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TED D. MORSE

Interviewed by W. Haven North
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Zimbabwe and SARP assignments Southern Africa drought relief success Southern Africa Regional Program (SARP	1990-1994
April 19, 1994	
Washington-Greater Horn of Africa Task Force	1994-1995
Washington-Bosnia Task Force	1995-1997
Washington-TF on Reorganization of Foreign Affairs Agencies	1997-1998
Washington-Conflict prevention Task force	1998-1999
Kosovo-White House TF Field Representative	1999
End of 37 year USAID career	1999

INTRODUCTION

For thirty-seven (37) years I worked for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). USAID is an agency that reported to and through the Secretary of State to the President.

The focus of my career was on the planning and administration of long-term economic development through U.S. foreign assistance to developing countries. I felt a personal calling to help people and countries that didn't enjoy the benefits that my family and I had experienced in America. More expansively, broad economic development in the world is, in my opinion, in the interests of U.S. national security. I was repeatedly assigned additional responsibilities for humanitarian, emergency and post-conflict reconstruction assistance. I worked on or lived in Latin America/Caribbean for five (5) years, Asia for ten (10) years, Africa for twenty (20) years and the Balkans for two (2) years. At the culmination of our careers, many U.S. Senior Foreign Service Officers are interviewed about our service. The tapes of the oral histories are used as reference and in training for new U.S. Foreign Service Officers by the U.S. Department of State's Foreign Service Institute in Arlington, VA. What follows is the transcript from my seventeen and one-half (17 ½) hour interview.

In "retirement", I spent another twelve (12) years as an international consultant or a re-employed U.S. Foreign Service Officer with the Department of State, USAID, World Bank, United Nations, British Government and various universities. Most of that work (1999-2011) focused on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants into civil society. There are probably two reasons why I focused on DDR in retirement. First, over the initial thirty-seven (37) years of my career, I could see where conflict precluded economic and political progress and wanted to help combatants disengage

from that conflict. Second, during my "regular" foreign service, I had developed a reputation for working in conflict contexts, which few civilians had experience in at that time…the skill was "marketable"!

INTERVIEW

Q: This is May 25, 1998. This is an interview with Ted D. Morse, who served with U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) for how many years?

MORSE: Thirty-seven (37) years.

Q: Starting when?

MORSE: June, 1962

Q: And you retired this year?

MORSE: No. I first retired two years ago; but, then I was brought back as a direct hire on a renewed, re-employed annuitant each year. So, I really haven't been away from AID for more than a month or two.

Q: Let's start off with your early years: where you are from, where you went to school, your education and any other work experience, particularly with a slant on what in those experiences suggested that you ought to get into the world of international development.

MORSE: The watershed of getting involved in international relations didn't actually come until my time in the military; so, the early years.

Q: Let's talk about the early years.

MORSE: Okay. I was born and raised in Sacramento, California. I was a fourth generation Californian. My mother and father traced their roots quite a way back. I was one of eight children. My father was a furniture refinisher and worked very hard. I guess I've always said that if I learned any work ethic, I learned it from watching him work and working with him. My mother never worked outside the home; but, with eight children, she worked hard in the home.

Q: Mighty busy.

MORSE: Yes. I think that I learned a sense of love and compassion from her. We came from a very poor family, unlike "the" Samuel F.B. Morse family, who were wealthy.

My father was a Samuel F.B. Morse. His name goes back to Samuel F.B. Morse, the inventor of the telegraph, who was also a painter. He actually made his living as a

painter, as an artist. My oldest brother is also a Samuel F.B. Morse, as is my oldest nephew. My father, too, was an artist and painter. With ten mouths to feed, however, his need to work hard left little time for painting. Still, his was a happy life.

I started to reflect my father's work ethic when I was seven - eight years old. It was during World War II. We raised vegetables to eat or sell in the neighborhood. We raised chickens to eat or sell the eggs. At eight I started delivering the Sacramento Bee newspaper. I learned a lot about managing money and being responsible, dependable, delivering people's newspapers on time. That kind of work ethic proved foundational later. We five Morse boys delivered the Bee longer than any other Sacramento family. Through folding that newspaper, in one sense, we had public awareness exposure every day as we read on the front page of the paper what was going on in the world. We would ask our mother and father about the news articles; through this reading and asking, we knew something about current affairs. My father had a keen sense of public affairs, somewhat unusual for a furniture refinisher.

By the time I was twelve, I was working in local print shops. I started by just sweeping the floors and cleaning the toilets and the basins, then cleaning type, then cleaning presses, then setting type. For the next eight years, I worked in every aspect of printing and was going to be a printer. All through junior and senior high school, that was my desire. In fact, I was working enough hours during high school as a printer that I was making lots of money. Coming from a family of eight children with a father who worked hard to just put food on the table, I considered that an early success. I bought a new car and paid cash for it from my earnings in the printing business. That had a downside in that I didn't pay much attention to my academic studies; I knew I was going to be a printer. I worked for half a dozen printers. One particular typesetting shop owner said that if I would come join them after graduating from high school and work for five years, he would give me his business. Of course, my father thought that was terrific. I, however, had by then become involved in student government and student politics, which I look back on now as helping to form my sense of public service.

I didn't run for the usual offices, but was elected head yell leader (cheerleader). The school I attended had never had a male cheerleader; however, the University of California did have male cheerleaders, so I thought, "Why couldn't I do that?" It was fun getting people's enthusiasm up, getting them to cheer and to be involved in whatever school event was going on. I see that as part of forming my personal values, not because of my grades, but because of the student government work.

I was given a very small scholarship when I graduated from high school in 1955. I think the thing was all of $120.00. The result was probably like giving somebody $12,000.00 now. The encouragement to go to college had more impact on me than the small amount of money.

That was a turning point in my life. Instead of going out of high school into the printing business, I decided I would get some college education. My father did not speak to me for months! He thought that was the most ridiculous thing he had ever heard, not because

college wasn't important. (At that point, only two siblings ahead of me had ever gone on to college.) He thought it unsound that I would give up a profession in printing that was so lucrative.

The decision had its cost. I wanted to go to one of the California state colleges but couldn't get in because my grades were so low; so, I went to the Sacramento Junior College. Once again, I got caught up in student government and was elected as the student body president. Later I was appointed president of all 121 California junior college student government associations. I got all caught up in that and didn't study very hard. Once again, the involvement gave me a sense of service, but not good grades.

I spent two (2) years (1955-57) at the junior college in Sacramento; but, at that time in our country, it was still required that we do our military service – "the draft". My brother, Monty, had joined the U.S. Coast Guard. Frankly, that was more appealing to me than going into one of the other services because it seemed directed toward helping people instead of preparing to kill people. So, I enlisted into the Coast Guard. I had an obligation of eight (8) years; 2 active duty and then six (6) years reserve. In 1957 I started out in San Francisco and crewed a 40-foot port security patrol boat around San Francisco Harbor: 12 hours on duty, 12 hours off, 12 hours on… It was kind of a life-saving mission for people whose boats had been becalmed in the wind or if they had a boat accident. The worst part of it was being called out when people would jump off the Golden Gate or Bay Bridge to commit suicide. We would have to go and try to pick them up. We also learned port security and marine inspection there. Then an opening came to be transferred out into the Pacific. (As my children like to say, "Yes, you set out for war on an island in the Pacific, but you never tell people it was Hawaii.")

I was again involved in marine inspection and port security in Hawaii. We focused on all Asia, as well as Hawaii. In Honolulu we were concerned with what amount of opium and dope would come in from the Far East into Hawaii and the West Coast ports. This was before there was something called the Drug Enforcement Agency. It didn't exist at that time.

I also doubled as driver to the Commandant of the Pacific CG district, Admiral Evans, because of my extra security clearance. As a result of that assignment, I would get to travel from Hawaii out into Asia with him. We would go out and meet with the local port security people in Japan, the Pacific Islands, Hong Kong, Singapore and the Philippines. We would try to gather information, especially from Thailand, Burma and Southeast Asia on drug trafficking and subversion.

On a trip to the Philippines, I had three days to myself on leave. I got on a bus out of Manila and just rode into the countryside. For the first time, I saw people poorer than my family was in California. On that bus trip, I realized, "This is something I think I could devote my life to. I think that we in America have things that we could share with these people that would help them to develop." I came back to Honolulu after that trip and started to make plans to go back to college after my military service. I had run out of funds earlier, by the way. All the money that I had made from printing, I had blown in the

first two years of college, even though I was living at home with my parents. Some money did go to my parents, though. Beginning at twelve (12) years of age, each of us kids contributed just to help out the family. It was a kind of self-help that was an important principle in economic development. So I started to save my (very meager) Coast Guard salary in order to go back to college when discharged.

Q: Absolutely.

MORSE: There is one story I'd like to mention. When I was in the Coast Guard, my main work was port security and marine inspection. Whenever the Commandant of the 12th Coast Guard district's regular driver was ill or on leave, the Commandant would ask if I would come and drive him. The reason I was asked was because I had the security clearances to go onto the other Marine Corps, Air Force and Army bases because of the security work I was doing.

The Commandant introduced me to a reserve Marine Corps General whose name was Melvin M. Smith. He was from Spokane, Washington. He and his wife were in Hawaii during his two- week active duty. He was a brigadier general in the reserve of the Marine Corps. His father had invented presto logs; he was a very wealthy man. He himself worked in the early days of the machines that blow plastic into milk cartons, containers and stuff like that. He made a fortune. He and his wife never had any children; but, he was very interested in helping young people.

I was asked by the Commandant to take General Smith around the Hawaiian Islands. We used our Coast Guard plane. I explained some of the history of Hawaii, what the Coast Guard did there, where our bases and boats were.

When we landed, the Marine Corps General asked what I wanted to do after my military service. I told him, "I want to go back to college because I'd like to get into some kind of international economic development work." I don't think I even knew what those words meant at that point. I knew in my heart what it was but didn't know how to phrase it. He replied, "I am happy that people from the West Coast want to get into international service. Our families are from the West Coast; and, I'm tired of seeing all those striped pants 'pushy cookers' (instead of the usual term 'cookie pushers')." He was very disparaging. He was a great big sort of gruff Marine. He said, "I want to help you do this." I answered, "I'd really appreciate that, thank you; but, I've saved enough money in the military that I can finance it myself." He then said, "Well, you can't go back to California. You've got to go to school on the East Coast. They don't hire people in the diplomatic Foreign Service unless they're from the Ivy League schools." My response was, "I don't have the grades to do that." "Well", he said, "we will help."

When I got out of the military in Alameda, California, he and his wife were coming up for a meeting in San Francisco and asked if I would meet them. He informed me, "Alright, you're out of the military now. You're going to school. Do you need any help?" I replied, "No, I'm doing alright." His retort was, "You said you used to have to work to put yourself through college. I think you need to study instead of work." Then he offered

some money. I responded, "Thank you. I've got enough to get along; but, let's stay in touch."

After the first year of college, he and his wife came to Sacramento and asked how I was doing. At that point, I had learned to study and get serious and was getting very good grades. I didn't need much help. He gave me $850.00, which was a huge sum in those days. He didn't give it as a loan. The only condition was that I stay and study international affairs. Like the earlier "scholarship" that encouraged me to go to college, the general's gift encouraged me to go into Foreign Service. At any rate, to make a long story short, whenever I was overseas, whenever they had the Marine Corps ball, I would always stand the midnight watch so that our Embassy Marine guards could go to the ball. I would stand the watch at the embassy security post in his memory, in appreciation for all he did. He was quite an influence.

In June of 1961, I finished up at Sacramento State College, receiving a Bachelor's Degree in Social Science but with a concentration on international relations. It was the first inter-disciplinary course they had ever given a degree in. Prior, you either had to study history, medicine, psychology, geography or business. Still, I took one that was interdisciplinary in international relations. I had some wonderful teachers, learned a tremendous amount about international economics, international law, international organizations and got involved in the Model United Nations. In fact, our college represented the country of India. In those early days of the United Nations, India was quite a leader. I had the privilege of meeting Prime Minister Nehru at the UN headquarters in New York as part of the work on the Model United Nations. So MUN had quite an influence on me. Do you want me to keep talking?

Q: Yes. You're doing fine.

MORSE: Okay. When I finished the Bachelor's Degree, my grades were good enough that I was given a full scholarship at George Washington University by the Scottish Rite. I was not a DeMolay or Mason, so that award was truly objective. My wife, Ernice, whom I met at Sacramento State College and had only known for eight (8) months before we were married, had a full scholarship at Sacramento State for a Master's Degree in business. She gave that up when we decided to marry in 1961. She accompanied me from California to the Washington, D.C. area, where I attended George Washington University. They had a two-year master's program at that point.

Again, I concentrated on an interdisciplinary approach to international development with international economics, law and diplomacy, organizations, history…the whole works. Because of the exposure in Southeast Asia that I had and the focus I had at state college back in Sacramento, I did all my graduate papers on Southeast Asia. I was really interested in that part of the world, even in 1961-2. It's fascinating how we have our own sense of identity.

While living in Hawaii, I had already identified myself as being a Southeast Asia scholar before it really became popular. Remember, this was only three (3) years after the fall of

Dien Bien Phu and the French defeat of 1954. I remember talking to some people in Hawaii about how that was going to change the world, the French withdrawing from their colonies in SE Asia. I didn't understand it yet at that point; but, it seemed like it was an area to study. Later, having studied it, it became a major work focus.

While writing papers at George Washington University, which was a block and a half up the road from the State Department building, I would go to the Department and pick up materials on whatever I was studying at the time and attempt to talk to people and interview them and get materials. I had never even heard of anything called International Co-operation Agency (ICA), as it was known at that time. I didn't know what it was and, frankly, didn't know the difference between the State Department, USIA, ICA or anything else. In going there to pick up papers, I would meet different people I found in ICA. They encouraged me to apply to ICA. A year later, in 1962, President Kennedy changed the agency to a development focus and renamed it USAID.

Q: Why ICA rather than the State Department? Were you particularly interested in the development side rather than the foreign diplomatic service?

MORSE: At that time development was still my focus. It stemmed from visiting the Philippines. I was more interested in helping people develop than I was in just representing our country through diplomacy. Frankly, I have to admit that I don't think I understood the distinction even at that point, being a college student. What the people were doing in ICA interested me. It was what I was studying. A fellow named John Blumgart was the ICA Office Director for Southeast Asia at the time. He encouraged me to join USAID. He gave me quite a bit of material. I would show him some of the papers I was writing in international economic development and international law…things like that. I think I finished my oral exams on a Saturday morning and went to work for what was then USAID on the following Monday morning (in 1962).

Q: You were brought in as an intern or what?

MORSE: There were three of us called "Overseas Interns." One of the other fellows was Eric Chetwynd. Eric went to Indonesia. I was supposed to be assigned to Laos. There was a coup in Laos; so, I ended up going to Thailand. What a stroke of good luck! Before the overseas assignment, there was the absolutely wonderful preparation through the one-year intern program at USAID Washington headquarters.

Q: What did they do for you?

MORSE: I rotated through different USAID offices. There had been an attempt, given the international economics education that I had, to assign me to Sy Tybenblott's office in AID/Far East Bureau capital projects office. Again, I credit John Blumgart for telling me, "Look, you're not going to have many chances to see the whole development or USAID organization's. Now is the time for broader learning." He fought to have me rotated from office to office. I interned in the Far East Program Office, in the Capital Development Office and took a tour in the Management Office. (I think Ben Hopkins was the head of it

in those days.) I went through six (6) weeks rotation for almost a year in Washington D.C. before going overseas. The disappointing aspect of it was, because I had passed French for my Master's thesis, I wasn't offered any USAID language training. I already had a language, they said. I wanted to study a Southeast Asian language. Because they were "preparing" me to go into Laos, I wanted to study Laotian. The answer remained, "No, the language you'll need there is French, and you have French." So I didn't get language training. As you know, later USAID mandated Foreign Service officers master a foreign language before they were tenured. It should have been a requirement before deploying overseas.

Q: Your Washington tour was just in the Asia Bureau?

MORSE: Only in the Far East Bureau, as it was called then; but… far from where; east of what? It was a colonial holdover term!

Q: That was the term of the time. What was your impression of the organization at that time?

MORSE: I was quite in awe of it all. One of the people that were mid-level at the time I came into AID was Princeton Lyman. Princeton would spend lots of time talking about Far East economic development and political development. Princeton had far greater depth on the political science side. Mine was kind of superficial across the board in lots of things. It was a wonderful relationship. Another young fellow, Bob Halligan, who was coming into USAID at the same time, was a protégé of John Blumgart's, who had been a wonderful friend all these years. We were the young interns of that generation and rotated around. People were very eager to see us learn, to help educate us about the organization, as well as to understand the mission, understand the programs, how we worked, how we worked with other organizations and how we fit into the world. They really took a lot of time to bring us along in a way that later became formal mentoring. At that time, there was no formal mentoring. It was a wonderful year of rotation.

Q: You had a whole year?

MORSE: Yes. Ernice worked for the National Geographic Society to help us pay our bills. She gained an international perspective working there. We lived up on 16th St. and New Hampshire Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. She could walk to National Geographic; and, I would walk to George Washington University from there. She had never been outside the United States before. I had been. She was both eager and fearful and had no idea what we were going to get ourselves into. I could write a whole book on Ernice; however, her passing is still too recent for me to continue. Why don't we stop at this point? What else do you want? Where do we go?

Q: That's fine. Let's move on. You just did one year and then you were assigned to Thailand?

THAILAND CONTEXT

Before getting into USAID work, let me offer a word about the first assignment country of Thailand. Hundreds of years ago, the Siamese (Thais), the Burmese, the Vietnamese, the Chinese and Khmer (Cambodians) neighbors regularly raided each other's territories. In the world colonial period, however, Thailand was never colonized like their neighbors were. The Thais have been fiercely proud of their independence. They also have a strong culture, built in large part on the majority Buddhist religion and high respect for their revered monarchy. There are neglected, very poor ethnic and religious minorities in the border provinces and urban Chinese business people, who were vulnerable to communist influence because of their differences from the approximately 30 million lowland/central Thais. There is a strong foundation of identity, individualism and tolerance. Since the 1932 coup that overthrew the absolute monarchy, politics have been dominated by the military. These historical, cultural and political facts shaped the l960-70 counterinsurgency policies of Thailand. They did not want externally imposed interference, especially the collective socialism of communism from North Vietnam, China and the Soviet Union, who were supporting local and regional insurgents to overthrow the Thai government.

This is the convergence with American interests – to stop the expansion of communism around the world. Thailand was America's most important ally in Southeast Asia. Relations between our two governments and our people were very good. The U.S. needed access to Thailand to base much of our airborne fight in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The insurgents wanted to break that relationship at the same time as change the government of Thailand.

Next door in Vietnam, the confrontation was military. In l960's Thailand, the confrontation was in the early subversion and intimidation stage of insurgency. The Thai leaders, despite being dominated by the military, made the decision to confront their insurgency by greatly expanding the resident police to protect their people, and simultaneously greatly expand the delivery and access of development services for all their people, to demonstrate the government's full support for their aspirations: "to win the hearts and minds of their people" and, thereby, to insulate them from subversion. Our government pledged to support the Thai strategy. This is where USAID played a primary role: support of both Thai public safety and development as a counter insurgency tool.

There was certainly not unanimity within USAID or the USG for this role. The traditional USAID thinking was to stick to ECONOMIC development, not to get involved in political or security activities. Many in the USG could not see our development agency supporting a police-based counterinsurgency strategy. The decision to have USAID support the Thai strategy was taken at the highest USG level in the White House National Security Council. Bobby Kennedy chaired the NSC counterinsurgency committee in the early - mid l960s and supported this USAID role.

This was the context for my first USAID assignment: l963-68 USAID/Thailand Program Analyst. Even as junior officers, my peers and I had responsibility for helping draft strategy and budget justifications in our assigned areas, as inputs to the overall Country

Development Strategy Statements that were approved by the American Ambassador and submitted to Washington for funding. We also had to help USAID technical staff do project planning, prepare documentation for plan implementation and do budget allocation/expenditure tracking in our assigned areas. This was done in close coordination with the Thai Department of Technical and Economic Co- operation, although less so in cooperation with the rest of the official U.S. country team.

As a continuation of my overseas internship, I was rotated in my first year to support virtually all the USAID technical division's Capital Projects, Health, Community Development, Education, Agriculture, Private Enterprise, Macroeconomics and Public Safety. Those rotations were fundamental to my later thinking about integrated rural development for counter insurgency.

In the second year I was assigned to backstop the Rural Development and Public Safety divisions and programs that were worth over $50 million. That grew to be 85% of the whole $200 million annual USAID budget by year three (3) of my assignment. It was a huge responsibility and privilege. In years four (4) and five (5), I was also the USAID Liaison Officer to the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) in Thailand and had liaison responsibility with the growing Southeast Asia Regional USAID program (REDSO), also based in Bangkok.

MORSE: I was assigned to Laos in 1962; however, because of the coup there and the delay, we didn't get to Thailand until 1963. They switched us at that point, which was wonderful. I had been studying under a professor at George Washington University who was a specialist in Thai administrative behavior. The man didn't have a doctorate, which was unusual for G.W.U.; but, he spoke Thai fluently and had lived over there. He was a public administration specialist, yet had a degree in psychology. So, he was looking at public administration from a behavioral point of view and at how organizations functioned in a behavioral sense rather than in a traditional public administration management sense. I learned so much from him. His name was Professor James Mosel. Under Professor Mosel I took a couple of courses in administration. He had a real influence on Thailand because of the work that he had done. I was writing papers on Thailand and, in fact, had decided at that point to write my master's thesis on Thailand. Because it was a one-year study program, we were supposed to spend the next writing our master's. (Going back to the work ethic of "a bird in the hand" and having a USAID job in the chosen field I wanted, I didn't write my master's thesis at that point. I went to work in USAID.)

When I got to Thailand, I continued to do research and wrote my master's thesis on Thai economic and political development. (Bless her heart; Ernice typed the draft on a manual typewriter, using carbons, after she completed her own work in Thailand and on week-ends.) I focused on the Sarit era. General Sarit became Prime Minister in 1957 and left office in 1962. So, it was all current. I had access to lots of material. While remaining in Thailand, I was continuing to do academic research on both the political and economic scene of that period.

Last night, I pulled out my USAID performance evaluation reports from Thailand just to remember what the heck I did over there. It was interesting how many times people like Charlie Stockman, Clint Doggett and Stan Duremas would mention the fact of my broader understanding of Thailand because of the academic research writing that was going on, not just getting caught up in the AID work and looking through a narrow pipe.

Princeton was up in Korea. He was doing the same thing for his doctorate in political science. We stayed in touch a little bit. In fact, after we both spent five (5) years (me in Thailand, him in Korea), USAID wanted us to switch positions. He had decided to go back to Washington to submit his doctorate and work there in AID/W; whereas, I wrote my master's while working in Thailand and submitted it back to George Washington University. It took three of my five years in Thailand because I got so involved in work. I never went back to G.W.U. to defend the thesis and was, therefore, not awarded my M.A. It did not seem as important as the work I was doing.

Q: What was your position?

MORSE: The lowest of the "junior-est" of the beginning of the Program Analysts, as we were called, in the USAID Program Office. You want to start on Thailand?

Q: Yes. What was the situation in Thailand when you arrived there?

MORSE: Economically, it was still considered a relatively poor country, not quite as isolated as Burma, not caught up in the disruptive wars of Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos, not as progressive as Singapore and Malaysia. Through the USG eyes of what was going on, however, there was a fear that the communist insurgencies that were being mounted in former Indochina would spill over into Thailand. In fact, within a year (in 1964) communist insurgencies had started in Thailand as well. A lot of what was being done by the Embassy was justified as counter- insurgency. I'm not sure whether that was right or not; but, at least some of the USAID work was justified in terms of countering the communist insurgency, not traditional development.

Political development was going on in the country as well, even though they had a history of military coups from the time when the absolute monarchy was overthrown in 1932 by a military coup. They had a series of military governments but were moving toward civilian government, which didn't last very long because of "the security threat". Moving to a civilian democratic regime was being delayed and postponed in the name of the necessity of strong security/government. Even the economic development was justified a lot in terms of winning "the hearts and minds" of the villagers to insulate them from the communist messages that the government didn't care about them and wasn't doing anything…"See how poor you are"?

A lot of the development was predicated on the basis of rural development for that justification. Many donors were involved. Thai people had a pretty good reputation for being studious and disciplined. The military and the police had a hell of a reputation for being corrupt; but, as we all learned: "These are our friends and our allies; and, they're

anti- communist!" proved to be the greater interest. We turned a blind eye to the corruption. I learned an awful lot about corruption by doing the research on Sarit and his own holdings. I also learned a lot about his wife, who started a brewery and a cement factory. I began to really understand the influence of cronyism, which helped me in the AID work because I had some insights that wouldn't come from the normal work unless there was also some pretty serious research on the subject.

Q: What was the program that we were carrying out at that time? You said rural development.

MORSE: We had a very broad program, a huge investment in education.

Q: This, of course, was now AID at this time.

MORSE: Right. It was l961 when the change was made to AID, when Kennedy came in and changed it from ICA to AID. The United States Operations Mission (USOM)/AID had a heavy education program. The Assistant Program Officer of USOM, of AID, whom I replaced, wrote a book years later on Thai development when he was at The World Bank. His name was Bob Muscat.

Q: It was on technical assistance in Thailand, I believe.

MORSE: Yes. I replaced him in the Program Office. Bob's book basically stated that, if the donor community as a whole (not just USAID) had done some good work, which he felt they had, it was because we all invested in building Thai institutions, to turn out Thai manpower, to find Thai solutions, to Thai problems, and help make them self-sufficient rather than trying to give them a "made in USA" solution to a particular problem. That institution building methodology had a great impact on my thinking over the years regarding what development was all about. We had water programs, health, education, community development programs, public administration, capital projects, public safety programs.

In the Program Office, I was responsible for the program planning and office support to two (2) divisions. One was the Capital Projects Division and the other was the Public Safety Division. In the Capital Projects Division, we had programs to upgrade the Thai airports and aeronautical ground services. We had teams from what was then CAA (the Civil Aviation Authority), which later became the FAA. We did everything from doing long-range projections of the air traffic coming in there, the size of the airports, the additional airports, the handling, the electronics, weather forecasting, everything to do with aviation. As the Program Analyst, I would help them write up their agreements and help them write up their commodity orders, the PIOCs (Procurement Implementation Orders for Commodities) and help orient the technical assistance teams coming in from the other USG agencies, like CAA. Another area of program focus, apart from aeronautics, was helping improve irrigation. We had a huge team in there from the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. The efforts ranged from small dams, with the intent being to get small villages to come together in water co-ops to share water and to maintain the canals

after they were built, to working with a huge team on the Mekong River Basin. I learned a lot about regional development from backstopping the Mekong team.

That Mekong Basis development team continued to meet even throughout the war in Southeast Asia when people were fighting each other. You would find that, because of their common river development interests, there was a 50-year plan for developing the Mekong River that would benefit everyone from China down through Laos, Burma, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. I learned a lot about regional development from working on the project that was helpful later in Africa, where I worked on the Nile & Zambezi basins. We also had road building programs. I remember feeling very much involved with a $50 million grant that we made for building a road out of Bangkok. At that time, it was just a two-lane road where people had simply dug and piled up the mud. When the mud road dried, they would put a thin layer of asphalt on top of it. They didn't know much about base work, compacting roads and/or widening them. So, there was a lot of work on capital projects.

Q: Were the projects concentrated on a particular part of the country or were they just countrywide?

MORSE: Capital projects were countrywide. A lot of the rural development work was in the northeast, where the increased insurgency was expected to come in and from insurgents that were already in there.

That gets to the other part of my USAID Program Office portfolio, which was the public safety portion. Having gotten out of the military not too long before, it was felt that I should be assigned the public safety portfolio because none of the other assistant program officers had my military background at that time - Weinstein, Blaine, Halligan. (Gordon Pearson did have a Doctorate in economics.) Therefore, I was assigned to backstop the Public Safety Division. I didn't know an awful lot about police or public safety work; but, it turned out to be a darned good partnership. The police advisors that we started with were a group of six (6) public safety advisors; when I left, there were sixty-three (63). I think the original six were AID public safety advisors that reported to Brian Engel in Washington; all the rest of them were CIA staff members. I was so junior and naïve that I didn't realize they were with the CIA for a year! In those days, AID was allowed to be cover for the Central Intelligence Agency. That changed, of course, after the Vietnam era, when Congress precluded that we be cover for CIA. Where to begin..?

Q: What did you do? What were the programs?

MORSE: I did the USAID documentation to describe and justify the money and commodities and technical assistance needed to strengthen all units of the Thai police. When we first started, the program was to expand the provincial police capacity to counterinsurgency. We helped bring in public safety advisors to train an enlarged Criminal Investigation Division scientific lab, then an air service division. We helped them arrange for technical assistance. We brought the FBI out; and, they set up a practical pistol course, which cost me about 45% of my hearing. (They knew I was a

shooter and invited me out because I had helped arrange the money and brought in the FBI. They built the course; and, on opening day, they were showing off their marksmanship. They were doing very well. I was asked if I would like to shoot. I said, "I would like to." As I was standing there ready to shoot, a new border policeman picked up a Thompson submachine gun and burst it off next to my ear. (We didn't have any earphones on in those days.) The burst blew out 45% of my hearing.

The reason for the FBI course, we found out, was because the Thai police had come out of their basic training (some of them 15-20 years ago) and hadn't shot their weapons since…ever. These men couldn't hit the broad side of a barn; they needed to practice. Unfortunately, they didn't have the money to buy ammunition; and, there were no training courses. They didn't even have firing ranges for them; so, some of our funds went into all that.

Later in the program, when I had been there five (5) years, the insurgency and our counter- insurgency support built up not only on the advisory side, but also on the commodity side. We had bought helicopters. We bought M-79 grenade launchers. We bought the equivalent of M- 16 rifles, the civilian equivalent being the Colt Ar-15. We helped arm, equip and train them. We tried to train them so that they were friends and protectors of the people. A lot of what I personally felt I was interjecting was not public safety but civic action. These are people whom the villagers needed as policemen, as their friends, as informants - or else they would turn against you. Also, they were the ones you needed to win over the people, convince them that they were there to protect them from the insurgent pressure they were getting from intimidation and killing. We took police to Vietnam. I made several trips there accompanied by police advisors. We wanted to show them how it was being fought in Vietnam and let them make their decisions how to fight it differently in Thailand. We, along with our military and CIA, helped them set up something called the Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC), which was an integrated military, police and civilian operations center of Thais. This was set up in the Prime Minister's office. We in AID worked with the Thai rural development people and the public safety people. Our military worked with the Thai military; but, there was an integrated sense of uniting all Thai assets to defeat the Communist insurgency. You got a sense where they learned that water was important, housing was important, agriculture, markets, education for their kids were important, as well as just giving them physical public safety protection. That led to the last two (2) of my five (5) years.

I was formally called the Liaison Officer between the U.S. Economic Aid Program and the U.S. Military Aid Program. I sat as a member of General Stilwell's JUSMAG staff. The liaison was needed for American co-ordination partly because he was ticked off that a decision made at our National Security Council level in Washington that would support defeating communism by working with civilians and civilian police, rather than the way it went in Vietnam, working with the military so heavily to begin with. General Stilwell felt that we and the Thais had to fight it with the military. He was frustrated that the counterinsurgency was a civilian USAID and CIA led operation. The Thai military was doing a great job of setting policy up at that CSOC. We were dealing with Thai Lieutenant Generals in that thing. When it came down to the actual strategies, it tended to

focus on the Thai provincial police, the border patrol police and the civilian development staff, integrating that with the water, education, roads, agriculture, markets and incomes services for the rural people. Stilwell was not particularly in favor of having to have a liaison officer who was a civilian and not a military man. He was, however, respectful that I had been in the military. Frankly, I learned a tremendous amount from him in terms of later developing my own management style. There is little doubt in my mind that this experience set the dual development and security tracks that became the hallmark of my service for the rest of my working life.

Q: You met with him.

MORSE: Two or three times a week. But, more important was not meeting with him over at the JUSMAG headquarters. General Stilwell held something called the Stilwell Seminars. Every Thursday night after dinner he brought together 12-13 interagency people. They would come to his house. They would sit around. He would assign a topic to one person. It might be psychological warfare, for example; and, the stage was set to talk about what we were doing. AID helped to put up a 50-kilowatt transmitter so that the radio broadcasts could reach into the northeast in their own language, programmed by Thais; however, we, the United States Information Agency (USIA) and our military, in a joint effort, put the transmitter in place and helped train the people in psychological warfare (PSYOPS).

Stilwell would host his seminars at night after dinner on Thursdays in his home, in part because the Ambassador had refused to ever convene a full country team, where such thinking and analysis should take place on a U.S. interagency basis. He never wanted all members of the American country team in a single meeting at one time. Ambassador Graham Martin was his name. His style of management was to deal with each agency and each program separately. I can remember one instance when I was also assigned as AID's liaison in an American country team counterinsurgency committee. It was chaired by a State Department FSO named Monty Spears. Monty would get all the agencies together, but at lower than the head of agency level. I was the lowest of the lowest of the attendees; however, because of the public safety program, I represented AID in there. Ambassador Graham Martin walked into that meeting and looked around. He didn't know he was coming in to a working level meeting on counter insurgency. He continued looking around. It was so obvious he was just taking cognizant note of the military JUSMAG, USIA, AID, CIA station chief, people from Immigration and the refugees. He then turned around and walked out without saying a word. He simply walked out. That validated to all of us that he would never meet with the entire country team at any level. In a sense, though, it allowed us more freedom and flexibility to discuss without his "august" presence.

Q: Stilwell had taken over.

MORSE: But only informally at night. Monty Spear, as the Ambassador's Special CI Assistant, was officially in charge of U.S. CI policy and programs. Graham Martin knew what Stilwell was doing; it was an "academic" group of free thinkers embassy staff who

would challenge each other and challenge the assumptions. It was wonderful intellectual stimulation; and, Stilwell liked it. We learned from each other.

I was also liaison at that point to the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of DOD. There was a subunit separate from the JUSMAG. The young fellow who was my age in there was named Jim Woods. Jim later rose to become the head of the Africa section of the Department of Defense International Security Agency. We maintained our friendship for many, many years. He became an Africanist long before I became an Africanist. He was a good thinker. It was fantastic to have this connection when later I started to work on Africa.

Q: What was Stilwell's position?

MORSE: He was head of the JUSMAG, the Joint United States Military Assistance Group.

Q: This wasn't the Stilwell of China then?

MORSE: You're thinking of "Vinegar Joe". No, this wasn't Joe. He was no relation. This Stilwell became a Lieutenant General, the head of our troops in Korea and then the Deputy Army Chief of Staff. He had quite an impressive career.

Q: What was the characteristic of the insurgency? Obviously, this was the prime motivation for all of this. What did you understand was going on?

MORSE: As we understood it, extensive infiltration of northeast and northern Thailand people who had been taken out of the country and trained over in Laos and Vietnam and were then re- inserted back into their own country, having gone through the Communist indoctrinations. When they were reinserted, it was basically to go around and tell the villagers: "This government in Bangkok is not your government. You are a different people. You are northeasterners. You're more like those Laotians. You're not Bangkok River Thais. They are a different ethnic group, a different linguistic group too. You should fight them." The insurgents killed and intimidated rural and official Thais in order to turn them against the Thai government violently.

Q: Was this called the Chiang Mai area?

MORSE: That is north. This was Udorn, Uban, over in the northeast area. It was coming from the north as well, however…not so much Chiang Mai, which is further south, but Chiang Rai, which is up on the Burma/China border. So, it was kind of readymade for AID to be involved with the Thai government: "Look, you've got to pay attention to rural development."

I consider one of the crowning successes of my career in AID to have been helping to expand a very small rural development project that we had. It was called The Accelerated Rural Development. We put a lot more money into rural areas; more importantly, we

worked to empower the local communities and local government officials to take responsibility for rural development. They actually had a tax base that we helped arrange so that they could raise some tax revenue, one that was not so onerous as to send a message to the insurgents: "See, all they do is take your money; and, they don't give you any services in return."

It allowed me to work with an Under Secretary of the Thai Economic Co-operation Department whose name was Piew Phusat. As a lowly junior officer, that was like walking into the Prime Minister's office to be able to deal with the Under Secretary of Economic Development. I had periodic meetings with his assistant, a Thai official named Nai (a royal title like a baron) Apilas Apihwong, like the Chinese part of the Apihwong. He was part of the royal family, albeit very distant. He was kind of our interlocutor on everyday work with AID's program office in terms of their economic cooperation. We had written, and gotten, Washington approval for this Accelerated Rural Development Program that integrated public safety, water, schooling, roads, health, agriculture and decentralization of public administration services. It was about an 83 page document. The only reason I remember that is because I looked it up in my EER last night. Washington was impressed, funded it and gave us a supplemental; then we negotiated, signed and implemented it.

Q: How big a program was it dollar wise?

MORSE: It started at $50 million. In that time, our whole program was only $12 million; so, to throw in another $50 million was like a four-fold increase. They liked the fact that it was integrated. It later grew to $250 million. It was justified as counterinsurgency against wide spread killing of rural Thais, but built on development activities for them.

Q: What did integrated mean?

MORSE: Integrating public safety and the different technical public service that before were either inadequate or nonexistent to help people. It was community development, a term that was later dropped from the development lexicon: "Not possible to have bottom-up development."

Q: How was the integration done?

MORSE: At AID or in government?

Q: In the country?

MORSE: It was to empower the chungwats, the provinces, to take control of all the services. Instead of having their services report directly back to Bangkok, they reported to the governor of the province. He was empowered to hold staff meetings, to draw up budgets, to draw up plans. We would put local government administration people out in the field. We brought in technical advisors to work on setting up new rules, procedures for budgeting and planning.

One part of this was extremely controversial; that is, nobody would be promoted to the higher levels in Bangkok in their Thai Civil Service unless they had put in a four (4) year stint at the province or district level. The traditional civil servant didn't want to leave Bangkok because it was insecure; and, Bangkok was where schooling was for their kids, where the hospitals were for their families. To go out there and serve in the rural areas? No, they didn't like it. However, this Under Secretary understood the value of that. He fought with his own people to keep that in the agreement.

I guess my and their respect for Under Secretary, Piew Phusat, who later became a minister in their government, was due to his belief in his country and the way of doing things that truly helped his people. He wasn't just fighting communism with guns and mortars; he really wanted to see his people progress and feel secure that they were Thais, that they were progressing in a Thailand that gave them hope, that gave them a future, where they saw progress. So, he was willing to fight his own public administration people, who united that they weren't going to sign any document that said they couldn't get promoted unless they served in the rural areas. He fought his own military that, yes, as much money was going to go into schools and school buildings as was going into building police stations.

Q: Did he seem sort of unique in the Thai government?

MORSE: I don't know. I dealt a lot with the highway people in the government, a lot with the aviation people in the government, with the education, health and irrigation people. The development people were of the same mind. There was almost a royalist paternalism; nevertheless, they had a real commitment to their own country and their own people that was very inspiring, from my point of view.

When we finished the negotiations on the first tranche of ARD, which was led by the USAID Director, I was his staff assistant. Was it Tracy Park or Marty Tank acting? No, it was Howard Parsons. Howard did those negotiations.

Piew Phusat, the Under Secretary, brought to the final session and gave to me, not to the AID Director, a hand-lettered statement that I had framed and have kept in my offices every place around the world. I didn't even know where it was from at the time; but, it became my motto for development, just as it had been his motto for development. It actually turned out that it's the motto for the Alcoholics Anonymous of the world. I had no idea that that's where it came from. The saying is: "Change the things that you can change; accept the things you cannot change; and have the wisdom to know the difference." Piew was a change agent in his country, his society and his government. He was awe inspiring. He wasn't even that unique amongst the Thai people in development; he wasn't even that unique amongst the police people we worked with. They were provincial people themselves. They weren't caught up in that kind of corruption and power that we saw amongst central Bangkok people. I think Piew later became the head of The World Bank in Thailand.

Q: How big an area did this program cover?

MORSE: It started with only three provinces; then, it expanded throughout the entire northeast, which included nineteen (19) provinces; then again, it expanded into the north with two (2) provinces; and, once again, it expanded to all the north. It eventually expanded into the south as well.

There were four (4) Muslim southern provinces in this Buddhist country. There was an insurgency being mounted from Malaysia, not unlike the ones in north and northeast Thailand from Laos and Vietnam. There was also a kind of communist irredentist movement that: "You are Muslims. You're not Thais. You're not Buddhist. You should belong to us in Malaysia. Revolt!"

There was also a lot of killing going on in the south. It was not just infiltration of subversives that were actually killing and intimidating people. I have upstairs a 12-guage pistol that was given to me by the Thai police after it had been taken off of an insurgent they had killed after he had blown the stomach out of a village head man down in the south, in the Malay area. The police took it in and analyzed it to see where it had come from. It was interesting. The wood for the handle was made in Batong, which is one of the four southern provinces. It was made out of that wood; but, the metal for this handmade 12-guage pistol came from southern Yunnan China and had been forged on a hand forge and turned on a hand lathe. (There was no electricity.) We helped set up a Criminal Investigation Division, which became a scientific lab to investigate things like this. They gave the pistol to me as a present for helping them bring in some of the criminal investigation scientific equipment to set that lab up. It was a reminder of the cruelty and the killing that was going on in an effort to intimidate people to join their side.

Q: Which was essentially to take over the country?

MORSE: Yes. Their aim, northeast, north and south, was to intimidate violently to get Thais to convert to communism and to take the country over. They would take it over through any message, whether it was a Muslim message of the south, the Laotian message of the northeast or the message of the far north of Chiang Mai, which was: "You're too far away; and, the government doesn't care about you; and, they don't give you any services. Join us. We will."

Q: Did you get a sense of who was orchestrating the insurgency at all? Was there any focus point?

MORSE: We could find strings that went back into China and came in through Laos and Vietnam. That gun I received was made in China. We found lots and lots of propaganda material. The Thais interrogated people who had been trained. Some of them were trained in Laos. Most of them were trained in North Vietnam, although there were some who were trained in the higher political fields back in China in those days.

AID had a unique role during that period. I felt very privileged to be in the position I was in working on that. It was the kind of rural development that had inspired me to join AID in the first place. It provided us with the resources. In addition, we had the kind of fundamental patriotism to try and use economic development to assist people in being loyal to their own country.

I admit being afraid many times during dozens of rural field trips. I would inspect our aid in rural villages and border police stations, where insurgents had killed just weeks before. I was flying in Thai helicopters that were targets taking off and/or landing. Nevertheless, it was an experience that taught me so much about service. We were integrating everything from public safety, public administration, finance, economic and taxes, to water, roads, education, health and community development. Integrating all of that, on our side we were able to integrate it within AID and by liaising with the military; but, by liaising with basically the entire U.S. country team, I could see things from a political point of view, from the embassy and from a military and an intelligence point of view.

By that time, I had been pretty well accepted by the American intelligence community. I was fronting for everything! I spent many hours flying in their one-engine STOL aircraft onto short dirt airstrips that had been hand-carved into the sides of rugged mountains. That was really scary, even in good weather. They had contracts with Air America; and, I was doing the PIOCS for Air America and for something that had the unfortunate acronym of CAS, which was the Continental Air Services, which, in turn, is the acronym overseas of the CIA station (Confidential American Source). I don't know why in the hell they ever named one of their flub air operations with the same acronym. All this was helpful in later years in being able to work with other U.S. inter-agencies, inter-discipline things that became the dual part of my career.

Q: That was a pretty complex thing to integrate. How do you think it worked over the long term?

MORSE: In history, when Bob Muscat wrote his paper, he focused on training and education – building Thai institutions. What we did on the integration side was to train people to understand the complex integration of rural services and development, of their national politics and security, their national economics, to be able to see it not as stove-piped vertically.

In terms of whether it worked or not, who will ever be able to say whether their own efforts with our support isolated them from the Communism that took over Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia but didn't take over Thailand. Did it work? Was our help effective? I don't know. It would be hard to prove. Were the strategies that we and they adopted right? They seemed to be. If they had fought it as a military effort instead of a civilian effort, it probably would have escalated into the same kind of military confrontation that the rest of Southeast Asia was caught up in. It didn't escalate. It kept it as a civilian confrontation. Over the long run, it has worked.

Q: Did you have any way of tracking progress in the rural community?

MORSE: Oh, yes. USIA helped their own Ministry of Information with messages and evaluation of impact. We sensitized civil servants with in-service training for their community development workers, with their health workers and school teachers and the local officials to learn to listen to their own people and to listen with a fine-tuned understanding of when they were just bitching and moaning that they were poor and neglected and had no government services versus when somebody was feeding them the propaganda line. You could tell pretty much when they were whining. Did it help? The rural services exploded out there. There were roads that penetrated into areas with new public services.

In terms of tracking progress, we had Independent Evaluation Office in USAID. Again, inter- discipline! We had a political scientist named Dr. Fred von der Mehden, who is now at Rice University in Houston; an anthropologist who came out of the Princeton School (later discredited because they had worked so closely with CIA), Dr. Tosho Yatashiro, a Hawaiian who came out of Hawaiian schools; the economist, Jim Hoffman, who came from the University of Wisconsin. They did independent, separate impact evaluations from AID. They were the AID Evaluation Office; but, they reported directly to the Director's Office. They were recruited from academia by the American Association of Southeast Asian Studies to come in on a two-year rotation. They got practical experience in the field that enriched their teaching when they went back home.

We got independent, objective evaluations from people who didn't have to worry about their next AID assignment or promotion or their reputations, because they were rotating in and out of academia into AID. The evaluations that they did were extensive; and, they built the evaluation capacities in the Thai ministries in rural areas and showed where we were losing, where we were messing up, where we were succeeding, where the insurgents were succeeding. So, it was a good management technique to have independent evaluation in there.

Q: Interesting. We talked about the empowerment of the people and so on. How did you go about this? What were the processes used to generate this feeling of empowerment to control?

MORSE: Some old-line community developer staff in AID and the Thai government worked with the villages to form community development committees. We started a community development program, established a community development training academy where they trained Thai community development workers. The foundation of all community development is empowering the local community, for decision making and with access to resources.

Q: The community development program goes back to the '50s.

MORSE: That's right. So, there was that nucleus methodology in place.

Q: I remember reading about it.

MORSE: Yes. It was already in place. Some old-line AID CD workers: Dallas Voran, Dr. Shelly, Bill Berg (not the economist Berg), the local public administration local government specialist who wrote a book on local government in Thailand, all came together again as an inter- disciplinary team to train Thais to empower people through community development. Dallas Voran was a water man; Berg was a local government man. We brought teams in from the district and the province and trained them on how to work with rural people, how to relate to them in a way that probably, if we're honest, was not the traditional Thai monarchy's way of dealing top down and not the way of Thai military of dealing with force. It was not even Thai economics. The Thai economists were brilliant, well trained, sound economists; but, they were looking at the macroeconomic development. They weren't looking at the rural development. Training Thais to do that work was what empowerment and service delivery was all about.

Q: That was started long before, so it had a long history.

MORSE: That's why I say it was "accelerating" rural development. It was a big program that was launched.

Q: The community development initiatives way back had been largely discredited as being a failure.

MORSE: That's right. I never would discredit C.D. I would fight that in our own bureaucracy all over the world. I just disagreed that it was discredited. It had validity and a success that we built on and which I felt was the core. Community development didn't have a public safety program; but, you wanted the public safety people to work in community development. We got military in to work with their military to do civic action and taught them that you extend your medical services, you arrange for mobile training teams to train their military and their police on how to put in roads, how to put in landing pads for their development use; and, you do it in a way that serves the people. Don't just put it in to the police station; put it at the school, the local government office, etc.

Q: What size of population are we talking about?

MORSE: At that time, Thailand's population was probably about 22 million and growing toward 24 million. That's the figure that sticks in my head. I'd have to research.

Q: Were you involved in health?

MORSE: Very much.

Q: Family planning had not started at that time?

MORSE: No family planning at that point. But health? Very much. Water and sanitation; primary health care. We had a Public Health Division with a big malaria division. Malaria was probably the main focus at that point. We helped to refocus it away from just

malaria to broader public health prevention and public health throughout the rural areas. We helped build the Chiang Mai medical school. We brought in the University of Illinois for that. I was involved in that for five (5) years. It probably went on for eleven (11) years. We helped expand the public administration. They had a course, but a very discredited unit, at Thammasat University. A very strong part of Thammasat was public administration. We helped them set up the triangle, as we called it, between teaching, research and practice, all of the people who were either teaching, doing research or practicing worked together as a team, in and out of academia, and out in the rural areas.

Q: Was this in public administration or in general?

MORSE: Primarily at that point public administration as part of a local government program that we had. Berg was the spearhead of that. He was a fabulous man.

Q: It wasn't Bob Berg, was it?

MORSE: No. Bob Berg is the economist, isn't he?

Q: It was Bill Berg who subsequently worked in development administration. Interesting.

MORSE: He wrote the book on Thai local government, too. We worked with the Thai mapping people and ours. The Defense Mapping Agency of our government helped liaison with Thai mapping and bring them in. We met with them. We had maps right down to the village level where they never had maps before. They didn't know where their own people were, where their own populations were. They couldn't do planning because they really didn't know these things. The census was totally discredited because the census workers wouldn't go into the heavy malaria-ridden areas of the heavy insurgency areas. That was another contribution that was made - all the maps that were made during that period. Huge map books for all to use.

Q: Were there other institutions that we helped establish?

MORSE: Khon Kaen University, which was the big agriculture school in the agriculture revolution. We were fought in Congress by the Louisiana congressman, Otto Passman, who represented the rice interests down there. He was livid that we were helping to expand and develop the Thai rice industry. What did these people grow? What did they eat? What was the economic culture of that entire society? Rice. From his point of view, we shouldn't help them.

Khon Kaen University was an Ag college, just a cow college, and it expanded into a full university. It was around agriculture; and, the Green Revolution that took place around corn. Why corn? It had an export market. I think it was Gordon Pearson who did the research on it, as well as this other economist. The market for corn was up in Japan. We wanted to integrate the economies with Japan because it was already evident what a strong engine of growth it would be. Institution building was what USAID was about in Thailand and should be about in all developing countries.

Q: It sounded like the AID program had a broad and substantial impact on Thai development.

MORSE: Everything from institutions for macroeconomics (and we had macroeconomic advisors) to village development. One person, whose name escapes me at the moment, retired there, still lives there and drives around in a 1956 Cadillac convertible with his Thai wife. He was our macroeconomist. Yes, it was a very broad, very comprehensive AID program. It grew immensely.

Other things we did: Again, I can only speak because, as a junior officer, I didn't have the big picture. I was working on a particular piece of it. Our military was putting in a 7th American base to fly sorties into Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam out of Thailand. Thais were our big military allies. They were taking a sleepy little fishing village down in the south, which was a little naval base called Sattahip. I used to go down there on week-ends, take Ernice and the children and write on my master's thesis. I loved to fish and swim. The thought of bringing in what was then going to be the largest U.S. military base in all of Southeast Asia, even bigger than Clarke Air Force Base in the Philippines, bigger than what we had in Okinawa, and put it in Sattahip just blew me away. I convinced our AID people and the JUSMAG people that we needed to do "base perimeter development" so that this just didn't wipe the local people out, but that the people could benefit from that huge investment in that corner.

We hired Louie Berger Associates as a contractor. He was working with the military on the base; but, we had his firm do off-base development to plan where all the Thais who were going to have to work on the base could live, instead of living in palm frond shacks and not having clean water, schools or getting away from malaria. It was a full base perimeter plan. The military liked it because it would be good living conditions for the local labor force, but it also meant that they would have a security area around the base perimeter of people who were working on the base, as well as villagers who were loyal and benefiting from the base instead of hating all the noise and all those GIs who were screwing up the young Thai girls. So, they bought it. We did a base perimeter study that then was a whole integrated rural development program. Huge cities grew up around there that never existed as more than a fishing village before. Ban Sattahip became Ban U-Tapao and became a huge economic center for that whole part of the southwest corner of Thailand over toward the Cambodian border.

Q: It that base still there today?

MORSE: Oh, yes. The Thais use it. We had seven (7) bases around Thailand. I remember when Secretary McNamara came to Thailand and we went up country together. I was at Udorn when the base at Khon Kaen was being developed into an air base. Our military had laid a strip on concrete that was 14 inches thick and 10,000 feet long to be able to take the big Air Force KC130 refuelers. That was going to be the place where the refueling planes were based at Khon Kaen. He came and he stopped construction. He said, "The computer tells us we don't need that to win this war in Southeast Asia." So,

out in the middle of the rice paddies there was a slab of 14-inch thick concrete 10,000 feet long. General Stilwell, in a meeting about a month later, asked, "What are we going to do?" The Thai military didn't want it. I suggested, "Why don't we take a look at what civilian use could be made of it?" It was in a jute drying area. It became the center of the entire jute industry. They would spread out the jute on that slab. We set up a jute factory, got private investment and leased that for about a dollar. It was a very expensive jute drying/wetting area but better than an abandoned U.S. military white elephant.

Another thing in terms of the VIPs that came there: Vice President Johnson came. My wife was pregnant with our daughter; Jeffrey was still a babe in arms. We went out to see our Vice President land. We went out to the airport to greet him. We were just two of thousands of people. I don't even remember how it happened; but, because I had been working on the airport part of the Capital Projects and knew my way around the airport, we just kind of walked out where we could get a good view of when they landed. When his plane landed, and as he walked by, somebody on the other side took a picture. We have in our family files a full newspaper page all-column photograph. Here is the Prime Minister of Thailand. Here is Lady Bird. Here is my wife. Here is Vice President Johnson. Here is the Prime Minister's wife. Here I am. It looks like we were standing in a reception line, which we were not. We were just kind of standing behind them when the photographer caught it. We were full-face right in the receiving line. It was a wonderful memory. We never, of course, had met a vice president before in our lives. Nor had we met the Prime Minister.

Q: What were the relations with the embassy? You talked about Graham Martin and so on. It was a bit of a contentious situation, is that right?

MORSE: I was there from 1963-1968. When I went there, I think the Ambassador was Kenneth Todd Young. He was replaced by Graham Martin. Then Martin, I think, left before I did. The relationships were up and down like yoyos. It was extremely difficult as a junior officer. I was sitting on like five (5) embassy committees, lower level things. Obviously, the USAID Mission Director related to the Ambassador most of the time and went to have a weekly meeting with him. The relationships depended so much on whether the embassy saw us as responsive, as co-operative, as doing what they wanted as fast as they wanted, and on personal relations.

The Economic Section of the embassy really appreciated the work that our economists were doing. We had more depth and more data than they could generate. They greatly resented when people like me would make pronouncements about the political situation and the security situation. Some of the embassy staff, like Monty Spears, who was the head of the Counter Insurgency Group and was a career Foreign Service officer (who later became a DCM and then an Ambassador), appreciated the academic research and insight into the history of Thai politics that could be brought to bear. The Ambassador's Special Assistant, a junior officer, was a fellow named Peter Romano. Peter is now the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America under A/S Jeff Davidow. Peter just thought that AID should not be involved in these things and stay out of it. The Chief of Station of the CIA and USAID Director were appreciative of what we were doing.

General Stilwell resented that we were so involved in counterinsurgency and he and his JUSMAG group could not be. They were ordered by our cabinet in Washington that our military were not to engage in counterinsurgency. So, he was sitting there wanting so much to do what his colleagues were doing in Vietnam.

Q: He was involved in training the military, but not in counterinsurgency.

MORSE: That's right. We got BELL204B helicopters for the Thai Border Police before he could get them as helos for the military. We got M70 grenade launchers for the Provincial Police before he could get them for the Thai military. Counter-insurgence had the priority out of the American production; so, when we ordered things, we got them before JUSMAG. It used to grate on him when I would stand up in his staff meeting and he would ask, "Where are you in getting the new…" He couldn't even get it out. "When are you acquiring civilian AR15s?" he would ask. He resented our public safety CI program. "Oh, we've delivered those, Sir. They're already here. They're in training; they're in training at the Phitsanulok firing range."

Q: These went to the police people rather than to the military?

MORSE: Yes. It was a fantastic experience. I wouldn't have traded it for another in the world.

Q: Any other aspect you want to comment on?

MORSE: Another part that made the interagency work easy is that Ernice went to work for the Officer in Charge of Construction (OICC) for Southeast Asia. Those are the Navy Seabees. She went in as just a low secretary and rose to become the secretary to the two admirals that headed that organization. So, my wife was relating to admirals; and, I was relating to the generals. We got invited to a lot of social functions because of her work and because of my work with the military. So, we got more exposure and more involvement, more recognition and more job satisfaction than you would normally have gotten as first tour junior officers. I had terrific supervisors. I was reading old EERs, as I said, last night; and, Charlie Stockman, USAID Program Officer, was so appreciative of my work. He wrote: "I never worked with anybody who was so productive." I can run my motor for a month on praise like that. Clint Doggett, Deputy to Charlie, wrote in an EER that (in a mission with contractors, USAID had over 1,200 people), "Ted works more hours than any other five (5) employees combined." We loved the work and we loved what we were doing and why we were doing it. It was easy.

Q: Meanwhile, you also wrote a master's thesis.

MORSE: And I wrote a master's thesis at the same time. I also wrote articles for the Siam Journal. I was a member of the Siam Society.

Q: What is the Siam Society?

MORSE: It is a group that is dedicated to preserving Thai culture and history. They had monthly meetings.

Q: This was a Thai group.

MORSE: It was all Thai, except they would allow foreigners to join if you were serious about learning about them. But it was 90% Thai. I wrote an article on my Thai neighbor. My neighbor down the street had a statue in front of his house. I wanted to learn who he was.

The Thai man's name about whom I wrote the article for the Siam Society Journal (and it was published) was Luang Vichita Vatikhon. Luang is a royal title. He was an amazingly interesting person because he broke all the cultural stereotypes in Thailand. It tended to be, if you were a civil servant, that was what your parents were born into and you went into. Your life was as a civil servant. If you were a royalist, you stayed in the monarchy and you did what they did in terms of work. If you were in Buddhism, you stayed a monk in that whole family. If you were military… Luang Vichita Vatikhon cut across all of those. He became the rector of Thammasat University as an academic. He was a full colonel in the military, as well as a teacher in the military. I couldn't find any precedent in Thai history for it. He became a government minister. He had been a deputy minister in the civil service. He had spent his time in the monkhood. He wrote the Thai national anthem. He was a song writer. He wrote popular songs. I can't remember the exact number, but it sticks in my mind that he wrote over 70 popular songs. Most of the people knew him because he was a song writer. Some of them knew him because he wrote the national anthem. Others knew him as a military planner. As a colonel, he rose to be a top planner in their military government. All this accomplished by one man in one lifetime. So, I wrote up a piece on him. His family was extremely appreciative of that article for the Siam Society. It was just also sensitizing ourselves. My wife and I were interested in Thailand. We learned to speak Thai; never because AID ever taught us; but, because we were out amongst the people and needed and wanted to. Just one more anecdote on the Thai language: The patron of the Thai Border Patrol Police was the Queen Mother. The Queen Mother had spoken to the King, King Bhumibol Adulyadej, and Queen Sirikit, his wife, and said that there was a group of American people working Thai's rural development: police, health and education people. She asked, "Why don't we invite them down to the Border Patrol Police annual gift awards ceremony?" That is where they give out the medals and the promotions. It was at Hau Hin, which is the royal southern palace; and, the King and Queen go there for their summer retreat. Ernice and I were invited, among others, to go. We were by far the most junior, lowest of the American people, but pleased beyond compare. The Thais flew us there in one of their airplanes, along with about ten (10) other families. There was one other set of foreigners. It was Jeter Williamson, the Chief of the USAID Public Safety Division and his wife who went down. We spent the week-end with the King and Queen at their summer palace. Before we went, we had to be interviewed at the palace in Bangkok. When we went for our interview, being a brash, arrogant, confident young AID officer, I asked all the things that my wife asked: "What do we wear?" "How do we greet them?" "How do we eat?" (and in Thai: "Should we speak to them in Thai or should we address them in English or will

there be an interpreter?") I was speaking Thai. His aide spoke to me in Thai and asked, "Where did you go to school to learn Thai?" I replied, "I've never been to Thai language school. I just learned the five question words and then I learned by asking the pedicab drivers, the rickshaw drivers or a villager, 'What is the name of this? How do you say that?' and then just built up my Thai." He and I conversed very easily in Thai for probably three or four minutes. Then I felt like someone had kicked me in the stomach because he said, "You know, the King and the Queen do speak pretty good English." I was crushed. I really wanted to speak Thai with them.

Q: Did you speak to the King and Queen?

MORSE: Oh, yes. But, before that, on the way down there, the aide was loading us in the plane and he said, "Mr. Morse, I could see you were visibly disappointed that you couldn't use your Thai; but, you are enough of a Thai scholar that you must know why." I was so caught up in my own ego and disappointment that I replied, "No, I don't know why. Why can't I talk to them in Thai?" He answered, "You have learned the Thai language of the common people. You speak the Thai of the commoners. You know that the royal Thai is a totally different language. The King could understand you; but, it would be inappropriate for a visit with the King." I knew that intellectually; however, my emotions had overcome me. For my wife and me to spend a week at the King's palace with his Queen and the others was beyond belief or expectation.

It was a week-end that was built around the ceremonies for the Border Patrol Police. As the patron, the Queen Mother had visited in the helicopters that we had provided and trained. We originally sent helicopter pilots to America to be trained. I analyzed the cost of that and then the long-term sustainability of it; and, we set up a local helicopter training school. It was a training school for both civilian police and the military. She had ridden in those helicopters; she had ridden with people we had trained. She saw the health work, the school work. We were trying to help. She knew about this. During the two-day week-end, she would come and sit and talk about whether we had made any progress in teaching the villagers not to grow opium. She asked, "I have some crochet work. Do you want to see the crochet work?" that we had taught them. We had to say that they could never make as much money in all the things we tried with those hill tribe's people to get them out of opium. We only saw the King and Queen twice during the week-end really. One time was an informal reception after the medals and the promotions were given out to the Border Patrol Police. They mingled. The aide said at that point to the King, "This is the American boy I told you about who was so disappointed because he couldn't speak to you in Thai." The King turned to me, "Why couldn't you speak to me in Thai? Do you not know Thai?" I spoke to him in English. I replied, "It's because I've learned the language of your people." He responded, "You are far more helpful to my country because you speak the language of my people. That is where you all work and that's where you will help." He was very gracious. His Queen…Talk about an infatuated young man. I told my wife at that point, "If there was anyone I would ever leave you for, it would be the Queen of Thailand." She was an absolutely beautiful woman, just as sweet and gracious and loving as can be. Ernice, herself ravenously beautiful, was not amused!

Q: That sounds like a good conclusion to this venture. Let's add a little bit more on the Thai program.

MORSE: Coming there as a first assignment in the government after the Washington internship, I've mentioned that I had wonderful supervisors and wonderful colleagues that I worked with; however, one thing that they made us do, which we weren't all that interested in but was just invaluable to be effective in Thailand and then for the rest of the career, was that we, the junior beginning officers, had to learn program operations – not just program planning We had to learn about the analysis and the economics and the documentation. We had to learn our concepts of obligation. We had to learn what it was to obligate money and to sub- obligate money and to account for money and the relationship to auditors and how to contract for it, how to write procurement orders. I learned at the feet of an old gentleman called Sebastian. He really squalled us. He tested us and made us understand. When we came out of working in that program office, our effectiveness with the technical officers of AID was that we could help them. We weren't to be educators, road builders, aviation or public safety people. We were to help them know how that fit into the broader foreign policy objectives, the broader foreign aid objectives. We could then also help them get the job done. That is where they were frustrated. That's where they felt they needed help. That's where we could help them because of our credibility and our effectiveness in dealing on the planning side, which was more sensitive. If we could turn out a procurement order, obligate some money, get some contractors in for them, show them how to get things done… I think one of the drawbacks that I have seen in the Agency in later years was that people didn't know the program operations. They didn't know the basic concepts of obligations and expenditures and how their documentation worked. That's not the glamorous part of the work; but, it's damned important.

Q: It's critical. After Thailand? On the Thai piece, you can add more as you read it through and flesh it out when the time comes. Let's move on. After Thailand, what was your next assignment?

INDONESIA CONTEXT

Like we did for Thailand, let me add a brief introduction to set the context for my USAID work in Indonesia. Indonesia's geographical position, in the strategic sea lanes of SE Asia, has shaped its history, migrating people and over-lapping cultures. It was colonized by the Dutch in the early 17th century to assure access to its spices for Europe. It had practically no economic improvements under decades of colonialism. It became independent in 1949, with only twelve (12) trained engineers, one of whom became the first President of Indonesia. Its large size (17,500 islands spread over thousands miles), huge population (120 million in 1968), history of animism, Buddhism, Hinduism and now the largest Muslim country in the world with huge natural resource potential made it a very important country. Its' violent rejection of communism in 1965-67 made it key in the SE Asia anti-communist American foreign policy of the 60s and 70s. We had terminated all except humanitarian aid to Indonesia. We restarted USAID in 1968 after Suharto outmaneuvered President Sukarno to establish a non- communist government.

The mid-1960s economic collapse and the ultra-high inflation in Indonesia presented an urgent challenge to USAID to support Indonesia to become a stable country and an American ally.

MORSE: My next assignment was Indonesia. I spent three and one-half years there (1968-71) after five (5) years in Thailand.

Q: What was your position there?

MORSE: Assistant Program Officer. We went there in 1968, which was shortly after Sukarno was overthrown by Suharto. The U.S. had a humanitarian assistance program before that was headed by a Food for Peace officer by the name of Harrison Parker. He was the epitome of someone who really tried to know his country and integrate and to show empathy, as well as do his technical AID job. Harrison played in a gom-long orchestra, which is the Indonesian equivalent of a xylophone with gongs. He had mastered that to the point where he was a full, accepted member of the Indonesian musical culture. He also had strong linkages with Cornell University, which had a long-term Indonesia study program. Cornell and the University of California at Berkeley had extensive Indonesia programs. In the USAID Program Office, my responsibilities included backstopping for the Food Aid (we can talk about how that was used and why), education and family planning. The linkages with the University of California at Berkeley were such that the Ford Foundation had trained a lot of economists for Indonesia there. One was a Ph.D. demographer, Dr. Widjojo Nitisastro, who was chosen by President Suharto (after he overthrew Sukarno) to become the head of Bappenas, which is the economic planning agency for the government of Indonesia. Because he was a demographer, Dr. Widjojo wanted to quietly start a family planning program for the country. AID didn't have family planning officers in those days. So, after I left Thailand, I was sent by AID to the University of Chicago to spend four (4) months studying population and family planning, to respond to Dr. Widjojo's strategies.

