kind of views. But they were of a very skeptical mind. They knew how to evaluate what they read from Southeast Asia; Terry, The New York Times correspondent not quite in the class of them; Chuck Bailey of the Minneapolis Tribune, a splendid reporter, very skeptical. They would push and tug around the edges. They were aware that there were divisions within the White House. I saw a fair amount of them. I traveled a lot with the press corps on these foreign trips. I took all of the
foreign trips that Johnson took ’66-’67, early ’68. I flew with these people a lot. (Robert) Bob Pierpoint of CBS, who was an excellent reporter. I forget who was there for the Washington Post. It may have been Murray Marder. There weren’t very many [skeptics?]. Most of them followed the path and the path followed the White House line.

Q: What do you recall about the Six Day War in October of ’67 when Nasser was attacked by the Israelis as he was getting ready to do his own thing?

MOOSE: The thing that I remember about that was intense concern about the Russian reaction, the fear that somehow if the Israelis didn’t stop, the Russians could become involved on the Egyptian side. I’m ashamed to say that’s about the only recollection I have of it. My recollection is that they used the hotline with Moscow during that period. I wouldn’t swear to it, but I believe that’s the case. I know we activated it and tested it. There was very great concern about that. I don’t remember much more than that.

Q: It helps point out how focused you all were on Vietnam.

MOOSE: Yes. That’s the first time I ever met Mr. Vance down in the Situation Room. I sat in on some meeting. But it was very focused. In December of ’67, Prime Minister (Harold) Holt of Australia was swept away bathing on a beach in Australia and there was a memorial service organized for him. The decision was made for the President to go as a mark of solidarity with the Australians. If incidentally other Asian leaders would show up, it would be a good time to lobby them on Vietnam. So, I went off on a C-130 about six or eight hours ahead of the President to help organized the trip out there. Then we made a jog up to Tan Nhut Air Base in Thailand and then Johnson decided—in an effort to try to get the Pope to weigh in to try to help stop the war or at least to stop being so much of a problem—that he’d go see the Pope. So, instead of coming back, we went on the rest of the way around the world. So, we stopped in Pakistan and there was all consumed with Vietnam. We did make a trip to Punta Del Este, Uruguay, once that wasn’t consumed with Vietnam. We went to the Adenauer funeral in Bonn. There wasn’t too much of a Vietnam emphasis at that time, but mostly it was Vietnam from dawn ‘til dark.

Q: I’m told that from a Foreign Service point of view a Johnson visit was equivalent to a typhoon if you were overseas. Not only was it a normal presidential thing, but he was an extremely demanding person on many things. Did you get caught up in any of that?

MOOSE: Oh, yes, I did, especially because I did these advances: Manila, the SEATO conference, the occasional trip to Cam Ranh Bay. He had a very limited diet. There were more things that he didn’t like than there were things that he liked. I remember some Air Force mess sergeants making repeated batches of tapioca pudding in a bathtub in the old Manila hotel, trying to get it exactly the right consistency for the President because if it was wrong, there would be hell to pay. At the Holt memoriam service in Australia, they cooked lamb chops on the airplane because—the most wonderful lamb chops in the world—Johnson got on and he got halfway up the steps and said, “I smell goat. Somebody’s been cooking goat in my airplane.” He made them take all the chops off and fumigate the airplane because he couldn’t stand the smell. We were getting ready to go to
Bonn. George (C.) McGhee, a Texas oilman and career diplomat, was the Ambassador and wanted the President to stay at the Ambassador’s residence. Of course, Secret Service will have none of it because it is right on the street. So, he went to the DCM’s residence, which is down in a parklike area. Johnson was very particular about his bathtub and his bathwater. They changed the bathtub. They had to redo the hot-water heater. Johnson was annoyed by any number of things about the bed. There was a big problem in Manila, too, of some sort. He was volcanic and very petty about little stuff. I was physically afraid of Lyndon Johnson. I never knew what the guy was going to do—not that I ever saw him hit anybody—but I just was afraid of him. He was big and he’d do all of these really angry kinds of things sometimes. He could be mean and cruel. He would mimic people. In the Manila hotel one night, he was sitting around mimicking Bill Bundy. It was sidesplitting, but it was also very cruel. He would make big waves wherever he went. When we landed in Karachi on the trip around the world, my main job was to make sure that the famous camel driver who he met when he was Vice President—who we were warned was going to be on hand—didn’t get anywhere near the President. I succeeded, fortunately. Otherwise, I might not be here. He could be really angry about things.

Q: I’m told Lady Bird Johnson did have a certain calming influence on him.

MOOSE: She could be absolutely wonderful. Yes, she did. When we were in Bangkok on a SEATO trip, the King and Queen of Thailand were giving a white-tie dinner for the President and his wife. The President was going to give a speech the next day at Chulalongkorn University. Harry McPherson was in charge of writing the speech. The Thais were very careful and didn’t want to get committed on the war. Johnson was determined to commit them. The Thais are so careful and so polite and he was such a raging bull in the china shop that everyone was on needles and pins the whole time. Harry was trying to write the speech so as not to offend the Thais’ sensibilities, but to make it forceful enough to please the President. So, he just went through repeated drafts of it. I was working with him in some minor capacity. But I was around when Harry would go over the speech with the President. We’d go over to the guest palace, where the President and Mrs. Johnson were staying, on the main palace grounds, to go over what was to have been—we hoped—the last draft of the speech. Johnson was sitting there in his underwear and his undershirt, barefooted, at a desk that would have been big enough for most Thais but certainly was not big enough for Lyndon Johnson. He was going through Harry’s speech and just ripping apart page after page of Harry’s draft and going on ranting and raving about each one. Lady Bird comes in and says, “Lyndon, we’re supposed to be ready for the King and Queen in about 30 minutes.” He didn’t give any sign that he heard what she said at all. She goes back out and comes back about five minutes later and says, “Lyndon, it’s less than half an hour until the King and Queen are going to be arriving.” He kept on and on. Finally, she says, “Lyndon, you really must stop. The King and Queen will be downstairs in five minutes.” He’s still sitting there in his underwear. She comes in one more time and says, “Lyndon, the King and Queen are downstairs. You can’t keep the King waiting.” Johnson looked up, for the first time showing any sign that he’d heard any of this, and says, “Why, what’s he going to do?” He went on ranting and raving. He kept the King waiting for over half an hour downstairs while we finally got up and went out. He could be like that.

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Q: You left in the spring of ’68.

MOOSE: I had lunch with Peter Lisagore and Hugh Sidey at the Washington Hotel. They gave a farewell lunch for me. I was leaving. We had gotten to be close friends. Peter had just seen old Judge So and So, who was a very close friend of the President’s. He didn’t come up very often. He had seen the President and Peter had talked to him. Both of them talked to him. They often did things together. They weren’t competitors in any way. But they had both seen him. He had told them that he thought Johnson would renounce the presidency, that he might not serve out his term. We spent most of the lunch analyzing this and trying to see—

We didn’t any of us for a minute believe there could be any truth to it, but we were all trying to analyze what game it was that Lyndon was playing. Obviously, there was some wise strategy. He had sent the judge out to spread the story. What was going to be the aftermath of it? As it happened, the judge had it absolutely right. Lyndon had not put him up to it. Peter talked to him later about it again. It was on March 17th that Johnson made his speech and said he wouldn’t run again. So, I left a couple of days before that. I don’t think it would have affected me, although conceivably it might have. George Christian [gap in interview] I went over to work on a project for the Ford Foundation. Rockefeller and Ford sponsored a study on the President and the management of national security. I wrote two chapters in that—the one on the State Department and the one on the NSC. It was to be done for the President-elect. Part of my work was on the NSC staff. I was working on that when the Paris Peace Talks began in May. Christian asked me to come back and to ostensibly work with the press corps at the talks but really to be another set of eyes and ears. They really hoped that something would come of the talks and they were very skeptical that they would lead anywhere.

Q: Could you describe the Peace Talks? This was when?

MOOSE: It was May ’68. It coincided with the riots in Paris. I stayed there. I was really the pipeline to Christian and those people in the White House who wanted something to happen but felt that in the hands in which we were, it wasn’t likely to happen. Enormous confusion; skepticism that Johnson would really make a deal. The belief that he wouldn’t let the negotiations be successful, that it was really an effort to put the blame on Hanoi for not agreeing. I don’t think that was the case. I don’t think Hanoi was [gap in interview]. We hadn’t come to the point where our politics [permitted?], unless the President would have been prepared to do a major about face, which just was too hard for him to do. I came to the conclusion early on that it wouldn’t work, that nothing would happen. I had gotten to know Standly Tarnell by that time. Jack Chancellor was there. They were extremely well informed on the other side. They told me that there was no way that the ___North Vietnamese________ would _______ allow ______ anything approaching the kind of deal that Johnson could sign on to happen. So, I was never very hopeful about it. I stayed until July or August and went back to my other work.

Q: Harriman was the head of the delegation. How was he going at it?
MOOSE: I think Harriman would have made a deal, but I don’t think there was a deal there to be made. I always felt Harriman would have made a deal. (Philip Charles) Phil Habib, if there was a deal to be made, would have found a way to do it. I knew Phil a little bit. Not as well as I came to know him later, but I knew him well enough to have a little bit of contact with him, although he felt rightly that I was a White House spy. He had been stalwart in Saigon and in defense of Johnson in the war, but he was one of those people who was capable of seeing the thing another way and, if there was a way to be found to have made a deal, I think Phil would have helped Harriman make it. Harriman could be awfully rigid, but Phil could have probably brought him around if there was a deal to be done. But I don’t think Johnson was at the point where he was willing to pay the price that he would have had to pay. I think Johnson could have done it, and done it in a way the country would have been torn up, and maybe Hubert would have been elected.

Q: When you left in early summer of ‘68, you went back to where?

MOOSE: We were actually working at IDA. They gave us space over there. I went back over and worked on the study. The formula that had been decided upon before I joined the study was that people would do their chapters and then each person would select three people to vet their chapter. One was supposed to be a liberal, one a conservative, and one somebody who was in the middle. I got Richard Neustadt to read my NSC work and a man named William Kaplan, who had been a director of the Bureau of the Budget and was a much-admired civil servant. The third person was Henry Kissinger. The Rockefeller campaign had collapsed by that time. So, Kissinger did not have an active political identification, but he had an interest in bureaucratic politics and my chapter was mainly prospective—like all of them were. There were three alternative models of organizing the White House staff. One of them was a state-centered plan. One of them was a White House-centered plan. The other one was the middle option, the one that I meant to be attractive. Henry was immediately attracted to the strong White House option and tweaked that one considerably. Then when, to everyone’s surprise, Nixon picked Henry as his national security advisor, Kissinger asked for the study and he and Mort Halperin took that as one of the things that they took into account when they thought how they would organize its staff.

I was very close to Larry Eagleburger from when I was in the Foreign Service. He was the transition person for the State Department. That was mainly through his connection with (Melvin) Mel Laird. He came to know Henry very well, and through Larry, Henry decided to bring me on as the Executive Secretary of the NSC. Then he decided that he didn’t want an Executive Secretary, even somebody as politically impotent as myself. So, he said, after first having agreed that I’d be the Executive Secretary, that I couldn’t have the title, so I made up the title “Staff Secretary.” I set about organizing the NSC staff for him. One of the first things we did [gap in interview] Henry was still wrestling on NSSM#1, which was the organization of foreign affairs. It was all patterned on this White House-centered system. He was trying to sell it to Nixon. Nixon was still very skeptical of Henry at this point because of the Rockefeller association. I remember, the hate mail that poured in about Henry Kissinger because he was a member of the Trilateral
Commission and the Council on Foreign Relations, the subjects of well-known communist conspiracies. But (H.R.) Haldeman and (John D.) Erlichman held him in very well regard. Henry’s first effort to push his takeover plan through didn’t succeed. Nixon was down at Palm Beach and he didn’t approve the thing. He didn’t disapprove it, but he sent it back with a note on it that said, “Show this to Andy Goodpastor and see what he thinks.” I had in the writing of my study of the NSC staff gotten into the history of the thing to try to understand how the staff had evolved in the way that it had. I had been fascinated. I had been very intrigued by the Eisenhower period to try to figure out how the real business got done. What we know of the Eisenhower period, what the standard picture is, were these elaborate sets of committees, Operations Coordinating Committee, etc. There were layers of layers of committees. I couldn’t understand—having worked for Rostow, seeing fast paper going through and knowing the operational needs of the national security community—how anybody ever got anything done. I kept asking questions in my interviews of the three people who had been Executive Secretaries up to that point. One of them [Paul Hare] said, “You’ve got to find Andy Goodpastor. He was the one who handled the papers.” Andy was a colonel on loan from the Pentagon to the Executive Secretary of the NSC staff and he handled the action paper. But he was a totally modest and self-effacing man. Nobody ever realized how important Goodpastor was. Goodpastor was over at the War College. I went over to see him. I gave him the preliminary. I said, “I can’t figure out how the thing worked. Who got things down?” In this very modest way, Goodpastor would tell me about how the Secretary of the Treasury or the Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense would send these papers over and he would take care of them. He was the key guy. He was the guy who got things done. He had a couple of people who worked for him. He did one very important thing that I discovered then. At the time, I made a note of it. I had no idea how important it was going to be. He was scrupulous about keeping the Vice President informed and in the flow of information. This was Richard Nixon. I understood immediately when the piece of paper came back and said, “Show this to Andy Goodpastor.” To Nixon, Andy Goodpastor was the last person in the world who would have wanted a White House-centered system. Goodpastor believed in keeping the responsibility out where it’s supposed to be. He wouldn’t go for any White House-centered system.

So Henry does a con job on Goodpastor. Goodpastor was not a scheming bureaucrat. That was one of the attractive aspects of the man. Goodpastor didn’t understand what Henry meant to do. I don’t think he saw on the page the living system that would emerge from it and did emerge from it. He contented himself with a few tweaks here and there that he thought would be enough to give some protections to the Cabinet agencies and then he said that he thought it probably would be a good idea to have a young colonel in there to help handle the intelligence. This is how he started. So, Henry said, “Ah, yes, obviously, we need a young colonel.” He has me call Fritz (G.A.) Kraemer, his old mentor. Fritz comes in to see Henry. Henry tells him he needs some colonel who he can trust. So, Fritz gives him three names. Among the three names that he gives him is Al Haig. So, he does that. Haig goes up, interviews with Henry at the Plaza Hotel. I’m up there for the interview and arrive back on the train with Haig. I talked to him on the way back.

I was horrified by Haig. I wrote Henry a note when I got back warning them that Haig is
an empire builder and is the guy who I would not trust around the corner. Henry not only hires Haig anyway, but he later showed Haig my note! When Haig and I shared an office right next to Henry’s down there in the basement, it was not a very happy arrangement. Haig immediately fell into league with Haldeman and Erlichman, in the first instance, protecting himself; in the second instance, actually helping Henry because he told Haldeman and Erlichman, “Keep an eye on this guy.” That’s what they did. That was quite a [gap in interview]. He’d keep an eye on Henry for them. Could they trust Henry? Could they trust his staff? Al carried the wire taps. He was the one who would review them before they went to Henry. I put up with that for about six months and then I went to Henry and said, “I’m supposed to be running the staff. I’m not running the staff. If I was running the staff, I wouldn’t run it the way you want it run. Let’s just call it quits. I’ve got a couple of ideas of things I might do. I’m not mad. I’m just not having any fun.” He looked at me, uncomprehending, and said, “You’re not having any fun?” I said, “No. I’ve learned that it’s not worth staying in a job where you don’t have any fun, especially if you’re working really hard. You’ve got to have some fun.” So, I leave. He says, “Well, I’ll talk to you tomorrow.” He couldn’t imagine that anybody would actually leave. He calls Haig in, I learned later. Haig comes to see me later on in the afternoon. He says, “Damn Henry.” He starts bad-mouthing Henry. I said, “Al, it won’t work. I’m going. Henry I know has sent you to find out why I’m really going. I told Henry that I was going because I’m not having any fun.” Haig says, “Well, he’s really a terrible person to work for.” I said: “Yes, he’s a terrible person to work for, but he’s got to do it his way and that’s not my way and I’m not going mad. I just want to go quiet.” (Robert H.) Bob Finch, who was the lieutenant governor of California and the person who managed Nixon’s 1960 campaign, was Secretary of HEW. Finch had wanted to establish a secretariat and had asked me to come over and talk to them about how they could do that in HEW, which is a totally unmanageable cabinet agency. He had an idea that he could get a hold of it if he had a secretariat. So, Haig goes back and tells Henry that I’m quitting because I don’t like his policy on the war. So, Henry calls me in. I said, “Henry, that is an utter totally unabashed lie. The war never came up, except Haig brought it up. It doesn’t have anything to do with it whatsoever. I just want to go. Please do one thing for me. Just say something nice to Bob Finch. That’s all I want. Just let me go and you’ll never hear a word about me. Just let me go.” I don’t know whether he ever said anything to Finch or not, but Finch when I got over there, we talked about it for a while. He was having a hard time getting [along in] the Administration, too, with the same characters and they had put a political commissar over there watching him. He said, “Dick, I will tell you, I’m not at all sure I’m going to stay here. You might want to talk to Pat Gray before you make up your mind.” So, I go down and talk to Pat Gray, who is the commissar, and then to Fred Malek. He said, “Go talk to Malek, too.” I talked to Malek and Gray. By that time, I could hardly get out of the building quick enough. So, I started back up to the Hill and went to see Mo. Then I went over to the Foreign Relations Committee and saw Carl Marcy. Marcy said, “Well, just by chance, Bill Bader is just resigning and there is going to be an opening. The personnel committee is going to interview people and I’ll put your name on the list.” The personnel committee was Fulbright, (George) Aiken (R-Vt.), and Senate Majority Leader (Mike) Mansfield. They interviewed me and said, “We’ve talked about some stuff.” I said, “I would be very pleased to come” and they all started on Vietnam. They asked me what I had done at the White House. I played down Vietnam a
lot and said: “I really don’t want to work on Vietnam. I’d like to work on other kinds of things, not Vietnam. I just don’t feel that I can leave there and come up here. I’m just not comfortable doing that.” Luckily, I got the job. Within six months, I found myself working on Vietnam. I did work on the Geneva protocol and on some African issues, the Nigerian civil war and some other stuff for a little while before we got going. But that was how I left.

Q: We’ll pick this up next time.

MOOSE: One vignette about Henry and the NSC staff: As he was putting his staff together, Richard Allen had been named as the Deputy National Security Advisor before Henry had been named as the National Security Advisor. So, in one of my first meetings after the inauguration, I was over there with Henry and said, “Henry, what in the world shall I do with Allen?” I thought he was maddening. Henry says, “Give him the biggest office in the place and no telegrams.” Henry didn’t trust him either.

Q: We’ll pick this up when you’re going to the Foreign Relations Committee.

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Today is Today is May 25, 1999. Dick, when did you go to the Foreign Relations Committee?

MOOSE: I went there in probably July of 1968.

Q: You were with them for how long?

MOOSE: I stayed there until January of 1977. I had been a member of the transition team for the Carter Administration, beginning after the election of November of ’76. I stayed on the FR payroll for quite a while, but I think I formally resigned from that staff in ’77 when I took up temporary appointment at State pending my confirmation to be Deputy Under Secretary for Management.

Q: Let’s talk about the summer of ’68. You went to the FRC. What was your position there?

MOOSE: I can’t remember whether we’ve gone over the Paris Peace Talks of ’68. I resigned from the White House, effective March 17. Johnson announced he wouldn’t run again on March 30th. In May, the Peace Talks in Paris with the North Vietnamese began. The White House asked me—mainly George Christian—to come back temporarily into the government service and be a part of the Vietnam talks delegation in Paris.

Q: Let’s talk about that. I don’t think we covered that.

MOOSE: There was NSC representation, but I had developed during the time that I was in the White House close ties and relationships through the White House press office that
really were somewhat independent of my role with Walt Rostow. I had been the coordinator of the daily line on Vietnam at the request of the White House press office. That had brought me close to Bill Moyers, George Christian, and with a tie somewhat to the President in that way. When the Peace Talks opened, the press office, Christian and others there close to the President, like Lloyd Hackler, were keen that they had an ear on what was going on. They asked me would I go to Paris, be a part of the delegation. They imposed me on the State Department and the rest of the delegation. I attached myself to the press operation there, which was a logical thing to do, and worked through the first month or so in Paris as it got going. I kept my contacts at the White House apprized in continuing the basis of how things were going. I saw a lot of heavy duty during that period and had a sense of what was unrolling, but I was not much involved in the substance of what happened there. I stayed there until well into August.

**Q:** Sometimes the press is an instrument in the negotiations and sometimes it’s not. How did you feel it was being used?

**MOOSE:** Habib mainly used his individual contacts with the press to create the image, the impression, that things were going forward, that the talks would lead someplace. There was a great deal of anticipation, this was a time that, although he had renounced running again, people who were very close to President Johnson felt that it was a kind of a statement that he could undo and might have been tempted to do so all the way up to the convention.

**Q:** Sort of the draft-type thing.

**MOOSE:** Yes. To come back as a Presidential candidate. Had the talks gone well, had they seemed to presage an early end to the war, I think he might well have turned around and come back. That was one of the reasons why the press office was so keen to stay in touch. Is anything really happening? I couldn’t see that anything was really happening. I thought that the Vietnamese were, from what I could glean, being every bit as tough or tougher than one imagined that they would be. Of course, that was the way it played out for a long time

**Q:** When you came back in August ’68, could you describe ...

**MOOSE:** I took a family vacation out on the West Coast. At the time of the convention in Chicago, Bobby Kennedy’s assassination and so forth, I came back to the FRC.

**Q:** What was the role of the FRC at this time and what were you doing?

**MOOSE:** The Committee was already cast in ’68 as being highly skeptical, if not opposed to the war. Fulbright was chairman. Mike Mansfield was the ranking Democratic Member. There was also John Sparkman of Alabama, Frank Church of Idaho. I’ll think of the rest of the Democrats in a minute. (Richard) Dick Clark, newly elected from Iowa, was on there. On the Republican side, you had, if anything, an even more distinguished group. The Ranking Minority Member was George Aiken. Clifford Case was next in
seniority on the Republican side. Aiken was from Vermont; Case was a liberal Republican from New Jersey. Aiken was already famous for having advised Lyndon Johnson that he should just declare that we had won the war and get out. Also, Jack (Jacob) Javits of New York, whom Fulbright always referred to as “the Committee’s lawyer,” although Fulbright was a lawyer; most of the rest of them were lawyers, too. Fulbright, who didn’t always get along personally with Javits, had a great regard for his ability to craft language and to find compromise. They were oddly paired on that way. Then there was Senator (James B.) Pearson of Kansas, who subsequently gave his name to the Pearson Fellowships. I don’t know whether they still exist or not, but they were a good thing. It was a very distinguished, thoughtful committee. On the Democratic side, Stuart Symington of Missouri. He had been the first Secretary of the Air Force in the Truman Administration and an also-ran presidential candidate in 1960. He was somewhat a gadfly. He had chaired a remarkable landmark series of hearings in ‘64/’65/’66 on U.S. security commitments and agreements abroad. That was a landmark investigation; extremely interesting and important in looking back on the conduct of foreign affairs in those areas.

I was looking back at the still-ongoing series of hearings conducted by Symington on U.S. security agreements and commitments abroad, where a whole host of secret arrangements had been brought to light and explored by the Committee to the embarrassment and intense irritation of the Administration. The agreements for foreign bases, what we had promised various governments, commitments that we had made to Greece, Turkey, Portugal, Spain, in the Far East, Japan, Thailand, just one after another. Two actual councils led by Walter Pincus, later to become a well-known Washington Post reporter (he covered the Pentagon and still writes occasional pieces), they had gone through that web of agreements that had grown up after the end of World War II and as the Cold War unrolled. Symington was hawkish on the one hand, but he believed the war was unwinnable. He was somewhat mercurial, slightly unpredictable—perhaps less cerebral than his some of his colleagues—but a man of deep conviction and political courage. Fulbright by ’68 had taken a critical view of Lyndon Johnson’s conduct. His foreign policy speech on the Dominican Republic was probably the watershed. That must have been ’64 or ’65. Although Fulbright had supported the Tonkin Gulf resolution, by the time of the Dominican Republic and when his Committee staff, Bill Bader, former Foreign Service officer, did an inquiry into the Tonkin Gulf for Fulbright, it was established to the satisfaction of Fulbright and a number of others on the Committee that the facts of the Tonkin Gulf incident had been misrepresented. It helped that Bader was a naval reserve intelligence officer and knew how to read the message traffic, which very few people did at that time. That really deepened Fulbright’s conviction that Johnson was capable of very deep dissembling and deception about the conduct of the war. So Fulbright was not really prepared by that time to believe almost anything that Johnson said. He had taken his last stab at trying to find some modus vivendi with Johnson. In ’66, when I was briefly in his Arkansas office, Fulbright had gone down to the White House with a memorandum that they had worked over for days. He had met with Lyndon Johnson. We all waited with bated breath for his return from the White House. When he came back, we said, “What happened?” He said, “Oh, shit. He gave me a Diet Dr. Pepper and then lectured me for an hour.” So, nothing came of that initiative, to which Fulbright
had _____ [devoted considerable effort?] __________. By ’68, he had already had some of his first and most notable hearings on Vietnam with Rusk. The die was cast as far as that relationship. It was my understanding with the Committee upon going there that I would not work on Vietnam or Southeast Asia. I was really sick of it. Moreover, I didn’t want to be cast as somebody who had left one side and then gone and joined the other and told all the secrets; not that I really thought that there were many secrets to tell. But we agreed that I wouldn’t work on Southeast Asia/Vietnam.

I started working on Africa. I was going to work on some UN issues. I was interested in environmental issues. I wanted to develop that part of the Committee’s agenda more. Along with the Committee staff was Jim Lowenstein, another Foreign Service officer. Jim had the idea of creating a reporting unit. He didn’t like to call it “investigative” and we didn’t really think of it that way; it was a reporting unit for the Committee. His argument was that the Committee really didn’t get very reliable information out of the Executive Branch about foreign affairs issues because of the tensions that had been created coming down—Fulbright’s speech on the Dominican Republic, the Symington investigations that I’ve referred to, the tension that had developed between Fulbright and Johnson and the Administration on the conduct of the war. It’s increasingly hard for the Committee really to know what’s going on because the briefings that come up are contrived and full of information that is designed just to support the Administration’s position. The Committee really doesn’t know what’s going on; they were very poorly informed. They get their information mainly out of the newspaper. They should have better information than that. Jim sold that idea on me. We took the proposal to Fulbright. He discussed it with the senior Members of the Committee. They agreed that we would take a try at seeing what we could do to report for the Committee.

To my consternation somewhat, Fulbright and Aiken and Vance said that we ought to go to Vietnam. I was torn. I recognized the utility of doing it. We were by then [negotiating with North Vietnam] The Paris Peace Talks were May ’68. So, what I’m talking about is the fall of ’68. After I had been to Paris, I came back and completed my work on the project for the Ford Foundation, a book that we did on the President and management of national security. That work was destined to go to the President-elect, whoever he would be. I wrote the chapters on the National Security Council. It was the first history of the NSC staff that had been done. I did a lot of the work on the chapters on the State Department. The NSC chapter turned out to be a critical chapter as the thing unrolled. The description I was giving a minute ago of the FRC describes the state of affairs when I arrived there in the fall of 1969, a year later. So, I came out of Paris, back to ____[the Ford Foundation?] __________ completed the work on the book. In the course of doing my work on the book, I had to select advisors, readers, to read what I had written about the NSC and the State Department: a Democrat, a Republican, and a neutral. I picked Richard Neustadt, a Democrat; Henry Kissinger, a Republican (he had been advisor to Rockefeller ______________ nomination of ’68), and William Kaplan __________, who had been director of the Bureau of the Budget. Kissinger was interested and recalled the work later after Nixon’s election, when he was finally tapped to be the national security advisor after Richard Allen had been tapped to be the deputy national security advisor. Kissinger, remembering this work, got me back in for some
talks through Eagleburger. Kissinger also brought Mort Halperin in and he read up on the war. I got to talk to Halperin, who had been working at the Pentagon. We discussed the notions that I had laid out in there on the chapter on the NSC future possibilities for the council. I laid out three alternatives—a State Department-centered national security process, a White House-centered, and the one that was option C, the throwaway. Henry was interested in the White House-centered. He took what I wrote and made it even stronger and that became the model for the way he organized that staff. I worked during the transition mainly with Eagleburger back and forth to the [hotel] where Henry was. Al Haig was chosen—an interesting story; also how Henry got his design for the NSC past Nixon.

We did not appreciate at the time how suspicious the Nixon entourage was of Henry, but they were deeply so, Haldeman and Erlichman, because they saw him as a Rockefeller person, a liberal, an Eastern Establishment Jew, a lot of things that pushed buttons that that group really couldn’t stand; the CFR Trilateral Commission and other [imagined] conspiracies too numerous to mention.

Henry knew exactly what he wanted to do and how he wanted to do it. He wanted to cut the State Department out of everything. He had two plans. He had the plan as written on the surface in the National Security Decision memorandum that Nixon subsequently improved. Then there was how he actually operated the thing. On the surface, what Henry drew up had many characteristics in common with the Eisenhower NSC apparatus, which was layered, and very complex and many committees and agendas. Henry made it look like that. But really he gave the meeting roles—the sensitive agenda-setting roles—to himself and his own key staff members. Henry was pretty far down the road with it before the cabinet members most concerned ever saw it—(Secretary of State William) Bill Rogers or Secretary of Defense Mel Laird. Nixon had hesitated about it, wasn’t sure about it, asked Kissinger to take it and show it to Andy Goodpastor.

In my researches in history of the NSC staff, I had discovered Andy Goodpastor had been the guy who handled the action paper in the Eisenhower White House. I could not understand how this cumbersome apparatus had ever got anything done in a real-time way. It was one of the great paper mills of all time. Having worked in the Secretariat at the State Department and having worked in the White House with Rostow, I couldn’t imagine that during the Eisenhower Administration there wasn’t some way to move fast important paper. I kept poking at this and interviewing the old timers and finally Paul Hare, who was one of the first Executive Secretaries of the NSC, told me, “The man you need to see is Goodpastor.” He was the one who handled the paper. He had been a fast-rising Army colonel, very self-effacing, modest, as he still is. I tracked down General Goodpastor over at the War College. He began in his own modest way to describe to me his role. Well, he was a real departure from the Executive Secretary of the NSC, which is a statutory position. He was really the guy who moved the paper. He was the one who got things to and from the President. I realized that Goodpastor was far more important to Eisenhower and Nixon than historians had ever really realized. He didn’t pose his own views, but he was a very steady kind of guy who looked after their interests rather than pushing his own views. Then I got intrigued about Goodpastor and wanted to learn more
about him. Goodpastor, as it turns out, was one of the principal people around [Vice President] Nixon, although he never emerged or was seen at the time as that. He was very respectful of the Vice President. He had gone to some pains to make sure that Nixon, when he was Vice President, was informed. He must have been one of the few on the Eisenhower staff who accorded Nixon that kind of respect and Nixon never forgot it. When Henry comes to Nixon with his scheme for organizing the government for the conduct of foreign affairs, the first thing Nixon does is say, “Have you shown this to Andy Goodpastor?” Of course, he hadn’t been anywhere near Andy Goodpastor, but he immediately hunted Goodpastor up and he spun a web around that wonderful gentleman. Goodpastor thought, well, it looked okay to him, but he just wasn’t prepared for somebody as devious as Kissinger. He was too trusting, too good a soul, to understand. On the paper, you couldn’t see it. Everything depended on who you put in those roles and how they played them and what their instructions were. So he tinkered with it a little bit at the edges and said: “Oh, there’s one more thing that would make this a little better. I think you need some better mechanism for ensuring the chiefs that they have a good input and access through this apparatus. Why don’t you get some bright young colonel—probably having in mind his own experience in the Eisenhower Administration—and bring him over here and put him on the staff? He can handle intelligence or something like that.” Henry immediately saw the wisdom of this suggestion from Goodpastor and called his friend, his mentor, Fritz Kraemer, the historian of the U.S. Army, a well-known bulwark of conservative influence on generations of young army officers coming through the Pentagon. He was much more than the Army historian. He was a keeper of a certain kind of flame over there. He was the “discoverer” of Henry Kissinger. He had pulled Kissinger out of the ranks of the Army in Germany and given him the opportunity that brought him to his subsequent fame. Kraemer sends three colonels over. He had a following. He was much like Andy Marshall is today, but not nearly of the balance and wisdom of Marshall; much more ideological. But he sends over three acolytes. One of them was Al Haig. Kissinger interviews all these fellows. I knew that Fritz had sort of indicated that Haig was the one. So, Henry chooses him after meeting with all of them.

