The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

JOHN BRAYTON REDECKER

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
Initial interview date: September 7, 2007

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INTERVIEW

[This interview was not edited prior to Mr. Redecker's death]

Q: This is an interview with John Brayton Redecker. This is being done on behalf of the Association of Diplomatic studies, and I'm Charles Stuart Kennedy. You go by Brayton or Bray.

REDECKER: Yes.

Q: When and where were you born?

REDECKER: I was born on October 29, 1932 in Frankfurt am Rhein, Germany. There are two Frankfurts. My father was at the time consul, and he had recently arrived there from Naples with his new bride, my mother.

Q: I'm trying to pick up some of the family background, where people are from. Let's start on your father's side. What do you know about the Redeckers?

REDECKER: My father was one of seven children. He was the youngest, and his eldest brother was 21 years older than he was. He was born in New York, but his mother was from a very, very prominent Rhode Island family with the name of Brayton which has quite a pedigree in Rhode Island. I think his great-grandfather was chief justice of the state of Rhode Island and there was a General Brayton who was chief of the Republican party.

My grandmother married a German immigrant by the name of Redecker who was something of an adventurer and married my father's mother essentially because of her name and the money she had. He was a highly educated German, something of a complicated man, a strange type of individual. He never accomplished much except to consume resources of his wife. This left a very bitter taste in my own father's memory. He grew up in financial difficulty after quite a bit of resources had already been expended before he had even arrived. He entered the Foreign Service as something of a response to this and as a separation from his father.

Q: Do you know when he went into the Foreign Service?

REDECKER: Sydney Redecker was his name. Sydney Brayton Redecker. He joined the navy just at the edge of World War I, American entry in 1917. He used his political connections from Rhode Island, from the family relationships that were still there, to get himself to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. He was there as a young petty officer on the U.S. delegation. It was there when he decided to make diplomacy his career. He got himself -- I don't know the details of all of this, and I'll tell you why in a minute --

appointed to Warsaw out of the peace conference when it concluded. He knew all of the American delegation.

He then got himself assigned to the embassy through these. He was well connected, and he made use of his connections. He assigned himself to Warsaw and became the private secretary of the then-ambassador, our ambassador in Warsaw. It was there that he then began to work on joining what he decided would be his life career: the consular service. The Rodgers Act had not yet come into force.

Q: That was 1924.

REDECKER: He entered, to my recollection, the consular service in 1921. He took the exams. I should point out he never went to college, and he nevertheless trained himself such that he could pass the exams. He came into the consular service sometime around 1922.

Q: Where was his education?

REDECKER: I guess in high school in Brooklyn in New York where he lived. He worked very hard at attempting to reestablish the "pedigree." He found his family very degraded. His brother never accomplished too terribly much. He was very offended, I think, against his father.

Q: Was your grandfather -- his father -- a presence, or was he completely out?

REDECKER: He was out of the picture. He had died well before my arrival since my father was so much younger than his eldest brother who was 21 years older than he was. It was a statement of rebellion to join the federal government. Nobody joined the federal government before that. There had to be something wrong with you because you have to go out and make money. He said, "I think I should join the federal government. This is a worthwhile thing to do." It was in Warsaw that he did this, and he had quite an interesting time in Warsaw in post-World War I in Poland. He related to me anecdotally many adventures there.

Q: Do you have stories of that time that stick in your mind?

REDECKER: I don't at the moment. I could start cogitating.

Q: You can insert those.

REDECKER: I see. One of the reasons, Mr. Kennedy, that I don't have very good information is that a great, great personal tragedy occurred for me in 1996. A fire occurred in a warehouse in Frankfurt, Germany, and burned all my personal possessions. I have ended up like a Russian refugee in 1918. I don't have a single thing from quite a rich collection of memorabilia and family documents. It was a great tragedy.

Q: Of course it is.

REDECKER: I don't have much tangible information for you. All of it has to come out of this poor little head.

Q: Your mother's background.

REDECKER: My mother was a Bostonian, rather proud, and not a very financially well established lady with a very good family past as well. In fact, I have two families who seemed to have gone down financially over time whereas the United States was going up generally.

Q: In a way, you've got a northern ethnic background compared to so many people who have written about the southern experience.

REDECKER: My mother was quite a proud and very attractive Bostonian. Her name was Jordon, and she related to me when I was small. She was very attentive in my upbringing for reasons we can get into later on. She was very attentive in trying to inculcate into me my own American past. She worked very hard to talk about the family.

Q: Where did she go to school?

REDECKER: She went to finishing school. After finishing school, one did not go further.

Q: My mother went to Westover, and that was it.

REDECKER: That was a world. Educated women were of a different social category than nice people as I have heard so often from her. Her life is somewhat camouflaged intentionally because I did meet her father -- my grandfather -- who lived to very great old age: 97 years old. He lived in Boston as a Boston family and goes way back. It is one of these wonderful American examples of degenerating families over generations as the southern families are so much better described in our literature.

Q: Well, can we talk about your very early youth that you remember? Where did your father go after Frankfurt?

REDECKER: That was some very interesting assignments. When he left Warsaw he completed his exams, was accepted, and was assigned to Rotterdam in the early '20s. I don't know terribly well what happened there, but he seemed to be something of a ___ and in possibly throwing his weight around, a little cocky. I don't know. That's just an interpretation, and I don't want to say bad things about my father. I gather from some of his correspondence that I had seen with young ladies involved, he was perhaps something of a man about town, you might say, to the extent that possibly this was not congenial to the consul general.

He was then assigned to Sumatra in the Dutch East Indies, today, of course, Indonesia. He spent four very productive and formative years there where he started building his economics capability which carried him way up into the Foreign Service. He studied the development of Sumatra and how the Dutch were developing a really large energy base for their economy there. His reporting was very highly appreciated. I think he was there until about 1926-27. I guess Sumatra, must have been a terrible place to be assigned to. He loved it! He was his own boss. He said, "I began the Foreign Service in a place where I was my own boss as a vice-consul." He did very good reporting; in fact, he made his name on reporting. He then was assigned to Naples as a pat on the back or a pat on the head. He spent four years in Naples under the famous consul general Byington.

Q: Yes, Homer Byington!

REDECKER: Homer Byington. I had heard so much of Homer Byington in my life. He apparently had this huge ego. I mean a towering ego and no competition from young ones.

Q: Byington was born in Naples.

REDECKER: I think that's right.

Q: His father had been the...

REDECKER: ...also.

Q: At a much later date, I was consul general in Naples and heard about Byington.

REDECKER: He was the great figure at the time. Father had greatly played on Byington's ego, manias, and weaknesses, and spent four years there and did rather good reporting, I understand. He focused very importantly on -- this is all anecdotal, you understand -- the role of the rotaries in economic development. The Italians had evolved the Rotary International, a group of do-gooders as we had the idea that they are and, indeed, are in some places. It was almost an instrument of the Mussolini state.

Q: Part of a fascist apparatus.

REDECKER: He started reporting on this kind of thing, what they were up to. They were up to very interesting industrial development projects, often technology-based. That won him some attention, and I think even grudging attention from Homer Byington. That got him then assigned to Frankfurt in 1931.

Q: Was he the consul there?

REDECKER: He was a consul already in Naples.

Q: Was there a consul general in Frankfurt?

REDECKER: Oh, yes indeed! Frankfurt was one of numerous consulates general in Germany. Yes, it was important even though the city is a small city. Dresden and Leipzig were much larger population wise.

Q: Frankfurt was a banking center.

REDECKER: Yes indeed, and which became Father's great goldmine in his career. It is also, of course, the city next to the I.G. Farben and Hoechst where Father bored in gradually, reporting because things were very interesting, and I can discuss those for you.

Q: Go ahead.

REDECKER: He moved into the reporting about Hoechst (a huge drug company) and reporting about I.G. Farben.

Q: Which was a great industrial company, dyes, and chemicals.

REDECKER: The highest technology in the world.

Q: Absolutely.

REDECKER: And also with worldwide connections including interlocking directorateships, ownerships, minority positions that were reinforced by links to Imperial Chemical, with American Dow, with many, many large American companies in the United States. Tentacles all over the world. He made it his business to get into this as a reporting officer.

He began reporting on I.G. Farben to the point that he said it was a state within a state. It has a foreign minister; it has an overseas foreign affairs apparatus. It has technology and other things. He said it is an important political-economic tool for Germany.

He really studied. I recall all the chemistry books, somebody he hired to teach him chemistry. He learned a great deal of it. He began to develop the concept, and then to prove the concept, that I.G. Farben was being designed by the incoming Nazi government, as an instrument for war-making. The new aspect of this was that chemistry -- chemical products -- synthetic products, were to be the backbone of the new German war machine.

In essence he began to evolve the idea that the central backbone of the German re-armament process was the chemical industry, not the coal and steel industry as was classically imbedded in people's thinking at the time. That's why you had to have the ruler, that's why you had to have the czar. You needed the coal, you needed to make fire to make steel, to make paint. He said, "No, no, no. You don't! The Nazis are designing a war machine based on synthetic materials and the ability to withstand blockade exclusion from normal raw materials.

Gradually he began putting out this material on synthetics and the use of synthetics. It started to cause attention being paid to his reporting, not by the State Department who knew nothing about it, but by other agencies in the U.S. government. That began to change his whole status first of all in the consulate, in the Foreign Service, and in the State Department.

The result of this is that "Washington" began to pay attention to this around 1936. Father had been there five years. They urged him to remain there and not be reassigned. He found that he actually liked this, and he was making and building an edifice of this theory and proving it. People were paying attention to it, so he stayed on. The long and short of that is we stayed in Germany until September of 1941, well into World War II.

They would not move him. After a while they were offering him different posts, seeing how he scoped this thing. He was so tightly involved with the local Nazi party, with I.G. Farben, the foreign minister Ribbentrop. My mother was a great hostess. I can recall from my childhood our substantial apartment was always a center of entertainment.

Q: Did you pass peanuts?

REDECKER: No, I was put to bed most of the time.

Q: I just passed peanuts.

REDECKER: No, I was not involved in that. They would have black-tie events. My mother was a frequent entertainer.

Q: Let's talk about being a kid there.

REDECKER: My father felt he should go for his own career. He said simply don't worry about it. He got double promotions when one could get them at the time. He then decided to stay there until 1939. We fled twice: once to Switzerland and once to the Netherlands. Every time my mother said, "I belong with my husband," and we came back to Germany. We were bombed eventually by the British, so I know what bombings are. We were there till well into 1941 when we were repatriated to the Schwarzwald.

Q: Did you go to the Schwarzwald with so many of the other similar...

REDECKER: We were assembled actually all American diplomats who in '41 were being taken out of Germany, and the assembly was in Frankfurt. We were put on trains -- these are the diplomats from all our consulates and the embassy -- and from Frankfurt we took this dramatic, out of this world, trip on this train from Frankfurt the French-Spanish border with Germans all over the place. We were in the sleeping cars. We were loaded on the Spanish train and taken to Lisbon where we boarded the USS West Point on her maiden trip. Before that she was the SS America. Then we came back to New York City and back to Washington, and that concluded my father's German adventure.

Q: We'll move on to other things, but let's talk about you as a kid in Germany.