Q: This was something you thought would be interesting?

MORSE: Oh, yes. I welcomed it. I had felt for years that a balance between the natural and the economic resources and the human resources were essential to making progress or else we'd never play catch up if the ever-increasing human resources kept outstripping the economic and natural resources. I studied under Professor Don Bogue, who had a contract from AID then to train AID officers to give them a population perspective. We didn't have a population office in USAID Djakarta. So, within the Program Office, that was one of my assignments. I'll stay with that for a minute and then go on to some of the other work. Dr. Widjojo told us that he wanted to expand the help that the International Pathfinder Fund had been doing there. The Ford Foundation had done a little bit of work on population; but, it was time to take a bigger step forward and get the government support behind an expanded family planning program, he thought. I think even now as Indonesia is hitting the press, as we talk to people, they are shocked when I point out that Indonesia is the fourth largest country in the world. At that time, there were about 120 million people. Part of their population solution was something that had been started

under Dutch colonialism called "trans-migration" to try and entice people to relocate off the crowded island of Java, which was at that point, I think, the second most densely populated rural area in the world, second only to Bangladesh. They never in the entire history of Dutch colonialism or since have sent more people off of Java than those that have come onto Java. Java was such an economic, cultural and religious magnet that none could resist it. So, we worked a lot with Ford Foundation and Pathfinder and then the Indonesian government to try and find the right ways to expand the family planning program. We strengthened their private family planning association that then greatly expanded its outreach program, but simultaneously began to work on a national population policy framework that would be acceptable. What is the name of the American general who so identified with family planning?

Q: He was also head of the Pop Council.

MORSE: Anyway, there was an interest on Marshall Green's part, who was our ambassador at that point, about supporting family planning because he knew that's where Dr. Widjojo wanted to go. He had as hard a sell within the USG as it was for Dr. Widjojo within Indonesia.

Q: General William Draper.

MORSE: Right. We arranged to bring Bill Draper out, after we had financed what was then called the GE Tempo Program. It was a computer-based model of a country's economic development as impacted by demography, by varying percent of population growth. The most wonderful part of it was you could just punch into the computer different assumptions about the rate of development growth based on different population growth rates. If you thought you didn't like that the population was going to grow at 2.7%, you thought it was going to grow at 2.9%, you punched that in and the computer would automatically tell you how many more teachers, classrooms, books were needed, how much money to pay teacher's salaries, to pay education, etc., etc. The same way with health and agriculture workers and how much more food and shelter would be needed. Using that model, we had arranged to have the statistical research done; and, the GE Tempo people had the analytical and computer work done. Then General Draper came in. Dr. Widjojo's strategy was to try and convince the top level Indonesian government people that they needed a positive population policy. Draper came; and, I, being the responsible family planning officer, was his control officer. He became very impatient because Dr. Widjojo couldn't get the audience with President Suharto as soon as he wanted. So, Draper was sitting around the first day, the second day. We thought we had an appointment; but, it came unglued. Finally, after the fifth day he was ready to get on a plane back to the U.S. but Widjojo said, "If you will drive to Bandung, we can see the President and you can show him this computer model." They would do it together, Widjojo and General Draper. It meant getting Draper up at two o'clock in the morning and then me driving him all the way to Bandung in the middle of the night in the fog and the rain mountains and everything else. He was in a foul mood. He was a very senior, gruff, take-control man. The idea of being kept waiting for five (5) days for an

appointment and having to travel all night by car was disrespectful, he thought. They didn't even get him a military helicopter! Nevertheless, we got him there.

I wasn't in the meeting. Ambassador Marshall Green was. We didn't have an AID Director at that point. I'll come back to that. Then Widjojo and Draper went in. President Suharto's concern was that family planning was anti-Islam, that it would be seen that the Christian West wanted to hold the Moslem world back and down. Widjojo stepped out and I asked him, "How is it going?" He said, "Well, it's a hard sell. The President understands the demographic statistical and economic implications; but, he's afraid of the religious backlash." He didn't want to go ahead with a population control policy. I responded, "Well, you know, have you talked about the success on Bali? In that Hindu environment on Bali, the family planning program had just taken off immeasurably." He dismissed it and replied, "Well, no, it had to do with Islam." I answered, "Well, there is nothing in Islam that is against family planning." Widjojo said, "He thinks there is." I said, "While I was studying at Chicago, one of the classes was on how different religions look at family planning. There is nothing in the Koran that would preclude this." Widjojo was a Moslem; but, he was also a demographer. He looked at it from a statistical, not from a religious, point of view. He went back in the meeting and told Suharto that he understood there was nothing in the Koran that was against family planning. That caught Suharto's attention. Then Bill Draper said, "Why don't we send some of your ulemas over to Mecca and see if they see anything?" Draper and I had actually talked about this in the car on the way up to Bandung. The work that University of Chicago and Pop Council had done showed that religious teachings could prove there was nothing in the Koran against family planning. They came out and Draper said, "Alright, AID is going to have to put up the money to send ten (10) religious leaders to Mecca on a religious hajj." I asked, "And I am going to justify the hajj trip under family planning?" He replied, "Yes." We talked it through. We talked about it going back down in the car. We thought we could get it set up. I proposed it to Washington. They told me I did not understand separation of state and religion, or the anti-FP lobby in Washington. I said I would "take the heat" for doing it. AID/W finally gave us enough money for five (5) ulemas on a hajj. We explained what we wanted them to do. We met with the religious leaders. Widjojo was always in the front on this, except for my putting my career on the line. It was really an Indonesian-led thing. We were just there supporting him. We said, "Basically, we want you to go and consult with all of the top ulemas at Mecca and come back with a statement as to whether or not there is anything in the Koran that prohibits the practice of family planning." They came back and they had one sentence written in longhand in Arabic. It read, "There is nothing that precludes this practice in the Koran."

We took some AID counterpart funds from the PL480 program, printed two (2) million copies of that. The Indonesian government put it out through the private association to every member on every island, which diffused a potential religious backlash. From that day forward, Suharto said, "Let's have a national population program." We were supporting an expansion of the family planning services in the cafeteria style of any contraception, what the people wanted, whether it was condoms, loops, diaphragms, jellies, shots even. The Depo-Provera shot had been experimented with up in the Chiang Mai Medical School in Thailand; but, it wasn't approved by our FDA yet. Ford or

Pathfinder could bring DP shots in. There is a funny story to this. Ambassador Marshall Green was over in the AID part of the embassy one day. Because we had been working together on population and family planning, he was interested in how we were doing. As you know, later he became the head of the State Department's Population Office. I used to kid him that I took credit for his assignment because he felt after talking with me that population control was too important to leave to AID! So, it needed to be led by a State officer. But what convinced him of that, I am sure, is that he wanted to see how a Lippes Loop worked. I had a plastic pelvic model in my office with a plunger. I loaded it with a Lippes Loop. I was explaining. I was looking at him; and, I was inserting it and showing him how it was inserted. I drove the plunger through the cardboard backing of the pelvic model! He said, "No more are you AID people going to do family planning." Up until then, he wouldn't allow us to bring in a professional population officer. "I do not want to expand the AID staff in the Embassy." I had been lobbying him to have one come in. He kept saying, "You're doing a good job. We don't need more AID staff. We don't want more population people. That's too sensitive. You can do it while you're a Program Officer." I insisted, "Come on, we really need a medical and a demographic team to support the Indonesians the way they want." My insertion blunder convinced him right then and there. He said, "If you're going to go around and show people how to do this and you can't even insert it without sticking it through the rectum, okay, you get your additional staff." So, we brought in Dr. Jarrett Clinton and started a professional family planning program. I don't know the demographic numbers right now, but I think over the next fifteen (15) years, the growth rate was reduced from about 3.2 to 2.8. The last time I looked, it was down to about 2.4 or 2.3. That sounds small, but when you're dealing with hundreds of millions of people, it was very, very significant. So, we worked interagency with private groups. We worked with the Indonesian government. We worked with universities to promote a population rate reduction program.

Q: The Indonesian population program has been viewed as one of the most successful. Why was that? Was there something about Indonesia or something about the way we went about it?

MORSE: I have to say it's because it was conceptualized and strategized and led, from my point of view, by Indonesians. The people in the private associations that we worked with were sensitive and committed, not so committed, however, that they would do dumb things that would set the program back. Dr. Widjojo, as a trained demographer and committed, was in a very effective place to lead it as the head of the Economic Planning Agency. We were able to build on the pilot successes of Ford Foundation and Pathfinder. We had critical top level Indonesian political support. We took political risks and won. We had the resources that were necessary. I think it was successful, however, basically because it was Indonesian-led.

Q: What was the strategy to get it spread out so well to the population?

MORSE: Comprehensive. Policy was put out over the airwaves to the people through radio and nascent television. We worked bottom up through women's groups, agriculture, technical groups. It was put into curriculum; it was put into the education and health

delivery systems. Family planning workers were hired by the GOI as motivators to go out to all corners of the country. There was enough oversight to make sure that they weren't just throwing the loops and the condoms in the canal and then getting their pay for how many they had put out. The medical profession worked closely with the social workers and the educators. It was a heck of a good multiplication strategy.

Q: Was there any opposition?

MORSE: Initially. At first some of the religious leaders felt it was wrong. On the outer islands they felt that this was a Javanese way to hold the Sulawesi and Sumatrans out, to hold the other people down. They weren't convinced that the Javanese were embracing family planning on Java; so, they didn't want to accept it on the outer islands. The Hindu island of Bali was in the lead from the start, led by the private family planning association on island. The effectiveness came, though, from good strategies developed by Indonesians themselves.

Q: Were there other donors involved?

MORSE: Not originally. Later the UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) came in.

Q: The World Bank was involved at one point?

MORSE: That came later…not yet.

Q: What was the scale of our program roughly?

MORSE: I don't know that I can remember that in terms of dollars or magnitude. It was nationwide as it grew. I guess as much as $10 and $12 million a year, mainly for awareness education and contraceptives.

Q: What about other USAID program interests?

MORSE: I should not have started this debrief with family planning. Food aid was my main assignment. The most urgent priority when we first went in there was to stabilize runaway inflation. This was in 1968-1970, a time when inflation around the world ran two (2) or three (3) percent. That was about it. If it got to be double-digit inflation, people really worried. Indonesia, in the aftermath of the economic meltdown under Sukarno and everything from discrimination against Chinese businesses, one military faction fighting the other, coups, confronting the dominant PKI (the Communist Party of Indonesia), Indonesia suffered 120% inflation. At that time only a couple of places in Europe – I don't know whether it was Germany after the war or Israel – had ever seen anything like that. The GOI and international community had all kinds of teams that we were working with to come up with the right strategies to stabilize that runaway inflation.

Ultimately, the best tool was recognizing that the inflation was being driven not by the price of oil and gas (because they weren't industrialized and there weren't that many

cars) but by food scarcities. Food sales were being handled by Chinese middlemen. They were taking the rap for the high prices; however, the price incentives weren't there for the domestic production of the rice staple by the small-scale farmers, which is what they had. So, we mounted a huge PL480 program that ran $100 million a year worth of food.

Basically, we flooded the market in the short-run but tried to work with the producers and the market so that they would know that it was for the short-run and that, if we could drive the price down, they would have a bigger market than what they were counting on. They wanted the higher price and, therefore, weren't happy that we were driving the price down. With the good work of the Bank and the IMF team that were in there on the macroeconomics and then our food aid working with them, we were all able to turn the inflation around. Within three (3) years it went from 120% down to 60%, from 60% down to about 40%, and then down to 12%. It was the IMF and the Bank's position that if you drop the inflation lower than 12%, you would then stagnate growth. So, 12% was considered an acceptable level of inflation.

In the meantime, we were all working extensively with the local rice producers and the marketers to get production back up domestically and phasing food imports out while phasing them (the local rice producers) in. We had to show that the magnitude of the sales would still make it very profitable for them, even though the price was going to come down from what they were charging versus what we put in. We had tremendous local currency generations from PL480 that we could literally program at post. We didn't even have to go back to Washington. As you know, the PL480 agreements required the GOI to deposit into a U.S. owned, but jointly administered counterpart funds, the Indonesian rupiah equivalent of the value of the food we brought in.

Q: What did you use those for?

MORSE: Family planning, initially; but, we also used it to organize tremendous agricultural extension outreach so that the rice producers understood what the strategy, timing, magnitudes and cost were. We helped build up a large agriculture extension information service, feeling that if the rice producers knew what cost rice was being sold for in town, they could adjust their own price so that it wasn't just the middlemen who were able to manipulate that price. We were determined to empower the producers and associations. That was the way for us to be able to quickly terminate our expensive food aid. A lot of the local currency also went into terracing of agriculture land for greater local production. All the local currency, except for family planning, went into the agriculture sector.

We did not have a single AID Director for very long. In the three and one-half years I was there, we went through nine directors: Vic Morgan; McDonald for a short period; a guy who went to Vietnam as the Director; Bob Mossler, who came in with Administrator Hannah when Hannah visited us in Indonesia (Mossler was sent to Vietnam three weeks later); Stokes Tolbert was on loan from the World Bank. He was our Acting Director during the real initial period of trying to stabilize the economy. IMF had a great analytical team in there. Alex Shakow, Indonesia Office Director in AIDW, also came out as Acting

Director for a while. AID was the big player, though. We provided the food aid so critical to reducing inflation.

Q: Why did we have so many problems having a Director permanently?

MORSE: I don't know. Some of the time they felt we didn't have a USAID leader who had the macroeconomic strength that could lead the anti-inflation fight, so it was better to borrow people from the Bank and the IMF. That way, we could also assure donor integration. We, the permanent AID staff, had huge responsibilities as a result of the turnover of AID leadership.

Q: As I understand it, the mission was closed before your 1968 arrival – during the Sukarno time.

MORSE: Right

Q: So, you were arriving at a mission that was only sort of a partial, start-up mission, right?

MORSE: Right. We were reopening the mission, except there had been a humanitarian aid person in there that was 100% concerned with food aid, and that was all. That was what Harrison Parker was working on. When we were rebuilding up USAID, it's hard to tell why we went through so many Acting Directors or Directors for such a short period. It wasn't as if people were fouling up and being removed. As I said, Mossler was taken over to Vietnam just after he got there. McDonald was going to be assigned at one point and ended up back in a high Washington position. Stokes was just on loan for the first year from the Bank. Vic Morgan and Alex Shakow came in and out from the AIDW office.

Q: How big a staff did you have?

MORSE: When we restarted in 1968, there were only about six (6) of us. When I left, there were probably 35 in that build up over three and one-half years. Alex Shakow was our Office Director at that point back in Washington. He came out and was Acting for a while. Don Block was our Program Officer. Louise Ramey was our Program Officer after Don. I guess what I'm saying is that, in the absence of leader continuity, the Program Office staff was really the continuity. Eric Chetwynd, who I said was one of the other overseas interns, went initially to Indonesia when I went to Thailand. So, instead of replacing Princeton Lyman up in Korea because that was more military/security work and I didn't want to do that again (I wanted development work), I went down and I replaced what Eric had been doing before the mission closed down. He went back to Washington.

Q: Were there any other dimensions to the program at that time?

MORSE: Oh, yes. We were expanding extensively in education; backstopping AID education programs was my third responsibility. Again, we were starting these things

from scratch, so it was a lot of just listening to what their national economic planning agency and their Ford Foundation advisors and Stanford researchers, who were helping them, told us. Education was a big technical assistance area for us to focus on. A lot of it was in agriculture education implemented by the Midwest Universities Consortium for International Activities (MUCIA) under contract to us.

Q: Was this at the university level or all levels?

MORSE: It was all levels. It was a very wide program on agriculture research, extension, teaching and materials. It was felt that, at that point, you had to get the agriculture part of the development equation right. What looked like was going to happen in terms of accessing the natural resources of oil, timber and nickel couldn't sustain food consumption through just importing it because the people wouldn't have any income at their level to buy imported food. They had to get domestic food production up for income generation and consumption.

MUCIA did, I thought, a wonderful job. I personally learned a lot from them on institution building. This was a time when they were really the world leaders in institution building methodology. Mel Blaze was out there, as was George Atkin and a lot of their top people. Their chief of party was the former provost of the University of Wisconsin, Dr. Ira Baldwin, who you may or may not know is still alive and working at 101. He and I still correspond. He sends out an electronic letter every month via e-mail at 101 years of age. He was the one who brought in Cliff Little, who I think you knew as the USAID Education Officer.

Q: Yes.

MORSE: He was an outstanding Education Officer. We did some very innovative things with the agriculture colleges to build up their faculty, their curriculum and materials and to build them up as strong, self-sustaining institutions. We also did some things that I'm sure would have been looked on as illegal later; but, as the Assistant Program Officer in charge of back- stopping the Education Division, I knew the portfolio better than anybody else in the mission. So, when the Education Officer, the technical officer, was absent, I was the Acting USAID Education Officer. Then, when the MUCIA contract Chief of Party, Dr. Baldwin, had to leave, MUCIA empowered me to be their Acting Chief of Party. After consulting with the lawyers and auditors, who were concerned about me submitting vouchers as MUCIA, approving them as Education Officer and then paying them as the Program Officer, it was not a good time for the usual checks and balances. We didn't lose anything, though, and it only happened occasionally; but, it showed the flexibility that we had. The American Association of Junior Colleges flew me from Djakarta to Honolulu to participate in their 50th anniversary. I delivered a paper on the "Application of the JC Concept to Education in Indonesia". The GOI education planners adopted the concept and developed a junior college track nationwide. USAID also had programs in supporting the GOI planning unit in macro- economic planning. We, Ford, the University of California and Harvard were all helping.

Q: You worked with the Harvard Group?

MORSE: Yes, Harvard. Les Gordon.

Q: Was AID in financing that group?

MORSE: We co-financed them for a while. In fact, what we did was, again, use the Pl480 generations of local currency counterpart funds to meet some of their local expenses, while Harvard was paid FX by the Bank. So, we did a lot of joint financing on the macroeconomic level.

Q: What were some of the other programs?

MORSE: Mine were basically agriculture, education and family planning. USAID didn't have much outside that except macroeconomic technical assistance. I volunteered to work with the City of Djakarta on week-ends on their public administration. I told you about studying under the GWU professor on Thailand, Jim Moselle, on Thai administrative behavior. I was very interested in public administration and used to volunteer to consult on the city's restructuring. They had an in-service training institute at the City of Djakarta for their own officials; but, it was not very professionally done. I linked them up to the American Association of Public Administration. What was the name of the grand old man of P.A.? Wendell Shaffer. He came out; and, we started to work just with the City of Djakarta to try and get them to think through a little more thoroughly from the metropolitan level how they were going to manage all the city services. Everybody else was focused on the macroeconomic; but, these people were struggling just to find a tax base and figure out how to motivate their civil servants. It was a lot of fun to do that; however, it was entirely voluntary and not part of my official assignments. I was not a technical officer – only interested. We weren't involved in public safety. There wasn't much of a need for that after the security following the PKI and Sukarno's downfall.

Q: Were we involved with capital projects very much? We had been, I guess.

MORSE: We had been; but, not at that time. We kind of dropped off the capital projects when we went back in. That was the first time I realized what a nice division of labor there was, with the World Bank handling capital projects and us handling technical assistance and food aid.

The other thing we were involved with was a lot of USAID support for programs for Southeast Asia regional organizations. I was also the USAID/Indonesia liaison officer, partly because I knew them when I was in Bangkok. The primary regional organization used to be the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). It later became ASEAN. SEATO was more of a military organization, while ASEAN was more of a political, economic and development cooperation organization; so, we worked a lot with the AID regional staff up in Bangkok. Who was the head of the Regional Development Support Office? We worked extensively with the Indonesians to join in the Regional Development Planning Officers Association, the Regional Central Bankers Association,

the Regional Agriculture Institutions, regional health institutions and the technology institutions. They would form centers of excellence throughout the region. Several of those were in Indonesia; so, there were people coming in from the region to work with these AID-supported centers. We in the USG thought if SE Asians worked closely at the technical level, it would help insulate them from communist political expansion going on in the region.

Q: How did you find Indonesians to work with in these regions?

MORSE: I enjoyed them immensely. I didn't speak the language like I did in Thailand; and, I didn't have the history that I had in Thailand; but, I found them very good to work with, except that they were kind of even more laid back than the Thais. I was never sure in my own mind whether that was the fear of stepping out with initiatives after what had happened under Sukarno or whether it was that Moslem culture was so different from the Buddhist Thais. People like Widjojo would take charge. President Suharto basically took the entire economic faculty out of the University and moved it over to government – put them in charge of the Ministry of Mining, the Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank and the National Planning Agency, etc. He almost stripped the economics faculty of the University; but, he was smart enough to get trained technical people around him. They all seemed to be really dedicated. They all spent time back part-time at the University – to train the next generation of Indonesian economists.

Q: Were you aware of the corruption and all that we hear about today, as well as the nepotism?

MORSE: Not at that stage. Remember, when we got there to begin with, it was early on at the development stage. Indonesia was very poor under Dutch colonialism. It had not prospered under PKI/Sukarno communism. There was little private investment; therefore, there were few opportunities for big corruption from 1968-71. When I left in 1971, we used to refer disparagingly to Suharto's wife, whose name was Tien, as "Madam Ten Percent" because it was getting to be common knowledge that she and the family (she was the bag person for the family) would demand a 10% kickback from anybody who wanted to explore for oil, get timber or nickel mining concessions or anything else. We were just beginning to see more corruption at that point with more foreign investment and economic growth after a long stagnation.

Q: When Suharto took over, was there a lot of brutal repression of people?

MORSE: Absolutely. During the 1965-67 period, especially. Over half a million people were killed – brutally.

Q: Was there any reverberation of that when you were there?

MORSE: As I said, I felt that maybe people were less eager to take initiative and stand out in any field for fear that that repression could come back on them. He was ruthless,

and he was focused against that element of the army that backed Sukarno at the time when Sukarno then was being backed by the PKI, the Communist Party of Indonesia.

He was using the resident Chinese business people as scapegoats for the economic collapse and stifling inflation. At that time (1965-69) it was just vicious. Everybody lashed out at the Chinese, from the shopkeepers to anybody coming into the country. The Japanese took a lot of that kind of heat, by the way, in the early days. You don't hear about it now in this current go around; but, back 30 years ago (in 1968) the Japanese were very feared. They felt that the Japanese Co-Prosperity Sphere (which was the reason that they had mounted the war in the Pacific in that part of Southeast Asia) was going to come into being because of their economic strength already by 1968. So, periodically, there were demonstrations against Japanese car owners and dealerships, investors and stuff like that. You asked how the Indonesians were to work with. At one point, Sukarno had erected a very tall stela, like the Washington Monument, and the Indonesians were putting a plastic over it to repaint it or sandblast it or something. It was shortly after Sukarno was overthrown. I think I wrote a cable that said that "the Family Planning Association had gone too far in describing it as a condom – they said it was putting a condom on the top of Sukarno's last erection!" They had a sense of humor, and I played into it!

The resistance to family planning, by the way, had a history. Sukarno was adamantly against it. Cindy Adams, a journalist married to Joe Adams, who wrote a book on Sukarno and his life, swears (and she and I talked about it at a family planning meeting) that, in a meeting she had with Sukarno, he said, "The only good family planning method that I know of and will ever be allowed in my country is for a woman to hold an aspirin tightly together with her knees." That statement had spread throughout the island. We had to overcome that. President Sukarno had also said, "There will never be any family planning in here." He disparagingly talked about it that way.

But in terms of other development going on, the economy was being brought right. Investment was flowing in. We were working very closely as a team with the other international donors to reduce inflation. The country looked very hopeful when I left in 1971. Ernice had been working as the American Embassy Commissary manager, winning tennis titles, hosting/entertaining, raising two children, etc. Because our next assignment was a separation assignment, she had many reasons to be unhappy about leaving Indonesia.

Q: We finished up with Indonesia, for the moment at any rate. Where did you go from there? What was your next assignment?

EAST PAKISTAN CONTEXT

Bangladesh was born of blood. I was there in 1971 when it went through the final war stages from being an East Pakistan province of 71 million people to becoming the independent country of Bangladesh. It was a horrible year for the Bengalis. It was a very tough half year for me and my family, and for the USAID program.

East Pakistan came into being as a province of Pakistan during the 1947 violent partition of British India. Millions of Moslems in India crossed over into East and West Pakistan; millions of Hindus in Pakistan and Bengal crossed over into India. An estimated 12 million people moved; an estimated 2 million people died. The 56,977 square-mile province of East Pakistan was separated from West Pakistan by the huge country of India and is surrounded on three sides by India. Over the next twenty (20) years, with known FX earnings, East Pakistan complained that the jute and tea exports from their side of the country were paying for the development of West Pakistan, to the neglect of their side. Separatist feelings grew strong. In November, 1970, an enormous cyclone in the Bay of Bengal created a tidal bore that killed over 200,000 Bengalis and one million cattle and ruined 400,000 houses and 3,500 schools as it came ashore in East Pakistan. West Pakistan was overwhelmed and slow to reconstruct the east, fueling separatist anger. In 1971 the Bangladesh Liberation War broke out, eliciting a strong West Pakistan military crackdown while the world stood back, calling it "an internal Pakistan affair". Millions of East Pakistan Bengalis were internally displaced from their homes and access to food, medicine and shelter. India, which had received 10 million Bengali refugees fleeing the war, sent 400,000 troops and its' air force to join the Bengali rebels. The India-Pakistan War of 1971 spilled over into West Pakistan, as it defeated the Pakistan army in the eastern province. As part of the November, 1971, peace settlement, Pakistan officially separated from its' former province and recognized the new country of Bangladesh. That was the context for my work there from April to December, 1971.

MORSE: My next assignment was Dacca, East Pakistan. We're now talking about 1971. I had finished about three and one-half years in Indonesia and was asked to make a direct transfer over to Dacca. I went in with the lofty title (Joe Wheeler used to come up with all kinds of titles to entice people to take on difficult and unpleasant assignments) of Deputy Provincial Director for East Pakistan. Of course, to have the "Director" in your name as a young officer…Wow, that was great. All my peers were being sent to Vietnam. I never understood who made the decision or why I was sent to East Pakistan instead of Vietnam, given my prior counter insurgency, integrated public safety work.

Q: What did that title mean in fact?

MORSE: In fact, East Pakistan was considered, as it was, a province of Pakistan and had not yet become the country of Bangladesh; but, it did so in the nine months that I was there. I have always described 1971 as the absolute worst year of my life, bar none, in almost any way you wanted to cut it. From a family point of view, we could not have family and children at post. It was a separation assignment because there had already been quite a war going on to separate East Pakistan from West Pakistan; therefore, you couldn't have dependents at post.

One reason it was the worst year is because Ernice, my wife, was very unhappy that we would not be together. We, at that point, had been married for about ten (10) years. We were married in 1961; it was now l971. She felt that by taking that assignment, I was putting the work before the family, before being with her and our two children. I tried to

explain that many of our colleagues were being called to Vietnam to serve during that same period and to be serving in separation assignments and that at least we didn't have to go into the war zone of Vietnam. I told her she would be safe-havened in Islamabad while I was in Dacca and we would see each other every few weeks. However, that put a strain on our marriage that led to her actually briefly leaving me and the children. She always had described it that I was putting work before family. Having served in the military, I felt that I had a responsibility to answer the call to duty and, if it meant Dacca, which seemed safer than Vietnam, that it was the right thing to do. She loyally served our country as well as I did; but, she had limits. She stayed through the Pakistan assignment, left us, and then rejoined us a few months later in Ethiopia, I am grateful to say. I relate this personal situation in this professional oral history just to remind our government decision makers about the strain caused by separation assignments, especially in a war zone. That was part of the reason it was the worst year of my life.

From the AID and the professional point of view, I was going in in a transition period where the Provincial Director, Eric Raphel, was just coming out and the new Provincial Director, William (Bill) Woofer, was going in. So, there was a bit of a hiatus between the two of them. We, of course, reported over to Islamabad, which was where the AID office was. That office was headed at that point by Joe Wheeler. The main task that faced us in Dacca was humanitarian relief. When I got there in April of 1971, all of the technical staff had been evacuated out of the country already. There were virtually a half dozen USAID staff; and, they were primarily in program and in the management areas. We had stopped virtually all of the technical assistance project implementation. The main task was humanitarian relief. Another thing that made it such a bad year in 1971 is that I got there just a few months after they had the horrible tidal bore in November of 1970. There had been a cyclone out in the Bay of Bengal, which sent a 41-foot-high wall of water up through the Chittagong Bay and along the coast. It came inland about twelve (12) miles. In that 12 miles, it drowned 200,000 people and one million cows and other animals. So, part of the humanitarian relief was to help fund and manage an enormous clean up. There was still burial going on; we imported lining materials that would facilitate mass graves and do it in a way that didn't pollute the water. Same way with the mass graves of a million animals. We had to stop the spread of disease. We worked closely with the old Southeast Asia Treaty Organization cholera laboratory centers that were already in Dacca and Chittagong to try and support them and the government's effort to thwart disease.

Of course, millions more people had had their food supply wiped out by that 41-foot wall of water; so, a lot of what we were doing was arranging import of basic food. All this had to go on in the middle of a guerrilla operation; therefore, while I had come out of eight and one-half years in Southeast Asia insecurity, this was really the first emergency operation that I was involved with. It later had a very influential impact on what I continued to do periodically, which was trying to do long-term development, but got called in to do ad hoc emergency work.

We were still trying to watch the USAID project inputs that were there in country but were not being overseen by American staff. We kind of restructured the USAID/Dacca office and used local Bengali employees who had been with the AID mission a long time

to monitor AID inputs. We had been in Dacca for many, many years and had some very competent FSNs (local staff members). We basically restructured and put them in charge of the projects that had been managed by the Americans. Similarly, in between Raphel going and Woofer coming, I reorganized the staff and the office; and, Joe Wheeler approved the focus on what was now our task, humanitarian relief. The original structure of the office, the organization, the assignments and people's work were geared toward development challenges, and yet, we weren't doing development. We had to shift that entirely. The local staff rose to that challenge very nicely and greatly appreciated the chance to stay on and work. They were afraid that they were going to be let go the way the Americans had left and took on the broader humanitarian relief activities with zeal and commitment. It was to help their own people.

Q: What was the U.S. response to this emergency?

MORSE: The response was overwhelmingly food aid, but with some medical supplies as well. The food aid was being put in through the United Nations Provincial Office for East Pakistan (UNPRO). They were coordinating all of the donors and did, I thought, an admiral job. World Food Program, the UN emergency food aid organization, had not been established yet.

Besides the food, we also financed almost 400 medium-sized vehicles that came in through UNICEF. We had to make a logistics plan and negotiate with UNICEF, and then with the UN Provincial Office, on how those trucks would be used and accounted for, as well as the food. That was a major responsibility.

We went through that period with the Bengali guerrillas (Mukti Bahini) being very active. Not long after I was there, they blew all the road bridges so that we couldn't bring the trucks up any longer with the grain out of the Chittagong port up into the Dacca Valley. So, we were faced with a situation that these longer haul vehicles were now trying to do food distribution short haul. They were really too big; and, it wasn't all that appropriate. To supplement it, we worked with the railway people of East Pakistan to try and bring the food up by rail. We had to engage in a lot more logistics discussions, again, with a multi-donor effort. But, we were by far the largest food donor. So, we had quite an influence in all food transport matters. We started to move the stuff up by rail.

In fact, a fellow who worked with us at that point, a USAID Food for Peace officer named Steve Singer, was instrumental in really getting out into the bush and talking food transport with the guerrilla leaders. I told the U.S. Consulate that I had instructed Steve to talk directly with the guerrillas to see if we could get the trains and the bridges and everything secured by them and the government, and also to make sure the guerrillas weren't going to blow them up. The CONGEN was reluctant at first but then he said, "Do it quietly and informally. We don't know about it; but, if that's part of your business to be sure the food is delivered, go ahead and do it." Steve was repeatedly out there and worked with the guerrillas to let the food through. Later, when they blew the bridges on the railway, I went back out in the jungles with Steve and asked these leaders, "You guys said you would let this food through. We're trying to feed your people." They said,

"Well, we're getting word that those trains are also bringing West Pakistani arms in here and troops and ammunition, so we had to stop it." We negotiated more with the guerrillas and then USAID West Pakistan Mission, with Wheeler: "Do we just throw up our hands?" We agreed the only thing to do was try one more delivery avenue. We chartered 17 shallow draft vessels out of Greece to bring the food up the river from the Chittagong port, which was like a two and one-half day trip. I went out to the bush again with Steve and tried to get agreement with everybody that the food could come up by boat on the river. It wasn't a month after the first vessels arrived and started to move food that the Mukti Bahini guerrillas put limp mines right below the water line and blew holes in our vessels. At that point, when we couldn't bring it in by truck, couldn't bring it in by rail, couldn't bring it in by boat, we basically decided, "It's all over as far as what we can do on a humanitarian relief basis."

Q: What scale are we talking about? How many people?

MORSE: About 10 million people being fed with our food and delivery.

Q: This was in the southern areas?

MORSE: Unfortunately, it was in the areas all along the India border. That was the guerrillas redoubt area. It was in the southern parts, too; but, as the war expanded, it was also up in the far north in the hills. It never got over on the border with Burma.

Again, let me record my admiration for two special staff members: Steve, who later also worked with us in the drought of 1984-1986 in Africa; Terry Myers, who was with us as a junior officer but later became a fine Mission Director. Those guys crossed the lines of fighting several times over toward the Burma hills to notify American missionaries that guerrillas were up in those hills, that they really had to get out, that we were not able to bring in food anymore and that it was not safe or secure. We were part of the embassy's watch and warning system. Those guys were just fantastic in going and contacting these people and then walking them out, walking them across the fighting lines.

Q: This emergency, was it solely because of the tidal wave or because of a drought or were there shortages?

MORSE: The war.

Q: It disrupted food production entirely.

MORSE: Yes. People were dislocated from the land. They couldn't get access to their inputs. They couldn't harvest if they did. Frankly, it was caused equally by their own people and the East Pakistan Bengali Mukti Bahini guerrillas, as well as the West Pakistani army. The West Pakistani army came over in June to force the country together. The all out warfare basically went on from about June until September.

Then Mrs. Gandhi had been training one percent of the refugees that had been streaming across into India (there another 10 million displaced on that side of the boarder) that were being fed. Those people in those refugee camps were also the recruiting grounds for the Mukti Bahini guerrillas. She and the Indian army had been training them. So, she reinserted them back in in September, along with 400,000 Indian troops. During that period from June to September, after the West Pakistanis mounted full suppression and began all-out war via the military rather than a guerrilla operation, another quarter of a million people were killed. That just added to my sense of why it was the worst year in my life. Then, in September, when the Mukti Bahini and Indian army expanded operations and fought the war through December, another quarter of a million were killed in that period as well.

Finally, I can't remember the exact date, late November, the UN finally got a British air force Hercules plane out of Singapore and flew it to evacuate us. On the third try, they evacuated the rest of us out of there, except for three State Department people in the Embassy. Literally, we walled them up behind a brick wall when we left Consulate ground. We put the mortar and the bricks in place and left Arch Blood, who was the Consul General, and one secretary and one communicator. We walled them up inside the embassy. We had taken them as much food and as much water, candles, flashlights and batteries as we could. They were going to stay there. All the rest of us came out. Arch Blood was a year behind me in the international studies master's program at George Washington University. He had returned to college later in life, so he was older than me. I did not really know him very well at GWU; but, as American Consul General in Dacca, he was my immediate boss, even though I officially reported to Joe Wheeler in USAID/Islamabad. I really admired Arch. He had sent a dissent channel cable back to Washington totally differing with official State/USG policy on East Pakistan. He saw the West Pakistanis committing what others later called genocide against the rebelling Bengalis. Official policy was for the U.S. "not to take sides; this is an internal matter amongst Pakistanis". He was convinced that, with India's help, East Pakistan would win and break away to form a new country, which it ultimately did. Arch felt we were on the wrong side. He wanted to stay and "report from within the country". Washington did not like it, because they knew he was partisan toward the Bengalis, but allowed him to stay. He believed it was only a matter of days before the guerrillas and Indians would take over Dacca and he/we would be on the right side. Again, he was proven right; but, at what a personal and professional risk!

Q: Was there some sort of communication? Why stay there?

MORSE: Especially if they were boarded up. I guess that was the thing – safe inside the Consulate. When I say "boarded up", that's a little too dramatic. The whole ground floor of the embassy was "bricked up" because of the rioting in the streets, the shooting and the demonstrations. Arch was trying to report on the war. He would come out through some back stairs to be able to get out and keep the reports going. In fact, when the Bengali military commander entered the city of Dacca, Arch Blood and the military commander had dinner together by candlelight up in the Consulate just eating tin goods that we had left behind. Arch tried to understand what their objectives were, who they were and what

the political ramifications were. He then reported this first-hand, high-level, authoritative information back to Washington, and to the world.

We could talk a lot about some of the aspects of war; but, one of the most devastating to me is we had a USAID program of support to the university in Dacca. I was driving into Dacca one morning; there was a bullock cart ahead of me. I was listening to the local radio broadcast and had heard the BBC on shortwave before leaving my house. They said there had been much fighting at the university. I started to go around this bullock cart. I could see that there was some "water" dripping off of it. As I went around, the tarp flew up. Inside was the entire economics faculty of the university that had been shot that morning against the wall at the university. The cart was taking them out to be buried.

Q: These were Western Pakistanis?

MORSE: No, these were East Pakistanis. The West Pakistani army had shot them because they considered them to be inciting the people, the students, to riot and demonstrate as university professors. But they were East Pakistani. I lost my stomach right there in the car.

Q: I can imagine. People you knew, I guess, worked with them.

MORSE: Yes. Two of them I had worked with closely. By this time the war precluded any further attempts to deliver food. And Indian bombing had blown out, through concussion, not a direct hit, most of the windows and doors on my Gulshan house. It was time to leave. Regarding our evacuation: A "stand down" in the fighting had been negotiated to enable evacuating us. Just one story to illustrate the complexity of what was going on. We were in Dacca, but we were coordinating with the UN, who were coordinating with Islamabad by radio at that point, not by telegram, but by radio. They were also in touch with Geneva and New York. We were coordinating with Embassy Islamabad and Washington, but also with the Russians in Moscow, who were trying to be helpful at that point. We did not know which side they would be on (versus us in this Cold War) between Pakistan and India. The British were sending the relief plane. Singapore, where it was based, and Bangkok where it had to refuel, were involved. Everyone had agreed to a stand-down.

The first time the plane came in, there was a two-hour window for it to leave Singapore, go to Bangkok, refuel, come up the Bay of Bengal over Chittagong, then fly up the river and land in Dacca to pick us all up. We were all out at the airport. Five minutes before the stand-down period started, a plane flew over and cratered the runway with several bombs; so, five minutes later, when the British Hercules got there, the pilot looked at the runway and radioed, "I can't land on that. You have big holes in the middle of the runway." We were all out there with our suitcases trying to fill the holes, but he wouldn't land. He went back. The second time the plane came, it took ten (10) days to get everyone on board so that nobody would shoot down this plane. The second time it came, a jet plane strafed it. We said, "Who the hell didn't get the word to stand down or didn't agree to it?" About an hour later, our Consul General in Calcutta came on the radio and

said, “That was the Mukti Bahini Air Force.” Everyone was screaming and yelling, “Who the hell are the Mukti Bahini Air Force?” The reply: “We just went out to the Calcutta airport. Over on the military side of it somebody had painted a Mukti Bahini flag on the side of an Indian airplane, a jet, and that was the one that flew over and strafed you.”

The third time they got us out and evacuated us. We went to Islamabad after a couple of days of indirect travel. We couldn’t fly over India; we had to fly around India at that point because of the war. There now was the India-Pakistan war! Once Mrs. Gandhi had cut loose the Mukti Bahini, then the Indians and the Pakistanis went to war including in Islamabad, West Pakistan.

We finally got to Islamabad. We were there only about two (2) weeks when the Indians opened up the western front and started to bomb Islamabad. That is where our families were safe- havened! So, Ernice and I and our two children joined 13 other families. We formed a convoy and flew white flags on the tops of our cars. We drove up out of Islamabad and then up through the Khyber Pass and up through the Kabul Gorge and then sat out the rest of the war in Kabul, Afghanistan. We had Christmas in Kabul in a vacated, empty house. Joe Wheeler didn’t want us to be bored! The Mission in Kabul was welcoming us; however, they didn’t know what to do with us, except treat us as refugees. Joe dubbed us the “Mission in Exile”. He asked us to do post-hostilities planning. Again, this was part of the East Pakistan assignment.

Q: He was still in Islamabad?

MORSE: He was still in Islamabad. The U. S. Mission in Islamabad stayed; so, a group of us who had been evacuated to Kabul started to do post-hostilities planning for a future Bangladesh. About once a day we would file a cable out of Kabul back to Islamabad and into Washington about the currency, the food, the relocation of displaced people, the transportation situation, telecommunications, government services – our speculation on what would be needed when the hostilities were over. Secretary Kissinger got hold of one of those cables and remarked, “I don’t know who the hell these people are that are sitting in Afghanistan talking about this unrecognized (diplomatically) place called Bangladesh that doesn’t even exist; but, disband them or else we are going to send the wrong signals on diplomacy.” That once again shows the clash sometimes between foreign policy and what we considered very good foreign aid planning to try to do post-hostilities planning that would give everyone a leg up about what kind of reconstruction effort would have to be done.

Q: But you had accepted the fact that Bangladesh was going to be independent?

MORSE: Absolutely. Maybe that was the reason that he didn’t want us working on it when the official policy was not to recognize a country born through war. We were assuming that there would be a separate country that came out of this war. Three weeks after we were all moved out of Islamabad to Afghanistan, the war was over. We went back down to Islamabad and then disbanded. Washington decided that nobody who had

served in Dacca before would return, that they would bring in all brand new people. I do not know who made that decision.

Q: Why was that?

MORSE: We were told it was because they didn't want American staff that had previous working relationships with the East Pakistanis or whether they were pro-West Pakistan and whether we would be seen as neutral or not. From my point of view, it was an absolutely terrible management decision from the standpoint of reconstruction. You had staff there who had lived there, studied it, knew it, were ready to work on the reconstruction and had insights; but, from the State Department's point of view, this could complicate whether or not we recognized the country, whether we were seen as objective. So, everybody from USAID/Dacca was disbanded. That's it.

Q: What were some of the main issues, lessons or experiences in managing a relief operation and so on?

MORSE: The usual ones on how much bilateral U.S. control there would be over the trucks and the food and our accountability versus trying to get good accountability standards agreed to with the United Nations and the other donors; how to get close enough coordination so we weren't duplicating each other; that we were talking to the East Pakistanis' relief commissioner with one voice and with a common strategy; whether the Bengalis were strong enough to have a relief plan of their own and not get rick-sawed by us, the donors; that, if we had a special interest in one needy group, one geographic area, one type of relief, it would distort the East Pakistanis' program. These were probably the biggest complications.

Q: Were the East Pakistanis cooperative in managing the program; or, did they resent the outside?

MORSE: No, the East Pakistan government, repeat government, which tended to reflect West Pakistan policies, were very grateful that we were all staying there and trying to help. If anything, it was the irony of the East Pakistan guerrillas who were trying to starve their people into revolution so that they wanted us to stop feeding. They just wanted us to put pressure on their own people rather than being seen as aligned with the West Pakistan puppet surrogate in East Pakistan. The politics became overriding to the humanitarian life-saving efforts, I'm afraid.

Q: Food became sort of a weapon.

MORSE: As always. Over and over, if you're not careful, while we carry out humanitarian objectives, we are very much part of a political agenda or sides in an insecure situation; and, it can be used as a weapon. We've seen that happen over and over again. It is a lesson I later took when I directed the USG humanitarian aid to the African drought in 1984-86.

Q: Were there any practical operational issues? You mentioned some of the logistics.

MORSE: From where we were inside the country, that is what overwhelmed us, just the sheer magnitude of the logistics of it. Also, the complications of trying to be accountable for vehicles, equipment and funds that were still there from the development projects, which we couldn't really follow up on directly in a war. You had some parts of Washington who kept asking us, "Have you located this vehicle and secured it and put it under your control?" You answer, "Hell, we can't get down there. They're shooting in that area. We don't go in there." Those kinds of realities. Washington wanted more reporting than we had access to or time for.

Q: How much U.S. funding was involved in the relief operations of this magnitude?

MORSE: I should know that. It would seem to me (and it wasn't just justified only on the basis of the 1971 tidal bore and then the West Pakistani invasion and the guerrilla war and then the Indian army coming in), the figure that sticks in my mind (this should be checked with the records) was like $400 million worth of food probably for the year 1971. Then there were the costs of the trucks, the chartered Greek vessels and the OE/admin costs of running the Mission.

Q: Was there any issue in getting adequate funding support?

MORSE: We didn't seem to have any. We seemed to be able to get the magnitude of food, transport and logistics that we needed.

Q: Funding for the trucks and all that.

MORSE: Yes. If there were funding squabbles, negotiations and difficulties, it was at a higher level than my pay grade. I was so preoccupied with on-the-ground logistics, it didn't appear. Certainly, it was timely. We got what we needed in time, partly because the relief effort had started back in the early part of 1970 with the tidal bore, but also because of the knowledge that the fighting, even before March of 1971, had disrupted the local food production.

On that production, I was in awe of East Pakistan's rice production, having just come up from Indonesia, which was just coming out of a very difficult period in the post-Sukarno period when they didn't have enough food, which was the primary cause of major inflation. In East Pakistan, there were places where they were getting four (4) crops per year off the same piece of land. They literally would harvest one day and plow it up the next and plant the next day. With the rains, however, and the monsoons, not to mention the heavy rains in East Pakistan, there were places where they could literally get four crops a year. Thank goodness, because I always felt they could feed themselves if they didn't have the political and security disruptions.

Q: What about this attempt to negotiate with the guerrilla groups and so on? Was there some formal operation? Was the U.S. government the primary group involved in that of

trying to negotiate with the guerrillas and with the government in terms of being sure that…

MORSE: The UN took the position that they couldn't talk to them. The British were persona non grata. So, the informal understanding is that we in USAID were able to talk to them and did talk to them. As far as everybody else was concerned, we were just talking to them – and we were only talking to them – about how many trucks would be coming with how much food and, "Would you leave them alone and don't blow the bridges and don't stop it and don't shake them down or siphon off and steal the bags when they're stopped to be checked?" and all the rest of that stuff. There was a tremendous amount of thievery caused by the sense of desperation and the number of armed people who had the weapons to interdict anything.

Q: Was it a reasonably well-organized and controlled structure with the guerrillas?

MORSE: At first, we felt it wasn't. They would tell us that this was a splinter group that blew that railway bridge or it was a splinter group that blew that road bridge; later, it became very clear that it was a well-structured guerrilla operation with a command and control structure that could effectively start or stop interdiction at its decision. That was my impression.

Q: Any other part of that experience?

MORSE: No, just that it was heartening to see a lot of our people later – people we went through this with. Bill McLaughlin was our Management Officer. He stayed on until the last to help literally go out to people's houses of all the staff that had been evacuated before us and try to get it packed up and into warehouses and secure it so nothing was stolen.

An interesting thing when I evacuated was that I left with about an hour and one-half notice with one suitcase. I left behind my few personal effects in my house in Gulshan, which was situated between the airport and the army containment area. It had most of the doors and windows blown out of it by that time. The house never took a direct hit; but, it was close enough that all the doors and windows were blown out. Despite that openness of it, my Bengali household staff worked to secure any effects. Eighteen (18) months later, I received all of my household effects, including a shotgun and a 22 rifle. It was delivered to me a year and one-half later entirely intact. That kind of dedication by the local USAID staff and our household staff was marvelous. I have such high respect for them!

Q: Impressive.

MORSE: Another thing that struck me is that having been sent by AID to the University of Chicago to learn family planning and population at the Don Bogue Center there before going into Indonesia, I was very keenly aware of the population pressures and the deaths and the birth rates, the replacements and all the rest of that. While over in Kabul, I looked

at some of the demographic numbers. There were people who would cynically say war was population reduction, "Out of this situation half a million people were lost to the flood, then another quarter million were lost to the guerrillas and Indians fighting and lost to the West Pakistanis fighting". Still, at the birth rate that East Pakistan had, the three quarters of a million people lost was made up for in thirty-two (32) days! Later, whenever I would get into a conversation with people about "how natural disasters are just God's way of equalizing population growth", I developed a little technique of accounting for losses in East Pakistan – that there was a birth there every second. With that birth rate not in any way interrupted, they replaced all of those people lost in just thirty-two (32) days. It had an impact on me in terms of trying to balance out the natural and economic resources with the human resource growths occurring. So much for East Pakistan, a year I'd just as soon never have gone through.

Q: It was just one year.

MORSE: Really only nine (9) months. We left Pakistan in March of 1972. A year that was the worst year.

Q: Then you moved on.

ETHIOPIA CONTEXT

Ethiopia's history goes back centuries, ruled by monarchies. The U.S. and Ethiopia's Emperor, Haile Selassie, were close friends during his 44-year reign. He allowed a U.S. National Security Agency "listening facility" outside Asmara on the Red Sea that enabled eavesdropping on European communist countries. In exchange, Ethiopia was the second longest recipient of U.S. aid.

In 1973-74, historians believe four (4) events began to undermine the Emperor's hold on power: An international oil crisis caused a worldwide massive increase in the price of oil/gas; the Emperor was unable to pay off military leaders for their loyalty; a severe drought hit the country and hundreds of thousands of people died, while the isolated Emperor refused to acknowledge that there were hungry and dying people in the country; a comprehensive education sector review publicly called for reforms in the elitist education system, which panicked the royalist; and popular demonstrations charged the reforms did not go far enough. The aged Emperor had refused to name a successor, resulting in palace discontent.

In 1974, a military junta moved to take advantage of this chaos. It imprisoned the Emperor and secretly killed him. It appointed a 90-person committee (Derg) to chart a new form of "representative" government.

By 1975-76, the rolling revolution established a socialist state which was supported by the USSR and took on anti-U.S. policies. My assignment from January, 1972, until mid-1976 straddled this transition period.

MORSE: After East Pakistan, we had been out of the U.S. for nine (9) years. Washington offered to rotate us back and was offering I come in and be the Jordan desk officer. Frankly, though, because it had been such a bad year, I didn't want to come and sit in Washington with that experience as kind of my last memory of development overseas. I asked if we could go to another assignment overseas instead. I wasn't sure whether it was the Africa Bureau; but, I do think it was probably Dr. Clifford Little who asked that I be transferred to Ethiopia to work with him. Washington resisted this because my backstop and assignments had been in the Program Office. The job that he had and wanted me for was a Multi-Sector Officer, which meant in our jargon that you had some technical competence in one or two development sectors. Washington continued to resist this, saying, "No, you're a Program Officer. You have to go into a program slot."

Q: What was Dr. Little's position?

MORSE: He was Chief of the USAID/Ethiopia Education and Human Resources Division. We had worked together in Indonesia. He was a superb technical transfer person. He really knew how to build education systems and institutions. I really enjoyed working with him. He came out of the University of Wisconsin, where he was, I think, head of the teacher in service training at the University of Wisconsin. He first took a leave of absence and headed up the Education Office in USAID/India, went back to the university, then was brought out by AID after a couple of years, went to Korea, headed up our Education Office there, then went back to the University of Wisconsin, then went down to USAID/Indonesia. At that point, the University of Wisconsin said, "Look, you have to decide. Are you a university professor or are you an AID technician?" He said, "I want to do this work in Ethiopia."

Q: He was in Nigeria before in the early 1960's.

MORSE: I didn't realize he had served in Nigeria. Did you work with him there? By the way, his daughter, Ann, is coming tomorrow. She has contacted me and will be here. We've stayed in touch all these years.

I was the Assistant Program Officer, as you know, in Indonesia, backstopping education. We had worked closely together there. He was a great person on education technical assistance. He didn't care about AID's documentation, programming, budgeting and all that internal stuff and wanted somebody who could do that side of the operation. We worked well together. Finally, Director Roger Ernst prevailed to have me assigned to USAID/Ethiopia. It may have even been you, Haven! Where were you in 1972? The Africa Bureau?

Q: Yes, I was in West Africa, in Ghana.

MORSE: Okay. The personnel system finally gave up their resistance that a Program Officer could be in a multi-sector technical position. I also had a strong commitment that I had been promoted very early and very fast in AID. I knew that I shouldn't be and wouldn't be promoted again right away; therefore, there was time to see the development

process from a technical point of view, from a project manager's point of view, rather than just a program planning point of view. So, I was eager to have the perspective and fought to be pulled out of the program assignment to be allowed to do the MSO job. I've always felt it was very enriching in terms of seeing our own AID operations from a different point of view and perspective.

Q: So, you started in Ethiopia when?

MORSE: In about March of 1972. I was the Deputy Multi-Sector Officer, Deputy to Cliff. We were in charge of an office of basically the soft development sciences. Education was the core; but, we also had some work with the labor movement, with local government administration and then, when I got there, they asked if I would start some family planning work because of the training that the Agency had given me at the University of Chicago.

Q: What was the situation in Ethiopia at that time?

MORSE: In 1972, it was relatively stable. The monarchy of Haile Selassie had been in place since World War I. He was still very firmly in control of the situation. AID had been there since 1951 and had a good reputation with them. They were a close ally of ours. There was political and security justification to stay close to them because of where they were situated on the Horn and access to the Red Sea because of the transport routes for oil. The Emperor was still seen as quite an African leader; and, with the headquarters in Addis of the Economic Commission for Africa, the Organization of African Unity, the country was important to the U.S. Politically, it was important, as well as for security and economics. From a development point of view, HMG and AID had started to develop over the last twenty (20) years a lot of indigenous education systems and institutions from the Gondar Public Health College, to the Alamaya Agriculture College, Haile Selassie University, a lot of education institutions that we were involved with. It was truly a rewarding assignment for 1972.

Q: What about the education part? What was the focus of that?

MORSE: We had $1.5 million a year for a higher education support program where we did salary topping off of American contractors who were teaching at Haile Selassie University on their salary scale - for every American position, which we called OPEXs (Operating Experts). I remember the scheme was called OPAS, OSAS or OPEXs – the same thing, depending on whether it was UN, British or American. We paid to educate in the U.S. two Ethiopian professors for faculty development for higher education to replace our Americans for every one American in there. So, we had a huge participant training program supervised by our office. The USAID Participant Training Officer was an American to begin with; but, we phased that out and replaced her with her Ethiopian assistant. We didn't replace the American because the Ethiopian assistant was so good. Cliff and I also supervised the participant training program.

Q: What were the main areas for these American OPEX people and the Ethiopian participants, what subject areas?

MORSE: It was really heavily oriented toward both the natural and the social sciences. We weren't very involved in the humanities and the arts. We were also involved in higher education administration. We worked closely with the president of Haile Selassie University, Dr. Aklilu Habte; and, his deputy, Mulageta Widadjo. Mulageta later went over (after the revolution) to the World Bank and headed up the IBRD Education Office, which is a measure of the stature of the quality of the people we were dealing with. It was really a joy to work on that project. You were dealing with high quality education people like that; when they came of their own country, they were world class. It was a really good program. Our Ethiopian Training Officer was Mulageta Widadjo's wife, Yeshi Imanu, which probably now would be seen as some conflict of interest; but, she was well qualified, having been an AID university participant herself. She did a wonderful job of managing that large participant training program, from my point of view. We sent probably 100-plus university professors under it. The success is demonstrated by Ethiopia being able to educate its' own university professors at home in their own institutions; we and they no longer need to educate them under an AID participant training program, out of Ethiopia.

Q: Roughly what kind of numbers are we talking about?

MORSE: For $1.5 million a year, we salary topped off about fifty (50) American professors. They each had a HS1 University salary in local currency (which preserved the budgeted position for returning Ethiopian professors); and, we topped that off to equal the American's stateside salary.

Q: So, it was pretty substantial.

MORSE: Yes. The second year I was there, there was a national education sector review led by some extremely competent Ethiopians. They had some UNESCO help on it. We provided consultants periodically to some of the dozens of task forces that were examining in a year-long review the whole education sector in Ethiopia. We brought in several experts from the University of California and Harvard to help analyze education financing under an expanded system. The "populist" sector review was adopted, but not without great political strain in Ethiopia. Its' main finding was that they should greatly expand mass education at all levels. Up until then, the Ethiopian education system had been elitist. The review said that if the country was ever really going to grow economically, then the mass of people had to have an education foundation that would allow them to innovate and to become entrepreneurial and to find work in the private sector, rather than just going to the government sector. The political elite resisted such a fundamental change : "We would give up education quality for mass quantity." I represented the U.S. when the sector review was presented to the Emperor; and, I met him at the palace. In the sector review, it was agreed that AID's special area would be analyzing the non-formal education area.

Dr. Little asked if I would be the Project Manager. We spent a good deal of time taking the analysis from the sector review and then working that into our own project proposals to Washington. It was approved; and, we started a rather large non-formal education program that included everything from work-oriented adult literacy to vocational education. I can't remember the exact figures; but, I would imagine at that point that you were still seeing the adults in Ethiopia were probably close to 50-60 percent illiterate; and yet, they were still the backbone of the economy and were going to be the producers until the younger people got through the formal education system. So, we were focusing on NFE, at the request of the sector review leaders.

Q: This was countrywide?

MORSE: Yes, it was. We were working again with a man who was the Under Secretary of Education, Million Neknek. He was just a joy to work with. We provided everything from advisors to some of the inputs to develop NFE materials that were geared toward adults: learning, but learning in a work environment, whether they were blacksmiths, farmers, carpenters, etc. So, many of them were learning and upgrading their technical skills while also getting the fundamentals of literacy, numeracy, civics, etc., which was extremely important at that point. It was a very satisfying project to manage. It wasn't a lot of money. I think we were putting in maybe $400,000 a year; but, the impact of that was great given the multiplier effect of our inputs.

Q: Was there an Ethiopian institution that was overseeing this?

MORSE: The Ministry of Education's Assistant Minister for Non-Formal and Adult Education led that effort. I can't remember his name.

Q: But with non-formal education, there is always this dilemma of trying to institutionalize it; yet, it's non-formal and you don't want to get it too institutionalized and that sort of thing.

MORSE: The government and we insisted on bringing in missionaries, hundreds of private organizations, everything from burial societies to farmers associations to almost guilds and unions and bring them together, offer the materials, offer to train the trainers and get the multiplier effect out through hundreds of channels of non-formal education.

Q: Did you have a fairly big staff on this sort of program?

MORSE: On our own?

Q: No, the Ministry of Education?

MORSE: They had a staff of maybe twenty (20) people in Addis; but, then every provincial education office had people who were assigned with this NFE responsibility. Some of my most wonderful memories were going out to the field to see this in operation in the rural areas day after day after day and to see how excited adult Ethiopians were to

learn and to grow through this program. Up until then, as illiterate old people, they felt by-passed and inferior to their own (few) modernizing young people. It stifled their productivity and undermined traditional cultural value of respect for elders.

Another program we were responsible for was to start family planning, as I said. There was no Ethiopian government policy there; but, the Pathfinder Fund had been working with the Ethiopian Family Guidance Association. We very quietly began to work with them to train their staff, to put more money in through IPPF, the International Planned Parenthood Federation in London. This was a time when white America helping to control the population and reduce it in black Africa was not a very legitimate topic of conversation. In fact, I was asked to go to an all- Africa family planning meeting in Lusaka in 1975 as an American observer to that conference. From what we were told, that was the first time that Africans having their own conference had invited an American population officer to come there. The program was extensively trying to build up the private Family Guidance Association's staff, institution, systems, management procedures, outreach, educational materials, providing everything from IUDs and the loops to them and training doctors to help on that; but, doing it quietly and low key enough that we didn't become a lightning rod to have groups who were opposed to it attack the private Family Guidance Association. We quietly trained E/FGA leaders in how to lobby the government and help write a national population policy.

Q: That was the time when the issue in the central Population Office in Washington was just pushing contraceptive supply and so on. There were others who were saying you had to link it to maternal childcare and health programs and so on. What was the situation in Ethiopia?

MORSE: Ray Ravenholt was not very happy with me because I started family planning in Indonesia, not his people. Still, he trained me. We did eventually bring in "his people" in Indonesia. I was trying to continue family planning in East Pakistan and started it in Ethiopia. I was a "true believer" that we had to do it, but that it had to be fitted into the culture, the society and the local delivery systems. So, we resisted having a separate American population officer in AID/Addis, and that we not only be the delivery system for the condoms and other supplies. Our focus was more on building Ethiopian F.P. institutions and local organizations. We let the politically sensitive higher profile stuff come in through IPPF or through Pathfinder, which AID helped finance through our Central Washington office. Frankly, one of the issues that we were stuck was what was an AID field project officer's responsibility for AID/W centrally funded activities? At different times, Ravenholt, whom I had met in Indonesia, Washington, after coming out of East Pakistan (which were big population focus countries for him, were very important to him) would waffle back and forth: "You are our representative. You are there on the ground. You are to oversee it. You are to manage it." But then if you managed it too much: "What the hell are you doing interfering with the central population grants? You are a bilateral project manager. These are through central grants that we give to London and to Pathfinder in Boston. Keep your hands off of those. We will manage these from Washington." Frankly, that in a very serious way complicated our field management, our

grantees' relationships with us. I'm not sure that issue is still satisfactorily resolved by the Agency in terms of the relationship with Central versus field, bilateral management.

Q: What do you think is the best working arrangement?

MORSE: Make the distinction between managing and monitoring. If we have obligated the funds, we have a fiduciary responsibility to actually manage those monies and projects; if that fiduciary responsibility is retained by Washington as part of a central project managers' responsibility of grant to a worldwide organization, that is where the fiduciary accountability management goes. Of course, then they're not on the ground, so your field people should be monitoring and reporting on those centrally funded activities; still, you shouldn't actually be trying to manage them. That is a little hard to restrain some of our people in the field sometimes, who feel like it's all American taxpayers' money and, if they see it's not being used correctly, they feel they have a right and a responsibility to report on it, to redirect it, even though it may ire the central grant makers' responsibility.

Q: What was the attitude of the Ethiopian people, the government?

MORSE: The government was aware of this. We met with the Minister of Health people, with the planning people and explained what we were doing; however, we always did it with their own Family Guidance Association leadership.

Q: That wasn't a government sponsored program, was it?

MORSE: No, it was not; however, it was not stopped by the government. As it grew, it became the supply line for inputting contraceptives into the government clinics. That came through the Family Guidance Association. The woman who headed it was Wizero Zahai. She was a royalist, well connected to the palace. She was also one of the key board members of the monarchy- sponsored Ethiopian Women's Welfare Association (EWWA). She was very influential and very easy to work with because we were supporting Ethiopian leadership. It was understood that we would never get out in front of what Wizero Zahai wanted. It was her pace, her profile, her strategies. We could give her alternative ideas, make suggestions, think about it, but we knew never to step out in front of her or the program would be blown out of the water as an American imperialist program to control the Ethiopian population.

Q: What about acceptance by the people generally?

MORSE: There were some fascinating stories. We could spend hours on that. Reaction was checkered and variable. It varied in part by whether the program was dealing with the Moslem urbans, or the Moslems up in the Asmara/Tigre area, or the Coptic Christian majority, or the animists over on the Somali border. A lot of it had to do with religion; but, it also had to do with the customs and the cultures of those different tribal groups. It was expanding at a phenomenal rate. You started from a very low base, so you could get

a 100-200% increase in contraceptive acceptors in a year's time just because your base was so small. The program was managed in a way to expand.

One of the bureaucratic complexities came from combining the non-formal education work that we were doing in USAID with managing the family planning work. We were working with the Ethiopian traditional birth attendants. Through them we worked in terms of literacy and numeracy, health and hygiene, and then through the Family Guidance Association bringing in the family planning methods to the TBA non-formal education. We offered to pay at one point for a little kit of things to be given to the traditional birth attendants when they graduated. We went into Washington with a procurement request. It seems to me we were looking at $15,000 for the whole TBA/NFE graduating class; but, we knew we had to get Washington's approval because we wanted to buy everything in the kits locally. At that point, I don't think we had even the minimal exception from the Buy America Act. So, we just explained that we wanted to buy graduation kits, that they would cost $15,000, and all the things in the kits were available locally, and it wouldn't make sense or time and be culturally acceptable to village TBA to import this stuff from America. Some commodity officer in Washington turned us down. John Withers was Director or Acting Director at that point. I went upstairs furious and mad and just pounding the table. John, in his quiet way, just said, "Just rebut it and send in an appeal to ask them to reconsider." Of course, I was coming off the walls and ceiling. So, I went back; and, I sent a detailed telegram about what we wanted to buy locally, which included a candle, that would give a flame, that would be lit by a match, that would sterilize a razor blade, that would be used to cut the umbilical cord (instead of chewing it off), that would be tied off with a piece of string, and that the TBA would wash their hands in a porcelain basin, with a bar of soap, and drying with a towel, one in each kit! I got a one word answer back: "Approved!" It does show, though, that we got overboard at times on that Buy America stuff when the AID local procurement had miniscule impact on our FX and trade balance.

Q: For sure.

MORSE: …that we lost sight of what was needed to do things right in the field and needed the local flexibility on small things. Later, of course, we had the policy for local waivers on that, which we could approve in the field.

Q: Was there any tie in on family planning with the rural health program?

MORSE: At that point, we weren't that big in the primary health program. We still had a rather large malaria eradication program. There was a big Gondar public health school AID project. The FGA distributed information, supplied contraceptives, collected statistics, did evaluations with the primary care clinics, etc. on maternal and child health and family planning matters.

Q: Was it being introduced into the public health curriculum and so on?

MORSE: No, not at that stage yet. Later it was; and, later it was added to the basic and university education curriculum. Information was given, not hard sell to change attitudes.

Q: The medical establishment was not fully engaged in this?