I rode back to Washington on the train with Haig. I was horrified by the time I got back to Washington by Haig. I could see that he was consumed with ambition. I had real doubts as to whether this was the kind of self-effacing [person that Goodpastor had been]; it couldn’t have been further even at that time from a model of Andy Goodpastor. I made the mistake of putting my views about this down on paper for Henry, to try to warn him off of this before he committed himself, but he went ahead and committed himself. Not only that, he subsequently showed the memorandum to Haig.

So, I started off not with a good working relationship with Haig, who set about establishing—through his friend Alex Butterworth of subsequent Watergate fame—[links] with Haldeman and Erlichman in a way which was helpful to Henry on the one hand. [However, it] led to the wiretapping of Henry’s staff, myself included, a fact not discovered until sometime later—the tapping of NSC staff plus a number of journalists. This is all a matter of public record now. So, I went to work there for Henry. I was to be the Executive Secretary of the NSC. Henry left it to me to fire Barnlee Smith, a
distinguished—now deceased—public servant who had been the Executive Secretary for a number of years, Smith was a loyal servant who suffered much during the Johnson era but had stayed on the job, was very committed to the institution of the NSC and to a correct relationship with the other cabinet departments, including mainly the State Department. I had worked with him closely while I worked for Rostow. Henry left it to me to tell Smith that he was fired. Henry subsequently told me that he wasn’t going to have an Executive Secretary, that I could make myself up some other title, which I did. I called myself “Staff Secretary.” I went about the business of helping Henry assemble his staff and get things going. It was a place riddled with paranoia from the very beginning. He lumbered a whole lot of study assignments and so forth through his NSC process on the State Department and the rest of the agencies. The real intention was to tie them up writing so many papers that they wouldn’t have time to do anything else.

Henry, while the inaugural parade was going on, put in a brief appearance up there, but he and Larry [Eagleburger] then repaired to the basement of the West Wing, where they got out a series of secret messages from Nixon and Kissinger to world leaders, none of which they ever showed to the State Department until some years later. Rogers was sitting up on the reviewing stand and Henry was down in the basement cranking out letters to world leaders. Rogers knew nothing about it. Henry would do things. Rogers would learn about it. Rogers would call Henry, confront him; Henry would lie or blame it on Eagleburger and me, whatever it was that was going on at the time. Relations were just really terrible, so he started meetings with Elliot Richardson, who was the Deputy Secretary. He got through somebody over there. He’d get hold of Richardson’s agenda before it came over, so he was reading his mail. Richardson caught him at it. Henry said, “This is overzealousness on the part of the staff,” and turned around and glared at Eagleburger and me. It just went on like that. I was trying to build up the staff, find ways to bring on board the people that Henry wanted. Nixon wanted to build a star wars command center under the West Wing of the White House. So, I was put in charge of developing the secret plans for that and getting the money for it. I did. I had to get some things through the Fine Arts Commission because we had to move some trees.

We got a lot of money hidden in the Defense Appropriation Act. We were all ready to start digging and I had done the memorandum to close West Executive Avenue and take away all of the parking places that were out there. All of that parking space adjacent to a garage adjacent over on G Street. The White House staff revolted. Erlichman interposed to stop the thing. In so far as I know, it was never done. There was always something going on. Erlichman was deep into the business of reviewing security clearances for anybody on Henry’s staff. Haig was talking to Haldeman, Erlichman, and Butterworth. I decided that the place was really so paranoid, so strange, that I wanted out. So, I went to Henry and told him that if he wanted me to run the staff, it ought to be run the way Henry wanted it run, but I couldn’t do it. It just was not my style. I wasn’t having any fun. I wanted to quit. So, he didn’t believe a word of that. He called in Haig and told Haig to go find out what was on my mind, that I was obviously disloyal. So, Haig comes over and starts saying bad things about Henry. I say, “Al, I know Henry has sent you over here. I’m leaving because I just am not having any fun.” So, I got Henry to give me a good recommendation and I wanted to go to work over at HEW with Bob Finch, who was the
Secretary over there, had been the Lt. Governor of California and was a noted liberal in the Nixon Administration. I got over there and discovered that there were a couple of Nixon’s commissars over there and that Finch himself was going to quit, which he confided to me. At that point, I decided to go to the Foreign Relations Committee.

Q: This would be in the fall of ’69.

MOOSE: Yes. I didn’t stay a year. I told Henry I’d stay three years but I didn’t stay a year, just because of the atmosphere of the place. Haldeman, Erlichman, and Henry Kissinger.

So, I went up to the Foreign Relations Committee, which was bemused by the prospect of Vietnamization that Nixon had announced. It was around the issue of Vietnamization, which the Committee couldn’t quite figure out—they couldn’t figure out whether it meant what Nixon said it meant, or not. Thus was hatched the idea that implementing Lowenstein’s concept of a reporting unit for the Committee, that we would go to Vietnam and come back and tell the Committee what was really going on. Some Members of the Committee wanted to believe that Vietnamization was going to work and that the war could be wound down then and that American troops could be brought home and all the rest of it. But there was just enough doubt in their minds that they wanted more information about it and they weren’t easy. Some thought that. There was a range of views. There were a few who never believed in it at all. I think Symington was probably the leader of that group. Fulbright was very skeptical. Mansfield wanted to believe that it would work but wondered if it was practical or not. I think a lot of them thought it was overpromising, that it might be a way for us to get out but it was going to be a lot harder than Nixon said; so Lowenstein and I went out with this charter to come back and tell the Committee how the Vietnamization would work.

Q: When did you go out?

MOOSE: We went in December of ’69. That was the first of a dozen or more reports that I participated in; the first eight of them were with Jim. The last four were with (Charles) Chuck Meissner, who died in Bosnia a couple of years ago (in 1996, as the Assistant Secretary of Commerce, in an air crash that also claimed the life of Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown).

Q: When you went out, you had an agenda, but how did you go about it? Let’s talk about the first trip.

MOOSE: Jim and I invented that; because we were both former FS officers, we knew a lot of people. Because I had worked in the White House press office, I knew lots of journalists. Jim said, “We’ve got to structure this very professionally. We’re not going to go out and be Cohn and Schine [McCarthy associates] people.”

Q: I was going to say, the Cohn and Schine thing immediately comes up.
MOOSE: Right. We were very sensitive about that. So, it was organized—and this was Jim’s genius—he organized the thing. He had the Chairman write letters to the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, and to the Director of the CIA, and said, “Two of our senior staff members who have full security clearances are going out. We would like for them to be briefed by your people before they go out. We’d like for them to be briefed out there. We would like for you to make facilities available for them to interview and to travel in country”—although we didn’t have a very clear idea of what we were going to do. Our only mandate from the Committee was to find out the facts and come back and tell them. The Committee was more or less [neutral?]. They were still united that they wanted the war over, but they had a variety of views about Vietnamization. So, we went to Saigon. We went to the Embassy, where we were courteously received by (Ellsworth) Bunker and given a briefing by the political section—probably Martin Hertz—and went out to MACV, where we got a briefing. Then we began to intersperse this with informal contacts that we would make, other FS officers whom we had known who were at low levels out in the provinces, but we found ways to see them or let them know. We talked to a handful of people in Saigon. We stayed at the Caravelle, which was the informal headquarters of a lot of the American press corps. I knew a lot of journalists, but I had learned which ones were really reliable and responsible. I had read a lot of them during the time that I coordinated the Vietnam press line from the White House. So, I had a good reading acquaintance with these people. I knew very few of them personally, but I came to know people like Larry Stern and Robert Chaplin of The New Yorker, a couple of guys who wrote for The Wall Street Journal, the more reliable and respectable guys. The Post reporters, most of them I knew—and the Times reporters some closer than others, but we talked to them and listened to them. We were open minded. I had never been an anti-war exponent. I had long since stopped believing that it was possible to win it and I had become really concerned about what I thought was the clumsiness of the implementation of many things and a lack of understanding on the part of the Americans of the Vietnamese, albeit I had only ever been there once and that was with LBJ and his famous trip to Cam Rahn Bay. But I had read an immense amount about it. Anyway, we formed opinions. Then we decided that we ought to travel to the provincial capitals. So, we arranged that with some difficulty. The Embassy was not much help, but MACV was pretty helpful. We went to the four CORPS headquarters and talked to an awful lot of people. We stayed in country for three weeks and just saw an amazing range of people from all over—from Hue all the way down through the Delta. We picked up a lot of old friendships, people that one or the other of us had known before like Frank Wisner, who was down in the Delta. We met Lt. Col. Jean Sovaggio, who they gave as an interpreter, which was our good luck. We came back and wrote a report.

Q: Were you able to talk to Vietnamese CORPS commanders, people like that?

MOOSE: Yes, we did. We tackled those, but we learned very quickly that those were very stylized conversations. Jean Sovaggio was a Marine Corps lieutenant colonel who was the best Vietnamese speaker in country by everybody’s agreement. He was the best of anybody who was ever out there, except maybe John Negroponte. We developed a technique for going to villages and things. We went to villages and talked to village chiefs and province chiefs and so forth all over, using Sovaggio. We developed a
technique—we saw it was a waste of his great talent just to interpret what these people said because they always said the same thing, like it was a script. The Army would always have another interpreter along, whether it be a local American or somebody who could do something of the sort. So, they did the interpreting in these useless conversations we had. Sovaggio would go off in the other corner of the village somewhere and the villages would gather around Jean. He was such a linguist that he could imitate many accents and dialects from various parts of the country. He wore a very strong-looking old overcoat. He didn’t look anything like a Marine whatsoever. His civilian clothes threw observers off. They couldn’t figure him out. He would get a crowd and they would laugh and joke. He would just amuse the crowd. Then he’d say, “Is this a happy village or a sad village?” Then everybody would vie to tell him what it was like. Then they’d argue with each other. We’d get back on the helicopter and go someplace else. He’d recount what he’d heard. It was an extraordinary peephole that very few people would have had the opportunity to have. Jean was in that direct line of dissent from a group of people that I still admire very much who I used to call the true believers. They never lost faith in the integrity of the whiteness of the American mission and what we could do in Vietnam, and never ceased to believe that there was a way you could find the right way to do it. It would still work out. Deeply committed to Vietnamese people whom he saw as suffering at the hands of both sides and deserving of much better, he was not ideological. He never said anything disloyal. I always just had the sense that I was hearing through Sovaggio close to what was reality as far as the feelings of the people were concerned. We spent a lot of time with AID. We spent a certain amount of time with CIA. We had classified briefings. We took careful notes and took care of our stuff. We came back and wrote a report that said in its concluding paragraph, “The war is far from won and far from over,” and said it was going to be a long, long time, a matter of years. That impressed the Committee. Someone on the Committee leaked substantial excerpts from it to the press. We had always been determined to have a classified and unclassified version of the report. We gave the classified version to the Committee. We stopped in CINCPAC (Pearl Harbor) on the way back, wrote most of it, and gave it to the Committee within a week of the time we were back. It was long and very detailed, lots of facts, footnotes. Lowenstein was a stickler for checking every fact. Some of it leaked, with the Committee insisting on it being cleared. We went into the first of what became a long series of clearance conferences with them led by the State Department. We succeeded in being able to print most of what we wrote. We had to take some things out. But we found ways. We developed a technique that we used successfully for years after. We always had our reports cleared and we always published them. Only one was not published. It was one that we wrote after the first trip we made to Cambodia. I got into a real tangle with Fulbright over that. I said that the Cambodian civil servants supported the war against the Vietnamese. Fulbright could not accept that characterization. He pressed me in a classified closed Committee meeting very hard about it. I stuck to my guns. He said, “Well, how do you know things like that?” I was irritated by his manner. I said, “Well, we had a number of meetings.” He said,” Well, who organized the meetings?” I said, “Well, one of them was a group of former Fulbright grantees who were students of government officials, academics and so forth.” It was very embarrassing to him. He always ______ but he had a really hard time. We argued so long about that. It was a long time before we ever got that report out. We finally did get it out.
Q: Was it that he had pretty well fixed his mind that he was going in a certain way and wasn’t going to accept things?

MOOSE: Yes, he no more than Kissinger, grasped the complexity of the Khmer-Vietnamese relationship. He didn’t understand it. Henry never understood it. Fulbright didn’t understand it any better. I knew nothing about it when we had gone out there, but we had some unusual experiences. I met a French journalist who had been raised in the mountains out there on a tea plantation and who probably worked for a couple of different intelligence services but who had written for *Newsweek* over a long period of time. He showed me his files and stuff that he had written, as well as pictures that he had sent to *Newsweek* of Khmers who captured prisoners and cut their livers out. He told me stories about the Khmer that enabled me to understand and [what] to believe about the Khmer Rouge right or wrong. In fact, he was the first one that told me about the Khmer Rouge and we were the first people ever to write about it, as far as I know. I tracked them from the very beginning. The American intelligence community was very slow to pick them up. Sam Adams, who was a wonderful CIA analyst who Frank Snepp introduced me to, plotted the origins of the Khmer Rouge organization using signal intelligence. The Agency wasn’t interested in it because they were totally focused on the North Vietnamese on the border areas. Adams was trying to figure out what these guys were doing. Those reports were the most interesting things that I ever did. We wrote six or so on Vietnam. In ’69, we wrote one. In ’70, we went into the fishhook in Cambodia right after the incursions there. We were on our way there when it happened. We were persuaded that it was going to happen. Fulbright and Mansfield said, “Go out and maybe you can see. Maybe they won’t do it.” We wrote those. We wrote one on martial law in the Philippines and Korea. We wrote one on nuclear weapons in Europe. We wrote one on the Greek dictatorship. We gradually covered all of Southeast Asia. It was among the most interesting work that I ever did. Lowenstein’s formula was a very good one. Chuck Meissner and I were in China when the Khmer Rouge took Phnom Penh (April 1975). We went in on the day before they actually captured the city. We went on an ammunition flight. We went to the Hotel Phnom, which always took a lot of money in from the journalists who were going to stay. Their organizations loaded us down with stuff. Frank Snepp had always been used by the Agency to brief us because they knew we respected Snepp and [he] was a very hardliner. This was two weeks before Saigon fell. Snepp was the lead agent that they had with [gap in interview]. He was a double agent, of course. [Note: Moose probably means Snepp exceeded his CIA brief in sharing with Congressional staff not that Snepp was reporting to the North Vietnamese or Viet Cong.] We learned that he passed a lot of good stuff. Snepp outlined for Lowenstein or for Meissner and me that the NVA-VC ordered a battle and their plans for moving on Saigon, what they were going to do, the stages, what the whole view of it was. His station chief, (Thomas) Tom Polgar, had rejected his report. The Ambassador, Graham Martin, wouldn’t listen to it. Snepp had nobody to talk to. Snepp turned himself to the business of trying to organize an effort to get the Agency assets out of Vietnam.

Q: We’re talking about people.
MOOSE: People. Snepp and a group of others in the CIA, acting against Polgar’s and Martin’s orders, began a clandestine effort to try to save as many of their people as they could. They saw that Polgar was not going to organize the effort himself. Kissinger and Martin wanted to fight the thing out to the very end. Snepp was telling them there was not a chance that this was going to end any way other than the total collapse because they had it all lined up, but they refused to believe it. If Henry did believe it, he wanted to go down with all of his guns firing for effect. Chuck managed to get a couple of people out as a result of our things on the last day or two in Saigon. We came down on an evacuation flight and went to Manila, wrote most of our report there and sent it back in classified form from there to the Committee. That led to the Committee asking for an appointment to see President Ford and they did all go over to see the President and said: “This is going to end very badly. You’ve got to do something here. We can’t just have the whole thing collapse without any effort on your part.”

The whole business of the stories of the report writing for the Foreign Relations Committee is filled with many adventures. We actually discovered the secret bombing in Cambodia and many other things. But it was a broad outline of the conduct of the war. Afterwards, the aftermath of the Paris Peace Talks and what had been and had not been agreed on [gap in interview]. There was months of that. All of that was my background on the Committee up to the time that I took over the staff after the fall of Saigon. The Committee formed a subcommittee on foreign assistance. I became the Staff Director of that working with Fulbright, who was gone by that time [Spring 1975]. He had been defeated in his primary in ’74. Javits and Humphrey, who had returned to the Committee by that time, were the sort of co-leaders of the Foreign Assistance Subcommittee. Fulbright would never allow such a Committee. He said the only leverage he had on the Administration was on the Foreign Affairs bill and he certainly wasn’t going to give that to somebody to run a subcommittee. In one of the more regrettable ideas that I had during the years ‘72-’74 when it was just really so awful between the Committee and the Administration and the Committee was unable to get any witnesses to come up and testify on points that they wanted to develop, I one day was on a plane on the way to Vietnam and I was thinking through this problem about how bad things had gotten. I thought, “How can we make the Administration answer to the Congress and the Committee?” It all of a sudden occurred to me that we didn’t have hearings on the State Department authorization, that there were for other departments hearings on the authorizations. I remember in called Carl Marcy—who was the Chief of Staff of the Committee—from Minneapolis, where we landed on the way to fly Northwest to Hong Kong and then on down. I said, “Carl, why don’t we ever have hearings?” He said, “Well, we have a standing authorization.” I said, “How did it get to be a standing authorization?” He said, “Well, it’s authorized in the bill.” I said, “If it was unauthorized, then Kissinger would have to come up before the Committee and testify, wouldn’t he?” Carl was a great legislative master and he said, “My God, I’ve never thought of that.” That unfortunately I lived really to regret. They did do away with the authorization and now it’s practically impossible to get authorization through the Congress for the State Department.

Q: I’d like to go back to Vietnam.
Today is September 21, 1999. We’re in this period of ‘69-’75. You were going back and forth to Vietnam. Did you see the change in our military both in morale, command, and how to approach things?

MOOSE: The first trip that Jim Lowenstein and I took was in December of ’69. It was the first year of the Nixon Administration and the emphasis all was on Vietnamization. There was a prevailing assumption that Vietnamization was working, was moving ahead. We traveled all over the country. We went all the way up to ICORPS. We went up to the Marines in the far north. We went to Hue and to the central highlands and down to Da Nang and over in the Delta. We got a pretty good view across the country. The proposition was, was Vietnamization succeeding? The test of that was the South Vietnamese Army was growing stronger with preparing then to turn over to the Vietnamese. So, we talked to commands all over the country in order to try to form an opinion about it, as well as talking to people in the civilian roles as well.

Our conclusion was that while there was a great emphasis on turning things over to the RVN and presenting the Vietnamese as capable of taking over the war, we found that the American military people by and large, if one spoke to them in circumstances where they could be candid and if they were disposed to be honest about it, they had very strong reservations. The American machine was beginning to some extent relax its stance. They were beginning to see the planning and withdrawals and a drawdown. But the sentence from our report that was most often quoted was, “The war is far from won and far from over. We cast a real doubt on the prospects of whether Vietnamization would succeed or not.” I think there was a testimony of the American military people, both Army and Marines. While in isolated cases they would speak well of the ARVN, of their individual commanders, they did not really believe that the ARVN could take over and maintain the effort. The emphasis on the American command was to begin to try to pull back and get out. I first went to Vietnam in ’66 on a Lyndon Johnson trip to Cam Ranh Bay. I thought that things were beginning to wind down. The Americans were not disillusioned, but no longer living on the illusion that, in fact, the ARVN was capable—or indeed the country was capable—of holding itself together. Obviously, it did for another six years. But I didn’t see it being won by American arms and I think there were a few Americans who denied it.

The further you got from Saigon, the more pessimism you ran into. The further down the hierarchy you got, the more realism you encountered. The official American Saigon people were terribly isolated. They lived within their own kind of self-spun information cocoon there. The junior ones because they didn’t have to spend so much time in obligatory program pursuits had a much better opportunity to get a broader view of what was going on. The people in the countryside were more apt to be candid about things but would by and large give you the official line. I thought the political section for the most part over the years that I saw it was poor. There were individual outstanding exceptions, but for the most part, it was very political, very careerist, and very much under the sway of the Ambassador at whatever time it was. I didn’t think that we were particularly well
served there.

I have to say the most interesting thing I ever saw in the political section of the Embassy in Saigon, the most creative and interesting person although there were some other exceptional officers there was a young man named Jim Knott. He was an unconventional FS officer. He didn’t have the polish that we usually associate with a lot of the successful people—not because he seemed to lack some of the social graces—and he was relegated writing biographic reports, which was the lowest kind of task on the totem pole. Knott was extremely creative. He was an excellent Vietnamese language speaker. He started a project of doing a genealogy of the various classes of the Vietnamese military academy. He formed the theory that if you wanted to find the interlocking circles of influence and power in Saigon, that if you would track those classes from the Dalat Academy, and their marriages and the families, that you would learn a great deal about the power structure. So, he began to do that. He started out on sheets of paper and gradually he moved towards rolls of newsprint. Since all Vietnamese love genealogy, if he would manage to get with a Vietnamese family or a Vietnamese who was willing to talk about this, they were interested. He said many was the time that he found himself down on the floor unrolling the sheet of newsprint with everybody crowding around him, pointing and saying, “No, this is wrong. She’s so and so’s sister.” They were getting these things all straight. As a result, Knott began to write a quality of biographic report that soon made some of his superiors—and made MACV—uncomfortable by some of the kinds of things that he was saying about the interlocking between politics and the army and business and corruption. But that was a rare exception. There was just too much pressure there to present a winning profile.

Q: During the Johnson period, Johnson was renowned for wanting information that supported him. This was not just with Vietnam. He had really a very heavy hand up and down the line. Are you with the program or not? Was there a different atmosphere than with Nixon and Kissinger?

MOOSE: No, not really. The styles were different, of course, but the pressure at any given moment to produce evidence that whatever tact we were following at that moment was apt to be successful was usually pretty pervasive in official circles. What happened to Johnson was [gap in interview] I was assistant to Walt Rostow and I saw the way that the intelligence was handled. Walt and a couple of other people would sift through raw intelligence looking for obscure reports that they thought would support their point of view rather than the more homogenized product that would come out of the intelligence community and was usually on the one hand and on the other hand variety about which a policymaker really couldn’t tell very much at all. But certainly the pressure in the Nixon-Kissinger era when their stakes were very high in their own way was to show that they were succeeding in Vietnamization, it was pretty ferocious. There was never anything worse than Graham Martin at the very end insisting that the emperor was fully closed and, as he said to me in a memorable last interview, that a truncated Vietnam could survive. He thought they could draw a line maybe 50 miles north of Saigon, hold that, and that was a tenable position. He was insisting that up until about 10 days before Saigon fell. The people in the Embassy were by and large compelled to try to behave as
though they believed it.

**Q:** What about within your Committee with staff and Members? What were the dynamics?

MOOSE: You had up until ’74—when Fulbright was defeated—Fulbright, Mike Mansfield, Frank Church, Stuart Symington among the principal of the Democrats. You had on the Republican side George Aiken, Clifford Case, Jack Javits, Senator Lester Pearson of Pearson Fellows fame, Mac Mathias. Hubert Humphrey rejoined the Committee in ’74. By and large, through ’75/’76, there was a strong bipartisan consensus on the futility of the war and the really deciding but not withstanding that strong bipartisan consensus among a very unusual group of senators They won very few votes in the Senate. Fulbright in the early years made some real efforts to win over Dick Russell and John Stennis. They were always very close to a line in supporting the war—that is not wanting to lose the war but having huge misgivings about the nature and size of the positive American involvement in the war. There was very little [gap in interview] There were very few differences within the Committee. John Sherman Cooper, a Republican, and Church sponsored the amendments but sought to cut off bombing in Cambodia, covert activities in Thailand, Laos, and so forth. But it was not until early ’75 as the situation grew more desperate in Vietnam that the Committee really won a vote on the floor to cut off aid to South Vietnam and that did not happen until Hubert Humphrey joined. When Humphrey rejoined the Committee in ’74, he remained opposed to efforts to bring about an end to the war by legislation, but he began to change toward the end of ’74. By early ’75, he had turned the corner and that made the difference. There were minute differences among the principal Committee Members but not many. There was always a handful of people on the Committee who supported the effort but they were in the great minority.

Something people don’t realize is that Fulbright was never involved in the anti-war movement. He may have been quoted by them frequently or invoked in various ways, but he never had anything to do with them and never wanted us to have anything to do with them not that I particularly wanted to either, although I was involved in the episode where Dan Ellsberg gave the Committee the Pentagon Papers. But interestingly enough, he didn’t know the Committee Members had them. None of them evidenced any interest in reading them until they were “revealed” in *The New York Times.* The Committee had had them for over a year. But that was not an aspect of the anti-war movement. The Committee was concerned that the Congress didn’t understand and didn’t have accurate information about what was going on and that was really the basis for the Committee’s sponsoring these trips that Lowenstein and I made. We didn’t always have an easy time. We had to maintain a balance and objectivity in our approach. I got in trouble with Fulbright once after the overthrow of Mon Hall [Sihanouk] and the American invasion of Cambodia. Lowenstein and I went into the fishhook and the parrot’s beak right after the incursions. We went to Phnom Penh and observed long lines of Cambodians trying to enlist in the army. We looked into this. A French journalist who had lived in Cambodia for many years explained to us that getting into the army is the best job you could get. It paid three times as much as the average wage and you usually had to ______ to get in.
But there was an upsurge of genuine patriotism at that time because they hated the Vietnamese and they saw the advent of more Vietnamese activity in Cambodia than they had seen before. They had been disturbed that Sihanouk had made the accommodations that he had with the Vietnamese, so there was a surge of anti-Sihanouk, anti-Vietnamese feeling. Jim and I were invited one night to a meeting of the former Fulbright fellows of Cambodia. We went and made a lot of excellent friends and contacts. They were young intellectuals, students, or government officials. In our report, we wrote (I still remember discussing the sentence with Jim) that by and large, the students and intellectuals supported the war against the Vietnamese. This didn’t conform with Fulbright’s view of what the probable situation was because he thought that the[Cambodian Government?] was corrupt, which was true. It was totally corrupt and we put it there. He thought that we had no popular support and that there was not popular support for the war. But the rest of the equation was wrong. Even in the face of these former Fulbright fellows and others that would talk to us, he confronted me in front of the Committee about it one time. I tried to avoid invoking my ultimate authority — i.e., the Fulbright alumni. Finally, when he pushed me really hard to know what kinds of specific evidence I had, I said, “Well, we went to a meeting of students, of intellectuals,” and he said, “Yes, well, there’s probably something arranged for you.” I said, “Yes, it was, but by the Fulbright Association.” It got a large laugh and the Committee embarrassed him and he was really furious with me for a long time after that. So, you had some variation in the Committee. The Committee always probed very hard on these reports that we wrote. It was an interesting time to be there.

Q: Did you find that you were running parallel or contrary to the various armed forces Committee? Were you checking each other out?

MOOSE: We had very little to do—we were so compartmentalized—with them. We would read the testimony that would be given before those committees. Occasionally, Members would ask us to comment on them or to help them with statements, but there was very little interchange. There were a couple of members of the staff of the (Senate) Armed Services Committee who I got to know who were very skeptical about the claims that were made, but they were in a position so that their Members by and large were supportive and so there wasn’t very much they could do. There was the notable episode of Senator Harold Hughes [D-Iowa]. One of the senators on the Armed Services Committee actually was the vehicle through which the secret bombing of Cambodia was exposed, the falsification of all the Air Force and those things. He brought that out. Those staff people who had that information came to us because Jim and I knew a lot about command-and-control arrangements and they did talk to us about that. That’s about the only instance that I can recall. We had a little commerce with some Members of the then-House Foreign Affairs Committee: Pete McCloskey [R-California], who was a former Marine who was very opposed to the war; Berkley Bedell [D-Iowa] Tom Harkin [D-Iowa], who was the Tiger Cages exposé. But by and large, the majority of the House Foreign Affairs Committee was always rather supportive of the Administration because its chairmen were Doc Morgan [1959-77 and Clement Zabolk] 1977-83. It was not until very later years that you got to Dante Fascell [Chairman 1983-93] that you found a more skeptical view on the House side. There were individual Members, but--
Q: In the latter stages, in ’74, did you play any role in this or were you kept informed?

MOOSE: Usually when we went to Vietnam, we would come back through Paris, at first in the early years because it was still worthwhile to talk to some of the French. There were times early on when we could go and talk to Jean Ecotour, but they got kind of out of date really. They were very wise and they knew a lot of things about the past and they could apply a lot of it. Then gradually after the Peace Talks, we’d go and stop in there to see what was going on. Usually, we dealt with Habib or somebody like that. Phil would give us the usual song and dance and we didn’t learn anything much of any consequence—with one exception. We went through there one time, and I don’t remember whether it was ’73 or ’74, and they weren’t quite ready for us when we got there and they parked us in a little office across the hall but within the restricted area that was used by the negotiating staff. We were sitting there in this empty office. Honest to God, I was looking for a piece of paper to write something on. I had my little notebook, but I wanted another piece of paper. I opened the desk drawer and there was a secret telegram in there. I couldn’t keep from reading it. It was an account of the previous days or a day or two before a negotiating session. It had a record of an offer that Kissinger made of aid for reconstruction under certain conditions. I quickly made a set of notes on it and reported it to the Committee when I got back. But that was about the only time we ever learned anything in Paris.

Q: So, basically, when both sides had agreed to the Accords, then it was a matter of ______[finalizing?]_______ after that.

MOOSE: After that, what would happen would [gap in interview]. We expected that the situation in the South would gradually unravel. We were there shortly while the major onslaught was unleashed in the central highlands [Easter Offensive of 1972]. We visited John Paul Vann at Kantoum the day before he was killed [June 9, 1972]. We saw massive evidence that the thing was unraveling and reported that to the Committee. Our view was that with every passing day, there was less and less to negotiate. There was a lot of emphasis during this time on what the Vietnamese were doing in Cambodia. Kissinger insisted that somehow the Vietnamese were bound by the Paris Accords to try to control the situation in Cambodia. We had, in fact, known from the negotiating record that the Vietnamese had committed themselves to nothing with regard to Cambodia and that as further backed up by the reason that the Vietnamese were in no position to control the Khmer Rouge. It was general [gap in interview] but mostly Chuck Miser, who replaced Jim on the Committee’s staff[8] We had tracked the Khmer Rouge from the earliest times. It was very interesting to watch that develop. We knew the difference and told the Committee that Kissinger’s insistence that Vietnam was violating Article 40 of the Paris Accords by failing to stop what was going on in Cambodia was a problem. We then had an episode in which we found that Americans, contrary to Cook and Church, were facing forces in Cambodia. That was another whole episode.