REDECKER: I'm an only child. That was very difficult. There were no other little American boys. One other consul had a son and a daughter. He had a very complicated marriage, but he had a son from a wife who had died who was four and a half years older than I. So I had no American connections. No little British boys were there. I was immersed in the German world. I grew up with Germans; German is native to me. I speak German to this day.

I grew up quite isolated. I grew up with a mother who was terribly intent on making sure that I had an American imprint. I had a nanny to begin with, then my mother's mother came to Germany and essentially raised me because my mother was very socially engaged. It was quite a lively little place. A small place, but they were very involved socially with quite a few people of considerable importance to my father and his reporting.

So my grandmother took care of me most of the time until I was eligible to go to school. It was decided that I should go to a German school. There are interesting connections that I will reveal later on along the line on this.

I was deeply exposed to the German environment, and the Nazi environment, and was very, very attentive to what was happening. I have vivid, vivid memories.

Q: Let's talk about them. For example, could you belong to the Hitler Jugend or something like that?

REDECKER: I couldn't.

Q: The Hitler youth.

REDECKER: An amusing little episode: I had a few friends. I went to the Wohler Schure and, of course...

Q: How do you spell that?

REDECKER: W-O-H-L-E-R S-C-H-U-R-E. I was in the first class. I was somewhat isolated, sometimes being pointed to an American and already the state of relations was deteriorating vis-a-vis Germany and the United States. The Americans were being increasingly seen as supporting the British Empire, Great Britain, and who are these Americans here?

In the first year this was not terribly difficult but in the second year, which I never completed, it became intolerable, and I had to be taken out of school. You mentioned youth groups. I was too young. Perhaps you could say fortunately. One day I did put on a uniform as a Fascist youth, a uniform of my little neighbor friend who was the child of

the janitor of two buildings down, He was four years older than I but was about my size. I said, “Let’s play a joke on my parents. Let me put your uniform on, and I will appear in front of them, and won’t they be surprised...” chuckle, chuckle, joke, joke.

Well, my father came home, and he looked at me and said, “Where did *you* get *that*?” I can remember that so well! Little Laurence was watching behind a tree, seeing what the reaction would be, they would all applaud and say, “That’s wonderful! This is the way the world should be!” I was, of course, crestfallen that I should be reprimanded. Father said, “You are a little American boy. You go and take that thing off and never *ever* put it back on.” That was a little episode in the doorway that I can recall.

We, of course, were bombed more or less regularly by very brave British RAF people. My grandmother who was with us said, “Oh! Those poor British boys! Those poor British boys up there when the search lights go round, “ ___ sixes and sevens, maybe eight, maximum ten. The Germans were yelling, “Now we’re getting some! Now we get some! Now we get some! Those English. We wipe them out!” This was tension building with my mother rubbing her hands and saying, “Oh, those brave, wonderful British boys,” and the emotional tension. I had written short stories about this because it is so, so electrically charged sitting in an air raid shelter -- with all of the tension. Bang! Bang! And all the sirens going on. It was traumatic.

Q: Could you talk about in the school your impression of both the teachers and of the students toward you? Not just towards you but also what were you picking up about the Jews, about Hitler. I realize you were very young, but you were impressionable.

REDECKER: There’s no question about it. I was very sensitized to the environment I was in. Sensitized, I would say, because I was different. I’m an oddity. It’s like a black boy in a totally white school universe. I had great sympathy for situations of racial situations because I was in the same situation. I was a curiosity. Fortunately, I could speak. I tried to mingle, but I was always looked upon as a strange oddity. There was no real hazing at the time. You could have expected that had I been a Brit. Obviously, it would have been impossible. But I was not, and the Americans were still in a singular state of political somnambulism. The Germans were still trying to maneuver the United States.

Q: We had the German Bund in the United States.

REDECKER: There was that, and the Germans were tolerant. We were not molested until the very end, into ’41 when life became impossible. I could no longer go to school. It was totally impossible.

Q: Why couldn’t you go to school?

REDECKER: America was being seen as supporting the British. The ships were coming, the Germans had been complaining about this unrestricted support, the hundred destroyers. Things were getting sour. “There’s that little American boy. He’s the enemy!

He's the enemy!" Gradually the notion of "You are the enemy. The friend of my enemy is my enemy," to rephrase the observation. It became difficult, and I had to be removed from the school.

Q: I'm looking as the observer: What about Hitler? Was it the glory of the Fuehrer and all? What was happening in school?

REDECKER: It was highly marshaled. I was at an age where all of that did not take place which the impact would have in, perhaps, some later classes. I was, after all only a half a year in class two. The effect was, "der Fuehrer" this and "der Fuehrer" that. The teachers, I must say and I give them that due account because I'm otherwise pretty tough on the Germans, the teachers were not terribly comfortable at having to propagate the Nazi way of looking at the world and describing the world to the children. Herr ___ was my second teacher. He actually came to the house to give me private lessons after I could no longer go to school. He used to shake his head and speak about where this regime is taking the German nation. That's very isolated to my way of thinking, my point of view. In general, the German nation was entirely supportive of the Nazi movement.

Q: But in general?

REDECKER: I found -- and I was exposed to -- a world of absolute total support, of adoration of this new regime. Specifically, I was very often up in the janitor's apartment. That's where I really belonged. I could eat goulash. My mother never touched these things. My mother was fine, and my mother was very attentive in Americanizing me. I want to stress this because she ordered materials from the Calvert School, that correspondence school. She was very intent on not making me lose my American heritage.

In the Foreign Service at the time, the children were almost always the product of two nationalities. The Foreign Service officer generally had a foreign wife. I don't know if you can say generally, but it was a very high percentage of foreign wives. My mother was insistent. I had Walt Disney comics stories. I had these books the Hardy Boys. I had Old Mother West Wind to impress the American theme on me. Many years later I was impressed at the strenuous effort my mother made to keep me American having never been in America.

As I was saying to you, I was up in the attic where the house munster and his wife lived. They had two children. My father called the wife a horse. She was stronger than 10 men. She could lift a grand piano practically and carry it on her shoulder. She had a son who went into the military. Hans was his name. The son came with his soldier friends. On Sunday afternoons music would blare. I would sit in the sill of the window. These young men in uniforms. Not SS. Black uniforms were also the uniforms of the tankers.

Whilst they were singing away, such a Sunday afternoon when my father was listening to classical music, perhaps, downstairs. Here I was feeling my oats as a little seven year old in the window sill with all these strapping young men in black uniforms drinking coffee,

singing at the top of their lungs. I had this recollection. This did not happen. Once it happened. Several times. I was very attached to the local people: the milkman, the gardener. We lived in an apartment building on the ground floor right in the center of town and not far from the railroad station.

Q: My first post was Frankfurt. This was in '55. Actually, my great-grandfather died there. He'd been consul general in Vienna in the 1880's and then went to Frankfurt. He was born in Germany. His name was Youson, but he was an American in the Civil War. He died in Frankfurt.

REDECKER: Died in Frankfurt?

Q: Little pitchers have big ears. There you were sitting in the corner with your father, mother, grandmother. Were you able from your parents to get their impression of the Nazi times? How did they feel about it? What were you picking up in their conversation?

REDECKER: My father generally said, "This is martial Germany in the way that the world has never see Germany together since, perhaps, the middle ages, the time when you had a holy Roman empire which was a functioning entity. He said, "This is a very dangerous problem." His concern all the time was there is another dangerous problem on the other side. Never forget that when the Nazis came to power, 14% of Germany was communist. The Nazis at least -- *at least* -- destroyed the communist movement in Germany that was on the edge of possibly taking over the country.

This is not fashionable to say, and people don't want to hear that but there was a perversely beneficial effect of the Nazi takeover of Germany on this communist problem. My father never lost sight of that. It was something that today is almost totally forgotten. The Nazi movement, he said, "There is a war coming. These people want a re-designed Europe to the advantage of Germany." He became increasingly worried. He said this was no longer, as it was so often touted by its apologists, a new social movement, a new regeneration. After all, the terrible things of the post-First World War. The Versailles Treaty. He said, "It is beyond this now. We're in some very malevolent thing." This was his view.

Q: Were you able to pick up the attitude toward the plight of the Jews? This is a question that comes up in the Foreign Service. Not that it was horribly anti-Semitic, but people were not receptive to Jews in much of society, fraternities, clubs, the whole thing. They weren't interwoven into our society at that point.

REDECKER: My father was very ambivalent about it, quite honestly. I wrote a short story and won a prize over it called "The Nice Nazi." It is a little American boy watching a big black uniform -- the *real* black uniform -- coming to pick up the gentleman on the third floor of our building whose name was Mr. Loeb, as we called him "Herr Loeb." My grandmother who spoke not a word of English called him Mr. Loeb. Mr. Loeb was taken away by these people and put in an automobile. We all looked around and said, "My goodness, what's that? What does this mean?" There was a sudden, strained silence.

I do not accept the idea that Germans knew nothing about it. Everybody knew a great deal about what was going on and chose not to -- or dared not to -- speak about it. But it was very profound there.

Q: It was a non-acceptance of the Jew within our society.

REDECKER: Even more than that. A removal of the Jew from the society. It had to be cleansed. The modern phrase "ethnic cleansing" is pertinent to the way the Germans looked at this. It has to be removed. What happens after the removal takes place? "Well, we don't want to know about that."

Q: I have my own theory, and I'm going to put it in here. Taking the Jew out of the German society in which it fits this group of people fits so well and added so much to it has destroyed the German culture. Today it's like a stew without salt. When you talk about German culture today, then you have to sit back and think. Movies? Not particularly. There's just nothing there. Anyway, that's a prejudice.

REDECKER: I don't think it's a prejudice. It's an absolute fact. The richness, the real culture.

Q: Also your father's interests: chemicals and dyes and also banking. The Jews were a very prominent factor in the pool.

REDECKER: Absolutely. All but major bank houses as I recall were all Jewish. But their philanthropy and the benefit to the society that was very significantly altered.

Q: The rednecks essentially took over with the Nazis. Who was the consul general?

REDECKER: We had several.

Q: Did they play much of a role, or was your father operating on his own?

REDECKER: He became essentially his own operator. He got so involved in his own special territory. He said, speaking in today's world, "I would be the CIA agent. The station chief." He was, in fact, his own little universe.

Q: After you were in school or forced out of school, were you feeling bewildered? Angry? All of a sudden you're caught up in this thing, and you had to refocus.

REDECKER: I was glad to be out of the school because the finger pointing began to start on me. As one can imagine might happen to Jewish little boys and girls. The finger pointing began: "What are you doing here" Get out of here!" I was quite content to be withdrawn from that. In the later times, they wouldn't let me out of the house alone. I'd have to go out accompanied.

As I mentioned earlier, my grandmother came to Germany and lived with us from 1934, 35, and became essentially the substitute nanny that I'd had in my earliest years. She became my nanny. Every day we went to the Paamen Garden. The Paamen Garden as she would call it, and my grandmother didn't know a word of German. She was an Irish immigrant, and she looked at these Germans with one eyebrow lifted and another lowered. She took wonderful care of me and she died a year and a half before we left Germany in 1939.

Q: You were taken out. Was this an affecting experience or was it just...

REDECKER: I was relieved because things were becoming ugly. Little boys who, you know from Lord of the Flies, ugliest creatures on this planet are little boys isolating one other little boy. That happened to me, and I was glad to be out of it. I didn't have any feelings. There's always the joy of not having to go to school. At eight, nine years old? That's the only thing I could think of! But my mother had ___ school and all the books there. She was very attentive to me.