MORSE: This was very early on. It was simply carried out with the medical people at the clinical level, not a lot of stepping out yet. They just felt it wasn't acceptable. The Emperor had not blessed it in any way. The feeling was that if you went too far, too fast, too big, it would backfire on you. Probably the next thing to turn to was the Emperor's overthrow.

Q: Were there any other sectors you were dealing with?

MORSE: Labor. I was managing our support to the African American Labor Center.

Q: What were they doing?

MORSE: Everything from teaching people – AALC had a rather extensive program working with the Ethiopian labor unions, politically sensitive, obviously, because they weren't always following the royalist path. There was other donor aid in there also, including the German Frederick Ebert Foundation that had a lot to do. The IFCTU was in there. The work that we were doing through ACLU was a lot of helping the labor leaders set up good management and accounting practices and how to run seminars for shop stewards and responsible unionism on how to calculate a raise, teaching the fundamentals of economics, on why you don't ask for a 70% raise when the inflation is seven (7) percent, how to justify a raise with productivity and earnings and all that stuff. It was a fairly good program and ACLU had been in there for quite a while.

Another program that we had, which, again, kind of integrated education and labor, was grants to Reverend Leon Sullivan's Opportunities Industrialization Center International (OICI). They had some very good staff members applying their own approach to training young people, and preparing them for work, and working with businesses to take people in almost on an apprenticeship basis whether it was a butcher, a barber or a woodworker. Banking was another area where they trained people. The only problem with that is that you didn't get the multiplier effect. It was probably very effective because it was small and hands on and they were able to deal with each individual. "Do you know enough numeracy to go in and be a carpenter so that you know how to measure a board?" "Do you have enough training in terms of how to dress if you are going to be working in that office?" There was training on how to deal with individual's discipline, showing up on time and being responsible to a boss. That was all good work training; but, it was so individually focused for a handful of people that it was extremely hard to multiply it without a high overhead of trainers and supervisors.

Q: Was this all funded by AID?

MORSE: At that point, they were 100% funded by AID.

Q: Was there any effort to try to get local funding and so on?

MORSE: There was. The funding for them tended – when they could get – to be small. They weren't getting an awful lot. It came from the Ethiopian private businesses. They would basically fund the salary of an intern while they were in training, rather than pay the overhead that OICI had that was so important to run the program with individual seminars.

Q: What about the government; were they providing any support?

MORSE: At that point, no. Later, we had it set up to be integrated and become part of the work-oriented adult education program. Then the revolution aborted that. It never went into being.

Q: Let's turn to the revolution. You were there during that time?

MORSE: I was there. I was also captured and held hostage by guerrillas for a little while and escaped.

Q: What were the first signs of the revolution? They had a drought at that time.

MORSE: That's right. Many of us have said that the revolution was a combination of three (3) factors. First, up until this period of 1973-74, any time Haile Selassie's authority was challenged, the military and the police, which were totally loyal to him, could be relied on to forcefully put down any sorts of demonstrations. But with the oil price shock of 1972 or 1973, it hit the economy in Ethiopia very, very hard. Frankly, the Emperor didn't have the money as a result of the deterioration in the economy to pay off the military the way he had before. That payoff was all the way from the generals at the top with all kinds of financial perks down to the lower levels that got large salary increases each year and got all kinds of perks in terms of free health, education, transport, and all of this. But with the oil shock, they couldn't do it.

Second, that was coinciding at that point with the drought of 1973-75, which was widespread and severe. But Haile Selassie would not allow any Ethiopian to be photographed without shoes or show being hungry. He would not declare a national emergency or a food shortage. He felt that that would cause more disruption if it showed that he was not able to take care of his people. His answer was, literally, as you've probably seen over and over again, and I watched it, that he would drive through the streets and throw burr, the Ethiopian currency, out the window. If anybody was poor, he would stop and give them some money or have his driver do it. That was his answer to the hungry and poor. When it go to the point where the students out at the Dire Dawa teacher training college were just so incensed that their families were dying, their families didn't have money to pay their school fees, they had to go back home and try and help find food and get out of school. And yet, the government would not even acknowledge

that there was a drought or a famine going on. The students rioted and demonstrated. When the teacher training college students rioted, so did other colleges.

Q: Where were the other teacher training colleges on this?

MORSE: That's a good question. The second riots were at the Harar one.

Q: One that we had helped create.

MORSE: Yes, they felt a sense of responsibility. Researchers ought to look at whether we were influential in training the staff to train the teachers to feel that they had a right to a government that would reflect what the reality was and not hide the reality in their own country, not ignore those dying in the drought.

The first time, the military and police put it down and a couple of kids were shot and killed. The second time they demonstrated, the military and the police stopped themselves and said, "Wait a minute. These are our children. These are our families. What they're saying is true. What in the hell are we doing shooting them?" So, the military didn't back the Emperor in suppressing it. That demonstration and rioting, and the government not responding to salary increases for the civil servants, for the teachers, for the government workers, as well as not having food, that combination of wild discontent just spread like wildfire throughout the country. The military didn't put it down. That undermined the Emperor's authority.

Thirdly, that combined with the urban royalists' concern that the old man was getting old and feeble and out of control, but had never allowed a clear designation of successor. So, from a political succession point of view, there were all kinds of urban indecision as well as the inflation, the insecurity, the drought, and the lack of food. All these factors played together. As you know, the military put the Emperor under house arrest and moved him from the Jubilee Palace to the old Menelik Palace up on the hill and formed the revolutionary Derg, which was a 91-person "Committee". Historians have later called it a "communist military junta".

During that period, I was still going to the university every day. I was on campus because I was the USAID Project Manager. So, I would literally (probably stupid as you look at it now) walk through the demonstrators' lines. Many of the student leaders knew who I was, knew who Cliff Little was, that I was the Project Manager. The school administrators knew. So, I was free to go back and forth.

It wasn't very long before some of our political and intelligence people at the embassy who were not getting out would say, "What did you see? What did you hear? What are they saying? What do they want? Next time you go, could you find out this?" So, it was bordering on: Was I a political and intelligence reporter; or, was I managing the AID assets and finding out if our technical people were secure and whether they were safe and able to hold classes and earn their salary and all the rest of it?

I personally had real high hopes that when Major Mengistu came in and set up the widely representative 91-person Derg, they were on a path to reform that ancient monarchy to a pluralistic democracy. They had in the Derg representatives from the students, teachers, the unions, farmers, royalists, business, military, police, civil servants, etc. Every segment of society was represented. They seemed to be very concerned about the population. We had a small program in local government administration. Bill Berg, whom I mentioned before in Thailand, had done some work for us on this. We were asked to submit papers on what would it mean to decentralize the public administration to give the authority out to the governors and the district authorities, etc.

Q: Asked by who?

MORSE: The Derg. We were asked if we would submit papers on different parts of a more democratic, populace, pluralistic government and administration and programs. They asked for programs, that would we support on a nationwide immediate expansion like the nation literacy program, things that looked very promising. But, as history (and we don't need to go into Ethiopian history and AID's role) at that point showed, Mengistu began to whittle down, dismiss even kill, the Derg group, and get it down to people who were more attuned to his communist thinking.

Q: What do you think was influencing him? Was he getting the signals from the Soviets and the communists?

MORSE: Last night on the Internet on the Africa News, which I read every night, Mengistu was being moved to a new, safer house in Harare, Zimbabwe. That is where he went in 1991 at the conclusion of the civil war to overthrow him. He is very concerned about the demonstrations that had been going on there against Mugabe's government the last three or four months and has made arrangements to move into a house where he can be better protected; but also, as reported, had made arrangement that if it becomes too insecure for him there, he will go to the one other country that had supported him so fully and is still in power - North Korea. I mention that in part answer to your question. I think we later began to feel that he was very much under the control of the world communist leaders rather than the world democracy leaders, or even a very good nationalist. I saw him originally as a very sound nationalist. Whether he always was a communist and was just getting credibility and legitimacy by talking more nationalist, populist things, or whether this is something that just changed him after time, I don't know.

Q: Do you know anything about his background, his training?

MORSE: He had been through military training in America and in Russia. He was a major when he took over, which was kind of a lower level because all the army generals were pretty much royalists. He also was an Amhara, but from way out on a fringe and not in a royalist role. Anyway, he whittled the Derg down by isolating them out. It became clear that he wasn't going to implement some of these populist reforms that had been talked about. Ultimately, as you know, he just literally annihilated his entire opposition and his Derg; there were eyewitness reports of people in the Derg meetings pulling out

guns and shooting each other in the Cabinet meetings. He then took over complete control and ran it as a communist dictator from basically 1974-1991, for fifteen (15) years, until he was overthrown. But by that time, he had certainly set back a lot of things, including what AID had invested in. There was a huge brain drain. Part of that was that he was not seen as favorable to the Amharas that had been the elite, that had run the universities, the training colleges, the government, the unions, the teachers' association, and all the things that we had helped build up. So, you saw this huge mass exodus of educated Ethiopians that fled for their lives – hundreds of thousands. By the time I left in mid-1976, having been there for four and one-half years, we had basically stopped the normal economic development program.

Q: What were we doing during that period?

MORSE: From 1973-1974, we were trying to continue to implement the projects that had been going on for 20-25 years there in the areas we just talked about. That was just my own AID job. I'm not talking about agriculture, which we had a huge program in, and malaria eradication, which we were involved with, and public health…it was more water at that point other than developing the public health college. We were trying to implement those things; but, it became increasingly more difficult and, frankly, the State Department was beginning to tell us more and more that maybe we shouldn't be supporting this regime and we should be sending them signals to cut back on the aid program.

Q: At that time, did we also have the issue of expropriation?

MORSE: Yes. Was it with the Kalamazoo Spice Company?

Q: That is why I raised the question.

MORSE: I think it was the Kalamazoo Spice Company, their investment in the tomatoes and the tomato paste were expropriated. That became the legal reason to terminate aid. And also the policy reason was we do not recognize and support governments that come to power by military force. There were lots of reasons to cut off aid.

While the development program was decompressing and shrinking, the 1973-1975 drought and the famine became even more severe. It wasn't just a one off drought. It had multi-year impacts. People who would normally keep their seeds were eating their seeds, even though it made them sick. So, they didn't have seeds to plant. Men who would normally do the kind of spinning for the women to do the weaving had taken their cattle off to look for grass and then died and never came back. You had women who didn't know how to spin, didn't know how to fend for themselves in that very traditional society. So, we had a lot of drought relief activities. It was in that context. We had a grant to "Project Hope." They tried to come in with their ship at that point; but, it wasn't acceptable. One grant was to the Foster Parents Plan. They were just one of dozens of American PVOs and hundreds of local organizations that we were working with on drought relief.

Q: Was this the time of the formation of the Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commission?

MORSE: Yes. It was headed by Ato Shamilas Udinya, who later became Ethiopia's ambassador to Bonn. He was the head of it.

Q: Did you work with that organization itself?

MORSE: Yes, extensively. In combination with Dick Cobb, who was the Program Assistant over in the USAID Agriculture Division; Dick and I worked under Lane Holdcroft on the agriculture side. Our division worked a lot on the social relief programs for women and children, feeding, and nutrition and that kind of stuff. They worked more on the direct food side; but, we were both working and helping to build up that Relief Commission. We gained a lot of experience; but, we at that point were still working with the transiting government. That government was still acceptable. It was a rolling revolution from 1973-1975. It wasn't just a clean cut "one day you're good and one day you're bad" kind of thing.

In the process, I had hired an ex-Peace Corps volunteer, Doug McClure, to help on the drought relief inspections and evaluations. We met in Gondar after he had gone to several relief projects and I had gone to several others. The AID plane flew us into Lalabela, where we were only going to spend 24 hours looking at the Foster Parents Program, which was training women in handicrafts to earn a living, women who had been abandoned by their families, young girls and older women with no way to support themselves; but, how to make them self-sufficient without a male support system back in the villages. They stumbled in there by the thousands.

It was in that process, when we were inspecting that program when some guerrillas took over the airport, blew up EAL plane, came in and fought with the police in Lalabela. It was the Tigrean Liberation Front people, headed by a man named Dejasmach Berhne Meskel Desta, who had been the mayor of Lalabela for twelve (12) years and was a royalist. By now, however, he was fighting Mengistu, who was anti-royalist. He had a group of 600 armed men that were following him, all on foot.

This Peace Corps volunteer and I were the only foreigners there, along with Rita Feinberg, head of FPPlan in Lalabela, (whose husband, Lloyd, now works in AID, in charge of the War Torn Project.) We had gone to visit their project. Lloyd was in Addis actually playing tennis with Ernice at the American Embassy. We were captured by the guerrillas in Lalabela when they came in to town. They wanted to hold us. They thought they could get some money out of the American government. They never harmed us in any way; we were just held hostage. We were not allowed outside the mud hut of the Seven Olives Hotel in Lalabela.

That is all written up, by the way, in a long paper of about twenty (20) pages that I submitted to the Embassy. Actually we collaborated on it (Rita, me, Doug McClure and

the Ethiopian woman who was key to our escape, Mimi Tedessa.) Mimi was our AID secretary; but, when we were charged with relief, I made her a Relief Officer. She was in charge of making grants to the women's organizations and inspecting them; so, she was with us on this field trip. She was the one who found out that the Coptic Christian priests had ordered all the guerrillas down into the underground Lalabela churches to be absolved of the sins of the people they had killed when they took over the town of Lalabela. When they went down into the underground church, we made a run for it on the third day, taking the only three vehicles in town, which we drove until they ran out of gas, after which time we walked the rest of the way out to Kobo.

Q: That's rough country to travel in.

MORSE: It was very rough. We were exhausted and scared. I lost seventeen (17) pounds in three (3) days. No food! Scared to death!

Q: Do you have a copy of this report?

MORSE: I'm sure I do.

Q: I'd like to have this as an attachment.

MORSE: Sure. Kissinger gave me the State Department "Secretary's Award for Valor". I think he gave the award to me for getting myself out of an insecure situation without making an international incident of it! Ultimately, we were in a wind-down situation as the drought wound down. The rains came back in late 1975.

Q: Princeton Lyman had become Director at that time?

MORSE: Princeton came in just after I left. Dr. Withers had replaced Ernst. Dr. Bill Reid was the Deputy, a black American who became a professor down in North Carolina. I later visited him and his wife, Hattie. To me it was impressive that we in AID had black American employees of the quality of John Withers and Bill, who were both PhDs and were both very competent people to work with and a pleasure.

Q: So, you left before the program was closed down.

MORSE: It was winding down to practically nothing. I left in June of 1976.

Q: That was shortly after that that it was closed down. I was the one who made the decision after a great struggle to keep it alive and get support to keep it going. We closed the mission except for the local staff.

MORSE: I thought we could influence the political change in the beginning. I really did. We were at a New Year's Eve party at a Swedish friend's, whom we stayed in touch with. He became the Deputy of the SIDA program for the whole world, then an Ambassador in Africa. We were in our Swedish friend's house for a party when we heard

these huge booms. Mengistu had brought up two tanks, one on each side of General Anan's house next door, and flattened that house. Anan refused to give up. He was in there. He put all his family out. When he started shooting with a pistol out the window, they just leveled it with the canons. To me, that was the watershed moment in my own mind of hope that we could work with this regime and this administration.

The Derg had started a ZIMACHA program, which was a youth work program. They felt that to integrate the urban and the rural societies, they should work closer together. So, all of the urban youth high school and college age kids had to do a summer, and then later a year, and then later two years of rural service to try and bring up the rural areas. In the early days, we were working with that. It didn't seem like it was a coercive program. Later, it became just a way of getting the young kids out of town so they wouldn't demonstrate; but, in the beginning, the conceptualization and the management of it was right. It turned. Everything seemed to turn from where it started in 1973-75.

You asked the right question; however, the historians and researchers will have to say whether he changed or whether that was his game plan all along. If you want to interview him, I can tell you, he's on Gun Hill/Zimbabwe. He lives right behind our Agriculture Officer's house in Harare.

Q: No, thank you.

MORSE: I don't think there's anything else to say about Ethiopia.

Q: Before that happened, what was your sense of the institutionalization of (the program had been there since the early 1950s) the Ethiopianization and so on of the various institutions like Gondar Public Health College, Alamaya Agriculture School, the teacher training college and so on?

MORSE: It was at a takeoff point from my point of view. If you had had a peaceful change from a monarchy or an enlightened monarchy that would now say, "Let's have a massive expansion of development rather than kind of an elitist, narrow focus", the institutional framework and the human resources were in place. The systems were in place.

Q: In good measure the result of the work that we had done in foreign assistance.

MORSE: We and others; but, yes, very much so. You can look with pride. The institutions we built are still there; but, the human resources and the systems just collapsed for years and years and years. My sense was that it was a country that, in another seven (7) years (just to pick a figure) could really be on its own. Even the 51-52 OPEX people we were supporting at the university were on a phase-out track. The participants were coming home. The entire senior leadership of the university had changed.

Dr. Prince and all the work he did up at Gondar had institutionalized the public health college from nothing. The institutions were all there. Ethiopians were in leadership out at Alamaya Ag College completely then. The linkages back to their American supporting counterpart universities were strong and were strong enough that they would have sustained phasing out the AID program after another couple of years, I felt. From my perspective, that political transition, perhaps caused by the drought and the world economy, stopped it for at least fifteen (15) years and set it back probably twenty-five (25) years.

Q: Okay. That's a good point to stop on there. So, you left there in 1976.

MORSE: I came home and did the Development Studies Program course. Then a man in the Africa Bureau named Haven North (you!) approved that I should go next to Lagos, Nigeria to close out the AID program.

Q: How did you find the Development Studies Program?

MORSE: I thought it was superb. It was excellent. At that point, by 1976, I had been out of school for fifteen (15) years. While I had majored in international programs and had international economics and international law and studied all the rest of it, I felt personally that it gave me the development tools that were now more understandable than if I had tried to learn them earlier. I also felt that it was a tremendous socializing program for the staff as a whole and for the Agency. People thought in a similar way; they could manage in a similar way. They looked at the program in a similar way; not that we were all stove-piped but that we had a frame of reference that was useful.

Q: Do you remember any sort of orientation about the development process or strategy that the course was trying to convey?

MORSE: I think the shift from the basic human needs or dealing with that in the macro-economic context was important. Professor Jim Weaver's opening of people's eyes to that, "you're just not managing a narrow project, but it is managed in this broader context". Having just come out of Ethiopia, where you saw the macroeconomic situation of the world had an impact to just destroy what we had built for twenty-five (25) years. It all had a great meaning at DSP. In terms of AID's strategies, from my point of view, it seemed that it gave you a conceptual framework, it gave you analytical skills and it didn't say that you had to do top down, bottom up. Still, certain principals were applied, like: "Thou shalt work together with the host country. Thou shalt make AID fit into their situation." There are a dozen principals that we all have known that you don't violate. It was excellent from my point of view.

Q: Off to Lagos to close the program – 1977-78.

NIGERIA CONTEXT

My assignment in Nigeria was to close down AID's largest and longest program in Africa. The reason for that was, with the oil boom of the 1970s, Nigeria, the largest population in Africa, had become the U.S.'s largest trading partner in sub-Sahara Africa. Six billion US dollars per year were going to Nigeria to pay for the oil we imported from them. By 1977-78 it was no longer defensible to the American public or Congress to continue concessional U.S. aid to the country. That meant the unpleasant task of prematurely curtailing important institution building and disposing of hundreds of management support operations. The job fell to me. The broader context was the violently unstable situation in Nigeria. After they gained their independence from the British in 1960, the country had experienced a bloody civil war, tensions among the dozen major ethnic groups, assassinations, coups and military rule. Nigeria urgently needed comprehensive economic development, indigenous institutions and expansion at all levels of education to make effective use of the oil resources and to lay the foundation for political and economic stability. It was in U.S. interest that this important country become a sustainable, strong partner with the U.S. Terminating U.S. aid in this explosive context was not popular. Creative alternatives for an American-Nigerian partnership for development were needed to support the transition to stability. We found an effective alternative in the education field by starting a program we called "Reimbursable Aid".

MORSE: I thought that was the mandate; but, again, this family planning/population bias of mine was to keep that program going. I don't know whether it was me who asked to continue FP/POP or Washington who asked for it. I know that it wasn't originally in Ambassador Don Easum's bailiwick.

Q: There had been at that time some effort to try to re-establish sort of a relationship with Nigeria because the program had pretty well died with the agricultural schools and some other programs. I don't know whether that was occurring when you got there or not.

MORSE: USAID Director, Bill Ford, was literally leaving within a matter of two weeks when I got there. My recollection was that my assignment was to wind down the program and to close it out, but to do it in an orderly way. We were doing some evaluations. Kansas State University had been at Ahmadu Bello University at the point, the number 27 years sticks in my mind; but, they had started with a two-week in-service veterinary program and expanded it to a certificate program, then to a two-year Associate Arts degree, then to a Bachelor's of Science, then a Master's, then a Doctorate in Veterinary Medicine, then post-doctorate!

Frankly, it was probably right to stop it at that point. The relationships between the faculty at Ahmadu Bello and Kansas State were strong enough that they would still exchange faculty, students, research and materials. It was long before the day of the Internet where they could do that much more simply; but, they had a commitment to each other. From my point of view, it was an excellent example of institution development, of staying the course, starting from ground zero and taking it all the way up to the highest level of academic and science standards of veterinary sciences. We tried to evaluate and document those projects as we closed out the programs.

Q: Do any others come to mind?

MORSE: No. I'd have to think about it more. That was the one that stuck out quickly in my mind. A lot of the close-out work had to do with selling the houses and furniture. I remember the row we had with the embassy because our files documented that we had bought the Director's house for something like $35,000, and over the years we had invested another $17,000.00 into it. It was worth what taxpayers had paid for it. Mobil Oil had come in; they were part of the reason we were closing out because of the oil revenues that were coming in. Nigerians were getting $6 billion a year from oil sales to the U.S. It wasn't very justified to have concessional aid to them when they getting that amount of our foreign exchange flowing in through commercial sales. Mobil Oil offered us $750,000 for that house. FBO in the State Department said, "We want that house. Just transfer it to us." What was the right thing to do? They wanted it for the Deputy Chief of Mission's house.

There was a lot of strain. Ambassador Easum and I were the closest of personal friends. He and I taught tennis together. We taught classes for beginners, intermediate and advanced. My wife was a national tennis champion of five (5) countries in the world, including Ethiopia, Pakistan and Indonesia. I'm still convinced that Don approved your recommendation that I go there because he wanted Ernice as a tennis partner!

When it came to things like the transfer of the house and the property, I was trying to get more guidance about whether we should sell it and return the money to the Treasury, which is what we were doing with the vehicles and other houses, or transfer it to State/FPO for the embassy at no cost.

We had wonderful USAID staff there, including the man who was the chief accountant, a Nigerian, who knew he could walk out of AID and find a job in the private sector and triple his salary overnight; but, those were his files, his books, his projects, his records, and he wasn't going to leave until they were all audited, cleared, accounted for and packed up. That kind of dedication and commitment just won my heart. Everybody else you had to let go when they had a job offer.

So, the difficulty was managing a phase-out program where people who had been with us for 12-15 years in Nigeria, for whom that was their whole life and livelihood, even though they would be released with a good, fair severance package, at a time when I still needed them to close out, that difficult management was the balance.

I remember getting into a discussion with one of the big five accounting firms, who wanted our chief accountant. They called and said, "He wants to come; and, we want him; but, you won't release him." My reply was, "Well, you're getting a man that is top quality. If you wait for him, you're going to be very pleased. However, I need him, too; and, he wants to stay. Can't we negotiate out a time for the transfer?" They weren't very happy with that to begin with and were not going to offer him the job, which made me really nervous that I may have screwed over an employee who was so loyal and so

competent that he wouldn't get a job. Then he did. He tripled his salary the day he left AID.

Q: Were there any other issues in closing out the program? Was there any effort to keep anything alive and continuing?

MORSE: Yes, the Family Planning and Population Program; but, even before that, we were going to use some of the AID/W centrally funded activities that still could be tapped. It was approved that we could tap into some of the central activities even though we didn't have a bilateral staff. The Economic Counselor of the Embassy was a fellow named Harry Cahill…very competent, very ambitious and high energy. He had the largest commercial section of an American Embassy in all of Africa, including larger than South Africa. We had worked out an arrangement where I would train his commercial officers to do development work and have a development perspective and a prism so that, even in their economic reporting, we didn't lose sight of the development aspects as distinct from the macroeconomic and where the oil revenues were going, but what was happening at a development level. Harry and I and Ambassador Easum agreed on that.

I must have run 15-18 training programs for the embassy staff. They resented it. They didn't join the State Department Foreign Service to be AID development reporters. I tried to explain to them how you would tap into central funds and what the resources were in our organization. They resented it to no end. As for Ambassador Easum and Harry's leadership, they would come to the training sessions but weren't happy about it at all.

At the same time, they were trying to teach me how to promote American trade and be a commercial officer. We weren't integrated at that point as a development/commercial section. I reported to Cahill. So, that was one of the bones of contention: How do you have some AID central resources continue to support development activities in the country, but monitored and managed by embassy economic officers.

Q: The assumption was that there should be no AID staff?

MORSE: Absolutely. What was the impetus for holding open family planning and population? Was it my bias? Was it the fact that Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa? Was it Washington?

Q: I think it was the Nigerian size and scale and importance of having a family planning program; but, it was probably more a central population office initiative than the bureau.

MORSE: Certainly that central AID office supported it.

Q: You had it already started at that point?

MORSE: Yes. In fact, it had been just started before I got there. In the year that I was there, rather than phase that one out, we were expanding it and building it up. We wanted

it strong and I kept arguing for it. Don Easum felt, okay, we could do that; but, we don't want any AID officers, so train one of my economic officers to be a family planning and population officer. Of course, that sent Ravenholt through the roof.

Q: Why was he so determined not to have an AID officer as part of the staff, given the things like population and so on?

MORSE: I think that it was part of what appeared to me at that level at that point to be a combination of things and that the embassy felt they could do it. I think I've said to you before that I lecture over at the Foreign Service Institute on the comparative corporate cultures of AID and the State Department. One of them is that there is a certain amount of arrogance in the State Department, and arrogance that an FSO can do everything; therefore, he can manage family planning programs. Not wanting AID programs was part of the decision that we would phase out the AID program and didn't want any more AID people hanging on if we didn't have an AID program per se. The whole stereotype is that AID always has more people than it needs to just hand out money. Of course, it's a lot more complicated on family planning, as you know.

Q: There was a lot of congressional pressure about phasing out because of the oil revenues. Was that the time when they had the reimbursable technical training programs?

MORSE: Yes.

Q: Were you involved in that?

MORSE: Very much so.

Q: What was that about?

MORSE: In fact, I met the brigadier general who was the number two man in the Nigerian government. His name escapes me now.

Q: Obasanjo?

MORSE: It wasn't Obasanjo. He was a brigadier general, but number two. He called over one day and asked Don Easum if we could help on education. This was a military general. This was in 1977. He had a huge set of briefers – military and civilians. I went over thinking I was going to meet with a Nigerian education officer about what they were going to do in education. What he laid out was that they had at that point six (6) universities, and that they had built seven (7) new universities with oil revenues; however, they didn't have teaching or administrative staff for them. He wanted to know if we would join with the British (they were approaching all other donors as well) to support American staff to come there and teach in the universities. Of course, we had the OPEX arrangement; but, that wasn't going to be acceptable. So, we discussed a Reimbursable AID Program that laid out: "Look, if you pay for them, we'll help arrange

to get them trained in the U.S. and to recruit American Universities to accept your trainees."

That was a big part of it. Then there was another second part I'll come to on the technical side, the kind of middle-level technical manpower. We arranged with the American Council on Education to come in and explain how they could advertise for Nigerian teaching positions in American journals and American professional associations and what kind of compensation packages would be offered to attract Americans to come teach in Nigeria. That went fairly well. The number doesn't stick in my mind as to how many Americans came in. There were a lot from England, a lot from other African countries. I'm talking about several hundred people from our side alone that were part of it.

Then, at the same time we agreed to help them to get access to placement for Nigerian junior faculty members to come to America and go from Bachelor's to Master's or Master's to Doctorate to get the teaching methodology in American teacher education institutions. Again, we arranged – I wasn't at the U.S. end of it but was certainly out there – where there would be consortiums of college that would come and explain how many Nigerian junior faculty they could take, under what circumstances, the cost and how to arrange that reimbursable program.

The third part of responding to their request was that we help with their education expansion on the technical level. Coming out of their own universities, they had a lot of highly trained people. They had doctors; but they didn't have lab technicians. They had dentists but not dental assistants. They had engineers but not surveyors. They lacked middle-level manpower. I am sad to say they emulate western academic bias that way.

My big academic transition, as I may have mentioned earlier, was when I went to community college before going on to a four-year college and graduate university. I was and am a great believer in the community college. They produce that kind of manpower. The community college system is the only part of our academic system that is indigenous, not imported. It meets multiple needs. We linked the Nigerians up with the American Association of Junior Colleges. The figure that sticks in my mind is like 12,000 Nigerians at the junior college technical level came to the United States during that period between the late 1970s and the early 1980s, completely financed by the Nigerians.

Q: That's right. That was managed and coordinated by AID; but, it was funded by the Nigerians.

MORSE: That was one of the most exciting things. I learned lots of lessons about phasing AID out; but, to do it and still keep the linkages institution to institution, opening up access to our different academic institutions if they would pay for it, I thought was an excellent example of follow-on to a terminating concessional AID program.

Q: What state was the Population Program in at that time?

MORSE: Figures?

Q: Was it a government program or mostly private?

MORSE: That was a distinction quickly becoming blurred. Dr. Ransome-Kuti, who was at the University of Lagos in the School of Medicine and Health at that point, was also in the private Family Planning Association, in addition to being an advisor to the government. In my mind, he was kind of the key interlocutor that was getting it expanded through both private and government channels at that point. He wasn't meeting with a tremendous amount of resistance that we could see at that point, either from the government or from the private sector.

I have to admit that, in terms of my preoccupation as "the last American AID officer" in there, so much of my attention was on close-out. I probably spent 85% of the time on that. Trying to get the handover to the Embassy Economic Section, initiating a follow-on reimbursable education program and extending the Family Planning Program was satisfying development work. We had some local staff members in family planning, including a young lady that I had recruited, a Nigerian woman. She was in a conference here in the U.S. two years ago. We met. She has blossomed into the head of the government family planning program. When we hired her, she had a public health background, but no family planning training whatsoever. We sent her and several Nigerians of our own local staff back for training in the States once it was agreed that we would keep that program open and keep it going. The embassy didn't mind if there were Foreign Service National AID employees in population; but, they didn't want an officer, even at that point. I don't remember how long after I left that we got an American population officer in there. Was it Keyes that came in afterwards…Keyes McManus?

Q: I don't recall. I think she was the first…

MORSE: Before Keyes McManus?

Q: No. I guess she was the first. That's right?

MORSE: But I don't remember how long it was after I left before she came.

Q: When did you leave?

MORSE: The middle of 1978.

Q: It was probably three or four more years.

MORSE: Yes; and, the family planning support program was run by our local staff with centrally funded intermediaries during that time.

Q: You must have gotten some sense of the total program of the past in closing it out. Do you have any recollection of the institutionalization work that had been done before and where it stood at that time?

MORSE: Yes and no. The "yes" part is that I was impressed that it was probably our biggest, longest AID program in all of Africa at one point. That was the impression I had. It was extremely comprehensive. You couldn't go any place in that country that you didn't stumble across and ex-AID participant in a position of responsibility and authority, private sector or government. The work with academic institutions was most successful, with a tremendous impact on institution building again. At the same time, I've lamented over and over again that I had to be so preoccupied with our internal rules and regulations of close-out, other than to be able to arrange a few of these evaluations, because it did seem so important to document what had gone on before, all the previous AID projects, that I didn't get into. I was totally focused on what had to be done then rather than the good work over almost two (2) decades.

Q: There was the University of Wisconsin in the west; in the north, we were working with the University of Lagos.

MORSE: In Ibadan.

Q: The University of Nigeria, which we had to evacuate because of the war and all that. That was not reinstated. Colorado. There were many of them. Many of those wound up.

MORSE: By the time I got there, they were almost all gone. In fact, as I said, Kansas was just about the last one. There were some people up at Ibadan at the Ford and AID supported Ag research station.

Q: That was at Samaru, I believe.

MORSE: That doesn't ring a bell. It's one of the regional centers on the Centers for International Agriculture Research (CIAGR), a huge operation, headed by an American when I was there, in fact. When you walked onto that research station, it was like going into Silicon Valley.

Q: This was IITA.

MORSE: Yes, the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture. We still had some funds going into there. As we closed out, I think, we made a grant that could run for a couple of more years to support the American administrative-management and controller types that were running that, not necessarily the field research people. That was a premier world-class Ag research institute.

Q: Right. Part of the CTAR network.

MORSE: The "cigar", yes.

Q: Anything else on Nigeria?

MORSE: It wasn't as much fun to close out an AID program; only because, Haven, you didn't have the opportunities to document the successes. You didn't have the time to research and document the accomplishments. Closing out a mission, I think, can be an educational, rewarding experience; but, if we're so damned preoccupied with the staff, management, the motor pool, the cars, the refrigerators and getting rid of the generators and all that stuff, you don't have time to look at what in two (2) decades AID accomplished in a country! So, if there is a lesson learned, share that when we close out.

Q: There was a very large infrastructure consisting of housing, vehicles and project work; and, all that had to be dealt with. Huge! Let's go on to your next assignment. You were assigned to OSARAC in 1978 in Swaziland. What was OSARAC? What was the function?

SOUTHERN AND SOUTH AFRICA CONTEXT

Decolonization of Africa really started after WWII, often as the result of wars of liberation. It started in North Africa in the 1950s and proceeded down West and East Africa in the 1960s. In protectorates of Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho were already nominally independent. The Portuguese pulled out of Mozambique and Angola in 1975; and, Zimbabwe achieved independence in 1980. Many of the African liberation movements were supported by the eastern block and China. America had no colonies in Africa. Despite our own revolutionary beginnings and foreign policy support for human rights, the US did not support African liberation movements. In the days of the Cold War, southern Africa became an area of competing influence with the newly independent countries.

South Africa, and its' League of Nations-mandated protectorate, Southwest Africa (later Namibia), were the last vestiges of colonialism on the continent. The new majority-ruled governments surrounding them became the "Front Line States" (FLS) committed to helping change the white, minority-ruled system of apartheid ("separateness"). Most of the FLS leaders believed change would only come through an armed struggle – the way many of them achieved independence. Many in America felt change was inevitable and that we should be on the side of that change; but, our nation and leaders were divided on how that change should come and at what cost to our friendship.

Western nations had a 400-year affiliation with South Africa. Extensive western investment helped make it the largest and strongest economy in all Africa. It was an ally in the worldwide resistance to communist expansion. It was a military and intelligence ally of the US, protecting the Cape of Good Hope trade and navel routes between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans and beyond to the Pacific Ocean. Official US foreign policy was to support the South African government, despite its' dismal record on democracy and human rights. Because it was not an underdeveloped country, in the macroeconomic sense that support did not extend to US economic assistance to South Africa; however, extensive military and intelligence assistance was extended.

The southern Africa region had long been considered a sphere of British, Portuguese and South African influence. We did not even have a separate US embassy in each of the countries. We only had modest US economic assistance to regional institutions, not bilateral US aid. The Portuguese departure and declining British influence in its' former colonies left an international power vacuum that was being filled by the eastern bloc.

I was at that time (1978) the Deputy Regional AID Director, and then Acting Director of OSARAC, and was given a lead role in implementing field changes in AID in southern Africa. In 1977, USAID/OSARAC was ordered to disband the regional approach and the OSARAC office headquartered in Mbabane, Swaziland, and open bilateral AID offices and programs in each of the six FLS. We opened Zambia in 1977, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland in 1978, Malawi in 1979 and Zimbabwe in 1980. We did not have close relations with what we considered communist governments in Angola and Mozambique (but did open aid to them later).

In 1981, the Southern Africa Office in AID/Washington, where I was now the Deputy Director, was also asked to explore possible US assistance to moderate South Africans who might one day be called upon to take more of a leadership role in the economy and who could be influenced politically to seek peaceful change to the end of the minority-ruled apartheid South African government. Given my extensive experience in the southern Africa region, as well as my background in program development, I was asked to lead the USG/AID research and analysis on this during a two-month mission in South Africa, in addition to making policy and program recommendations to our government upon return.

MORSE: OSARAC was the Office of Southern Africa Regional Aid Coordination. If I understand the history of it, the United States didn't have sufficient foreign policy or foreign aid interests in those smaller southern African countries back in the 1950s and 1960s to warrant bilateral aid missions in each of those countries: Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, Southwest Africa (Namibia) or in the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique and what were the British protectorates, independents after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia). Because we didn't have sufficient interests to have bilateral aid missions in there, we did have regional programs that went throughout the region. There were regional math, science and English programs for developing higher education. Frankly, it helped strengthen these small countries to work in a regional context. If I understand the history of it correctly, the regional office was in a place called Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia. Then the office was moved very temporarily into Lusaka, now Zambia; but, the staff told me that it was difficult to operate out of there in transport, so it was moved down to Mbabane, Swaziland. That was where OSARAC was for probably 10-15 years. That is where I was assigned as Deputy Regional Director in 1978.

The political dynamics changed with the Portuguese elections of 1974 and 1975. A new government came into power and decided that it would not continue its' Portuguese colonies in Angola and Mozambique. They had already been under a great deal of stress and strain from guerrillas fighting for independence; and, the Portuguese decided to pull

out under that pressure and under the domestic political change. With their pullout in 1975, along with a reduced British involvement in the southern Africa arena, there was a feeling on the part of the American administration that a power vacuum was evolving and was being filled in part by the Eastern Bloc and the surrogates of the Cold War. There were already Eastern Bloc countries that were supporting the guerrillas in Angola and Mozambique. There was a combination of the ex-colonial powers of, primarily, the British and the Portuguese, having a lesser interest in the region and, as I understand it, a much heightened interest on the part of the Eastern Block during the Cold War.

I recall that it was Kissinger who made the decision that we should expand American interests in the southern Africa region. Some of this policy change was especially around what was then considered our good friend and ally, South Africa, to fill the declining west vacuum and counter the Eastern Bloc influence in the region. To do that in part, bilateral embassy and AID missions were to be opened up where they had not been before. One US Ambassador handled maybe two (2) countries out of a single location. Similarly, Washington was directing that the AID regional program be greatly expanded.

If I understand the numbers and recall them correctly, in that 1977-1978 period, the OSARAC budget for southern Africa went from about $25 million and tripled to about $75 million. At the same time, the number of projects that had to be designed, the number of project papers to be produced and projects approved tripled as well. The OSARAC team was just working flat out. There was a wonderful group of people that were flexible enough to travel throughout the region.

Then in 1977, bilateral AID missions were actually being opened. I think the first one we opened bilaterally was in Zambia. A young intern named John Hicks, who had worked with us up in Ethiopia, was chosen to go there. He fell ill and didn't stay there permanently. That was an AID section of the embassy, a bilateral AID mission that still participated in the OSARC regional programs. In 1978, we opened up the bilateral missions in Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana. In 1979, we opened up the bilateral AID mission in Malawi. We made a lot of trips to go up and buy offices and houses and recruit staff and start to negotiate parameters of US assistance with the Malawi government, which I had a high regard for. The Malawi economic planning seemed well organized and disciplined. Then, in April of 1980 after the Lancaster Peace Agreements, we opened up the bilateral mission in Harare. I went from Swaziland to join Ray Love and others and stayed up there for about five months to establish an AID Mission there. So, from 1977-1980, OSARAC was changing from a regional operation to a bilateral operation, opening up bilateral missions, recruiting staff, starting programs and projects, buying offices and houses, etc. That's what I did for the next three and one-half years. At first I was the Deputy AID Regional Director. When John Keen retired, you appointed me the Regional Director.

Q: Let's first talk about the regional operations. You've talked about some projects; but, were there others? What were the regional projects?

MORSE: That was always a great debate in the staff within the region, with other donors and with Washington: What constitutes a region versus a bilateral or a multilateral project? To our way of thinking, it was regional if you had more than one country participating on a very equal participatory basis. The best example that springs to mind was the BLS University. The three very small countries of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland could hardly each afford to all have their own faculty of veterinary science, medicine, engineering and everything else; so, the attempt was to have a southern Africa university and a combined administration of the three ministries of higher education. Then they would specialize in one field or another. The citizens, the students, from the other two countries would have full and equal access to enrollment; that way, if Lesotho was taking the lead on agriculture, then the people from Botswana and Swaziland, the students, could come over and take their agriculture degrees there on the Lesotho campus of the regional university.

Q: Was there a multiple campus?

MORSE: They would have multiple campuses in each country. The faculty would be free to move back and forth between the three countries. The students were free to move back and forth. There were not out of country, out of state fees for those. Then their degrees were fully recognized by their governments and their home institutions. It seemed like a rather efficient way to run an education program in three very small countries.

Q: Was this well received by the countries themselves?

MORSE: At different times, a sense of national pride would say, "No, we want our own university. We want our own faculty of agriculture. We don't want to share this." There were many, many rivalries that were going on, even though they probably weren't professionally and technically efficient. There were also professional and technical jealousies regarding who was going to be dean and who would be vice dean and how many there would be from which country, that type of thing.

Q: Were there other regional projects?

MORSE: Some of the nurses training and nursing assistance training were operating on a regional basis. They were quite good. Again, if we brought a contract or a team of trainers out from the U.S. and worked with the nursing schools a lot, to do it in three different countries simultaneously would cost an inordinate amount. If you could do it consecutively in several countries; or, if you could have people come from other countries to a central location, it was far more efficient. So, we did a lot of that kind of in-service training.

There were other regional centers, like setting common educational standards. There was a regional testing group in Malawi that had participation from all of the southern Africa countries, with the exception of the Republic of South Africa. They would set the academic standards both in tests, testing, degrees and teacher certification. It just seemed like it was the right way to go, from my point of view.

There was another advantage to that that I always welcomed: From an AID development point of view, having a regional perspective was one of the most enriching experiences. Offering the comparative regional experience when recruiting staff to come join us in OSARAC made it attractive. You had an opportunity to simultaneously look at how six (6) countries would address the same or similar development problem differently. That comparative development experience was so rich that it was well worth serving in a regional capacity. You didn't normally get that comparative experience until you had the consecutive assignments of going from one country, after four or five years, another four or five years, another four or five years. You could get that simultaneous comparative experience serving in OSAPAC. I felt it made us much better development officers just because we could appreciate the different policies and approaches of the countries. That sounds like a sales pitch; but, it was sincere.

Frankly, our staff was on the road probably 70% of their time. That puts special strain on family, home life and on the individuals, to be on the road that long. We drove almost all the time from Swaziland to Botswana and Lesotho. To go to Malawi, Zimbabwe and Zambia, we would drive to Johannesburg and pick up a plane and then fly up there. We were constantly on the move.

Q: It's difficult traveling around, isn't it?

MORSE: You could never guarantee that, if you were booked on a plane, the plane might come or might not. The rewarding part of it was to see the comparative development experience, how each would approach water rights or a political change or an economic fluctuation in the South African currency or the reaction to a regional transportation operation, things like that.

Q: At that time, we were not doing any infrastructure projects?

MORSE: No, I don't think we were. The SARP (Southern Africa Regional Program) came into being with the creation of SADCC. It took place in Lusaka four (4) days before Zimbabwe became independent in April of 1980. Heads of government of the Front-Line States met in Lusaka and established their own regional organization, SADCC – just when we were dissolving ours!

Q: Let's come to that in a minute. Is there anything about those individual countries? You were involved, for example, in the transition in Zimbabwe.

MORSE: Before getting to that, because that's kind of 1980, let me just mention some of the other countries. We had been working in land conservation down in Lesotho for a long time. Frankly, it was more than needed and probably far too late. I remember first seeing some of the LANDSAT photo imagery that was showing that there was more Lesotho topsoil off the coast of Mozambique and South Africa than there was left on the country of Lesotho. So much of the soil had been washed out to sea; and, Lesotho was a

pile of rocks to begin with. It was very important to try to teach the people more land conservation.

The South Africans had overwhelming influence and had a far greater presence than the United States politically, militarily, culturally, economically, in trade and finance, any way you cut it; however, there were some good efforts that went on in land conservation. Again, we tried to share those with the mountain kingdom of Swaziland and get people from Swaziland to go to Lesotho and see what could happen to them if they didn't protect their soil. Something that is still evolving in Lesotho, and I think is very close now to happening, was the Highland Water Scheme, which was a multi-billion dollar investment.

The one thing that Lesotho had besides rocks was water. Because of its' high mountains and rocks, we would get to know that up in Maseru, the capital. If that water could be harnessed, it was quite a sellable item to the people who needed it and could afford to pay for it, which was South Africa. There was a lot of politics of: "Would you really go through with that?" At the time, South Africa was still apartheid. The politics would say, "No, you wouldn't"; but, the economics of it would say, "Absolutely that was the way for Lesotho to develop – to sell its' water and its' hydroelectric power to South Africa." They would get revenue from those sales they couldn't get probably any other way in Lesotho, except to tax the gambling that went on there by the South Africans who would come across to play.

Q: They had a large labor group in South Africa, I guess.

MORSE: Three of the BLS countries, as well as Angola, Mozambique and what is now Namibia, all had migrant workers that would come over to South Africa to work in the mines without their families for two (2) years. The remittances of the foreign exchange were very, very significant. In countries like Swaziland and Lesotho, those foreign exchange remittances from their miners would amount to as much as 50% of the annual foreign exchange earnings in those countries. Politically, it was looked down upon that they would provide laborers, because this was the way that the South African mines could kind of play off their internal black miners and say, "If you strike, we'll just bring in more people from Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana to work these mines, all of whom are eager to work, to have employment and to earn foreign exchange for their country." So, we worked with some of the regional organizations in terms of the screening, testing, safety, education and fairness of their foreign exchange remittances in order to make sure that they got it back and that the governments didn't siphon it off to the point that it never got to the families, and that the conversion rates were fair. So, there was a lot of work that we did on a regional basis.

Q: You worked on those kinds of issues.

MORSE: Yes, we did. Our Program Officer, especially, and our macroeconomist, Dr. Larry Saiers, whom you know. Another fellow that we had on the staff (originally we were prepositioning him thinking that, after we opened up in Zambia, Malawi and BLS countries, we would be opening in Mozambique next) was John Pielemeier, who had

been a Peace Corps volunteer in Brazil and spoke Portuguese. We wanted him prepositioned to go into Mozambique, which became independent in 1975. So, he did a lot of studies on macro and regional economic things like that for us while he was waiting to be inserted into the country. He never did get inserted because of the politics of why we stayed out of Angola and Mozambique so long.

All this is my way of saying that there were exciting things going on in each of the regional countries. We put Bob Friedlander in Botswana. That was taken over by Lou Cohen. A lot of good work went into public administration, and cattle. There were some capital projects in Botswana. What was the name of the cattle slaughterhouse that we helped establish in Botswana? I'll have to look at some of those names.

In Swaziland, we worked with the primary curriculum unit with Eastern Michigan State University. We helped them train people to analyze the country's education needs and then train people to write curriculum and then to test curriculum and to print new materials, and, again, to try to do that on a regional basis rather than just a bilateral. But, that primary curriculum unit down in Swaziland had quite an impact throughout the region, I found. So there are those kinds of bilateral programs that are helpful.

Q: Let's talk about the transition in Zimbabwe.

ZIMBABWE CONTEXT

The United Kingdom annexed Southern Rhodesia from the British South Africa Company in 1923. A 1961 constitution was formulated that favored the minority whites in power, contrary to UK public policy of decolonization and move to majority rule in all its' holdings - worldwide. In 1965, the white Rhodesian government declared its' unilateral independence from the UK. Simmering black Rhodesian discontent erupted into a 15-year civil war. Fierce guerrilla fighting and UN sanctions finally led to free elections in 1979 and independence in 1980. While the black political leaders clearly fought for majority rule, the uneducated black soldiers (approximately 45,000) were fighting for access to land to farm beyond the infertile plots that had been allotted them.

Because Cold War adversaries, Russia and China, had backed two separate political and military wings of the guerrillas, and the new Zimbabwe was on the front line with the wealthy US ally of (apartheid) South Africa, the US wanted to demonstrate tangible and immediate American support to the new Zimbabwe government by extending US aid at independence in April, 1980. My assignment was to go to the new country and start a significant USAID program - from scratch.

MORSE: As most people know, the British were trying to press the Rhodesians for some time to stop the civil war and move to black majority rule. While that was clear as the political objective, it was also clear to us as we talked to the black Zimbabweans outside the country that a lot of their fight was over land. That was why the average Zimbabwean, a black African, was fighting for access to land that was being denied to them.

Then the 1979 peace negotiations at Lancaster House got to the point where the cease fire and the peaceful transition to black majority rule were agreed. At independence in April of 1980, a lot had to do with would the U.S., the British or the rest of Europe pay for land that would be taken from the white minority to be given to the black majority? At one point (something that I meant to research) Kissinger, who was not Secretary of State then, had implied that we, the U.S., would participate in such a program; but, we never did for political, budget and economic reasons. That was a tough environment to work in in those early days then in Harare after we opened the bilateral mission, because the new government was fully expecting that we would come forth with land purchase money for them; and, we didn't. I came up from Mbabane; a middle- level political officer, Jeff Davidow, came from Pretoria; and, a CIA chap came over from Mozambique to open the embassy and AID mission in April, 1980. We had people that came in from the region and military chaps that came down from Malawi, where there was a large U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency operation. We all opened up the American Embassy. Jeff Davidow was the middle-level officer from Pretoria and was a wonderful fellow to work with. Jimmy Coker was with us and did a lot of good work on the political side. Ray Love came down from REDSO/Nairobi, where he was the REDSO Director.

We were working out of a house that Jeff Davidow had rented on a six-month lease over on Enterprise Road. I showed up and asked him if there was room for us to run the AID operation out of it. Jeff said, "You know, you're about four hours late. Everybody has taken the bedrooms and the bathrooms; but, I'll share the kitchen with you." Later in the afternoon I went back to David and said, "I don't mind that my desk is the stove top; but, I really resent it when the guys turn the burners on and burn my papers while I'm trying to work." There was that kind of fun comradery. We were working under difficult conditions. There was no support in there; but, we just coalesced as a wonderful interagency team.

Q: What were you trying to do programmatically for AID?

MORSE: One of the most interesting things was a kind of post-hostilities economic reconstruction package: What could we do to help jumpstart and reignite the economy and show some immediate results? There were several things that we put together. We worked a lot with the military and the planning people in terms of how many ex-combatants would be turned back to civilians out of all three of the fighting armies, the ZIPRA, ZANLA and the Rhodesian forces, and what could help them.

Most Africans were rural, small farmers before fighting. We put together a seed pack program. The seed pack had fertilizer, seed and hand tools. At the time that the black enlisted men would be de-commissioned, they were entitled to enough support to get back on the land and for farming to start; but, it was clear to me that was a really short-term measure, because the land they went back to was probably less than half an acre; and, it was not the most arable and fertile land. Therefore, you couldn't expect that they were going to progress on it. They might be able to get a self-sufficient crop to feed their family for the first year; but, that's not a backbone for development. This was my early

involvement in disarm, demobilize and reintegrate, (DDR) which became a later focus for me in retirement.

We also did something about repaving the roads, the Zimbabwe to Zambia (Zim-Zam) road. We drove the road and went up all the way to the Zambian border to examine what would be needed on a quick-fix basis. We worked with the highway people to make plans to basically just fix the potholes that had developed during the nine (9) years of war when the heavy military vehicles were using it.

Q: Why was that an important project? Why would you do that rather than something else?

MORSE: Well, to help restart regional trade they needed to open transport going from South Africa, through Zimbabwe, up into Zambia and further north just to get the goods moving on the roads again. Remember, South Africa was the engine for economic growth in the region. They would feel that the road mines were cleared and the roads were open and could take commercial road traffic that had been very, very restricted in the days of the war. That was part of it. Also, we were looking at labor intensive operations that could absorb some ex-combatant labor to work on fixing up the Zim-Zam Road.

Q: Was there also a health initiative at the time of independence?

MORSE: Yes, in fact, the first agreement that we signed on independence day was a two-million-dollar primary healthcare project. I think it was Ambassador Andy Young that came to the ceremony and signed it on independence day. We had expedited the planning, the documentation and the approval of that to get it started. Again, trying to show that healthcare and education for the black majority were now going to be part of the new government under Mugabe were important aspects of a new dispensation as distinct from what they perceived was a previous dis-balance favoring white Rhodesians. I have to admit that I felt, overall, that the Rhodesians were doing better at bringing around black African leadership, education and health services faster than South Africa was doing and, frankly, weren't too far off from what the independent countries (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) were delivering and far ahead of what the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique had done to foster black African services under their long colonial tutelage. That's all comparison and doesn't mean a lot when you're looking at inadequate individual progress versus comparative progress.

There were some exciting and interesting times of opening that mission. I lived in a hotel room at the Jamison Hotel for five (5) months. I used to kid that I was on a first-name basis with all the cockroaches and mosquitos after five months in that room.

My wife came from Swaziland and spent two and one-half months with me. For no fee, she helped open up the AID mission. For the first AID office, we took three rooms in the back part of what had been the American Consulate in Salisbury (now Harare) that had been closed up for many, many years. Simultaneously with program development, we renovated, painted, put carpeting and air conditioners in. That was the first

AID/Zimbabwe office. I had an AID hand- clasp symbol on my business card. I gave it to a young local lady and asked her if she would paint us a sign. She took it and painted a five-foot AID hand-clasp symbol on it. We helped clean out what was then the Consulate swimming pool and found on the bottom of the swimming pool a Volkswagen Beetle that had been submerged. The pool water was so putrid black that you couldn't even see the Beetle until we drained the water out. Frankly, we only drained it out because the mosquitos were so bad that you couldn't work there until we got rid of that water and the breeding ground. It wasn't that we had time to go swimming! Also, just in terms of the flexibility to open a USAID/Mission in a hurry, we did some things I'm sure that the auditors would have a fit over now. Ray Love and I talked to the auditors, told them what we had to do to open up. To begin with, we had no operating expense budget, no controller, no cash management and no embassy to work with; so, I think I ran up something like $8,000.00 on my personal Visa credit card and put in to get it reimbursed later. I had all the documentation and got 100% of it back. Still, I doubt if Washington would feel very comfortable these days about my using my own credit card to start an AID mission up.

Another disappointing thing (one reason we stayed the five months) was that Ernice had to return to Washington. We had finally been transferred back to the United State. We had been out for seventeen (17) years at that point; and, it was right to come back and put the kids in school and start them in an American high school. So, she came home and bought a house just around the corner from here. It was brand new. I had to wait for a USAID employee named Charles Grader to come from Uganda. He was going to be the first Mission Director. Washington wanted a smooth handover from me to him, to make sure he knew where we were; so, he and I overlapped for about three weeks to make sure the handover went smoothly.

I was assigned to Washington as the Deputy Director in the Southern Africa Office; I came right back out to Harare on a supervisory and programming mission. I guess maybe it was more like four (4) or five (5) months. I spent three days with Grader and our staff; and, then he drove me to the airport. We were standing at the airport. I was ready to get on a plane when he said, "I didn't want to tell you this until you were ready to leave the country; but, I've been offered a salary of six figures over in West Africa. (I think it was with a Guinean gold mine company or something.) I've decided to retire and to go take it up as an offer I can't refuse." I remember, I took him by the shoulders (We were very good friends; and, I dearly loved the man and respected him.) and said, "You son of a bitch! I sat in that hotel room for five months waiting for you; and, you're going to leave us. This isn't fair. You can't do that!" I feared a setback on this important program. He responded, "I knew you'd react that way. That's why I didn't tell you until you were going to get on the airplane."

At that point, you and Ray did a quick recruitment of Roy Stacy, who had at one time been my predecessor down in Mbabane, Swaziland in OSARAC. Actually, Roy and I had followed each other in several assignments, including both of us coming to Washington, D.C. from California on the same G.W.U. graduate fellowship. He was a year behind me on the California fellowship from Scottish Rite to G.W.U.

One other story that I think is worth relating: At one point in planning the work to start AID in Zimbabwe, we had a high-level work session. The Minister of Finance, Dr. Bernard Chidzero, had set it up to brief Prime Minister Mugabe. I went in to meet Mugabe, to tell him what we would be doing and what we were planning. He said something at that point that became even more meaningful later.

We talked about how important it was to keep an image that this was a place where the white Rhodesians (white Zimbabweans now) could stay as part of a multi-racial country, respecting investment and property rights. He made a special point, as he did publicly every place, that any white that could live under his political rule was more than welcome to stay and that he would do everything he could to protect their rights and their lifestyle so that they didn't leave. He said, "I've learned the lessons of my neighbors." I responded, "What is that, Mr. Prime Minister?" He informed me, "That in Angola and Mozambique in 1975, they were so angry at their colonial masters that they forced the Portuguese out, threw them out, made it inhospitable for them. Because of that, they have deprived themselves of the investment, the business, the income, the technology, that is needed to progress." This was now 1980, five (5) years after the transitions had started in Angola and Mozambique. He continued, "I've learned the lessons of my neighbors. I will preach the gospel of reconciliation and hope that the white Rhodesians will stay." It got back to the point where started this, on land. Continuing on, he said, "I'm not going to just expropriate and take land away from them without compensation." But again, he put it back on us that, "It was my understanding when we negotiated at the Lancaster House that you (America) would join the British and pay for that land; but, if you want us to deal this way with the whites, you're going to have to come up with the money for the land they took from we Africans.

Q: How did you respond to that?

MORSE: I said, "I know that there are active discussions going on; but, from everything that we've seen at the moment, we're not in a position to help on land compensation now. We're eager to start. We want American help to start quickly; so, we're starting with the health program, an economic reconstruction package for the infrastructure and for demobilization, and seed packs for the ex-combatants." I put the onus on speed and quickness. He said, "Well, we value the American support very highly. You will be given the second diplomatic recognition after the British. So, the British will be the first to be recognized; and, the Americans will be the second."

Q: These programs all evolved after you left pretty much.

MORSE: Yes. We planned them and negotiated them before I left. That work with the ex- combatants, which, again, gave me additional insights, as it had in Southeast Asia and working with the military in the India-Pakistan war, to try and understand the special needs of demobilizing ex-combatants to get them back into the economy and to meet their psychological and economic needs. So, starting AID in Zimbabwe was a fruitful professional experience. There are lots of Zimbabwe tales; but, let's move off of that.

Q: Were there other programs, apart from the regional ones; were there any other countries we were helping? Were there any initial actions to our opening in Zimbabwe, in Mozambique, at that time – in 1980?

MORSE: Not any initial USAID actions in Angola and Mozambique. The politics were such that we were not being asked to open up a bilateral AID mission or to deal with them out of the regional OSARAC. I don't think Washington was pushing at that point, were we? We were very busy opening six (6) bilateral USAID missions in southern Africa in four (4) years (1977-80).

Q: There was a $10 million grant to Mozambique at the outset of the independence.

MORSE: In 1975-1976?

Q: Yes, but I guess that was managed from Washington, not handled through OSARAC.

MORSE: I went to OSARAC in 1977. We were not able to travel "next door" to Mozambique because of the fighting. We were not allowed to travel over there at that point because of the war going on, the guerillas and the hostile operations.

In terms of the Malawi AID bilateral opening, what we did to start there was everything from identify office space and staff and housing and arrange to open up the physical aspects of the AID mission; but, as I said earlier, the fun part was working with the Malawian planning officials. They had such a good vision of what was in their interests, what they would allow us to do, what they wanted, where we would start. Many of them didn't have a clear understanding of what we had done under the earlier OSARAC regional programs in Malawi that went back for 10-15 years; so, one of the earliest sessions with them was to just take the OSARAC records and sit down and brief them on where we had invested and what our ongoing relationships were with them. We started a lot of employment generation and some business programs with them. Education help was still continuing with them.

Q: Was the Polytechnic project still there?

MORSE: Yes, the program was going on in both the engineering and science faculties - excellent work. The transition in Malawi was very difficult; we went through a couple of AID people very quickly – from opening it up with an AID fellow that quickly went on to the African-American Institute to an AID Officer, Vivian Anderson, who went in after him but didn't stay on that long. It was a difficult set of transitions.

The work in Zambia was much smaller. There was a participant training program. We sent our training officer from Swaziland, who ran our training program for the whole southern Africa region. She would go up to Malawi and Zambia, as she did in the BLS countries, and train local staff. We tried very hard to train up AID local staff that had never worked for us before using the Swazi local staff.

We also did that with financial management staff. We were fortunate to have a good fellow, Columbus Spain, in our Controller's Office, who had been a third country national financial management type. He came out of West Africa; I think it was Sierra Leone. He had been with OSARAC back in Salisbury and Lusaka in the old day. He had tremendous continuity. We would deploy him and his staff to train, to open new bilateral missions in six (6) countries. We were trying to work simultaneously; so, we were not only starting AID bilateral programs and doing project design work; but, we were doing institution building for our own staff on AID systems and procedures.

Q: You said there was a sudden expansion in funding of $75 million or more. What was this for?

MORSE: We had a lot of training and OPEX. There was a big regional technical assistance project. In fact, I think I got myself crosswise with Washington, because when the congressional notifications went up to the Hill for three bilateral projects in training BLS staff and funding OPEX's people (I can't remember the name of the project.), we basically designed the same project for three (3) BLS countries. In fact, it had been designed originally as a regional OSARAC project; then, it was broken apart when Washington wanted it run bilaterally.

We literally just used the same project paper and tried to explain at the beginning that it had started as a regional project and was now to be managed as a bilateral. Somebody up on the Hill raised a question about, "How dumb do you think we are up here on the Hill? You just Xeroxed the same project paper for all three countries and expect to get away with that?" I remember getting a lot of anxious calls from Washington about what we were doing.

We did a lot of work in the early days in environment. Another one that got me a bit in trouble was that we put in some investments in a Swaziland Game Reserve. This was before there was the big push on environment, ecology, animal protection and this type of thing going on in the world. Nevertheless, it was clear throughout the region that, if you didn't train the school kids to help work with the parents to try and change the agriculture, environment and ecological balances, that it was going to continue to deteriorate.

The Peace Corps had three (3) Peace Corps volunteers who were working at the Mlilwane Game Reserve, which was a national game reserve, but which was run like a private one. The King, Sobhuza III, had blessed it; and, it was right next to his kraal. They were repopulating this game reserve with everything from elephants to zebra to antelopes to lions and everything else they could. The Peace Corps volunteers had a wonderful environment education program going on in there; however, they couldn't get school buses in there. So, we went in with a program to try and improve the dirt track and log bridges a little bit. It appeared as though we were building roads inside a game reserve for South African tourists to come and go to a game park. They could already use cars, sedans, in there. That was just totally unacceptable to Washington; so, we spent a

long time explaining that we're talking $10-20,000 to upgrade dirt tracks so that the school buses could come into the environment education center.

I went back to Swaziland as recently as 1995. What you see now and when you look at the numbers, there isn't a child that goes through primary and secondary school in all of Swaziland that doesn't visit that ecology and environment interpretation center four (4) times. Every child comes there at four different times. The Peace Corps doesn't do the training anymore; there are Swazis that do it. We put in log roads and bridges over "dongas" (gullies) so that the school buses could pass. At one time, Washington was criticizing us because it got called in the translation an "overpass". They had pictures of the South African concrete fly-over bridges and overpasses. What you were saying in Washington was that there was one place where the animals were coming up from the ponds and there was a donga and they were putting tree trunks across the top for the buses to go over so that you wouldn't disturb the animals' walk-through underneath. It got interpreted as though we were building fly-over bridges of cement and concrete, when all it amounted to was maybe seven (7) logs. Still, it caused controversy; so, I was not without controversy in all these programs. The projects, however, made an impact; and, we stayed with sustainability, which, as we look back now, is interesting.

Just to set the stage for later life, my wife and I said after we were in Zimbabwe for five (5) months in mid-1980 to open up AID mission in Zimbabwe, that, if there was ever a chance to come back and serve there on a long-term basis, it would certainly be a wonderful assignment. Then ten (10) years later, in 1990, we were assigned there as the Mission Director.

Q: Any other dimensions of the program there? There was lots of activity going on, I know, in each of the southern Africa countries.

MORSE: Over in Botswana, there was a really important set of programs for the outlying areas with fencing, trying to get pasture rotation, fencing off whole areas where the domestic animals wouldn't overgraze. There was a project to build a slaughter house up north; livestock was the backbone on Tswana culture and economy. There were a lot of programs which were on community-level action. The government had a good sense of their own participatory democracy and their style of it. We started up programs that would reinforce that kind of civil society using a bottom-up approach. Botswana President, Sir Seretse Khama, was such a great leader on this. We could talk about lots of individual projects; but, I probably would have to look at my notes.

Q: What happened to OSARAC after you opened the six new bilateral USAID missions in southern Africa?

MORSE: It dissolved. There were different models about whether OSARAC should become a Regional Support Office to these new bilateral missions. If so, we would keep project or controllers or lawyers there, people like that. Another option was to dissolve OSARAC in Mbabane and treat the Swazi USAID as just one of many co-equal bilateral missions that would be supported out of the REDSO operation in Nairobi instead.

Whether there should be what we called the unfortunate acronym of SADSO, the Southern Africa Development Support Office, the equivalent of REDSO.

There were other organizational models that were put forward; but, ultimately, OSARAC was dissolved and AID Mbabane Office went to pretty much a straight bilateral mission, except for one thing: We did try to outpost regional officers in different missions. So, where there was a strong need for a controller in one place; you would have a senior controller there and maybe junior or local controllers elsewhere who would feel they could get that senior regional office support. We couldn't put a senior controller, a lawyer, a contracts officer in every place; but, you would try to outpost some regional people in each of the missions so that they would share those people. So, if there was a senior engineer or a PDO in the mission, you would try to share those with other missions.

Then, a wise man in Washington, You, said when we had all these models: "Don't throw away the original OSARAC organizational design, because the day will come when the political foreign policy need to have bilateral missions will probably fade again; and, we will someday probably revert back into a regional operation." Haven North, when you said that, I remember putting a special folder aside with all of the regional options and alternatives, regional staffing patterns, the job descriptions for the people, the functional statements of the office and the working relationships with the outlying countries. I put them all in one folder. I tried to tell Julius Coles, USAID/Swaziland Director, when I left, "Keep this in the library".