Q: When the Paris Peace Accords were signed and the system was set up of different areas under control of one side or another, what was the feeling that you had and also
what was the view of this in the Senate staff? Were they saying, “Please get us the hell out and get our POWs back?”

MOOSE: Yes. I never thought it was anything more than that. I thought it was a very elegant bugout and was a sort of hoax on [the public?] The Vietnamese had to act as though they believed that it was in their interests. We did a lot of talking with South Vietnamese after the Paris Accords were signed. They were monstrously unhappy. Of course, the Administration was trying to maintain the appearance that the Vietnamese were willing to go along with that, but we did long sections of a report in which we talked to lots of Vietnamese. I remember talking to (Nguyen Cao) Ky, for example, who was the Vice President and was very outspoken about the treachery of Kissinger.

Ironically, we saw Ky in a refugee camp in Clark Field in May of ’75, when he had been evacuated. I have a picture of him in my Vietnam collection of things of Ky sitting looking very elegant but he’s sitting on a cot in a tent in a refugee camp. He recalled the conversation that we had had at his headquarters about the Paris Accords. He was, of course, bitter. They thought they had been sold down the river.

Q: Something that continues to haunt us. How important was it on the POWs and MIAs at the time?

MOOSE: We pursued every lead that we possibly could on this. The Committee was intensely interested in this. Chuck and I ran down everything we could on this. I did a memorandum to the Committee files as the POW controversy became more intense. A couple of sources at the Pentagon—and I really believe them; they were the kind of people I can believe—said that they did not begin to have an accounting. They really had no idea how many POWs there might be or any meaningful reconciliation. There were large numbers that they had taken a stab at it. They had simply gone ahead and accepted the best assurances that they could get. I believed that then, and I think it’s been substantiated, that we really didn’t know and weren’t really making an effort.

Q: Was there any rationale at the time that there was anything holding prisoners of war back?

MOOSE: The rationale, though not a very good one, for using bones, bodies, and so on, was that they were storable and you can use them for whatever purpose you want. But for holding POWs back, it doesn’t seem to make any sense.

It didn’t seem to make any sense to me. I went to North Vietnam for the first time in my life in 1993 with (former Secretary of State) Ed Muskie and a group of others, including Orson Swindle, who had then been a campaign manager, but more importantly, he had been a POW in Hanoi for a long time. He had been in the Hanoi Hilton with John McCain and others. It was pretty clear that the Vietnamese by that time were making a tremendous effort to try to account for things, but they didn’t have the full cooperation and excellent coordination throughout their own apparatus. Given the fact that their own missing in action and dead were high multiples of our own, there were undoubtedly varying degrees if willingness to cooperate on their side. I could never see the rationale
that they would have for trying to hold back prisoners. It just didn’t make sense to me. I could understand how disturbed and tormented their families were. I spent a lot of time in ‘74/’75 talking with POW families and the Committee worked very hard. We used all the sources we had to try to find out things, but neither Lowenstein nor Meissner nor I ever had any contact or sources on the North Vietnamese side.

**Q: The war was played over when the North Vietnamese took over the South in the spring of ’75. Then what? Was it, “Okay, let’s move on to other things?”**

**MOOSE:** It really was. At the very end, when Meissner and I came back with our report after the fall of Phnom Penh—we had been in Phnom Penh until the day before it fell and Saigon 10 days before it fell—and came back and urged the Committee to go to the White House and try to get the President to do something to negotiate, to try to save Vietnamese. The war was now over. Really no one wanted to look back at that point. They didn’t want to hear about that. Détente with the Soviet Union was of more interest than that. Meissner and I took a trip to Indonesia, which is timely right now since we’re talking about East Timor and all of that. We discovered the trail of Kissinger’s having told the Indonesian military that what happened in East Timor was of no concern to the United States. The Committee wasn’t really excited about that. It didn’t bother them very much. We did a report on the Philippines that year. The Marcos dictatorship was in full swing. But there was a great desire to forget about that part of the world. It was just like somebody had turned out the light.

**Q: The State Department has never dreamt of _______ activity in Vietnam. We are at least accumulating the accounts via oral history. I hope eventually something will be put together. In ’75, your focus was _____. What were you up to?**

**MOOSE:** We did Indonesia, the Philippines. By that time, Fulbright having left, the Committee had recreated a foreign assistance subcommittee, which we had never had during the time Fulbright was chairman because he didn’t want somebody else being chairman of the Committee that controlled the main legislative activity. But Hubert Humphrey and Jack Javits took the leadership in that Committee. I became chief of staff of the foreign assistance subcommittee. We were looking at military aid programs, the arms sales programs. I hired Jeffrey Kemp, who later worked on the Reagan NSC, to do some work on the Middle East. We did a report on U.S. arms sales to Iran. Humphrey was interested in arms exports control and he wrote the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, which tried to dampen the volume of U.S. arms sales to the underdeveloped world. The Congressional Budget Act was passed in 1975 and that was supposed to have made a big difference in the role of the authorizing committees. The Committee had begun to authorize the State Department appropriations by that time and I worked on those appropriations. I worked a little bit with Senator (Charles H.) Percy on the first of the environmental things that he did. I had gotten Fulbright to resurrect the Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925.

**Q: We’re talking about poison gas.**
MOOSE: Yes. That had been activated again. Then there was the biological convention that followed on it. I was involved in a range of those issues. I was beginning to be a little bored.

Q: After these investigative reporting trips, in a way, the Senate, too, would have said this means you’ve got to do something. There were an awful lot of things in trouble.

MOOSE: It was never very popular to investigate the Cold War. In ’75, I went with Senator Dick Clark on a trip to southern Africa. That led to Clark writing what was known as the Clark Amendment, which prohibited U.S. aid to any of the parties in the Angola conflict. That occupied us for a little while in ’75, but that was the Cold War in Africa. There was very intense debate about that. There were two secret sessions in the Senate on that particular issue, which I then ran into again when I was the Assistant Secretary for Africa in 1977-81, as the war in Angola heated up again after the conflicts in Shaba in the province of Katanga. Shaba was also known as Katanga. These were the copper and cobalt mines of then Zaire, now the Republic of Congo. President Carter’s National Security Advisor (Zbigniew) Brzezinski saw the Cuban hand in events in Katanga and that led him into a desire to restart clandestine U.S. aid to General (Jonas) Savimbi in Angola.

As Assistant Secretary for Africa by that time, I was opposed to this. I thought in the long run, it would only fuel the civil war without any likelihood that it would be decisive. In any event, I thought that the Cuban-Russian influence was going to be decidedly limited, that it would not avail them of very much. American companies were continuing to pump oil and the South Africans were continuing to take diamonds out. But Brzezinski wanted to repeal the Clark Amendment or find some way around it. We had a memorable meeting over in the Situation Room at one point. Brzezinski was arguing that there was a way to interpret the Amendment that would allow us to do what he wanted to do, which was to exchange intelligence and provide some level of support to Savimbi’s people. The general counsels of the CIA, the Defense Department, and the State Department were over there and they all took their turns at trying to convince Brzezinski that what he wanted to do was against the law.

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, who also opposed Brzezinski on this, finally turned and said, “Well, ask Dick Moose whether it’s legal or not. Moose drafted the Amendment for Clark.” I could have done without the publicity. But in fact, they did investigate on the Hill. Brzezinski sent people up there—not me because they didn’t trust me to go up and find out whether the Clark Amendment was legal or not—but they did do soundings out there and there was no support for repealing it. By ’76, it was running down. So, when Vance asked me to be on the transition team after Carter won the election, I accepted.

Q: You said you went out and did a report on arms sales to Iran.

MOOSE: No, I didn’t go out myself. I sent Jeffrey Kemp. He was assisted by a young man who I had hired on the Committee staff named Bill Richardson.
**Q:** He’s been United Nations Ambassador and now is Secretary of Energy.

MOOSE: That’s right. Someone at the Senate who asked me to see if I could find a job for this young man, said, “He’s a fine baseball player, but I don’t think he knows anything about foreign affairs.”

**Q:** How did that come out? Kissinger went to supposedly Iran and told the Shah, “Anything you want you can have.” Our policy was a rather skewed, peculiar policy there.

MOOSE: It was very skewed. That was one of the reasons why we wanted to look at it. We thought it was a policy that was so skewed that it could hardly fail to produce the opposite result from what it was intended to do. So, Kemp and Richardson went out there. Bob Mantell, who was in the Department for a long time, went along on that trip as well. They came back and documented the arms sales and the excesses and the isolation of the Shah’s regime from the people and so forth. It was the sort of thing that you would have expected, that any objective observer going in there would have found. Kemp was pretty conservative in those days. He was convinced that it was a policy that was going to backfire on us.

**Q:** With something like that, it didn’t catch any particular fire?

MOOSE: No, it had no resonance at all. It was a good report. It was too long. I kept trying to get him to cut it back. But it was too long. It just didn’t attract any attention. Even the Committee was not very interested in it. Humphrey was interested in it, but he was practically the only one. Senator Case was interested a little bit.

**Q:** Had you played any part in the election of ’76?

MOOSE: No. I had worked some for Mo Udall. He was running for the Democratic nomination. I had worked for him when I was still in the State Department. I was one of the first, if not the first, State Department Congressional Fellow. I worked for Udall for half a year. So, I was very much [for his candidacy?] When he dropped out of the race, I sort of lost interest in it. I wasn’t so partisan that I would have backed any Democrat and I wasn’t that impressed with Jimmy Carter. Although I voted for him eventually, I didn’t feel strongly about him. So, I was working on the Arms Export Control Act in the fall of ’76. Dan Spiegel and I were writing a chapter in a book on arms control. That’s what I was doing in the fall of ’76 when the election was going on. I didn’t campaign then.

**Q:** Vance asked you to help. What was your relation with Vance?

MOOSE: I didn’t know him very well. I had met him a couple of times when I worked for Rostow. Vance was on the commission that looked into the 1967 Detroit riots or something of the sort. He was Secretary of the Army (in the Johnson Administration). I had seen him a little bit in and out of the Situation Room. But he had some names and
mine was among them. The transition group was myself, Don McHenry, Tony Lake, Dick Holbrooke, and (Charles W.) Bill Maynes. The State Department’s main interface with Vance was Phil Habib, who was close to Vance because they worked together on the peace talks. So, they were very close. My role in the transition was to work on personnel, which is to say appointments, and the State Department budget and the AID budget. Because I had been doing that work on the Hill for the Foreign Relations Committee, I knew the State Department and AID budget. I moved very quickly to consolidate State Department’s control over the budgets of AID, USIA, the Arms Control Agency, and to bring that squarely into the State Department.

Vance, like most Secretaries of State, was not particularly interested in that. He didn’t see the significance of it in the same way that I did. I had accumulated this. I worked with Treasury and OMB in a kind of relationship that I never saw the State Department able to achieve after that. I knew that Vance had asked me to take the [Deputy Under Secretary for Management job. I was going to work in New York. Vance kept suggesting business people to take over the management of the job. I kept saying that every one of them that had ever taken it over made a dreadful mess of it, that you needed somebody who understood something about the Department; otherwise, it wouldn’t work. Finally, he said, “Well, you’re always arguing about this, so why don’t you take it?” I said, “Well, I really don’t want it. I don’t want anything. I just want to go to another career at this point.” At any rate, so, I took it. But I knew that I couldn’t learn the budgets of the foreign affairs agencies and run the State Department management side, because there was too much of a conflict of interest there. I didn’t feel that it would have worked. I tried to get Tony to take it into Policy Planning or get Tony and Les somehow to take it into Political-Military Affairs, but for God’s sakes, to hold on to it for the Department. I couldn’t interest them in taking it. So, it gradually slipped away. Of course, that’s an issue that came back later on in later years. But I took on that job and worked through a lot of the appointments with the White House people in that first take on the State Department budget under Carter, redoing the budget that he had inherited and trying to put some new emphasis on things. Then I worked with (Patricia M.) Pat Derian (the Mississippi civil rights activist who served as Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs) in the beginnings of the human rights program. Then after the State Department began to be in more and more trouble with the Congress over African issues—South Africa, Shaba I, civil unrest in the Congo that we referred to a minute ago in a later context—that happened. Vance had kept (William E.) Bill Schaufele (Jr.) as Assistant Secretary for Africa mainly because Habib had insisted that Vance keep a balanced number of career Assistant Secretaries. He was appointing Holbrooke in East Asia. I think there was a political appointment in Latin America. [Note: Ambassador Terence Todman, Career FSO.] Habib argued very much to keep some career people in the regional Assistant Secretary jobs. Schaufele, who was the last of Henry Kissinger’s three or four Assistant Secretaries for Africa. I think Henry fired three Assistant Secretaries for Africa. Schaufele was there. (W. Beverly) Bev Carter was one he fired. Then there was a guy who subsequently got in trouble in Latin America with Kissinger over Angola that was (Nathaniel) Nat Davis, the second. Then Bill Schaufele was the third. But Schaufele was the object of suspicion from the onset, unfairly, by the Congressional Black Caucus. So, for reasons of political expediency and also to have
somebody who would get along with Andy Young, Vance asked me to take that. I had
some acquaintance with the Black Caucus from civil rights days. I knew Andy somehow.
I sort of fell into that. Mondale and Young went off to meet John Vorster, then the prime
minister of South Africa, in Vienna at the very beginning of the Carter Administration,
probably February or March, to try to see if there was some way we could work with the
South Africans to bring about evolution and change in South Africa. They decided that
[gap in interview] It was a little tricky. They knew that Andrew Young had to be involved
somehow, but they wanted to keep him out of the way of Vorster because they didn’t
think that would work too well. They thought Mondale could talk to Vorster but not with
Young there. So, the delegation went part way and had a big meeting in Lisbon and then
Young was going on to an anti-apartheid meeting in Moputu. So, Mondale asked me to
come along to the meeting in Portugal and then go with Andy on the trip to Africa to try
to keep Andy out of trouble, to try to keep Andy from saying things that he shouldn’t,
while Mondale was trying to talk to Vorster in Vienna. So, I went off with Andy to do
that. That somehow suggested [I was a logical candidate to be Assistant Secretary?] I had
always tried to cover my tracks. I had served in Africa in the ‘60s. I never wanted
anybody in the assignments area of the State Department to remember that. I wasn’t
anxious to do Africa again, but then after that trip and after Shaba, Vance asked me to
take it. I said I really didn’t want to. Then he finally told me that I must. So, I did take it.

Q: I’d like to go back to the time that you were in the both transition and in this early
administrative side. How would you characterize the change of Administrations within
the State Department? Sometimes, particularly when Reagan came, and particularly
when Latin America was practically _______ the corridors; other times, it was almost
as bad when Bush took over from Reagan, although-

MOOSE: I’m afraid we didn’t set them a good precedent. We were far more polite. We
didn’t do anything really like the way that (William G.) Bill Bowdler was
___[fired]_______ by the Reagan people—“Be out of the building in 24 hours,” or
whatever it was they said to him. It was almost that bad, wasn’t it?

Q: Yes.

MOOSE: We very quickly early on. The Ambassadors were very pro forma. They submit
letters of resignation at the pleasure of the President and they did this and the White
House decided early on to pick them all up, just to cashier the whole bunch of them. We
did it in a polite sort of way. We wrote them a nice letter, but they were out just the same.
We did it altogether indiscriminately, without really looking at people who were in place
who might have made a real contribution during the transition period—not just the
prominent people but other people who were just very good and not particularly partisan
like Mike Samuels, for example, who was Ambassador to ___Sierra Leon______.

Q: Once you get rid of all these Ambassadors, you’ve got to put them back in place, new
ones. Usually there is such a hiatus that it really doesn’t serve anybody.

MOOSE: We did something very interesting. Carter believed that ambassadorial
appointments were too politicized. On the other hand, he also believed that the ambassadorship shouldn’t be the exclusive domain of the career service. So, he wanted to make some non-career appointments, but he wanted to try to bring more diversity—not just racial and gender, but of background and experience—into the ambassadorial service. But at the same time, his people recognized that he was going to open himself up to just unbelievable pressure from all corners if he did this. So, we came up with the idea of creating an ambassadorial selection committee. It was partially to screen people who would be put forward for political appointments, but it also had an outreach function. We were supposed to go out and look for people who would make good Ambassadors, but who weren’t putting themselves forward or being put forward by the political process. We recruited a number of unusual people in that regard and came up with the first arrangement that we recommended the President make some funds available for people who might go to London or Paris but didn’t have a lot of wherewithal and might need it. It was a very interesting experience. I ran this for the Department, for Vance. We screened people and went out and looked for people. We got a panel of respected Americans. I don’t remember who all was on there—(labor leader) Leonard Woodcock; Barbara Tuchman; the wonderful black historian from North Carolina John Hope Franklin. It was a very good panel and they really worked very hard at bringing in names and we recommended a lot of those people to the President. We screened out three or four really terrible turkeys. Inevitably, put a lot of pressure on us for a couple of people. We amazingly resisted and, except in one case, the only one case that that group really let go by because we knew we shouldn’t. He ended up in federal prison some years later. We were right. But actually, the system worked. Not all of the outsiders that we recruited and brought in were great successes, but some of them were very successful. One of them was Kingman Brewster from Yale. He turned out to be a wonderful Ambassador to the U.K.

Q: This might be a good time to stop.

MOOSE: With this tremendous interest and pressure from Vance, we ran a very active affirmative action program, a mid-level entry course for minorities and women and moved to make that a matter of record.

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Q: Today is February 17, 2000. We wanted to cover your program for minorities and diversity.

MOOSE: Mr. Vance was very intent when he came to the Department as Secretary that we do something in affirmative action. Looking back on those years today, one has to remember that while affirmative action was controversial then, it didn’t labor under the judicial restraint and scrutiny which is applied to it these days. When I came back to the Department in 1993, we were actually prohibited by the application of the law—if not by the letter of the law itself—from running the type of program that we ran for mid-level entry for women and minorities in the late ‘70s, so that we could bring in and did classes of minority officers and women at the mid-level and place them and bridge the normal
entry procedures. While there were plenty of people who were unhappy about it at the
time, on the one hand that effort enjoyed a broader base of support in the late ‘70s,
perhaps riding on some tide of newly-sensitized concern over this issue. I don’t want to
imply that everybody had decided that there was broad support for this, but it was
certainly more support for affirmative action then than there came to be when I came
back later.

**Q: It lasted was seen as a discriminatory process. Then this was seen as “You’ve got to
do something and this is the way to jumpstart it.”**

**MOOSE:** Right. There had not been grievances, lawsuits, we had a relatively easy time
implementing the program. What was interesting, one of the reasons I wanted to mention
it is that when I came back in ’93 as Under Secretary for Management, although all of
that climate had changed, those cohorts that had been brought in, basically the
African-American cohorts, had had a very bad experience. On the whole, their experience
had not been good and it was pretty obvious in retrospect that we didn’t do nearly enough
at the time. We sort of brought a lot of people in. They were well qualified people, but we
brought them in without the recognition that there was a need for support systems; not to
give them special advantages, but to try to compensate for some of the natural advantages
that many other officers had that they did not enjoy. So, we needed to have done more
mentoring and there needed to have been a sort of continuing management concern about
what was happening to these people, how they were progressing. I came to see their
experience as a special subset of a larger problem that I thought the Department had and I
think still has. That is the need for a genuine career development program, so that the
question was not so much did we need a special career development program for women
and minorities who were brought in at the mid-level, but that we needed a program for
everybody in the FS, including these particular people who may have been a special
subset.

So, career development was a concern of mine when I came back. As it related to women
and minorities, I thought it was a particular problem we had. But affirmative action had
become very controversial and just to leap toward the end of that story of my experience
when I came back in ‘93-’96, we had a program of International Scholars, a
carefully-designed program to bring in disadvantaged persons. They weren’t all
African-Americans. There were a handful of Asian-Americans in there and a few whites
and some Hispanics. They were selected in their sophomore or junior years and they did
internships and we got them job places. Then they went to graduate school and we helped
them with all of that. Then the question was, were we going to give them a special ticket
to bring them in? They had undertaken a commitment to come in, but when the whole
thing was begun, we had not quite thought through how we were going to handle them
when they came to the point. Were they supposed to take the FS exam? What would
happen if they didn’t pass it? We had some questions then. I was for those people who
had successfully completed what we asked them to do. I was for giving them a second
chance and perhaps under some conditions a bye on entry, maybe a conditional entry of
some sort, in a way that we would have to design. We had quite a lot of back and forth on
this. It culminated in a meeting that I had with the legal advisor, Conrad Harper, whom I
admired very greatly and who had been very active on minority issues in the Department. Conrad said, “Dick, we can’t do what you want to do because if we do, the Justice Department will get after us because they’ll never let us go along with this.” I said: “Conrad, I want you to design the program. We will go ahead and do it. You give me as well designed a legal framework as you can and then let’s let them come catch us. Let’s don’t fail to try because they might say, ‘No.’ Let’s start the thing going. Let’s let somebody come after us. Instead of having black officers suing us because we don’t do anything, let’s let the United States sue us because we are doing something.”

So, that was the way I left it. I don’t know what happened. I’d like to know the end of the story. That was affirmative action. I’m very happy to say that there were a goodly number of folks that worked very well, but there could have been more of them. We didn’t have to lose as many along the way as we did.

Q: To give listeners an idea, about this time, I had two experiences in this. One was, I was with the Board of Examiners from ’75-’76. We seemed to be getting an excessive number of mid-career women and minorities, mainly African-American, who were coming in who were working for other government agencies, particularly EEO ones, which seemed to be robbing Peter to pay Paul. In other words, we weren’t reaching out to the general public; we were just reshuffling government workers. The other thing was, we had an African-American man in his early 30s who came as vice consul to me in Seoul, Korea, when I was there from ’76 to ’79. I was under no instructions to do anything. I thought, “Gee, I’d better not try to single him out to give him special help.” So, it was sort of sink or swim and he unfortunately sank.

MOOSE: Right.

Q: I felt guilty about this afterwards, but I remember thinking about it at the time and felt, “Since there is not a program, maybe I’d better not single him out for help.” I think I made the wrong call on that.

MOOSE: I think it makes my point. Well, you were left to your own devices on this and that wasn’t really clear. It makes my point about the need for a support system and for somebody at the top to say, “Okay, this is what we’re going to do” and to keep doing it. I don’t want to imply that Ben Reed, who succeeded me, had any less interest. He really did have a good deal. It was unfortunate that that Administration only lasted for four years and then there was a different cast of characters. I’ll give you an experience of another officer who came in at about the same time, an African-American officer. I played an important role in persuading him to come in. He was somewhat reluctant. He had been in the Department in the Civil Service. He told me one time that he was thinking about trying to make the transition. He wanted to do it and he made the application and at the last minute, he backed out. I really leaned on him very hard and he went ahead. That’s really what he wanted to do. He was assigned out to a post. The principal officer when he was assigned there said, “I don’t want this person. I won’t have him.” I said, “Why?” He said, “I really need a good political officer.” I said: “Well, I know a little bit about your post. You’re one of the best political officers I know in the
FS. I can’t think of a better person to be mentor to this fellow who is coming out there, who frankly, I think, will make quite a good political officer, as a matter of fact.” So, we went back and forth. Finally, it was virtually a direct order: “You will take the person and you will work with him and develop him.” The officer in question was a little stiff necked, but he was an awfully good officer. The man went out there. The principal officer worked with him very hard. There came a time when we needed a political officer in a nearby country and we said, “Okay, we’re going to take him and move him there.” By that time, I was in the Africa Bureau. I had given away part of a clue to this, but it will be obvious at the end. He said, “Well, you can’t take him. He’s my best person and we’re really busy.” I said, “Well, I remember how you felt when he went there. Thank you very much. You’ve done a good job. I’ll try to send you a good replacement.” The man was (Edward J.) Ed Perkins. He turned out rather well.

Q: He was later Director General of the FS and Ambassador to (Liberia, South Africa the United Nations and Australia).

MOOSE: Right. It was Tom Smith who worked with him. Tom was a superb officer and he trained Ed. He had a natural talent.

Q: This is what should have been done. It was a foggy time.

MOOSE: The last time, we touched on the transition to the Carter Administration. The director of the Bureau of the Budget coming in was Burt Lance. There was the move to go to zero-based budgeting, which President Carter had practiced down in Georgia. Zero-based budgeting, to oversimplify, is, instead of building next year’s budget on the basis of this year’s budget, implement some changes from this year’s budget projecting it up to the next—we’ll say: “Okay, what are our priorities? Where do we want to put our money? We’ll build it up from the bottom rather than doing it as a change or a variation of what we did last year.” One of the advantages that was touted for it was that it required you to reexamine anew at the beginning of each budget cycle what you were doing. Is this program still justified? It is still needed? If it is, to try to just keep from carrying things over from one year to the next. That is oversimplification. Needless to say, it was not very popular. It required a great deal more work than a traditional system, which the Department never totally abandoned and soon resumed once Carter was gone. When I returned in ’93, the whole concept of it was an artifact.

The other thing that happened during that brief period while I was there was, in ’77, I made the critical procurement decisions that brought the Wang systems into the Department. Wang was a predecessor of the personal computer [PC], but it was much more limited in its capabilities and really was only used for word processing. Although it was the most sophisticated word processor at the time, it did not have in the original versions of it the applications for other office work that the PC had, which was introduced later on. But we made the decision and we deployed it widely in the Department. It had some storage and retrieval capabilities. By the time it was installed in the late ’70s, the Department of State was far in advance of any other cabinet department or the military or the intelligence community. Although we laughed about the Wang,
which was still hanging around when I came back in ’96, the fact of the matter is, we were way ahead of everybody else in the late ’70s. What happened was, in the intervening years, the PC revolution occurred but—for some reason that I will never understand—it completely missed the Department, despite the fact that one of my illustrious and highly-distinguished successors had made his fortune and his reputation in the data processing world. I asked him once, “Ivan [Selin], I don’t understand it. Tell me what happened.” He said: “I don’t know. I just missed it. We should have put more emphasis on it.” In fact, I understand what happened. By that time, the process of decentralized, uncoordinated procurement had proceeded to such a degree in the Department that before Ivan could have ever really done anything about this, he would have had to go into the very difficult business—which I got into later on—of trying to establish an information technology policy and architecture for the Department, which meant to break the back of the IM bureaucracy and of the regional Bureaus’ control of procurement of that type of equipment. So, it wasn’t just that Ivan didn’t understand. It’s just that in order to do anything really sensible, you would have had to tackle some much larger management problems.

Q: I recall, around ’77 when I was Consul General in Seoul, we were trying to institute—Tom Stern, the DCM, was pushing hard on this—an automated or management system. We were working with one set of people that was the central one. At the same time, although I was a consular officer, I didn’t find out until later that the Consular Bureau was going its own way. It was really developing a better system.

MOOSE: The point that I’m talking about [gap in interview] The Bureaus control the money for acquiring that type of thing. There was no coordination of policy, no thought of an overall architecture. So, Ivan understood why it didn’t happen, because you had to change the way we did things in order to be able to do that.

It’s interesting that you mentioned Seoul. By ’95, I was in Seoul. One of the things I was most interested in was, I went post to post to see how application of information technology was taken hold. The consular area continued to be [gap in interview] I encouraged them to go on and move in their own directions. I did want some compatibility, some standards. That was not a problem with them. I helped them get more money. Seoul happened to be a place that had done a tremendous amount of innovation. Most of it was coming out of the consular section. Much of it was driven by a couple of young American Vice Consuls, but with very active help from the Korean national employees. They instituted some of the most advanced practices in any of the consular sections in the world. We then took those and replicated them elsewhere. Tom Stern was a superb Administrative Officer, among other things. That really took hold.

Q: Let’s move on. You took over the Africa Bureau from when to when?

MOOSE: I moved there in July of ’77 after barely six months in the management job. I stayed there through the end of the Administration, through 1981.

Q: Why the move?
MOOSE: During the transition, as Mr. Vance was making these decisions about his Assistant Secretaries that were key officers in the Department, he had been attentive to the need to try to retain a strong representation of the career service at the Assistant Secretary level. He appointed quite a number of people who were political appointees, although there were some kind of unusual ones—Ambassador to the United Nations Donald (Don) McHenry, Director of Policy Planning Tony Lake, Richard Holbrooke, all of whom were FS officers previously—and myself. So, there were four of us who had been FS officers but came back at the Assistant Secretary level as political appointees. Phil Habib was Mr. Vance’s perhaps closest advisor in decisions that he made about organizing the Department and had been Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs. Under Mr. Vance he became the Under Secretary for Political Affairs—they worked together on the Paris Peace Talks and so forth. Habib was a vigorous advocate for more career appointments. He persuaded Vance to keep Bill Schaufele as Assistant Secretary for Africa. Schaufele had been the third of Henry Kissinger’s Assistant Secretaries for Africa. He had fired two of them before—Bev Carter and Nat Davis, not necessarily in that order. I think he fired Nat first over Angola and then Bev over something that was never quite clear. So, Schaufele was the third. He had been held over. The fact that he had served under Kissinger in the Ford Administration was a handicap for him when it came to dealing with the congressional Black Caucus, which was newly active and energized in African affairs. He did not have an easy relationship. It was not anybody’s fault, but he didn’t have an easy relationship with Andy Young (McHenry’s predecessor as Ambassador to the United Nations), who was very influential and important with Carter on African policy issues.

When Shaba came along—Shaba I, in the Congo between the Shaba area of the Congo, formerly Katanga, always a threat to secede from the Congo, influenced by money, the natural resources that were there, and some meddling from across the border in Angola—a crisis broke out there. There was unhappiness all over in the White House, on the Hill, about the way it had been handled. So, Vance decided he needed to change and put the Africa Bureau under new management. So, he asked me one day if I would do that. I had this Africa background. I had in fact while in the management job been asked to accompany Andy Young, with whom I had a good close relationship, on an African trip and to go with the Vice President, Mondale, as he got ready to go see Prime Minister Voerster of South Africa in Vienna in the very early days of the new Administration. I had gotten tainted once again with Africa things. I had been at some pains to shake the red dust from my boots ever since I had been there in ’60-’62. It actually came to Vance’s mind that I might be able to do something there. I didn’t want to. I wanted to stay where I was. Vance asked me about it twice. Finally, the third time, he said, “You don’t understand. I’m not asking you if you’d like to do this. I’m telling you you’re going to be the new Assistant Secretary.” So, I did. I took that over in July in the middle of Shaba II, another outbreak of the same thing. The central feature of it was the allegation that the trouble in Shaba had been instigated or was participated in heavily by Cuban elements operating out of Angola. Mr. Brzezinski was very much in the middle of this in saying that there were questions as to what the United States was going to do, covert action, overt action. The Executive Branch was still limited by the operation of the Clark
Amendment, which had forbid any type of direct or indirect U.S. involvement in the civil war in Angola.

Any reasonable interpretation of it would have included all of the things that Mr. Brzezinski wanted to do vis-a-vis the Cubans, who he believed to be behind all of this operating about in Angola. The intelligence information really did not support Mr. Brzezinski. That became a controversial issue. I arrived sort of in the middle of that. There was a great issue in the press, the foreign affairs community, as whether Brzezinski did or did not have any intelligence or information that would have supported the claim that he made.

One of the first things that I did was to work with two of the members of President Carter’s staff, Jody Powell and [gap in interview] to examine the evidence to see whether or not there was really a basis for this. We didn’t find much basis for the allegations about the Cubans, and eventually that crisis passed. But that’s how I got going there, in the midst of that crisis. But the larger issue—the issue that occupied us during most of the remainder of the Administration until the Horn of Africa exploded later on in ’78—was southern Africa during most of my tenure in the Africa Bureau. That was the question of independence for Zimbabwe and Namibia and the apartheid regime in South Africa. That was my continual focus up through the Lancaster House negotiations in London that led to the referendum, the elections in Zimbabwe and independence.