Q: You got back to the States when, '42?

REDECKER: September '41.

Q: September of '41 was before we entered the war. December 10 or something like that was when Germany declared war. Where did you go?

REDECKER: We stayed in New York City with my father. We stayed in the Hotel Brittany on 10th Street right diagonally opposite from John Wannamaker. We stayed in New York for about four months, and then my mother took me to a school in Auburn-Lewiston, Maine. This began my American conversion for the first time in the United States.

Q: Did you speak with a Deutsch accent?

REDECKER: Oh, no. My mother would not tolerate me speaking German with any member of the family. English was the language. She was fixed on this. Not like she said, "I see all these other Foreign Service wives and their children can't speak English, and they don't know who they are. You're a little American boy, and don't you forget it. I'm going to make sure that you're a little American boy." I think that may be a little bit exaggerated.

Q: It was really the right thing to do. You were in Auburn?

REDECKER: We were in Auburn for about three months, and we went to my mother's school girlfriend Miss Crawshaw who was the daughter of a bank president in Lewiston. She had a little place in Pine Point, Maine. We went down to Pine Point, Maine. I began to acquire the basic sinews, let's say, of being an American for the first time. Pine Point

is near Old Orchard Beach. We went back there two or three times during the period that I was in the United States.

We were in the United States, just to give you a view of the time span we are speaking of: 1941 to 1943. We left the States in '43, and I'll tell you a little later what that was, but you asked about America. We were in Maine because my father was working, I think, it was in New York and Washington. He was happy to have all of us out of the way and well taken care of. I had my school and exposure there which made a big impression on me.

It was so different from what I had been exposed to in the past. It had a terribly strong imprint on me, going on a bus by myself from Auburn, across the bridge to Lewiston, talking about girls who were going to college, who were nieces of my mother's friend. Living in America, a wholly extraordinary experience! The impact of this is hard to convey to somebody who knows it from childhood or from home upbringing. Here I was crammed into this, and it was a very remarkable impact. It imbalanced me to some extent.

After that, Father then got a job in Washington not directly in the State Department. I have to think where he was. Remissions control or something involving...

Q: Somebody with knowledge of... He had been targeting a bomb...

[crosstalk]

REDECKER: ...with all the sequels to his own reporting and the extraordinary knowledge that he had accumulated. The reporting of very rapid advances at this time. We then came to Washington eventually. My father first of all at the Hotel Burlington on Vermont Avenue. Then my parents rented a house in Chevy Chase off Western Avenue. I went to a school in Maryland.

We were there, and I went to school as a little American boy in fifth grade and the first third of sixth grade, and then my father was transferred to Madrid. That was the termination of what I expected to be a much longer exposure to American. It was cut short in 1943.

Q: What did you think of the American school?

REDECKER: At that time I learned a great deal. It was highly organized. I had something called civics. I had American geography. I had beginnings in American history. But the civic thing was the more impressionable thing I had.

Q: I'm told that people who come out of a system... I've been interviewing some other Foreign Service brats, Beth Jones. Her father was an admin officer, and she later became ambassador to a number of places, a major Foreign Service officer. She went to a Soviet school and then to an East German school. She was older, but she found that she was astounded when she went to Swarthmore that the teacher asked what she thought about

something. In other words, did you find it was more give and take in the American system than in the German school?

REDECKER: Oh, yes, of course. This is what you absorbed, and this is how you reproduce it for me to verify that you have it correctly into your head. Yes, indeed! But I was not overwhelmed by this. I was too young for the difference to be terribly important to me.

Q: Did you find anybody at all interested in Germany or where you've been?

REDECKER: No, not at that age. Remember, I was only 11.

Q: I know, but I ask because of my experiences, my kids' experiences, nobody really cares. Unless you were with an historian, nobody asked. They don't care.

REDECKER: They're not at all interested.

Q: You were in Madrid from when to when?

REDECKER: Father was assigned to Madrid in August of '43. The circumstances of that were very interesting. Why would he be sent to Madrid? He was sent to Madrid because he apparently became part of what I call the "old German hands" like the old China hands, historically and operationally attuned to the Germans. He, I do believe, was selected to be re-placed to Germany on the destruction of that regime and its capabilities and to be reinserted immediately along with another small group of individuals who really knew Germany. He never told me that specifically. All his friends: the "German hands" as I call them, were assigned to London and Stockholm and Madrid.

Father went to Madrid. He didn't know anything about Spain. He was put into a very peculiar job called executive officer. What's an executive officer? Father didn't know Spanish, had no exposure to the Latin world whatsoever. Here he is in Madrid!

Q: This was war time. There were submarines all over the place. How did you get to Madrid?

REDECKER: We went by ship! Father hated airplanes and found them unreliable and disliked the physical effects on some people. We went to New Orleans, traveled by train to New Orleans, an experience all by itself. American train with beds that come down on the side. No compartments as one is used to in Europe. Here we were in New Orleans for three or four days and then loaded onto a Spanish ship, the *Mantes de Camillas*. There was another one called the *Magallanas.* They operated between Spain and the United States all through World War II much like the *Gripsholm.*

Q: The Gripsholm *is a Swedish one used for all the repatriation of all sorts of diplomats. I take it your ship was lighted up like a ...*

REDECKER: It was. The *Mantes de Camillas* was a floating crystal palace. At night time great big Spanish flags painted on the side and off the end to Spain. It took us three and one-half weeks to get to La Corunna because the British insisted on searching the ship in Trinidad. So we had to go to Trinidad to be searched. Then we made the crossing.

Father, being the old Foreign Service, had to always visit with the local incumbents of our establishments worldwide. It was a great way of going on holiday during pre-World War times. You always visited colleagues wherever you went. Wherever you went! I found that terribly tiresome because I wanted to do other things. But in Trinidad we got off the ship and visited with the local consul general. Then we went off with the most extraordinary collection of passengers who are vividly in my mind.

I'm sure OSS people were on there, Stackapole. I can remember someone having a name like Stackapole. Mr. Sanderson, a very old Mata Hari type creature, big hats. A swimming pool that looked like some lusty old fish tank. They were all distributed in their swim suits. Little Brayton Redecker actually, I am convinced, saw a periscope one day watching us. I called somebody, but obviously the periscope had disappeared, so I can't prove my point. We crossed for two and a half weeks, almost three weeks.

Q: Any little boys? Nobody to get in trouble with?

REDECKER: No.

Q: That's too bad!

REDECKER: I had a Finnish acquaintance who taught me all kinds of marvelous smutty stories. He was a great, big bulky... In his 50's, but he tried to look like Charles Atlas of the time. He taught me all these smutty songs. "Here Comes the Queen," "Take It Off, Take It Off, Cried the Boys from the Rear." All those songs.

Q: "Strip Polka."

REDECKER: Is that what it is?

Q: It was called "Strip Polka."

[laughter]

REDECKER: He taught me these things, and my mother was properly appalled. "Oh, my goodness! Oh, my goodness!" and probably loved it that I was being taken care of so well by the Finish man and all these other interestingly strange people in an atmosphere. Going to dinner with a trio: a violin and a ___ and a piano. Charming! Out of this world noblesque! We came to Spain to La Corunna. Of course, we had to visit the local consul, a Mr. Cole it was. We took a train to Madrid, and I began my Madrid adventure.

Q: You were there from '41 to '45?

REDECKER: No, no, no, ’43 to ’45.

Q: Where were you living? Let’s talk about being a kid there.

REDECKER: We lived in the Palace Hotel, one of two big hotels in the time past. The Palace and the Ritz right off the lower Castellana on the way to Aputca. I know Madrid very, very well. We were there several months. My father got a lovely big what the Spanish call “quisos.” We call them apartments, but we would distinguish between a two-bedroom apartment and a thing that’s a floor which is what they call a quiso. It’s a floor: five or six bedroom, drawing rooms, sewing rooms, two kitchens and so forth.

I first was coached by a tutor to get Spanish going. Actually, on the ship over there we had a Friar going back to see his family after 40 years. Why he had to do that in the middle of World War II I do not know, but there he was. He taught me my first bits of Spanish, but that wasn’t enough. I was taught by a tutor who tried to bang Spanish into me. Then I was put into a school, Catholic, of course. Catholic. Highly structured, high religious school. I managed to stay in there until the end of our Spanish sojourn.

Q: What was the religion of your family?

REDECKER: Episcopalian. My mother was Episcopalian. As you know, perhaps, there wasn’t a single Protestant church in all of Spain and that time and, indeed, until Franco departed. There was not a single one with one interesting exception. On the British embassy grounds there was an Anglican chapel.

I had possibly a nervous breakdown in that school. I was the only little American, and I couldn’t speak Spanish properly: not very well. I was thrown into this school, and I had to survive in that school. They took no account of where I had come from, what my capabilities were, how to deal with anything. You had the homework. Go home and do the homework!

19th Century pictures of weeping mothers with broken down children around the table in a little lamb pose couldn’t be more reflective of my poor mother wringing her hands, “What am I going to do? What am I going to do with this poor child? How am I going to get this child to be able to do his homework and go back to the school without being reprimanded and reduced to his own ego just because he can’t do the work?” It was very stressful.

Q: Were you getting any...

REDECKER: Other Americans, of course.

Q: I am interested. Coming from a class era and time, I would have thought that they would have put you into one of the many prep schools at lower level. This is obviously

what the British always do. Your family must have been going in a way against the times by taking Junior along with them.

REDECKER: No, my mother wouldn't let me. Would she let me stay in this country? No. She would never let me. She kept me with her. First of all, she had no family left. As I mentioned earlier, the families were all degenerated over time where they were non-functional, non-existent. Their own father was living in considerable poverty, and she would not entertain the thought.

Q: I can think of three things that must have hit you. One, Spanish and the Spanish culture; two, Catholicism; and three, Francoism. How did you survive during this period, and what were you getting out of it?

REDECKER: I almost did not survive. It was terribly, terribly difficult. Good New England girls, don't believe in a thing called "nervous breakdown." That's for lower class people. Americans don't do this, and Bostonians, of all people, not! She was confronted with a situation that looked like it was going to happen in her little boy.

To answer your question, I was required on every Thursday to go marching with class for military exercise.

Q: It was Phalangist, wasn't it?

REDECKER: We went to Mass every day. Well, a short Mass, a simple Mass of 20, 25 minutes. The language, of course, was terribly difficult. The only thing I could say out of it is I really learned Spanish, and I learned it fast, and I learned it perfectly. But I was almost a total wreck especially with all of these very, very posed little boys.

This is, of course, a boys school. It's still in business today. It's a mixed school today. I've been to see it several times. They don't wear uniforms, but then it was a rigid all-boys school with Gothic arches as windows. The word today is "intimidating." I don't really know how I survived it.

I survived it by creating a little world for myself with magic tricks in a store I found downtown that sold magic tricks. I found that by having a dog. My parents gave me a dog as some kind of compensation for social intercourse. I found that by traveling the trams in Madrid I learned Madrid like the back of my hand. Then there were two or three American boys my age who arrived late in my period in Madrid, nine months before we left. I interacted to some extent with them.

I think I was badly seared by my Spanish experience to the point where I never went back to Spain for 20 years. I traveled all over Europe, but I never set foot in Spain. I never advanced in the Foreign Service. I never even declared my knowledge of Spanish for fear of having to go back to an environment of that sort. I think it had a long-term searing effect on me. It was a very difficult time for me.