When I went back to Swaziland in 1996 for the last time, I looked in the library. Of course, the Swazi mission was then closed down. There were only three (3) people left in the Swaziland mission itself. The library had all been dispersed. I asked whether some of it had come into the Washington CDIE library. There was nobody around that had the corporate OSARAC memory. It's too bad because that predicted need to have a regional office again materialized with the $50 mil/year regional office that had been in Harare that has moved to Botswana, despite my protest. (It later moved to South Africa – no continuity!)

Q: We'll come to that in a minute. I think there's more you can add to that; but, we'll move on. You were there in what period?

MORSE: 1977 until September of 1980; three and one-half years. I then came into Washington for my first regular assignment.

Q: This was your first assignment in Washington?

MORSE: Since being an intern. I went through the one-year internship back in 1962-63.

Q: What was this assignment?

MORSE: I came in as Deputy Office Director for Southern Africa. Marty Degatta was the office Director at that point. We had some excellent people. Lucretia Taylor was a desk officer with us; Valerie Dickson was a desk officer with us at that point; Earl Yates was a desk officer for South Africa. It was just an excellent group of people to work with. Some of the old-line people, Lynn Derso and Cappie Capafary, who both knew program operations like very few others did were there. The quality of staff in the Southern Africa Office was just extraordinarily high. Bob Wren joined us later. He was great.

Q: What was the task of your office? This was a time when we had the Front-Line States and the major initiative for that area.

MORSE: It was a very complex set of assignments that included a lot of support to the six (6) new bilateral missions that had been opened up throughout southern Africa; a lot of effort went into support to what became the Southern Africa Regional Program (SARP) to support SADCC. It had been set up in Lusaka just before Zimbabwe's independence in April of 1980.

At the political level, SARP was to show that the U.S. administration (which took over in 1981- 1982) was working for internal solutions to apartheid within South Africa. At the same time, funding for SARP was probably driven more by the black caucus on the Hill, as well as some of the State people who felt that we had to identify ourselves with the Front-Line States. The political objective was to get the Front-Line States to moderate the more militant, violent, overthrow and change of apartheid government in South Africa. But, as we said to the staff time and time again, whenever you have an emergency, a crisis, a high political profile like with SARP, where you are asked to do things and do them quickly for political reasons, usually you can accomplish some important development objectives.

So, we upped the ante on the Southern Africa Regional Programs. We got an extra $50 million a year out of the African Support Act for regional programs. We started a lot of transport support. The Front-Line States made that their highest priority, not to be beholden to the transport routes coming up through South Africa through their ports and rail and road systems. The FLS wanted our help to try and break the leverage South Africans had on their commerce; they wanted alternative transport routes. So, heavy SARP investment was made in FLS transport. In Tanzania, we supported the TAZARA Railroad and the Tan-Zam (the Tanzania- Zambia) highway to strengthen a northern FLS route to by-pass South Africa. I think we worked with the Chinese on some of those routes as well, which had different rail standards. We worked on railroads coming into Zimbabwe through Mozambique at that point through Beira port and through the Mapopo line and up through Maputo itself to strengthen a central FLS transport route to bypass South Africa.

Improvements were made to the railroad in each of the FLS countries. We would periodically get caught between General Electric and General Motors bidding on trying to control the locomotive market down in that part of the world. I recall the saying that: "When two elephants fight, it's the grass that gets trampled". Many times, we felt like the

grass in trying to get an efficient rail operation while GE and GM competed fiercely. We were not just providing locomotives; we did a lot of analyzing transport routes and tonnages, and analyzing maintenance, and providing spare parts, retiring old equipment, and training people to do proper maintenance, setting proper rail speeds, and getting cargo protected from stealing, helping railway police – getting them to really police and put speed governors on the trains so they wouldn't tip over going too fast around curves and wipe out brand new U.S. provided locomotives. There was a lot to do in the early days to develop regional rail transport, while we had the SARP funding for political objectives.

At the same time, we started to work with South Africa itself. I think the first request came in the middle of 1981. We were asked to go to South Africa and take a look at what we would do to work as part of the internal settlement, while the western diplomatic initiative was working at half a dozen different levels with South African black, white, colored and Indians. I went in first before you came down and surveyed 137 black, white, colored and Indian educators, from ministers of education to principals of schools, parent-teacher associations, vocational school people, labor unions, civil society, community education and people running that huge correspondence education program. It was the largest in Africa, because non-whites wouldn't go to the apartheid schools. We learned so much from that exercise. Then you joined. Did you join me in Durban? Is that where we linked up?

Q: No. I've forgotten where we connected; but, there were three of us. I was with this black American woman educator from the District of Columbia.

MORSE: I've tried to recall her name. I have it in the files but can't remember right now.

Q: We covered pretty much most of the South Africa country: Johannesburg, Pretoria, Cape Town, Durban; we drove across the country. Do you remember that?

MORSE: Oh, yes.

Q: We were stopped by the security people

MORSE: Sometimes four and five times we'd go through security checkpoints.

Q: Because we were a mixed-race group, all in the same front seat of the car.

MORSE: Now you can talk about that. It was forbidden under apartheid.

Q: At any rate, out of that came our report. Do you recall anything about what was recommended in that study?

MORSE: I think we learned many lessons. Were you in the meeting with Bishop Tutu when we met with him? He taught us critical lessons on how to proceed, and how not to proceed.

Q: Yes.

MORSE: Wasn't he the first one that told us that we should not work through the white apartheid government, that if we did, the government could control our efforts for a non-violent internal settlement of changing the apartheid system? He told us the non-white community wouldn't participate with us if it was controlled by the white government. Remember when I waited all night practically to meet Zulu Chief Gotcha Buthelezi and heard similar policy guidance. We also heard it from the man who is now the South African Ambassador here in Washington, DC. When we met him, he was the principal of the Polytechnic College down in Cape Town. Recently, I was with Princeton Lyman at the South African Embassy; and, he introduced me to the Ambassador, Franklin Sonn. I said, "Well, you've probably met 10,000 people; but, we benefited from your insights on education and educational development during our study about how U.S. could support an internal settlement."

Our report basically said, if the USG wants to help the non-white South African community in education, labor, grassroots and civil affairs, we need to do it in a way that bypasses the RSA government. We cannot not have it controlled by the RSA. We will help build the foundations for a peaceful transition from apartheid. So, I think the report recommendation was to invest USAID funds outside the usual bilateral government-to-government relationships.

We started by strengthening the American Ambassador's unilateral Self-Help Fund, a huge expansion of money and activity. We notified the RSA government that we would be doing this. We didn't ask permission. We didn't ask to sign a joint US-RSA agreement. We just informed them that we were going to expand the Ambassador's Self-Help Fund for small project grants. The U.S. Embassy wanted very much to be part of that, to be identified with the moderate change internal groups. I remember the Consul General over in Durban, who felt that their staff could and should directly run it.

As I said to you the last time, when we made that recommendation, Frank Ruddy, who was then a Senator Jesse Helms' political appointee as the AID/AA for Africa, your boss and mine, strongly disagreed with our approach to by-pass the RSA government. When we first briefed him, he, as I recall, just said, "That's not the way we normally do things." Then he kind of left it at that. When we went over and we briefed State Assistant Secretary for Africa, Chet Crocker, and made our recommendation again to bypass the government, Crocker agreed; but, then Frank became very adamant that "thou shalt not do that". He didn't want to be identified with this approach, partly because he was a Helms protégé and came with that Republican conservative political backing. He didn't want to take the heat to bypass a friendly, conservative white government, or for his AID bureau to run what was also going to be a large African scholarship program. Congressman Steve Solarz wanted us to name the program the "Solarz Scholars". For non-white South African moderates to come and do academic studies in the States in higher education, to get Masters degrees, some Doctorates and a few Bachelors. Frank

didn't want AID or himself to be identified with that; so, he wanted the program to be run like the USIA ran the Fulbright scholarship program.

He and I went over to a meeting with the Director of USIA, Charlie Wick. We gave the same oral report that we gave to everybody else on our report. I remember Wick yelled at Art Lewis. Art was the head of the USIA Africa Bureau at that time. I knew him before in Addis. Wick said, "Why wasn't I briefed that we were going to have to take over this program?" He was feeling the same kind of conservative political embarrassment that Frank Rudd had; Frank didn't want to be identified with such a "liberal" program – neither did Charlie Wick. But, Art Lewis had already said that they would do it and run the scholarship training program from over at USIA. Frank wanted to just shove the whole program out the AID door and get over to USIA. Wick saw that and jumped down Art Lewis' neck in what was, to me, probably the most embarrassing high-level abuse of a professional foreign service officer that I had ever seen happen at that point. Just totally uncalled for in an open meeting with other U.S. government workers. He, Wick, berated Art Lewis to the point where he said, "You know, I was ready to put you up for an ambassadorship; but, if this is the way you're going to manage and keep me informed, then I'm going to withdraw that. You're just not a competent office that I want to put in for an ambassadorship." It was a terrible way to treat a person in a public meeting.

Far more humane was the way Frank Ruddy handled it. When we were walking back from the USIA office to the AID office, Frank said to me, "I assume you know you can't work for me any longer." I replied, far too impertinently, "But I can live with myself. You've made it pretty clear that, if I continued to express this report and this recommendation in a way that you disagreed with and I didn't change it, that you wanted people around you who could follow your lead."

I remember getting a call from Jay Morris within hours. Jay was then like an Assistant Administrator for External and Legislative Affairs or Public Relations or something like that; but, he was almost functioning like a deputy at that point to AID Administrator Peter McPherson. I got called in. I was more angry at that point in my career than I had ever been in the 18 or 19 years of government service. Jay Morris started by saying, "Frank Ruddy says that you can't follow the political lead of this (Republican) administration." He then went on to question my patriotism and my loyalty to my country. Nothing will set me off more than to say that. I can be criticized on a thousand fronts; and, I've got a lot of weaknesses and bad attitudes in work; but, don't ever challenge my sense of patriotism and commitment to serve my country. I said that to him, that, "I've worked for more administrations for longer than you've been old enough to be in the government. Don't you ever question my patriotism to my country. If I disagree with a policy and a program, I will tell you; and, I will tell my superiors that. If I don't like it, I'll resign; but, I will not ever back down from my commitment to my country and my patriotism."

About three hours after that, Joe Wheeler, who was then Deputy AID Administrator (who had been my boss in Pakistan) called. He said, "I've got good news and bad news for you. What do you want?" I responded, "Let's hear the bad. I know what that is." He said, "Well, you've been fired from the Africa Bureau." I replied, "I sure saw that one coming

for the last 24 hours." Then he said, "The good news is, you can pretty much go where you want to go. There is high-level State/AF, NSC and Congressional Black Caucus support for you and for your report. We'll put you out to cool you off until this blows over". So, I picked the Eastern Caribbean and went down to the Caribbean mission in Barbados. That was a tough move for the family. We had only been home for two (2) years and had a daughter who needed two more years of American high schooling! Eighteen months later, Jay came to give me the award for helping evacuate the American students off Grenada during our "invasion". Jay apologized for what he had said earlier about my patriotism.

Q: That whole issue of how to manage the South African program independent of the government was a very hot issue. There were factions on the Hill who were pushing very hard, some that wanted it to go through the government and those who said, "No, it should be independent." Of course, the black South African independence people were firm on that – Bishop Tutu and all the others. So, we had made several recommendations along the lines of administering the scholarship program, the support of local education initiatives. We also recommended there be an AID representative there, which the embassy had resisted but eventually succumbed to. That was the first beginning of an AID person in that country.

MORSE: How long of a gap was there from the time of our report? We did our analysis in November/December 1981. When did Tim Bork go in? He was the first representative, wasn't he?

Q: Well, there was a delay. We had to push for this position. They said, "If you're going to manage all these self-help grants and all these other things that we have recommended and the aspects of the scholarship program, we need somebody on the ground who knows the AID business."

MORSE: Absolutely.

Q: The State Department was resisting. So, it took a long time to turn that around. I don't know when he went; but, it probably took quite a while.

MORSE: It seemed to me it was almost 18-24 months.

Q: I think that's probably right.

MORSE: Which seemed like an extraordinarily long time. I was only in Washington another six months after our report. Then I was "exiled off" to the Eastern Caribbean in the middle of 1982. I think we went down to Barbados in June or July; so, I didn't watch South Africa after that; but, I was surprised while I was trying to monitor it from Bridgetown how slowly the AID opening in South Africa moved. I thought we were going to be able to start right away. I guess there were AID funds that we did channel down to the embassy. I talked later to a couple of colleagues who had been in the embassy at that time. They were saying they were overwhelmed by the AID

documentation, requests, reports, accountability, money and all the rest of this self-help. They wanted the access to the non-white community that came to them from making these multiple self-help grants; but, they certainly didn't want to take on all the nif-naf of AID documentation and accountability standards.

Q: One of the recommendations that we made on this was putting a big emphasis on improving the quality of the black teachers' teacher education; but, that was challenged by Congressman Solarz and others because that involved getting the South African government into the act again. This was such a critical need because the quality of non-white education was so bad. I think, however, we did come up with support from non-governmental organizations that provided training to the black South African teachers. Most people accepted that, when the apartheid government changed, highly educated non-white South African leaders would be needed.

MORSE: Wasn't it San Diego State that went in and did the work on examining the matriculation exams for us?

Q: Right.

MORSE: They had finished the work that I left; but, I remember that Earl Yates gave me a briefing on it when I was back from the Caribbean at one point. They had found that, consistently, the blacks couldn't matriculate out of high school into college because they couldn't pass a certain amount of history or science or math. In the other areas, they were quite competent and had learned. With that knowledge of where the blacks were consistently failing in those exams, we went back and looked at the curriculum and found a direct correlation. The reason they couldn't pass the exams was because they weren't being taught history, science or math adequately enough to matriculate into South African colleges or universities.

Q: It was a deliberate apartheid policy not to educate them in science and math.

MORSE: Which seems strange to me. Coming out of Southeast Asia, the Dutch made a deliberate commitment to train the Indonesians in science, math and engineering. That's why you had the early leaders of Indonesia becoming medical doctors and engineers. Those were the only technical fields in which the Dutch would train them; so, it seemed strange that that's what the (Dutch-based) apartheid system was protecting.

Q: It was protecting itself.

MORSE: But, it wasn't protecting itself on the social sciences, legal, law, political science and humanities fronts. It was different from the way the Dutch did it in Indonesia, I think; but, there was some wonderful analytical work in terms of who couldn't matriculate, why they couldn't and what weren't they being taught, and then what remedial education was needed. There was a tremendous effort in trying, therefore, to get the South African community organizations to give the remedial education. There was no

law on the books, as I recall, that prohibited a non-white from going to universities. They just could not matriculate in key subjects.

Q: That's right.

MORSE: Legally, they could get it. De facto, they couldn't matriculate. So, if you could help them get that remedial education, you could break through that until the apartheid system would maybe change. Remember, though, Witwatersrand and Cape Town Universities had 10- 14% non-whites enrolled already – not too many blacks, but a lot of Indians and coloreds that were in there.

A program later, when we started working with community-level organizations, expanded beyond just education to more conflict resolution. It taught people how to resolve differences; it gave a foundation that, in our own small way, I think contributed to the peaceful evolution of the political and the anti-apartheid change down in South Africa - we and many other donors. Lest we take credit for this, I think we learned from other donors where they were expanding their self-help activities and working with community-level organizations as well.

Q: Clearly, you were involved in South Africa at a very dynamic period of change and advancements and so on. I'm sure there is a great deal more that you could add to that as you think about it; but, let's leave it for now and you can come back to that. Maybe I'll have some more questions after I think about it some more.

Then you went to the Caribbean. What year was that?

MORSE: This was the middle of 1982. I had spent about two (2) years in Washington.

Q: What was the position you went to?

MORSE: The Deputy Regional Development Officer. It was a similar regional assignment down in Swaziland/OSARAC. One thing that I should have mentioned, I went there as the Deputy to John Kean. John only stayed for about six months; and, then his eyes gave him a problem, and he rotated back to Washington from Swaziland.

Q: This was when?

MORSE: In 1978 in Swaziland. John had to retire, I think, on very short notice. Because we were disbanding OSARAC at that point, there was no need for a new director. I became Acting Director of OSARAC. We didn't bring in a deputy because we had broken OSARAC apart. So, I guess that's the first time that I was in that kind of a supervisory position. It was more by chance at that stage because of John's early retirement. He's still there. I don't know if you've ever interviewed him.

Q: I've done his history.

MORSE: I'd love to hear his….and Marty Dagata?

Q: I've haven't gotten him to sit still yet.

MORSE: The next assignment was as the Deputy Director of the AID Regional Development Office for the eastern Caribbean (RDO/C) in Bridgetown, Barbados. We provided U.S. assistance to several regional organizations, as well as bilateral aid to the independent countries in the eastern Caribbean. We covered an area all the way from Jamaica to Trinidad. At the Trinidad University, at that time, environment, ecology, trade and business were acceptable areas to work.

Q: What was the overall U.S. interest in being involved in those small countries?

MORSE: It was a time when the Cold War was still with us. There was a feeling that this area was kind of the soft underbelly of the United States and was vulnerable to influence from the communists on Jamaica to Cuba and Castro on over to Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua. The feeling was that we needed to work with this "arc" of islands just so they weren't springboards of communism at that point. There was a feeling, too, that we wanted them developed so that there wasn't a massive outflow of Caribbean immigrants and boat people coming into the United States because there was no sense of hope, future and progress on their own islands; and, so, they would try to make their way into the U.S., as well as possibly be susceptible to the communist approach to their plight.

The Caribbean Basin Initiative was a big part of our regional work at that time; but, again, before the CBI, we were also starting to sign bilateral agreements with these countries with whom we didn't have bilateral aid before. So, my experience of working both regionally and at the same time bilaterally with small countries in southern Africa became quite relevant as we began to work with Grenada, St. Kitts, St. John, Antigua and Dominica, where Mrs. Charles was Prime Minister. We opened up little projects that ranged from supporting their tourist industry, which was the backbone of many of those economies, to trying to protect their environment and ecology, to increasing their trade and employment and things like that. We didn't have any bilateral projects on Barbados; therefore, the point I was making earlier about the staff spending 70-75% of its' time on the road (or water!) all the time became even more complicated. There was no justification to be home in Barbados when all our work was on the outer islands. So, we lived there for historical and comfort reason; but, for work reasons, we almost had to be on the road 100% of the time.

Q: Were the Bajans concerned about this, that we weren't doing anything there?

MORSE: They seemed to have accepted it. They used to complain about it periodically, especially when we started to work with other islands on a bilateral basis. "Why couldn't and shouldn't we work with them?" What we did do was to work with regional organizations that were headquartered on Barbados. Therefore, we expanded working with the Caribbean regional bank, the regional private businessmen's association, the regional economic trade groups that were headquartered there. There was some

justification for the staff to be home and working on Barbados; and, the Bajans felt they were getting some attention. In fact, Washington's guidance to us was not to open up anything in there. Not very good international relations with our Bajan hosts!

Q: What were some of the more significant projects that you recall that you think made a difference?

MORSE: There was almost a prohibition at one time or a division of labor amongst the donors where AID wouldn't be involved in tourism back in the 1950s-1970s; but, when you got to the Caribbean, you could see that that was absolutely critical. It's an important sector of the economy like any other sector; and, you have to pay attention to it. So, there were lots of policy and program differences. We were doing a lot to build up tourism, especially to bring in experts who would help them to market the Caribbean region as a region, to bring down their costs so that each little island didn't have to have its' own public relations firm in New York and Miami to sell it. How do they get brochures that sell each island, while at the same time put it in a regional context so that everybody didn't have to pay the same design and printing costs over and over again? We were helping to strengthen their tourist organization to do analysis of the trends. Who is coming in, what groups? What do they like to do? What do they spend money on? How long do they want to stay? What group would rather go scuba diving in the Grenadines versus sitting on the white sands of Barbados? So, a lot was being done in the tourism sector.

Then, we had projects that still tried to keep a regional character, but signed individual agreements on trade. Who had what production on what island that could be traded to their neighbors? The backbone was bananas; but, a British company had a monopoly pretty much on the marketing of the bananas. So, we kind of stayed out of the banana trade; and, yet, the price changes on bananas made a hell of a difference on the economies of these small island countries.

We worked a little bit with labor unions on terms, especially of the banana workers' unions and the dock handlers. We got some of our labor people to work with their labor people in just setting the mood for quality control, standards and fast action when you have a perishable like bananas that are at stake. Of course, the labor knew that, if you go into a slowdown, you could ruin a whole shipload of bananas if you slowed it down for 18 hours. In trade, even such wild things as looking at shipping water out of Dominica. There were tanker ships coming from the Middle East bringing oil from as far over as Central America and even into the Venezuelan refineries. The crude oil ships were coming in full, but going back empty. Could you have them stop and, with good liners, take water back into the Middle East? Was that economically viable? Trade analysis was as wild as that kind of stuff.

Q: Were you involved in any infrastructure? Was there a road or airports in Dominica?

MORSE: Small roads in each of those countries. Mrs. Eugenia Charles, Prime Minister of Dominica, was very persuasive and very personal. I will never forget the day that I went

on my first trip there. We had an AID airplane that was under charter. We "flew" to work every morning. In other places we would drive to work; but, here we would fly off to another island. We tried to efficiently schedule it and manage it. The plane would stop on certain islands on certain days and then pick you up in the evening on the way back or two days later, whatever was the best schedule. But when I went to Dominica the first time, there was a woman at the airport gate waiting to meet me. She introduced herself by saying, "I'm Eugenia Charles." The name, of course, rang a bell. I thought, "I wonder if she's here for Eugenia Charles." It didn't take me 10 seconds to realize she WAS Eugenia Charles. She drove her own car and drove me to her house. She fixed eggs for me at her house while we talked about road projects.

Q: What was her title? President?

MORSE: Prime Minister. Of course, she became absolutely critical to us under the Grenada operation. We'll get to that. She also was the Chairman of the Eastern Caribbean Association. She was the one who gave the official request for the United States to "intervene" in Grenada.

Q: She had a direct line to the White House.

MORSE: She did that day. But, talking about direct lines, you would pick up and phone her office; and, she would answer the phone herself. You would phone her at home (she wanted you to call her at home); and, she would answer the phone herself. She had household help; but, they would do the dishes after she cooked and served. She was quite a woman.

I took my wife over on one working trip with us. We were opening a little family-planning clinic that we had been supporting over there. We had a driver from the Dominican government and a government car. She was ahead of us in her car. We were following her. Our driver got into an accident. My wife hit her head on the dashboard and had a big black eye. I got in the next car and went on to the ceremony; and, Ernice went back to the local hospital. Mrs. Charles left the ceremony and went to the hospital to see how Ernice was. She was that personally involved.

The AID-funded road programs on these islands were small, just fixing up laterite and lava roads. They weren't expensive things. There was a lot of work done looking at harbors that could take more boat charters. Tourist and fishing charters were important foreign exchange earners.

Q: What about promoting private business?

MORSE: We had a huge RDO/C operation in trying to attract private investment down there. Businessmen have huge holdings in the U.S. and down in the Caribbean as well. We worked with the Caribbean Business Association itself and to try to attract investment, to see what was necessary, especially in the hotel industry. We tended to stay

away from that ourselves because we were not that far out of a period when AID wasn't doing much with tourism. It was still a "no-no" for us to help this field.

Q: But what about private manufacturing or processing? That came at a later time, I guess.

MORSE: It did with the Caribbean Basin Initiative. Once it was proposed that under this initiative goods and materials that were made in the Caribbean would have duty-free access into America, and that U.S. legislation was passed, then we teamed up with the U.S. Department of Commerce and the State Department's economic sections and tried very hard to promote American investment but also see what local biz would need to exploit this important opening. Too many times, it turned out there were practical constraints: "We couldn't relocate a factory there, in the Caribbean, because our staff wouldn't have access to good schooling."

This was a time when international firms were moving out of Hong Kong. It was a hope that we could attract a lot of the Hong Kong textile investments. There were several that did not come down into the Caribbean where they were closer to the American market. Also, there were electronic assembly firms that had been based in Hong Kong and Taiwan and wanted to move out of there with the announcement at that point that Hong Kong would become part of China again in 1997. Of course, this was clear back in 1982-1986. So, it was 13 years before Hong Kong was no longer a Crown colony, but part of China.

Businessmen were already looking to relocate; so, it was a hope to get them down into the Caribbean. There were a lot that came. I'm not sure that our own AID role was that instrumental. Each businessman makes his own business decisions on the risks and the profits. We could do very little other than to see if the Caribbean policy environment was conducive. We in the embassy and commerce would work with the Caribbean government to see that the foreign exchange, and the banking and monetary financial transaction system was honed, open and transparent so that new investors weren't being shaken down. Still, even on the infrastructure, their islands were so small it didn't take much. If a person was going to relocate a factory, they would put a load of crushed coal from a factory and have it sent down to the island town or the port, and offload it at the relocation spot. It did not take much.

GRENADA CONTEXT

The small (90,000-100,000 population) island of Grenada went through 300 years (1649-1950) under French and then British colonialism. It became independent in 1974. Civil unrest and questionable elections were followed by a 1979 paramilitary attack on the government and establishment of a revolutionary government under Prime Minister Maurice Bishop. In the following years there was a dispute over the type of government to be followed: socialist, favored by Bishop, backed by Cuba versus communist, pushed by Deputy Prime Minister, Bernard Cord, backed by Russia. On October 19, 1983, Cord lead a coup against Bishop and his Government. Following street demonstrations

supporting Bishop, he and seven (7) cabinet ministers were executed. The country was put under martial law, including a "shoot on sight" curfew for four (4) days.

These things greatly disturbed the USG: One, establishment of a strongly pro-communist government so close to the U.S.; and two, construction of a new, very large airport capable of striking us or refueling soviet planes transiting from Cuba to Central American communist countries. Then, thirdly, there were 827 primarily U.S. medical students studying on the island at an off-shore American medical college who the USG believed could be held hostage like the Americans at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. President Reagan decided the U.S. military should invade Grenada to bring the American students home and to install a non- communist government. He had the support of the Organizations of Eastern Caribbean States and the Grenada Governor General; but, the U.S. invasion was largely criticized by the UN and most of the rest of the world. My assignments, first from Barbados and then on Grenada, were to arrange for the evacuation of the medical students; then, after the invasion, to direct US assistance for reconstruction on the island. (For a very, very detailed military history of "Urgent Fury" go to http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/grenada/urgent_fury.pdf. There is no mention of the civilian role in there!)

Q: Let's turn to Grenada. Was that event while you were there?

MORSE: It was – October of 1983. There was a point about AID that many people forget that's part of the Grenada history. If I understand it (and I wasn't there at the time), when Maurice Bishop took over as Prime Minister of Grenada, he came to Barbados because that's where the American Ambassador was located that also covered Grenada. We didn't have a separate embassy on Grenada, just as we didn't have separate American ambassadors on the other Caribbean islands. Bishop asked for American aid. He wanted to develop his island and people. They were poor. I think, at that point, there were about 85,000 people on all of Grenada – but very poor people, overwhelmingly involved in the basic banana trade. The American ambassador reportedly said to Maurice Bishop, "The only American aid that we can give you is the $25,000 Self-Help Fund."

Every Grenadian that I ever talked to would tell that belittling story, that America only offered $25,000.00 to Grenada; and, that was our contribution to their development. It so incensed Maurice Bishop that he turned to the Eastern Bloc to get help because the Western Bloc had just offered him only $25,000. If you could find out who the ambassador was who said that and find out if he really said, "This is what I can do on the spot right now, that's what I can offer now; but, I will refer your request for American aid to Washington and RDO/C"; and, it got misinterpreted. I will say, however, that there wasn't a Grenadian that I talked to for the next two (2) years who wouldn't cite that offensive story of America's disregard for Grenada.

Q: You didn't have any regional projects there?

MORSE: There were a few that were still ongoing. They were more in the terms of tourism and education. They participated in some of the regional higher education work

down in Trinidad and regional tourism based in Jamaica; but, it was not significant. This was before we were doing the bilateral programs when Maurice bishop came into power. But, because we still had a couple of those projects under our financial and technical oversight, Bill Wheeler and I, as project managers, as the managers of the RDO/C mission, would go over to Grenada once in a while. The U.S. Embassy staff rarely went over there except for a consular officer and an intelligence officer visit. When the boom went up, we were asked whatever we knew about the island and anything about it.

I recall the sequence of events. At an Embassy country team meeting, it was reported by the American Defense Attaché that they had picked up the fact that Maurice Bishop had gone to Moscow to try and get some additional support and backing against, if you will, his own deputy, Dr. Bernard Cord. The Russians reportedly told Bishop that he's not their man, "We think that Dr. Bernard Cord is a true believer of the Russian version of the right philosophy of communism".

On the way back from Moscow, Bishop stopped in Cuba to see his close friend and supporter, Fidel Castro. Castro had been supporting him even to the point of having a Cuban construction battalion supervising the work to build that huge runway and airport which was the symbol of Grenada's way out of poverty. If Grenada could get that runway built, they could have international direct flights to bring tourists and business people. The airport was the whole symbol of economic development and progress to them. Cuba had responded to that. When the American intelligence people picked up the fact that, "Wait a minute, Moscow is saying they're going to back Cord; and, Cuba is reaffirming now that they're going to back Bishop. This could be a little messy." As you know, there was, among other things, an off-shore medical school for American students situated on Grenada. As I said, there were about 827 students that were enrolled in there.

Q: Who had this medical school?

MORSE: It was private. Americans couldn't get in easily to American medical schools on the continental U.S.; so, that school was started off shore. Frankly, many of the same professors who taught at Johns Hopkins, Michigan and Texas would come down and lecture there. They would get two weeks paid vacation to come to Grenada to lecture the same lectures they were giving to the medical students in America; so, it was very good quality education. But, they were basically trying to break the hold of the American Medical Association on limiting the number of medical students in American colleges.

We had an American Ambassador who was a political appointee out of South Dakota named Milan Bish. He had never been down in that area before and didn't endear himself when he announced (on his first day in Barbados) that when he was told that this was his assignment, he had to go to a map to find out where it was, and that he had grown up in an area where there were no black Americans, so this was a real change for him to be in a country where people were primarily black (unquote).

The fight between Cord and Bishop, people thought this could become a serious problem. Washington had gotten deeply involved in Grenada contingency planning, "what happens

if…" The American Embassy in Barbados was put on a real alert. In the country team in October, I don't remember what day it was, but I was acting RDO/C Director at that point. Ambassador Bish said, "The political people ought to monitor that; and, the intelligence people ought to monitor that; and, the military monitor this, whatever is going in Grenada."

We weren't too far away at that point from the reminder of the American Embassy people being held hostage over in Tehran, Iran. We were all conscious of all those medical students on Grenada and what could possibly happen to them. He said, "Washington has asked that we think about some contingency plan about how to evacuate those students from Grenada over here to Barbados. Has anybody ever been through an evacuation before?" Somebody said, "Morse was evacuated out of the India-Pakistan war." I said, "That's quite different"; but, he said, "Okay, you're in charge of the monitoring of any needed student evacuation. Do some thinking and planning on it." As you recall, when Prime Minister Bishop came home, his deputy, Bernard Cord, put him under house arrest, along with seven Grenada cabinet members. As soon as he was put under house arrest, Washington and the Pentagon and we went on a much higher alert. My part of it was to keep an open telephone line to the medical college campus, with the students, and with the college administrators. Then I had a second open line to the government of Grenada and into the Prime Minister's office. We were telling them how we'd like to get those students out of there.

Q: What were we afraid of?

MORSE: That they would be held hostage the same way that the American Embassy people in Tehran had been held hostage. We were also afraid that, if fighting broke out between the two factions, Cord's and Bishop's, that the students could get caught in between some way. So, at first, the administration of the school told me, "These kids are fine. They're going to classes. Yes, we know there are some problems downtown; but, we're out here on the campus; and, it's not affecting us. Keep us informed." I said, "Tell the kids not to go downtown, to stay on the campus. As American citizens, we really want you to stay out of this and keep a low profile and don't get crosswise."

Q: Were we not only afraid of the possible taking of student hostages; but, also the communist domination of the island?

MORSE: That seemed already a fait accompli. Bishop had by then declared that he wasn't just a nationalist; but, he was going to follow the communists. Three (3) or five (5) years had gone by from his initial takeover. He had declared that his was a communist regime.

The Grenada government didn't want us to evacuate the students. Every time I got them on the phone and told them that we'd like to see if we can get them out of there, they replied, "No, it's all peaceful. Everything is fine." My response was, "Well, we're getting reports that there has been shooting there or there are troop movements there." "That's all fabricated; it's not true", they repeated.

Q: Were there Cuban troops there?

MORSE: The Cuban troops who were doing the airport construction work were actually a military construction battalion. There was also a lot of Eastern Bloc representation on that island: Bulgarians, Hungarians, Poles, the whole Eastern Bloc was fully represented on that island. Then, as the situation began to escalate after they put Prime Minister Bishop under house arrest, we directly asked to be able to take the students out. We asked if we could land at the Cuban-built new airport. Their answer came back several hours later, "That's not been certified by our aviation department for international traffic; so, you can't land there. However, if you want to land over on the other side of St. George's…" Well, I reported to our Country Team, you can't get a plane in there that will take more than eight (8) people at a time because it's so short a runway. With 827 kids, it would take over 100 flights to get them out. So, we dropped that idea. Then we said to the Grenadians, "Okay, if the airport is not commercial, would you clear a private charter or a U.S. military plane?" Of course, it didn't take them a couple of hours to reply, "There's no way we're going to bring in American military planes, even if they are cargo planes." I went back and said, "You could have a Grenadian come up to Miami and ride in the plane so that you could see that it's not armed and it's only for cargo/passengers, no military planes." "That airport isn't to be used; it's not finished", they kept blocking.

When we reported this to Washington, we had an open line at the same time to a fellow named Ollie North, who was running the Grenada operation out of the National Security Council. He proposed that maybe a ship, one of the tourist passenger liners, could go in. He said, "There is a passenger liner that could dock there in about 18 hours." I asked the Grenadians, "Could they take the students off?" "Well, there was no reason they couldn't go. Yes, that liner is allowed in here. It was in here last month." Then they came back on and said, "But, that liner comes in on Friday; and, the tax office isn't open until 9:00 a.m. Monday morning." We questioned, "What do you mean, the tax office?" Their response was, "All of the students would have to clear their local taxes before they left the island." Every time we proposed anything, they would block it. It was clear they didn't want the embarrassment that the situation was so insecure that the students had to leave. Politically, the Grenadian government didn't want that.

The medical school administration didn't want to get between the American government and the Grenadian government because they had to live, work and function there. So, they kept saying everything was peaceful and calm.

The upheaval trigger came when a group of Grenada high school students demonstrated down in St. George's and marched in a demonstration up to Prime Minister Bishop's home, where he was being held along with some cabinet members. There were half a dozen Army at the house guarding him. The students just went in and overran the guards. There was no shooting at that point; the guards didn't shoot anybody. Several thousand of the kids went in and released the Prime Minister and the seven cabinet members, including his mistress, Jackie, who was the Minister of Education on Grenada. She had

been shackled to a bed with handcuffs. Talking to the kids later, they had actually seen that going into the house.

Then, a bigger demonstration occurred. Other city people joined the kids, with Bishop at the head of it, walking down to the old French fort, Fort Rupert, to basically throw Cord out of the office and take over again. When they got there, Cord gave the order to the Grenadian military to open fire; and they shot 92 people, including Prime Minister Bishop. We later got home videos from an American fellow who lives on the island across the bay from Fort Rupert; video of people jumping off the high walls of the Fort and breaking arms, collarbones and pelvises just to get out of the firing. So, down at the bottom of the fort, there was a whole pile of people with broken bones. That's when we realized, "Wait a minute. It's over. We have to get those kids out of there." That was my assignment.

At the same time, Washington was looking for a pretext to overthrow the communist Grenada government anyway. This was a hell of a good pretext. They couldn't have offered a better one. Now that there was the fighting between the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister followers, the U.S. turned to Eugenia Charles as the chairman of the Eastern Caribbean Political Association. She gave the formal request for the American troops to go in and not only evacuate the students, but also to return calm to the island now that the beloved Prime Minister had been killed.

Because I had been running the evacuation planning, I got the alert that the military "invasion" (called a "rescue mission") was being started about 4:30 a.m. They were going to come by and pick me up in Barbados and put me in a military plane so I could find the students. Ambassador Tony Gillespie, who was a Deputy Assistant Secretary, had come down from Washington and was basically running the whole Grenada operation instead of Ambassador Milo Bush, who was a recent political appointee. Tony was to go in; but, he would come in later. A consular officer would go in with me to process the students out as far as getting them back into the United States to make sure that we didn't pick up some people and evacuate them out that shouldn't be coming into the United States undocumented.

I got on a C-130; I didn't go in with the first wave. (This is getting too long on the military side of it.) The first wave of C-130s and American military were to jump onto the airport, the big airport; but, the Cuban anti-aircraft guns were shooting at them. They noticed, though, as they stacked up to drop troops from the C-130s, at the lower altitudes weren't taking any flack; only the ones at the higher altitude were. We had these electronic American control ships way up high; and, they could figure out that the Cubans couldn't lower their guns. The Cubans had placed them to shoot high; so, if you come in lower – less/no flack.

So, in the second run the American paratroopers jumped at a lower altitude than they had ever jumped before. They jumped at 500 feet. Their chutes were opened in the plane so that, when they came out, they were already billowing! They hit the sand; and they hit the Cuban base. They took fire from the Cuban and the Grenadian armies that were

protecting the country from this invasion by the Americans. The firefight went on for a couple of hours. Then we went in after they secured the runway.

The students were in dorms at the far end of the runway, called the True Blue Campus. The consular officer and I went there and organized the scared students for evacuation. That was during the first day. I can remember that, by the end of the day, we had secured enough of the runway and the surrounding hills that it was safe for the big C-141s bringing the troops up to land. They would drop off the troops, and then we would load the students onto them.

Q: The students had been alerted to be ready for this, I think?

MORSE: Yes. I had an open line to them the whole time. I told them, "This was a mandatory evacuation. You could only come out with one hand-carry on, no animals, no weapons, no electronic gear, radios, CD players or any of that." I can show you a photo that my daughter, Monica, wants for my wedding, a big color photo of me leading the students from the helicopter with the army lined up as I was putting them on planes.

Ollie North was just petrified that the kids would come back and say, as they had been saying all along, "What the hell did you come in here and invade this island for? We were safe. You shouldn't have used us as a pretext to kick a communist government out. We were safe and happy there." But, I remember saying something, as I had the kids assembled in what was to be the airport fire station. I had maybe a couple hundred students who were waiting for the first evacuation plane, with the troops lined up to give us escort. There were also the Black Hawk pilots that had gone up shore and taken some of the students off the beach by helicopter. I said to the kids, "You owe these troopers one hell of a debt of gratitude that they've been in here taking fire and bullets to make sure you guys get out of here safely." At that point, the kids broke into applause and clapping and scared tears. I remember the boy who was right behind me in red shorts when I said that. He was the first one off the plane when it got back here to Fort Bragg. He was the one who knelt down in front of the television cameras and kissed the tarp. When I heard about that, I cried with exhausted gratitude.

Q: Let's just describe the picture here and what was going on.

MORSE: What you have are the U.S. Special Forces and me who had gone to get the students at the True Blue campus down at the end of the runway to lead them up to the airport fire station. (We call it a base.) It was then the Cuban-guarded airport. We would put the kids into the firehouse and then get their names, social security numbers, phone numbers and stateside contacts so that we knew every student. One sheet per student. Then a consolidated list for the evacuation pilot.

Q: How many were there?

MORSE: 581 total. Then the consular officer and I would process them to get on the plane; and, we would walk them out when a C-141 would come in; and, they would

offload U.S. military; and, then we would put the civilian students on and they would fly back to the States. This boy in the red shorts with a white tee shirt was the one who really started to lead the kids to say "Thank you" to the troops that had come in and taken them out. Now the students were scared, as was I. There was fighting all around. There was bombing; there was strafing.

Q: This was going on at the same time?

MORSE: All the time. In fact, I had an Army Special Forces MP company of 90 men assigned to me fulltime to accompany me and the kids to safety.

Q: Those are the ones lined up beside you?

MORSE: And many other U.S. troops lined up like that. The orders from General Trobaugh to the company commander of the MPs was that "not one student was to be harmed and that the MPs were to take responsibility that, if a bullet ever reached a student, it damn well better go through a Marine first". So, every time we came under fire… We came under fire repeatedly because the hills that were around us still hadn't been cleared yet. They would go out, pick them up and bring them into the fire house; but, there were snipers and Grenada and Cuban military that were still controlling those hills.

Q: Were they shooting at the group here?

MORSE: We would come under fire when we would walk from here to there once in a while. Every time we came under fire, the MPs would just jump on every student and jump on me. I said, "Get the hell off of me. I'm not a student." "Morse, you are a civilian." The MP pushed my head into the sand and said, "Don't you raise your head up until I get off you. You're a civilian; and, we're not going to lose a civilian casualty while I'm on top of you." So, he literally would shove my face into the sand and keep it down. I owe my life to him! They later made me an honorary member of the U.S. Army 82nd Airborne.

Q: They did that for all the 581?

MORSE: Yes. We, weren't under fire the last day. That's the point. I can remember that General Schwarzkopf at the end of the first day was so pleased because we had gotten almost 400 of the students. He didn't know how many there were at first; he was so high up in command. I was working with General Trobaugh. At the staff meeting at the end of the day, he thought it was all over. I said, "Wait a minute. We only got half of them." He went berserk, didn't know that there was another campus up at the Grand Anse campus right on the beach; and, there was another couple of hundred students who didn't live on campus, who lived in the town of St. George's. They lived off campus. I had asked them to activate their college early warning emergency network to tell everybody, "Don't go into town. Stay out. Just stay where you are." So, those people, when we said that we were coming to evacuate them, we asked that word get out. The student wardens asked,

"Do you want us to go and walk up and knock on their doors?" We responded, "Not if it's not safe, no. You don't go anyplace that's not safe." So, there was this third "group" of kids up in town as well. It was the second day before we got all the students off of the Grand Anse campus.

The U. S. troops and I had to come in by helicopter and come in from the beach side to pick them up to avoid snipers. We were taking fire because the troops hadn't cleared behind the campus. We were taking fire on the Black Hawks as we went in to get the kids. I would run through the dormitories and through the classrooms and say, "We're Americans. Get on the plane. Get out. We've come to take you out. Don't take anything with you; but, run for it and stay at that door until you see that soldier tell you to make a run for which helicopter." So, the kids came back to the airport firehouse by helicopter. Most of them had never been in a helicopter before; so, they were scared by that time, and so was I.

Q: Were there a lot of non-American students at the campus, too?

MORSE: Not really. It was overwhelmingly American. The consular officer watched that. One other aspect: I remember a few days later when General Schwarzkopf told us that somebody in the Pentagon had pushed the Grenada Ops contingency plan, that had probably been made three years before, about what do you do if you have to go onto an island in the Caribbean. They dusted it off. When the Pentagon pushed the Ops button, everything automatically, from gasoline to helicopters to troops and medicines and everything, got activated. That included a group of Army Civil Affairs reservists out of Pennsylvania.

General Schwarzkopf was furious that these reservists who hadn't been in combat were all of a sudden going to show up on the island. He turned to me and said, "Morse, these are your kind of people. They are a bunch of civilians." He turned to his commander and said, "I don't want any of those reservists to be issued any bullets. They can have their uniforms and guns; but, I sure the hell don't want them with live ammunition. They haven't been trained. They haven't been practicing. They're going to hurt somebody. So, Morse, I'm putting them under your command." I said, "That's great. I've got money for reconstruction and no people and you've got people and no money." So, when they came in, I met with them and learned their civilian and C/A skills and put them to work.

That reserve unit later said they had the absolute best time they'd ever had because they went in, they surveyed the status of the infrastructure. They assessed the sewage system that had been broken. We blew apart the telephone system; then, we had guys from Bell Telephone in the reserve who could go in and tell us, "You're going to need this exchange and this unit" and what to bring in on the electricity, "This generator is gone. It can't be repaired." For water, "You can bring in parts for this pump". The guys who didn't have those technical skills went around and painted schools and clinics. I was quoted in "Time Magazine" at one point, when asked, "What's the difference that the troops have come in after the fighting's over versus what it was like before?" Then I said something about "The roads have deteriorated. They were just full of potholes; and, one

of the first things we're doing is mobilizing civilians and the Army Civil Affairs people to fill in the potholes." "Well, how do they do that?" "They just square it off and then put dirt and gravel in it and tamp it down with asphalt." Time Magazine wrote: "Well, they're making square potholes out of the round potholes!!" We also got some tremendous help from our own AID staff. Do you remember Phil Buechler?

Q: No.

MORSE: Phil and I had worked together in Southeast Asia. Then he went into Botswana when we were in southern Africa. He was a bit of a misfit. He is an ex-Marine; but, he always loved the emergency operations. Phil saw me on U.S. television. We used to give noon-day briefings. The military, the political and then the economic reconstruction, all three of us would brief the press after they were allowed in. As you remember, the media was not allowed to come in with the troops or to cover it for the first three days, which was a huge issue. Later, they came up with the idea of, "Okay, you can have a journalist pool to go in with the troops." Of course, that's what screwed up Somalia because they were on the beach with strobe lights when our troops hit the beach. Anyway, Phil saw me on television and got word to me that, "If you need me; I'll be there." Twenty-four hours later, he was in Grenada helping to supervise the military in terms of all kinds of civic action. We had a wonderful partnership. Later, we went up and testified on the Hill about some of the coordination problems.

Q: He was in AID.

MORSE: He was in AID. Phil also had responded to duty; he worked again for me on Contra aid. I'll come back to that. He went seventeen and one-half years without a promotion because he was constantly doing these kinds of non-development things. We stayed on after the troops had secured the area. We worked with the Grenadian government to open a USAID development program there.

Q: What was the status of the government at that point?

MORSE: We were working with the Economic, Finance and Planning Minister, who was also the Prime Minister. The government had changed in part. Truly, Haven, if 23 hours before we got there, if we had gone in before their beloved nationalist leader, Maurice Bishop, had been killed by his own people, we would have been hated. Once he had been killed by his own people, we were the saviors. That one difference of whether we were coming in to overthrow Bishop or to overthrow the people that had killed Bishop, made the difference in my mind of the good receptivity we enjoyed.

Q: Who had killed him?

MORSE: Cord ordered the military to shoot the demonstrators. Prime Minister Bishop was at the head of the mob. They finally got Cord; and, they got the general that gave the order to shoot the people. They never found Bishop's body. They later found three

Grenada enlisted men who had been ordered to take his body out to sea and dump it with the sharks so that it couldn't be found.

Q: Who was running the government at this point?

MORSE: I should back up. The night before the invasion started, the U.S. Navy Seals had come onto the island under the cover of darkness and made their way up through the thickest part of the jungles up into the residence of the Governor, as he was called. Under the British Commonwealth system, there was a person who was the Governor of the island. The Navy Seals went in to protect him and to keep him safe. They ran into a lot heavier opposition that night and early in the morning. They took a lot of hits. They lost half their men getting up there; but, they finally secured him and protected him. So, when our invasion started in Grenada, and Cubans came for him, the Seals held them off until our troops came in by helicopter to reinforce them.

He set up the government. In fact, in addition to Eugenia Charles, on behalf of the Caribbean Political Association, requesting our rescue, the Governor is the one who made a hand-written request for US help. The International Maritime Satellite Communications Package, one suitcase and an American communicator, went in with us. He set up the satellite communications up on top of the fire house. That night, early in the morning… It was still nighttime; but, I remember it was dark because I couldn't figure out what he was doing; but, he knew where to position that thing toward the satellite. So, we had telephone and fax and cable communication with the State and Pentagon and NSC Op Center in Washington through the IMRSAT.

At about 10:30 a.m., the Governor came to where we were at the fire house under escort of the military, who then wanted him off the island because there was still firing going around; but, they had protected him through the night. He hand wrote on a piece of white paper a request for the U.S. to come and secure the safety of the Grenadian people. I have the original of that request. It was sent by fax at about 11:00 a.m. They acted on it in Washington; but, I crumpled the original up and put it in my pocket. So, I have it upstairs in my files. But it wasn't written and sent until we had already gone in! Many people say that he had filed that request earlier. If he did, he had to give it by voice if the Seals had communicated it out when they protected him through the rest of that night until early in the morning. But he wrote it in longhand the next morning. So, that will be a point of some historical disagreement, I'm sure.

Q: It certainly will.

MORSE: Shall we stop on Grenada?

Q: Yes, but let's finish up on the follow up on the reconstruction. Is there anything more?

MORSE: President Reagan wanted private investment to help develop the country. He arranged for a bunch of American investors to come down several weeks after the invasion. Jay Morris was on the mission. They flew in, looked at it; and, the only

investment that came out of it was one American businessman who decided he would make wooden rulers on the island…that was about it…no other investment: "Too difficult a business and logistics environment to work in" was the conclusion.

Q: Did you finish the airport?

MORSE: We and the British did. AID/Washington didn't know I was on the island until the second day when they saw me on television. The "rescue mission" was highly classified. They weren't all that happy about it; but, State, Pentagon and the White House had said, "We need somebody who knows where those students are."

Then Jay Morris, the AID/W fellow who also had accused me of not being patriotic and a loyal countryman, said he was going to come down and meet some businessmen and journalists. When he came in, it was about the end of the second week. He went to Barbados first and then came on to Grenada. I got a tourist bus and picked him up with his entourage of journalists and businesspeople. I guess there were only two businesspeople. I handed him a printed schedule of what he would do for the next 48 hours: where he would stay, where he would go, who he would meet, background notes, and all of that stuff. In the middle of the visit, I had scheduled a discussion with the Grenada airport authorities, the Governor of the island, the Minister of Transportation, Tourism and the Tourist Association on the airport.

Jay was on the bus in the back. He came running up to me and said, "Have you handed this out?" I answered, "Yes." "You can't have me meeting with somebody about the airport! The President of the United States has gone on national television saying that that airport was put there by the Cubans and the Communist Bloc as a military base to invade the United States and control the Caribbean and is the link between Cuba and Nicaragua and that the base is all evil!" I said, "Jay, you've got to have a talk about this. The children have been paying five cents of their lunch money to finish that airport. The curriculum in the books describes that airport as the savior of this country. Every single person on this island is convinced that, if they don't have that airport, they will collapse and be dominated." "Oh, we cannot do this meeting. Take it off. Pick up the copies. You can't show that to the journalists." I said, "Jay, if at the end of the second day, you don't think you need the airport meeting, then I will cancel it; but, for now it is scheduled and it takes so damn much time to get these appointments and these people, I can't call it off and reschedule it." "I've had you fired once; I'll get you fired again. You don't learn; and, you don't obey!" I said, "No, I'm not going to obey this time either; but, I'm giving you the choice that, if you want it, at the end of the second day, it's there. If not, I'll cancel it, put it all on me as just somebody who is screwed up and didn't understand what the significance was." We went through that whole intensive day. In every meeting the Grenada officials told us how important it was to the country's development that the Americans finish and open the airport. The next morning at breakfast, Jay said, "Let's go through the schedule: "Meeting with tourism. Then I have that airport meeting. I'll do the noontime press briefing instead of you." He was a great, fast learner. It was fantastic. Later, I briefed him. He went over and stood in front of a window and memorized certain facts. He went out there in front of 100 newspaper and television people; and, he spieled

it off like he had been studying it for three years. He was fantastic. But, when he got to the airport point, he said, "And at the meeting of the airport, who is going to be there from our side?" I asked, "What do you mean?" "Well, are you going to be there? Do we have the military engineers coming to the airport meeting?" I stopped and laughed. I said, "This is the airport meeting you were going to fire me on?" "No, we've got to have the airport meeting." We started back. It was a Sunday morning. We had the embassy plane take us back to Barbados. Then it hit him again about what he had done and what we had been talking about and how it was important to finish that airport. He said, "Ted, you're going to have to tell Peter McPherson that we're going to have to finish that airport." My response was, "Jay, you're his deputy. You fired me twice. You tell Peter McPherson." He insisted, "No. It's got to come from you. You're on the ground. He respects your work; and, he knows that you're honest and that you'll tell him the truth."

We went to the hotel; and, on Sunday morning we called Peter at home. Jay went on about the whole trip and then he said, "Oh, and Ted has something else he needs to tell you." "You tell him." I gave Peter some of the background and the buildup before I proceeded to tell him, "Now, don't overreact to this. Even Jay, when he first heard it, went ballistic." "I didn't go ballistic." To Peter I said, "But, that airport is such a symbol of the future of that nation's economic prosperity that somehow, someway, that runway and that airport has to be finished." Peter just remained quiet. Finally, he said, "Well, write it up and send it to me in a telegram; and, then make sure Jay is ready to brief." I said, "You tell him." "Jay, you're going to brief Peter on it when you get home." "No, no, you're coming to Washington, Ted." Anyway, we did help finish the airport. We participated and helped to finish it off. Peter carried the ball on this with the President and White House politicos. That was a long story. I didn't mean to get bogged down in that one.

Q: That's a great story. Let's move on to post-Grenada activity. What did you do after you finished up in Grenada? Were you still then in the Caribbean position?

MORSE: I was. We were focusing on the economic reconstruction of Grenada; but, by the time we made those plans and got them laid out and approved, I had been selected to go to the Foreign Service Institute Senior Seminar for a year. Very prestigious! I was never quite sure whether it is a cooling-off place for people who are too hot to handle, whether it's a privilege to be selected and it shows that you are chosen for higher responsibilities, or at least more interagency responsibilities, or whether it's a training program.

From my point of view, it was an absolutely fantastic year that I wouldn't have traded for anything. I went there in August/September of 1984 to May of 1985. I was pulled out of it a month early by AID/W; but, that year was a wonderful senior training year for many reasons. One is that I had the chance to literally take a year off and to read, listen, think and discuss, a privilege that hadn't been there since leaving academia 22 years before. To do that in a setting with other agency people (primarily State, but also military, intelligence, Department of Agriculture, FBI, USIA, etc.), to see how they look at the

same lecture, at the same problem, at the same issue and to realize what a rich thing democracy and pluralism is.

We all come at high level policy or national or international issues almost from different perspectives; and, we bring certain strengths about how to manage getting all those views heard so that one is not predominant over the others, or is at least aired. We learned that you have a decision-making process for harmonizing those varied perspectives that take those all into account and then come up with a broad national interest decision. It was wonderful, from my point of view, to meet and spend a year with these people from all walks of American life. You are in class with them; you're eating lunch with them; you're traveling with them and exchanging views all the time. We spent one week of every month traveling to a different part of America.

Q: What were some of your lectures?

MORSE: The lectures covered every aspect of current events in America: our economy and trade; issues in local and national politics; cultural and social issues. Because we all were involved in international affairs, the subjects and visits covered foreign policy, all military branches and strategies, classified topics and visits to our intelligence community, etc., etc.

The speakers ranged from the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense to the National Security Advisor in the White House to Secretary of Agriculture, head of FBI, all senior people, the ones that have prominent names. There also were a lot of experts. One of the really rewarding parts of the way FSI organized that is each student who wants to (You don't have to do this.) is asked to organize a whole week. The issue for the week is, in general, set by the curriculum; but, than you get the speakers, you develop the issues, you identify the resource materials, you get it duplicated, you put out the binder for your colleagues to read, you select the colleagues to introduce the speaker, you select the colleagues who will give the note of thanks or the summary. "Note of thanks" is the wrong way to say that. It's the colleague who would then summarize the 50-minute lecture and then would be the colleague who would lead the discussion. You are the moderator; but, they are the substantive persons. I found that to be very rewarding.

Q: You put on a week?

MORSE: I did.

Q: Who did you get? What was the subject?

MORSE: The week was on American social systems because we learned about American society and its' influence on foreign policy. I brought in people from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, from the District of Columbia welfare system. I arranged for our whole class to go to the District of Columbia and see different social and welfare programs on the ground. I brought in people from academia, people from OMB who had

been studying the budget and how much of the budget goes for social welfare programs, and how much flexibility there is, and what are the domestic entitlements.

One week out of every month was spent traveling outside of Washington. So, if we were in Chicago, we arranged to meet with the mayor and then have one hour with their social welfare people to describe their programs and challenges. One of the most interesting things, I asked for a show of hands of how many in the class either had relatives, friends, or who had ever even talked to (in three different shows of hands) a person on welfare.

Not one person in that elite class had ever had a family member or friend or had ever talked to a person on welfare. So, I brought in a panel of people who were on welfare at the moment and one person out of the five who had been on welfare and was now off welfare. Even years later, the colleagues in their (people like Bob Houdek, who became our Ambassador, now the lead National Intelligence Officer at CIA for Africa) said, "I remember that session because it gave us an exposure to people who we would never even have talked to and we talked with them and learned their point of view on welfare or off welfare." It was a great year.

Q: Did you write a paper?

MORSE: I wrote a paper.

Q: What was that on?

MORSE: California State Efforts to Support International Trade. The State of California had just finished a three-year debate about how to organize themselves to capture more trade. They had set up an inter-department office in Sacramento, which is my hometown, on promotion of California trade. At that point, California was the sixth largest economy in the world if you took California's state economy by itself. A lot of that economy is oriented to both exports and imports. Then the question is: How is the state organized to facilitate, to set the tax structures, the policies, actually have trade missions to go out? So, I did a paper on that new office and what its' operations would be. It had only been in operation a couple of months; so, it was probably premature; but, it was educational to do.

Q: Did you travel outside the country?

MORSE: No.

Q: That had been the past practice.

MORSE: Yes, it had. Our class did not travel overseas. I think it was a budget function. In fact, I guess we had a choice in that. There was a certain amount of money for travel. The question was, do you blow lots of it on an international trip or do more domestic travel? Because all of us in there came from an international background and we had traveled enough overseas, we wanted to do more domestic travel. We traveled almost five

(5) days out of every month to a different state to see military installations, state governments, up to New York and Chicago to visit the city governments, up into Washington state to see the port, the transportation, environmental, and the Weyerhaeuser and Boeing groups, down to Silicone Valley and San Jose to see how the FBI was trying to operate, to protect against piracy of our high tech operations. We visited military submarines and aircraft carriers. A lot of learning took place. Fort Bragg put on a whole day of Special Forces exercises for us.

Q: Anything else on that you want to add?

MORSE: No, I don't think so. The lasting contacts helped many times. Nancy Ely was a class member. We were working together later on the merger of the foreign affairs agencies and had a common background and dialogue. As I said, later work with Bob Houdek, was smoother given our class relations, and on and on and on and on. It was a great year.

Q: So, that wound up and then back into the AID business. What did you do?

MORSE: I got pulled out early. I think I made the mistake of being over in the State Department building, in the AID offices, one day. I still maintain to this day that Ray Love just happened to see me walking down the hall and said, "Oh, there is a loose candidate. We can put him into this Africa Drought and Famine. I was pulled out of the Senior Seminar about a month early.

I went back for the graduation where Secretary Shultz handed out the certificates to all of us over at the State conference room. Ray Love said that Jim Kelly, who had been working on the Drought of 1984-1986, had decided to retire. I gather it was rather short notice. I saw Jim last weekend at a farewell for Kathleen Hansen. I wanted to ask him was he pushed out or was he leaving in discouragement or disgust? I never did get a chance to ask him that question. Now that it's been fifteen (15) years later, I should have asked him; but, I felt it was too personal in the setting where we were.

There was complex structure within AID that had the point responsibility for responding to the Africa drought and famine of 1984-1986. It was called the Drought Coordination Staff or Task Force on Africa Drought. On paper, I was the Deputy and reported to the Director of the Task Force. The Director reported to the Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa, who reported to the Assistant Administrator of Africa, who reported to the Deputy Administrator of the Agency, who reported to the Administrator, Peter McPherson! So, in paper, there were six (6) layers. In part, based on my experience in working on some of the emergencies in Asia, Africa, Grenada and what not, but partly because of the management style of Peter, those six layers had to be reduced down to a direct T/F relationship with the Administrator, who reported to the President. It was great tolerance, from my point of view, that Ray Love, Mark Edelman, Julius Becton and other senior staff, allowed that direct access by the Task Force to the interagency problems.

Q: Who was the head of the task force?

MORSE: Retired General Julius Becton was. But with great tolerance on his part, Peter would literally have us come into his office every evening between 5:00 and 7:00 p.m. and report directly to him. We also had direct access to him by phone. If we would indicate to his special assistant or secretary that we needed access for a decision or give him a heads up on something important that was coming down the pike, we could get a call back in an hour invariably, unfailingly. He was wonderful.

Q: What were the dimensions of the drought? What are we talking about?

MORSE: Two hundred million people at risk in 29 countries. Over one million people had died before I was called to take over. The human difficulties of this assignment were horrible. I had on my desk each morning the number of reported deaths. When visiting IDP, refugee and feeding centers, witnessing the human suffering was overwhelming; to hold a child, and two hours later be told that child died. The management and coordination problems were only lessened when Peter intervened at the highest levels. Getting enough food, money and transport, on a timely basis, was a daily preoccupation 12/14 hours a day.

Q: This was Africa-wide?

MORSE: Yes. In fact, in that year, I think we had either OFDA disaster assistance or Food for Peace food in all 29 of those countries. Of the 200,000,000 people at risk, there were probably 40,000,000 that received food aid. We put in two and one-half billion dollars ($2.5 billion) of U.S. aid. Because the Administrator of AID was a personal representative of the President on the emergency and, therefore, had the power to coordinate with the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the State Department on this, etc. with OMB, the Hill, etc., he was the U.S. government's lead. Our little Task Force operated for the entire U.S. government. We had an interagency task force and an internal AID Task Force; but, we were literally the only full-time people focused solely on the drought.

There were thousands of other people involved and hundreds who spent part time on it. But, what allowed us to operate were what I call the four "spark plugs": Tim Knight of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (By the way, we later worked with him in both the Contra operation when he had gone over to run the CIS's former airline out of Miami, and then again when he was OFDA's representative in Bosnia.); Steve Singer, who was the Food for Peace representative, who I had worked with in the India-Pakistan War and on East Pakistan food; Brian Kleine, who was AID's East Africa Office Director; and Hunter Farnham, who was working Africa Emergencies at that point. Those were the four "spark plugs" - full-time staff of our Task Force - who really made that thing go and made things happen. A very touching thing happened that I want to record, Haven. It's very emotional. Steve Singer was dying of cancer; but, he wanted to continue to work. From my point of view, despite the debilitating effects that the cancer and the chemotherapy treatments were taking on him, he was still a most knowledgeable, best-connected, flexible and hard-working staffer. In one of those sessions at six or seven

o'clock at night, Peter asked me to stay behind. He said, "Ted, I know you have a lot of confidence in this fellow, Singer, on the Food for Peace work; but, it disturbs me that he periodically kind of nods off in meetings, including meetings with me. Does he do that interagency?" When I replied, "He does; but, Peter, it's because four hours ago he received another chemotherapy treatment for his cancer. Instead of going back home and resting for a week the way the doctors tell him, four hours later, he's sitting in your office working." Peter and I both broke down and cried. He said, "Write me a personal note to Steve." Steve died a week later; but, it was that kind of commitment that made the Task Force effective. Peter never knew, because we didn't talk a lot about Steve, how far along the cancer was. I can always be grateful that I had a chance to tell him before he died. Peter took the note that I wrote for him and signed it and personally handed it to Steve the next time we were together, which was only a day or two later.

Q: Was the drought mostly East and southern Africa?

MORSE: Heavily East, although, at that point, the Sahel region was a big concern, right across the whole Sahel belt to West Africa. It wasn't as disastrous as the Sahel had been in the droughts of the mid-1970s; but, it was still a killer.

Q: Where was the major assistance?

MORSE: I would say the overwhelming amount of the assistance went into the Horn of Africa – Ethiopia and Sudan; then right across all the way through Chad across over to Senegal and the Sahel belt; but, as I said, I think there were 29 countries that received some kind of drought aid, either food or emergency medicine, water or shelter, during that period. The overwhelming focus was East and the Sahel. Our T/F job was basically to coordinate and expedite, to get decisions. One of the problems was, frankly (and I wonder whether this is not why Jim Kelley left… I don't know this for sure.), the frustration of not having enough food to meet the need. The U.S. was trying to supply roughly a third, the EU a third and the rest of the world a third of the food aid at that period.

With an election coming up in 1984 or 1985, there was reluctance to go back to Congress for supplemental food and money; and, yet, that's what was needed. Working with the Department of Agriculture, the field missions, the World Food Program, with UNICEF, with the UN operation, we pretty well documented that, if you didn't go for supplemental food and money around the world, hundreds of thousands, if not millions, more will die. Already, it was estimated that between Ethiopia and Sudan, about a million people had died in that drought.

Q: Did you have trouble getting agreement on the numbers? That's always a chronic problem in that sort of thing? Knowing how many urgently needed aid and where they were?

MORSE: Yes; but, we dealt with ranges of people, food and money, and said even if it was only the low part of that range, it was going to take supplemental money. We

convinced OMB finally. This was the first time that I had testified before Congress. We went up and worked first with the staffs. Later Congress held hearings. We did a lot of preparing Peter to testify at the hearings, preparing OMB to go – and we got the supplemental food and money.

But, yes, the numbers were difficult. One thing that was helpful was the UN at that point decided to form the UN/OEOA (United Nations Office of Emergency Operations in Africa). Something that we had never admitted to publicly, just not to complicate our lives, was that OEOA happened to be headed by my cousin, Brad Morse. Brad and I were only second cousins. We never would try to use that family connection; but, when it got to the point that I was the chief executive officer for the U.S. Government's Africa Task Force and Drought Task Force, and he was the head of the UNDP at that point, also the head of the UN/OEOA, we decided we'd better declare our family relationship or somebody was liable to make something out of it. So, at a UN/New York meeting establishing UN/OEOA, we introduced each other to our staffs and then to the press and to others. Nobody made anything out of it. No conflicts of interest existed. Maurice Strong was his deputy at that point. The new UN/OEOA was an interagency part of the UN system, where Brad and Maurice could coordinate World Food Program, UNDP, the refugees, etc. – a very successful operation. It helped our work to have the UN coordinating internally on the draught relief.