The United States had begun to collaborate early in the Administration talking with the British government—this was before I came—about a process that would lead to majority rule in Zimbabwe. Tony Lake had been very deeply involved in those. Lake had a great interest in Africa policy issues. With one of the think tanks where he had been before he came back in the government, he had written a little book called The Tar Baby Option, which was the story of National Security Study Memorandum #38 or 68, which was the Kissinger-era policy of essentially accommodating and in effect supporting South African interests in southern Africa as a means of opposing and resisting Soviet influence in the area, while at the same time giving a certain amount of lip service to the movement for majority rule in southern Africa. A feature of that policy had been Kissinger’s speech in Lusaka which appeared to represent some significant move by the then Ford Administration toward a recognition that change was coming in southern Africa. Africans mistrusted this. This is one of the reasons why Bill Schaufele had trouble. Anybody who was identified with anything about Kissinger in Africa was handicapped. So, we sought from the earliest days of the Carter Administration to move beyond that policy to some real course of action in conjunction with the British, who had and accepted a special responsibility for Rhodesia because it had been a Crown colony that had broken away in a unilateral declaration of independence led by Ian Smith, which had occurred back in 1965.

The British had not put down the unilateral independence move of the white Rhodesian settlers—not unlike our own Declaration of Independence—and they went their own way and they installed the minority-rule regime in place of the colonial regime, which in many ways had been less oppressive. Then the Smith regime for all of its faults was
never anywhere near as bad as the apartheid that you had in South Africa, but it certainly was not anything that any black African could accept in any form whatsoever. The white Rhodesia government collaborated closely with the South Africans and really exercised and were a part of the effort to preserve white hegemony in that part of the world. At the same time, you had the Angolan government, which was a Marxist government, and the Mozambican government, which was as well, although they differed very greatly in their values and the way that they applied it. So, we began to work with the British. At the very beginning of the Administration when I came in, that collaboration was already in training under the Labour government. David Owen was the British foreign secretary. We were working very closely with him. Callahan was the prime minister in Great Britain. We worked with them and looked to the British [to take the lead?] We tried to hold the British to a special responsibility, which they accepted in varying degrees. The Africans very much emphasized the British responsibility in Rhodesia and felt it was up to them. They had allowed the minority whites to take over and it was up to them to put it in its place. This was particularly a refrain that Julius Nyerere took every opportunity to remind Owen that just annoyed one so enormously.

A side anecdote: I accompanied Foreign Secretary Owen to Salisbury, the Rhodesian capital, in ’77. Owen insisted that we should go and talk to Smith, the leaders of the African so-called frontline states—those African states that adjoined or touched or surrounded Zimbabwe and Botswana—plus the Nigerians and Tanzania. Tanzania had a border with Zambia, so I guess they counted as a border state as well. Owen wanted to talk to Smith himself. The Africans really didn’t want him to go. They said the trip was a sellout by the British—“It would come to nothing. Why do you dignify it with a visit?”—but we went because Owen wanted to do it. He felt it was the right thing to do. Mr. Vance thought it was the right thing to do. I went with Owen. We went to Salisbury. Sure enough, Ian Smith gave us the back of his hand, was rude, and we left without even spending a night and flew back to Dar es Salaam. We had promised as a sort of condition, as a concession, to the Africans who objected very strenuously that we would stop and give President Nyerere a readout on the visit to Salisbury.

Nyerere was, by common consent, considered to be the leader of the frontline states. So, we went to Dar Es Salaam on Owen’s plane. Owen was in a very bad humor as a result of having been stiffed by Ian Smith. He was in a rancorous mood when he landed. He for some reason expected Nyerere to come to the airport to meet him, although a head of state would not normally come to the airport to meet a foreign minister. He sent his foreign minister at the time, who was Ben Mkapa, now president of Tanzania. Owen was not pleased. So, we went on to the state house and had a meeting. Nyerere really didn’t give Owen a fair chance on the one hand; on the other hand, Owen was irritated by having to stop there in the first place. He didn’t like it at all. One thing led to another. Nyerere went to his favorite theme—that if the British really cared about it and if they were really sincere about it, all they had to do was send some troops in to take care of it. Owen unfortunately chose to recall the fact that the British had had to send armed forces to Tanzania to put down an uprising by the army shortly after independence and things went from bad to worse. The meeting fell apart very quickly. As we were going out of the conference room, I was back toward the end of the line. One of the Tanzanian officials
plucked at my sleeve and whispered in my ear, “Mwalimu—an affectionate name for Nyerere that was a Swahili honorific for “teacher”—would like a word with you.” So, Owen goes out the door. I go back into the other side of the room where Nyerere has come back through the door. I go up to Nyerere, who leans over to me and says, “Dick, don’t trust the British.” At that very moment, although far out of earshot, Owen has realized I’m not behind him anymore. He comes back up and sees me and Nyerere “whispering together,” which was just Nyerere saying these few words to me. I turned around and went on out. Owen, who was nervous anyway, said, “Dick, what did he say to you?” I said, “He said that we shouldn’t give up on the negotiating track.” Owen said, “Oh, well, good.” I felt it was alright. If I had told Owen what he had said, he’d have had a fit. Actually, Nyerere was right. The British always flirted with some kind of a unilateral solution in Rhodesia. So, Nyerere’s suspicions were well placed.

Q: What was our judgment of Nyerere at that time? To me, he was a fascinating character. He seemed to have particularly the Europeans aglow. He collected money. It was an absolute disaster as far as what he did for his country, yet in a way he got away with it. How did we feel at the time?

MOOSE: His economic mismanagement was second only to the Kwame Nkrumah, who went to independence with a very rich treasury and lots of resources and skills and so forth, but the Tanzanians never even came close to thinking about them. What did we think about it? It depended on who you talked to. It’s fair to say that most official Americans who dealt with Africa did not quite trust Nyerere. He was a little too tricky, they thought. That wasn’t true of everybody. Bev Carter and some of the Africa hands thought that Nyerere had great leadership qualities. Of course, Henry Kissinger had not been able to stand him. Bev’s friendship with Nyerere was one of the things that got him fired. Mr. Vance was very careful about Nyerere. It was difficult for Vance to work with Nyerere, given the fact that the British mistrusted him to the extent that they did. But Nyerere was an effective intermediary with the more extreme or radical or impatient or militant African elements. He could talk to them. He could talk to Mugabe and the other Zimbabweans in a way that nobody else could. In fact, Mugabe had been in Tanzania before he moved down to Maputo to be a little bit closer. Nyerere had a stature and a standing with them that—for the same reasons that the Westerners tended to mistrust him—a lot of the West Africans would listen to him. Nyerere mattered when push came to shove after there were various developments in the questions of were we going to have a conference; would the Patriotic Front (the name that we gave to the united Zimbabwe opposition elements, the Zanu and Zapu) go to a conference, and how do you get Nyerere together with the Nigerians, who played a critical role? The Nigerians didn’t entirely trust Nyerere either, but the combination of the big guy on the block, the Nigerians, and Nyerere, the teacher, would get them to the conference table eventually. I always felt that we had to play ball with Nyerere because he was an effective intermediary. We knew what his objective was. He would not compromise on majority rule. There couldn’t be any shading about this. It had to be genuine. Of course, all of the Zimbabwe parties wanted to cook the deal to put themselves in power. Nyerere wouldn’t have any of that either. So he insisted that it be a free and fair election, which for whatever Robert Mugabe or the other Zanu and Zapu leaders said, none of them really
wanted a fair shake. They wanted to be installed into power. But Nyerere opposed that, too. I was always impressed with that and I always felt that he was quite sincere about it. Oddly enough, he ran a one-party state himself, but he wasn’t going to be a party like that imposed in Zimbabwe. I talked to him a little bit about that once and he never said that he thought it was a mistake; he said the conditions were different in Zimbabwe than what they had been in Tanzania. I would have liked to have a chance to explore that with him more, but we never really had that opportunity.

So, the British and the Americans formed the Contact Group. The American leader of the Contact Group was the U.S. Ambassador to Zambia, Steve Low. I forget who the head of the British side was. But they worked very hard and they worked primarily the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe issue in endless meetings and flying back and forth. I went back and forth to London a great deal for meetings at the Foreign Office as we went down through ’77 into ’78 trying to find a formula.

At the same time, we were continuing to press the South Africans on apartheid. There had been the Soweto riots (1976). There had been the murder of Steve Biko (1977). The meeting that Vice President Mondale had with Mr. Voerster in Vienna at the beginning of the Administration had been a failure. When Mondale emerged from that meeting the intent was that he would be very conciliatory not saying anything to inflame the Africans in the press conference. At the end of Vienna, Mondale when asked to explain what “one man, one vote” meant, said that it meant majority rule. He said it in terms that were a little bit more explicit than the South Africans had expected So, they immediately went back and assumed the worst and were no help to us on Rhodesia or on Namibia. We continued to hope that they would be helpful on Namibia, where there also was a contact group formed. That was led by Don McHenry from the UN. So, the continuing effort on Rhodesia, Zimbabwe, apartheid issues, whether there would be an embargo on South Africa or not, and on the question of Namibia moving on the road to independence, occupied our time.

At one point, Mr. Vance went to Malta to meet with the British, the leaders of the frontline, to try to advance a process there. The African radicals dominated the tenor of that meeting. They were very insulting to Mr. Vance. The British had not wanted to go. They only went because we insisted and they said, in effect, “We told you so.” The best thing to come out of it was Andy Young promoted a meeting between Lord Carrington, who was by that time the British foreign secretary, and one of the leading military people out of Zanu, General (Josiah) Tongorara. Andy believed wonderfully that if you could get these two military people [gap in interview] Tongarara was one of these brilliant natural leaders. He was a genuine guerilla leader. I don’t think Mugabe ever spent a night in the bush. Maybe he did, but certainly not many. But Tongorara had lived there and fought. Andy believed that if you could get Tongorara and Lord Carrington together, these two people with this military background would be able to communicate with each other. To a certain extent, it did work. It helped to promote a little bit of feeling on the British side that there were some people on the other side who could be effective. At a critical time at Lancaster House, when Mugabe was ready to pull out rather than continuing negotiating, Tongorara, who was there, was a powerful restraint on him more than anybody else. It
was Zamora Michel, the president of Mozambique, who sent word to Mugabe that if he walked out of Lancaster House, he could not expect to come back to Mozambique and continue to use that as a base for the war, that he had to stay there.

We covered Lancaster House very intensively. The Africa Bureau had traditionally had assigned to it in effect part-time one of the officers in the political section in London, who followed the opposition party in Africa. That was the assignment of this individual. When I first came to the Africa Bureau, it was an extraordinarily talented officer named Ray Seitz, who followed the Conservatives and African issues (Ambassador to the UK 1991-94). So, of course, he became extremely important when the Tories took over. He was succeeded by Gib Lanfer, who had been in the Africa Bureau. (He had taken over for Ray and he had Gib was there during Lancaster House.) Gib was extremely effective as an FS officer and established very close relationships with the British negotiators, who came to believe that Lanfer was much more sympathetic to them than I was. They were as suspicious of me as I was of them. I had long hair and a big mustache and had a rubber band on my wrist and had pressed them very hard and I had been very critical of their continuing relationship with the South African intelligence services. I thought they told them much too much and believed much too much of what they got passed back to them, especially by South African intelligence, on the Patriotic Front. But Gib had a very good relation with the British. We learned later that other British were tapping Gib’s home telephone and for all I know, the Embassy lines as well. Gib and I would talk openly on the phone, I under the assumption that the British were listening to it. So, we were kind of playing “good cop and bad cop.” I was the bad cop and Gib would enjoy their confidence because they felt that he had the same problem that they did—i.e., dealing with me, on the other end.

One notable thing that happened in the middle of those negotiations was that Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina, not then the chairman of the Committee, but quite a senior Member, sent a staff person (Michael Pillsbury?)—or rather the staff person organized his own trip—to London either just before or in the opening days of Lancaster House. It very nearly upset the progress toward the Lancaster House negotiations by encouraging the British government, the Tories, to believe that the U.S. Congress was about to block the Carter Administration’s effort to secure a free and fair election in Rhodesia. He talked with any number of influential people of various governments and urged them to go slow, saying that this whole initiative was going to be blocked and indeed Helms introduced legislation that was also introduced in the House. They came very close to making it very difficult for us to continue the path of pursuing these negotiations—which would lead to genuinely free and fair elections in Rhodesia, to become Zimbabwe.

On the House side, I worked very hard on this. I spent more time on this than anything else. The Administration’s position ultimately was saved by two Members of the House then Foreign Affairs Committee (now International Relations Committee). One of the more important was Steve Solarz, who was a Democratic congressman from New York, one of the most capable and knowledgeable Members of Congress in the foreign affairs area that I ever knew, and certainly one of the most hyperactive. He was very good. He
really understood what was going on. Steve almost singlehandedly in the FAC organized opposition to what Helms was trying to do. He was assisted somewhat belatedly by Bill Gray, who was a Democratic congressman from Pennsylvania, from Philadelphia. Bill was instrumental in energizing the Black Caucus, which had not been particularly active up to that time; he was also was more apt to be critical of the Administration for not doing enough than anyone else. But Steve organized Bill, and Bill organized the Black Caucus, and they finally blocked the movement of this legislation in the FAC.

Over on the Senate side, with Helms inside the Committee, Frank Church—now chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee the Committee where I had spent many years as a staff member—was back there sort of battling for life, trying to prevent passage of this legislation that would have undermined [the dialogue on Rhodesia?]

So, we go to some climatic hearings in the Foreign Relations Committee. I was up there two days making no headway whatsoever before I went out. The third day (it may have been day two), the Committee was pretty much moving away from us in large part because many Members of the Committee really felt that Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, the leader of Zapu, the other major party in what we called the Patriotic Front, the black Zimbabwean opposition to the Smith government, really felt that Mugabe for certain was a Marxist and that probably Nkomo was really at heart and that to offer these fellows an opportunity for a free election was to just invite them to take over, that they were really anti-democratic and they didn’t want any part of the U.S. responsibility for that. There was a lot of respectable support for that. The Washington Post supported that position. My good friend, the late Meg Greenfield, wrote some really bad editorials. Even my close friend Steve Rosenfeld, who was a deputy at the time [gap in interview]. Very respectable, sophisticated senators in both parties who might have otherwise been with us were not: Case was not. Javits, senior senator from New York; Pat Moynihan, also of New York, but not a Member of the Committee; Lowell Weicher, a senator from Connecticut, a much respected moderate Republican. We had a really hard time. The hearing was going on, they were about to move for a vote. The only Member of the vocally supported me was Mac Mathias of Maryland, a liberal moderate Republican. Church called a recess and took me in the back office of the FRC where the chief clerk sat and said: “Dick, you’re going to lose this. You’re just going to get rolled over. I’m not even sure that I can support you either.”

My instructions up there from Mr. Vance were not to budge an inch. I decided I’d better call Vance, so I put in a call to him. He was at the White House with the President. I somehow persuaded them to put the call in there. He had indicated that he and the President were of one mind on this. I talked to Vance while he was in the President’s office—that’s my understanding that that’s where the conversation took place—and Vance said, “Don’t budge an inch.” I said: “Cy, I’m going to get rolled. Church is going to leave me. I’ve only got one Member of the Committee with me. I think I’ve really had it. I think we’re going to lose it.” Cy said, “Don’t budge an inch” so I didn’t get any help there whatsoever. I went back. I got off the telephone and the person who was doing congressional relations for us then on this particular issue was Jeff Davidow, now the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico. He was our first representative in Harare—what Salisbury
came to be called after independence—and later was Ambassador to Zambia. During the recess and so forth, while I was talking to Mr. Vance on the telephone, Jeff had been talking to the Helms staff and he came to me and said, “Dick, here’s an idea.” He put forward a procedural device, a thing that would stall action for a little while. It was an idea. He said, “Why don’t you propose this to Helms?” I felt that I was just barely inside my instructions from Mr. Vance not to yield or budge on anything, but we made a procedural deal that really left the initiative over in the House; that the Senate would not move until the House did something or other. I was confident that Solarz would be able to control the pace of the action over there. Helms agreed to my compromise to this proposal that we put to him. There was some small verbal concession in this to Helms’ position.

Helms backed away. He did not press action at that particular time, which happened to give us the break that we needed to get things underway and for Steve Solarz to block things over in the House. I said that we didn’t enjoy much support up on the Hill. We had a lot of nervousness in the Department about the tactics and how we were playing the thing. I very nearly had a real break on this with Tony Lake, who was my close collaborator and associate and personal friend. Tony was Director of the Policy Planning staff, but he had stayed deeply involved in Africa. The Africa Bureau staff always resented that and felt that I should have worked harder to try to keep Tony out of African affairs. But number one, there was almost no way that that was going to happen. Number two, he was just extraordinarily intelligent and was as well qualified in that area as I was. The two of us could always argue things through. I thought it made for a richer decision making process to have a person like that, plus Don McHenry, involved in the scheme of things. So, I never worried about it as much as my staff did. Tony though and I almost came to a parting in ways. Tony was terribly afraid that the Administration was going to become overly identified with the Patriotic Front. Tony was very much aware of the conservative criticism of what we were doing, which was nowhere nearly as high minded and as intelligent as that of people like Senators Moynihan or Weicher or Javits. Indeed, at one point, Mr. Vance sort of appointed two teams to compete and argue the issues in a tactical sense about how we should proceed. Tony headed the other team. We went back and forth over this a good deal. It was really more about tactics and appearances than it was about anything else. I was always more emotional on the issue than Tony was. He was a far more sophisticated and calculating person than I felt that I was. I think the result of this tension within was probably a good thing. On the one hand, we kept pressing really hard. We kept a lot of pressure on the British. Rhetorically, we did verge on siding clearly with the Africans and the Patriotic Front. At the same time, Tony was responsible for having instilled a caution and a calculation about our approach that I think, had he not been successful in that regard, we would have had even more difficulty in the popular arena than we did.

Zimbabwean independence, although it’s taken for granted today, was by no means a foregone conclusion or a desirable outcome in the broad public mind—to whatever extent one could say that there was any broad public mind about this at all. It was very apprehensive about the prospect that the United States might be instrumental in handing another African country over to a Marxist regime. That’s what the great concern was
about. Of course, Mugabe and Nkomo really didn’t help at all. They’d get in Africa, from
someplace, and say things that lent themselves to inflaming opinion.

Q: Did you find that from the conservative side and others an actual repugnance on the
part of our older leaders, used to the way things used to be, of putting a minority of
whites under a black rule?

MOOSE: They never came out and said anything quite so racist as that. So, one is left
only to read their minds on this and to look at the rest of their record in other dimensions.
It wasn’t an easy thing to do. The precursor to this debate had been a debate that had gone
on for a number of years before the Carter Administration took over, and which was very
intense in the first months of the Carter Administration before I moved into the job. That
was the ultimately successful effort to repeal the Byrd Amendment, which was authored
by Senator Harry Byrd Jr. of Virginia. It had the effect of setting aside, as far as the U.S.
was concerned, the embargo observed by much of the rest of the world on trade with
Rhodesia. Rhodesia was then the leading producer of chrome in the world. The American
mining companies and automobile manufacturers had a vested interest in maintaining
access to this. They erected an elaborate structure of justification that went to the Cold
War and U.S. superiority; we would lose every type of military contest imaginable with
the Russians if we couldn’t keep our access to Rhodesian chrome open. This was just a
transparent kind of a business ploy.

At the same time, a much less articulated—in fact, I have almost no recollection of it
being a public issue at all—was probably a much more important fact, that Rhodesia was
the leading producer and exporter of the particular kind of asbestos. It was known as a
sort of long-fibre asbestos—it’s an insulator—which was critically important to our
buoying nuclear submarine buildup. It was probably far more important than the
chrome ever was. I don’t recall that issue having come out into the public quite as openly
as I understood it from some submariners. So, there had been that battle to repeal the
Byrd Amendment so that we could make the embargo effective. At the same time, many
of the friends of Africa in the United States were battling to get the U.S. to put an
embargo on South Africa as well.

Q: Where was Brzezinski in this? He was a Cold Warrior of the first water.

MOOSE: That’s a very interesting question. I cannot recall a single instance in which
Brzezinski ever asserted himself in any way on the southern African issues, except for
Angola and later on the Horn. There, he was very active, but I do not recall his ever
taking a hand in the business about the issues in southern Africa with the exception of
Angola; there he played a very important role. He was always trying to repeal the Clark
Amendment or to ignore it. At the time of Shaba II, the second outbreak of violence in
Shaba and Katanga, Brzezinski wanted us to become more engaged with the rebel group
in Angola known as UNITA headed by Jonas Savimbi, a personality and a group that
continues to this day to bear part of the responsibility for perpetuating the civil war.
Brzezinski wanted to provide support for UNITA against the Soviet-Cuban backed
MPLA government in Angola headed by Neto. This went on and on and on, these efforts
by Brzezinski to find a way to aid UNITA.

This came to a head finally in a meeting over in the Situation Room at the White House chaired by Brzezinski, Vance, Harold Brown, Turner the director of CIA, Adm. Holloway the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Air Force, and the Navy. The argument was whether the Clark Amendment would or would not prevent the things that Brzezinski wanted to do.

The general counsel of the CIA, which was going to be the vehicle for doing things, was asked for his opinion. He said that it was against the law, we couldn’t do it even with a presidential determination. Brzezinski was very reluctant to accept that. Mr. Vance in some exasperation said, “Well, ask Dick Moose. After all, he helped Dick Clark write the amendment.” I said that I thought the things Mr. Brzezinski was proposing were clearly against the law. Brzezinski was not satisfied with this and he proposed that they have an inquiry undertaken on the Hill by somebody other than me to find out how the Clark Amendment was interpreted by leaders on the Hill. So, they sent some folks off up there to take soundings on the Hill. Except for where one would have expected it, the chairman of the two committees and so on believed that it was against the law. I never knew whether Brzezinski really gave up or not. I would not be surprised to find some day that the CIA under pressure from Brzezinski eventually found some way to put some radios or some intelligence exchange in there. I found in other areas that the Agency had gone absolutely contrary to what Mr. Vance and Mr. Muskie and the President thought was the policy in some other areas, notably in South Africa. So, I wouldn’t be surprised to find some day that something went on there, but there was nothing that made any significant difference if it did.

Q: Going back to the Lancaster House, how did that play out?

MOOSE: Nyerere played a critical role leading up to that. There was a brief meeting which was arranged at Heathrow between Mr. Vance and Nyerere. Mr. Vance really wondered, before he fully committed himself to pushing the British to convene what became Lancaster House, if the Africans would really accept the outcome of a straightforward election. There was a brief meeting there between Vance and Nyerere. Nyerere was persuasive with Vance. It was one of the reasons why Vance pushed and stuck as hard as he did to push the British to go ahead. The British never openly opposed it, but the British would have up to the very [end?]. They really wanted a formula that they felt would ensure an accommodating black government. By that, they meant Joshua Nkomo. They felt that Nkomo could be controlled and, for that, probably rebought. I think Nkomo had taken money from the Agency earlier in his career, as indeed in the early ‘60s many African leaders had taken money from both sides—some highly respected ones. The British really tried to turn Lancaster House in some ways that--

There was a question of what would happen with the armed elements that were in the country, mainly Mugabe’s Zanu people. Here Tongorara, the black general who I referred to earlier, and Carrington actually worked out the arrangements for the regroupment areas where the guerrillas would gather and where the arms would be put under surveillance by
a British monitoring force. That was a key to getting the agreement. When they were able to work that out, when Michel Tongorara was persuaded to go along with this, it was critically important to ensuring an environment for the elections, which we could then say that we were satisfied that they could take place in an atmosphere free of intimidation. You would have the armed people in regroupments. It worked. It’s an interesting example. We’ve seen lots of situations in other parts of the world after that where that would have been the solution. This did work. There were no significant violations of this. It really did work when push came to shove.

The Lancaster House talks were successful. There was a formula. The British actually resumed for a brief period the exercise of sovereignty in Rhodesia. They sent down the grandson of Winston Churchill, Lord (Nicholas) Soames. He became, in effect, the governor general again. The British sent in troops to monitor this process. It was quite extraordinary considering the bitterness, the level of violence, and the rhetoric surrounded for so many years. But the African leaders kept faith. I’ve spoken to Mugabe and Nkomo. There were a handful of other black Zimbabwean leaders. There was Bishop (Able) Muzawera, who was a great favorite among American conservatives; he was a Methodist Church man. There was Chief Chuwow, the leader of a particular ethnic group. They all had their champions here in the U.S. who felt that the Muzaweras and the Chuwows were going to be dealt out in this process, that somehow it was going to be dominated by the Patriotic Front and the guerrillas and so forth. The fact of the matter was that these people had a very limited following. Muzawera was thought to be a pawn of the South Africans—in any event, to enjoy very little popular support. In the election, I think they got a fair shake. Everybody got a fair shake in that election. Interestingly enough, the British believed up to the very last that Muzawera and Nkomo in some combination of coalition would emerge as the dominant force and that this would be validated by the election.

The British officers who supervised the monitoring force had a sort of little poll among themselves the night before the election. Overwhelmingly, they believed that Muzawera and Nkomo were going to win. Of course, quite the opposite happened. Mugabe won a very resounding victory. I was thinking about this yesterday when the news was that Mugabe actually lost a referendum in his own country held under the auspices of his own government. He was trying to change the constitution to increase power to the presidency and he actually lost—which I think is a great tribute to the people of Zimbabwe that after more than 20 years of rule, they actually voted the president down in an up-and-down vote. Of course, he won. We went out for the inauguration, which was interesting. I was sitting with Andy Young and various other people. We took a delegation out. It was held in the football stadium, the soccer stadium, in Harare. The music for the occasion was provided by Bob Marley and the Wailers. I remember sitting up there in the stands and looking down there. There was Bishop Muzawera sitting over here, not even in the distinguished VIP section. Mugabe had stuffed him off. Here was Nkomo. I went down and talked to both of them. I remember trying to put my arm around Joshua Nkomo, who was about the size of a bail of cotton and trying to comfort him, telling him what a great contribution he had made in moving events to come to this state.
Q: You talked about the British intelligence service. How about the CIA and trying to figure out where these people were going? Were you helped much by that?

MOOSE: No, they were really not much good. They relied heavily on the British services and they didn’t really have assets. They had no human intelligence with these guys and they relied on the British for technical collection. Most of what we had that was any use at all came through the British and was technical—intercepts. It was almost exclusively telephones. They had a couple of agents of influence who were totally untrustworthy. One was a well-known British journalist who just consistently would tell the British things that they really wanted to hear and they believed him. Actually, Africans used him, too, but the British were [gap in interview] Everybody practices the selective use of intelligence. I can’t believe that all of their sources were as bad as the ones that they shared with us.

Q: It’s interesting to see that Brzezinski was pushing the CIA to do something. I’m sure they would have been active as all hell, but they really weren’t very knowledgeable.

MOOSE: The CIA knew their limitations of that area. I don’t know how we covered this before. When Senator Clark and I went on the trip through Africa that led to the Clark Amendment, it was a CIA station chief in Lusaka—who was an extremely effective, intelligent guy—who told us that the Zambian government was being used as a channel to pass arms to (Jonas) Savimbi and that the U.S. had a major effort of arms supply going through Zaire, how to both—Roberto Holden, who was the leader of the third faction in Angola [gap in interview] The reason why the CIA station in Kinshasa subsequently helped Clark learn what was going on in Angola is because the Agency didn’t want any part of it. They wanted out of it and it served their ends to see it exposed at least to the Committee, because they didn’t want a part of it. There were of course some cowboys on the outside who wanted to do some stuff. Indeed, in Kinshasa, that occasion [gap in interview] I was in the Intercontinental Hotel in Kinshasa and I saw a guy who I used to know was a CIA operative in Laos. I said, “What are you doing here?” He said, “What do you think I’m doing here?” I said, “Well, I assume you’re running arms.” He laughed. Either he didn’t care or he was terribly naive. He took me out to Kinshasa airport to meet a plane coming in from Frankfurt, where they transshipped stuff from these unmarked planes that the Agency was using, to smaller planes that could fly down to the various places in Angola. But no, the Agency really was not active there. They didn’t have assets or stuff in place and they really did not [gap in interview] Someone in the Agency in later years told me that they never really had a successful human operation in South Africa; that they never succeeded in running an agent down there hadn’t rolled on.

Q: I think this might be a good place to stop.

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Q: Today is August 14, 2000. Would you like to cover Angola first?

MOOSE: We could not find anything very compelling to support Mr. Brzezinski’s stand
that the Cubans were involved.

Q: Well, the Cubans were involved later.

MOOSE: The Cubans were all over Angola in one way or another, but whether or not the Cubans were directly involved into the incursion into Zaire, I doubt that.

Q: Let’s talk about the Horn of Africa in this period.

MOOSE: It was right in that period there in the late summer (1977), probably in July, that there began to be disturbing signs that Siad Barre, the president of Somalia, had some adventurous ideas about the Ogaden portion of Ethiopia, the territory made up of the southeastern portion of the Somali Regional State in eastern Ethiopia whose inhabitants are predominantly ethnic Somali and Muslim. Most Somalis believed that the Ogaden is a part of Somalia. The five-pointed Somali star has two lost points. One of them is Ethiopia and one is Kenya. As a result, the Somalis have never enjoyed anything remotely approaching good relations. So, we were aware that there was something in Siad’s mind of an adventurous nature. The Embassy tried to quiet our fears and concerns in that regard. The Somalis were working very hard behind the scenes here in the United States to try to attain U.S. support for Somalia. The Somalis had just about run out their string with the Russians, who had been supporting them. They sensed or knew that there was not going to be the kind of Soviet support that there had been in the past. The Cubans were totally involved in Ethiopia. Siad, who was very pragmatic in Cold War politics as was, his ambassador here in the U.S., Abdulaha Ahdu, who—parenthetically to my astonishment—appeared in The New York Times the other day as one of the respected leaders of the new Somali national government. He was a very resourceful Somali ambassador here. He cultivated an acquaintance with a New York physician who happened to be a great fan of the Somali people and who served in the human health missions.

They somehow got to Brzezinski and, through Brzezinski, to the President and pitched their case that Somalia was ready to change sides, that they were going to leave the Soviets—actually, they were about to be abandoned—and that, with a promise of U.S. support, they would come on to the U.S. side and they would try to tame the Marxist government. Mr. Brzezinski knew nothing about Africa whatsoever and didn’t know the track record of the Somalis, of their utterly mendacious behavior. He totally swallowed this hook, line, and sinker. Although this was largely unbeknownst to us at the time, he got some sort of a wink and a nod over at the White House, which we believed was really instrumental in the rather daring Somali decision to invade the Ogaden, which they did. There is an excellent work up on this by Sam Hammerin, one of the novels that he wrote on Africa. It’s very good.

It’s about this period and the Somalis making up their mind to change sides. We had enough indications to encourage us to get as much intelligence coverage in the area as we could. We had added satellite coverage on it, but the satellites and intelligence sources saw nothing—but we woke up one morning and discovered that the Somali national
police force and army, such as it was, was in the Ogaden headed north toward the largest Ethiopian town, Harar. They really gave the Ethiopians quite a good beating and headed north. Ultimately, the Cubans airlifted a whole lot more soldiers and weaponry in there. The Somali advance ran out of gas. We meanwhile were trying to talk Siad Barre into stopping, standing still, getting the hell out of there before something really bad happened. We were very much afraid of a confrontation with Cuba, the Soviets, and the Horn over this absolutely insignificant area.

Q: This would have to be about 1980 because Afghanistan was invaded in ’79.