Q: How did the church affect you? Other than going to Mass, were you pulled aside as a little heretic and somebody was yammering away at you?

REDECKER: I remember that more as political. What are you? If you're not Catholic, what are you? There was that kind of ideal. Remember, this was an environment of smaller boys, and they can be terribly brutal.

I would come home weakened, and my mother holding her head in a true Victorian way, "What am I going to do with this child? How am I going to deal with this?" She seemed to be more or less at a loss. At the same time having to entertain again. Remember, all of this was going on with a very heavy entertainment schedule there, too. My only little amusement was to put some of my little practical jokes into the teapot for the ladies to pick out a little quirk out of the tea and have a great lot of string. My mother was terribly embarrassed, would hold her cheeks and say, "Oh, my goodness! What's happening?" I was chuckling from behind the curtains. This was a way to escape the terrible isolation. It had a powerful effect on me.

One of the other things was the amusement, simply situational remarks to make. We had a lovely apartment. I have gone to visit it several times since then just to remember it, *in memoriam*. To the right side was the British ambassador's residence. He was in the back yard of the German chancellor. Every morning I saw a wonderful sight of the great big Mercedes with the big swastikas driving up to the chancellery. His Britannic majesty, with great big British celluloid flags and a Rolls Royce driving off to his chancellery. It's amazing.

All of this we said at night time. My father used to say on such occasions at night time under the moonlight they would be out, both of them, in the back yard in a little hole in the wall and play cards and talk about their various problems.

Q: This is the greatest story that one could think of, the battles and all. Were you following this?

REDECKER: Oh, yes, to some extent, but I'll tell you what next happened right into it. Father was intended for Frankfurt although the German regime was still in business, the war was still going on, people were being killed. We moved 30 days after the liberation of Paris.

Q: In 1944.

REDECKER: A very short time after the liberation of Paris, we traveled over land from Madrid to Paris. We took a huge truck of our possessions. We drove up by the pockets of the German resistance along the coast. We drove by with this huge truck with all our possessions, a grey Studebaker, and we traveled to Paris. We were three for about three or four months, four months maybe. Father was waiting for Germany to disappear, the Nazi regime destroyed. I was very much involved. Here we were, dropped into Paris just very recently like almost yesterday, liberated. Here we lived in Paris while Father was

being staged to go off to Frankfurt. What happened is in April, 1945, the Nazi regime collapsed.

Q: May third.

REDECKER: May third. So late! So late! In '45 Father left. He went off to Frankfurt, and my mother and I had the Studebaker which we had from Spain, brought it over.

Then we went to Switzerland. My mother said, "It's the closest I can possibly get to Frankfurt so that my husband can come and visit me because we are not allowed to go into Germany." That is what actually happened.

My father roared off and established himself as the new consul general in occupied Frankfurt, 10 days after the American troops had conquered the city in April. He said, "I am back in Nazi Germany, and Nazi Germany existed for two more weeks after I arrived."

We stayed in Switzerland, lived in the Three Kings Hotel on the Rhine at a time when there were no people anywhere. We were very welcome because there were no other guests except the British consul general who lived there, too, with his wife and child and a few other little amusing, strange people that congregate in times of stress like that. We stayed there for several months, and my father came to visit periodically and pick up goodies from Switzerland to bring back to Germany even though there was a PX and things. One could buy things in Switzerland still even in isolated Switzerland, to take back to Germany. He did that several times, and finally my mother was authorized to join him, and she moved to Frankfurt.

I was put in a private school in Switzerland. It was the first time I was put in what you suggested earlier, "prep school," because there was literally no other way to do this. She found a very nice school for me, and the school turned out to be one of the most prestigious institutes in the whole world. She negotiated my presence there. They took me. I guess they were happy to have customers.

My mother joined my father in Frankfurt, and from 1945 to 1948 he was consul general in Germany. Father moved his office to central Frankfurt and established himself in one of the undamaged buildings there. We lived right next to the commanding general in a very imposing house. That is how I returned to Germany.

For the next three years, this was the arrangement that prevailed. I went home on holidays to Frankfurt. My mother came to pick me up, replenish her requirements, whatever they were, shopping for gifts, clothing, material for clothing she could get in Switzerland and have more than Germany, and all sorts of other things. For three years Mother was back in Germany, and my father was then engaged in a very major debate about how Germany was to be organized for the future. He had very strong views. His views were not in fashion at the time. They were directed toward the menace of the Soviet Union and communism. He was very opposed to allowing Eisenhower's decision

to hold American troops in the West while the Russians took the East. He was also terribly opposed to withdrawing American troops from areas that they themselves occupied.

Q: Czechoslovakia.

REDECKER: Yes, and including Leipzig and the whole south. East Germany could never have existed. It would not have been functional had we not withdrawn from all those areas as part of our agreement with Russia. He was very opposed to that, and that was not fashionable. I think it scuttled his career.

Q: What was the name of the school?

REDECKER: Le Rosey. It was a well-known school, kings and queens of all the world over have gone there.

Q: Talk about your experiences there.

REDECKER: They were perhaps the happiest years of my whole life. I was very happy there. I was appreciated. I could work in German, I could work in English, and I very, very quickly learned French. My French dates from that time, I learned it quickly, at almost amazing speed. I was very happy there. I regretted having to leave after three years due to my father's transfer from Germany to South Africa.

Q: This brought you almost up to your senior year.

REDECKER: No. I was only 16. I was well into my 16th year when my mother called me on a telephone call. I'll never forget it. She had to go to a little booth. "Redecker, come here, you have a phone call! You have a phone call!" I got it in the booth, my mother on the phone. "I have to tell you something. Daddy has been transferred." I said, "He's been transferred?" "To Johannesburg." I -- sophisticated Brayton Redecker -- with all of this knowledge, said, "Where is Johannesburg? Where is Johannesburg?" She said, "Well, I'm going to let you think about that, and we'll talk tomorrow because it's going to happen soon, and I'm afraid you have to come with us."

Q: What was the student body like there?

REDECKER: It had, of course, a very, very rich past. The Shah of Persia was there. Anybody who you could figure out was there. Baudouin was there with my roommate with his brother, now King Albert. He was my roommate.

Q: Those were from Belgium.

REDECKER: Yes. They were very wealthy. Other lesser personages, but nevertheless of prominence, industrially or socially, of quite a few countries. There were under populated at the time having been isolated. Physically isolated.

The population of the school was, of course, almost entirely European and increasingly American. There has always been a strong American presence in the school before World War II. It was run, also, by an American, a very, very cultivated, charming, gracious, very intelligent woman. My mother gravitated to her very quickly.

My mother told the school of what my past had been and some of the traumas I had been through, and that I needed special attention. I would say that school at the time was terribly, terribly attentive to the personal needs of the students being that they come from such exotic environments or family situations. Special attention needs to be given. If you're the son of a king, you need special attention no matter whatever the democrats wish to say about this and the egalitarians. The child of a reigning monarch does need some special attention, etcetera, etcetera for other people in other walks and circles. The school was very sensitive to my situation.

I found great powers of recovery in my three years there. I felt regenerated and exposed, of course, in French and where my other languages could be used. I was working in German, beginning to study German literature, opening up even in French to elementary French literature. I worked in my Latin, and then I decided that I wanted to learn Russian. I took on a Russian teacher that was made available to me for private lessons. Mama had to pay for it thinking I was having piano lessons because she very much endorsed piano. I'm useless with my fingers. The piano teacher was also a Russian teacher. I started Russian there. I was on the football team. I was good in English. I did quite well for my age in fields that I'd never been in. I'd never been in athletics and soccer teams, and I was a very happy person in my three years.

Q: Was there any clash of nationalities?

REDECKER: That's one of the magic qualities of that school that they tend to work on. There was quite a big contingent of Italians. The Americans tended to be somewhat more American. The school made an understanding of the problem. First of all, you have to understand it. So many schools aren't even paying attention to it. They tend to mix you up. They put you in different groups. We had all room -- not dormitories, rooms -- and the nationalities were mixed up intentionally. One is seated at tables at mealtime intentionally to mix everybody up. The tensions were absolutely not only not there, they were actively worked out by the management.

Q: I think this is a good place to stop. I put at the end of the tape so we know where to pick it up. We'll pick this up in 1948 when you're off to Johannesburg...

REDECKER: South Africa.

Q: ...South Africa. Great.

Today is September 15, 2007. How long were you in Johannesburg?

REDECKER: Three years. We left Germany. In 1948 Father was transferred from Frankfurt. I think there was some pressure for him to be transferred because he had been so vocally opposed to the carving up of Germany into four zones in a manner which he thought was detrimental to American interests, specifically with respect to Berlin and the requirement from Yalta, apparently, to leave those areas conquered by U.S. troops, specifically in Czechoslovakia and in East Germany which became the GDR.

He was vigorously opposed to that. That was not politically correct at the time, I think, and he had a lot of stress with people in the State Department and had a declining number of allies in the military. I may have mentioned to you that he got along splendidly with the military, and the military was equally unhappy with the arrangements that finally sealed into established quarters of the division of Germany and the disadvantageous positive the western allies were put in in Berlin which played itself out, of course. Father said, "See? I told you so. Now, you have to supply the city by air." He said, "I foresaw something of this sort happening, and we maneuvered ourselves into a very disadvantageous position." That was not convenient to those who seemed to have wanted to arrange a different kind of relationship with the Soviet Union. So Father, I have been told, saw they had to go.

Q: You were in Johannesburg from '48 to '52. What were you doing? I'm trying to fix on you. How old were you when you lived there?

REDECKER: Sixteen. I was only there until 1951 because I had to go to college. I had never been to school in the United States except in the years '42 to '43 in Somerset School right up Wisconsin Avenue over the D.C. line. My father was here. I had never gone to school in the United States. My parents thought it would be important for me not to become totally expatriated, a very great fear of many foreign service families with their children at the time. They said, "You've really got to go back to college in the United States."

Q: Before you go to college, you had what, two years...

REDECKER: Almost three years.

Q: Where did you go to school?

REDECKER: My parents said, "He has to go to one of the best schools. He's come from Le Rosey in Switzerland," which I left with terrible regret, I must say. "We've got to find him a good school." Of course, in South Africa they had good, solid, traditional public schools. Uniformed public schools. Very rigid; very, very almost militarized. I was sent to Michael House in Natal near Pietermaritzburg. I was put in that school. It was another terrible, terrible experience for me. They actually whip you when you misbehave, misbehaving being a few minutes late for class or religious ceremonies. I was terribly unhappy there. It was a very rigid school, no adaptation to my unusual needs. Very regimented. I was among all these South Africans.

Q: What was the student body like that was around you?

REDECKER: They were all white South Africans. It's, of course, a white school, a boy's school, a uniform school, as I said, terribly regimented and regimented also in the school curriculum. I, coming from Europe, dropped into this. I had great difficulty finding my way at age 16 because it's all directed. The curriculum is directed to the achievement of a matriculation certificate.

I had great stress and also getting up at six in the morning and having a cold shower and running around and jogging around before you go to breakfast and windy. You had to have a class before you went to breakfast. A class! Can you imagine that? I was unable to do it, and I begged my parents to get me out of this, what I called a "torture institution," a British public school that had not even evolved as far as the British schools in the UK!