Q: Did it work?

MORSE: Yes, it did.

Q: Some people had problems with the way the UN coordinated.

MORSE: In fact, out of UN/OEOA came a recommendation to create the new UN/DHA (Department of Humanitarian Assistance). I think most people felt that OEOA was quite a successful internal coordination operation on their side. Our effort was to get them not only supplemental funds; but, then to get that money channeled out and to make sure there were people on the ground attending fulltime to food distribution, to medical and water needs and to transport.

Transport was probably the biggest relief problem, especially in Sudan, where the whole transport system had collapsed. It failed just under the extraordinary weight of trying to get too many things through the Sudan port and up country through the railroad system too fast. I remember at one point there were some Brazilian-made GE or GM-made locomotives that were bound for Mozambique. Because of FX and a political shift in Mozambique, they weren't going to be delivered. We learned about this and had the locomotives diverted, on the high seas, and put them into Sudan, procurement with no competition. Of course, the price had already been negotiated for the sale to Mozambique, which made it easy for us to justify proprietary procurement, given the emergency and the life-threatening situation.

Brazil, Mozambique and Sudan used the same narrow gauge rail system, fortunately for us. The unfortunate part of it was that one of those new locomotives, on a maiden trip, went across an old bridge that a flash flood (you can imagine flood in the middle of this drought) had weakened. The bridge collapsed under the weight of the locomotive because it had been weakened by the torrential wall of water. The brand new locomotive fell into the muddy river below, way out in the western desert of Sudan.

We had an engineering team out there within 48 hours. We combined the manufacturers, our engineers, the Sudanese and everybody else. I sent one of the AID inspectors, asked one of the regional AID inspectors to go. We wanted it to be clear what we were going to have to do. They all came back with the answer: By the time you get cranes there, lift the locomotive out, tear it all apart, get all the sand out of it, rehabilitate it, it's a minimum of nine-month operation. There were a large number of people that had to be helped immediately over in Western Sudan. The joint recommendation was to cover it up with sand and use it as the base for a bridge and put the tracks right over the top of that new locomotive and keep rolling. I took that to Peter McPherson, who said, "If the press and the Hill get a hold of this, we'll be absolutely laughed out of the country and out of business." My response was, "The press was on the scene; they knew it before we knew it. The press people are supporting this." He asked, "Who do we blame if it blows up?" I replied, "I take responsibility for the decision to make the recommendation to you." "Let's go for it," he said.

There were other aspects to that assignment that were difficult. We didn't have good political relationships with the communist governments in Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique. We were precluded by law from assisting those latter two countries. Under the "notwithstanding" legislation, we could invoke for emergency aid, we could have given both food and emergency aid to both countries; but, for political reasons, the White House didn't want to do this. We argued hard in the interagency forums that we coordinated with, and then with Peter, that millions were dying in Ethiopia. It was Peter who came up with the phrase that "a hungry child knows no politics" and took it to President Reagan in the Oval Office and got him to change the position of no help to Ethiopia. The comment that came from the President was, "Well, if we can embarrass those commies that their system doesn't work as well as ours by having to feed their people, let's go do it."

It was always with President Reagan on the basis of the Cold War. We then had to go with his and Peter's condition that in Ethiopia we not work through the Ethiopian communist government of Prime Minister Mengistu Haile Mariam. I was sent to Ethiopia to negotiate that policy with the government. Some of the people that I had known, having lived before in Ethiopia for four and one-half years and having experienced the drought of 1973-1975 there, in their drought relief structure had now risen to the top of that. I knew Ato Shamilas Aduna, who was now the head of their relief commission. He was later exiled out by Mengistu and became their Ambassador, I think, in India. He was replaced by Ato Dawit, who was a colonel. He became the new head of their relief commission.

Q: And you worked through the relief commission?

MORSE: We worked through the relief commission, which was supposedly a non-governmental organization; but, we put no money and no food through them or the government. When I went there, I had to negotiate with Mengistu's deputy, a high military general whose name escapes me at the moment. I asked would he allow us to bring in food that would be turned over to the non-governmental organizations, the NGOs, the PVOs and the international organizations. They would take title of it at the port, transport it and distribute it. He was not happy.

In the first negotiating session, he basically said, "No. This is our country. We are a sovereign country; and, you will use your aid to discredit our country and our government. You need to work through us. You work through every other government. You are a government to government aid program; and, if you want to operate in here, you work through us." I was really discouraged and went out to dinner that night with some of the relief commission Ethiopians. They were in the meeting with us. They said, "We have a meeting with him in the morning. Is there any flexibility on your part?" I said, "None. This has been a condition imposed on us, that's been dictated to us by our system. We could not get the food from Congress or the money from OMB or the support out of the White House or the State Department except on that condition." So, I give them credit. The commissioner basically went to him the next morning and said, "If we are going to have the food, we need to meet these conditions."

Our concern was that the Ethiopian government was using food as a weapon against the Eritreans and Tigreans they were battling up North, and that they would continue to use it against the southern people that also were in rebellion against Mengistu's government. After two more negotiating sessions, they agreed; but, then we had to work out the procedures so that, if the food was coming in, it really wasn't misdirected, controlled, restricted and used for political purposes. A whole network of indigenous NGOs and PVOs working with the international NGOs and PVOs sprung up. I thought they did an excellent relief job. With our new aid, Ethiopian deaths dropped dramatically.

Too many people had died before we could get the supplemental food and money and before we mobilized. From my point of view, frankly, the lesson learned on that was that it was a BBC journalist out of Kenya who initially put this famine on international television, that finally embarrassed the world, especially we Americans, into reacting to it. It took that high level of international public awareness to put pressure on the world political systems to react to it. It had gone on too long before the world helped. Again, this may have been one of Jim Kelley's frustrations, that it had gone on and he didn't have the resources to respond to it at the magnitude that he needed to.

As we approached the second year and "potential" rainy season, I made the toughest decision of my relief career. I told all our bilateral, international and private (PVO/NGO) partners that we were going to stop providing food to millions of desperate people in thousands of feeding centers. We would use the dry season to have temporary food transported to these people back in their villages when they left the feeding centers. It

was a very, very unpopular decision; but, if the food shortage (famine) was not to continue, it was essential for people to go back to their land, to start to plow, to use seed we all would provide, so, if the rains came, they would be able to farm, grow, harvest and eat their own food again.

There was a huge media, American public, Congressional, African and international demand for my removal. "I was condemning millions to starve and die." I resisted; and, Peter backed me. This was a calculated chance to end the costly relief and return to normal production. We were fortunate! Good, wide rains came at the right time to plow, plant, harvest and eat. Meteorologists tracking the El Nino phenomenon told us they "probably" would come! We then scaled back the relief effort.

Just one more thing on that subject: Ray Love and I and others who had been through the drought of 1973-1975 (I lived through it in Ethiopia) were now being called in after the fact, after it was so far along. I was pretty ticked off and, frankly, didn't want to take the drought T/F assignment in 1985 because it looked like mission impossible. People were already dying by the hundreds of thousands. We didn't have the food, the money or the political backing to address it. We vowed that we would try to leave in place a better famine relief system. I was disgusted that all the lessons we had learned on the 1970s were not available to be applied in the 1980s. The people that knew about it, the systems, the records, were not easily captured to be applied in the 1980s. We vowed that it wouldn't happen in the 1990s and beyond. And Peter and high level American political leaders asked us, "Can't you prevent these costly famines?" One encouraging fact helped me overcome my pessimism on this. A scientist told us not one drop of water has ever been lost since creation. Startling! We joined together to create the Famine Early Warning System (FEWS), in part due to the knowledge that I had gained at the Senior Seminar.

One example I tapped as T/F director to help answer that question was as follows: I had never been exposed to CIA satellite technology before. We had the civilian LANDSAT; but, it wasn't as accurate, as widespread, as up to date. We literally tasked the intelligence community to look into areas that we couldn't get to because remote transport was impossible; they could not tell us if there were villagers, if there were people back in there who needed help, before they died. That technology was made available to us so that we could help manage the 1984-1986 drought on an operational real-time basis. But, then because of that example, we devised what became the Famine Early Warning System. I think that most relief people would recognize that program today.

Q: What are the basic features of that?

MORSE: It's a combination of using satellite technology to see if vulnerable Africans are plowing, how many acres; to see if the rains have come and if you are getting any "greening"; whether that greening is pasture land for animals or whether it's crops. Then, with ultra-high resolution of that, you can tell whether it's crop land or whether it's pasture land. Then, combining that with on-the-ground truthing of such things as how

much seed was sold in an area and how does that seed translate into how many acres are planted, which would translate into, if the rains came, how much food would grow and be harvested and be available for food, and when there's a shortfall and whether you're going to have a future famine because of a food shortfall. That combines the ground truthing with social factors such as whether people are on the move, leaving their land and going in search of animal food; whether criminal records show desperate people. In a higher sense of desperation, are people selling off family valuables or cattle or the plow or things that a farmer won't sell until the absolute last. That ground truthing combines with satellite imagery, along with critical meteorological date early, so that you don't wait until after the harvest to say, "Oh, there wasn't enough food harvested to feed these people"; and, it's too damn late to mobilize the money, the food, the shipment, the transportation and the distribution before people start to die.

So, you have early lead time given by the satellite imagery and by the weather and meteorology and the ground truthing. So, you have an early warning that you will know before it is the "hungry season." This is where people have eaten the food that they grew the year before. They go hungry because there is no more food from what they grew last year or there is no more money to buy food even if it is available in the market. So, you have that lead time through the famine early warning system to preposition food, logistics and medicine even before you know a drought will result in famine.

Q: Did you cover all of the African continent? How did you decide what areas to cover?

MORSE: Using meteorology data, agriculture figures, population figures, we asked what are the countries that are at risk? We adopted the phrase that "There will be more droughts. They shouldn't become famines." We could target certain countries and have on-the-ground staff and tried to train local staff and tried to institutionalize it. At first, we ran into huge opposition by both the FAO and the world meteorology organizations, who said, "Well, we already have global early warning systems." Frankly, the numbers that were coming up were local government, national numbers that were sometimes skewed to hide that they had a lower food production or they were skewed to justify free food aid. You couldn't rely on that data; so, we had to have independent data, in part because many times both Congress and OMB and a current U.S. administration wanted us to have independent numbers to decide to take early action to avoid a drought becoming a famine.

Q: What about the African reception to all this? Were they involved? Was there any African institution…?

MORSE: We tried to institutionalize FEWS in Kenya using the LANDSAT center in Nairobi, or in their Sahel operations. It was hard to do that on a regional basis in the Horn of Africa because the old East Africa Community had collapsed and you didn't have a regional political- administrative base for it. The subunits of either the OAU or the UN weren't quite up to steam on relief stuff yet. It was too "avant-garde" for many of them at that time. So, bilaterally, there was an attempt to train east African people on how to gather the early warning data.

To me, the most important part of it, though, was feeding the data into national and international relief decision-making processes so that, at the national level, the Africans would be able to tell their leaders early, "We're going to have a problem. We've got to stockpile this, transport these, special budget allocation these, make commercial buys, request food aid earlier." And, internationally, mobilize the support when you could see it coming nine months in advance instead of having to react after the fact, after people were dying from hunger.

Q: In a sense, there was a unilateral surveillance system.

MORSE: Not really. Everything FEWS does on the ground is done with a bilateral African organization partner. In exchange, we gave them satellite date. We both had meteorological data.

Q: We were the ones that got the data, analyzed the data and fed it out.

MORSE: Initially, yes. And, we could only justify that unilateralism on the basis of what our own system needed to feed into our own decision-making process, until we had the bilateral partners trained and their analytical systems in place. That took time and money and vision.

Q: Is that combining emergency relief with development? What is the option?

MORSE: Knowing too late or not trusting other's data or not responding internationally early. But, as always, as I think I said on an earlier tape, we use these emergencies also for development purposes. If we could use that emergency to build up national and regional, local institutions and ground truthing services, so much the better; and, that's what we tried to do - institutionalize FEWS.

Q: Any other lessons on that experience?

MORSE: Just how interagency, how inter-discipline, how international those kinds of drought/famine things are and how critical at that point the lesson was to keep public attention in order to keep public support. Everybody tells you that you can't hold the public's attention to that kind of a thing for more than a couple of months. That's not long enough when you've got a two-year rolling drought and famine.

I guess, to give tribute to the media part of that, David Willis of "The Christian Science Monitor" wrote an article every single Thursday for two (2) years on the African drought. He would call me just about every Monday or Tuesday; and, he also had a list of other relief people. Sometimes he would write his articles from Rome's point of view, from the UN/FAO. Many times he reflected Africans and the U.S. perspectives. David won the Pulitzer Prize for Journalism in 1985 or 1986 for that very helpful series.

Similarly, I give full tribute to Live Aid, Band Aid and USA for Africa. If it hadn't been for those "entertainment" people who would constantly keep it in the media, on the television, in the special concerts, in the special recordings, we would not have sustained public, Congressional, OMB or administration support for two (2) years. USA for Africa later sent me a whole crate of the tapes "We Are the World" that they had put together to support African relief. I've passed those around to different people.

Other examples are: Live Aid and Band Aid had raised a lot of relief money; but, they had absolutely no experience in what to do with that money. Penny Gender (?) was a singer for Bob Geldof; she was married to Bob Geldof's drummer. She became the Executive Director of Live Aid Foundation. She would call and say, "How do you do relief? What do you do with this money? How do you assess situations and needs? How do you know these numbers? Where do we put our money? How do we organize it?"

I would stop in London when we were working with FAO or WFP in Rome and always stop in to discuss needs. In fact, they would call meetings and spent a lot of time. I had a T/F staff member that was basically fulltime liaison with them on how to use their money at our suggestion. They bought 90 short-haul trucks from defunct Chevron oil development in Sudan when we badly needed them. We had some good partnerships with them where we would provide food and they would provide trucks or they would provide cash and we would provide medicine; but, their critical support contribution was for sustained public awareness.

Q: Let's move on from the drought. You can add to that later if you want. What happened?

MORSE: As the emergency wound down, we wound down. We devolved the remaining relief responsibilities back to the Food for Peace Office, to the Africa Bureau, to the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, and moved it out of an ad hoc task force and made sure that the regular AID/USG systems picked up and continued to follow through on this. You didn't have the need for an ad hoc special task force to expedite, coordinate and represent.

As that wound down, I was assigned to Lusaka as the AID Director in Zambia, a place that I had first visited in 1975 when I went to an African family planning and population conference there. I visited there again in 1978-79 when we opened the bilateral AID program there. It seemed like a lovely city. It was facing some severe hardships.

Q: What was the situation in Zambia at that time?

MORSE: The overall situation was that the world market price for copper had collapsed. It collapsed for two reasons. One, the invention of fiber optics reduced the demand for copper to go into wiring. Two, the invention of PVC, the piping that reduced the demand for copper in water pipes. Zambia was a mono-economy, overwhelmingly dependent on copper exports for foreign exchange earnings, most of its' national income, and, frankly, for its' employment.

I guess half of the population was urbanized at that point in Zambia, which was high for most of Africa, which still saw 70-80% of the people still rural. To have over 50% of it urbanized presented huge challenges. That was because they were coming into work in the mines; then, as the mines began to peter out in terms of what could economically be mined without a lot of higher costs, more technology, more effort to get the same volume of copper out, coupled with the collapse of the price of copper on the world market, the country was in dire straits.

From the time that we opened the AID/Zambia program and John Hicks came out after a very shortened tour, John Patterson was in there as Director almost six (6) years. AID had one focus. It was helping agriculture to diversify the economy. We helped with agriculture production, agriculture marketing, agriculture policy, agriculture extension, agriculture research, everything to build the domestic agriculture institutions.

We had a contract with Virginia Tech to build up the staff and the systems in the Agricultural Economics Department of the University, build the agricultural economics capacity in the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Planning. The focus was to have Zambian capacity to deal with agriculture statistics and economics; and, through that generate the agricultural policies that would diversify that economy and get the employment, the incomes and the exports to fill the vacuum of the declining copper. We had that single AID program focus that we maintained, even while I was there. We took constant heat from Washington's technical offices over why we wouldn't get into education, housing, water, etc.

Q: What about population?

MORSE: We started some population activities while I was there. Remember, from our earlier talks, I had been sent to the University of Chicago to learn population and then worked on it in Indonesia and Ethiopia. So, very quietly, I mentored the woman who had been our AID training officer to coordinate some family planning activities. We worked entirely through NGOs. We didn't start a bilateral G to G program. We did it quietly with just inviting in some of the NGOs. Most of the activity was geared toward family planning Information, Education and Communication- IEC, to first help make FP a legitimate type of conversation – then policy.

I could justify that in my own mind, if you will, the expansion away from the core agriculture focus, simply because in the equation of what are the number of human resources that are going to have to eat the food resources. Others were saying that I was breaking the agriculture focus for population just because of a personal interest. Maybe that's partly true; but, it seemed right to help balance the human and food and economic resources if they were to make development progress.

A related effort was to try and start and link the use of condoms to an HIV/AIDS program. The Ministries of health and planning were willing; but, they knew President Kaunda blocked anything to do with HIV/AIDS. Then, during one of his monthly

televised news briefings, a woman reporter from South Africa asked him, "Everyone knows your oldest son died of AIDS; and, yet, you have not allowed an awareness or control program in Zambia. Why?" (I yelled down the hall for my staff to run and watch this.) After dabbing his eyes with the white handkerchief he always carried, he answered, "Because I never wanted his mother to know he died of AIDS". Then he closed the press conference. WOW – I thought the reporter would be arrested or PNGed! Early the next morning, the Minister of Health called me and excitedly said, "We can begin now," without having to say what we could begin. The Minister said he called the President after the press conference to explain most of AIDS transmission in Zambia was heterosexual. The President said he did not know that! So, we were able to start a small program with the Blood Bank and University Medical School, just before I left Zambia. Several years after leaving the Presidency, Kaunda became a very active, high-profile supporter of programs and policies on HIV/AIDS all over Africa and then the whole world. What a little information can do!

One of the demands in Zambia at that time, as you'll recall, was the absolute collapse of their foreign exchange system and the knock-on inflation and devaluation of their currency. The International Monetary Fund had a team in there that was trying to help them deal with this. They worked at the central bank.

A man named Dominic Mulaisho was the Governor of the Bank of Zambia. Before that, he had been in the Ministry of Finance. I knew him when he was the Economic Advisor to the President. Later, I worked with him when he left the country and founded "The Southern Africa Economic Review", a monthly magazine they put out in the southern Africa region. I felt that he was a fine, honest gentleman, and a professional. I had a high regard for him. We were fortunate to have people of that quality to work with, along with the IMF and the World Bank. This was the first time the World Bank tried the auction system, to auction off scarce foreign exchange as a way of setting what the true market value was. The first couple of times they did the auction, they had to abort. The IMF and the central bank didn't have the procedures right.

We were big supporters of the auction approach. We were trying to support it with cash transfer of U.S. foreign exchange that then would generate the local currency that was used for the agricultural extension and research programs. We put in foreign exchange that could be auctioned off along with everybody else. We were a small percentage of the total foreign exchange; but, between the IMF, the Bank, the other European donors and ourselves, there was usually enough foreign exchange to be auctioned off that you could peg the rate. But, there were certain weeks that, literally, if conditions precedent to either our disbursements, or if IMF disbursements hadn't been met and the foreign exchange wasn't there to be auctioned off, the whole system could collapse. So, you were living almost hour by hour as we went through that system.

Q: Were there a lot of conditions associated with our cash transfers?

MORSE: We didn't have a lot. We probably only had the usual procedural ones; but, then, after those, in terms of the technical ones, the CPs tended to be the next steps in the

agricultural marketing and the agricultural policy reforms program we were working on. We had a linkage there between the FX-cash transfers, the agriculture policy reforms and the implementation steps which the local currency would help carry out.

The family planning program was a very small one; but, basically worked through missionaries and through NGOs and local PVOs. One of the most fun trips I ever took was all the way over to the Angola border. An AID local assistant was from that tribe over on the Angola border. She was a queen. I guess her husband was a king; and, she was a queen. We flew as far as we could fly. We drove as far as we could drive. We took a long-tailed boat up a river as long as we could go and literally ran into low water in the riverbed. We got out and pushed that little boat through the river from about four in the afternoon until three in the morning to get to a missionary clinic that was administering family planning on the Angola border. It was a wonderful excuse to get into an area that we'd never gone into before. It took us two days to get there and two to get back. It was a wonderful experience. All we saw were the clinic records on the number of condoms distributed during consultations (!) but great country views.

Kaunda's political situation was very shaky. The economy was so bad, he was undermined. People were especially organized around the miner's unions to confront him. This was long before Chiluba confronted him, overthrew him and became the President. We are looking now back on 1986-1988. I always felt Kaunda was a good person. His brand of humanism or socialism (he called it "social humanism") showed he really cared for his people, I felt, and that he wanted to make decisions that followed those policies. I'm not sure I could always say that about a lot of the advisers around him that didn't always seem to have the same humanitarian instincts. He never pretended to be an economist. When we would meet with him, he would rarely carry the conversation on economic development, the economy or the AID program; but, he would let his ministers or his advisors carry that conversation. That's why Dominic Mulaisho was so key. Another competent fellow was the Permanent Secretary of Finance, James Mtonga. He, in the middle of the economic crisis, had been so discredited as the Permanent Secretary of Finance that he was removed by Kaunda. It was a blow to all of us who enjoyed his confidence and great working relations. In fact, James directly drove to my office from the President's palace to tell me that he had just been removed. He cried. He said, "I'm being exiled off to become the regional governor up in the far north, up on that border where we have the Quella bird Research Station." He really was unhappy and felt discriminated against; but, as a personal friend, I felt like I could tell him, "Well, let me just tell you, I got fired not long ago out of the Africa Bureau and exiled off to the Caribbean. Life does return." He was a good governor. We saw him several times up there. Three years later he was brought back to Lusaka, again as P.S. Finance.

Q: What do you feel was the main thrust of the agricultural program? What were you trying to put in place?

MORSE: It was a careful, long-term building of agricultural institutions and Zambian Ag manpower. As I said, we worked in every part of the government, such as the Ministry of Agriculture's Agricultural Economics Department, their Planning Department, the

Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Planning, the University's agricultural economics department, to turn out the trained Zambian agricultural manpower needed to build the integrated Ag systems to gather the data that was necessary to make sound policy decisions that would then revitalize the agricultural sector to become the engine of growth, as I said, to replace copper. Many people were impatient for progress, wanted to know why they couldn't just get the production up immediately; why all the prices and the subsidies had to be restructured. As they remove certain subsidies, they had to be sure that they didn't do that without having the safety net and the cushions in place so people did not starve. We worked with the commercial farmers union to understand what you're doing in terms of incentives and disincentives for or to them. They were good allies of ours and wanted to see the Ag sector get the serious attention needed; but, it was not without tensions.

There was also some crop diversification work. We were trying to get commercial investments in wheat production primarily. A large amount of FX was being spent importing wheat, which could be grown in Zambia. Because it is a winter crop, which needs expensive, large-scale irrigation, you couldn't get small farmer production. Again, part of the Ag master scheme was to get the commercial farmers more into the wheat, the high technology and the export crops, and to leave more room for the small farmers for the production of the maize, the corn, the mealies. We did get several European and South African investments in wheat down there. We damn near lost them when they had a devastating Quella bird infestation. We brought up people from the regional pest control units from southern Africa to help manage this. They were using new varieties of seed for wheat production; but, were working with commercial unions and public research institutions to get large farmers to try these things.

I felt that the Ag strategy had the potential to be effective; but, it probably needed the other donors to focus on the other parts of the equation. That meant the urban employment, the income that had to come for people who weren't going to go back to the farm. They just weren't. They had gotten a taste of city life while working in the mines. So, the other donors had to be picking up urban development. Especially we and the Canadians were extremely close and helpful in coordinating our policies and both in the foreign exchange auction, the agricultural marketing reforms, the products; and, they were working more with related urban economics than we could work at that point.

Q: What was the scale of the program?

MORSE: It varied whether we had a big cash transfer. During the year, it could be as small as $10 million and as high as $30 million sometimes, depending on what was coming in terms of a new obligation for a new contract for the technical assistance, the training versus the cash transfer versus the commodity.

Q: Did we have a big PL480 program?

MORSE: It wasn't a big Pl480 program; but, it was significant. There were both Title I and Title II, meaning the concessionary sales of food, as well as the grant relief program.

There was a mini drought that hit the southern part of Zambia while we were there. There was a need for a special targeted feeding program. There was PL480 for that. There had been earlier a much larger PL480 program. But, there was a strong feeling on the part of the commercial farmers that they wanted us to stop that. Our bringing in PL480 food, from their point of view, was a disincentive to their production and their pricing. So, we constantly liaised with them. Nicholas Jenks was our Food for Peace officer. I thought he did a super-good job in those days of being the liaison on food prices, the amount and the timing for when we brought things in. Timing was probably more important to the farmers than how much we brought in or how we put it into the food distribution system. It was the time of year that we brought it in, so we didn't distort their price, that was important to them, and to us.

Q: Were there any major issues that you experienced there?

MORSE: The major issues always were, were we were going to hold onto agriculture funding, whether we could be productive in enough time before the political system blew it apart because of the social pressures of unemployment. There were issues over whether we should be involved in the foreign exchange auction and macroeconomics at that level. There were AID issues and questions as to whether we should be focusing only on agriculture economics, those kinds of issues.

Q: How was it working with the Zambian staff and the people in the government?

MORSE: We had an excellent AID staff. I continued what had started under Patterson, which was to hire Zambian technical/professional people. He had some excellent agricultural economists and agriculture people, Zambians, who were on our staff; so, we didn't have a large American staff. The local staff were worried from time to time that we weren't going to have the staying power and about what their future was. While I was there, we even reduced the American staff a little bit further into the management area. Bill McLaughlin was the management officer.

Under his and our mentoring, we were moving up a woman who had just started as a telephone operator for us, then a secretary; but, she had an excellent education and had gone to night school and had gotten her master's degree in administration. She rose up to be the head of USAID/Personnel. I understand she is now the full Executive Officer in the mission. I was proud to think she started as a switchboard operator and to realize how many steps we took to use her full potential. There are a couple of others like that. Another example would be the family planning officer that I mentioned who was a secretary, then a training officer, and then was promoted up. There was quite an effort to bring them up for local continuity.

Q: What about relations with the embassy? Were you feeling considerable political pressures to do certain things or not?

MORSE: Yes and no. The yes part of it was, the political situation was so tense that they were very concerned that what we were doing in the short run foreign exchange auctions

and what we were doing in the short run in terms of Ag price adjustments that the U.S. could be fingered as part of the problem rather than part of the solution. When I say "they", we enjoyed the complete confidence of Ambassador Paul Hare. We kept him informed. We involved him. It was a wonderful team. He had some of the political and economic staff that were concerned that we were more interventionist. I think it's part of the corporate culture. I think I told you earlier that I gave a lecture over at FSI on the comparative corporate cultures of State and AID. One topic is they tend to recognize the local sovereignty and the independence; and, we are there to represent U.S. interests, but not to intervene. AID is seen as more interventionist, a change agent; so, there were those tensions that were there. On the other hand, overall, they respected the good relationships that we had. It was my privilege to meet with President Kaunda several times.

Just a little side story that relates the substance of him: President Kaunda had a practice that he personally served tea or coffee to his guests after dinner. On about the third time I had been to dinner there, when he came around to me (he called me "Mr. Ted") and said, "How is it that you as an American only drink tea? I remember the last couple of times that you only drink tea. I brought you tea because I remember, Mr. Ted, you don't drink coffee. Why, as an American, you don't drink coffee". I said, "Well, I spent ten (10) years in Asia before coming to Africa. Maybe it's because I like tea." Then he said, "Now you answer me one more thing. We both have the same British colonial history and we had the same British colonial masters. How is it that you don't drink your tea with cream the way that we have been taught by our British colonial masters?" I said, "Well, it goes back to the Boston Tea Party, Mr. President. When we had the Boston Tea Party rebellion and we were going against our colonial masters, we threw their tea into the bay up in Boston, Massachusetts, and we threw the sugar in there. There was no milk on board; so, we always just thought we should drink tea without milk to rebel against them by not drinking it the way they drank it." He really laughed. He was wonderful; he was a good man to deal with. He knew that we were dealing with people like James Mtonga, like Dominic Mulaisho, who could get to him and influence his thinking on substance economics. One other little side story: Paul Hare will never tell this, I don't think. We were going to a dinner one evening. The Ambassador was driving his own car from one reception he had gone to. I was driving my car from a different reception that I had gone to. My wife and his secretary had come in another car because they were coming directly from home. They didn't go to the receptions, but were meeting us at dinner. We had the dinner. I don't even remember who was giving the dinner. What happened overshadowed it.

There was still some insecurity. You didn't come out at dark, leave women alone or drive around by yourselves too much. There was a lot of crime going on. So, we left in a convoy with the Ambassador going first, the two women in their car second, and then me, in my car, third on the way home. We came around the old airport area, which was all dark when we came around the corner. There was a flatbed charcoal truck stopped dead in the middle of the road, no lights, and not even the usual African sign of throwing some branches or leaves out on the road to tell you that there is a hazard up ahead. Paul wasn't going very fast. He was in the armored Ambassador's vehicle. He was stopping fast when he realized the dead-lined truck in front of him. There was a car coming towards him on

the opposite side of the road; the lights blinded him. He couldn't see. He knew he couldn't go around that truck without hitting the on- coming car head on, so he literally had to run into the back of the dead-lined charcoal truck. The Ambassador's car hit the back of the charcoal truck, and literally went under the bed.

The gals saw it and started to pull off. I saw it and told them, "Don't stop. You go and get help. Go get medical and police help." I jumped out, ran over. He had been going slow enough that the car went under the truck bed and sheared off the top of that Buick, which was heavily armored. I looked down inside; and, it was like snow of shattered window glass mixed with his blood. I yelled at him, "Paul! Paul! Are you alright? Don't move! I've sent for help. Are you okay?" He rose up because he had taken off his seatbelt. He was going so slow he took off his seatbelt and could lean over and let the flatbed of the truck go across the top of him. He could raise his head up with the shattered glass raining all around him. He was cut from it. He said, "Ted, I've got my golf clubs in the back of my car. If people come, they're liable to steal the golf clubs. Would you take them out?" I said, "You son of a bitch! You're worried about your damn golf clubs when I thought you had been decapitated? I couldn't even see your bloody head in there." Most undiplomatic of me; but, I was crying, I was so glad to see that he was well and safe. We took him home to the medical people. He just had bruises, scratches and cuts. He was a wonderful man. He later said in Country Team, laughing, that I should not talk to him like that as an ambassador!

Q: That's enough on Zambia. Let's move on. After Zambia, what happened?

MORSE: In March, 1988, in Lusaka, I had a telephone call from Ray Love asking if I could come into Washington on consultation for a couple of days. I thought, "Well, have I screwed up and I'm going to be taken to the wood shed? Are they interested in the FX auction program?" It was urgent. I asked, "What is this about?" His reply was, "Well, we just want to talk to you about what's going on." He wouldn't say. The week before, maybe 10 days before, we had been up in Nairobi for a Mission Director's conference with the new AID Administrator Allen Woods, although, I don't think he had even been confirmed at that point. He came to the Mission Director's conference. All Ray would say is that "Allen wants to talk to you". I asked again, "Well, what about?" He just replied, "I'm not sure. He wants to talk to you. Come on in." I asked, "For how long?" He replied, "Well, just a couple of days." So, I had the staff pull together a Zambia program briefing book. I packed one pair of shoes, one suit and one suitcase and went into Washington thinking it was about a three-day TDY. I never went back to Zambia.

In Washington, I was at dinner at the home of a fellow I was recruiting to be my agricultural officer down in Lusaka by the name of Will Whelan; and, I had a call that night at his house from Ray, who asked, "Could you come in at 7:15 a.m.?" I said, "That's a little early for you guys, isn't it? I'll be there." He said, "I'll meet you in the Administrator's office." I said, "Ray, what the hell is going on?" He said, "You'll learn in the morning."

The next day I went in. There was just Ray, Allen Woods and myself. A few pleasantries were exchanged. I opened my binder that I and the staff had put together to explain where the Zambian agriculture program and foreign exchange auction program were. I started to explain what money and budget we needed, where we were on staff and all the things I wanted to take up because you don't often get that direct access to the Administrator. I thought we had sparked his interest in the Zambia program when I saw him in Nairobi a few days earlier. Allen reached over and closed the book. He said, "Ted, I'm interested in the Zambia program; but, we've got another special assignment that we want to discuss with you. I sat back and responded, "Well, I've always tried to answer the call to duty. What is it?" He said, "Tomorrow, the United States Congress is going to pass a law that orders AID to take over Contra Aid; and, we need you to direct it." I looked at him and said, "Contra Aid? What are you guys talking about? I don't know anything about the Contras that I didn't read in "Time" magazine. I don't speak Spanish. I've never been down to Central America." Allen leaned over and said, "But you're perfect for the job." I started to laugh because I just couldn't think of any reason why I was being asked to do this. He said, "Ray has told me how you ran the task force on the drought and did such a good job." (By the way, I was given the President's Distinguished Performance Aware and a $20,000 bonus for the Africa drought and famine work; although, I felt it should have been shared with the "four spark plugs" who, from my point of view, did the successful work on that thing.) He insisted, "You're perfect for the job because we're going to need to put together a task force. AID has been resisting this. We don't want to do this. This is not going to be good for our development image abroad, of dealing with the Contras and on this kind of political/security thing. We need somebody who is operational enough and politically sensitive enough that they can pull this off. I said, "I don't know a damn thing about this. You've got the wrong guy." Allen further insisted, "No, you're perfect for the job. We don't want anybody who has anything to do with Central America, who has anything to do with that part of the world. I promised Secretary Shultz I would." My response was, "You just want a patsy. I don't know when you have to know this; but, let me go back and discuss it with Ernice. We've only been down in Zambia two years. From my point of view, every substantive assignment I've ever done, we stay for and five years, except for Barbados. I'm just getting started at Zambia." Allen said, "The reason we asked you to come in so early today is that we have assembled in the Administrator's conference room about 17 people to brief you on your new job." I insisted, "I can't do this. I can't do this! I'm just overwhelmed. I can't do this." Ray Love later said I said that seven (7) times. Allen just quietly replied, "You know, we need your management skills, your political sensitivity, your ability to work interagency, your ability to get things done. We need you to do this for." So, I said, "I'll listen to it. I don't know what it is. I don't know what it is you're asking me to do." He said, "Well, they'll tell you." He walked in there and he opened that door.

I didn't know a single person in that room – people from the State Department, Latin America, CIA, including their task force director that had been running Contra Aid, National Security Council (not Ollie North himself, but one of his assistants) staff from the Congressional oversight committees. From 8:00 a.m. to 10:30 a.m., I think they said something; but, I don't remember a damn thing they said. I was in such a state of shock; and, I didn't even know whether I should take notes. Was this classified? I couldn't take

notes. I didn't know whether I could ask questions; so, I didn't ask questions. I was in there by myself; Ray had stepped out; Allen didn't come in with us. He had said, "Come see me when you're done." At 10:30 a.m., I went in and I said, "This is so complex and so politicized, let me go back and discuss it with Ernice; and, then I'll let you know." Allen said, "I have my car downstairs; and, it's going to take you to the Hill because you have to meet with the oversight committees now." I started to cry again. I suppose he thought, "What the hell am I doing with this crybaby? This is not what I need." By way of explanation for my tears, I said, "I'm just overwhelmed. I can't absorb what they're saying." He assured me, "It's alright; just so they can see that we're bringing in somebody who has run interagency operational things like this before."

We had seven (7) Congressional oversight committees watching us: two intelligence committees and two appropriations committees; two geographic committees and a hunger committee. Why the hunger committee? I never was quite sure. Congressman Leon Panetta was the chair of that one.

Q: Let's pause here and find out why AID was ordered to take this on when other agencies were involved.

MORSE: Other agencies had been involved; that was the problem. AID was asked to do it by Congress because they wanted to get it away from the CIA and from the NSC because of all that had just gone on in the Iran-Contra affair. They didn't want to militarize it by giving it to the Department of Defense, even though the task was to support uniformed, armed Contras and their families and keep them armed and keep them from going to war, not restarting it, but to keep them in a state of readiness as pressure on the Escapulas Peace Process, which was going on to try and settle the Nicaragua-Honduras-Costa Rica-Central American Contra war. The feeling was that, if the Contras were disarmed and disbanded immediately, then they wouldn't be out there as a potential pressure to be reactivated if the peace process broke down. But, at the same time, they didn't want them to go back to fight in the middle of the peace process. So, they didn't want the military to handle them for fear that it would militarize the situation. They wanted it out of the hands of CIA and NSC. The State Department had once before administered Contra aid for almost a two-year period when it had been taken away from the CIA; but, there was a GAO report that showed that the State Department could not account for 50 percent of the money that had been given to them.

So, virtually by default, they turned to AID and said, "This is a humanitarian task. You are to keep these people well fed and well exercised and healthy, well clothed; but, don't let them go back to war." At one point, when somebody on the Hill said that, I responded, "And how in the hell do you expect AID to keep a group of armed rebels from going back to war?" They didn't like the word "rebels". I was such a neophyte as far as who was a rebel, who was a guerilla, and who was, as the President called them, the "moral equivalent of the founding fathers".

Q: How many Contras are you talking about? What was the scale of the situation?

MORSE: Good question! Later, Secretary Jim Baker's Special Assistant, Bob Zoellick, who became Under Secretary of State, in one of the meetings asked that same question. I gave a figure and the State Department people gave a different figure. They gave a figure of 11,000; I gave a figure of 30,000. He went berserk. This was Bob Zoellick. He closed his book, looked at me and said, "If you're lying to me, I will have you fired out of here so fast; and, you're not going to make a fool out of me before Congress by giving me numbers that are so inflated." I look back at him and replied, "Mr. Zoellick, both those number are right. You asked that question in a way that how many Contras there are how many are we feeding and caring for. If you want to know how many armed fighters there are, there are 11,000; but, with their families and their support units, we are feeding 30,000 people." "Don't ever embarrass me by giving me numbers that I can't defend in front of the Congress, public and the press." That was quite a while later. He came in as a political appointee with Baker. Still, those are the numbers we are dealing with.

I came back from the Hill that first morning; and, it was clear that it was something that our agency had to do and that I was being asked to do it. I walked in to see Allen and Ray who said, "It's been quite a day, hasn't it?" I asked, "My first question to you is, "Who is my lawyer?" They responded, "You can have any lawyer you want." I told them, "I want Bob Meighan." Allen turned to Ray and asked, "Who is Bob Meighan?" I said, "He was my lawyer in the Caribbean on the Grenada operation; and, I've known him. He worked up in Nairobi/REDSO in Africa. He's the kind of lawyer we're going to need on this." He asked, "Where is he?" I told him, "I don't know."

They got the head of Personnel on the phone. They looked him up. He was serving in Morocco. We called in the middle of the night in Morocco. He began with, "You want me to talk?" I said, "No, let me talk first because the Mission Director is an old friend from Ethiopia days, Chuck Johnson." Chuck answered the phone about two o'clock in the morning, or whatever time it was in Morocco at that point, and said, "If you're calling me, Ted, it's bad news." I said, "Well, not for you; but, I need Bob Meighan." He said, "You can't have him." I said, "In this one, Chuck, I think we're going to need him for the Agency's overall interest. We're sitting in the Administrator's office. He has indicated that, if Bob is the person we need, we're going to need him." "Why do you pull rank on me?" I said, "Where is he?" He said, "He's on vacation in Italy and won't be back for two weeks." I said, "We need him in here tomorrow." "How the hell are you going to find him up there?" I said, "Somebody wrote his tickets or made his reservations or has his hotel information or his family's contact or the kids know where he is. He's got two nice kids." I found him in an Italian hotel. I talked to Bob. I explained. He got on a plane and flew immediately to Washington; he didn't go back to Morocco. His wife went home to Morocco. That's the kind of response, loyalty, of our people. When called on, they came. I said, "I need Phil Buechler?" They asked, "Where is he?" I responded, "I have no idea. Find him." "Why?" "He's the only person I know that knows enough about air drops in our agency that I can rely on him. The CIA said those people will run out of food in 17 days. They are not allowed by law to help. You tell me we're supposed to be airdropping into the Honduran jungle in 17 days. There is only one guy in AID that I know of who can arrange that. If you know of others, you bring them in." Alan said, "I don't know Phil Buechler; but, if you want him, you get him." I said, "I'm going to need

an air contract for air drops. The only one that I know of that's clean in that part of the world, and I don't know many, is the Tim Knight company. Ask Tim to tell me who has not been working for CIA and the Contras. We need a clean airdrop company in Central America." We went on. Allen said, "Well, can you give me a plan of operations?" I said, "Tomorrow morning." Allen said, "Try and keep the Agency's reputation intact so that we are not seen as part of what has tinged the Iran-Contra, that politicized it; and, let's not get us into the kind of support for military/paramilitary that we got out of after Vietnam. But, be as responsive as we need to in order to carry out U.S. foreign policy of feeding the Contras, clothing them, keeping them healthy and exercised, but not engaged in a military way. Give me an action plan." I said, "Tomorrow morning I'll have it."

I think I stayed up all that night, partly out of nervous anxiety, partly out of jet lag and partly because of shear fear of what the hell we were getting into. We met again at 7:30 a.m. the next day. I laid out what we would need in the way of a task force, what authorities. I said, "I've got to have "notwithstanding" authority. When I was on the Hill yesterday, the people on the Hill said, 'You'll get it. We'll give you the notwithstanding authority when we give you the money.'"

Q: What was the notwithstanding authority?

MORSE: There is a clause in the FAA Disaster Assistance Account which says that, in the face of an emergency and life-threatening and over-riding situations, the President or the re- delegated AID Administrator can invoke this clause of the legislation that says that, notwithstanding any other clause of the legislation, you can basically do what you need to do to meet that emergency. That means that you don't have to go through the competitive contracting, the competitive bidding, etc., the normal 34 volumes of AID handbooks that constrain us sometimes. But, that's why I wanted a lawyer. My first thought was, "Every time we invoke that, we're going to have to have a legal determination; and, I want it documented as to why we are asking for that exception and how we are going to use it."

We got it 100% of the time. At no point did anybody ever question whenever we invoked the notwithstanding authority of why we had to sign an air contract, had to work expeditiously with personnel people. Remember the old RAMPS system? I said, "Have the computer run; and, I want to know who has ever served in Nicaragua or Honduras. I need these skills in contracting, procurement, field operations, programming, financial management, these skills in the field – now. Run those AOSCs to see who has Spanish capability. I need those tomorrow morning." I wrote that at 6:00 p.m. I said, "You want my action plan. Other people are going to have to stay up all night the second night." So, we put together a Contra Task Force within eight (8) hours.

Q: How many people?

MORSE: Initially in Washington, there were just five (5) of us; but, we were focusing more on getting the field staff in place. That weekend, I flew down to Honduras with the State Department Nicaragua desk officer, Al Bahr, who became part of our task force,

was assigned full-time. At the beginning, it wasn't clear whether he was there to watch us or report to us. He also was my translator. I didn't speak Spanish; but, he knew the on-the-ground people, the contacts. We went down, met with the American Ambassador, who had a personal commitment to the Contras that went so far that he couldn't get reconfirmed as an ambassador after that.

Q: He was in Honduras?

MORSE: Yes. His father was an ambassador before him. Contra support was all mounted out of Honduras. He had been working on it from there and pulled off all of the diplomatic, military, intelligence and economic relations that were necessary to support the Contras out of there for many years. His name escapes me for the moment – Ambassador Ted Briggs?

Within 17 days, we made our first airdrop. That was after buying food, clothing and medicine on a basis expedited under the notwithstanding authority. We hired a personal contractor that had worked for Phil before that knew how to train people to pack pallets because we didn't want to use any of the people that had ever been involved with the Contras before. So, we had to set up a whole new procurement and logistics system - warehouses, packers. We involved the Contras themselves so that they would know what was in there and they could feel comfortable about how to rig those pallets for parachuting. We signed a local Honduran contract for air support services and made our first drop in 17 days into the Honduras- Nicaragua border jungle.

Q: What was the situation for these 30,000 people in terms of their location?

MORSE: The overwhelming majority of them were on the Nicaragua/Honduras border in the deep jungle. They had camps there. They were temporary camps that were literally makeshift. You could see they had been moved from time to time but, they probably had been in those camps for about a year. There was also a southern front on the Atlantic side that was another group of the Contras. Then there was a small group that was based over in Costa Rica. On the first trip down, I went to Tegucigalpa and then out to the border and then over to the Atlantic coast. We also immediately signed a helicopter contract so that we would have helicopter support into those very remote and rugged areas.

Q: Was it not accessible by road? Some?

MORSE: Yes; but, it was probably a three-day drive versus a three-hour helicopter ride. By road, we moved the major supplies to the other camps as time allowed. Most were inaccessible; and, you had to airdrop food, clothing and medicine to them.

Q: Were they active military operations or were they just on a "stand down" situation?

MORSE: They were fully armed, uniformed, marching and exercising daily, all day long; but, they did not fire any shots during the two (2) years that we were supporting them, during the peace process itself, and then afterwards during the demobilization phase.

Q: They didn't make any forays into Nicaragua?

MORSE: They had a lot of people inside. We had a program that we called "Cash for Food". Rather than trying to deliver food to them inside, it was to give the most controversial thing you could think of, which was to send Nicaraguan currency to buy food on the inside.

Q: You mean in addition to the 30,000?

MORSE: No, they were part of the 30,000. Those were mainly combatants inside. I got four estimates of numbers from the CIA, from the Defense Intelligence Agency, from the Intelligence Oversight Committee and the Contras themselves. The four (4) estimates of size were all different. I met with Contra leaders on the ground. Their estimates were different from the three that I had up here; so, trying to figure out how much money, how many uniforms, how much food, how much medicine, how many airdrops, how many helicopters, how many planes, how often, was a nightmare. It was just like dealing with refugees, as you alluded to before. How many people are at risk and how many need food? It was the same thing. I had four (4) different estimates from four (4) different groups; so, we made our best estimates. Soon, we could learn who was inflating the estimates and for what reasons, for personal aggrandizement or for corruption or by incompetence.

Q: Let's talk about that side of it. How did you deal with the issue that the reason why it was turned over to AID was the problem of loss of funds, unaccountability and so on? How did you approach that issue?

MORSE: There were more accountability ways than people were happy with at first. When "Time Magazine" reported on it, they said that "the AID system that's now conducting Contra aid is so tight that people are complaining that the food and the medicine is not getting through and that they are literally x-raying every bunch of bananas that goes out." The reason for that was that we had a very elaborate control system; but, it had to be flexible enough to be responsive and fast enough. The first thing was that we provided everything "in kind" except the CFF, which I'll come back to. That caused huge concerns. The Contras were accustomed to getting cash, foreign exchange. The CIA had given them primarily cash. The frustrations and the dangers that we were facing were because, when we switched it from cash to "things in kind", it didn't sound like that could cause problems. In about the sixth week, we were summoned out into the jungle. I was in Washington all the time; but, I traveled down there at least once a month, every month, for two years from Washington through Miami down into Central America. We were summoned. We went out into the jungle and were met by what would be the equivalent of their G4, their logistics man, Commandante Douglas.

Douglas has a fourth grade education. He had grown up in the Contras and was a pretty tough character. He also had made one hell of a lot of money when the previous support was cash. The money for the food was passed to him under the CIA program. There were

many other channels that money was going out. Douglas said, “Look you gringos, you don’t know how to take care of us. You say you’re paying for these tall, fat, heavy cows and what we get delivered to us are these skinny, short, underweight things that won’t feed our people. You don’t know how to feed our people. We can feed ourselves. You just give us the money the way we had it before; and, we will buy the food and feed our people.” I replied, “No. I explained to Commandante Enrique Bermudez, as we explained to you and to the whole senior Contra staff, that process has changed. That’s changed because of the way we, AID, have to operate.” He really got angry. He had been, obviously, siphoning off a lot of money. Now his money source had been cut off. He couldn’t turn around and sell the cows when they were being brought in because the people needed them and slaughtered them immediately for food. There was no refrigeration, obviously, out there; so, we delivered live cows. He was waving his pistol around. I’m a hunter who was raised with four brothers and a father who hunted. I’m accustomed to being around guns; but, they still scare the devil out of me. His was loaded; and, he had his finger on the trigger. At one point, he put it down on the log table. When he put it down, I threw the gun off into the bushes. We were sitting at a log plank table where they had just split logs in half; and, that’s all there was. His men quickly pulled up their guns and pointed them at us. I remember that one of our staff was really frightened and I was too. I said, “Don’t you ever pull a gun on any of us ever again – me, my staff, any of our representatives. We are here to feed you, to clothe you, to make sure you’re healthy with medicine. None of us are armed. We will never come in here with arms. Don’t you ever, ever pull a gun on any of us again or your people will go hungry for three days.” “You can’t do that. You can’t cut off our food.” “If you threaten us and you change the rules, then the rules will change about how often you’re fed. If you change the rules and you’re going to threaten us, pull weapons on us, we’re not your enemies, we’re not here to hurt you, and we’re not here to in any way harass you.” Our AID contracting man said in Spanish, “If you really think I’m buying these light cows and paying for heavy ones, I’ll just brand them when we buy them so you get what we’re paying for. Your men are with ours. When we go to buy, one of your men is right there to see what we’re buying.” We bought the cattle locally and then had to transport them by truck out of Tegucigalpa and then through a couple of provinces. Douglas was angrily frustrated at that answer. “We will brand them in front of your own men so you know we’re getting what they and we agree we’re buying.”

He and his contingent of about 40 men just stood up and stomped off into the bush. We never heard another word after that; but, that was the first “accountability” confrontation. They wanted cash again. So, the long answer to your point was we provided them “things in kind” instead of money; so, we had physical controls. We provided them uniforms “in kind”. We did inventories of everything, including medicines.

There never had been an inventory. They said, “That’s our business. You’re not to go into our warehouses.” Their warehouses were just palm-thatched huts. I said, “Well, our people will come in and do the inventory so we know how many uniforms you have and need.” “You don’t know how many we have inside.” This was now the quartermaster section. How many uniforms they wanted didn’t match with how many people had to be fed. Through us, our US military were providing the uniforms.

I went down to Fort Bragg in North Carolina. We worked out a logistics arrangement where the U.S. military would still fly them as far as Tegucigalpa. I took a woman out of our Public Affairs Office. Sharon Isralow became our quartermaster officer. Our military and the Contras would always kid her about how she didn't buy enough underpants for them. We would do the inventories. We would see how many were being distributed. If they over distributed in relationship to the number of people that are inside Nicaragua and the number inside was also correlated with how much money per head went inside and supposedly how many families were back on the Honduras border (where we had access to them) and getting family support. So, we were cross-checking all these factors, all the time. They had never seen anybody do that before; but, we could pretty well then determine what was an appropriate number of uniforms, amount of food, etc.

On the cash, we wore out several currency counting machines. We had teams of AID financial controllers, some wonder people. We rotated them down there from Washington every six months. John Lovis would probably tell you these stories, too. The staff were held up in Customs in Miami. Walking through Miami with a currency counter! Who else uses currency counters? A bank? "Are you associated with a bank?" "No, we're not associated with a bank?" "Are you laundering money for drugs?" "No, we're not laundering money. This is what we do." But, they were twice stopped and held in Customs because they were taking currency counting machines up to have them repaired.

Early on, I went to the seven Congressional Oversight Committees with Bob and with our AID Inspectors and said, "We need to agree with you and, through you, the GAO and with our own Inspectors and our own auditors what the accountability standards are for this extraordinary program. How far are we to account for what kinds of things? If you really want us to take care of people inside, do you want us inside Nicaragua? Do you want the GON to know where we're going inside and what we're giving them inside?" "No, you're an overt operation. Before, it was a covert operation; so, they went in covertly and took care of the people inside." "So, how did we do it?" I asked. "Here is our proposal. We will get people on the inside to identify who their family members are outside where we can count them. The family members have to show identity of who is inside, how many are inside. We'll correlate it with the records that came from DIA and CIA and your own records on the Oversight Committee. They're not going to agree. We're going to have to agree on what's a common number and what amount of monthly cash is to go in so that the Contras inside can buy food, and so that they won't, as they've threatened to do, use their guns to force people to give them food if they didn't have any money to buy food. You don't want enough cash that it looks like we're paying them off. Is this their salary? Is that what it was before? Was it the CIA's salary to these people? I've got the records of how many got paid how much. We can't justify that amount, much lower." "We're glad, Mr. Morse, that you have it much lower. We think it's a lower figure. The accountability standard will be that you turn cash over to one of the commandantes at the border and they sign for it and they take it in. Our plan was that we said we wanted a signature from each of them; get a signature from each one who got his cash for food, that will be the acceptable accountability standard. When we get back the

signatures, we can cross check them with families, lists, names from people outside where we have access to them.

Q: For each of the families?

MORSE: No, each of the Contras inside. The families were outside of Nicaragua. The Contras were supposed to be rotating back out every six months. "If somebody doesn't come out within six months where we see him personally, then he will be stopped from receiving CFF, taken off the roles. If you say it's somebody else, we'll just reduce the roles by that number – you decide. But, we're going to take that name and that person off the roles within six months." So, we had that accountability system for the inside cash for food for component.

Q: You had a list of all the people?

MORSE: Yes. We had four lists. None of them agreed. We worked through an office in Miami, which was the Contra office, that was headed by Adolfo Curerro and Enrique Bermudes. Later, when Enrique went home maybe 12 months after Mrs. Chamorro was elected, he was shot in the head and killed sitting in his car in Nicaragua. Again, I cried.

We had one other system for accountability. Here is the first recommendation. I've said this over and over. Any time you have to move from Pakistan into Afghanistan, if you have to move in Iraq cross border, you get an agreement on the accountability standards with the Congressional Oversight Committees, with the GAO, and our own AID auditors and inspectors. After that, you're all working on the same game. We did one other accountability thing. Congress said, "GAO is going to do an audit on you." I said, "Before there is anything to audit?" They said, "Yes, right away." "Are you going to audit the program before?" "No, we're going to be auditing you." I said, "Fine. Then we will call for a concurrent audit by our AID auditors; and, if we're going to have a concurrent audit by your GAO and our auditors, I'm going to use some of this money to hire a private audit firm to make sure you've got something credible to audit. Otherwise, you won't have any receipts, you won't have any records. Rather than have AID staff do this, I want a private audit firm to keep those records for us."

So, we hired Price Waterhouse. They had people on the ground. They had people who were Spanish speaking in their local dialect. At first, PW didn't want to take it on; but, eventually those were the people to whom every single receipt went first, not to AID or GAD, but to an independent audit firm. We were heavily criticized by some who were the big supporters of the Contras about the tight oversight and accountability systems we put in place. We literally had our own officers, then Price Waterhouse, our AID auditors, AID inspectors and a Contra officer. PW reported to me and our staff. Shelly was AID's AG man on the ground all the time. GAO reported to the oversight committees. They said, "You'll not be able to work under all of this. It will slow the program down." I said, "No, they're all there to expedite it." Any time we had a question, I could turn to the AID and GAO people either in the field or here in Washington and say, "Look, we're about to do this. This is how we intend to do it. Do you have any problem with that?" I wanted

concurrent auditing not something that came out six months after a potential problem. That is how Price Waterhouse and the other auditors and inspectors interfaced. We had 121 audits done on us in two years by the whole system, up and down. When we closed down at the end of the two years, there was not one outstanding audit recommendation. Nobody every closed us down or stopped us because of the way we were doing something.

Q: Were there any losses reported?

MORSE: Yes; and, we agreed initially on what a tolerable loss would be, what I called the "evaporation rate", especially of gasoline. We had to bring in trucks and put in bladders that had been used in Africa for delivering water. I just adapted the same kind of logistics to the Contras about delivering gasoline remotely out there in bladders. At first, the evaporation rate was really high. One of the Contras was on each truck. One would ride in the delivery truck. The contractor would drive it. Then we would periodically put our own person on it for spot checking. When we started to put our own people on the delivery trucks for spot checking, and quickly put a Price Waterhouse auditor on it, the evaporation rate stopped. We didn't have any more thefts of gasoline. The Contra logistics people on Douglas' staff privately told us that under the CIA they would get half of what started out each time.

Q: It was sold en route?

MORSE: Or siphoned off by agreement, whether it was the driver, the company, the Contras, the police… You had to go through a lot of military and police checks to get out to where you were going. You couldn't just drive out there as a civilian. You had to go through many, many checks. We had to get IDs for everyone; we had to get clearance.

Q: These were Hondurans?

MORSE: Yes. There were Hondurans who were all part of the political support system all the way to the top. The Contras ran a huge hospital operation near the family camps. We supplied medicine and supplies. The list was very, very, long. One very influential retired American major general, who was a very close ally of the Contras, came stomping into my Washington office one day and said, "I'm getting reports that you're letting these people die. They don't have these sutures, syringes" and going on and on and on. "You're not supplying these things to them." I said, "Do you know what we are supplying?" "I know what is not getting to them."

I called in again one of our AID logistics people, a public relations staffer with the same name as the President of Panama, Roger Noriega. We showed what we had delivered. I said, "They're signed for by the Contra medical people. They're delivered. These things are there. The expenditure rate that had gone on before according to the other agency's record shows that we were getting exactly the same amount of medicines, medical supplies, aspirins and sutures that were coming in there before. Hundreds and hundreds of items were going in. We had to procure and ship them. He was flustered and went out.

He hadn't been confronted before with that kind of factual record and evidence that showed what the Contras were getting.

At the beginning, when Allen was still there, Secretary Shultz insisted that we report to him every morning at 08:15. Allen and I would go to the Secretary's office; and, we would sit at the Senior Staff meeting with all the Under Secretaries or Assistant Secretaries. He would take a report from us on the status of Contra aid. Then later we would have a weekly meeting with him. These tended to be more private meetings. Allen got sick, as you know. I continued to go to those meetings.

At one of the meetings with Shultz, he said, "How did it go yesterday up on the Hill?" I said, "I took some real heavy beatings." He said, "Who from?" I answered, "On the Senate side, it was Senator Dodd because he said we were moving too slowly to disarm the Contras and demobilize them and make civilians out of them. On the other side, there was Representative Henry Hyde over on the House side that said 'We're not doing enough to keep the boys strong and ready.' Shultz said to me, 'That's perfect.'" I said, "That kind of pressure isn't perfect." His response was, "As long as you're being beat up with equal intensity from both sides, you're right where I want you on this issue." I said, "Thank you, Mr. Secretary!"

I later asked U/S Mike Armacost, who was acting for the Secretary one day when John Whitehead was away and the Secretary wasn't there, "Why do we continue to report to the Secretary, as busy as he is worldwide?" He answered, "Because he wants to protect you and wants to protect himself." I asked, "Can you explain that?" Armacost said, "He wants to protect himself because he figures he got outmaneuvered on the Contras once before between his own staff, Casey, Defense and NSC; and, he doesn't want that to happen again. If Contra aid is being done in his building by his people, i.e., you, he wants to be able to know everything that's going on." I said, "I can't believe he wants to know the kind of technical stuff that we say every day." He said, "It's to protect you." I said, "From whom?" He said, "From their former sponsors, whether it's in the administration, the Hill or from his own Assistant Secretary of State, Elliot Abrams. They all know you have direct access to him; so, don't try an end run."

Q: What was the scale of the operation? How much money were we putting in?

MORSE: We got $30 million for the first six months. By the way, when Allen recruited me, he said, "It's in the legislation that this is a six-month operation. Then you can go back to Zambia. Timing was ultimately determined by the pace and conclusion of the Escapulas peace process. Ha! The $30 million varied. At the end of about four and one-half months, I went back up to the oversight committees' staff and said, "This is what we're spending. This program is going to go on for a second six months. This is what we're doing. I'll have $6 million of the initial $30 million left over. We can turn that back to you; but, we're going to need $30 million for the next period because these costs weren't incurred: they were start-up costs; they are recurrent costs." They said (I think it was George Ingham and Jim Bond were sitting there together.), "Nobody has come into this Appropriations Committee and given money back before. Henceforth, you get

whatever amount of money you want for this exercise." I said, "I can be honest to that trust." So, it ran about $30 million every six months; and, sometimes we'd give money back. We ran it for two years at roughly that level.

Q: Somebody said something about $50 million. I wasn't quite clear.

MORSE: That came when they added the money that we had to spend for the Nicaragua election process. After the Escapulas peace process got to the agreement that there would be a national election, they added to the six months legislation that AID should support the election process in there. So, we got extra money, $20 million to support the election. Here, you're kind of like Bob Zoellick. It is how you ask the question: How much for the Contras; or, how much for the Nicaraguan elections?

Q: What was your ability to keep the Contra troops from becoming actively engaged?

MORSE: I don't think that we on the Task Force had to pressure. It was clear to me that the American political, foreign policy, military, intelligence community that had sponsored them before had enough influence on them to say that, "You don't shoot; you don't go back to fighting' you don't steal; you don't fight. This is over. We're going to settle this democratically. There's going to be an election." Every time any Contra commanders threatened to do that or it looked like they were mobilizing to do that, we would report it. If you will, everybody from the ambassador in country and the American team that had been supporting them before worked back here in Washington through the Contra liaison in Miami who would lean on them in the field not to do that. At the local level, basically, the only leverage that we had on them was that: "If you want to continue to be fed, clothed and given medicines, then you've got to keep the peace agreements that we have. If you break that agreement, then we're going to change the support."

Q: The agreement was not to enter into combat?

MORSE: That's right. In exchange for which we would support them in political-peace negotiations and with humanitarian assistance.

Q: There were no military supplies provided?

MORSE: Only military uniforms and clothing and quarter master supplies.

Q: What about lethal supplies?

MORSE: No. We had an agreement on what they would get. We didn't need to supply them with any guns or ammunition, nothing lethal. They already had plenty of guns and ammunition, mortars, etc.; and, they weren't supposed to be using what they had. What was lethal? Was a machete lethal? Was a knife? Were parts for the vehicles if they used them aggressively? Were binoculars? Were mess kits? Were canvas kits? We had all those discussions that went on about what was lethal. Again, we cleared it with the

auditors and the oversight committees. So, there was no misunderstanding about what we would supply and what we wouldn't supply.

Q: Did we attempt to do any development type activities?

MORSE: Oh, yes. You know, my commitment there, you take every emergency and try to turn it into a development advantage. Later, I want to come back to the elections because that's a whole major part of this. Regarding development, we first of all did a survey of all the Contra families and those combatants "on vacation" in the camps: how old, male/female, children, adults, how much schooling, what did they do before, farmers, skilled people? Then we did another survey on their aspirations when this is over. We hired Creative Associates (CA) that have quite a bit of experience with Latin America. They are education people primarily, but have a lot of social psychology experience. We worked closely with them. They were fabulous partners. With the aspirations, you could find out who felt they wanted to go back to school when the war was over. We kept putting it in terms of: "After the elections, you will be demobilized and go back into a civilian life. What do you want to do at that point? Where will you go? What kind of a living? What family responsibilities?" The majority of them were campesinos. They wanted to go back and farm. They were hoping to get a cow, a plow, seeds and access to land. Land was very important to them, overriding. Who wanted to go back and continue their schooling even though they maybe only had four years of schooling? At what level? Was it realistic? Could they sit in the classroom with younger kids? Were there adult education programs? Which ones had been working as mechanics on their Contra vehicles? Which ones had become really good paramedics and knew medicine from working with injured/sick Contras. What were their functions and their assignments within the Contra system that would indicate some skills?

So, we put all that information together and then sponsored programs that ranged from numeracy and literacy through vocational training. CA offered everything where they had some skill/interest – electricity, woodworking, metalworking, auto mechanic. I bet we trained enough barbers to cut all the hairs in Central America every day. You could train a barber within two or three days with a comb and scissors start-up kit!

Those who wanted to go back to school and who were ready to start to study CA were tested, giving them a sense of hope, a sense of future. This was the biggest change. Psychologically, to begin to think of themselves as civilians when up to then their identity came from that gun and that uniform. We were trying to build up to the point where we had to demobilize them and disarm them and mentally they could see themselves with an identity that was different when you stripped off the uniform, when you took away their gun. Were they psychologically going to do this; or, were they going to run off, take their gun, go into the bush and become bandits and earn their living the way they had always earned a living, through their gun? That's what they knew.

Creative Associates was extremely helpful in doing the surveying, then arranging the training and doing the psychological preparations for all of this. So, we had all of these classes going on. That was another thing – keep them busy, so they didn't get bored and

go off and become just bandits and just run away from the Contra organization. We wanted to keep the discipline and use their own structure for that discipline. We had to find that balance of using their organization, discipline to accomplish the coming psychological change, the civilian preparation to go back. We trained them in democracy and gave them enough faith that they could achieve their purpose through an election instead of through the guns, through the rebellion. These were pretty simple concepts, but critical for sustainability. The testing and training was well received, especially by the families in the camps. Remember, we were dealing with a total of 30,000 people.

Q: Were they willing to allow you to get that much information about them?

MORSE: Different times, yes; different times, no. When we got into the radio operators and we were dealing with people who knew how to operate radios, then you're getting into sensitivities about who had been trained by the other agency in decoding, in electronic warfare. So, yes, it got sensitive. Not a problem for the most part, especially for the families. Among them, there were other sensitivities; and, it took a lot of work on our part to deal with some.

There were a couple hundred female sex slaves. The men talked about them as their girlfriends, as their wives, as female combatants; but especially through the insights that we got through contractors working the medical side, we could see a lot of female abuse that was coming into the medical tents. These "classrooms and clinics" were all pretty much tents except for the big hospital, which was closed down right after we got there. It was at a Honduran army base. These women, a couple of hundred of them, had been so traumatized, some of them taken in their early teens as sex slaves all over the war. How do you deal with them? What special needs will they have? Many who would literally service as many as 10 and 12 men in a single night. Others were traumatized because they were in love with one man, but then he had to share her with others. There were others who had born several children. So, we had a whole separate program of maternal and child healthcare and psychological counseling and that kind of operation with them.

Q: Did you have a lot of technical assistance people working in these areas?

MORSE: We did. We had several contracts – one on health, one on education primarily. Then, of course, there were contractors to buy food locally and deliver it – and contractors for trucking, air support, etc.