MOOSE: Zbig was very concerned about the Russians and the Middle East, so he took this quite seriously and—unmindful of the history of the region and _______ in great power terms—was frankly simply in his ignorance and naivety about it. He was manipulated by the Somalis, who were the world’s greatest manipulators. I made two or three trips to Mogadishu to talk to Siad to try to persuade him to get out. He always denied that his army was even in the Ogaden. I finally got authorization to show him some satellite photography of his units out there. Things were getting worse and worse. The Ethiopians were collapsing. The Cubans then began to push the Somalis back; they were approaching the border of Somalia. What would the U.S. do if they came across the border?

Zbig in the meeting over at the NSC wanted the U.S. forces ready to intervene and give air support to the Somalis if the Cubans came across. He said that was a place, if we had to choose to fight, where we could bring our power to bear. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had no stomach for this whatsoever. There was a very tough argument over in the Situation Room on this. The intelligence community, Defense Department, Joint Chiefs, were totally opposed to what Zbig wanted to do. I made one more trip out there to try to persuade Siad to get his guys out of there. While I was getting ready to go, we got word that in fact most, if not all, of the Somali units had been withdrawn. I asked Siad in a conversation: “It’s really remarkable. We devoted quite a lot of technology and effort into trying to keep track of what you’re doing out here. You sent your whole army in and we didn’t know that they were there. Then you got them all out when we were watching you even more closely than we did before. How did you do it?” He said: “Well, I spent several days traveling by truck, mostly at night, visiting the camps. You all think that I can just order these people in and out, but I have to persuade them. You don’t understand much about how we rule ourselves over here.” I had three wonderful conversations with Siad. I’d go to the Embassy. We would wait for a call from his office. I’d take a nap on the couch in the waiting room or the Ambassador’s office.

Q: Who was the Ambassador?

MOOSE: Don Peterson. So, I’d go out there and wait and then he’d call. I’d go over about midnight. All three times, I talked to him for almost three hours. He’d sit in his chair and smoke his cigarettes. One night, we smoked the better part of three packs of cigarette. I drank four glasses of Somali grapefruit juice and a couple of glasses of [gap in interview] I was afraid to stand up when we got through. Siad was a charming rogue and
played as so many rulers of small desperate countries have played, quite a very shrewd and clever game with us. We, tangled in our own fears and anxieties, fell prey to a clever fellow like this, who was used to living by his wits, which is the only way that Somalis could live. We fell for it again a few years later.

Q: Were we getting anything about the intentions of the Cubans?

MOOSE: That still remains very murky. There must be more known on this and accessible on this in the Soviet archives that are now available. It was never quite clear, any more than Castro’s motives in this and other African adventures and his involvement in Angola. I would credit him with a sincere, if maligned, willingness, interest, in seeing Cuba at the forefront of what he thought were anti-colonialist or struggles against the oppressors. In the case of Angola, he could look at (Jonas) Savimbi backed by this odd collection—the Chinese and South Africans—and he wanted to see Cuba in the forefront of fighting the apartheid-supported elements. In Ethiopia, although Mengistu was a terrible fellow, Castro must have seen him as some sort of a spearhead of Marxism in Africa. There weren’t very many other growing Marxist concerns in Africa, so he didn’t have much to pick from. This was a struggle in which he could oppose the United States. Whether the Russians wanted him there or not, whether they wanted him in Angola, is a subject that I assume some historians have now looked at. I had come to doubt by that time that the Russians had much stomach for this, although they were happy to get a toe hold in Ethiopia, but I don’t think they liked the cost of it once they got there. So, I think Castro’s motives were much more his own, rather than he being the [pawn] of the Soviets—as a lot of conservative observers in this country preferred to believe.

Q: During this time, with Brzezinski on the NSC and the State Department Africa Bureau, you weren’t seeing eye to eye. But did you have your man in the NSC?

MOOSE: Zbig early on in the Administration—I had discovered that the staff person that we had for Africa was not very strong or well informed. He was a nice enough fellow, but Zbig didn’t think he was an effective advocate for his point of view, so Zbig asked his friend, the head of the AFL-CIO, to recommend somebody out of the AFL-CIO’s labor office experience in Africa. He recommended Harry Funk. He had been an AFL-CIO guy in Addis for a number of years. Zbig figured for that reason that he must be conservative on most of the issues, had a cursory conversation with him, and put Funk in charge of the NSC on Africa. I was apprehensive about this because I figured that anybody who came with that credential was very opinionated. I figured anybody with that provenance was probably a bad fellow.

Q: Well, we’re thinking about Mr. Anti-Soviet (George Meany) who was the eminence grise of _______. So, I figured anybody who was sent by him was apt to be bad news, but I played it very carefully and he did, too. We discovered within a very short period of time that we were largely in agreement with one another. I don’t recall over three years that Harry Funk and I ever had a disagreement. We worked hand in glove, Harry—somewhat behind Zbig’s back—on the Africa issues. Funk, of course, knew the Horn of Africa, albeit from the Ethiopian perspective. But Funk was extremely shrewd
and astute and was also good on the Angola side and he gave me a lot of cover in that regard.

MOOSE: Liberia I wanted to talk about because it was such a tragedy. I’ve gone over that a lot of times in my mind. The (April 1980) coup in Liberia was a total surprise to the Administration (Master Sargent) Samuel Doe and some of his other buddies had bought themselves a number of beers and were down on the beach there in Monrovia. They got themselves pretty well tanked up. Somebody had the idea of going up and, “Let’s go kill Tubman.” I came to know Doe, unfortunately, more than just a little bit. I came to know one of the other members of his group quite a bit better even than him. He gave me an account of it. “Let’s go kill the president.” So, they went up and to their surprise, they walked right into the place and killed Tubman.

Tubman, who represented the Americo-Liberians—who in reality were colonists, were a colonial group, they had over the years of rule never done anything much for the people in the interior and they lived a funny sort of comic [gap in interview]. They ran a government that was not effective and was kept afloat by small amounts of U.S. aid and foreign exchange that came from Liberians in the United States; revenue from the Firestone (rubber) plantation; from the intermittent operation of the iron ore mines, and from a certain amount of smuggling. There was a little bit of gold there. It was enough to keep just a little bit of activity going in the country. They were overbearing as far as the rest of the populace was concerned. Early on in my time in the Africa Bureau, I stopped in there and became aware that there was the beginning of some dissonance; even within the cabinet, the junior justice minister, A, had almost opposed the government. So, I knew that there was something going on there. I had my eye on the place. I used to talk to our folks who covered Liberia and said, “Isn’t there something going on there?” I knew it was a rotten situation. But then out of the blue comes Samuel Doe, who didn’t have any serious thoughts about any of this except to the extent that the people who came out of the backcountry hated the Americos and saw them as oppressors. So, Samuel came out and killed him. Then they took power. I couldn’t believe that the Americos wouldn’t regroup and get themselves together. They had every advantage of training and contact with the outside and organizational ability. I figured in a few months that the Americos would get their act together and come and chase these guys out. These guys were untrained, illiterate, semi-rabble. The President decided to send out, on the recommendation of Mr. Vance, a mission to talk to these people, to see what they were about. He picked (William H.) Bill Gray to be the head of that mission.

Q: He was a congressman.

MOOSE: From Pennsylvania.

Q: A ranking member of the Black Caucus.

MOOSE: Yes, at least he was by that time the member of the Black Caucus most interested in foreign affairs, Charlie Diggs having passed from the scene earlier. So, Gray and I went out there to talk to Sammy Doe. The first meeting that we had with Doe was
up on what they called Capitol Hill, in their Congress. We were not at all sure that we’d be able to get them to come to the meeting, but there was a U.S. military mission captain there who had been involved in some training of Doe. Doe thought the world of him and he was our primary conduit to Doe. He persuaded Doe to come and bring his guys. Their numbers had swollen from the original four beer drinkers to 30-40. They all filed in in their combat fatigue uniforms, almost all of them with a weapon in one hand and many of them with a handy talkie radio in the other. They put their guns on the desk and I remember looking at Gray, who was really shaken by all this. I was too dumb to be scared. I was just amazed at the spectacle of the thing. I was thinking: “Is this really for real? We’re sitting here. There are all these guys with guns who hardly are going to understand anything that we talk about. How are we going to try to deal with them?”

Before I went out, I had tried to find somebody who could interpret Sammy Doe to me. We had gone to a lot of trouble. We had tracked down the former Peace Corps volunteer who had taught in the village where Doe grew up. This man was by then a professor of history or political science and wrote out of a university or somewhere. I got him to come down to Washington. I spent all night talking to him—about what was Doe like, where did he come from, what those people thought, what was his orientation, what were the limits of his horizon, what did he know and what rebel could I speak to. He gave me this wonderful advice. He said: “Speak to him in parables. Tell him stories. He will not understand the abstract concepts that you talk about because that’s just not part of his experience. He is not unintelligent, but he has very little horizons.” It was extremely good advice. I followed it any number of times. For example, we were very concerned that the Nimbans (opposition forces from Nimba County) were going to become involved and Doe would be susceptible to the kind of blandishments that they could organize. I said to Doe, “If you were in your village and a stranger came from many miles away, and he suddenly appeared in your village and said he wanted to give you a gift, what would the people in the village think?” He said, “Well, they would like to have the gift.” I said, “Yes, what else would they think?” He said, “Well, they would wonder what he wanted.” I said, “That’s what you should wonder about these follows. What do they want for these gifts that they’re going to give you?” Another time, when we were very concerned that all the money was rapidly disappearing from the treasury, what little money they had, I said, “You need to put your money in a safe place. Where do you keep your money in the village?” He said, “We bury it.” I said, “What you’d better do is to bury your money, but instead of burying it, we put it [in a bank.]” He said, “People have told me that we should put the money in the bank. What is a bank?” I said, “Instead of burying the money, you give your money to somebody else and the other fellow uses your money and then he pays you some money for having had the use of your money.” We struggled over this one for a long time. I finally persuaded him to take the guy who was head of the Africa Bureau regional economic office [gap in interview] I got him to agree to let him come out there. He went out and practically ran the treasury for about four months. Every week, he’d send me an urgent message pleading and begging to please let him come home; he was going nuts. It was wonderful. I felt Doe would get overthrown. I thought he’d be thrown out. In the interim, we had to try to do him a service as we could—keep him away from the Nimbans, try to get him to make some statements to return to good order or some semblance of democratic process.
It was hopeless. We should have learned something right there. I told (Chester A.) Chet Crocker, who succeeded me as head of the Africa Bureau when I left: “We’ve had enough time, less than a year. We’ve run out the string on Doe. He’s never going to do the right thing and the odds are he’s going to do the worst thing. You’ve got a terrible choice to make: whether you can go on and try to work with him. I see no signs of that. Or whether you want to try to put in motion some effort to overthrow him. Or to get rid of him, remove him from the scene by some other kind of way. Frankly, I don’t see the stomach around here to do it.” We talked about right after the coup whether there was a case to be made for U.S. intervention in Liberia. There was absolutely no support. There was even less support for Africa than there was for Zbig’s proposal to intervene in the Horn of Africa. It just wasn’t on the table. In retrospect, if we put a platoon of Marines down in Monrovia and marched them from the Embassy up to the palace, Doe and all those guys would run for their lives and the result for the time being would have been different. But having once seen that you could do that, they would have been back at it again. It was a freak thing that altered forever the landscape out there and I think was a precursor of much of what we have seen in more recent days.

Of course, it got much worse. It was a big disappointment to me. I have asked myself many times—“Was there a bolder course we could have followed?”—but I never felt that I had much to work with in this situation, so we tried to educate Doe and that didn’t really work. I saw Doe one more time, after I was out in the private sector and was a banker. They were holding some fellow prisoner and hostage and there were stories about him being horribly mistreated. I knew some of the people involved and I heard Doe was in Switzerland at one point. I went to see him and had a talk with him. He had changed very much by that time. I knew the fellow who mounted the most effective challenge to him was one of the original beer drinkers. I stayed in touch with him for a while. He made his move. It fell. He met an end too horrible to be described. That was the Liberian experience. [Note: Doe was overthrown by Charles Taylor and murdered in September 1990.]

After the fact, some of the Americos, including Ellen (Johnson) Sirleaf, believed fervently that the CIA had engineered the coup at an international workshop on Liberia in Africa one time. In fact, she accused me of having helped organize a CIA-sponsored coup. They couldn’t accept the reality of the degree to which they were detested by the others there and their own shortcomings, although Ellen was one of the very few of that group who ever raised questions about the behavior of the regime. I always respected her. I viewed the things that she had to say just as an indication of the depth of their despair, their inability to do anything about it. She kept trying to do things. I feel it was a failure, but if I take a realistic view of what we might have done, it’s never quite clear. We exerted as much influence with Doe as we could have at the time. [Note: Ellen Sirleaf was President of Liberia 2006-18 and jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2011.]

Q: If we’re going to say this place was a neo-American colony, we had not been leaning on the Americo-Liberians to clean up their act.
MOOSE: No. We didn’t understand that dynamic there. We thought that the *Americos* were kind of quaint. We thought they were decent characters. We didn’t really realize some of the really dreadful stories that I began to hear before this about their abuse. There are some fairly well-documented stories about their abuse of the people and some of the individuals who were killed in the aftermath of the coup, some of the government officials; it’s clear now that they even in their personal behavior had done some fairly horrendous things. But this was never apparent. I don’t think we examined that situation very closely, maybe because it was so familiar to us we had gotten used to it. We continued up to the very end to attach a great deal of importance to our access to the port of Monrovia, for what God only knows, for the placement of a big VOA transmitter there and for our right to use Roberts Field in emergencies. Again, it was a Cold War thing. We would put up with a lot in order to have access to those facilities.

*Q: Why don’t we talk a bit about the Sudan during this ’77-’80 period.*

MOOSE: It was boon time. Everybody was excited about the Sudan. I used to make speeches about the breadbasket of Africa. Oil was discovered, which made it an even more popular address. I made a couple of appearances at U.S.-Sudan chambers of commerce, or whatever they were called, on boosting the idea of investment in Sudan. It was a period in which the civil war was briefly in remission (before resuming in 1983). We enjoyed on the whole quite excellent relations with them. There were a few hints of what would follow in U.S.-Sudan relations. The problem with the south was there. There was a kind of uneasy relative peace at the time. So, it wasn’t a major factor. There were the beginnings of some problems, but they were a little too far over the horizon to see. That’s my recollection of it. If it’s wrong, it at least reflects the way we thought about it.

*Q: What about Chad? Was it undergoing its wars?*

MOOSE: Chad, the Libyans [were attempting to secure a friendly client] There was a war there that nobody would have ever known about if it hadn’t been for modern media. They push things around one way and the other. The French can usually be counted on to take care of situations like that. They’d fly a few Mirages over the place and that was usually enough. But when Goukouni, who was the rebel leader out there, got going with quite a bit of support, it became quite a serious matter in the relative scale of things. It was of concern to us, but not really very much. Outside of southern Africa—Angola, the Horn, concern about Zaire, and the episode in Libya—we were trying to build relations. I spent a lot of time in the last year (1980) working on the question of West Africa, helped persuade Mondale to take a trip to West Africa and then encourage Ms. Lillian (Jimmy Carter’s mother) to take a trip to the Sahelian countries. My wife and I did that. She went to Rome and got an award from the World Food Organization for her humanitarian efforts. Then she raised the question of going to Africa. President Carter asked me what I thought of it. I said, “If she’s up to it, I think couldn’t help but do a very good thing.” She had been a Peace Corps volunteer. She was a registered nurse. She had been a Peace Corps volunteer in India when she was in her 70s. We eventually went on a trip to five countries in West Africa in the middle of summer. We went every place from Timbuktu to the Roots village on the river in Gambia to Niger. She never missed a day. It was
remarkably successful.

The Vice President in 1980 [gap in interview] He was troubled by recurrent stories that he might challenge President Carter for the Democratic nomination, so he tried to make himself as scarce from Washington as he could. He called me one day and asked me what I thought of his taking a trip to West Africa. I said I thought it would be really good. He said, “Well, where should I go?” I said: “Well, first you have to go to Nigeria, but you ought to go to some other places, too. You ought to go to Mali. They have a leader there who kind of looks like he might want to have a representative government of some sort. At least he’s not a tyrant. He would be the next African to serve on the Security Council. Besides, in the evening as the sun goes down, the camels that are in the city are doing things, hauling things around, people riding and so forth—they take all the camels outside of town and the camels walk across the John F. Kennedy bridge and it’s one of the most splendid sights in Africa.” He said, “I’ve got to see it.” Unfortunately, in anticipation of his arrival and being ignorant of my sales pitch, they got all the camels out of town two days before Mondale got there. We sat on his terrace overlooking the John F. Kennedy bridge and waited in vain for even one camel to go across and never saw any. They took me to the zoo the next day, where they had a flea-bitten camel of some description and the last tree in Mali, which was a broken down old tree that had been run over by a truck. Since it was the last thing that passed for a tree in the whole country, they brought it in and put it in the zoo/museum. He was amused by that.

But it was a time when we didn’t have much traction in West Africa. We had a good relationship with the Nigerian government because those were the final months of the rule of General (Olusegun) Obasanjo, who was determined to move Nigeria back to a democratic path after having been put in charge by a group of coup makers with whom he had not been involved at all. They put in a man named Murtala Mohammed in charge. Mohamed died under the usual mysterious circumstances. By a great stroke of good fortune, the army chose Obasanjo, who turned out to be a truly great leader (President of Nigeria 1976-79, 1999-2007). There was a very strong relationship there. He was very helpful to us in the Zimbabwe negotiations, at one point, literally practically forcing Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe to attend a meeting with ourselves and the British and the other members of the frontline in Tanzania. President Carter said, “Are you sure you can make them go?” Obasanjo said, “Yes.” That was a good relationship. U.S.-Nigerian relations were excellent in those days.

Q: Were we pretty comfortable with the French and their francophone areas?

MOOSE: I think it would probably be accurate and fair to say that we were content to leave the French alone in their sphere of influence. I don’t think we ever described it to ourselves in quite those terms, but that was de facto what we did. We were sensitive to the limits of what we could do in those situations. If we had any doubt about that, we saw even in Liberia—where there was a better case to be made than any place else—that we were not willing to extend very much of an effort. We didn’t have much aid money to use. The French kind of kept a lid on things. If they got back everything they sent, probably with some interest in terms of construction contracts and privileged exporter
arrangements. I suppose if anybody had asked me, I would have said off the record, “Well, they probably earn whatever they get out there.” I thought they were exploiting and played things to their own ends, but if they did very little good, they did relatively little harm either. These were the years of the Cold War, so we were glad to have a Western power there in that position than anyone else.

Q: Did Rwanda-Burundi and Tutsi and Hutu play any role then?

MOOSE: No. There was an outbreak of some sort. There had been problems forever. There had been a particularly bad outbreak in the ’60s or so. One of the American Ambassadors at the time, a political appointee, had become very involved and impassioned by all that for reasons that we now understand better than we did then. But it was quiescent at the moment. I once was going to Khartoum for an African-American Institute meeting. The only plane I could get was an Air Zaire. I was someplace on the west coast and I went Air Zaire through Rwanda to Khartoum. The Embassy in Kinshasa sent a message to Rwanda, to Kigali, saying that I was on an airplane that was going through. The characters in our Embassy, having little enough to do, called the foreign minister and the foreign minister went out to the airport to my stop. I was pulled off the plane when we landed. It was dark because we had been delayed getting out of Kinshasa by a horrible thunderstorm, the worst storm I ever saw in my life. We got out. They came out and called me by name off the plane. No one on the plane knew who I was. It was the usual cast of characters who would fly Air Zaire. The foreign minister takes me up to the VIP room in the airport and we reviewed U.S.-Rwanda relations, about which I could not summon hardly a fact. But of course, he knew everything that had ever happened.

To add insult to injury, the VOA guy there shows up and wants an interview with me about the whole thing. I was ducking and dodging and bobbing the whole time I was there, which was about an hour, during which time the airport authorities turned out the lights in the airport, with the result that when they finally delivered me back out to the airplane, the pilot announced that he couldn’t take off because there were no lights in the airport. Fortunately, the foreign minister hadn’t left the premises yet. We got the foreign minister to call the minister of interior, who got civil aviation and got the lights turned back on after about two and a half hours. No one on the plane would speak to me. They weren’t at all grateful for my having gotten them out. They figured I was the one who got them in trouble in the first place. It was a great sensation.

My visit to Kigali was a very big deal. That’s what it’s like. I went back within two or three months after I was no longer in office. My wife and I took a long trip around Africa to see all the things I had always wanted to see but never saw. I had never been to a game park. So, we went to various things. We went to Burundi to see Francis Cook, who was Ambassador there. The Queen Mother couldn’t have gotten any more attention than we did. They were looking for somebody other than the Belgians and they wanted some protection against Zaire. They wanted someone to talk to about the Hutus and the Tutsis, but it was kind of under control at the moment. The earlier Ambassador had such experiences. That was (Thomas Patrick) Melady.
Q: He ended up as Ambassador to the Vatican.

MOOSE: He was a political appointee. We had a penchant for sending those kind of people. In the first part of the Clinton Administration, we had this guy from Texas who was in Burundi (Robert Krueger, 1994-95). He was far out. But in retrospect, Melady and this guy were responding to the latent horror in that situation, which we unfortunately saw.

Q: I just finished a very fine interview with (Robert E.) Bob Gribbin on the aftermath of that period, about how they finally got really quite a responsible government and it’s been trying to put things back together again. He’s quite optimistic about it.

MOOSE: When was Gribbin there during that period?

Q: He got there in ’94-’98 or so. He was in Rwanda.

MOOSE: Our failure to respond there after what we had done in Somalia was a big disappointment.

Q: Somalia changed things.

MOOSE: It did.

Q: Just one last thing. Did the Central African Empire more or less a ___ rather than a [gap in interview]

MOOSE: It was off the charts. Nobody paid much attention to it. Bad things went on. But I can’t recall that ever having figured in any important way. When we were talking about Liberia, I was thinking about Bill Swing, who was in Brazzaville. He was in Liberia when all of those events happened. He really knew that government.

Q: Where is he now?

MOOSE: Is he in Congo? Maybe. [Ambassador Democratic Republic of the Congo 1998-2001.] He’s a good man in a tight place, the kind of guy you want in a place like that.

Q: Dick, you left the Department in The Carter Administration went out and you went out, too.

MOOSE: I went out. I last went out in ’81.

Q: Could you talk a bit about the transition? When the Reagan Administration came in and went into Latin American affairs, there was sort of blood in the corridors. How about with African affairs?
MOOSE: Well, we were offended by some aspects of their transition. Their Africa transition group included a person who had been a paid lobbyist of the South African interests in Namibia. We had brought the Namibia talks to a point where, with just a little bit of effort on the part of the South Africans, we could have had a settlement in Namibia before the end of 1980. It was kind of like Nixon in Vietnam. We were reasonably confident that these elements in the Reagan Administration who were quite close to the South Africans had encouraged the South Africans to drag their feet on this. It didn’t take much encouragement to get South Africans to drag their feet on things like settlement with Namibia.

Whether Chet Crocker was aware of the contacts that went on between the Namibians and the South Africans on the subject of the settlement, the fact of it was that with the prospect of the Reagan victory, there was little possibility of movement into Namibia. We had the framework of an agreement, the one that they didn’t get until years later (1990). There were elements around Reagan who certainly did not want to see a settlement that would bring another black government to power at that moment, especially one that was rumored as practically wanting to have Marxist contacts. I had known Sam Nujoma since 1975. I knew Sam was no more Marxist than I was and that they were a fairly harmless group. Whether they would be effective running the group or not might be another matter, but that really was not for us to decide. The control and perspective of the people who were going to follow us was decidedly Cold War. Their view of the situation in southern Africa very easily paralleled that of the usual Cold Warriors. Their concern was not self-determination democratic government, war against poverty, any of that. It was how do you contain the communist menace. They reamed all of us in a major way in Angola. They looked the other way on RENAMO and Mozambique.

I don’t think Chet personally supported all of that, but felt that the right thing to do was to work with the South Africans if they were willing to work with the Reagan Administration, the way that they were not willing to work with us. The constructive engagement [gap in interview]. All of that you could see foreshadowed in their view things as they took over. I am bitter about their influence having retarded the Namibian negotiations. That could have been put into place. But they did not come in in the way that they did. I have heard stories about what they did when they came in in Latin America, but I don’t think they did that.

I had deliberately put in place to be acting after I left Lannon Walker, who had been involved in and out of Zaire for many years and who probably was viewed as much more conservative on the question, much more willing to get along with Mobutu than I was, although I think Lannon probably read Mobutu more accurately than most people that I know. So, Lannon was not seen as an ideological character, whereas I certainly was. He was also a very skillful bureaucratic manipulator. Lannon and I have lots of differences, but I figured that if I put Lannon in there, he would protect the Bureau. That’s what I told people when they said, “Well, why did you put Lannon in charge? You and Lannon don’t get along.” I said, “I put him there because I think he’d protect the Bureau and the Bureau is going to need protecting because we are far out on some of these issues that we’ve described, like the Horn, Angola, Mozambique, and the negotiations in Zimbabwe.”
Lannon was there. (William C.) Bill Harrop was there. Princeton Lyman was there. They left it alone. Chet took charge before too long and he enjoyed a lot of respect in Reagan circles. Even if you may not have always agreed with him, he gave it strong leadership. I told Chet in particular that I thought for southern African issues that he should really rely on (Robert C.) Bob Frasure, who had been an Office Director and together with George Moose, my closest collaborator on things in southern Africa, and Nancy Ely-Raphel, who as one of the deputy legal advisors had been much more involved in policy issues on Africa than deputy legal advisors usually are in the regional Bureaus. He did keep both of those people and they became his closest collaborators. In that sense, there was somewhat of a continuity of policy, although the overtones of it were different in constructive engagement, which gave it a different appearance to the outside, but Chet tried to work with what was there and with the political influences that surrounded the idea of him [gap in interview]

Q: From ‘81-’93, you were out in the wilderness.

MOOSE: Well, it was a wilderness that was very good to me. I went to Lehman Brothers in New York to help them build their business in the developing world. Lehman was part of an informal consortium with the British merchant banking firm and was one of the oldest New York investment banks. It was a merger of Kim Loeb and Lehman Brothers. Bobby Lehman of the Lehman family; Robert Lehman of New York, senator. Lehman Brothers, Kim Loeb, was part of the new formal consortium that had been created with S.D. Walberg and Lyndon and Lazar in Paris to assist governments, mainly finance ministries, simple banks, in debt negotiations. They were brought in by the Indonesian government in the aftermath of the Indonesia crash.

When I got there, we were just about to do the Turkish rescheduling of private bank debt, of private banks lending to governments. Many of those governments had over borrowed and were coming a cropper on debt at the time. We sat on the government’s side of the table and advised them on the negotiations with them, the privatized banks. That was the so-called London Club or the Paris Club. The Paris Club and the London Club. One was the renegotiation of public debt. The other was the renegotiation of private debt. I think the London Club was private debt. I went there and became involved in that work, but I saw that I had to learn a lot about numbers and about banking and about lending. I did that. I sort of did a crash course and learned a fair amount. We did a lot of rescheduling. We did a number of African countries and some South Americans. We continued to advise the Indonesians. We advised the government of Saudi Arabia in their offset programs. I began a small business which got much larger in trading in debt, in the debt instruments of these countries that had been rescheduled. But that was a very short kind of business thing.

After I saw how complex and sometimes shadowy some of the players were, I got out of that work [and it went to] someone else. It became a very good business. I then worked on privatization. This was the early days. This was about 10 years too soon on that one. But there were a few governments which were beginning to think about privatization. We had to privatize government-owned mines in a couple of places. I tried to develop a
couple of privately-financed resource investments in Africa. One was going to be in Tanzania. We were going to develop the Pondi gas field in Mozambique. I did a plan for refinancing the Mozambique debt incurred in the building of the Kaborabassa dam on the Zambezi, and tried to create an alternative financing scheme that would have let Lesotho build the mountain power projects that 15 years later are maybe going to be built. We did the first privatized infrastructure project in Thailand and we privatized a couple of utility companies in various parts of the world. I kept my hand in the developing world during that period and then I went to the American Express Company, where I was in charge of international government affairs at the time that we were negotiating our financial arrangements in what was becoming the European Union. Then I had also under my charge the government affairs officer in Washington, which gave me a window on the amazing world of lobbying the banking committees of the U.S. Congress and other types of lobbying activities. There were telecommunications. We were early on in the field there of deregulation competition. We were the largest private sector telecommunications user in the country and we worked out some interesting strategies there to break the hold of the former Bell companies on long distance, because we ran two worldwide communications networks.

This was very interesting to me when in ’93, after (J.) Brian Atwood was picked to head AID, Christopher called me and asked me if I would take the Under Secretary for Management’s job. They figured I could get confirmed because the White House would go along with it because I was from Arkansas and knew Bill Clinton and, because I had worked on the Hill I could probably get confirmed, would I come and take the management job? So, that’s how I returned to State in ’93 about six or seven months into the Clinton Administration.

Q: Before we get to that, bankers go around lending money to these very fragile countries in Africa, in Central America, and in Latin America. They have a very bad record of running around and using the money and not paying it back. What is in it for a banker to lend money to Brazil or Mexico?

MOOSE: You have to go back and recreate some of the circumstances of the time. There had been until the early ’70s relatively little private sector lending to developing countries. There had been private-sector lending to sovereigns since the beginning of history as we know it. That’s why the city of London is where it is. The guilds had some money to lend the King to help him to put down his enemy. So, sovereign lending was nothing new. But sovereign lending to developing countries, other than those that have resource banks—other than the Iranians that obviously had an identifiable resource cash string that could be committed in a legal way, so that they could get their money before it went back to the capital. That was a well-known kind of thing. But then there came to be in the ’70s a cash surplus in the world’s lending institutions. There was a kind of a feeling that there was a worldwide economic upswing, that things were going to get better, that these economies would develop. The banks got very good margins on this lending. They got very big fees up front. They earned very big fees that they took off the top. They arranged to loan to the government. They took their piece off the top and the government had to pay for the thing.
Now, American banks had never been deeply involved in that. They were very much involved in Zaire, the building of the infamous Inga-Shaba (Extra High Voltage D.C. Intertie) power line, which took power from the Congo River and transported it to Katanga, where the copper and cobalt smelting and so forth went on. But that was a boondoggle. They got lent once in pressure and then lured Mobutu into building. American banks lent them a lot of money and wrote perfectly outrageous contracts. Other people saw, “Well, maybe that can be done other places, too.” The European and Japanese banks were just as energetic and just plain lost sight of what was a reasonable risk. They entirely lost sight of it because they were earning those fees up front and they weren’t thinking about the long-term political instability, the ability of these countries to service the debt and so forth. The first early problems were in Zaire and then Turkey, but the Turkish government did a very responsible job of handling it, but then all the rest of it—

Once bankers got worried about one place, then they got worried about other places. It was a sad thing. The governments had been lured into borrowings that they shouldn’t have taken and the proceeds disappeared and the banks got fees and the countries ended up with a debt. Africa and Latin America—

It was not a uniquely American thing. We were deeply involved in it but the British and the Japanese were heavily involved. The Japanese were mainly in Asia. But most of those economies out there handled it better than the ones in Africa or even ones in Latin America. It was not a pretty experience.