At that time they didn't whip you, and I got whipped regularly! "Thrashed" as they call it. "How many did they give you this time, Redecker, in your last thrashing?" That's the way they'd talk. I found this absolutely impossible to deal with, so I'd withdrawn in the third term. The South African school system is a calendar system. They went on quarters, so in the third quarter I was taken out.

I selected a Catholic school in Johannesburg -- day school -- and lived at home after that and was much happier. The Catholic school was much more flexible, understood my situation, adapted the curriculum for me to be able to pursue to the matriculation.

Q: What courses did you find yourself attracted towards?

REDECKER: I found South African history interesting. I was into South Africa quite a bit and plunged into a totally South African situation with no Americans again.

Q: No Americans!

REDECKER: I never had any Americans growing up with me. I'm an only child. I don't think I ever stressed that in our earlier conversation. I'm an only child, so I was always very isolated and very, very exposed to some of the more rough and tumble of growing up as a single exception in a majority alien environment. I had great sympathy for a black person being in a white population. The same problem exists.

Q: Speaking of that, did you get any feel for the native African culture at this school?

REDECKER: No. I did not at the time pay any attention to any of those things. There were servants for the school.

Q: Sometimes there's a Zulu, Chaka. Did that come up very much?

REDECKER: Only as a function of its impact on the white historical evolution of the country: the different battles. But, not interest in investigating the native side of the equation.

Q: What about the other battles between the Boars and the British? How was that played out? Was it pretty much a British viewpoint?

REDECKER: Very much a British viewpoint. The differences between the two -- if you want to call it -- communities was very profound and marked at the time. We had to learn Afrikaans as part of the curriculum, and I did. It is seen as an alien culture. The two were deeply fractured.

Q: The Catholic school, was it mainly Anglo?

REDECKER: Mainly Anglo and run by Marist Brothers. They are all over the world. They had a wonderful school there, and they were very sensitive to my special needs and difficulties. I got a curriculum to suit me and to bring me up to speed with the curriculum that was moving, as always, in these kinds of educational systems, to the one single objective: taking and passing the South African matriculation.

Q: As far as American education, were you pointed toward any place or thing?

REDECKER: I mentioned that I did make the matric. I passed it. Not brilliantly, but I passed it. I then wanted to get back to the United States. I said, "If I don't get back pretty soon, I'm going to lose all connections to America." Multi-lingual, European. And with this active South Africa teenager experience. Traveling all over southern Africa with my father who was attending his garden patch of territories that I mentioned to you earlier where we took all these trips to what was then the southern Rhodesia, northern Rhodesia. Even up to the Belgian Congo. That was not his territory, but it was just up over the line.

We went to Cape Town and the consular post down there. At the time we still had in Johannesburg the concept and the operational reality of a supervising consulate general and that individual, my father, being that person. We don't have things like that anymore. We had the situation of the ambassador in Pretoria of dealing with what the government did for six months because it would go into Cape Town the other six months, the legislative period. South Africa moves down to Cape Town. So does the ambassador. But that's his only function, and then he sits with the consul general in Cape Town and probably invades on his territory for six months. An awkward situation. Meantime, my father was moving around this territory as a medieval potentate.

Q: Were you able to as a teenager have girlfriends?

REDECKER: Oh, yes, when I got to college.

Q: I mean in Johannesburg.

REDECKER: I took the matriculation, and that was in December of 1951. Then I was confronted with the problem of what to do with myself for nine months until September of ’51. I had a big question: What kind of an institution should I consider for myself in the situation that I was in? I had always heard about and been intrigued by Williams College.

Q: What this Williams and Mary?

REDECKER: No, it was Williams College in Williamstown, Massachusetts. Not William and Mary.

Q: I’m joking because I’m the class of ’50 at Williams.

REDECKER: You?

Q: I graduated in 1950 from Williams. I can’t think of any place more stuck out in the middle of nowhere!

REDECKER: I was stuck out in the middle of nowhere. I wanted a small school. I did not want to be in an urban school. I didn’t like the taste of an urban school. I said, “That’s very interesting, but I heard about the small liberal arts school in the United States as being one of the premier ways to expand the mind and open up fields that you would not get running around as a little urbanite trying to attend classes in a city.” I was also strongly encouraged by two businessmen who were in Johannesburg who had attended Williams and who had said, “I think you would be very happy there. You’ve gone to prep schools in Switzerland, a very intimate kind of student/professor relationship. The beautiful surroundings of Williamstown. I think you ought to try it.” I applied to Williams from South Africa, and I was accepted. It was the only school I applied to.

Q: You were there from ’51 to ’55?

REDECKER: Yes.

Q: Could you describe Williams in 1951?

REDECKER: Very much the same as it is now except for the fraternity question. Now, of course, you have to say it’s a mixed school. Then it was all male, very heavy fraternity, even though by the time I left the fraternity question was under great challenge. Soon thereafter it was dismantled centrally. Otherwise, having been back there quite a few times, I have found that there hadn’t been that much profound systemic or structural change to the school. The way it looks at the world, the way it decided education should be offered to the students, the way it is offered, the types of supporting non-academic activities. Very much the same as it was then.

Q: Having come through completely a European system of various types, but basically the European system, how did you find your exposure especially near to an American college? Was it different?

REDECKER: It was, again, difficult. My life has always been colored by a great deal of difficulty in adapting to new situations. My freshman year was a difficult year. I had to get used to an entirely different regimen. When I arrived, my father's brother drove with me to Williamstown in September of '51 when I arrived off an airplane from South Africa. He took me up to there, and I was lodged in Sage Hall in freshman quads.

Q: I was in Williams Hall.

REDECKER: Were you!

Q: It was right across the...

REDECKER: Yes, indeed! I came into Sage Hall, and I am reported to have said by my good friend who is an Indian with whom I became very close and have been a lifelong friend of his. An Indian from India. He was a freshman, too. He had come to the United States from India and he had a very powerful patron, from great Barrington. He had gone to prep school. I am reported to have barged into Sage Hall and to have said, "I say, chaps, can you tell me where I'm billeted?" Suddenly, among all these new young boys waiting a great silence fell over this crowd who slowly turned to see who had uttered this peculiar phrase.

I'm not truly certain that I actually said that, but certainly I recall a long silence and slowly turning heads, so maybe the, "I say, chaps," may not have been exactly that. My Indian friend with a twinkling eye always said I shape the past to suit my present and future. He always laughed about that, so I don't know if it's true. I certainly made an impact, and it showed the vast cleavage between me and the real American system. I, who was supposed to be an American, after all -- after all, what else was I? -- had this great identity problem adjusting to an American regimen, environment, and way of looking at the world and thinking. It was significantly difficult for me.

And the rushing problem, the problem with fraternity rushing. I was looked upon as some kind of oddity. They said, "Where do you come from?" "South Africa." "Where the devil is South Africa? You're not black!" The first reaction was, "You're not black!"

Q: Did you go into a fraternity?

REDECKER: Eventually, yes, but not in the beginning. I was intimidated, I was insecure, all these "jocks" so to speak. They wore blue jeans.

Q: They were khakis.

REDECKER: Khakis. White bucks.

Q: Oh, dirty white bucks.

REDECKER: Dirty white bucks! Of course! I wanted to have clean white bucks.

Q: We're talking about a shoe made out of white buckskin. To show you were a full person, you got them dirty. That's dirty white bucks. If you went to Yale, the thing was that they might have clean white bucks. Certainly at Williams it was dirty white bucks.

REDECKER: You're absolutely right. I was looked upon during the rushing period of fraternities something of a curiosity. An intriguing curiosity but something off, and then the world comes always to be remember, something of a tricky fellow. That word today doesn't exist.

Q: It meant you didn't fit in.

REDECKER: And something of a, "What do we do with this fellow?" A couple of fraternities mulled over what they might do with me. The long and short of it, to answer your question, was that I was asked into a fraternity a year later.

Q: Which one was that?

REDECKER: Delta Phi fraternity on South Street on the way to the Clark Art Museum. It was a rather more interesting fraternity because it had some foreigners in it and was more attuned to say, "They could do something for the fraternity and with what he brings with him."

Q: Was it an adjustment to be in an American college class where you were asked not to recite but to expound on your own? I've talked to some people who have gone through the European system and found it rather difficult to have somebody say, "Tell us, what do you think? What does this book say?"

REDECKER: To some extent, I think that was true. You confine your questions to a very narrow issue or a freedom of thought or freedom of flexibility in thinking. In the wider sense I had a need for a good year or two to adjust to the way of living, of thinking, to the way you do your homework, the way you do everything. It was a big adjustment. Of course, I have to tell you my entire life has been secrets, adaptations, many of them quite stressful.

Q: I think in many ways you were far better prepared than many of the students coming to Williams. You had been under a lot of strict regimes. You were used to being under discipline doing things, presenting things and, of course, languages as well. Did this prove to be an advantage?

REDECKER: I don't think so. You touched on the earlier point -- the inclination to open up your own thinking and to have you respond independently of what you had been told

is the truth of the subject matter we're talking about. But to think independently about it, that was a significant problem of transition that I should actually contribute my own thoughts to the evolution of a discussion or a seminar. I had to get used to that. I got used to it, of course.

Q: I imagine that you would go under the systems that you were familiar with. You could write fairly well?

REDECKER: Yes, I did. I did creative writing; I took a course in creative writing. I have to tell you, of course, that one trick of that is I also, I at least certainly did at the time, something of a competition of languages. I can think in French and German. I would always be juggling these three languages: English, French and German. Spanish never got up to it. I never got up to that one although I have a four-plus, four-plus in it.

But I'm not in State Department evaluations, but Spanish is not the same language for me as French and German are. I had a problem of figuring out which language I spoke! There are three of them inside my head. My English professors suggested somewhat stilted, somewhat artificial, somewhat contrived depending on the subject matter being described by language. So I, in fact, decided to major in English and have at least one reportedly native language. Truly, it was a native language but it was a native language that was developed in a foreign environment. That was what I decided to do, and I did very well in it.

Q: Was there any particular area of English that you were working on?

REDECKER: I got interested in the world of the courtesy book, the extinct century courtesy books derived out of Italy, basically. The original courtesy books in modern times derived from Italy. When there was a large development of the ___ in England in the 16th and 17th centuries, I plunged into that. I wish I had the names of the main authors in my head. That's something I got into and, in fact, did my thesis on a gentleman by the name of Lord Herbert of Cherbury. He was the brother of George Herbert who was a diplomat and a deist. He wrote some interesting books, the most important one was The Do Very Parte, something of the deist treatise. Then he also delivered himself of the courtesy book, how gentlemen should be a gentleman. I should mention for these purposes the courtesy book is an etiquette book. How are you a proper gentleman, what are the things you should do, and how should you think, and how should you write, and how should you behave yourself in certain circumstances. I got into that. I had a thesis professor who was also the head of the English department.

Q: Who was that?

REDECKER: Robert Howland. He was there for many years. He took a great shine to me. He said, "You are a very interesting person. You have interesting things that haven't been fully exploited, and I'd like to try and exploit them and draw them out of you." He took me on. He selected Lord Herbert as my thesis subject. Herbert was a very elegant diplomat in the French Corps. He was a person on some standing in England but not a

very great nobleman, sort of a lesser noblemen with some very interesting thoughts between his ears. He steered me into that, and I did my undergraduate thesis on that individual.