Q: Living in the area of the Contras?

MORSE: The education and the medical technical people did; but, the others were always coming in and going out of the camps. They developed close relationships. We never had AID people that lived at the camps.

Q: These were Americans, not locals?

MORSE: No. In fact, we and the contractors had American supervisors; but, they relied heavily on Central American local staff members. We didn't want any of our American staff to actually live out there. If they were caught out there and had to stay overnight, yes, they did; but, we didn't want them out there all the time. Frankly, having been a hostage in Ethiopia myself, I was concerned that we not put any of our staff in place where somebody, just for a wild personal reason, could take a hostage and put him at risk.

Let's turn to the election. When the Escapulas peace process got to the point where they said there would be a national election to settle who would run Nicaragua, Congress did appropriate the other $20 million for election support. Then again, I give full credit to Bob Meighan. He and I went up to the Hill and negotiated the standards of what would apply. AID wasn't that involved in "supporting elections"; so, we laid out and took up and cleared with them what we proposed as parameters. They bought exactly what we laid out. We would not support a particular candidate. We would not support a particular party. We would support the democratic and the election processes. We could support people who were doing electoral educational materials, for what democracy and an election would be, but not campaign materials for a particular party or candidate. We could support rallies that were training people in getting out the vote, registering to vote; but, if it turned to the point where it was a political rally for a particular candidate or party, no.

So, we had a whole series of what the standards were for supporting the elections. You talk about again getting caught between the right and the left on this issue. There were some who felt, "Well, Mrs. Chamorro is the American candidate and we should support her and her party." But, to be fair, when we said, "Whatever we're going to do for Mrs. Chamorro, we will do for Daniel Ortega", they were furious on the right about that and tried to stop it. But, by that time, we had built enough understanding with the oversight committees that they didn't stop us. We knew we wanted to work for both Central American democracy and with human rights and election groups. We needed to work with the whole country. We're working with an election process inside Nicaragua, whereas before we were not inside Nicaragua. We were working outside Nicaragua.

Q: Were you doing this election work with the Contras?

MORSE: In part. Again, that became controversial. We thought they're all going to go inside, go home to vote, therefore tilting the election numbers because they'll go. One of the more interesting parts of this was trying to be balanced and trying to support the electoral process at a pace that was demanded by the Escapulas peace process. Again, the notwithstanding clause was applied to work with the U.S.-based democracy and elections groups, including the National Democratic Institute and the National Republican Institute.

When the head of the National Democratic Institute put in a proposal to us that was so heavily tilted towards buying candidate campaign materials, paying for campaign rallies, megaphones, printed candidate materials, and all the rest of it, we turned it down. The

head of the NDI objected and took us to the "wood shed" with the AID Administrator. Allen had died at that point. I want to come back to his death. That was callous of me to put it that way.

The very influential, Brian Attwood, was the NDI Director. He took our turn down all the way up to the LA Assistant Secretary of State and Deputy Secretary, John Whitehead. He claimed we were not giving the Democratic Institute the same attention and money that we were going to give the Republican Institute. We said, "We're not trying to do this in a way to equalize NDI and NRI. We're trying to equalize election support inside instead." Brian Attwood later, when he became Administrator of AID said, "Ted, I always knew that I could trust you to be honest and true to your principles because, when I took you all the way up to the Secretary of State, you didn't bend and you turned me down you stayed with it." He was the head of NDI. That was the first time I had met Brian, of course. At another point we can cover where the $20 million for election support went, if you would like.

I've described what running Contra Aid was like from Washington. I'm delighted that you're talking to some of the Task Force field people. They're going to see it differently and report it differently. The problems that we had with AID/W, State and interagency, with Congress and the public were preoccupying us. Much of our work was to manage the policies, get agreements on extraordinary procedures, mobilize the staff, money, logistics, contracts and accountability. We had a field team that was astronomically energetic and effective. They were politically sensitive, but true to principles. They didn't try to cut the corners and then get us into trouble and discredit AID or discredit the U.S. government or upset the peace process.

We had to rotate the staff every six months, except for some who agreed to stay longer. We were just bringing people in from wherever we could get our hands on – a financial controller, a field operator, a director. We had an absolutely fantastic group of people. Phil Buechler stayed on and did a major part of that. I felt badly because I felt the six months rotations broke up the marriage of one fellow whose wife and he were a tandem AID couple. Later, they both told me that, no, the marriage was on the rocks before that. To pull good AID staff out of worldwide missions and Washington assignments was often disruptive. I tried to provide recognition and incentives to lessen that. The Administrator and Ray Love's help was essential in getting good people released for this work.

Q: Any other dimension of that? You were there through the elections?

MORSE: There's one example on tough working relations in Washington. As it wound down, there was one particular hearing that we had up on the Hill. I went up to testify about the status of the program – especially election support. I think it was the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Some staffers were trying to discredit us – the agency and Task Force. The word had gotten out that we had done such a good job, that I must be a political holdover and was holding onto the Contras, not disbanding them, a true believer on the right side, a political appointee that had been brought in to run this.

Congressman Henry Hyde knew that I was a career employee; so, he insisted on having the first question. His first question was, "How long have you been with AID?" I can't remember the exact number I gave. I think it was like 27 or 28 years at that point. The other Congressman, who had a whole set of notes about how to discredit this political appointee, said, "I don't believe that." Mr. Hyde said, "You don't believe the witness?" "No, we have evidence that he is a political appointee, that he just came into this." I responded, "With all due respect, it's a matter of public record that I am a career AID officer and have never been a political appointee." The Congressman turned around, looked at his staff members and threw the whole set notes away. We had credibility with Congress; and, that really helped later. In the election, what we were doing was trying to be equal, fair, open and honest. Transparency was the thing that they appreciated. Everything with Contras had been done in secret up until then, hiding things. So, there wasn't a thing we were doing that was not transparent. They wanted and appreciated that.

Q: What about the Contras out of Honduras? Were you involved in that? Presumably, they were supposed to be repatriated.

MORSE: We turned them over to what had been agreed to in the Escapulas peace process, that an international organization rather than we, the U.S., would take them back in for fear of by Central Americans and the Nicaraguans that we would somehow tilt it. So, we looked at several different organizations. I called a man who I had known when he was the Controller of AID, who was now the Deputy for the UN High Commission for Refugees, Doug Stafford. Doug and we had hours of conversation on the telephone and asked if UNHCR would take them. Of course, the Contras weren't refugees in the historical precedent; but, they were cross-border. He agreed in principle. I kept arguing, "Wait a minute, your definition of a refugee is somebody who is outside his own country, across the border. Then how do we deal with the Contras inside?" "Well, then maybe the OAS has to take care of them", he offered. So, we had long discussions with the OAS about what part they would play. Then we talked to the UN system in terms of receiving them when they came inside. Who got the busses? Who verified who was legitimate? Who were the Nicaraguans going to accept? How do you know these aren't Hondurans that are infiltrating and immigrating? How do they show their Nicaraguan citizenship, their coming home? Who pays for the busses? Where do they go? What kind of reception center? What processing arrangements? All of that. It was a tremendous operation that took a lot of coordination with the UNHCR, the Honduran government, the Nicaraguan government, our government, the OAS, the contactors, the UN and the Contras before they could leave the camps to destroy their weapons. Then, there was the whole process of planning turning in their weapons and then taking a blow torch and cutting the barrels off and literally making them inoperable, or welding their breech closed, disposing ammunition and anything lethal that they should not take…all of this. Then how many were brought in versus how many they probably had and how many they buried under the palm trees and all the rest of this lethal stuff. So, it was a nightmare.

Q: What incentive did they have to give up their weapons?

MORSE: They wouldn't be allowed to get on the bus to go home; and, they wouldn't be given the repatriation package until they had turned in a minimum of one weapon per person.

Q: The package was financial and what else?

MORSE: Financial and in-kind support, on the inside, depending on whether they were going home or to school, a vocation, small business or back on the land. Also, in terms of that process, we tried to get them to form a veterans' association. Their influence had been through the gun; and, their political influence was through their military command structure. We tried to teach them that in a democracy their influence was going to have to come through their political association. Were they willing and able to stay united and have spokespersons who could put pressure on the elected government?

There were some on the Hill and in Central America that thought keeping them associated would allow the Contras to be called back quickly to renew fighting. They elected spokespersons; but, they wanted them to be active military people, not as a retiree or a veterans' association. That had to be established in country. They had to set up their own offices; but, were we allowed to pay for that office while they were setting it up? It was part of the demobilization process. There were a thousand little things like that that you could spend time on, that we could go through. Then, there were disagreements that went on between the three fronts because the Southern Front and the Atlantic Front were willing to follow a different repatriation model than the Northern and Costa Rican fronts were. Were they allowed to take their medicines and their vehicles back inside? Was that going to threaten the peace process because all this was inside that could be mobilized quickly and lead back to war? There were thousands of little decisions like that to be made day in and day out. Our people on the ground were taking them into account with good political sensitivity.

Q: Did they all return eventually?

MORSE: Not all. Some of them had married Hondurans and Costa Ricans and wanted to stay out. Others were afraid to go back; they didn't think they would be protected, because of maybe people who knew what they had done as fighters. So, there were many that elected to stay out. I don't know what the figures ultimately were; but my guess is that 90% of them went back. We can get the numbers from UNHCR.

Just one thing, a staffing lesson learned. I mentioned Phil Buechler. I think I said earlier that I almost felt guilty about misusing somebody like him. He answered the call to duty every single time. I think I told you that he came down after he saw me on television doing the Grenada noon broadcast. He was down in Grenada. He had been with us in Southern Africa in opening up the missions. I knew him in Southeast Asia. He had actually been working for the State Department at one point on Contra aid when they had it. He was seconded over there because of his abilities. Earlier, in fact, when the American pilot flying for the covert Contra operation was shot down, he had Phil Buechler's card in his shirt. I was worried about putting him back on our Task Force

roles even though he was AID. He went 17 years without a promotion. Part of it is because our AID promotion system does not reward people who do these "non-development" assignments. The corporate culture is that we are a development agency. The evaluation, the peer group ratings, the promotion standards are all set up relative to that. So, people who do these emergency operations normally don't get the kind of promotion they deserve.

I was quite an exception, I felt. I was rewarded many, many times. Knowing this and feeling the guilt, but also wanting recognition for Phil's work, I mentioned his case one day to Secretary Shultz. I said, "We can't do this without the people who are willing to interrupt their regular career, volunteer and be pulled out and then have to be reinserted back into a career after they've responded to these emergencies. I've seen this on the drought as well." He said, "Well, that isn't fair; and we should do something. What do you recommend?" I said, "I would like to give him a special achievement award, one that we don't have to. I can write it up and ask you to bring it." He said, "I'll do that. I'll present it to him personally." We arranged something like this for every other staff member. I tried to make sure every one of them had some form of recognition throughout the system, but especially starting with Phil.

We went up onto the seventh floor into the Secretary's suite. Phil's family was there, and a photographer, all the Task Force and the interagency people. We had awards and recognition for others; but, we started with Phil. Shultz got called away at the last minute; so, Deputy Secretary of State, John Whitehead, presented the award to him in front of the camera, the families and everybody else, just to recognize the field people, the field work that had gone on. I personally took the Secretary's award over and had them put it in Phil's personnel folder; and, he finally got promoted by the next panel.

It's a shame, though, that people who will respond to these emergencies and work in this area where so much of the Agency's work now is humanitarian, emergency, relief and transitions, that it's still not part of the AID core recognition. I always told people, "Never do these back to back. In your career, you will be stymied and 'typed' if you do this back to back." Why did I go to Zambia after the drought? Why did I ask for a regular development assignment after this? Because you will not have a career in this Agency or you will be so 'typed' that you'll be stymied in your career.

Q: You have to recognize the system with that experience, which is a tremendous capability, it isn't an experience that fits very well into a more standardized development operation.

MORSE: The way an Agency career was defined was standardized; but, you now look at the amount of money and time AID works in disaster assistance, emergencies, transition assistance. The Agency work has changed over the years and yet, the corporate culture regarding recognition hasn't changed to recognize that. So, I think that was an important thing to have a record of what we still have to do to adjust that corporate culture. We still keep that special emergency expertise and recognize it has the ability to be applied in a regular development setting.

Q: You probably found what I found. My own experience is that when you get an emergency, high levels to demand that people respond; but, the working operations, the missions, the desk officers, and so on like to stay on their track. Understandably, they have a good job. But, it's very hard to fit an emergency into a standard, ongoing bureaucratic operation.

MORSE: Absolutely. I'll come to that when we do the Greater Horn of Africa assignment, when we tried to institutionalize it. Do you want more on the Contras?

Q: Okay.

MORSE: Deputy Secretary John Whitehead asked if I would go with him to the White House one day to see the President. He wanted an update on the Contras; but, we also had to make a decision about whether or not to go for additional Contra funds at that point. OMB was again arguing that we should scale it down and move it out faster. State was saying, "No, you have to stay the course and move at the pace of the peace process." We went in the Oval Office to see President Reagan. He was almost paternalistic in his attitude to the Contras and paternalistic in the way that he addressed me and Deputy Secretary Whitehead: "I hear you're doing a wonderful job taking care of our boys." He had a personal identification with them. I wasn't in there very often with him, a couple of times. His attachment to the Contras was very clear. I'll leave it at that.

Toward the end, the NSC lawyer with whom we worked, David Addington, asked, "Is there anything we can do for you personally?" That is often an opening for a political appointment – like an Ambassadorship. But, I really liked the AID service. I said, "Nothing really; maybe a simple thank you note." He had President Reagan sign one and sent it over. The Agency put me in for another Presidential Service Award – which I was given, along with a $10,000 bonus. (They said no-one gets more than one of these!)

Q: After the Contra saga, what happened?

MORSE: There was a little interim assignment in Washington. The new AID Administrator, Ron Roskens, asked if I would help manage the integration of the Asia Bureau and the Private Enterprise Bureau. I told him to get somebody else to do that; I was tired after the Contras. I had taken no leave for two (2) years. I had leave built up and was eager to go take my leave and make up neglect of my family, rest up and get on to the Zimbabwe assignment. He basically said, "You really have to do this. I need somebody who is not involved with either the Asia or the Private Enterprise Bureau to get a whole management view of their unbalanced workloads." I said, "I just don't believe such integration would work." He said, "No, we've got to equalize the workloads between Henrietta Holsman Fore and Carol Adelman." I said, "You're going to have two AAs testifying before the AID oversight geographical committees? How are you going to put together a single budget if the Private Enterprise Bureau is also handling part of Asia? There is an interest in Asia trade and private enterprise; but, that's not what our AID portfolio is." Anyway, against my better judgment, I agreed to help, but only until the

serving USAID/Zimbabwe Director finished her tour and I could depart on my assignment there.

We put together all kinds of little working teams to identify which projects, documents, offices, space and staff might shift between bureaus. We got to the staff part of it; and, one evening I was briefing Roskens about where we were. I was lamenting the fact that, "All the two bureaus are doing is dumping their dead wood on each other". He said, "What do you mean; their dead wood?" I said, "Well, in every bureau, probably 10% of the staff is underperforming at any one time. They're seeing this as an opportunity to get rid of their dead wood and the other bureau is shifting their dead wood." He said, "I don't believe that any loyal appointees of Ronald Reagan would have bad staff, underperformers and dead wood on their staff." I said, "You can't get rid of it either – they are Civil Service. You can in the Foreign Service; but, it takes a lot of work of documenting underperformance. It's almost impossible." He said, "I just can't believe that's going on." So, I started to get up and walk out. He said, "No. Sit down." He had his secretary call the two AAs in. This was late in the evening, probably 6:30 or 7:00 p.m. I felt like I was sitting in the corner like a bad boy. I just sat there waiting for the AAs to come while he did his work at his desk. They walked in and greeted. Before they even sat down, he said, "Ted Morse tells me you both have underperforming, bad employees on your staff and you haven't gotten rid of them." They replied, "Well, it's really hard" and all this. He said, "And he says you've probably got as much as 10% of your staff this way." Henrietta looked at him and said, "No, Ted is wrong. I probably have closer to 15 or 20%." I stood up and started to walk out at that point. He said, "What do you want to do?" I said, "Why don't you discuss it with the AAs without me present." He didn't seem to have a good grasp on how our agency operated, what its goals were, what its commitment was, why it was organized with separate geographic and central/functional bureaus. That was just one example, from my point of view, which demonstrated he was inappropriate to lead AID.

Q: Did any of the bureaus ever get integrated?

MORSE: Oh, yes, they did, to some extent.

Q: With two AAs or something?

MORSE: He kept the same AAs of Carol Adelman and Henrietta.

Q: How can anyone deal with two AAs on the same area or program?

MORSE: We literally moved staff, desks, offices, portfolios and files and everything from Asia Bureau over under Carol Adelman; and, she took on more responsibilities.

Q: One of them left?

MORSE: She didn't originally. In fact, his rational was, we didn't have a European Bureau at that point. He had Carol taking on more of the aid in the former Soviet Union

as part of Asia, some of the "Stans", if you will. But it didn't last long. As soon as he left, the organizational structure righted itself.

Q: That's like madness.

MORSE: That was consistent, I'm afraid, with at least from my perception, of how he mismanaged that agency for a little while. Fortunately, it was only a little while.

ZIMBABWE CONTEXT

European hunters, missionaries, soldiers and settlers began arriving in southern Africa in the mid-1800s, overwhelming indigenous African inhabitants. Following his mining and political successes in south Africa, Cecil Rhodes and his (colonial) British South Africa Company first negotiated mining treaties with the Ndebele King and then overthrew the man and named the country after himself – Rhodesia, as a British colony. The early 1960s change in England's colonial policies called for majority African participation in political rule and land ownership, from which they had been excluded under Rhodes. Southern Rhodesia resisted and declared a Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965. Following UDI the southern Matabele and northern Shona tribes rebelled and fought a 13-year war for independence. A political settlement and the first free elections in 1979 resulted in the establishment in April 1980 of the African ruled country of Zimbabwe, under the former guerilla leader, Robert Mugabe. I went there in April 1980 to open the USAID mission, over the next 5 months. I returned there in 1990 as Director of USAID Zimbabwe and Director of the Southern African Regional Program until April 1994.

In the first ten years of independence, Zimbabwe thrived under moderate economic and political policies. When the ten-year restrictions in the Lancaster House Peace Agreement expired in 1990, President Mugabe began to reverse his reconciliation policies, nationalize land held by white farmers and established strong state controls. That sent the confidence and economy into a decline that has existed for over 25 years.

In 1990, about July, Ernice and I transferred down to Zimbabwe, which we fully expected to be our final assignment, after 32 years of service. As we said before, she and I went there at independence time in April of 1980 and helped open the first AID Mission in Zimbabwe. It was a wonderful country. We said if there ever was a chance to go back, we would. At that time, Allison Herrick was retiring and that Mission opened up. I was privileged enough to get it. The country by that time had ten (10) years of independence and ten (10) years of economic growth, which was not particularly bad. It ranged from three percent to seven percent GDP growth in different years during those 10 years. There was a lot of donor aid that flowed in after independence. But 10 years later, the glow had worn off and there wasn't the same amount of foreign aid from other donors that was coming in. Our program at that time was running about $20-25 million a year on the bilateral program, more, depending on whether we had a cash transfer of non-project assistance or whether we had a housing investment guarantee (HIG) any given year.

Q: The program had been reinstated after Carter walked out of our own Fourth of July reception, after a Zimbabwe minister publicly insulted the U.S.

MORSE: Yes. It was put on hold because of that slight; but, then it was restarted again. It was realized that we had some longer term interests and commitments in that part of the world, especially because of the influence of Mugabe and Zimbabwe on the other Front Line States at that point and their importance regionally for a peaceful transition, as a model for South Africa. But, because of that restart after a decade, Washington asked for a new AID strategy when we went down. I welcomed that, not that the other one wasn't working per se; but, it was one that had pretty much been in place for eight (8) or ten (10) years.

We conducted a couple of weeks of intensive sessions – just listening, listening, listening. We rented a room over at the Meikles Hotel. We invited academics, government, other donors, NGOs, missionaries, businesspeople, farmers, farmer's associations, everybody that we could get to just listen to their perceptions of what the development problems were now and were going to be in the next decade for Zimbabwe; and, we wanted to learn where they thought the U.S. had a comparative advantage and what they wanted. It was interesting to me how many times it came back to land. I think I may have said earlier when we were dealing with the 1980 opening that we had a small program of seed packs and helping to demobilize some of the ZANU, ZAPU and Rhodesian Forces. It was clear in working with those people that their fight was not black on white. It really wasn't even, as Mugabe at time was a declared Marxist, ideological. For 95% of the black soldiers in ZANU and ZAPU, it was land and access to land. There was great frustration that we were not dealing with that. As I think I said earlier, Kissinger had been involved in Zimbabwe about three (3) years before independence. There was a so-called implied commitment that we would join with the British and put up money to pay for land to have it redistributed from the white Rhodesians to the black Zimbabweans. We didn't have the money or the political backing on the Hill to be able to do that. It never came about. There was a lot of carryover of unhappiness that we weren't going to deal with the land. We realized that here it is 10 years later; and, the same 4,000 whites held the same 50% of the land, that the 887,000 blacks had to farm the same amount. The latter were farming worn out sod; and, the whites had the arable land. I still maintain to this day that, along with one other factor, land access will blow Zimbabwe apart.

The other factor is that Mugabe had clamped down on any other political opposition and having a real democracy in there. Those two factors, I think, are what are going to lead to a second revolution in that country. It's almost criminal that we all can't help some way to avoid that. Certainly on the land reform side, $25,000 to the Land Tenure Center at U. of Wisconsin to come to Zimbabwe and show them 40 models around the world and hold a couple of months of consultation could have provided consensus and basis for land resolution.

Q: We couldn't even do that?

MORSE: No. Partly the embassy was afraid of getting back into what was a very sore point with the Zimbabwe government over the so-called Kissinger commitment; but, history shows that commitment followed a 1977 Lord Owen and Andy Young "Anglo-American Proposal" to fund land reform.

Q: That we were going to pay for land reform compensation.

MORSE: For the compensation of transferred land. It came up again three (3) years after Kissinger was made Secretary was on the sidelines of the 1979 Lancaster House negotiations. At that point, I think, Carter was President. Secretary of State Vance sent word over to our London Ambassador that "we would be helpful". Jeff Davidow was right in the middle of those negotiations. He was our liaison, as well, in there. It got sticky. If you read the history, again, the U.S. sent in word that "we will be helpful." That was a key factor as far as both Joshua Nkomo and Mugabe were concerned to go ahead and sign the Lancaster House agreement. Then we've never followed through on it. That came up over and over. Jeff wrote a book on those negotiations. The details are in the book.

Back to our 1990 AID strategy planning sessions. It was a wonderful process of learning and listening and actually getting to know the new team, the new players. You wouldn't have normally had a chance to hear from them for two hours each one of them. From that, we put together a new AID strategy. REDSO sent a couple of top-flight people down to help us write it. We had Patty Buckles on our staff in the lead. Dave Gordon did the political analysis for us. He is now at the National Intelligence Council in charge of humanitarian and development assistance for the world.

Q: What was the strategy? What did you come up with?

MORSE: Obviously, it was a multi-focus approach to help deal with the high unemployment rate amongst the black Zimbabweans. Depending on who measured it and when, it was in the formal sector 35-40% unemployment of employment-age people. There had been a huge outpouring from the elementary and secondary schools, and from vocational school, who couldn't find employment. While the urbanization rate was not as high as Zambia's, it was exploding and growing. This was in part because there was no access to any new land that could absorb them and employ them in the provincial areas. The laws were still favoring the elitist kind of large investment in business and not small-scale business. So, the new AID strategy was woven around black employment. That included agriculture; but, it also included small business and the construction industry. One of the projects that was a linchpin on this was an agriculture economics project. Michigan State University had been in Zimbabwe for 14 years under a Farming System project and some Ag economics training. They did some very good work. The problem was, they were so tied in with the University, they weren't tied into the decision-making process in the government. So, while they did train a lot of Zimbabweans in Ag economics and strengthened the capacity in the Ministry of Agriculture's Planning Department, Ag Economics Department and the faculty over at the university, they never got to the point of really tying it in with the policy, planning and development budget

decision-making exercises in the country. The MSU was such an academics-to-academics activity that I could not get them to apply their good work to real world decisions. They were not happy that I terminated the project. I caught holly hell for that with all kinds of pressure coming through Washington, Congress and their lobbyists.

Q: Why did you do that?

MORSE: Because, as I said, we needed to get on with operationalizing the Ag economics results; and, they tended to be still comfortable analyzing it and didn't seem to be able to make the adjustment. This was a year after talking with them about it, to integrate it more with the decision-making process. What did that mean?

The Permanent Secretary (who was Deputy to start with and then became Permanent Secretary of Agriculture), Tobias Takavarasha, was an absolutely first-rate academic and government civil servant, first class, world class, easily could have gone off to World Food Program, FAO, IFAD at probably five times his salary; but, he had a commitment to his country. We worked with him to put together a new Ag marketing program that was to basically set the government policies, to have the research done by Zimbabweans, not by Michigan State University people. MSU trained them; and, they were competent. Then that research and analysis was being fed into their own planning and decision-making process and then backed up on our side with cash transfers and non-project assistance when they made the policy reforms.

In terms of how it fit our strategy, it was basically trying to make it more attractive for black small holders to really excel in the maize production and to make it less attractive for the while commercial farmers to be in maize and to have them, with a lot of consultation with the Commercial Farmer's Union, move more and more into the export cops, for foreign exchange earnings, that required larger capital investments, more technology, more management intensive than you would get out of the smallholder agriculture.

I would give full credit to two Zimbabweans. Tobias, as Permanent Secretary of Agriculture who led that, while we backed it up with research, analysis, seminars, papers written by Zimbabweans that we helped pay for, and, then, on our staff, a young Zimbabwean Ag economist who also came out of Michigan State, but was the second generation who had been trained at the University of Zimbabwe by the faculty who had been trained earlier at Michigan State. He was on our staff as a contractor. His name was Calisto. He subsequently has left Zimbabwe and taken employment in, last time I heard, Namibia as a contractor. But, with his good contact with his faculty members and the Ministry of Agriculture and Planning people, we had insights and liaison and coordination that we never would have done through an American university. We just couldn't have. They just wouldn't talk the same actionable language even though they had been there 14 years from Michigan State. It was just now time to indigenize that process. It was very successful. Over a three-year period, they would slowly move the price of maize, change the subsidy arrangement on fertilizer, then the marketing

arrangements, allowing more businesspeople to get into marketing and getting the government out of marketing and storage.

Q: It was really policy reform.

MORSE: It was broad Ag policy reform and had tremendous impact. It was backed up not only by our cash transfers and non-project assistance; we in a multi-donor environment had the lead and recognized by all the other donors, if you will, of the Ag marketing sector of the national Structural Adjustment Program being led by the World Bank and the IMF. Every time a Bank team would come to do an assessment, they would literally turn to Calisto. He worked for Dr. Bob Armstrong, who was our DH/AID Ag economist and who is still in Zimbabwe. He retired there; and, he teaches Ag economics at the new university up in Mutara, to continue to turn out Zimbabwe manpower to address their own problems.

So, that integration with the other donors on a larger Structural Adjustment Program, I feel, was very successful, both in terms of the shifts in price, agriculture involvement, employment and incomes. I saw an independent evaluation done by the World Bank on our program, if you will, led by the Bank employee who used to be with AID, Barry Riley. Barry sent me a copy of the evaluation. I had been gone from Zimbabwe that time for about three (3) years. He said it was one of the best programs they had ever seen. Again, I give full credit to the two Zimbabweans who led it internal to AID and internal to the government.

Q: They didn't have major difficulty getting these policies adopted by the government?

MORSE: Yes. The politicians didn't want to take the heat and change the prices. Philosophically, they were more social equity than they were free market. So, upward price adjustment was done with a great deal of pain. Again, the combination of their technical people working within their government decision-making process and the leverage of the World Bank and then our Ag sector lead had the effect of making it move. Technical people understood domestic food production would not increase to replace FX paid for food imports until local farmers could get higher crop prices to induce them above subsistence production.

I understand it's been set back recently in the last three or four months with both food riots and unemployment riots going on in Zimbabwe. The government has undone a lot of the reforms. That gets back to the point about why I feel so strongly about crisis prevention and the importance of that work. You can have 15 years of development work go down the drain if a crisis arises.

Q: You said this was supported by a cash transfer. How did that work?

MORSE: We would agree on certain agriculture policy reforms that they would adopt. Of course, we were backing it up with grants for research and data collection analysis. Then the reform steps would be put into an agreement and signed and disbursements tranched.

They would take these policy steps, these price changes, these marketing reforms, then we would release $5 or $10 million at a time. The U.S. dollars FX would go directly to their central bank to meet scarce import requirements. The programming of the local currency generated by the FX was fed back into the transitions on the price supports and the cushioning on the subsidies and also small farmer and small business loans like for people to get into trucking, to go into areas that they hadn't penetrated before, to open up Ag marketing distribution where that they hadn't been into before. We've gone on at length about that one program; but, it was a good example of the kind of things that we did.

Besides that agriculture new initiative, which was building on the important policy work that had been done before; but in the changed strategy, we also continued a very successful and long-running housing investment and guarantee program. Almost from the opening of our aid program in Zimbabwe, more low-cost housing had been identified as a high priority. There had been several very successful HIG programs. Just for the record of how those worked, basically, the U.S. government would guarantee the repayment of a loan from a private American bank into Zimbabwe, either commercial banks or the central bank, depending on how it was structured. Our guarantee was based on a bilateral agreement we would sign with the Zimbabwe government wherein they guaranteed they would pay the loan back if the commercial firm owner ever defaulted. What it then would allow was a U.S. commercial bank to go in and offer low-cost housing construction loans that were probably everything from ½ to ¾ of an interest point below what the market rate would be if they were not backed up with that kind of guarantee. Some of those loans would be $20-25 million loans. It put foreign exchange into Zimbabwe that was necessary to fuel their industry and buy their import parts. Because the construction of these houses was probably 87% local materials of bricks and mortar and not a lot of wood (these were all brick houses.), there weren't a lot of foreign exchange costs to them.

While those were on ongoing programs, the new strategy developed entailed listening to the bankers, again, the white-controlled banking system, to change lending practices. Just to put that in context, while they had had 10 years now (from 1980-1990) of black political control, frankly, the economic control had not shifted very measurably from the white Rhodesians to the black Zimbabweans. The banking system was still heavily controlled by white Rhodesian interests. Their lending standards and the kind of loans that they would make were for heavy industry, for the mining industry, not even light manufacturing, and, of course, a lot of loans for the commercial farmers for heavy-farming equipment as well as implements. So, there wasn't a lot of money and a lot of interest in loaning to small black businesses. So, we worked a lot with the banking industry. We had an excellent team that included Don Greenberg on the private enterprise side, Mike Enders on the housing side, Patty Buckles on the program and policy side, that worked with the banking industry, the Ministry of Finance, the central bank. Their and our objective was to see more money flow into new black banks or loans from the white banks that would support the housing industry and the small black business investment sector. Again, it was an employment strategy through the construction and business sectors.

Q: What kind of housing are we talking about?

MORSE: There were different schemes at different times. Usually, a two-bedroom house with a wet block of bathroom and kitchen and usually one sitting room that doubled as a living room/dining room. So, they weren't much; but, they were certainly stable and a wonderful step up and highly desired. They usually started with corrugated roofing. Some of the schemes, the program would only do the sites and service and develop the public services – roads, sidewalks, electricity, water, sewage, and then leave it to the private developers to actually build the houses and turnkey or on a self-help basis. Some contractors would put in the base slab; and, on a self-help basis, individuals would build one room at a time. They knew they could only afford to build the kitchen one year and then one bedroom next year; so, you had different schemes that worked depending on what market they were after in terms of the level of income, the ability to pay. It was certainly a successful program.

Q: Do you know how many houses were built?

MORSE: Under our program, in the tens of thousands. My guess would be that over the 14- year period, we probably helped build maybe 18-20,000 houses as a figure; but, I would have to check that.

Q: All over the country?

MORSE: Primarily, it started in the urban area of Bulawayo, which is the second largest city, and the capital, Harare; but, again, under this strategy of trying to get employment back out in the rural areas, we opened up those programs in many of the provincial towns trying to give employment out there for contractors, people who would stay because they could have housing. It was fairly successful. We found the town councils in the provinces were eager to have that kind of an investment and program that they had been unable to attract before. So, that was another "democratic-decentralization" twist on it.

There was also an American from California, whose name escapes me at the moment, married to a white Zimbabwean. He and his father-in-law had a construction company in Zimbabwe. They put forward a program of low-cost housing that could build houses for 20% less cost than was up until then. It took them almost a year and one-half to get the business approvals from the municipal authorities and the half a dozen government entities and the banking system. It was far more integrated with the black banking and the black Zimbabwean construction industry. It was very effective until (I heard just about six months ago) it probably was so effective and had taken such a large share of the low-cost house construction market that some of the older housing and construction companies were finding all kinds of reasons to stop them. They didn't get the "right approvals or the ministers that had been paid off had changed" and new ministers were coming in and wanted to close them down. I don't know the details of it; but, it shows again how frail some of these programs are – just like the one we were talking about on Ag economics.

There were a couple of other programs that we had. There was an ongoing family planning program that was integrated with the maternal and child health program and had worked extensively with non-governmental organizations and the Minister of Health, Dr. Timothy Stamps. He was one of two white Rhodesians in Mugabe's cabinet, a big family planning supporter and a very close ally. We had joint strategies and access to him. He would call on us at any time. In fact, in my farewell, he was one of three ministers that came and spoke of the good work that AID had done over the years there. He was eager to raise the family planning profile. He felt it had gotten to the point where now it could grow beyond just kind of a private program and take it onto the airwaves and start to promote it in newspapers, on television and in magazines. He got his own cabinet members involved, to go around the country where they would hold a big family planning rally all day, which was kind of like a provincial fair with a lot of music, fun and food. The whole idea was to promote public awareness and make family planning a legitimate topic of public conversation. Before, they had always kept it in a health context.

I remember when Vice President Muzenda went with our Ambassador, Gib Lanpher, down to one of them. It turned out both of the men had had vasectomies. They were standing up there in front of the television cameras and a crowd of some people that was probably close to 13-14 thousand people talking about their various vasectomies. If you ever want to have a political impact! That was quite a public step forward from where vasectomies had been in the closet up until then. We also had started at that point an AIDS program.

Q: On the population program, apart from the awareness and so on, how was it really tied into the maternal child health? Or was it really a separate thing run by the NGOs?

MORSE: No, it was totally integrated into the health delivery system. The NGOs had been the channel to receive the contraceptives, to train, if you will, government staff. The contraceptives were moved from the private organization directly into the Ministry of Health stores. They and we trained the Ministry of Health storekeepers to keep active, accurate accounts of the movement of contraceptives. It was mainly through the Ministry of Health. The Family Planning Association probably didn't have two clinics of its' own in the country. Those were more demonstration and training clinics. They worked entirely through the government health operations.

Q: Was the government network of clinics pretty widespread and well-developed?

MORSE: It wasn't bad. That was one of the things that the Rhodesia government had really promoted, along with nationwide schools.

Q: That was one of the things that we had supported at the time of the change of government.

MORSE: That's right.

Q: Were we still supporting that?

MORSE: No, not in a physical way. We felt that the outreach and the provincial physical facilities were there and the managements systems were there. The problem was that the pay wasn't good enough for the health workers to stay in rural clinics. They were migrating back into the cities where they could work half-time at the government clinic and then have a private clinic and get more income. It was very difficult to keep all clinics staffed up fulltime. The government was even considering a requirement that a government-paid person couldn't get promoted until they had served a certain number of years in the provincial and rural clinics. That is what the Thais did 25 years before.

Q: Was it a fairly decentralized system?

MORSE: It was highly centralized. Almost all personnel decisions being made by the Minister and the Permanent Secretary of Health. By the way, the Permanent Secretary of Health was such a big family planning supporter and had been trained and was very involved, he was hired by one of the AID contractors and moved to Nairobi in a regional family planning job. So, we were indirectly contributing to this manpower shortage.

Q: Were there strong efforts to build up district health services and decentralized health services, below the provincial level?

MORSE: The government wasn't ready to take that step. It was almost going clear back to the colonial era of "high standards". They had to control it from the central government to make sure that the high medical standards were maintained. It wasn't an area on general health services that we could get into as AID. Our efforts at that point were entirely family planning and then HIV/AIDS per se.

The birth rate was about 2.7 – 2.8; but, it was dropping. I don't know what it is right now; but, it looked like it was making good impact along with improved maternal and child health and infant mortality programs. We also had a lot of push on the oral rehydration therapy (ORT) programs that were so effective in keeping diarrhea babies from dying. As you got that infant mortality rate to come down, there was more probability for women to have fewer children. We saw that over a 14-15 year period in Zimbabwe. It was making a significant impact. In starting the AIDS program, that one was really quiet. No high profile whatsoever. The Zimbabwe government wasn't ready to deal with it. Is this story already covered in the Zambia section?

Q: How did it become more public in Zimbabwe? How did you get the government to support it?

MORSE: It was a three-fold kind of political, technical and public awareness strategy. The political strategy was that we would take with us members of parliament or members of the cabinet, deputy ministers or permanent secretaries, to go down and see the program that was started in Bulawayo in the Municipal Health Service.

It was started with a grant that we made to the University of Zimbabwe's Social Science Psychology Departments to do research into AIDS behavior; then, it was expanded to link up with the University hospital and medical people working with the Bulawayo municipal people. There was enough research then to show the frequency, the pattern and the behavior. I'll come to that in a second.

Basically, the municipal health officer in Bulawayo would call in all the prostitutes off the street; then, the University people and the municipal health people would train the prostitutes with one message, from 50 different directions. That one message was "AIDS kills. It will kill you as a prostitute. It will kill our john. It will kill your customers. It will kill your sister prostitutes. If you can come out of that practice, then here is a program for your new identity, income and retraining." Women were urged to leave the commercial sex trade and were trained in handicrafts, given opportunities for secretarial training, home crafts, to work in restaurants, etc., etc.

Those who didn't leave the trade and stayed in it were given a card; and, any time the police picked them up, they had to have that card on them. If that card had not been punched for more than two (2) weeks, meaning they missed the usual Wednesday afternoon training session, then the police would bring them back in and fine them or turn them back over to the Municipal Health Department. They came in every week.

In their weekly sessions, they put on plays. They would learn how to approach the military, hotel operators, taxi operators and other prostitutes who were refusing to use condoms because their customers wouldn't pay them as much if they used a condom. They had training, training and more training. When they would leave the training, they would be given as many condoms as they could carry, which was a spin-off of our family planning supplies of condoms, but the AIDS program put into. They were very successful. Some of the women who went through that training were fantastic leaders. They organized other people.

The number-one spreaders of AIDS in Zimbabwe were the truckers, along with male soldiers and policemen. The truckers were away from home and the usual social constraints. They were on the road; they were away at night. They were paid high wages, so they could afford to buy commercial sex. So, a huge effort was made through the commercial truckers associations to educate them. These trained women would go right into the trucking companies; and, they would work with the truckers at the truck stops. They were really impressive.

One time when I had taken the Deputy Minister of Social Welfare on a three-day program, she joined us for that part of it. We were looking at all kinds of programs in Bulawayo. She gave a nice talk to the prostitutes in the training program and really encouraged them. Then she went out on the street and watched them. She said, "I've never seen any other program that empowered women so strongly as this one."

Q: What was she watching for?

MORSE: That they would talk to a male in a strong, authoritative voice that you didn't normally hear Zimbabwean women using. She was looking for their ability to organize other women into groups where they could reinforce each other so that, if three or four of them were working a particular hotel, and one of them was not using safe-sex practices, how the others would deal with her sensitively, not just coerce her, but show her how her wanting just that little bit of extra money was endangering everybody's lives. They would go into power centers, like the army and police barracks, and give lectures and put on plays. They would have the military guys rolling in the aisles with their plays, because they were sometimes a little saucy; but, they were also right on the mark. The men would just roll. I could go on for a long time.

When I took Ernice into a Bulawayo training one time, they greeted her by giving her beads and crochet that they had made, they sang songs, they put on the plays and they clapped and clapped. They wouldn't let us go; and, we had other appointments. Finally, the municipal health person informed us, "You have to realize that not many men bring their wives in to meet these prostitutes." Ernice just thought it was a marvelous experience.

Q: What about the support from the other ministries? The management of AIDS is government-wide, isn't it?

MORSE: It was still low key until almost the time I left. Then it broke loose; and, the Ministry of Information allowed it to be put up on billboards and to be put into public campaigns. The Ministry of Education was starting to allow it to go into the curriculum for teacher training. The Ministry of Agriculture was going to put it out through its' Ag extension networks.

Q: Did Mugabe support it?

MORSE: The answer was, no; he never came out and publicly supported it. He said in that famous interview before he took power that he was an avowed Marxist; he was a Catholic and trained in Catholic schools. He, frankly didn't sanction family planning or AIDS because AIDS control, like total abstinence, implied safe sex. So, no, he didn't support it.

On the other hand, when Sally Mugabe died (she was from Ghana), his sister-in-law became his constant consort. She came out in support of the family planning and AIDS movements in Ghana; and, she became quite a leader in Zimbabwe.

Q: I know her. We worked with her, a dynamic lady.

MORSE: So, while Mugabe never would stand up and be counted, she would; and, he never stopped her.

Q: What about the programs to deal with consequences of AIDS, which were so devastating on families and so on? Was that started at that time?

MORSE: No, those programs hadn't started at that time. Remember, we started from ground zero, working through a university psychology and sociology department. It had grown faster than any of us could have expected, given that fact; but, we hadn't gotten into those kinds of treatment and consequences programs. There was a lot of talk, a lot of other people that were considering doing that. Our approach was to see if you couldn't come in through the regional programs. Because AIDS is not a respecter of a line on a piece of paper called a border, it had tremendous regional implications and was being spread by businesspeople, truckers, hawkers going back and forth all over the place.

I'll talk about the SARP program, which we haven't touched on yet; but, Malawi became one of the earlier programs to try and then deal with people left behind, their incomes, the children that were left behind and orphaned, all of the devastating medical and hospice arrangements, the overload on the burial societies that didn't have enough time to get money to bury their members fast enough and all of the economic and social aspects of that. Still, we weren't able to get into it in Zimbabwe.

Q: What other programs were there?

MORSE: On the bilateral side, the other thrust of this was jobs, directly as part of our employment strategy. The jobs programs were working to set up an Investment and Trade Center, a one-stop shop, so that foreign investors and domestic investors could go to one place and pick up all the authorization forms. Information on this is what you have to do at the bank, at the Ministry of Industry, at the Ministry of Commerce; and, try to give them a road map of how to get through the government red tape to make an investment. So, we helped set up a business investment center. We made a grant to Deloitte or Price Waterhouse; and, they helped train the management, get the systems, buy the computers and keep the records. That was starting from ground zero as well; but, it was an employment generation program.

Q: Did it work?

MORSE: Not well at all. The red tape was still so cumbersome; and, the investment culture still was so controlled. There was a sense from the black political leadership that they didn't want foreign investment in there because that would take money away from them; and, they wanted it left for their own investment. The investment was still controlled by the whites; and, they invested in the traditional high return areas of mining, manufacturing and commercial farming and didn't get into the small businesses that were labor intensive. So, no, it wasn't working as well as we hoped.

Another thing we did was to work with the Black Business Association. They had a couple of crackerjack entrepreneurs who were not only good businessmen in their own right, who ran small pharmacy businesses or small printing businesses. We helped support the BBA because we encouraged and helped them through the central AID/W grants like bringing in the "pounch corps", the International Executive Service Corps, who had moved their office into Zimbabwe. They, with our support, were bringing in a

lot of people to work with the small Zimbabwe businesses. We also worked with the business association to try to help their members become politically attuned so that they became effective lobbyists for the kind of legislative changes, pressure important groups to them. That was very controversial, especially with the embassy. The embassy felt we were meddling too much and the government could come down hard on our embassy as well as on the Black Business Association if we were training people to be lobbyists and policy influence people. This kind of dissipated when Mugabe opened the BBA annual meeting. They must have had close to 2,000 of their members in there, small businessmen. That was when he addressed them and said that, "We are here to support you."

We had brought in even a couple of speakers from America to give lectures on small business set aside, incentives and affirmative action kinds of programs. Again, the embassy wasn't so sure that we were not way out in front on this; but, when Mugabe spoke, the embassy said this was a good program. So, that's another bilateral program.

Q: How did you find working with the government?

MORSE: I guess it was fantastic because of the people. Dr. Bernard Chidzero, who I had the pleasure of meeting in 1980 when we first were opening up and negotiating with him. We could brainstorm together. He was just back in 1980 in country. He had been the Deputy Director General of UNCTAD up in Europe and came home to be the Minister of Planning and later also became Minister of Finance. He was an absolute gentleman, a world-class development scientist, and a good friend. In fact, later his wife would see my wife or me and urge us to try and get him to leave the job. He had been in those jobs for 10, then 11, then 12, then 13, then 14 years by the time we left. In fact, unfortunately, he fell ill just before I left. His wife, who was Canadian, was kind of resentful that he had stayed in there so long that he had endangered his health; but, he was a wonderful person to work with; and Mugabe, cabinet ministers and civil servants listened to him.

The Ministers of Agriculture, a couple of them were terrific. The person who would be my choice to replace in the current government would be John Nkomo, who at that time was Minister of Labor and Social Welfare. We began to work together on another story I want to tell, the drought that hit there at that time. I had really such respect for him. He seemed from all accounts to be honest. He, of course, as the name implies, but is no relation to Vice President Joshua Nkomo; but, he comes from the same southern Ndebele tribe rather than the same tribe as Mugabe, the Shona. He was very pluralistic, very democratic, a good manager, a good politician. Certainly, as I say, he would be my choice to replace Mugabe. I think you'd see a big political change in there. But, he is not of the ruling tribe.

Q: What about the bureaucratic process? Was that a problem?

MORSE: Not as much as some other places where we had worked. We enjoyed good relationships with the Ministry of Planning and Finance people, with the central bank people, with the technical people, especially agriculture and health. They were very

anxious to work with us. They had their own ideas and their priorities. I mean, we couldn't just dictate to them in any way. With that kind of strength in knowing what they needed and wanted, it made it easier to pinpoint where their interests and our interests overlapped. There were a lot of things they wanted us to do that we wouldn't and couldn't do. There were things that Washington had set as priorities that they wanted us to push in Zimbabwe; and, we couldn't and wouldn't. We just didn't have the staff, the resources or the budget to get into all the things, especially the centrally funded activities that they wanted us to get into. So, I think overall, our relationships were quite good.

Let me mention that drought. I brought it up in relationship to Minister John Nkomo. As I said earlier, having been through running the U.S. task force on the drought of 1984-1986, which was not very long ago in 1990, and having helped create the Famine Early Warning System that we had set up but did not operate in southern Africa, I had contacts that would send us information that would alert us that, "Hey, it looks like you're going to have a really serious problem down there." So, we began to work with the SADCC Food Security Unit, which also had enjoyed a lot of spinoff from the old Michigan State University technical assistance people.

Q: Southern African Development Coordination Council money.

MORSE: Yes. I'll come back when we deal with the SARP of what SADCC is. It became clear early, we had enough warning, that there could be a very severe southern Africa drought. Washington pooh-poohed this. "Southern Africa doesn't have droughts. Southern Africa is not a traditional food deficit area. Yes, there are pockets and you can move food around, but rely on the commercial system to sort it out. South Africa is a big granary; and, they can take care of the relationships." As we kept watching this, it became clearer and clearer that it was just going to be bigger and wider spread and a more devastating drought than people had anticipated. This was a real drought in 1992 and 1993. In fact, Haven, it was probably one of the success stories that I am most proud of. It never got any recognition because is never was a crisis. I've had far greater recognition for emergencies and crises. This one never got to that, so there was no recognition for it.

Q: Why wasn't this a crisis?

MORSE: Because we were ahead of it and people worked around the region, thousands to head it off. It was the worst drought in 100 years to ever hit southern Africa. It hit every country literally from Tanzania all the way south to Cape Town. In the face of that 100-year record drought, there was more food moved than I think has ever been moved in a drought emergency in the history of the world, in any part of the world: 11.5 million tons of – grant food, loan food and commercial food. We used every "spigot" we could find, probably even made a few of them up: PL 416 Program, Title I, Title III, the Commercial Sales, everything we could all get our hands on.

Q: 11 million tons was the total from all sources.

MORSE: All sources: grant, commercial and loans. It was probably moved faster than we've ever seen the world move: in 14 months that 11.5 million tons of food was moved and moved through seven (7) different corridors through the ports all the way up north in Dar es Salaam, through Beira, through Maputo, down through Durban, Port Richards, Cape Town, over in Namibia, and through literally 11 different railway systems. Six of those countries affected were landlocked; so, the port and rail systems were critical. Because of the work that we had been doing over the years in railroads and southern Africa transport, we had a pretty good handle on these systems. We also had a crackerjack transport economist who was working there regionally, a black American Ph.D. and former Princeton professor, a young fellow who had worked as a planning officer in the Ministry of Transportation in Ghana for their government directly, Dr. Sam Mintz. With his computer modeling, backed up by the CIA's transport modeler, we could model the movement of that 11.5 million tons along with the commercial cargo, along with the fertilizer that was needed without disrupting next season's Ag systems: know that this port is going to clog, this rail will clog, this port and the rail are clear; but, the trucking system can't take it, shift it down and make it come up in another way.

Q: Where was the control for this?

MORSE: Johannesburg. We all worked with the South African rail and road and port authorities. They saw it coming; and, they were starting to think about it for their own country only. Then they realized how they would have to be important for getting relief and food into Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi, the landlocked countries. We went down and asked them to set up a coordination center in South Africa. They were excited about it. They had the computers and the transport networks; but, they hadn't worked much north of their own border.

Remember, they were still white ruled at this point. It hadn't changed. So, we brought in Africans from the northern tier from the Limpopo River north from their rail and road associations and paid for them to live in Johannesburg in hotels: 24 hours a day, round the clock, that operation center was manned. They brought in information from everybody's ports, rails, shippers, forwarders, arrivals, storage, etc., who was supposed to get the food and fertilizer, how far it had to go. They would continually work out how many rail cars and how many long-haul trucks were needed versus where the goods were stored. A couple of times when they got to the point where they would hit a bottleneck downstream and get it through the port and the rail, the truckers couldn't move it that fast, we paid to put up temporary storage. You just overnight would put up a pole and corrugated iron storage facility and throw some pallets on the dirt and tell the truckers to come and pick it up there. We put guards on it and protected it and made sure it was going to the right country. 22 million people were being fed, all at risk that were being fed on the feeding programs in those 11 countries. Again, I think, the feeding programs, the food distribution and logistics also set world relief records.

Q: These countries were willing to work together despite the South Africa differences?

MORSE: Absolutely. I had whites in the South Africa Railway Association say that they were so impressed with their black counterparts, that they had never realized the quality of some of their people. I had blacks tell me how they had never felt the pain of discrimination of walking through that building and having to go up a separate elevator, and yet work side by side with a white transport economist. All of the stress and strains of the politics and society were there on both sides, but not in the Drought Transport Coordination Center in South Africa. Boy were we all proud of this world class success, and it was never recognized. I blame Natsios for that.

The domestic distribution was handled always nationally. Again, we worked through the Food Security Unit of the Southern Africa Development Coordination Council. We trained people in how to assess vulnerability. Is it from a health point of view, food access, or incomes and locations? Then they would go back to their countries and put in place national assessment and distribution systems. They hadn't been through this before. They had never seen anything like this.

Q: Was there a Washington counterpart to what you were doing?

MORSE: There was no coordinating committee back there. There was good support out of Food for Peace. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) made cash available to countries. We in Harare were kind of a coordinating point because of our regional perspectives; but, each country was also running their own. That was one of the successes, that while all the domestic distribution was being done and all the decisions made nationally, it had to be put into a regional context and looked at as a regional problem, especially transport, which was different than had been done before.

There was one problem with the Washington people, over which I am sure I would have been fired (again!) if they could have; I came very, very close to it again. President Clinton's wife came down in a presidential plane and stopped in Zimbabwe. She stopped for a day in Bulawayo as part of showing U.S. concern for the drought. You need a certain amount of publicity to keep a high profile on this stuff to get the enormous, extended support for it. Her number two was the head of AID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Andrew Natsios.

We had planned Mrs. Clinton's visit so that we broke up her party into five different groups depending on whether they were technical or political. Everybody was going in different directions. I didn't see Natsios the whole day. Mr. John Nkomo had come down to Bulawayo from Harare and had pulled together most of the indigenous NGOs to brief Mrs. Clinton and for her to ask questions of how they were doing it. The overwhelming response on targeted feeding was being done by indigenous NGOs, not by the government or INGOs. This was partly because people didn't trust the government to do it fairly. Natsios came out of that meeting and said, "Ted, why don't you ride to the airport with me and we'll put somebody else, the ambassador, in the car with Hillary Clinton."

He broke off from her because he had been at her side the whole trip. I thought, "Oh, we'll have a chance to talk about the program." He got in and the car door wasn't even closed and he said, "The way this has been run is good from a technical point of view; but, you have no political sensitivity." I said, "What are you talking about?" He said, "You have refused to allow any of the American NGOs to participate in this program." I said, "Well, we don't need them." He said, "That is not your decision. I said, "Well, it's the Zimbabwe government's position as well. You just left a meeting where there were over 247 indigenous NGOs running this program in country. They don't need outside NGOs to muck it up." He said, "If you can't change, we'll have to change you." I said, "Then what would you want?" He said, "Let them come in there. Give them grants. Let them help distribute the food." I said, "I am not going to screw up a highly successful program by having a bunch of outsiders that don't know the difference between the Soo, the Swoowo and the Masao." It became a shouting match.

We got to the airport. Hillary was standing on the tarmac. She got into the plane. Her security people went with her. Andrew was still on the tarmac. It became known around Washington as "the tarmac attack." He was shouting, "You will let American NGOs in there. You will give them grants. Don't you know they are the ones who get the food for us? Don't you know they are the ones who lobby Congress for us to deliver? We can't exclude them from this. If it's a good program, let them participate in it." I kept saying I had already done my analysis and that we didn't need them, didn't want them, the government didn't want them, and it would just cause problems with the critical indigenous NGOs.

I had started a complete bypass of the government in Ethiopia, worked entirely through NGOs there and had a good reputation with the NGOs and believed in what they did; but, it wasn't right for this situation. It was totally right for Ethiopia earlier. He finally wouldn't give up on the attack. Hillary was waving from the window for him to get on board. She sent one of her security people, Secret Service people, to literally take him by the shoulder and put him on the plane. As soon as he got back to Washington, he told John Hicks to remove me. There was a coordinating meeting with all the other donors in Geneva the following week; and, I was supposed to go and represent the U.S. Andrew said "no", that he was the one representing because I can't follow Washington's policies, once again. So, I came very close to getting fired a second or third time.

Q: Was he getting a lot of pressure from the U.S. NGOs to get them involved?

MORSE: He was. Anybody who was already on the ground we were working with; but, we weren't making new grants to new people, new NGOs. They would be another layer that did not know the local situation.

Q: But there were some international NGOs on the ground.

MORSE: Oh, yes. We had CARE, AFRICARE – a few others.

Q: Then there wasn't an issue of using international NGOs?

MORSE: Oh, no, it was whether they were already established. I said, "This is not a learning process. We are involved in an immediate emergency operation." Just in summary: 100-year record drought; 11.5 million tons moved; in 14 months; through seven (7) southern Africa transport, port/rail routes; to 22 million people; and, they all recovered with the first rains and didn't become a food dependency. It was a historical success, in my mind.

Q: Wasn't there some discussion of trilateral deals where we could get grain from some country if we traded off with another?

MORSE: Yes. We did that, especially with Zambia for wheat and corn, and some of Zimbabwe's surpluses. Then we brought in PL 416 wheat. We can sit here and talk about the number of interesting food schemes that were used. We did make a grant to World Food Program to work with the Southern Africa Transport Coordinating Commission (SATCC) and try to get them to work with the SADCC's Food Security Unit. The WFP had a liaison also down at the Joburg Transport Coordination Center. They were very helpful. They moved efficiently, quickly and they were good.

I was disappointed in the UN as a whole. We tried to get them to take the lead. Frankly, there was nobody in the UN portfolio that had a regional perspective; and, we needed to have a regional perspective. So, it fell to us amongst the donors.

We also had a couple of wives that we put on contract that would cull every telegram, every radio and fax report, and taking stuff off of the intelligence reports, off the political reporting through the region regarding the drought – vulnerable people, food arrived/distributed, etc. They would constantly revise our handbook of data. We had a rolling book of regional drought data that was probably 50 pages of colored printouts. We shared it with everyone to use – SADCC, governments, other donors, NGOs, port and transport associations, etc.

We had Famine Early Warning System finally come down and use this drought emergency as a way of training people in the region on setting up an early warning system with FEWS. I think FEWS still is working now in southern Africa. Those wives continued to stay in touch. They say that it was the most satisfying thing they had ever done in their lives. They felt that if a journalist, another donor, if another country of SADCC or a contractor came in, they had the data and they would use data books. They were keeping it current and ran slide shows on transport and what the needs were, who was identifying that they had a health need now versus a food need versus a transport or storage need, or a tarpaulin cover need. At the end, we left one copy of the data book with SADCC, one in AID/Zimbabwe and sent one to AID/W for the reference service. It was a fun exercise; and, I feel very good about it.

Q: Let's go on to the second aspect of the Zimbabwe experience.

MORSE: The AID mission in Harare had duel responsibilities. What I have described up to now was the bilateral aid program; but, we were also the regional hub for managing the AID Southern Africa Regional Program (SARP). The overwhelming amount of that money was going through the Southern Africa Development Coordination Council (SADCC). SADCC had been formed in March of 1980 up in Lusaka at the time that Zimbabwe became independent. It was kind of transforming an informal Front-Line States political and military grouping to counter South Africa into a regional development coordination group. With the independence of Zimbabwe, the feeling was that there was a lot of donor and investment money going to be flowing in; some of the other Front-Line States were afraid that the money was all going to go to Zimbabwe instead of being shred more equitably by the rest of the Front-Line States; so, SADCC was formed coincident with Zimbabwe's independence. It included the ten (10) black majority ruled states of southern Africa. Part of their agenda was to break their dependence on white-controlled South Africa, their dependence on road, transport, ports, railways, economy and currency. They organized themselves in a way that the headquarters for the SADCC operation was in Botswana. It was headed by a Zimbabwean, a fellow who had been the Minister of Power, a very young man, a minister probably in his late 30s. He was a Ph.D. His name was Simba Makoni. He was about the most effective political animal that I have ever worked with in southern Africa. He had plenty of arrogance and ego and had very high competence. He was a skilled politician-public affairs man and a fairly good manager. Sometimes he didn't deem to talk to lower individuals below heads of government; but when he did, you could have a decent conversation when he would deem to do it. This was a man who was very young still; but, he had been anointed with the blessings and the support of ten (10) heads of government and he moved in that circle.

The organization decided that each country would take the lead for a particular development sector. Zimbabwe was the lead on food security. It had better agricultural production overall in time of non-drought than others. Mining was with Zambia because of the heavy dependence on copper mining in their economy. Transportation was with Mozambique, a key outlet to the Indian Ocean sea lanes. Angola had power because of its oil. Education was chaired by Swaziland. Malawi had environment; etc Each country had a lead responsibility for a sector. They usually had their permanent secretary of the particular sector in their own country take on the responsibility of coordinating regional plans. They would have sector meetings each year, usually held in the host country of that sector. Then they had an annual meeting that would rotate around the region. You literally would have foreign ministers and then heads of government come in for a day. Many felt that it was still a smokescreen for the political and security attacks against South Africa; but, it also was a way of mobilizing international community support and money for regional development for the Front-Line States and help them break their dependence on apartheid South Africa.

Q: How did each of these different sector things work?

MORSE: They worked from fantastic to lousy, depending on the sector, the national leadership, the time they put into it and the prestige and energy. Some of the countries

would get behind in paying their dues and others were carrying them because they had the money and they believed in SADCC and wanted to make it work. The head of it, the chairman, was the President of Botswana, Sir Seretse Khama. Later, the chair rotated among all members.

Q: Which ones were good and which ones didn't work?

MORSE: I felt that the Swazi lead on education, human resources and training was just so weak they could never come up with a regional strategy, a regional plan. I am afraid that it kind of reflected my own bias of having lived in Swaziland for three and one-half years and feeling that the government there didn't have the depth.

The leadership in Angola was technically quite sound in terms of being able to look at oil, the generation of power, what was hydro, what was coal and what the future demands were. They made grants to look at forward projections and what generation and distribution networks would have to be developed. But, frankly, because they were at war so much of the time internally, it was hard for them to take that technical competence and get it across. Mozambique suffered a similar kind of thing. They had the transport lead because they had a couple of the ports and their road and rail system was important as an alternative to the South African roads and rails; but, given the investment that was going into that sector, I felt SATCC could have been more professional. Too many times, the priorities were set on a political basis; it was sort of, well, this country got that road last time, so it's time this one gets the locomotives this time. It was spotty. But overall, having watched it start when I was there in April of 198o and coming back to it ten (10) years later, it was a heck of a lot better than the sub-regional organization that was tried up in East Africa and fell apart. It was not as strong at that point as ECOWAS was in the west, in my mind anyway, but not bad as a total regional organization.

Q: How did they relate to the donors?

MORSE: Donors came in falling over themselves to deal with it. Many of them didn't have a regional pot of money or a spigot to roll in with the bilateral; so, they tended to come and just take credit for what was going in the Front-Line States bilaterally. Others truly saw that there was a lot of advantage to doing things on a regional basis that might be more efficient, more effective, better coordination and were true believers. The World Bank felt that way about SADCC. The Canadians were very strong supporters. Many of the Scandinavians were. You didn't get the feeling that the Germans or the French were as committed to that approach.

Q: What about the U.S.?

MORSE: We said earlier that the U.S. had closed down its' regional program starting after the transition to bilateral programs 1977-1980. The OSARAC office and program closed down. The regional funds were closing out. But lo and behold, the Black Caucus of our Congress put a lot of pressure on the administration to support this new SADCC

group. I guess the State Department wanted us to support them for political moderation influence.

You have to realize that the FLS were training guerillas in Tanzania. The political headquarters for the ANC was in Zambia. I would see Thabo Mbeki, and his father, socially frequently when I lived in Lusaka. Thabo was teaching at the Namibia Institute in Lusaka; so, the State Department kind of wanted some of this political and security radicalism moderated on South Africa. So, I guess there was State Department support for SADCC as well as Congress. The Congress had passed annual laws that provided an extra $50 million a year set aside for the Southern Africa Regional Program. It was administered out of our office in Harare, by the same staff that was doing the bilateral AID work.

Q: What did you do with the money?

MORSE: In 1990-94 I pretty much continued what had gone on before. A large amount of the money was going into locomotives, railways, railway parts and railway maintenance systems. We had put locomotives up in the Tazara - in that corridor between Zambia and Tanzania. We put locomotives into Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. We didn't put them into Botswana, Lesotho or Swaziland; but, there was a lot of other railway work that was going on there. We had formed a Southern Africa Railway Association under SADCC. That was where the majority of the money went. We also had a big program in natural resource management and wildlife area. A lead for that was supposed to be Malawi; but, Namibia was very committed and interested, so a lot of the money went over there. We had programs in Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana in natural resource management.

Most of them were experiments with variations of village and community responsibility for wildlife protection, recognizing that probably the greatest poaching was being done by the villagers for their own food as well as to get rid of pesky animals that were raiding their crops and killing their children in the case of leopards and lions. It took different forms in each country what a community-based operation was. There was a very good one up in Zambia working with the Parks Department. We had some relationships with the World Wildlife Fund and the National Wildlife Fund here in America. The Zoological Society of New York provided manpower in helping with some of this work. In Zimbabwe, the Parks Department was still a first-class operation. Tourism was still a good earner of foreign exchange. They also could get South Africans to come up there. Later, they had direct flights from four airports in South Africa landing in Victoria Falls and then started to land directly into Wankie Game Park. They didn't even fly to other places first.

The community-based operation was pretty much directed on our staff by Dr. Charles Cutshall, who had done his doctoral dissertation work in Zambia and then joined the university in Zimbabwe and had been on our staff for a couple of years already. He greatly expanded the work. It was very successful with something called "Campfire," which was an acronym for "Community Management of the Parks and Wildlife." The

program was so successful that you soon found that you had an oversupply of elephants. They had to cull the elephants to be sure that there was enough food for them. The animal rights people around the world went crazy when they found out that AID was supporting the Campfire group that was culling. The villagers would actually protect the wildlife and then harvest them and get the revenue. They had the choice of either hunting safaris and getting very high fees, trophy fees from commercial hunters or photographic safaris, or just tourism in the area that didn't take animals. That was a village decision.

The difficulty was trying to get the money split equally between the village benefiting from that and the Parks Department which needed somebody to pay for their scouts, who often were from the village itself. So, the villagers found a different source of income from this instead of having to kill the animals for their food supply. When Campfire was so successful and so well organized they began to lobby at the international level to allow the exemption to the convention which is the conservation of endangered species cites.

A couple of the southern Africa countries had literally millions and millions of dollars worth of ivory which they couldn't sell and give to the villagers. The villagers began to say, "Wait a minute. If I let a poacher come in, and he takes the ivory, I get a kickback from the poacher. I let the Parks Department harvest that elephant, and, they don't give me any money for the ivory. Yes, we get the elephant meat and hide and we can make elephant purses and elephants skin shoes and everything else," but they knew that the big money was in the ivory. So, Campfire started to lobby. That caused a furor that went all the way into the Congress, saying that AID was funding groups to kill wild animals and to break the sale of ivory. Last year, that was broken. Now the ivory from Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana can be sold, but only to one country - Japan. I've never figured out why Japan. We did that so well that we caught hell for it.