I talked mainly in terms of the Western governments and the Western banks, but at the same time that the Western banks were pushing this money out the doors on these hapless governments, the Soviet Union and their satellite Eastern European countries were doing very much the same thing. These countries like Mozambique, which wanted arms or wanted other critical imports, would make deals with the Russians and the deals that they made were really outrageous things. In one of my assignments, I was asked by the government of Mozambique to put a team of technicians in their central bank to help them understand (this was probably 1985 or 1986). President Michel and his finance people asked me to come in and to help them try to understand what their situation was. They felt that they ought to be able to restore their credit and borrow some money to do things that they needed to do. I said, “Well, you’ve got to get your house in order before you do that.” So, we went and they agreed finally—we had to overcome resistance from the workers union of the central bank—to let Westerners come in, but I put a couple of Portuguese speakers, Americans that I found, and we catalogued Mozambique’s debt to the external world. If American investment private banks had taken advantage of the situation so the Soviets and the Eastern Europeans had, they just made extortionist-type demands on these countries for resources—raw materials in return for shoddy tractors and other kinds of equipment that was really no good. It was a barter-type thing. They took them to the cleaners. Their debt was enormous. The default on debt for the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries is in proportion to the economies of the lending countries much bigger than--. They took a horrendous hit, but the stuff that they sold in
return for the indebtedness was overpriced and shoddy, so net net, end of the day. Everybody screwed the poor working guy in those countries, East and West alike.

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Q: Today is November 8, 2000. Dick, in 1992, what were you up to?

MOOSE: In 1992, I was working back in Washington. I was living in Virginia. I was a senior vice president of the American Express Company for international and government affairs. We decided that I would move back to Washington because we had a very active agenda in support for multilateral trade negotiations, a very important part of American Express’ agenda. I was also working on helping steer the drafting of the European Union’s rule-making arm for financial services and we were trying to amend the banking act to permit financial institutions to mix banking and investment banking. So, I was back here working on that.

Q: In ’92, it was a political year. Were you keeping your finger on the political pie?

MOOSE: I had not really. During the time that we had lived in London when I worked at Shearson-Lehman Brothers and after I returned to New York and we were living there, I really had not re-involved or involved myself in politics in any way. I had gotten really out of the habit while we were out of the country. I said that during the reign of President Reagan, I was just as happy to be living outside the country, because to be back in the U.S. would be like trying to live in Vichy, France. I really hadn’t done much in politics. But in ’92 as the presidential election was on the horizon, I decided to try to reacquaint myself with what had always been my party, the Democratic Party. So, I started going to a variety of political events. I ran the American Express political action committee [PAC] among other things. So, it was not entirely out of my gambit to do so. I went around and looked at all the presidential candidates. Despite the fact that Maggie and I both are from Arkansas, we had no direct connections to Bill Clinton at all. My sister who lived in Arkansas had worked for him in one of his first campaigns when he ran for attorney general. I worked with everybody that year. I was working for a candidate. I went to a conference where Clinton spoke. Like so many of us, I was attracted to him by his knowledge of a wide variety of issues and the personality. Little by little in 1991 Maggie and I both got involved. We both—particularly she—began to raise money for Clinton. I supported him in a variety of other ways. We got involved that way kind of by a selection process. I thought it was [gap in interview] Democrats and it really didn’t have much to do with being from Arkansas. If anything, I thought that was probably an insuperable handicap, but we didn’t have a very high opinion of ourselves, I guess. So, we got more involved and that’s how it was. But I had no intention of going back into government. I was really quite happy with what I was doing at American Express.

Q: You mentioned being with the political action committee. I suppose these things change. What did that mean?

MOOSE: We had a PAC that was contributed to by employees, mainly by executives. We
had a committee and we agreed on amounts of money that we would use to support political candidates who had a favorable disposition on issues in which our company had a stake. For example, I mentioned amending [gap in interview]. That was an extremely important object of ours—liberalizing international trade was so that approval of the Uruguay Round of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, things of that sort. We used the contributions to ensure ourselves access to Members on the Ways and Means Committee. Like any big corporation, especially one that’s in financial services, we have a number of issues before them as the tax writing committee. We were always trying to get some write-off for something.

In those days, ‘91-’92, there was not very much soft money involved. Soft money is actually corporate money, not personal contributions like a PAC, that is fed through various loopholes in the federal electoral legislation. It’s perfectly legal. I think it’s quite a destructive practice. It is fed through favors loopholes to various sorts of campaign entities. We could get soft money—that is to say, it’s soft in the sense there was no statutory limitation on the amount that one individual could give as their individual contribution. But we would give that to groups like the Republican Party of one state or another or to an entity, not to a candidate directly, but to some usually a state or local party organization that we knew was going to use it for the benefit of a particular candidate. We didn’t have much soft money in those days. I remember getting one of the first soft-money contributions American Express had ever done. We did a couple of them in that campaign. We supported both Republicans and Democrats, depending on who was in a position to do us some good. As a subtask of my larger corporate role in charge of international and national government affairs, I had the oversight of the [gap in interview]. At any rate, I was very happy doing the things that I was doing for American Express at that time, ‘91-’92. I didn’t work the Hill a lot myself. I had a wonderful staff that was very effective up there. I was a coordinator of their activities, as well as things that were done elsewhere in the U.S. and what we were doing overseas in some specialized kinds of issues that we had, like trying to straighten out our banking license in Singapore or getting our American Express money machines into Moscow, and how do you deal with the Arms Export Control Act that kept us from exporting the machines. There was a whole range of issues like that—and still doing a few things occasionally with American Express banking and with Shearson-Lehman. I did some privatization work in Thailand during that period. So, I had a varied agenda. I was doing a lot of things. I was on the American Express Executive Committee for restructuring the company.

Q: I would have thought that the Bush Administration would have been quite a compatible one. I mean, it was business oriented.

MOOSE: It was, very much. The chairman of American Express named James D. Robinson III was also the chairman of the Business Roundtable. Both before and after his chairmanship, he was head of its trade subcommittee. This involved my coordinating a group of his and other CEOs’ appearances on the Hill, meetings with Members of Congress, lobbying the Executive Branch on trade issues. The Bush Administration was very congenial. Robinson was a big giver himself to Bush. When he couldn’t go to
things, he made me go. He knew I was a Democrat, but he’d let me do my Democrat stuff as long as I did his Republican stuff.

Q: How did you get involved?

MOOSE: In ’93, I had been asked, by people associated with the campaign and people in the NSC as the new Administration was forming itself, whether I wanted a position or not. I said that I did not. I was offered a couple of things, specifically ambassadorships, and I didn’t want to do that. I didn’t want to go back into government. I had had enough of that. We had come along in August of ’93 [gap in interview] Warren Christopher had asked me for recommendations for the management job at State and some other positions as well. I had known Christopher well when he was Deputy Secretary and I was in the Africa Bureau. I had strongly recommended that he get Brian Atwood to be Under Secretary for Management and I had talked to Brian a lot about the job and helped persuade him to take it.

Q: Wasn’t he closely connected to Clinton?

MOOSE: Not terribly. I was probably better connected to Clinton than he was. He had political connections, but they were probably more to Gore and to some other Members on the Hill. He had worked on the Hill a lot himself. He had worked for Tom Eagleton. He was well known on the Hill. So he had good political potentials up there. What Brian really wanted to do was to head AID, but there was tough competition for that job from two Members of Congress. They were competing not only with Brian but with each other, more importantly, about who would get to be head of AID. Eventually, it became apparent to Brian that one of the others was going to win. There was a long hiatus though. Brian was offered and accepted the management job at State.

Q: Why was the Congress not interested in that particular job?

MOOSE: It had a title and these were ex-congressmen by that time who had been defeated. So, they were looking for jobs, among other things. This was a reasonably good paying job that kept them in Washington. They had some acquaintance with foreign affairs. I didn’t think either one of them was qualified, but what’s new? I had seen other unqualified people in that job, so I didn’t take particular note of it. Brian had the management job. Meanwhile, the stalemate continued between these two characters. Eventually, it became easier to choose some third person rather than between the two of them. They turned back around to Brian, who was already in the management job, and asked if he would take it. Of course, he leapt at it.

At that point, Christopher called me and said, “What do we do now?” I said, “Well, I don’t know.” I didn’t have any more ideas. I thought he was the best guy. Christopher said, “what about you?” So, we talked about it. I talked with Tony Lake and to Sandy Berger. One of the reasons why Christopher was attracted to having me come back was because, as he very candidly said, “You’re from Arkansas and your Arkansas connections over at the White House will make it easy for us to get your nomination through the
White House.” They were already terribly stacked up in that disgraceful backlog that they developed over there. He said, “Apart from everything else, you’ve already been in the job once before, albeit only for a few months, and you know about it.” There was a lot of stuff like that. I thought about it. I talked to the people at American Express. It involved some financial sacrifice for me. I decided that I was enough intrigued with the idea of doing it. I talked to Christopher more about what we would do. So, I then said I’d take it. So, that was sometime in the summer of ’93. Brian was already in the job. Sometime in August, I went down there and began to sit down the hall waiting for the time when I would be confirmed and reading what was going on. I took it over and I think it was the very early days of September 1993 when I was confirmed and took my position.

Q: Did you have a feeling that the top Administration took an inordinate amount of time to start putting its people there? There were clearance reasons and all this. The State Department must have been suffering from this.

MOOSE: It was. I did not realize at the time what a serious problem it would become. I had for the very reasons that Christopher had deduced an easy time of it myself over at the White House. I had been confirmed before, twice, by the Senate and had worked in the Foreign Relations Committee, which was still in the hands of the Democrats. I had no delays whatsoever. So, I may have had a mistaken impression of how complicated things were, but it didn’t take me very long to understand. The minute I got at the desk, it was stacked with frantic calls from persons who understood that they were to be nominated for such and so, but whose nominations had not been sent out and who had not been cleared by the White House. They had no idea what they had to do in order to get through the maze over there.

Q: What was the problem? We’ve gone through many transitions.

MOOSE: Oddly enough, there is not a standard operating procedure in the White House itself. Each new President and each new White House staff to a very large extent makes up its own rules and procedures about what it’s going to do. The Department itself has an extremely well-organized, well-understood, and efficiently-run system for processing and handling nominees. It was presided over by the same person when I was there years before. She did an excellent job of running this. But once the papers are sent from the State Department over to wherever it was that they went, it was like they were being dropped into a cavern because nobody at State could figure out what was going on over there. They ran into a more complicated process and procedure than I had seen with previous Administrations. I was in the transition to the Carter Administration. I presided over the process of personnel selection and approval and so forth throughout the transition of the Carter Administration. I stayed in that job for six months. I was familiar with that and how it went. In the interval though, Washington had gotten more complicated and cynical. Clinton and his people felt the necessity to institute a far more demanding and searching set of criteria, particularly with regard to financial conflict of interest. The amount of data that they required to be submitted by a would-be nominee was by orders of magnitude greater than anything that I had seen in the Carter Administration. As a matter of fact, I had been involved in the transition to the Nixon
Administration. I had seen a lot of what went on in the national security area appointments at that time. No comparison. Far more complicated. Far more sensitivity to public opinion and possibility of criticism. So, a lot more paper. A lot more demand. A lot more stringent rules. More things to sign. Going into an extremely disorganized process. In fact, it was not a process. It was chaos over there. Nobody knew where the papers were. They were losing track of them. This was a period of time when they were getting security files that they shouldn’t have been getting. It was hideously mismanaged—so, unusual new requirements, a chaotic lack of a process, a great reluctance to make final decisions. The White House staff was not organized. It was not clear who could make decisions. In the last analysis, far too many of them went directly to the President himself. It wasn’t the thing that he was most interested in, especially after he got past the top things. So, too much detail; too little process; inattention on the part of the President, and a lack of structure in the staff and discipline to move things through, tended to stack up and stack up.

Q: What were your responsibilities as you saw them at that time?

MOOSE: The Under Secretary for Management has delegated to him or her by the Cabinet Department an unusual range of responsibilities and authorities, so that essentially you have everything to do with the management of the Department—money; people; security; transportation; procurement; foreign buildings; communications; the entire consular function of passport office, visas, protection of Americans overseas, and a collection of other types of activities. The only person in the State Department that had more people reporting to them than me was the Secretary of State himself. With our very much too-large administrative support apparatus, there were a huge number of people. I had six Assistant Secretaries reporting to me, each one heading one of these kinds of headings in addition to which they [gap in interview] function and the IT function. You had a very broad range of responsibilities: the budget and the accounting, all of the financial operations, as well as human resources.

Q: I take it that Warren Christopher, like almost every Secretary of State, with perhaps the exception of George Marshall, but George Schulz had no particular interest in this.

MOOSE: No. Christopher had a concern that these functions be in capable hands, but his model for handling this was that of the management partner of a large law firm. He really didn’t expect to be troubled with day-to-day kinds of issues about things. He did expect the Deputy Secretary to take a closer interest in that. Under normal circumstances, I would report to Christopher through Strobe Talbott, but—because my connection with Christopher went back such a long time—I never had any hesitation about going directly to him, nor was that ever a problem between Strobe and me. He knew that I was close to Christopher.

Q: This wasn’t his interest either.

MOOSE: No. If anything, he cared even less about it than Chris did. I was at some pains to try and get Strobe to meet on a fairly regular basis with some of my administrative
heads, the Assistant Secretaries, which was always useful as a means of giving them some exposure and for him getting a little more direct feel of their problems than what went on in the Department. But yes, he was very busy with the Soviet Union, with Russia and the former Soviet Union. Then he became the Haiti coordinator very soon after I got there, if he wasn’t already. That absorbed whatever other amount of time there was.

Q: Were you feeling the repercussions of the decision of James Baker not to ask for more money when the Soviet Union fell apart and we ended up with 15 more embassies? Things were going on. It was a whole new world where, at least to the laymen, you couldn’t justifiably ask for more money to support this. It seemed like this set the whole State Department on a downward track.

MOOSE: It did. When I arrived in August or September of ’93, Brian was well into trying to put together the budget request for the Department for what would be fiscal year ’95. We were in ’93 and ’94, but it was being acted on. We were putting together what would be the ’95 budget. It was apparent that we were in crisis. Immediately, Brian told me we were really in crisis. We simply did not have enough money. It was a question of deciding where we would cut back. When I realized how bad things were, I went to Christopher and said we were going to have to make some extraordinary kind of effort. The reason why we were in such bad shape would have to be a combination of the appropriation having been cut and the fact that we had assumed really heavy new responsibilities with opening a new post. I think Baker’s decision to open the new posts as part of a strategy to support the Newly Independent States was absolutely brilliant. I think that, as time goes on and people look back, it ranks on the par with what Truman did in ’48 to try to shore up wherever possible resistance to the Soviet Union. It was brilliant what Baker did. I never really had a chance to talk through this with Larry Eagleburger, who knew more about it than anybody else, or with Ivan Selin, who had been Brian Atwood’s immediate predecessor. But my understanding of Baker’s decision not to go for more money for the opening of those posts, which they really ought to have done, was that he was afraid that if he did, if he went up with an extraordinary request, it would get tied up on the Hill—that policy issues, some of which would be extraneous, would get thrown into the middle of the thing. Meanwhile, he’d be hung up and wouldn’t have the freedom of action that he would have if he just reprogrammed funds that he already had and spent them there. That in itself was difficult enough to do, but it must have looked like the only way to move quickly with minimum restraint. In that sense, it was the right thing to do and was a bold decision, but it was a bold decision that turned out to cripple the Department thereafter. This is not to say that it shouldn’t have been done for that reason but only to underscore the fact that a really serious unprecedented effort was then in order to get the money that we really did need to build things back up. But that was not to be.

There were competing policy priorities for the money in the Department. There was the problem of trying to stay within the overall budget strictures. OMB was extremely closed minded about this. We had a person in charge of the State Department account over in Office of Management and Budget who had a very active disdain for the Department and for its management requirements. Neither really understood the Department’s situation
and I couldn’t get them to listen. I had more support up on the Hill than I did in Office of Management and Budget.

Q: Who was it in Office of Management and Budget?

MOOSE: I’ll think of his name later. I had two very serious subcommittee chairmen on the Hill who had a great sense of responsibility and, if I could have gotten OMB to let us ask for more money and the President let us ask for more money, I think we would have gotten it on the Hill. On the House side, it was Congressman Neil Smith of Iowa. On the Senate side, it was Fritz Hollings from South Carolina. They both had a sense of responsibility about the Department. I tried to get them to give more money, but they said, “Dick, you can’t expect us to spend more money than your boss will ask for.”

Q: Did you find Warren Christopher willing to go to the President on this?

MOOSE: No. I hate to fault Christopher for anything because I respect the man very greatly. He is a good and a very decent man. Dullness is not a moral defect. He wasn’t an exciting person to be around. I liked him very much, but he was unwilling to go and really challenge. It would have taken a far greater challenge than Christopher was willing to do. Madeleine Albright—when she came along, when she succeeded Chris—did it and with some success, but we had laid a lot of groundwork by then and even so, Madeline didn’t understand the longer-term consequences and she put all of her emphasis on getting money for one year. She did not perceive the utter necessity of getting Clinton and the OMB locked into half-year numbers. I was out by the time that happened. I kept warning them. I had just written a report on the funding of the foreign affairs function. I had led a task force at the Council on Foreign Relations. We had done a public report. We put great emphasis on the half-year funding. What they did was, Clinton gave OMB instructions. OMB bumped State up for one year, but in their out year projections, they took them back down to the lower level. State was going to be in just as bad shape or worse than it was before because the fact was that deferred maintenance and recruitment and many other deferred modernization of information technology, all of that was building up and becoming more extensive all the while.

Q: Was this your Number One priority, the problem of dealing with [lack of funding?]

MOOSE: The budget was the Number One priority. It had to be because we were in crisis. I was figuring out what to cut, how we could cut things without undermining our central function. My Number Two priority was to deal with the information technology deficit. Related to the first priority, and really my Number Two priority ahead of information technology, a subset of dealing with the financial crisis was to stop the hemorrhaging of State budget to support the overseas activities of other agencies. While there was in place an existing system for State to be reimbursed by the other agencies overseas, it did not begin to recruit what would have been required to sustain our own establishment.

Q: This would be the equivalent of the FBI and the attaches abroad.
MOOSE: And paying only a fraction of the cost of what it took.

Q: And the proliferation of government agencies abroad.

MOOSE: With the end of the Cold War, the civilian agencies and the changing national and international agenda, the other agencies had begun to proliferate and to build up. While there was some contraction in the defense representation overseas, it was not proportionate to the reductions that were in progress in the defense budget. Other agencies with newer agendas were beginning to be seen and in particular the law enforcement community was moving abroad in increasingly large numbers. The FBI and the DEA were putting people out there. The ins wanted to put inspectors for free clearance. The customs wanted to have people out there, and so on. We had increasing numbers of trade people; ACDA. There were many negotiations underway in various directions. So, you had an expanding overseas State presence.

Q: Could you come up with a calculation of how much it cost to keep a DEA agent abroad?

MOOSE: No, it was hard for us to tell that. We could come up with what it cost us to keep him abroad. I figured that it cost about a quarter of a million dollars to keep an American employee abroad and that it cost these other agencies at least as much as it cost us. They generally provided for them better than the State Department did. They’d give them more housing allowance or various kinds of accommodations. Often, we’d be expected to provide the office space, housing and the maintenance and support. A part of those expenditures would be an account like some of the operation and maintenance accounts, where we couldn’t really take their money back into our accounts. So, I figured that we were getting back only about 1/3 of what we laid out in support of other agencies. We had reimbursement arrangements in place with other agencies, but they didn’t work very well.

Our own people felt that State was carrying very poorly for them. Moreover, we were paying for other people who were being allowed to live, and being supported in part by us and in part by their own agencies, in a style better than what the FS was enjoying. I think that criticism is often quite valid. So, in addition to trying to get a larger request to the Congress, I was trying to find a way to stop this hemorrhaging of our own funds in support of others and to trim down our own expenses. I laid heavy cuts on the Assistant Secretaries who worked for me. But you could only go so far in that regard because 2/3-3/4 of the State Department budget is salaries and expenses. So, short of a RIF, which we hoped to avoid, we would have to nibble around the edges and do other sorts of things.

Then information technology: State had been early on [the IT revolution] in the late ‘70s when I had been Deputy Under Secretary for Management, which was the title at the time. I had been involved in initiating the procurement of the first automated word processing system in State, which is the famous Wang system. At that time, when that
system was installed, we were ahead of all of the rest of the government agencies, including the intelligence and the Defense departments. People used to come see our stuff, but for a variety of reasons, State had not been able to keep pace with development. They had missed the PC revolution that actually did computing. The original Wangs were just word processors. Eventually, Wang replaced the word processors with a computer, but Wang never developed, nor did others develop, the applications which we take for granted now as a part of the personal computer. So, State continued to use these things mainly for word processing, for some very limited computer applications of no particular or great consequence in the operations of the Department itself. Wangs had little or no effect on the efficiency of our telecommunications or document or information management. It just wasn’t a part of it. That had just been missed altogether. I had been very much involved in information management and technology at American Express. An important part of our lobbying in Washington had been to try to create some opportunities through the telecommunications law and regulations, allowing us to do some innovative things. We were the most automated of any of the financial services companies. I discovered what was or wasn’t going on there. So, I tried to do that [when I returned to State]. There, I ran into a range of obstacles. Money was only a part of it. There were institutional obstacles that were very hard to get around. I never really quite mastered them.

Q: What would be the obstacles?

MOOSE: In the first place, the importance and the potential of information management as we now think of it was virtually nowhere appreciated in the Department. A few individuals who had a sense of the potential [were not in a position to make it happen?]. The State Department is not too unusual in this regard. At this time, most of the American private sector had failed to ask for what we now take for granted. So, State wasn’t that unusual, nor was it unusual among the other civilian agencies. But inside State, there was very little appreciation, enthusiasm, or support for this. What little there was on the front of the building. The Executive Secretariat was reasonably well provided for but it wasn’t hooked into anything else. It just served the front of the Seventh Floor. It wasn’t hooked into any systems that were integrated with the rest of the Department. A few Bureaus had begun to spend money, but there was no standardization, no standards, no concern about interoperability. The information management division of the A Bureau [Admin Bureau] was staffed by long-serving civil servants who had grown up with other kinds of technologies. The people who ran IM when I got there were people who had started out on the teletype machines. There were even some of them who went further [back?] than that. They understood the teletype, conventional telecommunications circuitry. They didn’t know what an electronic switch was as far as I could tell. They knew the Wang. They did not know PCs at all. They did not understand open architecture in the sense of being able to run systems together to achieve complex things. They didn’t want to learn. They had the budget carved out into things. The financial management people had some money that they had provided themselves with and they were building a system that wasn’t going to hook into anything else. The A Bureau was for the most part uninterested in the idea of process reengineering and applying technology to their own processes. So, there was huge inertia and very little demand inside for modernization, in
addition to which we didn’t have the money anyhow.

*Q:* You had been in and out of the FS. What about morale? They always talk about State Department morale being terrible. I came in in ’55 during a terrible morale crisis and never came out of that. In real terms, was this having an impact on our ability to perform what you thought we should be performing?

MOOSE: I came in at about the same time. It seems to me that there was never a time that it ever got any better and that’s continued on downhill past your time and my time, too. I’ve just recently been at a conference on State Department personnel and heard some outstanding young junior officers from there. It was almost enough to make you cry. It was the worst thing I ever heard in the government from career government civil servants. They all said they loved their jobs, but they said, “Here is what we’re looking at.” “Will you stay?” None of them would say for sure if they would. They were outstanding young people. It’s only gotten worse. How did I feel about it in 1980? I took for granted that everybody would say that morale was lousy. The focus of the morale was money. They thought money was the real problem. They weren’t appreciated. The Department wouldn’t ask for enough money. The Congress wouldn’t give them enough money. If only there were more money, things would be better. I always thought money was a very important part of it, but I did not think it was the root of the problem. I thought the root of the problem was leadership. I didn’t think the leadership of the Department took enough interest in the Department. I was constantly struck by the reverence that FS and other State Department personnel expressed to me for the reign of George Schulz. If nothing else, the money was not noticeably better during Schulz’s time. He had his budget crisis, too. Now, he got a big improvement in it at a certain point, but then came along the opening of the new post right on the heels of that. People felt that Schulz cared about them. FS believed that he cared.

*Q:* We’re here at the FS Institute, which is by all accounts a creature of George Schulz. We never would have had this wonderful structure.

MOOSE: Exactly. Nobody ever cared enough about training. Nobody cared about the people enough. I was always touched. There was nothing that I ever found that people in the FS cared as much about as training. One time, we got together a group of the sort of basic entry level secretaries. We brought them over here under special arrangement. They were almost all women. They volunteered on some of their own time; got their bosses to agree to let them come over for a special type of training. Then there was a graduation and something else. I came over here for it and those women were in tears. They were telling me, “Nobody ever did anything like this for us.” They started to realize, “He cared enough about me to give me training.” George Schulz understood that and did it, understood how important it was. I felt funny because I was a great admirer of Cy Vance. I was very devoted to Vance. It always hurt me a little bit that everybody thought that George Schulz was better than Vance, but I understand why they did, because Mr. Vance was a great deal like Warren Christopher, who was his understudy.

*Q:* They were lawyers. I don’t think you find much devotion in a law firm by the
secretarial staff.

MOOSE: No, not at all. After investment banking, it is probably the most self-centered of the professions.

Q: And it shows.

MOOSE: It was apparent to me before I had been there very long that partial measures, working around the edges, was not going to do anything to ameliorate many of the kinds of problems that we had and try to bring about some major sorts of systemic changes. But in order to do that, we needed to try to build an understanding and support within the Department for some rather far-reaching changes, which we could put in the form of a plan and go to the President, go to OMB, go to the Hill, and say: “Here are the needs of the State Department. Here is what we propose to do. Here is how we propose to do it. We need your support.” At about the same time, the Vice President created the President’s Management Council and I became the representative on that for the foreign affairs agencies. These two notions of the need for far-reaching measures inside the Department in the context of governmentwide effort to reinvent government became very much the focus of my next two years at the Department.

Q: We’ll pick that up next time.

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Q: Today is February 14, 2001. Dick, let’s talk about Clinton coming in. It’s always interesting. Each Administration that comes in has its own tone and way of dealing with things. You had been around a while. What did you think of this one?

MOOSE: Well, unlike two or three others that I was closer to than this, I wasn’t there at the very beginning. My wife and I raised money for Clinton when he first went after the nomination. In the transition, Tony [Lake] and Sandy [Berger] asked me to do a paper on Somalia. They talked to me about a couple of ambassadorial things, but I didn’t really want to come in the government. I stayed at American Express. But I watched what went on. Obviously, there were a lot of my friends involved. The perception that I had coming in, I wasn’t surprised that Clinton was not himself attracted to foreign affairs. I had been around him enough by that time to know that he really had very little interest in that. But he of course inherited two or three situations that were to draw him in, mostly to his misfortune—Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans. In each case, there had been things said during the campaign that haunted him. He criticized the treatment of the Haitian refugees. He hadn’t had so much to say about Somalia. I think he did raise some questions about why we were there. In the case of the Balkans, again, there had been criticism of the previous Administration. At any rate, I didn’t think these were high on the agenda. I thought that he put together very deliberately a team of persons who, however talented and capable they were, were chosen for what he expected to be their ability to get along together. There was no great star among them. There was no hotshot. Christopher was a known commodity with his ego firmly under control and not an exuberant sort of person
at all. The Secretary of Defense—Les Aspin—had a reputation for being thorough, a conceptualizer. Then Tony, who really had a private passion to be a good team player, but he also, as we came to see, had other passions as well. Christopher chose a sort of non-“all star” team. I can’t emphasize too much that I don’t mean that to be pejorative. But it was a team that got along with each other so well, at least in the early innings, that there was no real leadership that emerged out of the group.

Q: Strobe Talbott was another one of these.

MOOSE: He was another one of them. The deputy to Les Aspin from Wisconsin—(William J.) Perry was a quiet sort of man, not a striking personality or person. [After succeeding Aspin in 1994 Perry] came to be the strongest person in the national security apparatus in the Administration in many ways. But it was a low-key thing. I think what happened over time was that as these foreign affairs issues from which the President was unable successfully to flee had to be confronted. Then there was frustration on Tony’s part that the three cornered relationship there wasn’t producing anything. Tony was increasingly critical and ultimately punitive about the Department and began because he felt there was no alternative to taking some leaves [liberties]. After Les Aspin’s staff and after a certain interval, I think Bill Perry did the same thing. They moved into areas where they believed there was a vacuum. Perry did it in Partners for Peace, extraordinary work that he did there throughout the Administration, worked a lot in the Gulf in that area over there—nuclear nonproliferation in general, doing a terrific job.

Q: Partners for Peace dealt with the former Soviet Bloc.

MOOSE: Yes, the states of the former Soviet Union. One of the most important parts of it was the implementation of Nunn-Lugar (Cooperative Threat Reduction), which provided money for the dismantling of a lot of the former Soviet ballistic missile capabilities, some parts of which ended up in other parts of the former Soviet Union. Tony had a particular attraction to Africa always and that led him deeper into Somalia, and Haiti was not unlike that. He later in other circumstances was drawn into Sudan. He certainly was drawn into Somalia, but he was also drawn into Sudan, largely on a humanitarian basis because of the civil war. He felt very strongly about that. Then it came to be that he became very much identified with a very active anti-terrorist policy that came more and more to dominate U.S. relations with Sudan. But that’s how they started off. I didn’t come into the government until the late summer of ’93, by which time a lot of the former [gap in interview]. I had written this paper on Somalia at Tony’s request.

Out of my previous experience in dealing with Somalia and the Horn of Africa, having spent a fair amount of time in Somalia, I had very strong feelings that as soon the humanitarian situation could be brought under adequate management and treatment, we ought to move out of there very quickly. I saw it as a morass and I saw no hope that anything could really be done in Somalia of a lasting nature. You just didn’t have the elements there to try to put together a nation. I love the Somalis. They’re one of my favorite people in all Africa. But they have some profound defects. Americans, unless they have really spent some time with the Somalis, just don’t understand what they’re
dealing with. Tony and Sandy never did. That was a tragic situation. I picked up on the end of that when things got so bad out there. I was trying to get the rest of the Americans out of there because we had managed to insert more people in there in a situation that was not at all safe. I was very afraid that we were unable to protect the people who were there and I didn’t see us fulfilling any useful purpose in being there. I tried from the earliest time that I came back to get us out of there, and worked with the people over in the Pentagon who wanted even more desperately to get out than I did and trying to bring about the closure of the installation that we had out there. Anyway, we want to go on to the management side of things.

Q: You came into management. You were doing that from when to when?

MOOSE: You mean in the Clinton Administration?

Q: Yes.

MOOSE: I came in in midsummer of ’93 and stayed until the end of August of ’96. I had been Deputy Under Secretary for Management, the M title at that time, at the beginning of the Carter Administration. I had done that in the transition. We had done the foreign affairs budget working with Burt Lance in ’76-’77. Then I had been Deputy Under Secretary until July, when Mr. Vance had me take over the Africa Bureau. So, I came back in in ’93 and stayed until ’96.

Q: In ’93, when you came on board [gap in interview] There are usually two agendas. One is your own personal agenda. The other one is the Secretary of State or the President. What did you see as you came in?

MOOSE: The thing that was so hard to see around when I came in as usual was the State Department budget. Brian Atwood, who had preceded me for six months in that post before he was moved over to be Director of AID—which is what he always wanted to do—was headed for real trouble in their quest for appropriations for FY ’94. It was already clear that that was going to go badly and it did. So, what I was looking at was how to shore up the Department, what can we do to get by the immediate crunch, and then what can we do looking forward? I had seen a lot of budgetary bad times in the Department, but I had never seen anything coming on like this was. So, the first thing was really to try to patch the holes in the bottom of the ship and keep the thing from sinking.

Q: What was the genesis of this extremely difficult time? One of the overriding times there under Christopher was that he didn’t get the money and didn’t make the pitch for it as he might have.