Q: Did you get any history while you were there?

REDECKER: Yes, I did. All American history. I wanted to get American history because I was very deficient in American history. I was a total blank after living abroad. I took two courses in American history. Charlie Keller, of course.

Q: He was my honors guide, Charlie Keller was. I had a great deal of respect for him.

REDECKER: He was mildly intrigued with my persona and situation and where I had come from, but he was too American to pay too much attention to that. He really wanted to get me into the heart and substance, the nitty gritty of American history. I think he certainly thought he motivated me. The book he used for his course, I read it to this day. I am refreshed by it. I find insight in it. It is Herbert Agar's The Price of Union.

[crosstalk]

REDECKER: Marvelous book. I found that I lost everything in the fire as I mentioned to you earlier. I hadn't mentioned it on the machine, but I had a terrible fire that I had later on that wiped out everything I owned. Only very recently did I get a hold of a second-hand copy of The Price of Union. That was Charlie Keller's book. I found it very enriching and very, very informative.

Q: What were the movements on campus?

REDECKER: The fraternity issue was roiling and boiling, a complete rushing. Everyone should have an opportunity to be in a fraternity. "Total rushing" is the term, and that was a roiling issue during much of -- almost all of -- my time there.

Q: That meant that everyone could be a member of a fraternity.

REDECKER: Exactly. If they wanted to be, otherwise, the Garfield House.

Q: The Garfield House for those who didn't. There was not a choice in it. In my time people chose not to be or they weren't accepted. This is where so many Jews ended up.

REDECKER: So many interesting people, too. In fact, the Garfield House -- as I found since I was part of it for one year, my freshman year -- was full of interesting people. In other words, individuals, if I may say egotistically, somewhat like myself rather than the stereotype Joe Jock. The DKE's: Delta Kappa Epsilon. The footballers, the crew-cut muscle-bound jocks. I found the Garfield House people, I made quite a few friends, very interesting individuals.

Q: Our house had what we used to call "The Two Steves." One was Steven Birmingham who wrote Our Crowd and became quite a social historian. The other was Steven Sondheim who was a music major. You arrived at Williams when the Korean War was just beginning. Did that intrude? Were people thinking about military service?

REDECKER: I was, in fact, for one year a member of Air Force ROTC. Then I gave it up because I said I didn't want to do this anymore. I did not have enough time to do the right things that I wanted to do. I found so much richness in the Williams experience that I was constantly auditing courses. I audited art courses. My goodness, I felt that they had opened up vast areas for me. I took more languages there. I took Dela Guerra in Spanish to upgrade my Spanish. I didn't take language just because I wanted to take advantage of all the other opportunities that Williams offered me. I found it a very enriching experience.

The first year was, again, very hard for me. You might find that odd for me to say because I had been through pretty stressful situations in other parts of the world, but I found the first year very hard to get through. I ended up with a *cum laude* and honors in English, but the first year has been, again, a hallmark of my life.

Q: This was the first time you ran across that strange creature: the American boy.

REDECKER: Eventually, one would say with weekend forays and into Smith and Bennington and Mt. Holyoke, got into American female territory. That was also very interesting. I must tell you I never found anything terribly interesting in Bennington. I should have, but I didn't. We need not get into that any further. I found some very interesting targets, one should say, in an establishment called Finch University in New York. I must say I have never seen so many beautiful young women as Finch managed to collect and advance through academia. I think it doesn't exist anymore. It was something like a collegiate social school.

Q: The girls went to get an MRS degree.

REDECKER: Possibly. They had very good looking gals, very socially well connected in New York City. Really well connected. I found quite a few very attractive women there.

Q: What happened holidays?

REDECKER: What we have not discussed is the day in 1952. My father left South Africa, and he found it necessary to retire. It was a tickly situation.

Q: Time in class.

REDECKER: Time in class or not. I do not know and have never been told. I suspect it may have been that. He had an angina problem in South Africa. His life was supported by rockets. He was roaring full as you have seen in some of the photographs I've shown you. He had a very, very active, multi-dimensional life and also entertaining himself. We had

a frenzied cycle of entertainment all the time that affected him and his heart. He had a poor heart. He came back to the States in ’52 for four years, and he also retired.

With my assistance as driver, he found a residence in Greenwich, Connecticut. On his retirement I had been in the United States one year without them. He hired a car in Rhode Island. Father didn’t know where he wanted to live. He put down his so-called day to day rules. We hired a car in Providence, Rhode Island -- Newport -- and drove out way down to New York City. It took us four weeks to do this, looking for a house somewhere from his origins down to what he thought might be a new opening for him in the big city: in the Big Apple.

We were on the road with this wrecked Plymouth going to different villages all around the coastline beach in Rhode Island. We stopped everywhere, looked at houses, and Father said he wanted a big house. Everybody said at the time, “A big house? What do you want with a big house, Mr. Redecker?” “Well, we have lots of things” because big houses were not terribly in fashion at that time. He wanted ramblers. Do you remember that term “a rambler”?

Q: Yes.

REDECKER: That was what it was. He said, “I want something elegant. I have a lot of very nice furniture.” The long and short of it was we went to old Saybrook, Mystic, down to Port Chester, New York, all along the coast. We finally found a very large house, a Hudson, a beautiful house that needed work. Nobody wanted it. It was on the market. The lady that wanted to sell it was very anxious to move into a much smaller arrangement. A very handsome house. Georgian. Magnificent from what you have seen in the pictures, some of the furniture, perhaps we had had, really wonderful things from Germany, taken all around the world with us, all over South Africa. We found a wonderful marriage between my parents’ furniture and a lovely American house. He moved in there in ’52 with my help.

I should mention another amusing little sideline. Neither my father nor my mother drove. One didn’t do that! One had chauffeurs. When he retired, of course, this way of dealing with the world didn’t work. So Brayton Redecker had to move in to provide the service for what I just described to you and for other things later on, too. Very inconvenient for me, I must say, this not knowing how to drive, but Father never knew how to drive. He’d go crazy behind a steering wheel, and my mother was much too elegant and much too ladylike to put a steering wheel in front of her and actually be responsible for moving herself through traffic. My goodness! What a thought!

They found themselves here, and for the next three years I had my home in Greenwich, Connecticut, in a lovely house. My parents started to entertain. My father became a member of Netherlands America Foundation because of this connections to the Netherlands. He had a great deal to do with South Africa, the Afrikaans. All of this tied together. He spent the next 18 years of his life in Greenwich, and I had three of those

until I graduated in 1955, coming down there very frequently. It was a beautiful house. Absolutely beautiful.

Q: Where did you come out on the fraternity?

REDECKER: I met a couple of very interesting young men in the Delta Phi fraternity.

We did many modern plays and moved them around the New England circuit. We took it on tour. All of these activities induced Delta Phi to want me in. I said, "I think I should go through the American academic experience having been in a fraternity as well." I submitted and was initiated into the Delta Phi fraternity in the beginning of my sophomore year.

Q: As you approached 1955 and graduation, did you have any idea what you wanted to do?

REDECKER: I said, "I have certain talents, and I have a lot of limitations. I don't think I'm technologically very adept. I'm not somebody that is good with his fingers or hands. I know languages. I want to see if I could do that. I liked to become a cosmopolite, if I may say. I'm comfortable in European environments of all kinds and sorts whereas Americans are not. I think I have some advantage."

I thought of the Foreign Service, and my father naturally said, "I don't want to influence you in one direction or another," but he said, "I think you would do very well there. It certainly is an exciting life dealing with very interesting human situations, social situations, and political situations, if not military as well. You've been through it all, so you know what it's all about. You know surprises." I thought of that, and so I took the Foreign Service exam in my senior year and failed it.

I failed the oral. I failed the oral that you might find a very interesting point. All the examiners, the worthy examiners -- I have a document somewhere -- concluded that I had insufficient American experience to work and represent the United States overseas.

Q: I can understand that because they were looking for people. I remember, you took it when, '55? I took my oral exam in '55, too. I just spent four years in the Air Force. I remember they were talking about we would need the infusion of Main Street. This was the terminology at the time.

REDECKER: It was! The terminology that was used with me... It was not used with me, but what we all called it, "corn-fed Iowa kid." They wanted *real* Americans, not the sophisticated international types who knew nothing about our own culture and society. It was very true at the time.

Q: Do you recall any of the questions that were asked?

REDECKER: The one that I think certainly is one gentleman examiner asked me, "Can you tell me through which states the Snake River flows and what happens to it?" I couldn't answer that question properly. I think there were other ones. They worked on the American side really hard because they didn't ask me what I thought about the communist revolution or Nazi Germany or South Africa's race problems. They asked me about, of course, the one area where I was clearly weakest.

Q: What did you do?

REDECKER: I volunteered for the Navy and volunteered for a Naval OCS -- Officer Candidate School -- in Newport, Rhode Island, and I was accepted into it. I graduated from college in '55 with honors in English, and I was very shortly thereafter inducted into the military and sent to Officer Candidate School in June, July of '55.

Q: The Korean War was over in July of '55. How did you find the Navy?

REDECKER: I felt I wanted to do something useful and I said I could do something more useful and gain more out of it myself if I go as an officer -- even if that is going to cost me an extra year from a regular two-year draft. I said I'd much prefer a quasi-civilized role. The Navy maybe is, perhaps, as my father always said, the most civilized of the services. They really are like diplomats when they're not fighting wars which is most of the time. They are visiting ports, talking to potentates, and engaging themselves in quasi-diplomatic works. "If you're in the Navy and doing the things that navies do when they're not killing each other, it is not really too far away from what we do in the Foreign Service and in diplomacy." I thought that was a telling remark. He said, "If you're in the army you're going to be a grunt, and you're going to be in the dirt, in the mud, but Naval officers are not that. They are a different breed." I thought that was a worthwhile thing to say and a worthwhile observation, so I applied for it and actually made it.

I was inducted immediately and, of course, went to OCS in Newport, Rhode Island. That, again, was another stressful few months. It's always the adaptation that's been the most difficult for me. Always adapting to rather drastic, new environments and behavior patterns. I must say the way they selected at least for the class, I was in Class 23. They selected an extraordinary collection of American young men. Really, very smart guys in many different walks of life or academic disciplines, one should say. I was amazed at what talented, diverse individuals the Navy gathered unto itself.

I made quite a number of friends and as interesting individuals as I would have had in any civilian environment. I was utterly astounded! I was more comfortable with my class -- Class 23 -- and in JG Company which I was, J Company, and these individuals had all kinds of intellectual pursuits, backgrounds, and future hopes and dreams. It was fascinating to be with them. Just the regime was hard for me, but to deal with the individuals was really a continuing pleasure.

Q: How did you come out in the end?

REDECKER: I came out as a general line officer. That what's OCS produces. You get started there. You're not a supply officer, you're not an admin officer, you're a general line officer. Then the biggest surprise of my life happened in that I didn't know what was going to happen to me. I had no opportunities to exert influence in one direction or another. I knew nothing about the Navy, and I don't think my father knew anything or anybody else who's able to do it. I was on graduation when you get your assignments -- everybody's biting their nails, "What am I going to get? I'm going to get a capital ship? I'm going to get Huron?"

Q: Hurons are destroyers.