There were a lot of other regional programs; but, the main other one was in Ag research. We paid a lot of attention to get results adapted out of Nigerian IITA research in Ibadan, out of the ICRISAT centers over in Hyderabad and the Cymit Center down in Mexico and out of the CGIAR worldwide Ag research centers – to get all that research adapted into the Southern Africa context. A lot of effort was to get dry-land Ag production. There were some super scientific breakthroughs that were made on the seeds that were drought and pest resistant, low rainfall production, not in maize so much, but in the sorghum area. Many of the villagers remembered when sorghum was their main source of food supply for their grandparents, but production and taste had moved over to maize. Again, with the cheap price of maize coming off the white commercial farms, it had distorted sorghum domestic production. So, we were working in terms of the restructuring of the Ag market bilaterally in each country, but also at the regional level in terms of what kind of seeds and prices were going in.

Q: Were there a number of sub organizations in the region, one in agriculture, one in business, and then the one on transport that you mentioned?

MORSE: Yes. Each country had the lead in a different sector.

Q: But there was a center, a business council group?

MORSE: Not always. Some places, there wasn't even an office. SATAC in Mozambique had an office. In Botswana, we helped build a research coordination center right outside of Gaborone in Botswana for agriculture research.

Q: And there was a business council.

MORSE: It had a temporary office; but, it fell apart. The director who was chosen was the head of the Zambia Chamber of Commerce. He came in there and spent more money on his house, the pictures in his house, his cars, and furniture than he did on starting a business association that was really effective. Finally, the National Chambers of Commerce told us, "We're not going to put any money into that thing anymore." It was too badly managed.

The regional program was fun. It built on experience working with the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) operations in Bangkok and Indonesia, and the regional organizations that we had worked with over in OSARAC, and the regional operations down in the Eastern Caribbean. So, it was a natural focus. I really enjoyed that.

Q: Looking ahead to the question of when South Africa would enter the picture, what were you doing about that?

MORSE: A lot of transition studies. Some were probably too political for what we should have been doing at that point. We funded groups that were specialists in conflict resolution. There were other groups headquartered in both Lusaka and in Harare that were bringing people up from South Africa; church leaders, government leaders, military leaders would come up to explore a transition.

You mentioned the business center. At one point, we were hosting the annual meeting of the SADCC Regional Business Council. For the first time, the three major business councils from South Africa were invited up to Zimbabwe. Again, it was two years before Mandela was released; but, we were trying to make transition preparations. There was a conversation that I will never forget, with the head of the SADCC Business Council, its' chairman. (He was not the executive director from Zambia that I talked about.) He was Zimbabwean. He was talking to his counterpart from South Africa. We were out on a boat up above Victoria Falls on the Zambezi River at sundown. We were up on the bow. The two of them were talking. I was standing there; and, I introduced them. They had never met before; but, we had invited them and paid for them, so I introduced them. They were talking about what happens when South Africa becomes majority ruled. The black South African said, "We're going to take over all the white businesses; and, we're going to run them and put black managers, owners and laborers in there." He was really talking up a storm. The Zimbabwean said, "We had plans like that. We wanted to do that, too; but, we found that we didn't have the management capacity and the trained manpower to do that. So, you had better rethink your plans a little bit." The South African said, "Oh, we've already thought about that. What we're going to do is come throughout southern

Africa and take every black owner, manager, executive director, chairman of the board; we're going to pay them twice the salary and bring them down and put them to work in South Africa." At that point, the SADCC business council guy said, "Wait a minute! You'll ruin our economies!" The South African said, "That's alright. We'll be back in three or four years and take you over anyway with your own people." At that point, I said, "I'm out of here. I'll go back and introduce other people." But that was the quality of the discussion that was going on with those kinds of transitions.

Another transition: Simba Makoni was almost ready to break off discussions with me at one point. We had an audit of that business council and then some of the money at SADCC itself. Frankly, the auditors found so much, not stealing, but misuse of the money in terms of what it went for, in terms of offices, cars, pictures and furniture, and overpaying for conferences and that kind of stuff. He and I got into a conversation after having had a very, very testy four-hour meeting over this audit; but, he came over to the hotel after work and we just sat around. He didn't drink; I don't drink. We just sat around for about two hours and talked about the transition in South Africa. What is it going to be like? That was so absorbing to him. He had been thinking about it. He had been given a mandate by the heads of government to start planning. They didn't want to have a majority-ruled South Africa dominate them any more than a minority-ruled South Africa dominate them. They were just as fearful that the economic giant of a majority-ruled South Africa could smother them the way the black businessman was describing in a thousand ways.

So, Simba was laying out his plans about how to have South Africa become part of SADCC, what sector they would take the lead in. He talked about business leadership or mining leadership, or other sectors. South Africa was just so much ahead of the rest of their Front-Line neighbors that it scared them. Planning was all built around how to use that engine of growth, how to harness that to bring along the other regional economies without them being subverted. Simba talked a lot about that. Then we talked about one other thing. We had just seen at the end of a meeting in Botswana where the first time that Botha and Mugabe and Maseru's Kama, the three of them, had met at the SADCC meeting. Botha came at the request of the other two, quietly at night because there had been a military coup in Lesotho.

The three heads of government called the Lesotho military leaders, sent a plane for them and brought them up to meet together. It was the first time Mugabe had ever met Botha. He swore he would never talk to the man, never deal with him; but, what they did was, basically, these three heads of government, using the "African big man" syndrome, these are the elder statesmen, the leaders, the paramount chiefs, if you will, told these young military Turks in Lesotho, "That's not on. That's not the way you're going to change government down here. We're not going to do it by military coup. You guys get back into your barracks and turn that government back over to civilian rule." They went home; and, they did it.

Simba and I were sitting there at the hotel talking about that example, about conflict resolution. Should, can, SADCC play a role in resolving what was in internal war

problem in Angola, a potential security problem in South Africa, and the internal security problems that were still going in the Mozambique transition and were always just below the surface in Zimbabwe? While SADCC was changing its' name to absorb South Africa, they took on a conflict resolution mandate. I don't know if it was already in the heads of governments' mind, whether it was in Simba's mind, whether our conversation was a kernel that was part of that; but, I've watched the role grow since then and that has now become part of SADCC. They changed the name from the Development Coordination Council and just called it the Southern Africa Development Council (SADC). It has changed its' mandate and its' relationships a little bit and is truly trying to move to become a regional integration group, with conflict prevention added.

Q: At that time, you took on the task of developing a transition regional strategy for southern Africa.

MORSE: The man who took it on was my deputy.

Q: And you had this contract with SAFER to do the conference and all that?

MORSE: Right. Steve Spielman was my deputy. I'll come to that part of it; but, I want to give him full credit for this. He was a lawyer in AID. He had come into AID mid-career. He had served over in Pakistan and a couple of other countries in REDSO; but, then he was given the portfolio to jump to be Mission Director in Liberia. He had never been a deputy before. He was straight out of the general counsel's mold. There was a blowup in Liberia and he couldn't go. There was no other senior management group assignment for him. So, he was offered the deputyship in Harare.

He had heard that Ted Morse wasn't the easiest guy to work with and wasn't sure he wanted to come down there. Then there was his own sense of importance of not getting his directorship, but was only going to be a deputy. So, Steve and I talked before he came. Originally, we thought he would split the work kind of bilateral-regional. I was still very interested in the regional. He would take on the bilateral. But it wasn't more than a couple of weeks and it was clear that he hadn't the experience to run a bilateral mission. He really didn't know financial management operations or program processes, management, personnel, and procurement, or the facilities, security, and so on. There were just a lot of gaps in his experience. So, after a couple of false starts in the first couple of weeks and month, he and had a quiet talk about whether this split was going to work and maybe we ought to divide it in terms of different offices and functions in the mission and we'd both do regional and bilateral. He had the choice of going where he had strength. He is a fantastic thinker, a wonderful conceptualizer, a good planner, a good questioner. As a lawyer, he would just ask wonderful, penetrating questions. He also was good at mentoring people. He was excellent at staff development. Did he want to go where his strengths were of did he want to take on some tasks where his weaknesses were? We agreed he would do one of each. We would rotate those assignments.

He came back to me after about six months and said, "You know, I really resented coming down here and not getting my directorship. Then after the first couple of weeks, I

really resented you treating me like a trainee. But, thank God, you did that. I would have screwed up so badly in Liberia; and, I would have screwed up so badly in this bilateral mission. This is a great assignment. We're having fun, I'm learning, and we're growing. Thank you." I really felt pleased. For about the first six months, it was not an easy thing for him to swallow and for me to manage.

When it came to this initiative for southern Africa, Washington wanted a new initiative, one that really dealt with a transition to majority rule in South Africa. I wanted to direct the initiative so badly I could taste it. I had lived and worked in southern Africa off and on since 1977. This was now 1994. You, Haven, and I worked on the initial study of changing U.S. foreign policy to support an internal settlement in South Africa. But, it was time for Steve to grow again; so, I sat back and put him up front. I had been up front on the regional drought; and, he ran the bilateral mission while I was running that drought. So, he brought together people from South Africa, the southern Africa region, our own missions, other donors; and, we put on another "Let's listen, talk to people, learn." What are going to be the trends? What will be the impact on donors? What will be the impact on the regional institutions, the regional activities? It was called the Initiative for Southern Africa (ISA). I frankly would have to think for a minute in terms of all the component parts of it.

Q: I was involved in doing this study in SAFER; but, he wasn't there when I was in it, was he?

MORSE: Where was he?

Q: I don't recall. What happened to the SAFER operation? They was a major component of developing this strategy, the study that we did for you?

MORSE: SAFER stood for the Southern Africa Economic Research Foundation. It continued to grow from conflict resolution in South Africa to working throughout southern Africa and ultimately offered its' consulting services worldwide.

Q: It was funded by AID.

MORSE: Yes. The fellow, Joshua, who had been the head of our Ag economics before Calisto joined us, was the executive director of it. He was a black Zimbabwean, but under the direction of a fellow who had been the permanent secretary in agriculture and also worked for Dennis Norman as executive director of the Beira Corridor group. That turned into a think tank kind of operation that looked at the trade statistics, the economic relations, the currency exchanges, what would have to be adjusted; and, that was kind of a private enterprise, academic and research operation that SADCC at one point wanted to take over and have it literally come in as part of their executive secretariat. The group that sponsored it said, "Absolutely not. We want this as a private enterprise, business relationship." The fear that SADCC had was that it would have been co-opted by South African business interests. The group began to take grants from South African businesses

as well as from southern Africa businesses. The last time I heard, it was still in operation and making a wonderful contribution on both sides of the border.

Q: You remember we did this study for you. That was the basis for his strategy. SAFER was going to have a big conference about it, supported by AID. I just wondered what happened to it.

MORSE: It was very successful in terms of showing people that there are complementarities between the southern African states and South Africa. Where was Steve at that point? He must have been on leave or something down there.

Q: What became of your initiative on southern Africa strategy?

MORSE: I have to tell you that on April 19, when my wife, who had battled manic depression for 20 years, had been off her medicine and committed suicide, that I completely shut down in a way that I can't tell you. I don't know. I was just in such a state of shock. I wanted to retire immediately. I didn't want to work. I had enough leave that I didn't need to go to work for a year and one half. I came back to the U.S. immediately the next day. There were several things like the initiative in progress; but, I can't tell you what happened to any of them. Steve would have to tell you.

Q: When did you finish up in Zimbabwe?

MORSE: I left April 20, 1994.

Q: Is there anything else on the southern African regional business or Zimbabwe at this point?

MORSE: No. I went back later on short assignments; but, we'll touch on that later.

Q: What did you do after finishing Zimbabwe? Was it the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI) – 1994?

MORSE: Yes, when Ernice passed away on April 19, 1994, I was going to retire immediately. Everybody counseled against that. At that time, the President had called Brian Atwood in and said, "Can't we prevent some of this stuff in Africa instead of just racing to one crisis after another?" This question had already come after Somalia, Rwanda and Ethiopia. So, there was a "Presidential Initiative", the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI). AID had the lead on it; but, it was to be interagency. There were parts of it that really were interagency. I came back from leave and headed it. We really had a blank slate. It was: " Can't we do things different in the Horn of Africa to try to avoid some of this costly emergency stuff?" We put a group together. I was asked to be the chairman of the GHAI Task Force. We put an AID inter-bureau group together that basically included the Africa Bureau, the Global Bureau and the Bureau of Humanitarian Response. Then we put an interagency group together that included State, Defense, CIA, Defense Intelligence and the National Security Council.

The first four or five months was spent conceptualizing what this was, talking to people, listening, finding out what people thought could be done differently. We were fortunate enough to have the new leadership of President Meles in Ethiopia and President Isaias in Eritrea. Because it was a Presidential Initiative, it got mentioned whenever these two met with the President at the White House and the Secretary of State, when Brian met with them, etc. They took the challenge quite seriously. One of the three tenants of this work was to try to follow the lead of new younger, more democratic African leaders in the Horn and hope that they wouldn't be following the kind of "big man syndromes" that had led the Horn of Africa before. In one session of listening to them, we asked them about their concepts of regional or sub- regional organizations to lead on conflict prevention and crisis prevention.

In the first meeting, Meles was pretty much of a mind that there should be some sort of sub- regional organization, even though they had right there in Addis Ababa the Economic Commission for Africa and the Organization of African Unity. He had seen a little bit about what ECOWAS had done in the west; and, we briefed him on SADC down in the south. He knew what had been planned back in the now defunct East Africa Community. He was kind of interested in getting regional people to work together, because drought and famine doesn't stop at a geographic border, and revolution, chaos and refugees don't stop at the border. So, he knew they needed to work at these things on a regional basis. We asked him what regional organization did he think that we should work with. He talked to President Isaias of Eritrea and they came back to us and said to work with IGADD (Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification)." I think I almost resigned at that point. IGADD was considered absolutely weak and ineffective. It was headquartered in Djibouti and had the status of an international organization; so, every time you wanted to dump somebody out of your country into that area, every time you wanted to get rid of someone for political or for corruption reasons or any other reason, you dumped them into IGADD so they could get a fat international salary and they would leave. It had been totally ineffective. In fact, Fred Fisher, when he was the head of REDSO, forbade his staff from even going to talk with them simply because he felt the organization was so bad; and, we had no mandate to work with them. However, because it was chosen by the new African leaders and, at that time, the chairperson of IGADD was President Moi of Kenya and he had agreed, the three of them agreed to that sub-regional organization in order to strengthen it.

So, we took a couple of trips into Djibouti and tried to assess the institutional capacities and mandates. It was really as weak as sin. It just had a long way to go to be effective in its' existing mandate, without taking on a GHAI initiative. Everyone was lamenting, "This is not going to work. We're just not going to do it."

The GHAI Task Force was fortunate to have been working with a woman named Gayle Smith. Before that time, Gayle had been a journalist and met both Isaias and Meles by working as a journalist on both sides of the Eritrea-Ethiopia war. She was on very close personal terms with both, even to the point that President Carter invited her to be part of his delegation later at the peace talks between Eritrea and Ethiopia. People made a snide

comment to me once saying, "She is so close to both sides you can't figure out which one she's in love with." I really felt that was a low blow. Gayle was very bright, very intelligent and had Horn of Africa chaos insights. She kept us focused on, "Look, if this is their chosen sub-regional organization, then we should work with it."

Then we began to figure out how to strengthen IGADD in terms of the mandate that they wanted, what they wanted to accomplish. We had the other agenda of conflict prevention, which was not in their original mandate; but, after talking about what they wanted to do on drought prevention and development and then on cross-border political solutions, they embraced the concept of conflict prevention. I don't know that it was so much anything that we pushed on them as that they saw SADC had changed and now included conflict prevention. They actually had an early warning unit in IGADD; but, it was only early warning on drought, desert locusts and natural things like that. But, the concept of having early warning prevention was already there. The task was to broaden it to include conflict prevention.

Q: Do you know who the originator of IGADD was?

MORSE: I don't. I should know that; but, I don't? Maybe it's worth researching before we pin this down. Unless I am mistaken, it grew out of desertification, desert locusts; and, it may have come from the African Desert Locusts Organization. I'll have to double check that.

Anyway, IGADD had a chief of state, head of government meeting that took place in Nairobi; and, they redid their charter and changed it from desertification and drought to development and included sub-regional development, defining their relationship with the existing main regional organizations. It was interesting to me that, at that heads of government meeting, you had heads of state who were officially at war with each other. Sudan was at war with Eritrea. Uganda was at that time undermining Kenya. Kenya and Uganda were supporting the rebels in southern Sudan. Somalia couldn't even agree on a representative; so, they had no observer at that meeting, which was the unfortunate part of regional chaos. Still, we launched the kind of institutional strengthening and development that the heads of government had asked for and we wanted as well.

The second mandate of our Task Force, which was then embraced by them, was conflict prevention. We had set up an interagency U.S.G. working group on that as part of our GHAI Task Force. It was chaired by the State Department office director of East Africa, who is now our Ambassador in Ethiopia, David Shinn. He was fantastic. He really was cooperative, open and frank. Where there were State constraints and reservations, he addressed them. It was a very good working relationship. His day-to-day person on this, besides his deputy, David Dunn, who became our DCM down in Tanzania and is now director for East Africa in the State Department, was Rosemary O'Neil, Tip O'Neill's daughter. Rosemary had a long history of being identified with conflict prevention that went back to her father and her efforts in Ireland and was eager to work on this. I thought she did an extraordinarily good job of bringing together State, AID and the intelligence communities.

Q: Where was she based?

MORSE: Under Shinn in the State Department. She was a Foreign Service Officer. She was a State Department career officer. She is now in the State Intelligence and Research Office (INR). There had been a working group on conflict early warning and prevention that State had earlier. Several times it had failed; but, she took it up with quite an interest. That interagency group was represented on AID's side by Bill Renison of PPC and Jonathan Olson of the G Bureau. Jonathan had formerly worked in State in the Geographer's Office. He formerly was with the CIA; so, he had a good cross-agency working understanding of intelligence, State, as well as AID. The working group came up with something called RADAR. We must have spent three or four brainstorm sessions trying to figure out a good name for it. It represented Reporting, Analysis, Decision making, And Response. That was the system. It basically said, "What you need to do first is share all existing reporting that is being done on a much wider, open basis."

There was a courageous fellow over in the State Department who had worked for Princeton Lyman in the IO bureau who was breaking down the walls inhibiting sharing information using the Internet. He was a first-rate fellow. He joined our working group. They were also eager to include the NGOs and the PVOs. What are the potential conflicts, insights, held by the academics, journalists, NGOs, political officers, intelligence, electronic eavesdroppers? Everybody had huge amounts of information. So, that was the first part, the "R" for RADAR: reporting. They did some excellent work of breaking down the bureaucratic walls to share insights.

Then there was the "A": analysis. The problem is that nobody was analyzing this data for future trends. It was all short-term, what is going to happen now? In fact, when I worked a little bit with the NSC on this, their concept of "early warning" is, what is going to break on the evening news? What is going to hit the administration in the next two days that they need early warning on to do damage control? The idea of a longer perspective was just out of everyone's realm, totally out of the corporate cultures; however, the working group put together, again using basically the unclassified Internet procedures to do longer term analysis to share insights, to analyze trends.

Let me tell you one story about the working group fellow from Defense Intelligence Agency who was "a true believer" in C/P and was really involved. He said that, as an analyst in the Pentagon, he saw many things that he felt would destabilize situations over a period of 5-15 years; but, if he ever tried to report those and the causes of these things, he would be laughed out of the Pentagon. His reports would never be cleared and submitted.

He used the example of Lake Victoria where different parts of that lake (and other lakes) were coming up with water hyacinth. His projection was that, if this water hyacinth continued to expand at the rate it was going, he saw the decline in people who could make a living off of the shore and fishing. Those people would be forced to look inward and be putting pressure on every place from Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya and Uganda, where

there were already population and land pressures, and that would cause a conflict between the fisherman and the pastoral people. He put a paper up on that at one point; and, the Pentagon almost fired him, he said. That led us to understand something else. That is that people still had not embraced how the development tools could be applied for preventing conflicts by looking at the root causes and getting at them early enough. That wasn't accepted within AID either at all. But, here is a defense intelligence analyst who can see an environmental impact that is going to cause a population movement that could put people in conflict. That is the kind of analysis that you wanted: inter-discipline, interagency and forward looking.

Q: Why do you think the Defense Department would reject this or not be interested?

MORSE: They wanted to know how many guns, how many revolutions, where was the ammunition coming from, who was the new military leader, and what kind of strength and organization? That is the real stuff. We're not talking about water hyacinth!

Q: It's much too narrow a view.

MORSE: Yes, at least in the defense intelligence community. RADAR. There was Reporting, Analysis, and then the "D" – Decision Making. Again, how are we, the U.S.G., structured to prevent something? All the organizational structures seem to be geared toward how do you solve today's problem? How do you work together interagency on taking the analysis and make decisions that are immediate and pressing? The only things that get up to the interagency National Security Council high level (principals, deputies and EXCOMs levels) are things that are most urgent. Golly, you talk about working on something that may happen three to ten years from now? You can't get anybody to make interagency decisions. So, there was a RADAR recommendation that the principles and the deputies at the NSC on the interagency basis push down decision making on prevention to the U.S.G. office director's level – not even the Assistant Administrators, Assistant Secretary's level. Why?

Again, those people were so busy at that level dealing with the short-term immediate that the chances were slim of them having the time to sit back and look at trends or being as close to an issue as an office director or a desk officer would be. Plus, we felt that office directors had influence over resources; therefore, if you could push the decision making down to them, where they were closer to the action, had a little more time to think trends and conflict prevention out, had access to resources, that that would give you a different decision making process for the last part of it, which is "R" – Response. The responses were, again, to be inter- discipline, interagency, to be wide open so that the wildest solutions had to be open for grabs. People would look at what were the root causes of potential conflict problems. They would make recommendations on how do you get at them and then what kind of programs you might mount over a three to ten year period to get at some of the problems, before they exploded. RADAR was looking at involving very much the host governments and those outside of government, like the INGOs, the local non-governmental people, academics, religious leaders and business people who

could think outside the box, people who had grievances against the authorities, that might explode.

One of the classic examples was in Kenya, where you could see that if Moi continued to discriminate against the Kikuyu the way he was, there would be conflict. It was interesting when you had information from the defense analysis people about weapons coming into Kenya; when you got from the missionaries who were working with the Kikuyu, not as intelligence operators, but just their normal reporting the disgruntlements against Moi's government; combined those with the political analysis from the embassies, then the other donors, you could put together a mosaic and say, "The Kikuyu are not very content with the status quo; and, the day is going to come when this turns violent." Same with the Oromos in Ethiopia, where you found so many weapons going in and that they were already organizing to follow the pattern of what Eritrea did to break away from the Amharas in the highland. The Oromos Liberation Movement wanted to do this. They had the strength, the money and the organization to do it and would unless harshly suppressed or accommodated in better pluralism. Well, those pillars of the GHAI, the regional institution development, the conflict prevention, had to be overlaid on some practical early addressing of food security and drought, human rights neglect, which they and we wanted us to work on. There was tremendous resistance to working with IGADD, working in conflict prevention, working cross-border on food security and drought issues instead of just feeding people, although you saw the refugees getting hungry even though we had a focus at that point that grew out of the drought of 1984-1986.

I kept saying that what we wanted was a conflict early warning system like we had put in place with the Famine Early Warning System. It didn't have to be elaborate. It didn't take any new people, any new organizations, any new money. It was just the way we looked at things and the way we decided things. That was the downfall of it. Because there was no money in it, because there were no new people, no new officers or organizations, just changes in the way that we were doing business, which is what the Africans wanted us to do, people were not interested. They were saying, "We want you to do business differently with us than you've done in the past." The resistance in the embassies and the AID missions was enormous. It was overwhelming. When we tried to go out and listen to people early, the U.S. representative did not facilitate access.

Q: What kind of reasons did they give?

MORSE: Everything from, "It's not my responsibility to think cross-program. I am responsible for managing this project and this program and now you're trying to stretch me to think cross- discipline, cross-problem, cross-agency, cross-organization, cross-solution." Things like that from State. Even though the Task Force Working Group had been led by David Shin, a State Department officer, resistance included things like: "Conflict prevention is not AID's role and this is an AID thing". This, even though it was interagency. "They shouldn't be mucking around in such things as political and military revolutions and crises. That is State's responsibility."

There was tremendous resistance every place we turned on it. It didn't get very far. It took almost two (2) years of development. Even within the Africa Bureau of AID, Jerry Wolgin, whom we love very dearly and respect, was of the belief that: "Everything we do in AID contributes to long-term development; and, the only way you're going to prevent these crises is to have long-term development." We pointed out that the trend that was happening in Africa was that we didn't have the luxury of long-term development because it kept being disrupted, overthrown. We used the example of Ethiopia, where you and we had been for years and the good development progress gets completely overturned, not only the Mengistu and Haile Selassie revolution, but after that, the Eritrean war, and then Somalia war – it just goes on and on. So, you never have the luxury of having the long-term development put down sustainable roots.

Q: Yes, I suppose your responses to IGADD with the RADAR concept were long-term types of programs. They weren't quick fixes.

MORSE: That's right. They are long-term but targeted. Find out what the root causes of these problems are to the best of your ability. That was the point where people would say, "You'll never understand them. These things can't be known. The reporting doesn't capture it." The other reason for resistance was the corporate cultures, which were not geared to prevention, but rather to immediate problem solving and response.

Carol Peasley was so mad that I kept using that term that, one day in a meeting of about five or six of us, when I used it again, she took a spiral notebook and sailed it over the top of Jerry Wolgin's and my heads and bounced it off the wall. She wasn't trying to hit anybody; she was just so frustrated to think that we couldn't overcome. At first, she didn't believe that there was corporate cultural resistance to prevention within AID, within agencies of the U.S.G.

Q: How do you compare the fact that in West Africa, they launched the Sahel program and in southern Africa, the SADAC? What was different about this phenomenon that suggested it couldn't get off the ground in east Africa? Was it a lack of sense of emergency or crisis as it was in the Sahel and then, of course, the issue of South Africa? What was different?

MORSE: There was no common enemy such as South Africa. There was no common enemy such as the Sahel drought that was driving it at the moment. People said that there were just too many animosities and too many differences amongst the east African countries. Somalia didn't have a government. Sudan was overthrowing its' neighbors. There was internal war everywhere. They didn't want outsiders to settle them. Everybody was supporting guerillas cross-border over there. They just didn't believe that conflict prevention could be done for hundreds of reasons that we can…

Q: The crisis of the area was not external. It was internal in their conflicts with each other.

MORSE: Right.

Q: They weren't threatened from outside in the sense of a drought or an invasion.

MORSE: Right.

Q: So, what happened to it?

MORSE: There had been a steering committee that was established at the Deputy Assistant Secretary and Administrator level. We met first weekly, then bi-weekly, and then monthly just so it didn't take up people's time after it got launched. Brian had it reporting to him and then he reported back into the White House, the NSC, and reported when he was at the Secretary's meetings. He would report on progress and on what the constraints were. The framework was there; and, it was beginning to wear down because they just felt that there was too much bureaucratic resistance. It was just too complex, just too difficult to do. We had tried to make it as simple as possible; but, it still was too complex, too interagency. Brian was the visionary and leader; but, as A/AID he was probably in the wrong position to overcome the resistance.

Q: Were there any others in the donor community interested?

MORSE: We went abroad with a wonderful Power Point show, around Europe, and presented it to probably 12 different European governments. There was tremendous interest on the part of the Dutch. Pronk was very, very interested in it and picked it up with quite a commitment. The British, French and Italians were quite skeptical about it. The Germans were more interested, but hadn't thought it through at that point. Interestingly enough, the Italians felt more of a residual responsibility for IGADD in that region, even though the headquarters was Djibouti, a French area of interest. The French also were resistant, saying, "What are you fooling around with in Djibouti? You have never had an interest. Why are you all of a sudden interested in this?" But, as we presented the concepts of GHAI, the institution building, and the conflict prevention, and then the substance on the food security side of it, most began to slowly take some interest. When we went up and worked with the UN, they were interested. We had meetings with the NGOs. They were all interested. My concern was we were getting more interest outside of the U.S. administration than within it; and, we couldn't deliver. We were still so torn apart with doubts and resistance internally.

Q: What about Congress?

MORSE: Wonderful reception. We went up and briefed three or four of the committees. The appropriators said, "If you guys need separate money to make this thing go, we will earmark and set money aside." Of course, the administration never likes earmarks; but, the committees were so convinced that, "If you could spend three or four million dollars or ten million dollars to prevent something that is going to cost us hundreds of millions because we get involved in them early, whether it's a Somalia, a Rwanda, a Burundi, we will back it." They were all for it. They were really quite eager to see it go ahead. The work was not long after Ernice's death. I personally, again, was getting discouraged by it,

but was also feeling that it was time to retire. The GHAI effort had gone on through 1994 and 1995. I had announced that I was going to retire at the end of September in 1995. By that time I would have served a 33-year career; along with my unused leave, that would be over the maximum retirement benefit, so I would be working for only 30% of my salary! We wanted to institutionalize GHAI before I retired.

I felt part of the problem was that we were running it as a separate Task Force; so, it had been agreed with John Hicks and Carol Peasley and the chairman of the steering committee (which had moved to Dick McCall, the AID Chief of Staff) to institutionalize GHAI within the Africa Bureau. So, we had started to train staff and to hand over to Pat Rader, who was just coming out of the War College at that point and I felt would really have the interagency and prevention perspective. But, almost immediately, she was caught up in being the Deputy for East Africa Office and didn't have time for GHAI. "There was no money behind it. I've got to do a budget. I've got to do a congressional presentation."

Q: There was no mandate to go to Congress to get funding for it?

MORSE: Unfortunately, no. When I reported Hill interest to Jill Buckley and to Brian, they said, "We don't want more earmarks." At that time, there was not. Just before I left, it was decided that within the Africa account, they would set aside some money. I was always of a belief when I was head of the SARP program down in Harare that we had way too much money. That set aside of $50 million a year had driven us to buy expensive locomotives. I always felt we could give back $40 million a year to the Africa Bureau and have $10 to do the kinds of things that were really important for regionalism. I kept saying, "We'll just take a little for GHAI from the SARP program." Of course, that was not popular. It was agreed, finally, and there was $3 million that was set aside annually for GHAI to begin with support for workshops, seminars, the institution building, the public administration, the management of IGADD strengthening, as well as support special studies on food security and on conflict prevention. I do not know what the result was.

Q: Was anybody on the Africa side pushing?

MORSE: The IGADD Director at that point was being changed. The outgoing fellow embraced it very quickly because he felt this could let him hold onto his job. He was a Ugandan fellow. He really liked the fact that anybody was really interested in their work. By that time, Isaias, Meles and Moi relations were strained; and, that was in addition to the strain that was already going on with the presidents of Sudan and Uganda. So, we weren't getting as much support there as we could. It just takes time. When people would be frustrated that Horn of Africa regional cooperation wasn't happening quickly, I said, "You realize, at that point, SADAC was 15 years old. It took 15 years to get to the stage where they are." And the southern Africans had the common purpose and objective and were working together to counter minority-rule apartheid in South Africa.

Q: Were there any specific activities initiated?

MORSE: Yes. One of the first things was to link all the regional President's offices up with Internet communication so that they could more easily communicate with each other, but also then use that as the backbone for linking them up on GHAI. You still had to call from IGADD in Djibouti through Paris to get back to Addis on the telecommunications system. They just weren't able to talk to each other very easily, sending faxes, emails, scans, etc. There was also a program of upgrading IGADD's internal management and using the devices of word processors and that kind of thing. There was also training of IGADD and member staffs and helping them to focus on how to set priorities, what is important in the region, how do you organize where people within the region express what is important that they want to work on? Out of that came prioritization of transportation, food security, refugees, those practical things. So, there were studies and analysis of these as part of the institution building part of GHAI. The conflict prevention part of it never went ahead at that stage.

Q: Has it died?

MORSE: No. It was on a high when it was a high level Presidential Initiate. The support and interest dipped down as we made the transfer to institutionalize GHAI within the Africa Bureau and relate it to the whole interagency cooperation; but, then AID set up a section in REDSO/Nairobi and used the money as small grants for a program that the Africans themselves and the NGOs would decide on the basis of competing grants, with the flexibilities that we wanted to get around the contracting delays and that kind of stuff. There was a lot of work done to break the bureaucratic constraints.

Another by-product that I see now very much embraced is what was at that time fairly new. We talked about the relief-to-development continuum. One GHAI working group we had with Dina Esposito and Christy Cook conceptualized that working arrangement. I come back and look at GHAI periodically or sit in different AID meetings and hear where it is or comment on it. When I come back to it now, it's been five (5) years since we started GHAI and four (4) years that I've been away from it, since 1995; and, I guess I'm pleasantly surprised and pleased at what has taken hold. Concepts like the relief-to-develop continuum, people are working on that and see it differently.

When we first talked about that and had the wonderful papers that were being written by Dina Esposito and Christy Cook on that continuum for us, the USG and African organizations leadership, everything was stove-piped, separated. People weren't thinking of how to get from conflict through relief to development – get from here to there. At that time, we developed the "10 Rs" of this business: relief, recovery, rehabilitation, reconstruction and the rest. Everybody thought that was a very unique contribution just to clarify terms among themselves. Actually, it was critical to problem solving for people to use and understand the same lexicon.

Q: Can you list the 10 "Rs"?

MORSE: Oh, yes. In fact, I've got them up to 20 now. I used them on the Kosovo operation; and, there are 20 Rs these days. I continue to use that.

Q: Maybe you would want to insert that.

MORSE: Okay.

Q: I think not many people know about "the continuum and the 20 "Rs".

MORSE: No; and, it's helpful almost initially with people to see what their role is and where their role begins to fade into another role. They don't have to be territorial about handing off and moving into another phase or be concerned that somebody is encroaching and taking over. I think it makes a small contribution to cross-agency, integration and to start breaking down the institutional stove-piping. That to me was a real contribution that was made by GHAI.

IGADD itself is so much stronger than it was. Other donors have continued to support it along with AID. Now we find that people like Pru Bushnell, who was in on this when she was in the Africa Bureau, and is now Ambassador in Kenya, embraces much of GHAI thinking. David is Ambassador in Ethiopia; he was an architect on GHAI. The GHAI thinking has been embraced; and, it is starting to work a little bit more.

Q: Is there anything more on that?

MORSE: No, other than there was a personal transition at that point. I had decided that it was time to retire, partly to get out of this bureaucratic contention. We could institutionalize GHAI in the Africa Bureau and phase out the task force, get rid of it. I felt it was now more of an object of contention than a contributor and that the Africa Bureau was ready to start to take the responsibility solely and, in fact, resented that there was high level, inter-agency and inter- bureau involvement in GHAI. So, we closed down the task force at the end of September of 1995.

I had been asked by the Africa Bureau to go back down to southern Africa and help evaluate what looked like an impending drought down there for the last couple of weeks of September. I did that, filed the report. I stayed down there until the 30th of September with a fellow who had been my deputy in Zambia, who is now director in South Africa, Cap Dean. I was staying with him and his wife before going to Zimbabwe to spend two weeks meeting my son and daughter and a group of about 11 people who were coming to dedicate the tennis courts we had built in Zimbabwe in Ernice's memory. That was to be my final act.

BOSNIA CONTEXT

Bosnia has a long and conflicted history going back to the Neolithic time and the late Bronze Age. The four centuries of Ottoman rule brought extensive socio-political changes. Large Muslim, Catholic, Jewish and Orthodox communities were established.

The Austro-Hungarian era did much to codify laws, introduce new political practices and provide for modernization focused on the ideal of a pluralist Bosnian nation. Nationalism soon dominated political life. A Serb nationalist assassinated the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne in Sarajevo in June 1914, sparking World War I. With the 1929 establishment of the Yugoslavian kingdom, the region was portioned between Croatia and Serbia, removing most traces of Bosnia. When Yugoslavia was conquered by the Nazi forces in World War II, Bosnia was ceded to the independent state of Croatia, resulting in the wide spread persecution of Muslim civilians. Yugoslavian communists under the leadership of Josip Tito organized a multi-ethnic resistance group (partisans) later supported against the Fascists by the allies. At the end of World War II, the Republic of Yugoslavia was established with Bosnia-Herzegovina as one of its republics. Yugoslavia communism promoted Bosnia' diversified multi-ethnic society, initially overcoming nationalist elements. Croatia's declarations of independence and ensuing war placed Bosnia in an awkward position; stay with Yugoslavia (favored by the large Serb minority) or seek independence from Yugoslavia (favored by the Bosnia-Croat majority). A Bosnia declaration of independence and referendum resulted in an independent Bosnia on March 3, 1992. Open warfare raged for almost three (3) years. The Bosnia-Serbs were backed by the Yugoslavia (Serb) army. Yugoslavia was desperate to stop the further break up of their country and to protect the large Serb minority in Bosnia. International outrage at war crimes and atrocities being committed helped turn the tide of the war. The U.S. brokered Dayton Peace Agreement was signed by the Presidents of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Yugoslavia on December 14, 1995 in Paris. Between 200,000 and 250,000 people were killed and more than 2 million were displaced.

The Dayton Accords had a General Framework for Peace and Annexes on Military Aspects, Regional Stabilization, Entity Boundaries, Elections, Constitution, Arbitrators, Human Rights, Refugees, Displaced Persons, National Monuments, Public Corporations, Civilian Implications and International Police Task Force. The word reconstruction only appeared once bracketed by humanitarian aid and elections! Reconstruction was estimated to cost $5 to 6 billion. The U.S. initially pledged $600 million because State felt: "Bosnia is in Europe; and, we think the Europeans should lead here." I was assigned to direct a USAID Task Force on Bosnia Reconstruction.

MORSE : I got a telephone call, first from the Director of Personnel, saying that, "There is something that is going to happen in Bosnia; and, we would like you to be involved with it." I responded, "I am really committed to retiring." He went on, "Well, don't be surprised if you get a call." I was in South Africa, as I said, with Cap Dean and his wife.

Then Carol Lancaster, DA/AID called and told me, "We really need you to work on Bosnia. There is going to be a peace agreement out at Dayton; and, we want you to be part of that." I said, "I can give you names of people that we've worked with over the years and trained; they can do this." She insisted, "I don't know that the Administrator will take 'No' for an answer." I, in turn, insisted, "Well, I'm retiring tomorrow morning. I'm off the rolls and heading for Zimbabwe."

I was at an end-of-fiscal-year party in Pretoria for the AID mission, the AID staff, when Brian Atwood, A/AID, called and said, "This is really an important one to the Agency and to me. Can you postpone the retirement?" I asked, "How soon do you need it? I'm meeting people up in Zimbabwe for a memorial service in about four days." He said, "Four days? Why don't you fly to Bosnia, to Sarajevo, then to Washington. You can be back in Harare in four days!" I responded, "That's a killer!" He kept insisting, "I'd like you to take a look at it." I respected Brian; so, I agreed to look at what was needed by AID for Bosnia.

Q: So you went to Bosnia?

MORSE: Yes, on September 30, 1995. I flew up to Europe and then into Sarajevo and took a look around at what was going to happen. The UN actually flew me in. The only flights that were going into Sarajevo at that point were the United Nations relief flights. All the roads were blocked. I then flew over to Washington and met with several people there, including Brian. At that point, I agreed that I would postpone the retirement again to work on that challenge.

I went down to Zimbabwe. I stayed for the dedication of the courts but didn't go on the white- water rafting, the safari or all the other things with my kids. I felt that I kind of shortchanged them on that; but, we did what we wanted to do as far as Ernice's memory, which was the most important. And, they all agreed that, if there was a chance to make a contribution on Bosnia, it was the right thing to do. They were fearful that without work, my grieving would continue.

Q: What was your assignment, your position on the Bosnia situation?

MORSE: Again, I was asked to set up a Bosnia task Force within AID. In addition to that, as the Director of that Task Force, I represented AID on other inter-agency task forces related to Bosnia. To spend a minute on that, there probably were around town at least six (6) or seven (7) Bosnia task forces internal to each organization; so, we had to kind of keep in touch with those. State had three (3) separate Bosnia task forces. DOD had a couple. AID had ours. The intelligence community had theirs. Then, NSC had theirs. So, the assignment was internal to AID but also working with them. I want to come back to that later.

There were literally thousands of administration people working on Bosnia. That is not an exaggeration. But, it also said something about the USG corporate culture and the relief to development continuum. In the first meeting with Assistant Administrator for the ENI Bureau, Tom Dyne, he said, "One reason we wanted you to go there and then will need you to go right back there is that we don't have anybody on the ground. We don't know what is going on. We don't know where to start." I said, "That strikes me as strange, Tom. I just met with Tim Knight, who has been on the ground in there for four (4) years. Tim worked with me on the Africa drought and famine of 1984-1986 task force when he was OFDA."

Q: He was in AID?

MORSE: He was in AID; and, he's still in AID. He was with OFDA and had been in there for four years. Our agency had administered one billion dollars of relief in Bosnia before Dayton. We were funding over 100 Americans through OFDA direct hire contracts and NGOs; and, yet, here the Assistant Administrator of AID/W's ENI Bureau, which had responsibility for the Bosnia area could say, "We don't know anything about the problem in that country. We don't have anybody on the ground."

Q: Because this was run by another AID bureau.

MORSE: That's right. It was run by the Bureau of Humanitarian Response and not his ENI geographic bureau; but, it tells volumes about the kind of problems of shifting from a relief to a reconstruction operation again.

Where do we begin on it? First, some of the real big issues from my point of view. The NGOs had played such a fantastic leadership role during the four years of the siege of Sarajevo and the war. They had been on the ground. They had been working effectively. They had staff, institutions and organization. They wanted to continue to be involved in the reconstruction phase and yet the way it was being shaped, working government to government again instead of through NGOs, their role was going to be greatly diminished. Because of that, the NGOs were openly hostile and critical to the U.S. reconstruction plans and particularly to the fellow that we chose to put in there as the director, Craig Buck. I think that was most unfortunate that they wanted him out because they said he was anti-NGO and all that sort of stuff. It's, again, that difficult stage of having to go through a relief to reconstruction transition.

The NGOs were delivering the relief. Yes, many of them can deliver development; but, there are a lot of things they can't do. You're going to have to structure it differently. That was a huge issue. The peace agreement (the Dayton Accords), from my point of view, was lousy as far as a basis for reconstruction. It probably was the best that I had seen if you look at what we went through with the agreements we've talked about. The Lancaster Agreement for Zimbabwe; the Escapulus Agreement for Nicaragua; the Paris Accords for Cambodia; etc. It was the best; there is no doubt about it; but, as a basis for moving forward, it just was shot full of holes. Still, it was the best political agreement you could get to stop the Bosnia war.

Q: What were these holes that you are referring to?

MORSE: Take all of the agreement annexes, all 11 of them. The one on the elections: The elections were to be held within one (1) year. We held meetings that Dick Holbrooke chaired, inter-agency meetings, up in the Secretary's conference room up on the seventh floor next to the Crisis Center. I remember saying to Holbrooke at one point that, "We have been working with the World Bank, the IMF and with the European Union; and, we're coming up with a five- year economic reconstruction program; but, it's not just economic reconstruction. It's also political development and governmental development.

There is no government under the Dayton Accords. You are talking about a one-year election; and, we're talking about a five-year process. Don't you see the disconnect?" His answer was, "That is because you guys are too damn slow. You have to speed up and lend your support to us."

I was so frustrated by the agreement calling for unrealistic reconstruction and development. I said about two weeks later, "The election is going to do nothing more than polarize the three factions that have been fighting all along. The same three factions will be elected; so, you're institutionalizing the kind of competition that has been there for four years between the Croats, Bosniaks and the Serbs. That is not developing good governance."

In private (never in public), Dick Holbrooke said one day that, "One year is the best that we could get because that is the exit strategy to pull the U.S. forces out of Bosnia. That is all we could sell in Congress and to the American public. You can't pull them out unless you have the legitimacy of a newly elected government."

I can go through lots of those kinds of holes in the Dayton Accords that, from my point of view, were flawed. The fact was you didn't have a government to work with; and, you had to consult with three (3) different groups that couldn't even agree on license plates or the flag, let alone policies. All of them felt that the U.S. and the West were tilting away from the Serbs and even away from the Croats to the Bosnians and Muslims – that we were biased.

Q: Were there any points of agreement among the three groups?

MORSE: Lower down, not at the so-called "national" level, but at the sub-national level. In part, we with the EU, the World Bank and the UN, the IMF, had all agreed that, whatever we did, we had to use the reconstruction aid in ways so as not to perpetuate the ethnic rivalries. So, whatever we did at the municipal and local levels all three parties had to agree. There were three mayors, three councils. I don't know if you've interviewed anybody yet on this; but, it's well worth doing. I hope you can interview Craig. So, we literally would have the three of them sit down together and say, "Okay, if we're going to fix the water wells and the electricity supply for this municipality, you need to recognize the sources are up in the Croat area and the people are in the Muslim sector; but, the water canal comes through the Serb area. You all three must agree how it's going to work and that you're going to make it work and that you are going to work together. Otherwise, you're not going to get the revenues from the electrical generation or from the water sales; and, you're not going to get the electricity or water." So, everything was predicated on that type of tri-party cooperation.

It's unrealistic, I think, to believe that you can either use development aid to break down old ethnic rivalries and force them to live together in harmony. It's deeper; and, it needs a different approach. It gets back to the conflict prevention work.

Other big issues in this, besides the flaws in the peace agreement as a foundation for economic reconstruction, were: "Can aid be a tool for ethnic reconciliation? Can it be a tool for achieving our political objectives? Can it be a political-social tool at the same time as you're doing economic reconstruction?" That was so complex. It could; but, again, everybody wanted it done in a year.

General Snuffy Smith (we worked closely with the military) was highly critical that AID just didn't fix everything ourselves, get it done and have it working instead of working slowly with the three parties and the three organizations. It took time, meetings and consensus to get something done. From his point of view: "Get the damn electricity on, AID!" There were a lot of issues about whether you can achieve those three objectives simultaneously.

Another huge issue was, we talked one game and played another in terms of the European leadership. The U.S. had played such a lead on the military pressure and on the peace negotiations, the political front, it was desired by Congress, by the public and by everybody in the White House that the Europeans should pay for the economic reconstruction. The Europeans were not all that happy that Holbrooke and the Americans have a Dayton Peace Accord and then they're supposed to pay for it. In fact, the White House, the NSC and the State Department were so involved there was absolutely no way they were going to let go of that.

Dayton was going to be one of the successes of this administration; and, "We damned well weren't going to walk away at the end of Dayton and say, 'Okay, it's up to the Europeans to bring about the reconstruction and to implement it.'" It was almost embarrassing at times, the sense of our authoritarian dictating to the Europeans, let alone the Serbs, Croats and Muslims, what would be done. It was almost embarrassing to be so publicly non-engaged but in every private meeting: "You will do this. This has to be done." The U.S. was still leading it, just like they had at Dayton. That was a huge problem in terms of what we publicly would state, but not what we were actually doing at that point.

Q: We were giving directions; but, we were also not willing to put up the money?

MORSE: We worked with Congress; and, it was agreed that we would put up $600 million over three (3) years for Bosnia reconstruction. But, I can tell you there was a kind of shell game that was being played so that we made it always look like we were only paying one third; yet, the total U.S. amount that was going in there didn't get counted as reconstruction because: "That is still relief, and it's rebuilding houses, and that's just human relief of their habitat, not reconstructing of the wells, the water, the electricity, the telephone, the buildings and the services."

Frankly, it was embarrassing when you had to explain this to OMB and to the Hill, the press and the Europeans, the Bosnians and everybody else. We had two sets of books: a huge amount we were putting in, which was way over the $200 million a year and the $600 million in three years that was supposedly agreed to by Congress.

Another part of that is, I guess I had a grandiose idea that AID would be in USG leadership on the Bosnia economic reconstruction. Holbrooke had decided long before that Treasury would be in the lead. So, he had at Dayton itself, a fellow I have enormous respect for, who has now left the government, David Lindstrom, who became Under Secretary of Treasury and Assistant Secretary of International Monetary Affairs. He rose dramatically fast. He was a very young fellow, but was very competent and very good to work with.

But, it was Treasury at Dayton, not AID. We asked and fought for a major role and tried to show what we would contribute to reconstruction and development where Treasury was at a macroeconomic level. We needed to be working at a different level to pull reconstruction off over the five years and Holbrooke said, "Well, but Treasury is the lead with the World Bank; and, we want the World Band and the IMF to take the lead. Treasury has more influence with the European Union than AID. Besides, State really will take that lead instead of AID!"

All of a sudden, AID wasn't in league with the other donors, wasn't in league with the Congress. Part of this was, there were so many Bosnia task forces around town. State had one on the economic reconstruction headed by Jim Holmes. How ours related to his task force was always a bone of contention, even the influence when AID went to the principals and the deputies in the EXCOM meetings.

This is very critical of Tom Dyne; but, I've said it to Tom and I've said it to Brian directly. Tom Dyne, as the Assistant Administrator, would be the "plus one" many times at these senior meetings. Tom would never speak up; yet, we had spent an enormous amount of time on his talking points, briefing papers, briefing folders and briefing books. He would go to those senior meetings and never say a word, even though, I felt, we had better insights, better understandings of things relative to the economic reconstruction or when they were talking about the economic phasing of the military withdrawal, the holding of the elections, or the working of how do you knit together the politics of reconstruction. He just wouldn't confront or even contribute when Tony Lake or Sandy Berger were in the NSC chair. Tom and I would walk out of the meetings and walk back; and, I would say, "Why didn't you make this point, Tom? "They've got a wrong impression. They've got wrong data." He would say, "I didn't have a good opening" or "It wasn't the right time" or something like that. Finally, when I was going as the "plus one" or sometimes actually sitting up at the principals' table in the White House war room (we would meet three times a week), Brian would say, "If there is something to be said, you say it. You'll never find Tom doing that. You do it." So, with Brian's blessing – and Tom got irritated at first - I said ahead of time that, "I've been asked by Brian to make some of these points". Tom accepted it; but, it caused some more strain there.

He had a wonderful special assistant who was also kind of my deputy on the task force, Paige Alexander, a political appointee who had been the Bosnia desk officer through this period. She knew a lot. She was just fantastic, bright. She could write; she could understand the political contexts. She was open to working with people. She was a

wonderful, wonderful person to have with us. She was a good "bridge" with Tom and ENI.

Let me talk just a minute about our own program. Again, there was some conflict between ENI and AID/W Bureau of Humanitarian Response (BHR) in the beginning over one of the three main focuses of the program, which was to help fix up the houses. When we would listen to the Bosniaks, they over and over would say the most important thing to them was to get their houses repaired and get them fixed. There was huge damage over the years on that. (There was a lot less damage on Kosovo housing right now, by the way. People were judging Kosovo by Bosnia and were making mistakes.) Thinking that, okay, relief was over and this was reconstruction, our job, the Assistant Administrator for the Bureau of Humanitarian Response (the guy came over from UNHCR, the guy we turned the Contras over to), Doug Stafford, was saying, "You guys are too slow. You're not flexible. We're on the ground. We have staff and NGOs." Ultimately, to appease the two competing AID/W bureaus, it was agreed to do two programs, a fast start by OFDA, and then an ENI reconstruction program, which caused problems because we were using the same program standards.

At a London economic reconstruction meeting, we called a side meeting focused on housing with the UNHCR and the other donors. Different donors said, "Well, we'll only do the rough. Well, we'll do one room. Well, we'll do one room and electricity. Well, we'll do the whole house. No, it's self-help – We'll give them the money and they buy it. They will do it." It was such a nightmare of 40 different agencies working on housing reconstruction. It was a mess. We contributed to it because the two approaches by our two bureaus were so totally different. As a Task Force Director, trying to make some sense of what our agency was doing wasn't always an accomplishable task. The second program focus was to restore municipal services. If you had the plugs working in the house, was the transformer down the street going to get the electricity? Not rebuilding the dam or the transmission lines, but as far as the transformer. The same way with water, schools, clinics and everything else. That was quite a success, I thought. It was good working with the military, with the Bosnians, Croats and Serbs in the villages and the municipalities. There was good interface with what was being done at the village and municipal level that had to be backed up by municipal services. We found that people would say when they did start to come back as former refugees, that the schooling was the most important thing to them. Is the school working? Are the teachers there? It wasn't the job. It wasn't the house. That was important; but, they were living under tents in plastic and jerry rig it. They wanted the school open. So, we put a high priority on getting the schools and the clinics working, as well as the electricity and the water. I think that is a huge success story.

The third program focus (we only had really three major focuses) was a program to get employment going with small business development. Before the war, there was still overwhelmingly parastatal ownership of the means of production in Bosnia. The first reaction was, the Bosnians wanted us to rebuild the coal mine and the steel mill, things that had never been profitable before and shouldn't be rebuilt. There was a program of selling off those and trying to get private investment to buy them. We found that there

wasn't a single banker in all of Bosnia that had made a private loan; so, if you're trying to get a small business developed, the banking system was totally geared to the parastatal organizations that weren't going to be rebuilt, not geared to small business loans. We made contracts with both Riggs and then with Chase Manhattan banks and helped rebuild the banking system with one working at the regulatory parts of banking and the other one working literally training the tellers and the loan officers. But again, State, Defense, our military and NATO were highly critical of us, that, "Why don't you have people back to work? Why don't they have an income?" When you say, "Well, to get an income, you have to have a job. To have a job, you have to have a business. To have some sort of a business, you have to have finance. To have finance, you've got to have banking."

You couldn't get the three parties to agree on what the national banking system would be or the currency. There was a revolving chairmanship at the national bank level. Every month, you got a Serb, or Croat or a Bosnian at that level. So, trying to get a central bank established, that would set up regulatory structures – ugh! It was tough. But again, a lot of small business development work was by by-passing the formal banking system and working with the NGOs, a lot of small business development took off. People were eager and it was necessary to get them into production and get some income. They were penniless. They had zero, no savings. That had been wiped out by inflation. They had nothing. So, those were the three program focuses.

Q: What kind of scale are we talking about in terms of the numbers of people involved?

MORSE: The World Bank, the EU, the IMF and ourselves had worked out a five year, six billion dollar reconstruction program that went from the highest infrastructure down to the lowest level. That is the magnitude of that. In terms of the people, you're looking at a couple of million people. It's doable. It's small enough.

Q: That's not large.

MORSE: No. It's not a Nigeria. It's not an India or a Pakistan. So, from the standpoint of the magnitude of money that was being committed and the time to work on it, it was five or six years, and the numbers of people – it was doable.

Q: How did it work on that ground?

MORSE: The UN wanted to take the lead. The EU did. The World Bank did. But, as you know, there was the UN Special Representative, Carl Bildt (former PM of Sweden). His deputy was an American. They were heavily preoccupied with coordinating the ethic, political, military, security, the police and all that part of it. In terms of the reconstruction part of it, Bildt had floundered at first.

I remember when the World Bank lead for this called me. Her name was Christine Wallick. She was highly competent. Chris had been working on Bosnia for quite some time. It was time for the World Bank team to take the first trip in. They were going to do it with IMF. We said, "We would like you to do it with the EU, too, and ourselves." She

said, “How do you get into Sarajevo?” She asked, “Where do we stay?” The Holiday Inn had been blown apart. They were kind of starting from that low level of current background and knowledge, but then wanted to take the lead to coordinate! Ultimately, there were municipal level coordinating groups that were set up to coordinate the donors, the NGOs and the three parties. At the higher level, there were donor coordination meetings that were convened by Carl Bildt on behalf of the UN.

Q: And this level was among the donors?

MORSE: High Representatives and with the host country representatives, yes. But there should have been a much stronger lead by either Carl’s office, but they were preoccupied with other matters. The Bank and EU were less prepared to turn the lead over to the UN because the UN wasn’t a reconstruction player. They weren’t putting much money into it; but, they had the political fig leaf of the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative, Carl Bildt.

Q: How was AID represented there? Did we have a mission?

MORSE: Oh, yes. Almost immediately, Craig Buck was transferred in from Eastern Europe and made Bosnia Mission Director. He set up a temporary office within what was the embassy compound and then ultimately found space down the street and opened up an office. The office had an authorization to begin with direct hire and a lot of contractors. Overall, I think we were fairly supported. There are always the to-and-fros of the competing AID/W bureaus.

Q: He was backstopped by the Humanitarian Bureau or by the regional bureau?

MORSE: The ENI bureau, the geographic regional bureau. There was a parallel Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) office still that had been there for four (4) years. They were not co-located. I had urged that they be co-located and wanted that continued again to get them to work together; but, they were going to phase out in a year. There was also a separate Office of Transitional Initiatives (OTI) office that was starting up and was very active. They supported the democratic initiatives, the elections and all of that. There was also a lot of good work that we could spend a lot of time on in terms of listening to grassroots groups, trying to get not political parties formed, but people to express a cause and an issue rather than just come together around their ethnicity. OTI was quite good in doing that.

Q: What is OTI?

MORSE: The Office of Transitional Initiatives, which is one of the three offices of the Bureau of Humanitarian Response: Food, OFDA and the Office of Transitional Initiatives. This was a perfect transition for them to work in. We worked with George Soros. Again, the election was coming up. There were three television and radio studios. They were each controlled by the Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. They were just spewing out the ethnic line.

We had different surveys that showed that 87% of their people got their news by television, but that same 87% only listened to one channel and it was the channel of their ethnic origin. When you asked why they didn't listen to the other two channels, they said, "They're just liars. We can't believe them." We were trying to support independent training of reporters. I have to tell you, I was interviewed by different reporters over there. They didn't even know how to ask a question. They had grown up in a system where there wasn't free speech and free press; so, there was a lot of training about how a free election should be reported. We tried joint funding of television. One group wouldn't give the property rights. Another group wouldn't permit a transmitter. Another group in the government wouldn't give the transmission frequency, just to block it, so that they didn't have an independent voice. It was a long-term process that people were trying to get away with short-term solutions.

Q: How has it evolved?

MORSE: I don't think Bosnia has healed the ethnic differences. In fact, the way the peace agreement is set up, it has perpetuated it. You basically have the country divided along ethnic lines. We called it the "inter-ethnic" boundary; but, it was supposed to be called the "inter- entity" boundary. It was basically separating the Serbs from the Bosnians and the Croats.

Q: At the practical level, what has been accomplished?

MORSE: Reconstruction has not been as fast as people wanted; but, overall, we found that people were able to restore basic services. What they didn't do, total failure, is put Serbs back into houses in areas that had been theirs before, but that the Croats and Muslims had kicked them out of. You couldn't get Muslims back into areas that were now Republic of Serbska, part of Bosnia, a total failure. So, the whole refugee resettlement areas were just a total failure. It's validated ethnic cleansing in the interest of stopping the fighting quickly.

Q: Was there an alternative?

MORSE: Longer term building reconciliation. It would have had to have been started earlier. There probably wasn't much of an alternative at the time of Dayton. That gets us to one other role. It's a sensitive role. Because of the inter-agency work as the head of the AID/Bosnia Task Force working with others, I worked a lot with State, CIA, Defense and the NSC. They were extremely frustrated that we, the U.S., never could come up with a plan of what to do about arresting and taking the indicted war criminals to the Hague, mainly, the two main ones, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. The NSC staff did a paper on this; and, it was rejected. State did a paper; and, it was rejected. DOD and DIA did one; and, it was rejected. Every time, basically, the NSC principals would say, "Take it back to the drawing boards." And they would put somebody else in the U.S. leadership on this. At one point, the NSC principals put Admiral Blair in charge. He was the CIA's DDI, the Deputy Director for Intelligence, not operations. He put together a small group

of three people. He asked Brian in one principal's meeting, "Can Ted join us?" Our agency doesn't do that much with CIA and certainly didn't want it known, overt and public. This was at a time that I had stepped back into more of the conflict prevention work and less of the Bosnia work. Brian asked why. Admiral Blair said, "Well, because we need somebody who understands the Bosnia economics. We want to see whether or not there is some understanding of how Radovan and Ratko are financed, where they get their money and that kind of stuff." That request came in part because, early on in talking to our people on the ground, the 100 that had been there through the relief operation, they could tell you where the corruption was and how it worked. They could tell you where the Serbs were cooperating fully with the Bosniaks and selling each other everything from booze and cigarettes to arms and ammunition. There was that secret transit tunnel that was underneath the airport that was never publicly announced. It is now a museum. They have painted the walls inside with murals. But that tunnel came out on the Serb side: and, the Serbs let the Bosnians come out of the besieged Sarajevo through that end of the tunnel, which was very, very long. But the cost was a case of whiskey, a case of cigarettes, a case of ammunition or a case of rockets or whatever they were bringing in. Some of our people knew who the contacts were and who the mules were for all that stuff. I didn't know; but, some of our NGOs knew about it. Some of our OFDA people knew about it. So, I went and would work two days a week out at CIA headquarters with Defense Intelligence, State and a CIA person

Q: This group was supposed to come with – what?

MORSE: Another plan yet of how to either deliver these two indicted war criminals to the Hague, or neutralize them by undercutting their power base, their finances and all the rest of it.

Just one story on that. One day, the CIA psychologist was invited in. He had prepared a psychological profile of Radovan Karadzic. It was an excellent briefing. He had to admit that he hadn't had a chance to talk to anybody who had actually talked to Karadzic. I said, "Well, you know, he was a professor of psychiatry at the university. Why don't you talk to some of his fellow professors at the university?" "Well, we can't go out there and talk. We can't do that openly." I said, "You don't have to. The chairman of the Department of Psychology lives about six (6) blocks down the street from you at the CIA headquarters." "Who is he? How do you know him? What is his name?" I opened the book and said, "His telephone number is such and such." Well, they don't think of unclassified, open sources like that. Admiral Blair asked, "How do you know him?" I said, "He is the father of the Bosnia Foreign Minister. On my last trip, the Foreign Minister asked me to deliver a package to his father. He was the chairman of the psychology department where Radovan Karadzic taught. He knows him. He knows his thinking. They taught together for seven years." But, the CIA doesn't always think in open sources; they seem more inclined to electronically intercept information and all that kind of stuff.

One more comment on Bosnia in terms of winding that down, too, it was my recommendation that we disband the AID task force and turn responsibilities over to the

geographic bureau. BHR was out; and, it was pretty regularized by that time. We're now looking at late 1996. Just before, I was supposed to go on a plane to Bosnia with Ron Brown, as the AID person on it. I went over and had an inter-agency briefing for him and others at the Department of Commerce. It was so much selling America when we were trying to simulate the local economy that I disagreed with what they were doing on the trip. I told Brian and said I just didn't think It would be helpful for us to explain to our European reconstruction partners and to our local partners why AID, a Bosnia local development supporter, was really promoting American exports, instead of local production; so, I dropped it. Next thing you knew, Brown's plane plowed into the mountain at Dubrovnik.

Q: That was fortunate for you.

MORSE: That's kind of what I felt, even though my heart and mind pained for the loss.

Q: The Task Force disbanded then; and, it became a regular operation.

MORSE: That's right. The Bosnia desk. The geographic bureau ran it from that point forward. They had the continuity of Paige Alexander.

Q. It was more of a reconstruction and development type program?

MORSE: Right.

Q: Humanitarian aid was phased out?

MORSE: That was done. The BHR bureau was done; so, the need for an inter-bureau TF and inter-agency work had practically dried up as well.

Q: But the core issues with the lack of cooperation among the three governments still persisted; so, you were dealing with three separate territorial entities.

MORSE: And with political, administrative and economic ramifications.

Q: Except that there were some points, I gather from what you're saying, where they agreed to cooperate on some practical solutions.

MORSE: If you put enough pressure, at time when you'd get Holbrooke back in there or we would have to take an issue over and over to Carl Bildt or the Secretary of State would weigh in, State and the U.S. administration stayed involved day by day, hour by hour – but divided as well. There is another story in that one. When Holbrooke finished Dayton, he retired almost immediately. To take responsibility for Bosnia within the USG there were all kinds of mechanisms. Holbrooke had run Bosnia policy as a separate task force, separate from the European Bureau; but, the man who was the European Bureau Assistant Secretary of State had been Holbrooke's deputy when he was Assistant Secretary for Europe. So, they got along fairly well; but, when Holbrooke was going out,

the administration asked Ambassador Gallucci, a fine human being, if he would take Bosnia on. Gallucci said he would. We only had half a dozen meetings before he left.

Gallucci kind of set out what were the parameters of my authority, my responsibilities vis-à-vis all these other task forces, the White House, the NSC and Holbrooke, who was still feeding indirectly to the White house, to Gore, to the Secretary and to the Assistant Secretary of European Affairs. It became clear that he had enough influence still that he was tilting responsibility to the European Bureau instead of to Gallucci and his Task Force. I don't think Gallucci was on the job three months when he said, "I have another opportunity; and, I'm departing." My own speculation is he left because Holbrooke was still calling the Bosnia shots, from behind the scene. He is now head of the Georgetown School of Foreign Service. He's a fine person.

Bosnia policy was getting institutionalized within the USG, but not without a lot of strain. Just to continue that up to today, after Gallucci, then Ambassador Montgomery took it over. He was completely overshadowed by the European Bureau. Then Bob Gelbard came in because they felt they needed a higher profile person. Gelbard ran it just until last week. He is now our Ambassador to Indonesia.

Q: Outside of the European Bureau or in it?

MORSE: Outside.

Q: Why didn't they integrate it into the State Department European Bureau?

MORSE: I guess they felt that the Bosnia Task Force needed direct access because these people were all known as the President's Special Representatives and the Special Advisor to the Secretary of State. How can you be advising the President and the Secretary if you're under an Assistant Secretary? The man who is now heading it, Ambassador Jim Dobbins, is now taking on Kosovo and Bosnia, the whole Balkans. He's within the European Bureau; but, he still is the Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State.

Q: Is there anything else on that that you would like to add?

MORSE: Not on the basis of what we've done.

Q: In what year did you leave the Bosnia experience?

MORSE: I retired again in November of 1996. Then in about April of 1997, I was called and asked if I would come back because there had been pressure for a reorganization of the foreign affairs agencies. It was going to involve the State Department, USIA, Disarmament Agency and AID. As you remember, Senator Jesse Helms had pretty much held up replenishment of our funds to the World Bank and IMF and paying our dues to the United Nations. He was using that as leverage to get the merger of the foreign affairs agencies. He very clearly felt AID, USIA and the Disarmament Agency were holdovers

from the Cold War, that they were agencies that were no longer needed and that any of their residual functions should be merged into the State Department.

Q: He was not really interested in the development function.