MOOSE: There were a variety of causes, some of them long in the making. The Department’s budget eroded in real terms over the years. The inefficiencies in the thing hadn’t really been addressed. Many people would say that Jim Baker’s absolutely brilliant, courageous decision to go in and open up posts in all of the states of the former
Soviet Union without asking for a budget supplement really inflicted a terrible new burden on the Department.

There were 12 or 13 new posts, all of them very expensive to try to get them up and running quickly, which was the only reason for doing it, to reinforce the sovereignty and the integrity of those countries. We had to stick people out there in a hurry and we put them out in terrible conditions and worked very hard to try to ameliorate those, give them the tools and things that they needed. But the conditions were very difficult. I participated in opening a lot of the posts in Africa in 1960. The opening of the new posts in the former Soviet Union was, in most cases, far more difficult than what we did in Africa in the ´60s. In the ´60s, for whatever else you can say about it, the colonial systems which were still largely intact when we went into Africa in ´60 really provided some basic elements of infrastructure to work with. Our people who went into these states in the former Soviet Union really didn’t have that. When I went into Cameroon, for example, or when we went into Gabon or the Central African Republic, there was a functioning PTT. There was a French logistics operation. You could get fresh cream from Normandy and fresh veal at least two or three days out of the week and you could get most of the other things—at a price, but there was a structure there. There was a private structure there. There were shipping arrangements. You really could get stuff in and out of the place. There were some buildings, not very many, but there were contractors that you could engage I built 12 buildings in Cameroon, including the Embassy. You could do things like that. You had a commercial code, albeit a colonially-imposed one, but stuff worked. It works much less well there now than it did then 40 years ago; very expensive, very disruptive, high priority. It was the right thing to do, but what a pity that Jim Baker and the political support that he had didn’t go in and ask for some money. He needed to ask for a billion or so dollars just to do that and to do it right. Our people would not have needed to have suffered as badly as they did and the State Department wouldn’t have been trying the way it was. I won’t blame everything on Baker because the Department was in bad shape before Baker did that, but that was a big problem. Moreover, the overseas administrative support system—the foreign affairs administrative support structure—under which the State Department provided most administrative support for most agencies overseas, had deteriorated into a situation of open hemorrhage of the State Department’s budget. We were paying 95% of the cost and we were being reimbursed for only about 1/3 of it. When I in my initial rounds talked to people in the regional Bureaus, worked with Pat Kennedy and the others in the A Bureau [gap in interview].

I came in in those two situations. Warren Christopher didn’t have a management agenda that he gave me coming in. He looked for me to do that. In conversations that I had with him before I agreed to leave American Express and take the job, I told him that I had a lot of fairly strong ideas about what ought to be done in the Department. We simply had to do something to address the human resources concerns of the Department. Concerning the morale of the Department, it was not felt that it was being supported in the way that it deserved, that there were serious dysfunctionalities in the way [the Department] operated, and that we had to give the Congress a convincing plan of reform or they wouldn’t give us the money that we needed. The information technology question had to be addressed. I said those would be my priorities—money, people, and the technology and internal
efficiency and effectiveness—and Christopher was quite happy to have me concentrate on those things. I made the usual speech about the importance of his being involved and he gave me the usual commitment that he would do what was necessary and I’m sure he meant it at the time.

I went to work to try to do whatever could be done in the time remaining. The hearings on the budget were mostly completed. There were a few yet to go. The appropriations committees hadn’t acted. I spent a lot of time up with the House Appropriations Subcommittee. That was headed by Neil Smith of Iowa. I spent a lot of time with them trying to establish a rapport with them. Then I went to work on the interagency question, but that was very difficult. There were tremendous divided views inside the Department on what ought to be done about that. A lot of tension between the central financial management people in the Department and the regional Bureaus. It was very difficult. Then it was along toward the end of ’93 that Vice President Gore began to crank up the President’s Management Council. Because I was interested in management-type issues, the potential of that organization intrigued me. I also saw it from the first as a mechanism that I might be able to use to benefit the Department in some way. I wasn’t sure I was going to do it, but I thought it was probably important for us to get in and play a role. So, that was the kind of going-in agenda when I started out.

Q: The idea that Jesse Helms of North Carolina was out to destroy the Department of State—how did you feel about that?

MOOSE: I knew Senator Helms from the time that I worked on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but even more from the time that I had spent in the Africa Bureau. Helms had been such a tremendous adversary in our efforts to secure independence for Zimbabwe on a straightforward basis that would give the Zimbabweans the opportunity really to choose their own future. We had had a long struggle—Helms and the Africa Bureau and the Administration—over that. Helms was very anti-Patriotic Front, which was Mugabe and Nkomo and those others who were self-styled Marxists and who Helms didn’t like. He supported the British-South African effort to rig the independence elections. We had our difficulties over that. But, I never saw Helms as a serious problem on budgetary or monetary issues for the Department. [Note: Helms became Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in 1995.] He would be advised on personnel, individual personalities, nominations, and things of that sort. But the authorizing committees are not really very significant in the picture of getting money and operating authorities to the Department. They do things like stick in anti-abortion amendments or anti-UN riders and things of that sort. But the irony of that was I, during the time I was on the Foreign Relations Committee staff, was the one who advised the Committee to initiate the practice of annual authorizations. We did that as a means of getting some leverage on then-Secretary of State Kissinger, who wouldn’t come up to testify on policy issues if it didn’t suit him. In frustration at one point, I had suggested to the Committee chief of staff that, “Why do you give the State Department a permanent authorization? Why don’t you put them on a shorter leash and make them come up here? Then the Secretary would have to come up and then you can ask him about things.” I lived to regret that piece of cleverness on my part. Although it never really bothered me a
lot, it has bothered the Department in some other ways. It was not a good idea, but it was one of a number of things that happened at the time of the Vietnam era and the runaway presidencies of Johnson and Nixon. At any rate, Helms wasn’t a problem as far as the budget was concerned.

**Q: Was the problem that the State Department—i.e, Warren Christopher—wasn’t paying attention to this?**

**MOOSE:** The President and the NSC never gave this issue any serious treatment at all. They said the obligatory things, but that doesn’t turn the Congress around. Then by the time we were looking at the FY ’95 budget, State-NSC relations were so strained that I found it impossible, despite my being very close with Tony Lake, to get Tony engaged and involved in trying to get more money for foreign affairs.

**Q: What was the genesis of this estrangement?**

**MOOSE:** It was a feeling that I referred to earlier. Tony’s a can-do kind of guy who wants to take hold of a problem. It’s not so much that he is a power seeker but he felt that there was a vacuum of leadership at State and somebody had to take over and do it. He was disparaging of State’s leadership. The only times that I ever had conversations with him was when he would call and ask me why I was making it so difficult for the NSC to get people detailed over there. He just kept building the staff over there. Finally, I drew a line and said I wouldn’t see him anymore. We had fights about that. But that was later on. That was late in ’94 going into ’95. But the President and the NSC didn’t take any particular concern about it. Chris worried about it when he could, but like all other Secretaries of State with the possible exception of George Schulz, Chris didn’t really see the crisis in the institution. In my really critical conversation that I had with him later on in ’95, we had a discussion about whether the Department was dysfunctional or not. I maintained that it was and that there were a lot of things needed to be done.

Like most of his predecessors though, Chris’ concerns were the policy issues. That’s where his mind, interest, and energy was. The Department had gone past the time where somebody at my level, the third level down, the Under Secretary level, could really do very much, especially against the culture that was largely entrenched against changing. There is a connection there. I’m saying that there were problems that we had that we could have dealt with better. I think Chris was not the kind of person who would go to the Hill and make a great crusade anyway.

Now, ironically, about the time that I left, I was able to finally turn Mrs. (Pamela) Harriman [Ambassador to France] around from a critic of what I was doing to supporter. Mrs. Harriman, in my efforts to squeeze the European Bureau more, had organized all the political Ambassadors against me. She came to town once in mid-’95 and went to see the President and the Vice President and the Secretary of State to tell them what a bad fellow I was, that I was going to ruin American relations with Europe because I was taking all the money away. She, however, a year later, came around and she really got after Clinton on the issue of money for the State Department, which Ms. Albright was able to
capitalized on after Chris left and the President began to have some notion that there really was a problem over there. But still, he didn’t really get behind it. Now they have a very much better chance under General (Colin) Powell, who attracts a lot of attention.

*Q: What were some of the manifestations of the lack of money that you saw in the State Department as it affected operations?*

MOOSE: Well, just the operations and maintenance budget of the Department itself was really inadequate to support the level of operations we had out there. We were just short on operating money. We were short on money to maintain our buildings and facilities. We never had enough money to implement the (Adm. Bobby Ray) Inman requirements for physical security. We didn’t have the money to modernize our information technology. There were other reasons why we didn’t do technology very well. Money was not the only one, but it was an important one. I began to squeeze everything that I could squeeze to try to get more operating money. You have to pay the people and that’s 2/3 of the budget right there. Then most of the rest of it is just operating costs. So, we were squeezing everything that we could. I made a decision not to give the FS exam for a couple of years. I didn’t see how we could afford to take in more people when we could barely pay the ones we had. In retrospect, I would have much rather have done a selective RIF and I looked at that very hard. If I had it all to do over again, I would have taken the heat for doing that rather than cut on the intake at the bottom.

*Q: What about communications? In the ‘90s, we were entering a whole new world—the beginning of e-mail, cellular phones, faxing, etc. This is something that would seem ideal for the State Department to be on the leading edge of.*

MOOSE: Well, a small technical point. E-mail didn’t really get to be a bit thing until really toward the end of the ‘90s. It was really ’98 or ’99 that it came out like gangbusters. It was out there. We should have been doing more with it. But the question is, how and why did State miss the PC revolution?

Back in the late ‘70s, I was involved in the decision to bring the first computers into the Department. Computers then were used mainly and regarded primarily as ways to do word processing and some limited amounts of bookkeeping. By the time State actually got their installations in the late ‘70s, we were the most technologically-advanced agency in the government. The intelligence community would send people to look at us—I’m excluding NSA. People from the rest of the government would come and look at our Wang computers. Well, they were really word processors. They could do a few other things.

What happened was that in the ‘80s, State failed to stay abreast of what was happening in the computer world. I think one of the reasons is that the computer was seen as primarily a word processing and accounting device. By the early ‘80s, the Department had invested an awful lot of money in the Wang, but did not keep pace. Wang didn’t evolve from the word processing world into either mainframes or the PC. The State Department had this investment. If it thought about making the conversion, which I find no evidence that they
ever really looked hard at the situation in a comprehensive way of saying, “We ought to do so and so but we don’t have enough money [gap in interview].” I’ve never really been convinced that they did that because the IM part of the A Bureau was about as backward as you can possibly imagine. In that respect, it was not unusual among other departments and agencies in the government. They almost all had the same problem. They didn’t understand what was happening. The Civil Service system had elevated to the top the people whose main knowledge and technical competence had to do with the oldest of the systems.

State IM was still being run by people out of the teletype age who didn’t understand the Wang, let alone the potential of the PC. That continued to be a problem down into my time. I think one of the reasons was that the computer was seen as a sort of word processor and they didn’t see the communications and the information management, the knowledge management, the aspect of the PC that we’re so interested in—how do you process and disseminate large amounts of information and knowledge that you want to share around? They didn’t see that. But they weren’t unusual, not only in the government but out in the private sector. I spent the ‘80s out in the private sector and I watched how slowly that happened out there. I was on Wall Street in investment banks. It was very slow to get going. Once it caught on by ‘83 on Wall Street, you just saw a surge of investment in technology and so much so that technology got ahead of the people there for a while. At State didn’t happen. I talked to Ivan Selin one time, one of my predecessors in M. Ivan, after being in systems analysis at the Pentagon, where he used lots of computer power, started AMS, American Management Systems, which is a huge computer organization here in town. I said, “Ivan, you were there during the ‘80s. How was the PC revolution missed?” Ivan said it was because he could never get enough money and because of his extensive involvement, he had had to distance himself a little bit from that area. That was unfortunate.

It was in the ‘80s, especially in the late ‘80s, that the State Department really got terribly behind. The bill for redoing things by that time was just prohibitive. I had worked a lot on technology issues at American Express. American Express was the largest American corporate user of technology outside the communications companies in America and probably one of the two or three largest in the world. I had been involved in a lot of that and I came to State with the intention of doing something far reaching and dramatic. But I failed, in part because I couldn’t get beyond fighting the budget and in part because of a lot of internal resistance. But we made a good start. But if I had it all to do over again, by ‘95/’96, I should have seen the e-mail coming on the way it was. But we didn’t have enough money to redo the systems.

Beginning in ’94, I took a trip with some of the senior officials of the Department of Defense. Out of that, we looked at a lot of State-Defense communications issues—out of which came an effort that we put together to create a State-Defense messaging system. It would have been a State-Defense Intranet in effect. It would have been based on a technology that was very promising at the time. There would have been multilevel technology that would have allowed us to run over the same network, classified and unclassified. I wanted to get away from two networks and I wanted to avoid a situation
which had to have two computers on a desk, one for classified and one for unclassified. Technology that they were working with in Defense offered this. I had acquired an assurance from the then-authorities at the Department that as the development proceeded, Defense would carry State’s share of the development costs. When we got around to the implementation stage, they would put the money into it. They considered such a link to be really essentially to the national security and they were prepared to carry a great deal of the cost that, for us, was so prohibitively high but for them was almost lost in the rounding sometimes. That effort didn’t succeed. There were long technical delays. When I left, some of the personal relationships didn’t carry over. It was a false start.

Interestingly enough, I am now working a little bit with something called the Navy-Marine Crops Intranet, which is an effort to do the same thing just within the Department of the Navy using a different kind of technology. Interestingly, the whole network operation, including hardware maintenance, was outsourced to private contractors, which was the conclusion I had come to by ’96 in the Department, that we ought to outsource the two telecommunications networks and outsource the maintenance of the IT backbone and equipment in the Department. I came to believe that government departments and agencies are really incapable of planning and staying ahead of the technology development curve and that they were unable to get the big amounts of money that it takes to do major purchases. Whereas if we converted the operation of the networks, the modernization cycles, into contracts that could be rolled into our regular operation and maintenance, we could get the money to do that; otherwise we were never going to get a half a billion dollars to take out all the computers and put in new ones all at one time. We could do it the other way. So, I started trying to go the outsource route and I ran into the unholy combination of the Information Management Office in the Department and DS and the State intelligence community coordination body—which was a protective society for the old boys who ran the network, who ran the operations and the various things. They said, “No, we can never accept to outsource the networks. The intelligence community would never put up with that because you’ve got to have these dedicated communications.” I argued the thing, but it wasn’t an argument I was ever able to stay with 24 hours a day. Every time I’d turn my back, they’d down tools and quit working on it. Two years after I was out of the Department, I was out at the CIA one day on some consulting and I learned that they had outsourced the operation of their entire networks and were well underway to doing it at the time that I was talking about doing it over at State. But bureaucratic politics inside among the old troglodyte information management people had [stymied it?] I wish I had been talking to the intelligence community instead of to DOD.

Q: What about the geographic or economic Bureaus? Did they see the PC as being something they could get a handle on?

MOOSE: It varied a great deal. The question is interesting. What happened in the Department is something that happened in most large organizations as the information technology revolution unrolled. Because of the way money is allocated out to the geographic Bureaus in the Department, and because there was not an emphasis in the central system on IT modernization, what happened was that the front of the Seventh
Floor had its IT needs looked after by the Executive Secretariat, by SS/EX, where there were a succession of progressive IT managers. They kept the front of the building reasonably well equipped with some data retrieval capabilities and interfaced with the central receiving and sending system, but did not much interface with the Bureaus. The Bureaus meanwhile, having more trouble getting money than the Seventh Floor front of the building did, scrambled around to meet their own immediate needs. There was no central setting of standards or compatibility or interface. So, each Bureau—and sometimes offices within Bureaus—made their own IT procurement decisions. So, by the time I got there in '93, you just had a crazy bunch of stuff which greatly complicated any prospect of going in and trying to put it all together in one efficient system. It made it all the more imperative that you really had to tear out everything and change it all at once, because there were so many different kinds of standards of systems and equipment operating the way cables were distributed from OC/T, from that part of IM that actually works with the circuits [gap in interview] There were various kinds of systems for getting a telegram from off the wire up to the user. The great majority of them were still being printed on paper by the time I got there. There were some distributed without being printed by some Bureaus that had chosen to spend the money to get it. But it varied a lot. Some Bureaus were fairly modern; others weren’t. The European Bureau was not modern. NEA, which has always been probably the best managed of the Bureaus, was probably the best. EA was not particularly good. Poor Africa was, as always, struggling. The Latin American Bureau may have been worse than EUR. It certainly wasn’t any better. But NEA was the best.

Q: You were also there during a time of increased awareness of gender and race issues. You had an Administration that was sort of [gap in interview] I would think this would have caused all sorts of problems for you dealing with gender and equal opportunity issues.

MOOSE: It was and it was a shock to me to come back and find what I did on minorities. When in the Carter Administration, Cy Vance had been relentless in pushing for what we came to call affirmative action. We instituted some of those programs for mid-level entry for women and minorities. A lot of people came in during that. The programs were not followed. They were not well designed. They were not followed up well even within the limitations of the way they were designed. There was a lot of need for mentoring for those people who were brought in. Some extraordinary people came in in those programs. Ed Perkins was one. He was an outstanding example of a person who would never had had an opportunity but for those programs. But there were far too many failures, with the result that in an environment that was never particularly embracing of the idea in the first place, unfortunately, the way we went about it produced enough bad results that it further discredited the program. Then the national mood turned. The legal environment changed. There were those landmark decisions that really undermined affirmative action in the government. When I came in, I discovered that none of the programs that we had had before were functioning and that when we started thinking about how we could address those problems, I just kept running into legal barriers. I think the Department as a whole was better disposed to affirmative action programs. Certainly there was less overt gender bias than there had been before. Much more progress was made in that domain than was
made on the minority side.

Recruiting for minorities was still just abysmal. We couldn’t compete. Part of it was the exam. Part of it was reputation. Part of it was the fact that the economy was doing very well and African-Americans who had the same qualifications that we were looking for found it more attractive to go other kinds of places. The reputation of the Department hurt a lot in that regard. There were class action suits in full swing. I guess the women’s class-action suit had been settled at that point. But the attitudes about gays were a little bit of a problem, as were some of the surrounding political pressures. There was and is an organization of gays and lesbians within the Department. I believe I was the first Undersecretary for Management to officially meet with their officers. They were always after me to create some sort of charter and rights for gays and lesbians in the Department. I said, “Look, as long as I’m here, you’re not going to find the kinds of decisions being made aimed at you, but if you force me into a situation in which we have to try to issue some charter, you know what’s going to happen. I’m going to have Chairman Helms and any number of other groups up on the Hill after me. So, don’t ask me to put something in the regulations to say that the gay partner of a FS officer can live with him or her in their government quarters. What do you think I’m crazy? As long as nobody raises an issue about it, let’s just let it go. If you feel you’ve got instances in which there is discrimination, let’s try to deal with them individually. Let’s don’t make this into a policy issue.” Eventually, I don’t know whether I convinced them or whether they got tired, but the issue seems to have gone away.

Q: Did the advent of the Newt Gingrich crew coming into the House of Representatives and the election of ’94 (the “Contract for America”) have great impact.

MOOSE: That led to the government shutdown. That’s what happened there.

Before we go there, let’s just say a word more about the budget. I mentioned that I worked with the subcommittees a lot. I tried to persuade them, especially on the technology side, to show them what we were doing and planning in that regard. I began to take the first steps to try to deal with the support money that was owed us by other agencies. That was an effort that led to ICASS, the International Cooperative Administrative Support Services, which is a subject I might spend a little time on at some point. But we also very significantly broadened the use of consular fees to pay for consular operations. Mary Ryan, the Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs, and Richard Greene, the Chief Financial Officer of the Department, came to me early on. Mary and Richard talked about could we ask for authority to make a significant increase in the amount of money we could keep and spend for consular functions? Mary was in agreement. She was very apprehensive about how much we could go for. Richard, being in charge of the purse, was desperate to find things to do. We did a lot of work on the Hill and we got increased authorities and subsequently we got another increase the next year and I understand that that’s going on. We pledged to use that money for modernization of the processes and Mary brought in excellent managers, which is one of the things the consular service has produced, and a lot of very good IT people and a lot of innovation at various posts around the world. They came up with good ideas and then Mary spread the
good ideas. So, the Consular Affairs Bureau became a real center for IT innovation in the Department, largely funded by these fees, which have gotten bigger and bigger. Then we began to cautiously use the fees for some non-technology, non-process, things; like for security and better facilities, waiting facilities for the hordes of non-immigrant visa applicants who would gather, particularly in some places. That program, which I credit Richard and Mary with, was a great success. I’m glad it’s going ahead.

Comes the election of ’94 and the (Newt) Gingrich people come in. It was in the winter of ‘95/’96 that the government shutdown, which was the result of the confrontation between the Gingrich Congress and the Clinton Administration. The Department was caught in the middle of that. A few departments and agencies were able to go on operating. We had partial continuing resolutions that would let us operate some things but not other parts of the Department. We could keep passport operations up, but we couldn’t keep all the consular functions going. We had to close down the rest of the Department, designate certain people as “essential” and “non-essential.” That was probably the most painful thing that I went through at the time that I was there. Not only was it hideously complicated from an administrative and financial point of view, it was very disruptive from a morale perspective.

Q: So, you put a program which was essentially distributing the costs more fairly?

MOOSE: I was trying to collect money from wherever I could and I had apportioned out some savings that I expected to be affected. The largest parts of that by far were aimed at the administrative areas of the Department, the A Bureau. I had to find that Patrick Kennedy was my best friend in the Department probably continuously over this and IT and most everything else. We had to scrap those budget plans, because the Bureaus were so hard put to try to get back into normal operating rhythms. It was well into the late spring/early summer before we really recovered from the disruptive effect of the two shutdowns. It was uneven in various parts. There were heroic things that were done with payroll. The three centers around the world were absolutely magnificent. I made a trip just to thank them. The personal impact of it was just hideous. I had every one of my direct reports of the Assistant Secretaries who reported to me—I told all of them that I wanted them to call 12 of their people who were at home every day and I wanted six names from each of them and I would call them. I made hundreds of telephone calls in that period. The others were very good about it, especially Patrick Kennedy. People were just devastated by that. The ones who stayed at home felt so guilty that they were at home and other people were working, and the people who were working felt so badly about the people who were at home. It was very touching and it took me a little bit by surprise. I knew managerially that it had to be treated very seriously, but it was only when we got into it that I realized how deeply affected people had been by it. We did our best cooperating with the operation that was run out of the White House to dramatize the negative impact on Americans at home and abroad about the shutting down of the State Department. We dramatized every bad situation that we could think of in order to make it look worse. Actually, our folks really did a good job of that. We were able to get a lot of mention on the air.
Q: I was out of the Service by this time but, early on, there had been the threat of a shutdown during the Reagan Administration. I can’t remember what it was about, but I was Consul General in Naples and was trying to figure out how the hell do you shut down an operation that is essentially a 24-hour thing. They were saying that if you try to get somebody out of jail, you might have broken the law.

MOOSE: I wanted to explain to people why it was that they couldn’t work for nothing. They said, “Well, we don’t expect to get paid. We’ll just come in anyway.” I had to send out some very strong notice implying that they would go to jail if they did that. Of course, I knew they were doing to do it. Their dedication to service was that great. And the fact that the Department of State was largely closed but not every other agency was shut down. They could look at some other agency that wasn’t shut down and this was just another blow to their own self-esteem. The State Department could be shut down because it was sort of non-essential; there were two shutdowns. I couldn’t believe that we were going to get Number Two when we got it. Two funny things happened during the second shutdown. I was sitting there in my office one day and got a call from Patrick Kennedy, who said, “I’ve got to warn you, boss. I think the network is going down.” I don’t think the whole telecommunications network had ever gone down. This was just due to the heroism and ingenuity of a lot of people in IM who, although I thought they were terribly boneheaded as I indicated earlier when it came to modernization, were terribly committed to keeping the network going and they did an amazing job of it. I always commended them for that. But Pat said, “I think the thing is going down.”

The shutdown coincided with a terrible snowstorm. What happened was that the coolers up on top of the building that we used to cool the main computer equipment that ran the telecommunications network froze. I went up and told Christopher, “We may have a little crisis that we have not had before. It’s going to be because our air conditioning system broke.” He said, “How can air conditioning hurt us in the middle of this ice storm?” I explained it to him and, of course, he understood. The other thing was that we had a political appointee Ambassador who had been confirmed and was ready to go out. He was going out to some relatively obscure, unimportant place. He was absolutely determined to have his swearing-in ceremony on the 8th floor of the State Department as scheduled. I called him and said, “You’re going to have to move it to someplace else. We’ve closed the building.” He said, “Yes, but I’ve got to have this.” So, he called the Vice President and he called the Secretary of State to try to get us to open the building so he could have his swearing ceremony. It was ridiculous. That’s how bad the worst of them was.

By this time, Pamela Harriman was the best of them. She was one who really went to work for the Department. There were the other kind as well.

Q: Did you sense a change in the new crop of ’94, mainly Republican congressmen, who came in? A significant portion of them did not have passports and you were dealing with a new isolationist breed.

MOOSE: I’m the person who had that statistic computed in the first place. I was wringing
my hands and fuming about their attitudes about money for the State Department. I said, in a moment of anguish one day, “I wonder how many of those jokers have passports.” Of course, you had to be very careful. I said, “I don’t want anybody going out because there are privacy issues and some other kinds of sensitive things, but it would really be interesting to know and to have some sense of security that we were fairly sure about it to know this.” Within a few days, I was given the information and began to put it out here and there. There were only about 1/3 of them who had ever had a passport. A lot of the ones who had a passport had never used them.

Q: Was there a reflection of dealing with them? Were you coming up against a “Know Nothing?”

MOOSE: It manifested itself both in the particular and in the aggregate. Our House subcommittee appropriations chairman coming in, replacing Neil Smith of Iowa, was Hal Rogers of Kentucky, who had been the ranking minority member under Smith. He had traveled a lot with Neil; they were good friends. Rogers was, and I’m sure still is, a good friend of the Department. But Rogers got a couple of these know-nothing flat worlders assigned to his subcommittee and they were really difficult. They didn’t see why you needed money for anything. I think they would have closed half the posts and brought people home. They just didn’t see any need for them. In the larger arena, on the idea of getting an increase for the Commerce-State-Justice appropriations subcommittee, the dynamic was all wrong. The added money was going to Justice, mainly to law enforcement. This crowd was very strong in law enforcement. It would go to Commerce Department for new technology kinds of things. The State Department was down here struggling to keep our nose above the water and against the tide of an agenda that had turned against them. Then the idea you were going to get any money added back; it was just never the possibility there. Of course with a divided Congress, a President (Clinton), who as we observed earlier in these tapes, was not particularly interested in foreign affairs, was never very interested in trying to get more money for the State Department, and that came later, with no presidential leadership and a divided Congress, with this new sort of dominant breed of flat worlders, what had been a very bad situation before became nearly disastrous.

Q: Did you get involved with Vice President Gore and his “reinventing government,” which was to make the government more efficient?

MOOSE: Yes. Reinventing government led to the President’s Management Council, which was mean to be a coordinating body for reinventing government efforts throughout the Executive Branch. The President’s Management Council was composed of the Number Two officials in the cabinet departments plus the larger agencies—the CIA, the General Services Administration were probably the only two agencies. As designated Chief Operating Officer of the Department, I was on the Council and I undertook to represent all the foreign affairs agencies, not just State.

Vice President Gore laid down various targets that he wanted met. He zeroed in on middle-level “checkers.” He sort of arbitrarily aimed at certain functions of certain
middle-level categories in the departments and agencies and effectively they just wanted a certain number of scalps for the Hill. They wanted to be able to boast—as they subsequently could and did extensively—that they had substantially decreased the number of employees of the government. Well, they did, but 95 percent of the decrease came because of the budget cuts in the Defense Department. When Gore’s staff would rack up how the various departments and agencies had done at getting rid of people, State would invariably end up somewhere near the bottom. I stonewalled them. While I thought there was a lot of rearranging we could do, I thought their particular prescription was mindless and was harmful. I had my own ways of going about it. There were other kinds of things we needed to be spending our management time on. I was very active in the Council and I used the Council as a means of ultimately getting the critical support needed to bring the other foreign affairs agencies on board for the ICASS system. ICASS was a new approach. We might on another day just take a fresh start on that.

Q: This might be a good place to stop.

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MOOSE: What I wanted to talk about first, because in the succession of administrative initiatives as we took management initiatives that we took, chronologically, the first of these [gap in interview] One of those that has potential for lasting importance is the ICASS system, which we developed. ICASS was introduced worldwide two or three months after I left the Department, but had been in preparation for a couple of years. ICASS was the successor to the previous system for sharing the cost of administrative services among the agencies, the so-called FAASS [Foreign Affairs Administrative Support System], which had the unintended effect of saddling State with a mostly-disproportionate amount of the cost of supporting other agencies abroad, in areas such as building maintenance and management and a lot of the communications support infrastructure. When I took over when Brian Atwood went to AID, by the time I got my feet on the ground, the Department was just ramping up for the budget hearings on the FY94 budget. The outlook of State Department’s budget was probably the worst that it had been since ’85. As it turned out, it was a good deal worse than ’85 was. In ’85, George Schulz was able to go back up and get more money. A lot of the draconian measures which actually Schulz and Company had approved at that time were actually reversed. So, they did not fall into the pit that we did. We did fall in the pit very badly, but we could see it coming.

As I took stock of the managers in the Department, their greatest concern within the money area, other than just the overall shortage of money, was the drain upon the regional Bureaus, in particular from the FAASS system, from State’s disproportionate share of overseas administrative services. I worked closely with Pat Kennedy [Assistant Secretary for Administration 1993-2001, Under Secretary for Management 2007-2017], who knew as much or more about this problem as anybody alive, and Richard Greene, who was the Chief Financial Officer of the Department, and the Executive Directors of
the regional Bureaus where most of the money was and I determined that there truly was hemorrhaging going on here. We had stanched the flow in some way. Going to the other departments and agencies and asking them to give us more money was not a prospect that had any hope of success, if we approached it in the usual kind of way.

We were being squeezed in our own budget and we had to take the support for other agencies right off the top of what we got, which left us with less and less. We were concerned about intake of new officers at the time. We were concerned about enough money for transfers, change of stations. I was looking around in all directions for ways to keep the thing afloat. I had begun to participate in the President’s Management Council, which was a group of the Deputy Secretaries of the cabinet departments and the heads of a lot of the more important independent agencies like GSA, CIA. I was the designated Chief Operating Officer of the State Department, so I was a charter member of the President’s Management Council representing the foreign affairs agencies.

One of the early topics of discussion in the President’s Management Council was a system for sharing administrative costs and services among the domestic agencies in various places in the United States. This was an experimental program where you’d have [gap in interview] Say in Des Moines, you had a scattering of people from 20 government agencies. Nobody really had a critical mass enough to provide a basis for support and some bright person came up with the idea of a combined administrative services unit. The various agencies pitched in some money to provide each other with the necessary kind of wherewithal for administrative support, local purchasing of services and maintenance, and sometimes operation of automobiles. This model was much approved by the President’s Management Council as being very progressive. A lot of these operations outsourced the services which they required, because nobody had the personnel to provide them and didn’t really want to. I saw this as an excellent model that I could adapt to the State Department and I could sell the thing to the President’s Management Council in a slightly altered but still recognizable form as taking this successful, innovative device that was being sponsored by the Vice President in his Reinventing Government program. I could say, “Well, we’re going to do the same thing overseas.” I could see that I could catch the other agencies in this net as I did that. If I could get the President’s Management Council to officially endorse this concept that we were going to do at the State Department. Well, I was very fortunate. John Koskinen, who chaired the President’s Management Council on behalf of the Vice President—he was in fact a deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget—liked the idea very much. I was also fortunate that John Hamre, who later became Deputy Secretary of Defense but who at the time was Comptroller under Bill Perry, was representing the Defense Department and all their agencies. DCI John Deutch represented the CIA and the representative of the Department of Justice was a very talented woman [Deputy Attorney Jamie Gorelick?], a very tough, strong manager. I got Defense, Justice, and CIA to sign on to the concept.