REDECKER: Destroyers. Further training? Quite a few who went into naval aviation would go on to Pensacola, Florida for naval aviation training. One was biting one's nails! One could get into some pretty awful things. I found that I was assigned to Port Lyautey, North Africa, in French Morocco at the U.S. naval facility.

Q: You knew French, I guess.

REDECKER: One can conclude that the Navy as opposed to all these kibbutzes who remark if you speak perfect Japanese, they'll send you to Berlin. Here the Navy made what was an extraordinary match and, indeed, sent me to the fleet intelligence center in the Eastern Atlantic in the Mediterranean. This was a Sixth Fleet entity, shore-based, in French Morocco. And I was assigned there! I said this is absolutely extraordinaire. It was an astounding assignment.

I soon went there in 1955. In December I left on an airplane for a Naval facility in New Jersey and then went to North Africa, to French Morocco. One more year and it would no longer be French Morocco, but it was still. I had two astoundingly interesting years there. It couldn't have been a more happy, professional marriage.

Q: Was Tom Pickering there while you were there?

REDECKER: He was!

Q: I've interviewed Tom Pickering. I'm still interviewing him. He was a Naval officer.

REDECKER: He was married which sets one up into a somewhat different social situation than if you're a bachelor. Very good point! We were at the very same facility.

Q: Basically '55 to '57 you arrived. What was the situation that you all were looking at from the Sixth Fleet?

REDECKER: This was, of course, a very classified entity, buried halfway in the ground and very secure. We were contributing to the national intelligence estimate. We were writing pieces that I was engaged in. Its purpose was tracking Soviet submarines and being a backup as it was, indeed, intended to be a backup to the Sixth Fleet. It was a Sixth

Fleet entity and it was an entity that supported any kind of intelligence requirement of the fleet.

Q: It's obvious time has moved on so much that I'm sure there is nothing classified. What sort of intelligence were you getting? Did we seem to have a pretty good handle on most of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean and on the sub?

REDECKER: Yes, indeed, but our interest at the time was diverted to a very special event which became for a certain period a center of importance. It was the Franco-British invasion of the Suez Canal.

Q: Oh, yes. October of '56.

REDECKER: And that is what was leading up to it. One of my jobs was to determine what kind of naval assets were entering into the Mediterranean. That became for a temporary period a very great moment for me and a priority that was specifically assigned to me to track. I began tracking them with whatever assets I had.

Q: Did you see in Tangier the...

REDECKER: Actually, I did. We were following the British and French augmentations into the Mediterranean. Very interesting. At a certain point the British had six to seven embarked aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean that were coming in. I sat in Tangier doing what you suggested. By golly, there goes another one!

Q: You must have had a chair that had been reserved. A naval officer in World War II probably did the same damn thing.

REDECKER: I suppose so. I went to Tangier many times. I found myself with this fleet intelligence center eastern Atlantic, Mediterranean called Thickou. I found myself in another fraternity with fascinating individuals from a variety of backgrounds. I developed very good friendships with individuals from premier schools. I said the Navy must be the most brilliant recruiter of any organization I've ever seen. How did they manage to coalesce in this small entity such interesting individuals: young men, intermediate officers. It was a joy to be assigned there.

I met and became good friends with a number of young men, ensigns and j.g.'s who were as curious and eager about the situation that they found themselves in. We decided to visit Morocco. We traveled all over Morocco every single weekend. We made targets of destinations that we wanted to see. We traveled all over Morocco including many times to Tangier. We got ourselves memberships in the International Club of Tangier, learned about more things, really proto-intelligence work, talking to people.

I got into the Istiqlal party at the time -- the independence party. What were they thinking about with the French? You should recall, perhaps, I think I already mentioned this to you, the base near, Port Lyautey, Tamitra, the original name of the city before the French

came into it, was a joint base. Not even joint. It was a French base in which we were the tenants. We were the tenants to the tune of about 80% of the territory, but it was essentially a French base. I made it my business to get involved with the French on the other side.

There were great difficulties between the Americans and the French on practically every subject at the time. You had an awfully difficult time. I made an effort to try to get close to them.

I started getting a very close bond with the French. "How could he speak such French? He must be wanting to know something about us. He's been directed to find out." I said, "I'm not directed to find out about anything. In fact, we don't care about it. We have the Sixth Fleet, we have the Soviet submarines. This is what we're interested in."

Gradually, this worked itself into a consciousness of the French, and I became quite nicely accepted by them. I learned quite a bit about what was going on in the French mind with respect to their situation and the breakdown of the protectorate which was now very advanced. The French were having a terrible time trying to extricate themselves out of Morocco in a way that didn't totally demolish their presence as it did in Algeria later on. I think they managed to squeak through pretty well.

Q: What was the attitude toward the French and towards the British within naval circles that you were familiar with when this went on? Eisenhower certainly took a very firm stand against the Suez invasion to the great disappointment of the French and the British and the Israelis who didn't expect it, but they didn't ask us. They just did it and expected us to follow through which we didn't. Can you characterize the attitude of the young naval officers towards this?

REDECKER: We thought it was a mistake by Eisenhower. In our own environment we said, "We think that the French -- principally the British -- should retake the canal. What are these rag heads going to do with the canal if we let them run it?" Our securities, priorities, could be jeopardized. Freedom of movement could be jeopardized. Put the Limeys back in there and enable this critical link to be guaranteed in such a way that we can use it without having to worry about whether somebody's going to blow it up and make it totally inoperative as some years later, indeed happened.

I think there was an attitude in general that this was not the right thing to do, to be sure it's the counter argument, "Well, we've got it now," finally come to terms with Arab nationalism. We can't keep relying on colonial arrangements to secure our position. We did that in Vietnam or we were still doing it in Vietnam was the argument at the time. We were simply buttressing a French arrangement that had come apart in '54. We had buttressed that for so long, and where did it leave us. Dien Bien Phu, '54, all down the tube. That's what you do if you support the colonials. There was a tension there, but the military would look for secure solutions rather than intellectual solutions.

Q: What about the French naval officers you talked to? It was only about 15 years before you had the French navy who were the most patriotic haters of the British and, by inference, the Americans. Were you picking up any of this?

REDECKER: Always, of course. All the time. "You Americans want to take over Morocco. This is what you're here to do. Previous French governments have stumbled into our key bases here in Morocco, and Morocco was an important military asset or is configured geographically in such a way that it is important, and you're taking over from us. You are undermining. It's your anti-colonialist plan. All you've been talking about is how to remove the colonial powers from their possessions. Look what you did in Vietnam," in French Indochina, one should say. "Look what you did with the Dutch East Indies. Here you are wishing to substitute our presence for your own." That was basically the view, and I had active discussions with this. There was a deep resentment, of course.

Then you have also, remember Lyautey was a naval aviation base. The French had their own planes there, they're all P2V's, too. We had principally P2V's, too.

Q: These are patrol planes.

REDECKER: Yes. They had their own. They had a different purpose for being there. They patrolled the Moroccan Mediterranean, Atlantic coastlines, whereas our planes had different missions, to look for submarines. There was a deep resentment that some thoughtful French understood that their presence in Morocco had to be fundamentally changed. They couldn't keep on with this. You had in Morocco an indigenous French secular population who one could call settlers, but... There were 500,000 to 700,000 French residents of the protectorate, and they had made that country into a truly fascinating, wonderfully advanced country. The French said, "You put this all in jeopardy by wishing to exclude us as quickly as you can."

The tension, to answer your question, was always there. I could overcome it somewhat because of my language, but I can assure you with a very direct example. I fell madly in love with one of their young ladies who was secretary to one of the base vice-commanders. That was seen as some kind of malevolent trick. "What is he doing with one of our girls, one of our really attractive girls? He's trying to worm his way into not only the lady but our innermost secrets so very definitely. Why is he doing this?" She was put under great stress, and she broke off the relationship for the very reasons we initially drew out from a military resentment standpoint. It worked itself out in this situation with this young lady.

Q: At that time I think we still had B-47s based in Morocco.

REDECKER: At the air bases, yes.

Q: This was a second strike.

REDECKER: SAC bases.

Q: If all hell broke loose in Europe, then second strike would go in from Morocco. Was this a problem, a presence for you all?

REDECKER: The Air Force was a different world. They were physically removed from us: One was in Casablanca, the other base was a little nearer. There were three SAC bases and a fourth in reserve, near Casablanca. There was great concern that the Americans had appropriated Morocco not for anybody else's benefit other than their own strategic purposes. Many knew we had these planes. I don't know if they were B-47s.

Q: They were B-47s. It was a peculiar looking plane. It had a great, powerful body. It had a pilot and a co-pilot or something. At that point I suppose we wouldn't have had an ambassador there. We would have had a consul general in Rabat. Did you ever pay a courtesy call?

REDECKER: We not only did that, we volunteered IR -- intelligence reporting -- reports of our travels because we traveled so extensively on our weekends. We got ourselves into so many interesting situations that we thought this was really not a purview of the navy. It was naval intelligence, but we'd send courtesy copies off to the consulate in Rabat, and they were very grateful for it. They said, "This was very nice. I don't know what the guys in Washington will think of it, but thanks a lot for sending this to us."

Q: Did you get any feel for the political situation? The way you were brought up, it was in your blood.

REDECKER: Oh, yes indeed, but we were looking at this, and we reported on what we observed. The whole question was, "What were the French trying to do? The French basically had to worry about how they were going to relieve themselves out of a situation they did not extensively hold on it and where they said, "The Americans are undermining our presence here by being here. They want an independent Morocco so that they can do their own thing without us around." We kept protesting that that was not the case.

We traveled and talked to people. The French took quite a shine to me. One regimental commander invited me to his headquarters. He said, "Will you come down and spend a weekend out on deployment?" It was very interesting. It was one of the most interesting visits so I, of course, had to head back, good boy that I am and reported it immediately.

We Americans weren't really interested in the French anymore. They were interested in what was happening in the revolutionary movements within the Moroccan resistance, if you wish. I didn't have very good contact with them particularly in the French environment. I had very good connections there. I started to have really good connections.

Q: You left there in '58?

REDECKER: In late '57.

Q: Then what?

REDECKER: I was reassigned to Washington, to the Potomac River Naval Command's intelligence office. I was very unhappy. I had had this fabulous life, two years of meeting all these interesting people, interacting, seeing new worlds in a country I knew nothing about beforehand. I got along very well with Moroccans and with the French once we could get over these suspicions. I could work with them, and they would accept me as they wouldn't accept, let's say, the crew-cut hamburger-eater colleagues of mine.

Here I was, assigned to this naval gun factory in Washington, DC. I was admin officer. I don't know how this happened. I had never, never resisted being assigned to onboard ship duty. I wanted it. I said to the general line officer, "I'm not an intelligence officer. I'm not a 1630 designator. I'm an 1100, and I'm happy to go aboard ship. I didn't go aboard ship. I ended up in a naval gun factory. You know where it is down there southeast?

Q: Yes.

REDECKER: Southeast, down by the Anacostia River. I left Morocco with many tours and great parties and all my friends. It was a very, very tearful separation because I had a marvelous time in Morocco. I had good friends, and we partied, and we had lots of very attractive women, a political environment that was as exciting as you could possibly want without actually putting yourself in the crossfire. I left with great regret but said, "I know I must go on," and I had another year to go in the navy.