MORSE: No, nor as far as that goes, the functions of USIA or Disarmament Agency that were separate from the State Department. He is not a great believer in the State Department either. Faced with that kind of pressure, nobody will ever admit it, but it was decided to put the decision up to President Clinton, not leave it to the Congress, and for the President to decide what to do about the reorganization. He in turn had Vice President Gore lead an effort to define what should be done to streamline this. It was kind of under Gore's re-engineering of the U.S. government mandate; but, it was very definitely separate. There was an option paper that only Gore took to the President on April 17, 1997. Basically, the decisions were that the Disarmament Agency would be merged totally within the first fiscal year; USIA would be totally merged in the next fiscal year. AID would not be merged. It would stay as a separate and distinct agency with its' own budget, but under the direct authority and foreign policy guidance of the Secretary of State.

Q: Why was AID kept separate while the others were not?

MORSE: I think the combination of the President, influenced by Hillary Clinton, influenced by Gore, with tremendous lobbying on each of them by Brian Atwood. Secretary Albright, feeling that the USG development function would be relegated to such a low level that it could not operate separate from a political expediency. The Secretary knew enough to be more neutral. She and Brian maintained very good relationships because she was a member of his board when he was the Executive Director of the National Democratic Institute. I think, if she had her way, she would have merged all of them but wasn't ready to fight for that; and, if she could give Helms two out of the three agencies, that was what he was asking for. So, it went forward that way to the President.

He never actually signed that document; but, he made the decisions. He made them orally in a meeting that was only attended by himself, Gore and one of his personal staff members who then recorded what the decisions were. So, in terms of having a staff recorded document you could point to, none. We knew the decision; but, it was always subject to interpretation.

The State Department chaired a task force that was made up of the four involved agencies. It was to take the President's decision and turn it into a report that would go back to the President saying, "This is how we carry out your decision." That report was then to be blessed by the President and submitted to Congress. All that was to be done by the end of the fiscal year, September of 1997, because, at the beginning of the next fiscal year, the Disarmament Agency was to be merged.

I counted once 172 people involved in 17 working groups under the major Task Force. I was the AID representative and had an office over at the State Department just like a person from Disarmament and USIA. We reported to a steering committee that was chaired by Assistant Secretary Pat Kennedy. The principals, the Secretary and the heads of the three agencies were to get our report and to resolve differences and problems above the steering committee. Kelly Kammerer and Jill Buckley became the real AID/interlocutors for an executive committee that was ad hoc and met periodically with Kennedy. I was the AID staff assistant to all that. We had AID people on all 17 of these working groups even though AID was not to be merged.

The one thing that had been agreed to in those negotiations is that we would not operate a separate press office any longer. Our press officers would be merged with Jamie Rubin's press office at State. That was Jill Buckley's decision. Tactically, she felt she had to give that up at one point. Those 17 task forces were all chaired by State people; but, there was one that was supposed to be on improved coordination between State and AID as part of carrying out what it means to "be under the Secretary's direct authority for foreign policy guidance". We put Terry Brown's name forward as the chairperson of that task force. State didn't want an AID person to chair it; so, that task force was never formed! The development task force was never convened; so, we participated in all the others and we made our inputs into those task forces. We went through all the drafts and worked with them on an hour-by-hour, day-by-day basis and had the draft reports vetted within AID.

Q: What was relevant to the AID relationship in all these other task forces?

MORSE: Very little, expect on the administration side, where there were calls on those task forces to do away with separate housing boards, administrations and work under a joint Embassy/USAID administrative service and things like that. There were changes we tried to get because at this point, it was agreed we were supposed to be coordinating closer with State; but, at the same time, the decision was made to move AID over to the Ronald Reagan Building. I pointed out that the computer system that Larry Byrns had bought for AID was totally incompatible, a non-interface, with State. How are we going to communicate from another building? The security access system wouldn't recognize State badges at AID, and AID's badges would no longer be recognized at State. So, you had to be entered in as a visitor. All through the operations, if there is a State person who came over to AID, I had to go down and let them into RRB. It was stupid, just working against ourselves in terms of closer cooperation coordination and communications. The task forces' report was finished with lots of unanswered details.

Q: One of the lines that one picked up from this discussion was that one of the motivations of State was to get a hold of AID's operating budget. They were under budget constraints; and, AID had operating funds, so this was particularly attractive to State. Was there anything in that?

MORSE: Yes and no. I think that the bigger issue was that State wanted to control development assistance and have it more responsive to foreign policy. We maintained that foreign aid is always part of foreign policy. To start or to stop is always a foreign

policy decision; but, we didn't want State determining a particular project, how much money, each country conditions and all that sort of stuff. I think that was a bigger issue than the OE.

Q: You were talking about the paper you drafted.

MORSE: The task forces' report was finalized. There were four issues that were to go to the Secretary and the principals of the three agencies to decide. On the Disarmament part, it was an issue relative to having independent advice to the President on certain very highly classified missile and disarmament negotiations.

On the USIA part, it was an issue whether to have still a separate broadcasting service – VOA. It was decided to keep the broadcasting but under a separate board. There was also an issue about equality of integrating the USIA people into what cone of the State Department or create a new cone.

On the AID side, the issue was still how are we going to coordinate better? Part of the President's decision was that we should meet and come up with recommendations on coordination. That task force had never met. State kept saying, "Well, that's not an issue that is urgent. We've got to focus on the immediate mergers of the other two agencies." In fact, my own suspicion, which I think has been validated, was that State was going to go back up to the Hill around the President, which if the White House ever found out, it would go berserk, to lobby when the integration legislation was passed by the Hill, to merge AID as well. All of a sudden, you found State up there talking to the Hill to get certain things into the legislation that were outside our report. The report had never made it to Congress. We had a full report finished in September 1997. Then in early 1998, out came some of the legislation, which was much stronger and gave the Secretary of State authority to decide over AID's budget, personnel, programs and policies. With that one sentence in the new legislation, it totally undercut the President's decision and all the work and independence we held out for.

When that legislation was passed, I had been out of the merger work from about October of 1997 until early 1998, until that legislation was passed. Then State set up another task force. Kelly and I worked together. Kelly was the continuity in all this stuff, was really very senior. Jill was emotionally and titularly very involved. She was Acting AID Administrator. She is right; she had been involved right from the beginning with the President's decision. She just couldn't let go of it. I felt a couple times that maybe she was reacting because she had not been watching the legislative move, which was her AID responsibility. I think she felt badly that State made a Hill run on it and let that disastrous sentence get in the legislation. So, the Hill was taking a much harder line. Brian himself stayed involved every step of the way. We reported to him hour by hour, minute by minute. There wasn't a paper, a decision, a meeting or a position that we took that he didn't validate and wanted validated. He really wanted to protect the Agency from being totally merged right up to the end.

Q: How do you understand the outcome? Was it operationally very different from before?

MORSE: Not for AID. The other two agencies were being totally merged.

Q: I mean for AID.

MORSE: There is in existence now another AID coordination exercise where they are going to define what 'closer coordination" is. We did a paper in which I had Dirk Dijkerman and Terry Brown's deputy, the budget fellow, outline what is, in effect, the 20 points of where we and State already coordinate. "What more do you want? Here is the structure. Here is the process. Here are the decision points for coordination." It is complicated because now you have the State SEED coordinators that have different authorities from the State European bureau. They have the money; and, they have the authorities. AID doesn't.

The European coordination is quite different from elsewhere. There was a time when some felt Julia Taft, when she became Assistant Secretary over in State, that she wanted to take all of BHR and OFDA over to State under her. What was finally agreed to was that there would be another attempt to define "better coordination". Just as that was done, a former AID employee who had been very frustrated that he didn't become the head of the Office of Transitional Initiative had then joined State. He called for a separate study on merging the Bureau of Humanitarian Response and State Department, if not the whole agency. That committee is now slogging it out all over again for the third round; but, with Brian gone, many people fee that probably within a year, AID will be merged. Brian's independent AID Administrator position was not going to change as long as the Vice President is there; and, if Gore becomes President, it won't change. I'm not sure I see the Secretary of State and the State Department arguing for a complete merger now. They have more than they can absorb with USIA and the Disarmament Agency; but, in 2-3 years, State will want AID functions merged.

Q: Let's step back a bit and look at this. Of course, we are in a whole different era than we were in the years when you and I grew up in the AID business. The global environment is different. Is there a different rationale for the structure of foreign assistance and where it fits into the global picture? Rather than talking about it in terms of power plays and bureaucratics, which is a lot of what you were involved in, where does it conceptually fit into the future of international development and U.S. interests? How would you view that?

MORSE: There had actually been a couple of papers that had been drafted by Terry Brown's committee internal to AID, getting ready to work with State on coordination, that looked at that. There is no doubt that the stage of underdevelopment that was there is the 1950s-1970s is different. Is there a role for AID still? I think most people feel that foreign aid still has a tremendous contribution to make to foreign policy. That contribution is seen in the present transitions, not just out of communism into capitalism, not just out of dictatorships into democracy, but those are important parts of the new global realities. Those are very important parts still. Also, from my point of view, what we in AID do at the government-to-government, project-to-project, specific technical

assistance level is more effective than you could accomplish at a political and macro level. That approach is still needed while working through the World Bank, the UN or the "IFIs" at the macro level. They fit together. Part of that debate of new global realities is a reflection of Congress still not being comfortable with the World Bank and the UN; but, if they could transform the transition and take over responsibility, sure, they could do it with more objectivity than AID does. But that is not the reality. Also, in terms of AID's contribution, you need that separate voice, a different view that doesn't reflect only short-term politics. In the corporate culture of the State Department, dissent is almost relegated to that formal channel. You don't hear an awful lot of different views expressed.

When you take a Zimbabwe, as we said before, and you don't just keep supporting Mugabe to the point that 19 years later, he's ruined a country that has gone down the tubes… He has ruined it politically, economically and socially. It is waiting to blow because he has failed his people. When you see that and you know AID can work at it, but politically State says, "No. That is a sovereign country. We can't interfere" and all of that. It is frustrating to have State foreign policy trump where foreign aid could prevent a crisis and support new development positions.

So, from my point of view, there is still a role for AID technical assistance, working on almost a project level, as well as working at the policy level in some areas. Do you remember when we were training high level manpower from around the world here in America? These countries have their own universities now. There is enough intellectual intercourse across the Internet and everything else that scientists and academicians can learn from each other. I am sure that we do not need the kind of institution building we did in those days; but, different countries are at different stages and there is still need for AID technical assistance to get at root causes of conflict and impediments to stronger development.

Q: So, your impression of State's corporate culture is that it is not capable of thinking of the longer term issues and that U.S. interests are connected to conflict prevention through more long-term initiatives? The issues of the world such as environment and so on, those are long- term problems and they are very relevant to U.S. interests; but, they don't see them as issues for AID.

MORSE: It's not a political experience. The political expediency is what dominates over and over again; but, that is not particularly new. I remember when we did the India-Pakistan assignments. We had that group and then in Pakistan, Kabul, where we had gone in exile. We were doing post-hostilities planning up there on what would become Bangladesh. Secretary Kissinger ordered that we be disbanded. I remember that USAID Director Joe Wheeler said, "We need to be thinking about how we are going to relate to a post-war Pakistan." The State Department sent a cable back and just basically said, "We'll deal with that when it's the reality. We don't have to plan ahead. Whatever the reality is when the war is over, we'll deal with it then. You can't tell what the reality is going to be, so why are you doing post-hostilities planning?" That is such a typical kind of wait until you're confronted with the new situation and then you'll shape an ad hoc policy to deal with it. Short-term focus over and over. AID's development culture is long

term because the root causes are complicated and take time to change. AID is a change culture; State is a status-quo culture.

Q: Any last points on this reorganization question?

MORSE: My own feeling is that we should be and can be working closer with State. I don't think we need to fear it; but, it's got to be on a basis of more understanding of each other's strengths and weaknesses and how we work together or else it won't work. I am afraid that there is such corporate bias built up against State within AID and vice versa within State against AID that I don't know if we can quietly get a better working relationship. It may be that the politics of it will overwhelm us and AID will be abolished before that can happen.

Just a postscript on that. When the President made his decision that AID would not be merged like the Disarmament Agency and USIA (that decision made in April of 1997), one of the things he called for was "under the Secretary of State's direct authority and foreign policy guidance, there would be closer coordination". But the staff work on that was never done in 1997-1998. Supposedly, State felt that they were preoccupied with the merger of the other two. Many of us felt that they just didn't want to take on Brian at that time and they thought they could get some support from the Hill in terms of how that coordination would virtually accomplish the same purpose of putting AID under the direct authority almost like a merger. But, in 1998 there was an obvious need to define that. The report that had gone to Congress said there would be additional work done on the coordination, improved coordination, between State and AID.

So, under Assistant Secretary Bill Courtney, who had come in from Eastern Europe and had been in the NSC and actually was the husband of an AID officer, was appointed to initiate the coordination. So, while I was doing the conflict prevention work, Kelly Kammerer and I were again asked if we could participate in this. Their first attempt on the State part was, they wanted to set up an AID Coordinator for the whole of AID within the State Department, almost like the SEED Coordinator position. They said that there needed to be someplace within the State Department, a stakeholder, someplace where people within the Department could go and appeal to have a hearing on AID matters and that there wasn't a focal point within the State Department. So, they wanted an AID Coordinator to do this.

Q: This is like IDCA.

MORSE: It sounded like it.

Q: One notch down.

MORSE: That's right, but without the IDCA Coordinator having such a strong development focus, too. We rejected that as too unbalanced, unnecessary and unwieldy. Then they came back; and, they wanted a State Department chaired Development Committee, which again sounded a little bit like IDCA. Some of this "coordination"

thinking was being fed into the Department by people in academia and in the Overseas Development Council. There were all ideas bubbling up about how to do this from other sources, including some ideas that were coming out of some of the speeches and teachings of the former Deputy Administrator of AID, Carol Lancaster, who had worked over at the State side and also had worked on the AID side. Anyway, the State chaired committee idea literally was not a co-equal. State would chair it and they would decide issues that were brought to it by anybody and everybody. You could see that it was just going to completely undercut AID's ability to run its' own program if there was another layer to appeal to.

The third approach was, okay, then let's study where there needs to be better coordination. Bill Courtney really had no idea himself as to what the issues were and where there really were needs for better coordination. There are needs; there is no doubt about it. So, he went around and interviewed people kind of at the Deputy Assistant Administrator level within AID. Then he went around and interviewed people at that level in State. He came up with more of a "gripe list" than a list of management improvements, organizational improvements and policy improvements. So, I am afraid that it floundered.

The vehicle for all this was a letter that Secretary Albright was to send to Brian Atwood as the Administrator. State drafted a letter and, when it came over, frankly, the tone of it was, "This is what you're going to do." The substance of it was so superficial that it really added no substance to the improved coordination between the two agencies. The style was always one which many of us who have worked with State/Washington believe, they always want to do it like an international negotiation. "Here is a draft. Comment on it. Make word changes. We will accept or reject your word changes." We went through 12 drafts of this letter from Secretary Albright to Atwood.

In the middle of that, to try to show them the coordination that was being done right now, I asked Jim Painter in the Budget Office of the M Bureau and Dirk Dijkerman, who had moved over from Asia/Near East into the Policy Planning Office (PPC) to put together a paper that would describe what coordination we do now. Ambassadors already do clear off on the R-4s on the country assistance strategies. Ambassadors do rate AID Directors. There are weekly meetings. There are technical meetings. There are geographic meetings…on and on and on. In that paper and then a chart that we laid out existing coordination. That panicked Jill Buckley in that she said, "It's too much in the weeds." I kept arguing that if we couldn't show them all the detailed levels of interface already, they would just dismiss it and say, "We've got to have better coordination." When I tried to say, "Where? For what purpose?" I got no substantive answer. So, we had some internal AID bickering over it.

Finally, we did boil the paper down to four levels of coordination in the field, at the geographic bureau, and coordination that took place on the management level, and then the coordination at the higher policy level; but, we backed it up with the more detailed paper. That approach kind of threw State, because then they said, "Well, what are we doing? Why are we trying to build more coordination if all this is going on?" It kind of

stripped away the façade where people felt that the whole exercise on the State side was to gain control over AID through this mechanism that had not been achieved through the legislation or through the President's decision.

There was to be a State-AID Coordinating Committee set up to consider "better coordination". It was just being established as I left. Dirk was going to represent AID. Bill Courtney was moved off onto a new assignment; so, nobody in State had been appointed. Just before the State/AID Coordination Committee decision was taken, there was a disgruntled ex-AID employee who had wanted to become the head of the Office of Transitional Initiatives in the Bureau of Humanitarian Response. A bright and competent officer, Steve Morrison, was very hurt that he wasn't chosen to head OTI when it was formed. He left AID and went over to work in different parts of State. He had worked for Craig Johnstone in their Resource Budget Coordination Office. He was presently working in the Secretary's Policy Office.

In the last draft of the Albright to Atwood letter to come from the Secretary was inserted a new paragraph which called for an entirely separate study that literally called for the complete merger of the Bureau of Humanitarian Response with the State Department. I felt we should just stop that as out of hand. The works of BHR and State were miles apart. It was something that had never been discussed with the Hill, with the White House, or with OMB. We talked with OMB and the NSC, who were very much working with us in AID so that State was not just going to roll us, that there would be reference back over to both of them on whatever the terms of reference for this stuff was. When this one came up, one of the thoughts was, if nothing else, BHR had been gutted by people working on everything from Mitch to Kosovo to Bosnia. There was literally nobody there to work on coordination or State absorption of BHR or not to do it. Right at that time was when I was pulled off to do the Kosovo humanitarian work; but, I understand informally that that committee had not met as of about two (2) weeks ago. They were still floundering about. Many people felt that had been slowed down waiting for Brian's departure, waiting for the new Administrator to come in and then probably a whole new exercise could be mounted to redefine the relationships between State and AID – merge or control AID.

Q: In all this discussion about State-AID relationships and integration, did anybody start from the point about what the U.S. foreign policy interests are likely to be in the future and how they have changed post-Cold War and how this then changes State's role as well as AID's relationship to it?

MORSE: No. In the studies that we did from April of 1997 until about October of 1997, we brought up all of Global 2000, all of the think tank kind of projections. There were talks that Pickering was to chair a reengineering and reinvention committee that would look at the new State Department with the new global challenges in the post-Cold War period and how to organize the USG. None of that happened. We had called for it; but, always "foreign aid is part of foreign policy and you can't define foreign aid objectives unless you know what the foreign policy objectives are". Of course, they can trot that out, which they did often. You may have seen the International Affairs Strategic Plan that is

in response to Vice President Gore's reengineering effort. State Department put forward a paper which basically, unlike operating departments of the U.S. government that matched resources to objectives and goals, this one was just a restatement of total U.S. foreign policy goals. But it included so much from the military, the intelligence, commerce, trade, intellectual intercourse with foreign aid and traditional diplomacy that the Vice President's office said, "Well, that is a wonderful framework; but, it doesn't meet what we want." That framework was just so general, so broad, that it really was not a new tool.

Q: That is interesting. I would think that the new post-Cold War crises and issues would affect State's reorganization even more than AID's, but maybe not.

MORSE: Well, they have attempted to make some minor changes, adding a new bureau here and combining one here and things like that; but, it's all been tinkering without, as you rightly implied there, a holistic redefinition of what is the U.S. role in changed world affairs and what is the Department's role, how to organize for it and how foreign aid fits into that.

Q: They have created some sort of a Global Bureau that was supposed to deal with a lot of these global issues.

MORSE: The Global Bureau in State existed though for four or five years now. By lumping all transnational issues into a global bureau, and not adjusting existing bureau work, the status quo prevails.

Q: Where did that fit into relations with AID?

MORSE: When the President made his April decision, one of the areas for coordination specifically mentioned global issues. Again, at the time we were going to have a separate committee look at this: Were there needs for definitions of who takes the lead with international organizations? Who sets the policy? What is the decision-making structure between State Global Bureau and AID Global Bureau? Sally Sheldon and Ann Van Dusen were very interested in that and were ready to engage in it and had some very good ideas about supportive inter-agency roles of the two global bureaus; but, because the coordination committee was never set up, their ideas never went forward. That is kind of where it was when I left it. They were about to call this coordination committee; but, they wanted to see what the new Administrator's posture was going to be on this before moving forward.

Q: Are they still under some requirement from the Hill to produce something?

MORSE: Not officially. The report that was called for in the 1998 legislation went up to the Hill in March of 1999. There is no outstanding requirement. On the other hand, nine out of ten people on the Hill will tell you that now that the first two agencies are being merged, the Foreign Relations Committee will call for AID to be merged as soon as the new Administrator is in.

Q: Was there any reaction to the report?

MORSE: The reaction to the report was very technical; and, it focused almost entirely on should there not be a separate scholarship or fellowship or Fulbright office within the State Department when they and USIA were merged? There were technical issues regarding whether the President would still have separate advice coming from his Disarmament advisor? Would that person have to report through the Under Secretary for Security on Disarmament? It was all that kind of technical level. Within the State Department, they had proposed a couple of new Deputy Assistant Secretaries. It all got botched up on the Hill in terms of how many DASs and PDASs you can have! They never focused on the broader foreign policy issues. AID was not the issue of that report; AID was not the issue with the Hill. Every time we would ask, everybody would say, "don't even raise the question. AID is not an issue. Leave it alone."

Q: That is very interesting. It will be interesting to know what the end of the story is at some point.

MORSE: What is driving the people on the Hill about why AID should be integrated? What is the underlying pressure, view, feeling or reasoning that says that this has to be done? The official reasons that you get from the foreign affairs committee staffs, as distinct from the appropriator's, is that State does need to reorganize in the post-Cold War period, that a United Stated Information Agency, where we would try to get our work out, is now not needed in a post-Cold War period. That foreign aid was to help resist communism and now that threat is not there, development should be left to the private sector, and that it is duplicating what the World Bank, the UN and the IFIs are doing. So, retreating, if you will from development involvement bilaterally.

I think on the appropriator's side, they believe that there can be some economies of scale, cut back on staff and cut back on money. You see that year after year, the operating expense budget gets cut so drastically that you can expect that they are trying to abolish AID. It's just getting to the point now that there is just not enough OE. When you talk to people on the Hill about the reorganization, those are the two main themes that come out.

Q: That's fairly clear. Let's move on. Do you have any other points that you want to make before I ask you a couple of general wrap-up questions?

MORSE: Let's get the conflict prevention one done first. I am not exactly sure what motivated Administrator Atwood; but, he had another call from on high that there should be work on conflict prevention. I wish I could say the momentum came from our earlier GHAI work; but, I doubt it. The AID chief of staff, Dick McCall, was being used extensively in conflict resolution to resolve existing conflicts – whether it's Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, Congo, etc. But, we had all been saying that we should be trying to prevent them, not just trying to resolve conflicts after they started, using AID's unique tools to combine with other USG tools. One day I was called in with Brian Atwood and with Dick McCall; and, there was Ambassador Galbraith, whom I had worked with in the Balkans. He was our Ambassador to Croatia. He had just come back.

There was a very unspoken word that he would not be reconfirmed by the Senate as an ambassador because of the role that he supposedly played with Tony Lake in terms of authorizing the Iranians to support the Muslims in Bosnia with arms. Therefore, the State Department was not going to put Ambassador Galbraith up for another ambassadorship, at least not any time soon. The Hill had made it clear they wouldn't confirm him. He was offered a job and then hired by AID to work on conflict prevention; but, because he didn't know AID, our tools and our approach, and we wanted to build on the work that had been done under the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, I was asked to come back into AID.

I had been out at that point for about three months. In the first couple of meetings with Galbraith, it was clear that what he personally wanted to do was the same thing that Dick McCall was doing. He wanted to work on jumping in and resolving conflicts. He wanted to go to Nigeria to settle that one. He wanted to go back down to the Congo and settle that one, and to get into an existing conflict and use his diplomatic skills, backed up by AID resources. I finally, after about three weeks, said resolution work is not the way that I would like to be involved. So, I bowed out. Three weeks later, Galbraith bowed out. He had decided to run for the Kennedy and Tip O'Neill congressional seat in Massachusetts. So, he resigned. Then I was asked to come back in again and pick up the work on conflict prevention.

Brian's approach was, let's have another task force and let's do it not just for the Horn of Africa, but something for the Agency as a whole. Let's see if we can improve our contribution to preventing these things. I demurred and said, "Look, we had trouble just on the Greater Horn of Africa. There is still resistance. There have been several efforts. Why don't we study what those efforts were?" The Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, had called for a Secretary's Preventative Action Initiative (unfortunate acronym of SPAI, pronounced "spy"). There had been the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative. There had been attempts in the State International Organization Bureau that had been ordered to do conflict prevention work.

So, we agreed that instead of just setting up another task force and trying to move forward, I would spend time going around and interviewing people in AID, State, CIA, Pentagon and the NSC. Why did these earlier attempts fail? Is there still a need out there? Is there a unique contribution? Out of that came some wonderful insights that we put into a Power-point presentation and then showed it first to Brian, his deputy and Dick McCall, then to the AID senior staff, and then he wanted it shown outside of AID. We frankly were spending more time showing the study results to people around town than getting on with organizing. I will add later what were the 12 or 15 major themes that came up. They ranged from, "You can't know these things in advance; so, you can't prevent them, but can only react to them later." to the "corporate cultures of State being primarily reactive rather than long-term planning to address root causes", to people feeling that, "What AID does now contributes to prevention; and, you can't target it any better because you don't know what the flashpoints are". I'll fill that in when we get to that point.

From that, it was agreed that we had four options of what to do. The first option, which I didn't propose, but had it in the recommendations, was to set up an inter-agency group again probably led by the NSC, that would bring together the different military, intelligence, information, political, diplomacy and development people and to come at conflict prevention at that very high profile level. I was against that because it was so complex and so full of inter- agency rivalries that what we had learned out of interviewing on why GHAI had failed; it was just too fraught with inter-agency problems to attack prevention that way. On the other hand, that was the level that really would give you some sense that you were matching the demand, you were meeting the problem if you were working at something as comprehensive, as complex, as inter-agency, as inter-discipline as was the recommendation number one.

Recommendation number two was more modest. That said, there were good things being done within AID and State at that point. We highlighted some from Latin American, where there was a much closer working relationship coming out of the old Alliance for Progress days where State and AID were doing some things that tended to be more preventative. Interestingly enough, in the two years since GHAI had been started, the Africa Bureau was now very much in the lead within AID. Where you found people like Jerry Wolgin's office that previously held the only solution is long-term economic development, Jerry had now set up a conflict prevention division within his office. He had staff, including staff seconded over from the Pentagon, that were working on prevention. The new AID Assistant Administrator for Africa when she came in, Vivian Derrick, was very much caught up in this and brought in a special assistant on conflict prevention, John Flynn. She also brought over a State Department ambassador as her advisor on conflict prevention who was working for her. A couple of the State Department people who had been non-believers before on Africa were now saying that it is absolutely critical that we work on this. One ambassador, an office director, a fellow I had worked with in the field, Howard Jeter, said to me, "There is not a single country under my portfolio as the Office Director for West Africa that is not in crisis. I am tired of just having to pick up after the fact. Can't we get at preventing some of it?" So, it was a very encouraging thing to come back at this and see how the Africa Bureau was light years ahead of anybody else in the Agency on conflict prevention. There was tremendous non-commitment in the ENI Bureau and in the Asia/Near East Bureau. There was some lip service in Latin America on it. Anyway, we went about setting up an AID inter-bureau working group on prevention to try to redefine what our policy was. When we interviewed people, they said, "What is our policy on conflict prevention?" There had been a restatement of policy out of the State Department that we had worked with when Craig Johnstone's office on to put in the guidance for the MPP, the Mission Performance Plan. There was a specific call in there for the ambassadors to work with AID, the Defense Department representatives, the country team to put into the MPP conflict prevention recommendations. Not one single MPP addressed that when they came in. Craig Johnstone said he had inputs, too. I went around and I asked half a dozen ambassadors that I had worked for in the field, "Why hadn't you addressed this?" They basically said, "The whole MPP exercise is a nothing. We don't take it seriously. You turn it over to people like AID and you have to do those exercises. If there is no money in it, no staff for us, it doesn't increase our State money, it's not a serious exercise." That

was almost to the person the way the embassies were looking at the MPP and, therefore, the policy guidance on prevention. So, there also needed to be a restatement of the policy on the State side. Similarly, there had been a policy statement put out through AID in the R-4 guidance. That is where we got into the first bottleneck. Within AID's own PPC bureau, despite that's where I was working out of at that point, there was tremendous resistance to this. "Another fad, another task force, another initiate, no money, just more work for us." The people in PPC literally dragged their feet. Even when we had drafts of the new State-AID policy statements and asked that it be put into the State new MPP guidance, it was dropped out primarily by PPC. It just astounded me. It was so discouraging that we couldn't even get it out of the bureau that we were working in. There was a separate thrust which was to work with other donors. There was a real problem there because of Dick McCall's Counselors' office. He had two people that were working on more conflict resolution, including Cathy Blakeslee, who had been working with the multi-donor DAC (Development Assistance Committee) when they were looking at conflict prevention. They came out with the DAC guidelines on conflict prevention. So, she wanted to continue to do that work; but, again, PPC felt they should take the lead with the donor coordination on this even though the other parts of PPC didn't want to engage in it. So, there was a big bureaucratic brouhaha over that.

Just another point on this. Carnegie Foundation had concluded its' exhaustive two-year study on preventing deadly conflict. It was a study done under the guidance of former Secretary of State, Cy Vance, and Dr. Hamburg, the Director of the Carnegie Foundation. It was a very good study. A person I consider one of the most brilliant former U.S. government officers I have ever known, Jane Hull, was the executive director of that study. We were constantly talking and in different meetings, seminars, and workshops. I was representing AID and they were launching their study results; but, I kept pointing out to her and to others in there that their approach was kind of the traditional approach as far as foreign assistance and foreign aid to prevention. That is, "If you stay the long-term and bring about education, economic growth and open administrations, then you're going to get stability ad revolution." From my point of view, that was totally wrong. We had pointed out that in the nine years since 1990, there had been 27 wars where over 100,000 people had been killed; and, the nature of those wars was overwhelmingly internal, where people were revolting and rebelling internally. They were not cross-border and big wars; but, people fighting with spears ad machetes and long guns. Something needed to be done to see whether or not if those people who were rebelling, if there wasn't a better way to solve their problems. I was flattered when Jane called back one day and said, "You know, we think you're right. Even though the study has been done for a year and there were 17 annexes, that is an annex that we should have done and we didn't and so we will." We had suggested if they did a separate study on the role of foreign aid in preventing deadly conflicts, then we would work with DAC and put together an international meeting to review it. That again was going along very well when I got pulled off to work on Kosovo; but, it looked very, very promising.

Working with the other donors, we found that the Germans were way out ahead of us on this and that they had many good ideas and were still working on it. The European Union had put in place a conflict prevention network. Their network was actually doing studies

on potential flashpoints around the world and then feeding them into the European Parliament so that the European parliamentarians could then take the initiative to address those. So, I guess I was discouraged at, again, our internal bureaucratic resistance to it, but somewhat encouraged at the external support and interest of organizations like Carnegie and the other donors.

Q: Was the UN involved in any of this? Were they working on this?

MORSE: Nancy Soderberg, who is one of the U.S. ambassadors up at the UN, had asked that we come up and give the presentation that we had been putting on around the world. We would also learn and listen to what the UN had been doing. Ambassador Soderberg had a real interest and involvement in conflict resolution during her U.S. and UN careers. We didn't get up there before I left; but, it appeared that there were a couple of places within the UN Peacekeeping Office where the UN also had been doing some interesting work on conflict prevention.

KOSOVO CONTEXT

Yugoslavia was a country in the western part of the Balkans. Although it suffered centuries of conflict and multi-ethnic impositions, it was only officially formed in 1918 after World War II. After WWII, it consisted of six "republics" and two autonomous provinces of Serbia, Kosovo and Vojvodina. Josip Tito was "President for Life" and ruled from 1963 until his death in 1980.

The country began to break up in the 1980s, roughly along ethnic and national lines. Kosovo province became the last entity to break away through conflict in 1998 and 1999, led by the Albanian "Kosovo Liberation Army" (KLA), which fought for independence from Serbia- Yugoslavia. NATO promoted war in Kosovo "as the first humanitarian war", based on reports that proved to be highly inaccurate. From March 24 to June 11, 1999, NATO launched a controversial bombing campaign, unauthorized by the UN. Approximately 850,000 refugees, mostly Albanians from Kosovo, fled Kosovo province and Serbia to escape Serb discrimination and NATO bombing. The overwhelming majority went into Albania and Macedonia. Other countries offered temporary asylum.

I was appointed the White House Field Representative Kosovo Humanitarian Affairs, from April to June 1999. Refugees were already moving on foot, by tractors and trailers, and periodically by train.

Q: Any more on conflict prevention?

MORSE: No

Q: Alright. Now to Kosovo.

MORSE: That we'll call the last one. It was a short assignment. While working on the conflict prevention and the reorganization assignments, I got a call at home one Saturday

evening from Brian. He said that he had just come out of a White House meeting and the deteriorating situation in Kosovo was discussed. We are now looking at the end of April 1999. It had been decided to set up in the White House an interagency Kosovo Humanitarian Coordination Council. He was to chair that council. It included 13 other U.S. government agencies, everything from FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) to the Department of Agriculture, and, of course State, AID, Intelligence, Defense, etc. They were a Washington based coordinating committee; but, they wanted a field coordinator. He asked if I could leave immediately to go to Kosovo to coordinate the U.S. effort. They had discussed this with the United Nations and particularly the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. They had discussed it with NATO and particularly with General Wes Clark, with whom we had worked on the Bosnia assignment. They had discussed this role with the two ambassadors in Albania and Macedonia. All seemed to agree, so, literally, four (4) days later, I got on a plane and just dropped the conflict prevention and the reorganization work and went to Kosovo.

I went around before leaving and talked to 13 different agency representatives out there. Each one had a different idea of what the "U.S. Field Coordinator" task was. It ranged from the UN had been slow off the mark and could I come in with ideas and suggestions about how the UN could strengthen its' organization and management because they were being overwhelmed by the whole crisis; they were far behind the curve, so what we need is a problem solver, somebody who can be on the ground and speak with the authority of the White House and solve problems. When I got to the field, the American Ambassador in Macedonia basically said, "Look, I'm spending so much time on the humanitarian, I can't coordinate the war effort; and, I can't coordinate the peace effort. I would like to just turn the whole humanitarian effort over to you. So, you are the embassy's humanitarian coordinator. You chair the Humanitarian Coordination Committee. Everybody will report to you. You do the reporting; and, you solve the problems." It was totally different from the way Washington looked at it. On the other hand, it was a platform from which to operate to help both the field and Washington.

Q: This was based in Macedonia?

MORSE: That is the Macedonia part of it. The American Ambassador over in Albania (I had a regional responsibility), had quite a different idea about the work. He felt that overall, their team was pulling together; but, they wanted somebody who could do high level problem solving with NATO, with the Albanian government, with the NGOs, etc. Plus, he had a longer-term perspective. He wanted to put things into a total regional context and had a concept that this has to be resolved not just for Albania, but in the whole Southeast Europe region. So, it was a very interesting perspective.

There were 13 masters in Washington pulling me in one direction; and, then there were two ambassadors who looked at it differently! Fortunately, the World Food Program had a daily flight between Albania and Macedonia; and, I could literally just call and get a seat on it, didn't buy a ticket or anything, just go back and forth. It was a hour and 10 minute flight. It really facilitated working at both ends of the Kosovo equation.

As the work evolved, part of it was to try to get our AID Bureau on Humanitarian Response people, OTI and OFDA to work together with the AID Mission. State had a huge role out there because they were funding so much of the UNHCR. The State people were working very closely with OFDA in terms of funding the NGOs that were running the refugee camps for UNHCR. Traditionally it is the responsibility of one NGO in charge of the whole camp, but then under them, another NGO was in charge of the food, another the water, the sanitation, the health conditions, the building, etc. That was going fairly well. By other refugee crises standards, there was nobody dying. It wasn't like an Africa drought refuge situation. Nobody was dying from lack of food or water. Nobody was dying from disease.

There were the usual day-to-day operational problems that seemed large in everybody's mind. I saw the bigger issue of trying to get people to think of what we call "the continuum" and to go from immediate refugee and relief to the return, resettlement, recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction phases. The U.S. Ambassador in Macedonia, when I said I'd like to get about a half hour with him and show him the "continuum" conceptual framework, then I would like the country team and me to work with the Macedonian government, the UN and NATO, he basically just dismissed it and said, "I don't want to deal with any concepts. I want problem solving." I replied, "But, if you don't put it in some conceptual framework, you don't know where you're trying to get." He was just dismissive. Later, I came back to him and said, "We're depriving ourselves of the intellectual framework that is necessary to get out of this."

Nobody at that point was doing any post-hostilities planning, even to the point of working with the United Nations, trying to get them to think about next steps. They were busy with the day- to-day relief operations; and, there was nobody there from UN beyond UNHCR per se. So, I started holding stakeholder meetings at the Skopje Hotel on a reconstruction phase. I made it clear that as soon as the OSCE, the World Bank, the UN or whatever the peace process ultimately came up with was in charge, that very day, I would turn over whatever reconstruction planning that we had been doing to whoever was ultimately in charge. People working on the ground responded to that, so they participated in the meetings. There were people who wanted to start next-phase actions. Our own OFDA people were already planning about what kind of purchases to make for shelter and how to "winterize" people inside Kosovo versus winterizing them outside. Soon the UN appointed Martin Griffith of UNDHA as the coordinator for the refugee return, he got off a plane at two o'clock. I had been working on the phone with him and his people. He came to a five o'clock reconstruction meeting three hours later. I stood up as he walked in and I said, "I want to introduce the new chairman". He said, "Not that fast!" But he did, he took it over, and the UN took the leadership on reconstruction planning. Everyone except our own ambassador saw the necessity for this. He was a prime example of State Department "immediate-concern corporate culture".

Q: Where was he from?

MORSE: The Department of Humanitarian Assistance (UNDHA), the one that was set up after the Africa drought of 1984-1986. There were many, many incidents that we could

spend time on. One of them was that there was a riot that took place at one refugee camp. At one point it had 30,000 refugees and was the largest in Macedonia. A riot occurred because somebody had seen a man who was wearing a necklace that belonged to another man's father; and, therefore, it was assumed this man must have killed the other man's father inside Kosovo and stolen that necklace from him. Whether that was the reason they were rioting versus that the accused people were Romas, which is the word for gypsies, and the riots were another way of discriminating against them.

At any rate, a riot had started. Catholic Relief, which worked inside the damp, couldn't put it down. In fact, their own people were being held hostage with some of the Roma people that were being beat up. There was a terrible beating of a woman who was pregnant. A man had his jaw broken. The UNHCR tried to get NATO to come in and put down the rioting. They didn't want the Macedonian police to come in because they were overwhelmingly pro-Serbia; and, that would have just inflamed it right in the middle of all these Albanian/Kosovar refugees. The woman who we had been working so closely with in UNHCR called me and said, "This is so far out of hand. Have you got any ideas?" I asked, "Would they turn the hostages over to American Embassy people and turn these rioters over instead to NATO?"

We all had cell phones. The phones were the only saving grace. We were all able to talk to each other all the time on cell phones. The UNHCR checked with the Catholic Relief people, who checked with the camp leaders, who checked with the rebellion leaders. They said, yes, they would turn the hostages and injured over to the American embassy. I called our ambassador and said I wanted to use his title for an hour and go and get these people. (I had the same senior foreign service rank and a White House title; but, the rebels probably would not recognize these.) He asked, "What for?" I explained the situation. He responded, "No way! I am going in. We'll go in together." Literally, with four of his bodyguards from the embassy (not Marine guards, but the State Diplomatic Security people), we went into the rioting camp and negotiated with the rebel leaders to turn the hostage and injured people over to us and to quell that riot. The ambassador did an excellent job. We put him up on a chair with a bullhorn; and, he basically said, "Look, this war is going to come to an end; but, you can't take matters into your own hands. The new Kosovo is going to be a nation of law and order; therefore, you can't have this kind of lawlessness. If these people have committed a crime, turn them over to us. We will see that it is properly investigated." They kept on demonstrating.

Q: The Catholic people were American?

MORSE: The Catholic Relief people were Americans. There was a UNHCR person that was also being held; but, basically the people who had been beat up were Albanian Kosovars, the Gypsy Romas.

Q: They would be turned over to the U.S. Embassy representatives.

MORSE: Yes. As long as they held them; people wanted to kill them. They wanted to torture them. You had those kinds of incidents.

Q: What happened to those people?

MORSE: They eventually turned them over to us. The Kosovar Albanians that were rioting inside the camp, we finally got them to sit down. I also give full marks to the Roma camp leaders. There was an organization of camp leadership that handled those kinds of security problems. Working with them, we got everybody to sit down and talk. Then, UNHCR, Catholic Relief and our embassy people went to where the hostages and injured people that were badly injured in the rioting were held. Others were being held. They brought them back out of the camp. We basically asked the rioters to disperse: "Let us handle this. Don't you guys take the law into your own hands." We kept blaring through the horn.

There were times when we were out on the border until two or three o'clock in the morning just because a flood of refugees kept coming all day and all night overwhelming everyone. UNHCR particularly seemed to appreciate the fact that, if there were people from the British Embassy and ourselves who would go out and work with the local border police, work with the customs people, work with the UNHCR, processing had to be sped up. We helped push that. You would find that, for some reason, the Macedonians would have two desks to process 5,000 refugees coming across the border at a time; and, when we would call the Minister of Interior and say, "Can't you speed this up?" – seven desks would be opened up within a matter of minutes.

You have to ask what are the conflicting policies of not letting them in or slowing it down and resisting? There was certainly a perception that Macedonia was not anxious to have these refugees. They wanted them out. We spent a lot of time trying to negotiate opening up new refugee camps for them or arranging for them to go cross-border into Albania to speed up their processing. We were the interface with the Macedonian government, which had set up a committee that met every Monday, Wednesday and Friday under the Deputy Foreign Minister with NGOs, NATO, the UN and bilateral donors with the Macedonia government. Those meetings every Monday, Wednesday and Friday were problem-solving meetings. The Macedonians were very eager to participate in refugee movement – to plan for their return. They were afraid they were going to permanently get stuck with the refugees and that they wouldn't go home. Already, 22% of their own population was Albanian. Many of them had been demonstrating in Macedonia for joining Albania or Kosovo. The Macedonians were afraid that more refugees would create other demonstrations; so, there were lots of operational problems like that every day. One that intrigued me was something that the Germans were doing while they were the chairmanship of the EU. It also caught on with the State Department. The idea was to put the conflicts in a regional context of a Balkan stability pact or the Southeast Europe Initiative, to get people to stop thinking of themselves as Bosnians, Serbs, Croats, Kosovars, Albanians, Macedonians, etc., but to get them to think of themselves as Southeast Europeans. From the conflict prevention commitment, we worked with the regional governments and others to try and perpetuate and support that concept. After the NATO bombing of Serbia started, people started to go home. The

whole refugee problem was changing to a return stampede. I came home to get married and settle my house.

Q: What was your position? What were you called?

MORSE: That's another unique thing. I could almost define my own role. With Brian's approval, I was called the "White House Field Representative" of the USG humanitarian coordination in Kosovo.

Q: Who did you report to?

MORSE: The White House Coordinating Committee and its' 13 different agencies; but, basically, I usually reported to Brian as the Committee Chairman. What did that mean in practice? Lots of flexibility. One of the 13 agencies was represented by a four star general who was the J4 over at the Pentagon. In talking to him, he said, "If you have any questions that have to do with our activities, don't hesitate to pick up the phone and call me." I was in Albania one day when General Wes Clark called over. He basically said, "Could we get some help on the civilian side to rehabilitate the Albanian road that goes up to the Serb-Kosovo border?" The concern was, if military people were up there, that would be a lightning rod for cross-border strikes by the Serbs; and, it would appear to the world that they were exceeding their NATO mandate of humanitarian assistance. In fact, NATO had to have that road for military purposes; however, we also needed that road improved for the refugees to come across that border and get down into other parts of Albania. I went out to the NATO military base in Albania and talked to the three star general who was in charge of the construction work. He was an American, although his NATO unit was under a British general. He confirmed what help they wanted, how far along construction planning was and how soon they could start it. He basically said, "All we need is about $1 million to buy raw construction materials. If we can say that we're improving this road for the refugees to come out, that is the political cover that we need." I replied, "Well, we were about to improve that road and give it to a civilian contractor; so, yes, I think we can help." I called back to the Pentagon and was put directly into the Joint Chief of Staff and discussed this with him. He said, "I am for it. I'll take it to the White House interagency committee. We're meeting in four hours." He took it to the interagency committee. There was a NSC principal's meeting right after that. The President approved it. Within about six hours, we had the million dollars. So, who was I reporting to?

Q: $1 million from AID?

MORSE: Yes, but the work was done by U.S. military forces.

Q: Even though there was some reservation about that.

MORSE: Yes; but, we cleared it through the policy loop within literally six hours. The consensus was the risk was overtaken by the NATO bombing. We were able to get that

funded. That was fantastic; but, in addition, the word was out that I can make things happen in six hours. So, I was expected to do that over and over again!!

Some of the bigger issues had to do with how long the refugees would be out of Kosovo, when would they could go home, how many would go home, etc. As you know, there was an airlift that was started. Over 40,000 of the refugees had been airlifted to different parts of the world. I think there were something like 32 different countries involved. Were they to stay in an asylum country once they left? Were they never to come back to Kosovo? Were they just being placed there because they couldn't be absorbed immediately in Macedonia and Albania? Albania never agreed to that. They felt that it was just validating the ethnic cleansing that Milosevic wanted by having people taken out on a permanent basis and shipped away. They wanted them returned to Kosovo.

Another big issue to do with the preparations for the refugees' return was in terms of working with the local councils. Both the AID Mission and the Office of Transitional Initiatives, in addition to some of the NGOs, had been working with what was then called the "parallel Kosovo government", which had been established for the last two years in Kosovo. Representatives from that parallel government came out of Kosovo wanting to work with the refugee leaders while they were in the camps. They wanted to set up local councils, reinforcing a kind of bottom-up public administration. Others felt that, no, you couldn't tell whether these were good or bad Kosovars or whether you were going to reinforce the role of the Kosovo Liberation Army when they came back in. So, there was far too much time lost in debating working with these local council members.

Q: The people in these camps, were they essentially all from the same area so that there was sort of some sense of regional community?

MORSE: In the sense that the refugees who were in Albania came from one part of Kosovo. The people in Macedonia came from a totally different part of Kosovo. Yes. Many of them actually opted to move "en mass". When they came across the Kosovo border, they were coming almost as total villages or as common townspeople; so, they kept together in many respects in the camps. They didn't have to. They were free to move wherever they wanted to.

Another huge issue was the camp public safety and police. It started with who was going to maintain security within the camps? UNHCR? No. The NGOs? No. The Macedonian and Albanian police? No. NATO? No. So, they needed some sort of self-policing amongst the refugees. There were coordinating committees within the camps that tried to set up security committees just like they set up food and water committees. There were some in the international committee who wanted to immediately work with them and start training them as police to provide the public safety back inside Kosovo. There were others who said, "No. There will be an international police force." State had a lot of money and had actually started to recruit people through DYNACORPS to come in to train. As opposed to Bosnia, these people were to be armed. They were never armed. In Bosnia, they were there as advisors. These people were to actually keep the peace. So, then what is their role versus the Albanian peacekeepers that were inside the camps and

expected to go home versus the KLA, who expected to be the new government and the new military and the new police when they went home. Things were evolving so fast. You didn't have the luxury of being able to sort those out with more participatory meetings. It was necessary to almost make decisions and get validated by Washington.

Every other night, there was a telephone call back to NSC. The NSC was doing the staff work for this interagency committee. They would call every Monday, Wednesday and Friday and literally discuss issues for about an hour from seven to eight o'clock at night. One of the real issues was the NSC, as a secretariat for this, was getting into so much detail, such excruciating detail, that they were not focusing on the bigger, broader policy. That part of the NSC that staffed this was the Humanitarian Office of the NSC. The deputy there was a woman who had worked in OFDA; so, you had people who understood that side of the operation as well as people who worked on the intelligence, security and political side of it. But, there was always an issue of just how much detail they needed. There was also an issue of almost every one of the 13 agency representatives back on that committee wanted to have a personal telephone call just before they would go into their Washington meetings so that they could say, "I've just spoken to our Field Representative; and, this is a situation on the ground," I spent almost as much time feeding back into Washington as I did problem solving on the ground.

Q: A game of one-upmanship, I guess.

MORSE: Part of it was that. When Brian left, as you know, after the return of the refugees, there was a question of whether that committee should be shut down or should it now become a reconstruction committee. It was going to be chaired by the Deputy White House Chief of Staff, Maria Echaveste. I frankly don't know whether they went ahead to put her in charge and kept the committee or whether it was dissolved and turned back over to routine agency operations. I left before that action.

Just one last note. When I came back, there were five (5) separate requests for my staying involved with this. I was quite eager to do that at first. One of those requests came from the Deputy Foreign Minister of Macedonia, who asked that I come back as an advisor to his government. That was very tempting; but, to me it still seemed like the right role for the Europeans to be playing. It was certainly harder for others who didn't come from an AID background with the sense of democratic participation and involvement, working with the host country and being a low-key advisor. That was one request. (He later became Prime Minister.)

Another request was to go back and coordinate on the reconstruction, just like I had been doing on the humanitarian relief. Another one was to go as an advisor to the United Nations. The last one was to stay here and be the reconstruction coordinator out of the State Department on the staff of Ambassador Dobbins, who was the man who had taken over for Ambassador Holbrooke. I looked at that for a week in Washington. They had so many people working on this, many pulling in so many different directions, that I finally bowed out. What does that mean? On the reconstruction, they wanted somebody who understood program and budget, but in a political and security context of reconstruction.

The SEED coordinator's office had a very competent fellow that we had worked with on Bosnia and was still there on Kosovo. He was very much in the lead on this. He could and should have been doing that work. They had brought in a retired ambassador who was doing the other donor coordination. A lot of that other donor coordination was on reconstruction of Kosovo. The majority of it was. He wanted to do that work; but, he only wanted to do it at a macro level. Basically, I think he wanted me to be the budget officer and not the strategic planner and operator.

Ultimately, I just decided, more for personal reasons, that it was just time to step back out and to help my new family, step back and not continue to work on Kosovo operations.

Q: Where was the money for all this coming from, from AID's budget or from all sorts of budgets?

MORSE: There had been a supplemental passed by Congress; and, a huge amount of the money was in the State Department to pay for the police. They had the responsibility to recruit for and to carry on the diplomatic effort; but, State also made our contributions to the United Nations for the resettlement of refugees. The AID money was a much smaller portion than the State parts.

Q: Our money was mostly for relief and rehabilitation?

MORSE: The Hill, when they passed that supplemental, made it clear that they wanted the Europeans to do the reconstruction and the U.S. could help with resettling refugees. So, that became part of the issue of what is rehabilitation versus resettlement versus reconstruction. Again, I have these 20 definitions. I'll put those into the paper.

Q: On Kosovo, what kind of conclusion do you reach about the whole way this thing was managed; and, how do you respond to this sort of thing?

MORSE: Let me take it a step higher than that first. We've had four (4) ex-Yugoslavia wars between Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo. There could be four (4) more between Serbia, Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro. In fact, I wouldn't be surprised if, within the next six to eight weeks, Montenegro blows. I think the bigger lesson is, in this new post-Cold War period where people are able almost under the rubric of free democracy to express their grievances, how do you manage the resolution of those grievances so they don't become yet more ultra- national demands for separatism, more religious differences demand for separateness, more tribal demands for separateness and this continued bifurcation of a country. In this case, all of Yugoslavia could end up with eight (8) little separate countries, none of which are very economically viable, none of which will even be ethnically cleansed and pure. How do you get from this sense of separateness to processes that can give a foundation of diversity and pluralism for people to live in a truly democratic society? I think that is one of the real challenges that is facing us not just in the Balkans, but in the world as a whole.

Can you imagine what would happen in India if there was a linguistic revolution of people who wanted to be separate because they had separate languages? People say there are at least 121 separate languages in India. Take that democracy, which in one sense is the largest democracy in the world, and through that freedom of democracy in India, people were able to keep not a Kashmir kind of separateness, but a linguistic or ethnic? The world would turn into chaos.

Q: But, in the Southeast Europe area, we've had a situation where one ethnic group has dominated all the others pretty much – by the Serbs. Is that reasonably accurate?

MORSE: Yes, at different times in history. In different time, the Serbs have been controlled by the Turks, as they call them, or the Muslims. At different times, the Croats were more dominant.

Q: But in recent times.

MORSE: Yes, but that was an authoritarian imposition by Tito.

Q: Right. The question then is, if you have situations where one ethnic group dominates all the others, it will never be permanently stable. You eventually will get to where they will control if they have the power and will; therefore, there needs to be some form of federated arrangement. This goes to the point you made for the need for a larger concept of identity. Did anybody think about that?

MORSE: There was a wonderful amount of work being done by a group over in the World Bank that started in their Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit. They are now thinking in terms of pre- conflict prevention. They had an economist, Paul Collier, who I think has done the absolute best work that I've read anyplace. We got him over to AID and had him brief people like Emmy Simmons, who is the head economist in the AID Global Bureau now, Jerry Wolgin and Crosswell, PPC's chief economist. Paul has looked at all of the internal conflicts that have taken place since World War II and boiled it down to the fact that all conflicting people either have grievances or greed, greed for power, land or money, or grievances that may be religious, political, ethnic identity, what it is. This gets then down to your other point about how do you manage these and what kind of structures do you put in place? Basically, he feels that you can begin to identify early on what those grievances are and the greed tendencies of a dominant group and what you have to put in place in terms of the transparency, in terms of the accountability of a society and a government to counteract those so that they don't get to the point where they are so blatantly authoritarian that you destroy the democratic or the pluralistic base of your society. So, I think there are a lot of lessons learned.

I didn't answer your first question about what are the lessons learned out of Kosovo. Certainly, the White House interagency group was unique. It was not using the NSC structure. It was chaired by the AID Administrator. It was high level. There were working groups all over town as Kosovo Task Forces. In every single agency, the U.S. government had literally thousands of people working on it. It came together on the

humanitarian crises at that level. I've never seen that happen quite like that before. I've seen NSC working groups and task forces set up, but not as focused as that.

Q: What does this suggest for certain types of crises like this? An ad hoc structure is probably worthwhile.

MORSE: This is what State seems to be putting in place over and over again on their side. They don't rely on the usual structure, nor does AID. You put in place some sort of a working group or task force to do it. This one at a high level, this one an interagency, this one with the single focus on humanitarian. Having run a couple of Task Forces for the Agency, I believe they are right for specific problems – short term.

Let me tell you the weakness of that. I kept worrying about why aren't people worried about the police part of this, the refugee return, the public administration, the reconstruction, etc.? They were only focused on the humanitarian, the immediate relief. I was astounded that, after a month on the job, when I raised this question I was told that, "There is another group working on that." I asked, "What is the interface? What is the tradeoff? How do we coordinate them? Who is it?" Well, it wasn't as formal as that; but, the NSC person for Europe was chairing a more political group. Here again, the humanitarian was outside that and yet we had missed the opportunity to use the democratic process training of people in the camps. For instance, in this continuum of the relief to development, there is a fairly consistent pattern when people go back and return and they seek revenge, whether Hutus and Tutsis, whether they are Muslims, Bosnians or Serbs, where they take revenge on each other unless, while you have them as a dependent audience in the refugee camps, you can literally day in and day out preach the gospel of tolerance and law abiding citizens under a new regime. I kept saying, "I hate this next phase because we don't do a good job of it." It came so fast; and, people had resisted it; and, we saw what happened. As soon as the Kosovar refugees went home, they have taken the revenge on the Serbs that the Serbs were taking on them. You ask yourself as a country, as a world, have we accomplished anything?

Q: Good point. Did you in this task force business encounter resistance from the traditional line of agencies saying, "We're busy with our things". Did they, therefore, resist participating or supporting?

MORSE: Some them did, yes; and, some of them did not. I depended on the leadership and their own perception. Let me give you one example. The woman who heads the education and human resource part of the Global Bureau of AID comes from Latin America herself. She has written books and chapters in books on how to use education for peacekeeping. Her name is Emily Vargas. When we were working as a conflict prevention task force, Emily came forward immediately and said, "We can work with UNICEF on everything from mine awareness, mine education, land mine protection, to reexamining the curriculum of all parties in a situation like this. We can work to get the discrimination, the hate, the history of superiority, the curriculum of supremacy and move it towards a curriculum that would sustain a pluralistic society rather than a separatist society." She came forth and made offers of help. On the other hand, when you

set up a separate task force like this, then the rest of the institutions can say, "Oh, well, that's their job. That's not mine. I don't have to get involved in that." That is the downside of a task force. So, it is a difficult management problem, given the need to pull in experience where people have been through similar problems before, often people are assigned bureaucratically, whoever is in a relevant office now: "You're in the task force because you are the (Albanian) desk officer." They may have no clue what this is all about. I guess I come down on working at these problems as a task force, but interfacing it to draw on and getting people in the task force who are knowledgeable and intellectually honest enough to draw on the other resources and not do it as a power play on their part.

Q: In the international setting, what do you see as the relative roles of the UN or European or other groups and not just the U.S.? Was the UN effective in this? What is its problem?

MORSE: You almost have to desegregate it. Certainly, when it came to the military and the security part of it, the military arm that is authorized under the UN charter, but had never been activated, could not have done what NATO did. Could the U.S. have done it without NATO? They absolutely could not have, should not have and would not have. But, was the U.S. the dominant force on the military part of it versus the UN or NATO? Absolutely. We were calling the shots in the military. The Europeans could have done the same, if they were united on an issue or empowered one of their members to do it.

On the humanitarian, we wanted very much to have the UNHCR in a leadership role with the Kosovo refugees. We were very disappointed at the beginning that the UN was so slow off the mark in putting experienced, senior and good UN managers into this.

Q: Why do you think they're slow? Because they didn't get the mandate, didn't have the resources?

MORSE: No, the resources were there. It's just that it meant making the decision to empower a Dennis McNamara. Dennis and I had worked on Cambodia together. We had worked on Bosnia together. He would have done the job immediately if the cumbersome UN system could have acted more quickly. In fairness, the immediate and huge refugee situation required an immediate and massive response.

Q: He was the head of which UN group?

MORSE: In UNHCR, he is the deputy; but, he wasn't put in charge of managing Kosovo refugees until about halfway through the exercise. In one sense, if you look at it, the humanitarian part of this basically only lasted two months from the time the refugees came out, from the middle of April until the middle of June; but, it took the UN a month to react. In that month, you had UNHCR being overwhelmed. They had people on the ground who hadn't been through this kind of thing before; but, they needed immediate senior leadership to lead the whole effort. I think they did very well, after four weeks they had a very active multi-national team. They also brought in a fellow who was normally in

charge of Asia. He was the guy I turned the Contras over to in UNHCR. He was put in charge of Albania; but, that was only one part of the complex refugee equation. So, they did bring in some experienced people very quickly. Their role on the refugee side of this was absolutely critical. In fact, I think sometimes the U.S. overplays its role and doesn't recognize the dominant and predominant role that the UNHCR does, should and must play in this. In that regard, I am a little critical of our own OFDA and the woman who was in charge of the DART team in the field taking credit and reporting things that made it look like the U.S. and the DART and OFDA were such important bigger players than they really were. Two-thirds of the money going to the UNHCR was coming through the State Department, IO. Is it important? Absolutely. OFDA has very critical money that comes in little pieces and is flexible and fast; but, the bigger money and the total responsibilities are much larger than OFDA/DART.

You asked about the roles of the UN and other international organizations. Not the military, not the refugee relief, but then when you come to the reconstruction phase, other organizations must lead. There had been an urgent request that the EU take the lead on that; but, the available money was from the World Bank. So, does the Bank take the lead versus the EU? The latter had set up a task force in Brussels that was to be jointly staffed by the World Bank and the EU; but, at the time I came back, the task force didn't have anybody from the Bank on it. Nobody had been assigned over to Brussels yet. Again, international leadership often takes time to evolve, when a situation demands immediacy.

Q: Did UNDP have any role in this?

MORSE: No, not much of a role at all. It was pretty much the big five powers were ascribing to the UN a different role, not a UNDP role at that point. The UN role was to put together the Kosovo administration, the interim administration. The United Nations Security Council resolution, which the big powers had asked for, authorized the UN to go in on an interim basis to Kosovo and totally run the country. To the best of my knowledge (and I have to research this), I couldn't find any other parallel in my immediate experience except for what we had in Japan after World War II.

Q: What about the Congo in the 1960s? The U.S. funded it; and, the UN went in and ran the government.

MORSE: That is a good one. That is a real good one. I know we came close to it over in West Africa at one point in Liberia where we put the Minister of Finance in place.

Q: That was a U.S. effort.

MORSE: Rather than the UN.

Q: The UN's most important role was in this larger question of a potentially new country administration and reconstituting a national system.

MORSE: But, here again, there was tremendous conflict between the UN's role and the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe). The OSCE had been on the ground. They had been so dominant in the election process and the public administration over in Bosnia. They had been working in Kosovo before fighting broke out, almost with a shadow government in Kosovo. They had been working with some of the refugee groups outside. They were headed by former American Ambassador Walker. He got crosswise with Holbrooke; and, so OSCE itself got a tainted name simply because Walker was heading it. Still, you found that OSCE was widely involved outside the UN.

Q: Did they have an independent capacity?

MORSE: Oh, totally. They had staff and what we called the "pumpkins", the orange-colored vehicles, hundreds of the OSCE orange-colored vehicles, running around. They were the Peace Verification Group inside Kosovo before this last humanitarian and reconstruction phase. For two years, they had a couple of thousand people in Kosovo that were verifying adherence to the peace that had been negotiated two years before. Then, when that peace broke down, they came out ahead of the refugees and then with the refugees; but, they were prepared to go back in to verify any peace agreement. They also were in charge of collecting information on war crimes. So, they were interviewing refugees in the camps; but, there were differences between OSCE and the UN regarding establishing or running an interim Kosovo administration.

Q: This was basically the European organization.

MORSE: Yes.

Q: With the Russians and the others all very active.

MORSE: That's right. But, then the role on establishing a government and Kosovo administration that you might have thought fell to the UN very naturally became complicated by the tension with the OSCE in terms of who should be doing this. Of course, who would the UN put in charge? Carl Bildt at one point said he didn't want it; but, then he was going to be the super person over it. I guess my biggest criticism was that people don't think of the different over-lapping phases in a continuum that you have to work on simultaneously. If you're not working on the refugee return at the same time you're doing refugee relief, you're not ready. If you're not working on setting up the new government, the police, the elections and the local government at the same time you're working on the relief and return, you're not ready, you're behind the curve. Almost everybody thinks of the relief stage as so separate from the return, from the resettlement, from the rehabilitation, from the reconstruction. They must be seen as over-lapping phases in a continuum.

Q: There is no group that looks at these things in that perspective? The UN might be taking that role.

MORSE: If you talk to the Europeans, if you talk to the World Bank, you talk to the United Nations, everybody can talk a continuum; but, they can't act on it. It's just like the American ambassador didn't want to be bothered with the concept. Others understood the concept but bureaucratically could only work on one phase at a time. For instance, in the U.S. side, the Congress certainly didn't want the U.S. involved in the reconstruction of Kosovo. So, in terms of being able to do the prepositioning, the roofing, the prepositioning of the construction materials, or deciding who was going to be in charge of restoring the transformer for the village versus the plugs in the house versus the dam to generate the electricity, they don't think in these terms. You just don't have over-lapping assigned responsibilities or staff that stays to work on the follow-on phases.

Q: That reflects this conflict resolution preparation process. Until you have a conflict, it doesn't have a priority. After a while, you create an entity to deal with these things when there isn't anything happening. You have to have a crisis to bring it into being.

MORSE: That's right. That is the whole process with doing prevention versus resolution.

Q: People don't get very enthusiastic about prevention. How do you find that?

MORSE: I think I may have mentioned when we were talking about the GHAI that people on the Hill, the people over at NSC were absolutely excited about: "If there is a way you guys can prevent these things, we'll sure put the money and the time behind it." I don't know if you saw the President's address to the Veterans of Foreign Wars this week. What was he talking about? The press headlined it: "Prevention, Diplomacy and Foreign Aid"; but, he never quite linked them. I am almost to the point of writing a letter to the editor about the hypocrisy of the President on this in terms of truly mandating prevention. There is hypocrisy in the State Department and within AID of the prevention side of it. Yes, as I just said, you take the little corner of Southeast Europe, we've had four wars and the potential is for four more. Within six to eight weeks, we could see Montenegro blow. Within two years, we can see Macedonia being split off by its 22% Albanian population that is already demanding a separate language of instruction in the university. By Greece that is strangulating the trade of landlocked Macedonia. Why? Because when Macedonia was created nine years ago, they didn't like them using the country name of "Macedonia". So, they are retaliating. They still don't give visas, they harass the trade, the transport, and they're strangling them. Well, how long are Macedonians going to put up with that before something blows? Why, when we see something as mundane as a country's name, as important as the language of instruction in the university, we have to go to war to solve these things?

Q: But then whose responsibility is it to prevent these things or to help resolve them?

MORSE: If it's a democratic, pluralistic government, it's the host government. If it's not, they just clamp down and use force to suppress it; and, the sacrosanct policy of "sovereignty" stops international preventative work.

Q: What about outside? Who can help prevent it? You talk about needing preventive action. Whose responsibility is that? Where does the leadership come from?

MORSE: It will vary in my mind from region to region, problem to problem, who has got the influence, the credibility, who could over the last 50 years talk to the Pakistanis and the Indians about resolving Kashmir, which they've fought two wars over, and now we get all excited because they have nuclear capability? This is no more than just throwing cannon balls at each other. Who is responsible Was it the British? Maybe 50 years ago? The UN? They've tried. The U.S? Who else? In Rwanda, it will be different. In Yugoslavia, it will be different. In Ethiopia, it will be different. Who has the influence and the credibility? That is the problem. There is no leadership; and, there isn't a single focus.

Q: Let us stop here. It has been a very interesting, reflective experience to have you do this oral history. I thank you for the opportunity, as I thank you for letting me work with you periodically during the Africa part of my career.

End of interview