The President’s Management Council created a little working group with me as the chairman. I knew where I wanted to go. The others were willing to go there. We worked through a lot of things. We came back with a slightly more elaborated plan, a precursor of
ICASS. It was endorsed formally by the President’s Management Council, so that all the agencies were committed at the very top in principal to doing this thing before there was ever any discussion at levels below that in all the agencies where everybody predictably would have said: “They’re trying to pick your pocket. Don’t do it. Don’t go there.” By the time they found out about it, their principals were already signed onto it. According to the general outline of the thing, we created a working group, again under the auspices of the President’s Management Council. I stepped back from a leadership role at that point—although I continued to hide behind the screens and pull the strings to the best I could—and appointed people from other agencies to lead the planning effort. We put a very skillful USIA person. Overall in charge we had a Department of Commerce person. They began to develop the particulars of the program. What all this meant [gap in interview] There was a lot of discussion and everybody had an opportunity to say what they thought. There was a lot of input from the field; a lot of it very good. We really took a year, we shaped up the program; ’95 we spent planning, and by ’96 we developed—

The idea was that administrative services would be organized and managed at post by a council. The council would decide what services they wanted to have provided for this mechanism. Agencies were expected to look to this device as much as possible, not to try to do things for themselves. The assumption was that would be less efficient. Most agencies were quite ready to go along with this concept. AID was a holdout because they had this practice that they had used for many years of skimming their program accounts to run a very fat kind of administrative support operation. They would build buildings and do new kinds of things that we were totally hung up against doing, but they were using program money to do this offshore. AID was a problem and we had to keep constant pressure to try to push them as hard as we could to get them into the fold so that we’d maintain the critical mass and not have two parallel systems operating. That was largely successful.

The Department of Defense under John Hamre’s leadership was enormously helpful. We could have never gotten this through if it hadn’t been for John. He sat on DIA and the attaché groups, the various other exotic defense groups of one sort or another. He just told them they had to play and they did. The effect of this when ICASS finally went into operation full scale, we ran a virtual operation for a year. Mike McLaughlin was the overall worldwide executive director of it. We ran in ’96 a virtual program. They ran two sets of books—the usual one that everyone did and then they ran a phantom set of ICASS books side by side, so that they could see what problems would develop if you really operated this thing in the real world. That was very successful. Mike had an interagency group that reviewed the results of that. The first year of operation of that, I’m told State saved about $25 million. It doesn’t sound like a lot of money, but when you were looking at outflow of the proportion that we were, it was a big saving and it’s gotten bigger ever since.

Q: And it also offered a certain amount of team discipline, didn’t it? It cut out a lot of the irritations.

MOOSE: It really did. There were two or three big categories of reasons for doing this.
Number One, we were [gap in interview]. That was the most important thing. If we hadn’t been [gap in interview], we probably wouldn’t have gone to so much trouble. But Number Two, it lifted a psychological burden, changing the atmosphere at a post from State being the whipping boy for everything that went wrong. Other agencies not having to pay for the things that they asked for just often made unreasonable demands on the administrative system. The poor State administrative officer didn’t have enough money and he or she really didn’t know where to turn. It poisoned the atmosphere at many posts. Everything was always State’s fault. So, this collaborative cooperative program approach made a big difference. The third reason was, I felt that as the other agencies proliferated overseas and as this management administrative burden got greater and greater, State was more and more diverted from its primary mission. The primary mission should have been analysis and coordination of foreign policy and not hotel keeper to the U.S. government overseas. Some Ambassadors felt it was important to keep that role because it gave them a degree of control. I never met a really good manager Ambassador who felt that that was the case, but many did that were not very good managers—they wanted to make sure they had their hands on the controls. Often, this kind of betrayed some personal: “Boy, I’m going to be able to operate this system, so I’m sure I’m comfortable. Redo the Embassy residence when I want to. I have to explain it to a lot of people.” But we weren’t out there to manage housekeeping operations. What were we doing? Why were we running three worldwide telecommunications? We weren’t a telecommunications utility. We were supposed to be in the diplomacy business. ICASS was a way to get out of that. I also wanted to get out of the housekeeping business.

Now, ICASS did not work everyplace. It required a certain harmony and synergy among the agencies. It took sponsorship by an Ambassador or DCM who really understood the program and who worked at making it work. But my crew followed the program from the very first and told me that it’s worked well in most places. It has indeed saved even more money than I imagined. One of the things that we wanted to do was to force greater visibility in the system. Other agencies believed that State was playing games with its money. Indeed, we often were. The regional Executive Directors became more and more concerned about ICASS as time went on because—as they argued it and I understood their position—they were the ones who picked up the slack. If Post A really was in desperate straits, they could move some money and do some things. They were closer to the picture than anybody else in Washington. So, they played an important role. Sometimes they could carry some of these operations on the cuff, in the hopes that they were going to get their money back, but they didn’t always. They saw themselves losing control of the system. If posts made decisions, if agencies reimbursed directly to the posts, what was the role of the executive office of the regional Bureau? Some problems could arise from that. I acknowledged that they could, but I said that I thought that those problems were not as serious as the problems that we were solving by the positive things that ICASS did.

By making the cost structure transparent and by making every agency’s bill public and visible—post by post—then the agencies would have to go back to their appropriators and say, “Here is the money we need for our overseas operations.” In many cases, the appropriators had never had any idea how much it cost. This was a case where the
Department of Justice for sure had no idea how much more money they were spending, with all of the FBI agents and all of the Drug Enforcement guys and everybody that the Justice Department was sending overseas. A lot of those costs were being subsumed in the State Department budget and being partially reimbursed to State in ways that really didn’t show up in the appropriations account.

I was lucky in another thing. I talked about the sponsorship of the President’s Management Council and the collaboration of these other three subcabinet officials who were so helpful. But the other thing was the support that I got from the State-Commerce-Justice appropriations subcommittee. Hal Rogers of Kentucky was the Republican who had replaced the Democrat Neil Smith of Iowa, who was chairman until ’94. Well, they were both kind of small-town main-street businessman types and they were very reasonable, realistic fellows. They expected a lot of accountability. I got along very well with them. I had known people like them all my life. When I explained what we were trying to do, they liked it a lot. Indeed, Rogers became such an advocate of it that he wanted to jumpstart the thing a year before I felt we had the bugs out of it. Rogers actually took me to see (Robert L.) Bob Livingston [R-La], the overall Chairman of the Appropriations Committee and said, “Explain the things. We want to move money out of all of these other appropriations across the whole government, the requisite amount of money, and put them into this new system.” Rogers meant that he didn’t have to appropriate quite so much money for the State Department. He thought the principal concept of the thing was good, but he went and got Livingston and I had to argue Livingston and Rogers down from actually starting the thing a year earlier. They were so enthusiastic about it. As it was, they inserted a lot of appropriations language that made it impossible for my successor to back out of the thing and more importantly for the other agencies to try to back out of it. It’s not a panacea for everything, but it was a revolutionary change. The post operations saved money because there was an incentive for everybody working together to try to find cheaper ways of doing things and to pare things that didn’t need to be done. State didn’t have to share its money to the extent that it had in the past. I guess among the things that I was able to accomplish while I was there, I think this made the most sense and, at least through its first year or two of operations, fulfilled my hopes for it. It’s not a pain-free process. Running administrative support never is, either in the public or the private sector. But this took the State Department off the hook and served the purpose for which it was intended and really was good government. I was always pleased that the President’s Management Council would count this among its greatest accomplishments in making government work better and cost less.

Q: Do you think also it could be that the Justice Department or the Pentagon suddenly realized how much it was costing to put people overseas and it might cut down on the presence?

MOOSE: Indeed. That was one of the reasons why the appropriations subcommittees liked it. They thought if agency management saw how much it was costing, if they had to come up to the Hill and defend and justify it, the chances are that they would reduce the number of people overseas. Hal Rogers was always just incredulous when we would travel around at the numbers of people he would encounter. He had a theme. We would
have like a hearing at every post we would go to. Rogers was very good about this, as Neil Smith was, going and seeing how people lived and understanding what the money was. But he wanted to know, who were all these people there in the country and what were they doing? In Paris, American law enforcement representatives were effectively out of control and they were numerous because it was a plush job. You got the FBI guy in Paris by dint of being a loyal servant. I got them to go with Rogers one day and he couldn’t believe how many there were.

I got Rogers to propose that they have some sort of a council so that they could coordinate their activities. They were horrified at this. The FBI guy spoke up and said, “We need no guidance from any other agency about carrying out our mission.” Rogers was appalled at what he heard. He got a lot of pressure from Justice and Commerce to try to control their overseas expenditures. I brought him into more of a partnership with the Department than he had before. He understood what our problems were. His expectations were reasonable. He understood how our people lived.

He took several members of his subcommittee and went on an extensive tour. We started in Vladivostok and we went to a couple of other godforsaken places in the Russian Far East, in the middle of Russia. We went to the Stans. We went to China, two or three places; Mongolia. Rogers walking up four flights of stairs in this miserable, crumbling Stalin-era apartment building that our people were in, going into the apartments where our people lived. I never had any trouble with Rogers about getting money to try to improve the living conditions of our people. He was good. He felt a sense of responsibility for us which was critical. I would tell him what our problems were. I would tell him our shortcomings. I’d be honest about it. I’d say: “Here is my plan. Here’s what we would do the first year. Here’s what we’d do the next year.” He was reasonable. He was a good person to work with.

By mid-’94, I had a number of things in mind that I thought really needed to be done in the Department, but I really felt that we needed some sort of guiding principles to help us make choices. We needed to be more efficient. We needed to spend our money more carefully, more purposefully, but we also at the same time, and more importantly, had to make sure that we were well organized to carry out our mission. It had been some time since there had really been a thorough review by knowledgeable, responsible people inside about the mission of the Department and to think how we might reorganize ourselves to more effectively carry out our work. But first we had to assess where we were; what the state of the Department was, and to come up with a theme and approach the thing in a methodical manner—not just start moving the boxes around before we had figured out what it was that we were supposed to be doing. So, I proposed a strategic management initiative to Christopher, that we engage on a voluntary basis people from around the Department to create working groups to explore a blueprint for the future for the Department. We were just beginning to see what we now call globalization and a vast change in the way foreign affairs were conducted. We recognized that we were still doing a lot of things the way we had been doing in the Cold War. So, these six working groups were appointed and they went out and did various kinds of things. They talked to our stakeholders in the foreign affairs community. They talked to 150 people out of as many
as 80 organizations, both public and private, that came in contact with the Department about what did we need to do. We interviewed a range of what we called “eminent persons,” people who had been very prominent in the national security/foreign affairs field, most of them out of the Department. We got their views on the Department. We incorporated those into a series of reports that we took back.

The six teams that we created brought back 20 recommendations for reducing workload and affecting savings for reengineering processes and to provide a conceptual basis for how the Department would organize itself in the future, some of the kinds of things that were consensus findings of these six groups. I really let the groups have their head. I did not try to influence where the groups came out at all. They emerged with a remarkable consensus, things about ourselves. They found that State’s analytical reporting is universally respected throughout the government, that constituents and stakeholders really valued the services that are provided by our Embassies. Not everything they were doing was really core or central importance to our mission and we ought to get rid of them [those requirements?]. Everybody thought that internal and external communication was terrible—upward, downward, out to the public—that there was a lack of accountability in the Bureaus, with the result that we needed to restructure. There were too many chiefs, too many layers. The Department did not have leadership from the top, nor a clear vision about the Department’s mission and its management. A lot of hard work to implement changes would be necessary. Other organizations that have problems as complicated as ours have tackled them and they have done it. It would take a matter of years, but if we have a consistent vision and a defining strategy, we could do it. The themes and conclusions were ones that both supported the importance of what the Department did but pointed the way to the things that needed to be done to make us more effective in carrying those out. We had an offsite in September of ‘94 ___. We had it out here and had all of the Assistant Secretaries, all the Under Secretaries, the Deputy Secretary, they all came. Everybody came. We talked through the reports of these groups which were extremely well written, very persuasive, not radical, just saying: “We’ve got an important mission, but we’re not well organized to carry it out. We have some real problems and have got to work on them. Here are the main things and here is our mission and what we ought to do.” We went back and did some more work, came in with supporting more specific recommendations; another offsite out here, same group of people. This time, Christopher came, in addition to all the others. We got everybody there and really talked through all the issues. Then we put the set of recommendations to Christopher in an actionable form. Other things began to intervene.

Meanwhile, Foreign Relations Committee Chair Jesse Helms had launched on his campaign to force the consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies. That muddied the waters a little bit. It needn’t have; Christopher had been consistently supportive of my efforts to modernize and to bring State into a better alignment with itself internally. I gave him a big notebook full of recommendations and we had a number of discussions. I had continued to emphasis that he had to be personally involved in the thing, that we had achieved an unusual consensus in the leadership of the Department and that the FS officers and Civil Servants who had drawn up these recommendations represented the very best of the FS; that they were in many ways self-selected. People knew who the
leaders were and they were involved in these groups. The individuals had not been persuaded of the desirability or the need of this at first, but the more that they listened, the more that they investigated, the more perspectives they got on the Department, the more persuaded they became. And they were persuaded that we really could do it. But everybody had agreed that it had to be very strongly led. Strobe was not particularly interested in it. I don’t think he really understood it. Christopher took a lot of time.

I guess the critical meeting in this was in February of ’95. The recommendations of the first groups had been adopted back in December of ’94. These other recommendations were coming forward in February of ’95. Sometime after that, March or so, Christopher and I were talking and he said, “Dick, how much of my time is this going to take?” I said, “Well, it will take maybe not quite as much as the Middle East peace process, but it’s going to take a chunk of your time.” He said, “Will it be disruptive?” I said, “It doesn’t have to be, but there could be profound changes. A lot of it will take time beyond the time you and I are here, but if we can launch on a plan, maybe your successors will follow it.” He gave me the go-ahead on a variety of the things to do, but he really did not embrace it as an overall major undertaking. Maybe I should have lied to him about how much of his time it would have taken, but if I had, he wouldn’t have been there when I needed him and I would have rather [gap in interview] It was better that I knew that we weren’t really going to be able to go with this all out. I picked up three or four things out of that I wanted to do that I thought were doable and most important; continuing with ICASS was one of them. That had been interwoven—the new overseas administrative support system; the modernization of the information technology in the Department. By the end of ’95, we had for the first time a strategic architecture plan for the Department: The concept that had been worked out, the needs of all of the parts of the Department, our needs for interfacing with the rest of the world. Internet was coming on the scene. So, this was a conceptual blueprint for the kind of architecture we had. The IM people fought it every step of the way. They said, “We don’t need a plan. We know what we’re doing.” But I pushed ahead with that. I felt very much that we needed a workforce management plan for the Department. We didn’t really know how many people we needed. The Personnel Bureau would count up from time to time how many vacant positions we had. I see this game is still going on. I see in the newspaper that the State Department is reporting it has 2,000 vacant positions. Well, I think we always had 2,000 vacant positions. I was never impressed with that. I really wanted to know how many positions we needed in order to do what, to define the work to be done, and then in the Department as a whole, in a Bureau, at a post What’s the work to be done?

So, we needed a workforce plan so we’d know how many people we needed, with what skills, at what point, and how we were going to get them. We had nothing that even approached that. It has a very long recruitment; it has a very long training. It has a very long budget process, how do you want to manage the flow of people through careers in the Department. We weren’t doing that. The existing FS Act provisions had broken down. The promotion-up-or-selection-out process that only worked to promote people up. It rarely selected anybody out. We were getting a congestion at the top and I was under constant pressure to give career extensions to whole masses of people with no concept of plan or what was going to become of themselves. We needed a workforce plan. Also, I
wanted to continue to work on the overseas problem. I wanted an overseas staffing model for not a cookie-cutter approach to how big posts should be, but some sort of standard that we could use as a point of departure or benchmark, that it may be reasonable at a particular period to have a greater emphasis one place or another. But most posts’ staffing patterns, their composition, were a product of accretion, they were made by topsy and would just grow. There was not much plan about it.

The usual predictable objections were raised that we were trying to dictate one size fits all and so forth. Well, the regional Bureaus were compelled to play in this by a variety of stratagems. At first they didn’t take it seriously. I told principal Deputies they couldn’t send substitutes. We appointed (Ambassador J. Stapleton) Stape Roy to head a working group to come back with recommendations about categories and then we would develop those more fully. Stape had an excellent team. He picked them and did a wonderful job. He came back and the principal Deputy Assistant Secretaries of the regional Bureaus began to work through and came to a remarkable consensus about five or six categories of kinds of posts. If you have that sort of blueprint, it helps to feed your workforce planning model. It also helps you with ICASS. It helps you manage in the other divisions. It helps you going up to the Hill and saying, “We have some standards about how we do these things. There is some rationality to this process.” That was going pretty well. That was going to work out.

One of the other things that we did was also in the personnel area. That was to try to get a handle on who we had. This was related to the workforce plan. We didn’t have a database that would enable us to really take stock of the skills and talents that we had. So, I had a group of people come from PER and say, “We have an idea about how we could build a relational database in the Personnel Bureau that would really give us the tools that we need for modern personnel management. If you give us a little bit of money, we’ll go hire a contractor and we’ll get this marvelous thing done.” I said: “I’ll give you some money, but I won’t give you money to go hire a contractor. I’ll give you money for you all to get the training that you need to design the thing yourself. Then we’ll get what we really need and have something left after it’s all over.” (Patricia A.) Popovich was the person who came to me with this. So, she had four or five people with her. We gave them the money to go get some training and give me another report and proposal. It was a marvelous proposal. They were given more money and they did it and they had the database that they needed. Another group of employees came to me about the same time as a result of the Strategic Management Initiative and said, “We believe that the Department’s logistic system could be ___” Somebody came to me who was in charge of all the warehouses and said, “We’ve really got more warehouses than we need. What are we doing with all these warehouses?” So, this led to the conversation about the logistics system of the Department. Those one or two people became five or six. I sent many of them to Mike Hammer’s Business Process Reengineering School courses up at Harvard. They got really deeply into looking at State’s logistics system, which supported not only State but everybody else. They wanted a place to work. I got them a couple of rooms down in the basement of the State Department and a few computers and they began to diagram and to map all of the logistics and the logistics-related processes of the Department. They mapped on these great charts on the wall that they would make with
yellow sticky papers. It was a beautiful job. It was a great plan.

So, modernizing the information technology architecture and equipment of the Department, the workforce management plan, the personnel information system, the logistics reengineering—those were all things that one could do that would contribute to whatever strategic design the Department would subsequently come up with. These would provide greater efficiency and would be compatible with any number of conceptual systems of how the Department ought to be reorganized to carry out its modern mission. So, I wasn’t able to pursue the grand strategic blueprint and it hasn’t been done. I read all the literature of all of the groups that were convened to study and I’ve read it and gotten tired of listening to the people who draw them up. The few of them that ever really come to grips in a useful actionable way with what is the work that we’re expected to do? Let’s define those core missions. Let’s build around those. Let’s try to shed the things that distract us from our real mission—to make sure we have the people trained, equipped, and deployed in the right way to carry out the things that are the key mission. Instead, people start at the other end. They start saying, “We’ve got to reorganize the Department,” but they don’t know to reorganize to do what.

One of the 20 eminent persons who were interviewed by one of the SMI working groups was (General) Colin Powell, who was past chairman of the Joint Chiefs, by that time out of the government. I reread the interview the other day. This group wrote up all of is interviews and they were available to all of the people, the officers of the Department. Powell said: “You do a great analytical job. The whole government really depends on you. The government is also dependent upon you for the coordinating functions. That’s critical. When you don’t do it, things come apart.” He didn’t have a lot else to say, but that was enough. He had the right idea. It’s very hard though to take something that simple and follow it and use it as a guide for an organization that is as complex and has grown in the kind of way that any government department will. State’s luckier than perhaps all the rest of the Cabinet departments, in the sense that it is more of a unitary department than any other. I realized this from my work on the President’s Management Council. I really had a handle on all of the money in the Department except separate program money—like refugees and that kind of stuff. But I had a handle on the money and on the people. The Secretary of State had those authorities and they weren’t really carved up among Bureaus and subagencies the way they are in Justice or Agriculture. You really can manage the Department. It doesn’t want to be managed, but the tools are there. So, when somebody decides to do it, they will be able to. The consolidation episode that I referred to in passing was one of the big features of this period. That turned out to be one of the great fiascos of all time.

Q: Had Christopher had his own study about putting things together and this was thrown in his face later?

MOOSE: Yes. Before I came, Christopher and Brian had talked a lot about this. Christopher and I talked some about it. Christopher really believed that the foreign affairs establishment needed much more coherence than it had. But like many lawyers, he had a kind of lawyer’s concept of what organization was. I don’t think he appreciated the
complexity of the thing, although I made myself a real nuisance with him in trying to get him to understand it. He did believe at the beginning of this that there ought to be a substantial measure of consolidation. I don’t think he ever defined that in his own mind and I don’t think he ever had a paper on it. I never did one for him. He told Gore that he thought they ought to be consolidated.

We’re talking about AID, USIA, Arms Control, and State. The Foreign Commercial Service in the Department of Commerce was a candidate but it didn’t really get drawn into this. They had sufficiently strong political leadership that they didn’t. Jesse Helms decided, I think primarily for mischievous reasons, that he would try to force these aforementioned agencies to consolidate under the State Department. I think he really wanted to reduce the size and strength of the foreign affairs establishment. He thought he could force them all together and then reduce the aggregate in size dramatically. He knew that Christopher had some sympathy for this idea at first, but then when the whole thing began to develop, Christopher saw—it was another one of those conversations—“How hard will this be?” I said: “This will really be hard. This is going to be war. I think your energies are much better directed at putting State’s house in order; that we get our own house in order. Then we’ll be in a position to think about integrating these other agencies, but frankly I don’t think we run ourselves very well and I don’t think we could run the other agencies very well either, although I think they for the most part are even worse managed than we are.” USIA was going through an internal reorganization that turned out to be reasonably good. AID’s was a disaster. ACDA was really too small of a matter. But there is huge redundancy between ACDA and Political-Military Affairs in the Department.

Christopher changed his mind in midstream about this mainly because he didn’t think that the fight was worth it. I think probably he was right about that. Gore was annoyed with this. He felt that Christopher’s vacillation had exposed us to Helms. Then when Helms pushed forward and we tried to work out some sort of reasonable plan, Brian Atwood over at AID didn’t want to play at all. Brian went to the Vice President and got protection from him. John Holom, who was head of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, went to Tony Lake and he got protection there. Poor Joe Duffy, who was head of USIA, couldn’t find anybody to protect him, so USIA got swept in. AID in its kooky scheme stayed on the outside. The whole thing turns out to have been a mishmash. Nobody was saved. Everybody kept their own communications system. It was mischievously conceived and not planned at all and hideously badly executed, so the whole thing really accomplished nothing good, as far as I can see. A lot of upheaval, a lot of unhappiness. The other agencies said, “State can’t manage itself and so why does anybody believe they can manage us?” Congress was more than prepared to believe that.

Gore really was no help. Tony Lake and the Vice President were no help at all in this thing. They had a kind of ambivalence toward the Department. It was pronounced. I sensed it in lots of things, although Tony and I had been friends for 20 years. His attitude about the Department was very bad. Gore’s was as well, even though we had done some outstanding things in the government, in the reform area, the kinds of things that I had talked about. Gore wanted reductions in jobs. He wanted, as Lyndon Johnson would say,
“coonskins on the wall.” We couldn’t provide him any of those except the vacancies that we had because we didn’t have enough money. I tried to parlay those to everybody that I could. We needed to get rid of middle managers. We needed to focus our money more on our objectives and we didn’t succeed very well in that. It’s a shame that when they get the money now they’re not taking a hard look at the core mission. But it’s the very early days. Colin Powell understands how to do those things. Maybe he will. So, that’s about it.

Q: Then what happened?

MOOSE: I worked through those four or five things, getting ICASS ready to go, continuing to push the strategic architecture plan. I had gotten a commitment on the Hill for phased funding of a complete redo of the information technology infrastructure. We were going to do it every three or four years. We had a plan to phase it out. I’d rather have done it all at once, but I didn’t think I’d ever get that money, that they were going to make the money available to me. I was also going to get some money from the Defense Department. I would have done one of two things. I would have merged our worldwide communications into some kind of a Defense network, or I would have outsourced them and gone commercial. I was working those projects when the time came for me to resign and leave. Unfortunately, there was quite a hiatus in between. They didn’t really take off with things. Pat Kennedy, who was probably my closest friend in the Department, was Acting after I left for a number of years. Pat, as close as he and I are, we did not see eye to eye on many of the things that I was doing. So, not surprisingly, they didn’t play them out the way I might have played them out. But he’s one of the best people we’ve ever had. But he didn’t share a lot of these views.

Q: After your time, did you get any feel for how Madeline Albright took on the administrative tasks?

MOOSE: I think she was successful in going up and getting more money for one year. I was still kind of in touch with her at the beginning of that period. I told her, “Look out for not getting a one year bump up; that they buy you off with something for one year. You’ve got to keep your eye on the out years.” I had left and gone to the Council on Foreign Relations to lead a study for Les Gelb on financing the foreign affairs agencies. It was one of these Council working groups that many eminent persons are on. We said that the Department needed more money; that, “It needs some very substantial internal reforms. It needs the assurance of long-term funding to sustain some of these infrastructure investments.” Madeline got in the FY97 budget a bump up. The White House made a big production about doing this. I went over with some members of our task force who were invited over there and we got into a discussion with Alice Rivlin, who was head of OMB, and told Sandy Berger, [who had replaced Lake as] National Security Advisor; I jumped on them about the out year projections for State beyond the next fiscal year. I had gotten hold of the data and their out year projections were either flat or declining. That’s what happened. They began to slide again. They didn’t hold that heat. Madeline looked at it mainly in terms of money. I would have been happy if Christopher had done that. I would have been happy to take care of the rest of it. But there was a long hiatus there. There was not somebody there who was determined and
had the political backing to try to push for the institutional changes that were needed and are still needed. So, it was an opportunity missed. It’s my own fault.

Q: With the expertise that you have in management, particularly in Africa, what have you been doing with yourself since?

MOOSE: I did this study on the financing of foreign affairs agencies for six months. We got a lot of publicity and good editorial support on that. I think it helped Madeleine.

I then went over to the Center for Naval Analyses, a non-profit which is the oldest and least known of the federally-funded defense research institutions. I worked primarily for the Navy and the Marine Corps. I went over there with a project to write what I thought might become a book. It was going to start out as a study on the President’s Management Council, on the experience of it that we had in the first term of the Clinton Administration. What did we try to do in terms of reinventing government or making it work better? What were the big objectives? How did we seek to carry those out? What succeeded? What failed? Why did things fail? If you were going to do it again, what would you do differently? What would be your advice to people who follow you?

I had enlisted five or six of the Deputy Secretaries or heads of the other agencies who were going to work with me on this. We were going to work through it department by department, not try to do them all, but six or so of them. We were going to have discussions and then some recommendations and tie the whole thing together. Well, it was an interesting idea and I had some foundation funding for it. But then while I was getting cranked up to do that, Bob Murray, the president of the Center for Naval Analyses, was approached by the Secretary of the Navy, who wanted to carry out what he called the revolution of business affairs in the Navy, and our organization had been asked to coordinate these activities, bringing in outside experts and looking, helping, the Navy examine itself and bring modern business practices to bear. So, Murray asked me to be the coordinator of that on behalf of the Center for Naval Analyses. So, I spent a year and a half, almost two years, working with the Navy leadership on this. They did not revolutionize business affairs in the Navy. But it began a process that has gone on in the Navy and a number of good things have indirectly flowed from it. It was interesting. It sort of rounded out my experience in trying to bring change to bureaucracy. I had been through a strategic management initiative change process at American Express in the ‘80s. It got into real trouble but then it began to get itself out of trouble, largely because it really faced up to its internal problem. But I’ve now seen public and private bureaucracies large and small. I think ________ led a strategic plan for our own organization, the Center for Naval Analyses. So, I tried strategic change in large organizations and small ones—military, civilian, public, private. The problems are very much the same. The vocabulary and the costumes change, but a lot of the problems are the same.

So, I’ve become more and more wedded to the notion that the organization needs to understand what its reason for being is. It really needs to understand that. That is really hard work to reduce a description of work and a mission down to terms that are really
actionable. It’s very easy to start redrawing the boxes, or say, “We’ve got too many people” or “We’ve got to cut X percent out.” But you really need to start at the other end and say, “What is it that we’re trying to produce here?”

Q: One of the things that I’ve noticed in life everywhere is that we’re getting more and more like some of the bureaucracies in other countries—for lots of legal and other reasons, too many forms to fill out, too many ways of saying “No,” too many people inserted into the situation, sort of a sclerosis of the system by trying to manage rather than—

MOOSE: There is a vast amount of that in the federal government and state and local governments. In my current responsibilities as president of the Institute for Public Research, we are diversifying what has essentially been a defense-consulting business for 50 years. We’re now out and I’m competing for contracts for organizations like the Healthcare Financing Agency [HFA] that runs medicare and medicaid; the Department of Education, the National Institutes of Health; the Department of Agriculture, the FAA—we’re competing and winning competitive contracts there and using our operations research expertise to tackle a whole variety of problems that sometimes have some similarity to what we’ve done in the Navy and sometimes don’t.

But the clutter that surrounds the procurement process is unbelievable. The effect of that is that it’s very hard for government to bring in expertise in ways that really are useful. There are so many layers and so many rules. They’re the strictures that the Congress puts into the authorizing appropriating legislation. Those are then interpreted and implemented by agencies and departments that write rules to carry them out. Then there are Inspectors General corps. Then there are auditor’s corps. Then there is the GAO. Then there is the general increase in litigiousness in our society. The consequence of this is that these agencies are managed defensively for the most part to keep from making a mistake. There is very little individual accountability. It is spread in all sorts of directions except in the most minute kinds of manners; a deadening environment.

One of the great problems throughout the career service in government—it’s true in the Navy and the other armed services—is today’s young people are more sensitive to the need to be doing meaningful work. They don’t have careers anymore. You don’t go into something for a career. You go because you want to have meaningful work. That’s the reason why so many of the really splendid officers are getting out of the Navy. It breaks your heart. Why do they leave? Because they go from commanding a nuclear submarine to carrying a briefcase and following some admiral up and down the corridors of the Pentagon, not meaningful work. FS officers have the same experience; not being given meaningful work to do. Then when you do, you have all of these things that you’ve mentioned. Well, that’s the reason why I saw we’ve got to go back and re-clarify what is the work we’re going to do. You can’t do this just working in the Executive Branch. You’ve got to have the collaboration of the Congress. The Navy guys will tell me, “Well, you can’t do this because Congress has put all of these rules in the way.” That’s true. There are a lot of rules there. But if you get to looking at the rules, you’ll find many of them have their origin in the department and agencies. They’ve bound themselves in their
own red tape. It’s not all Congress’ fault—not by a long shot.

Q: Dick, I want to thank you very much. This has been a long journey.

MOOSE: It’s really wonderful what you and your Association are doing here.

End of interview