Then I was at PR&C. I was admin officer to a commander. He was a bitter old man, looked at me as some kind of apparition out of a circus side show. That was not a very successful assignment, and I went to O&I and then registered my displeasure and unhappiness and disappointment. I said, "I think I have talents you can use elsewhere."

Shortly thereafter -- within the course of two or three or four months -- I received an invitation to go to Germany, to an intelligence organization called St. Malm Rep Ger with headquarters in Frankfurt and suburban offices in Berlin and Munich run by a navy captain. Miraculously this offer was made to me with one caveat: We want one more year of your life. We're not going to send you there for a year. You've got to go there for two years.

That would be four years in the navy, and I stroked my chin over that and went home and consulted with my father. "What do you think I should do? Was this just playing frivolously on stages that you never have any relevance in the future?" He said, "I think you should do it. What's the job?" I said, "I don't know what the job is. They won't tell me what it is unless I'm ready to go." It was a classified intelligence job. I made the decision, "Yes, okay, I'll go. I'll accept a year's extension."

In December '57 -- I seem to move always in Decembers -- I went to West Berlin, Germany. I was briefed by a gentleman called Captain Tenney who was the commanding

officer of this outfit sitting in Frankfurt. A fascinating man. Absolutely fascinating. A four-striper and multilingual. What is this man doing in the navy? A little, short fellow, beautifully educated: Oxford, Harvard. He drove a Mercedes. The man liked fast women. He had a couple of fast women in his circle of friends. I finally met one of them, but not in the beginning.

Q: You didn't get involved with Rosemary Metternich?

REDECKER: Yea. "The Metternich broad."

Q: She was a high class prostitute in Frankfurt, in a black book in every...

REDECKER: All kinds of very wealthy, new German businessmen and industrialists coming up in a string of Mercedes.

Q: I was the vice consul at the time. She was completely out of our class. I was a married with kinder. Rose Mary went through the ___ or something like that.

REDECKER: The film was called ___Rose Marie. A fascinating picture.

Anyway, I accepted the assignment and came to West Berlin and found myself a member of a very small intelligence organization whose principal purpose was to interrogate refugees coming through, American intelligence organizations where there were droves of probably more intelligence people in the world. Refugees. All sides of the army, positive intelligence army, counter intelligence army, internal security, air force, OSI. One after the other. It was unbelievable. The navy was in there, too. We had a very small outfit of lieutenant commander and with me three officers and a German staff, isolated, and three yeomen. We were in the business of interrogating and preparing IR which is the naval term for Intelligence Report for individuals who would be in naval interest coming through this tube, this vast tube of refugees coming from the east before there was a wall. There was no Berlin Wall there at that time.

Q: I was a refugee relief officer at that time, and we would read your report. Not particularly your reports but copied a lot of intelligence people all over these refugees. The refugees were accusing people of being both communist and Nazis at the same time. It was a real rat's nest.

REDECKER: And these poor people had to go from one office to another to another to another. Every morning one would go to the refugee designation meeting, every morning at 9:00, all the agencies would meet around the table, and all the new arrivals would be passed around. Everybody would vote on what would indicate whether they wanted to interview them -- or interrogate them. I don't know which is the correct word. Every morning we had to go through this and, sometimes, maybe, "We need to see these people."

These poor individuals had to go from office to office to office, carted around in some small VW bus, dragged around with their children, their children put into holding pens while the interrogation went on. Then they'd move on and get in another crowd of individuals who asked essentially the same questions. These poor people went off, and then the Germans picked them up and sent them off to West Germany. It was a terrible system. But it provided employment for a lot of the pseudo-intelligence people.

Q: Also on both sides.

REDECKER: Yes, indeed!

Q: I sometimes think the Spy vs. Spy game, one cancelled off the other, but they kept an awful lot of people busy both from the Soviet side and the Allied side as far as paying people and doing things. To what purpose, I'm not really sure.

REDECKER: We knew! In our little navy world, we knew who our counterparts were on the other side and what they were doing. We would occasionally get somebody who knew or pretty close to them and could tell us what our associates on the other side were doing and thinking, almost childish kinds of shadow and light things.

Q: There used to be a comic strip in Mad Magazine called Spy vs. Spy. It was a comic thing, two characters blowing each other up. It reflected reality to a certain extent.

REDECKER: Definitely. Then, of course, we would engage in the more and more sensitive and more ominous kind of turning some of these refugees back: recruiting them and turning them back. On the more ominous side of this where one had to be very careful would be an effort to turn a refugee of interest in a situation where he had left on the other side and to induce him to go back and to start creating the conditions to make that possible for him to do. This was also part of my mandate, and we actually accomplished this on a few occasions.

Q: I'm reading a book right now called Legacy of Ashes by Tim Weiner. It's a history of the CIA. It talks about this is an era of sending people back on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Almost completely this was a disaster. The people were rounded up. They stood out, whatever it is, and many were sent to jail or were executed. It was a very sad operation. Not that there were not some successes; I don't know.

REDECKER: We had a couple of successes ourselves, but it was *very* carefully done. It was done with Germans. It was not so much in the army side, the army intelligence, sort of mass production agents. How many have we turned and sent back this month? That was all they were interested in, not on the totality of the operation.

Q: Almost all those rounded up. You did this for another two years, right?

REDECKER: Two years, actually.

Q: Were you there during the Poznan riots? No, that was much earlier. Did you feel under threat that war might start, and there you were trapped?

REDECKER: We had two tense moments, I think. I did not see the wall go up. I was there just before, and there were some skirmishes on the border. Berlin command -- the Berlin *commandante* -- rode out our 15 tanks, all 15 of them, and sent them to the border to insist that the border be kept open. This was at the time when they wanted to close it and establish a control because there was no control. That's why refugees could get through. These tense moments, '57 was then this started. It was always a very dicey situation. I recall my father always saying we placed ourselves in terrible disadvantages as he had said at the time. He said, "If we have to meet the Soviets, we meet them at the Brandenburg Gate. But we have half the city, and we have the whole country behind us. We've created the situation." I felt that. I never felt personally insecure at the time.

Q Looking at the time, this is probably a good place to stop. We'll pick this up when you left in 1960 prior to the election of 1960. We'll pick it up then and what you did.

Today is the 19th of September, 2007. Bray, two things: One, you wanted to correct when you took the Foreign Service exam, and if you would explain when you did do that.

REDECKER: I stated incorrectly to you at the time I confused myself. I took the Foreign Service exam not upon my graduation. I confused the event for five years. Actually, I took the Foreign Service exam the first time after the navy and then failed it. Everything else I said about it was correct. I only got the timing wrong.

Q: You said you had a couple of things to add about your time in Berlin.

REDECKER: I wanted to re-emphasize that I think that my time in Berlin was one of the highest, one of the most extraordinary experiences that I've had anywhere . I was learning a lot. I was able to use what minimal talents I had. I had the German language which was very useful at the time.

I wanted to extend what I said before to when I got into real clandestine work. As I mentioned to you, the navy intelligence presence in Germany was a very, very remarkable thing. On our staff we had the private secretary of Admiral Canaris who was the intelligence chief in the third Reich and was, unfortunately, killed right after the assassination attempt on Hitler in 1944.

Q: Canaris was involved in giving information to the British.

REDECKER: In Zurich, I guess. Anyway, we had his secretary working for us. We had all kinds of other people working for us in Berlin and, I should mention, the Berlin office was created by a gentleman with the name of Speedy Graubart, Captain, U.S. Navy. Captain Graubart, whom I met and whom I became a close friend of, looked at me as a young boy to be trained. He was naval attaché in Berlin in the 1930's, and he knew my father. He was quite a garrulous gentlemen, and by the time I met him he had retired from

the navy. He had set up much of the St. Malumet arrangement in Europe as a cover for intelligence activities. One of the reasons that Berlin and, indeed, Munich and Frankfurt, its other sister age offices, were so good at what they did is because they had remarkable continuity from Nazi Germany provided largely by Captain Graubart. He came back to New York and, as he told me, took the *Prinz Eugen* back to the United States and that was then used in the atomic explosion.

Q: It was the Bikini explosion.

REDECKER: It was. In any case, he was a very colorful individual. He had set himself up as a consultant, Admiral Kitchener and Captain Graubart in Frankfurt, and they came to Berlin frequently. He seemed to know much more about me than I would have expected. Indeed, he seemed to be very well informed. Shortly after my getting close to him, the commanding officer in the office in Berlin invited me to take on some clandestine operations quite aside from what I described to you earlier as the interrogation of refugees which was the overt part of our presence there.

I got into some very remarkable connections. Strangely, almost by accident, perhaps by design. I was assigned after about a year and a half in Berlin the task of meeting a gentleman named Oskar. Oskar was a clandestine man, deep cover individual in East Germany. He came out as someone from the Nazi period. He was apparently a gold-barred connection transferred to the office but carefully held. He was a very strange individual. I met him at night time in one of our Mercedes automobiles, old fashioned Mercedes cars to avoid attracting attention, and I met Oskar from the East. Oskar purported to have detailed and continual connection not only into the SED -- the Communist East German party -- but into the central committee of that and the central committee of the CPSU in Moscow. I began to receive remarkable documentation on subjects that had actually very little to do with the navy. Every so often it was a token getting information on what was going on in the Baltic and how the Soviets were deploying their cruisers in the Baltic.

This was compartmented top secret to DNI -- Director of Naval Intelligence -- in ONR. It was very interesting. Oskar apparently knew something about my father as well. One saw all kinds of connections evolving out of this that were really quite remarkable. I think this was all designed. The high point of this really very heady adventure for a young man on my age, really outstanding, was when King Faisal was assassinated and Nuri al-Said along with him, his prime minister.

Q: It was July 14, 1960, I think.

REDECKER: Fifty-eight.

Q: In Iraq.

REDECKER: In Iraq. Of course, Iraq was a key of the alliance that John Foster Dulles had made, the Baghdad Pact. Oskar provided me with information that stated generally as

I recall, and these were two exciting subjects to forget one of them, but the details do escape me, that if the British supported by the United States sought to reinstate the monarchy in Iraq, Soviet forces would invade Northern Iraq where they had been before during wartime, the northern part of Iran, so it wasn't unnatural that they had substantial forces on the Soviet side of Iran.

This was pretty high, heavy information. You would wonder whether this was pertinent information or was diversional information, intimidating, a whole lot of things, or a true deterrent information, its purpose unclear. We reported this through phone, and it set quite authority because I think it was Admiral Franco who was director of naval intelligence, put this forward in the USIB -- United States Intelligence Board -- and it caused quite a fluster between all the heavy agencies. "How in the devil did the navy get hold of something like that?"

Apparently it set off something of a witch hunt. In fact, aerial photography confirmed that the Soviets amassed on the border of Iran and possibly actually were ready to take action were we to do something to reverse the course of events in Iraq. I thought this terribly, terribly exciting, and I met Oskar several times, always at night time, always picking up at some forlorn place.

Q: This was before the wall.

REDECKER: Yes, this was before the wall. The wall came in 1961 after my departure from Berlin. I faithfully sent all of this in, and Oskar continued to report on this particular event, also what was going on in the Soviet Union at the time. It was very interesting material, the authenticity of which was hard to evaluate from our standpoint of view, and we could tell nobody about it. That was an episode that greatly affected me.

Graubart is very interesting, as I said, somewhat of a garrulous person. His portrait, I think, is drawn by the author of The Winds of War.

Q: I want to say Herman Wouk.

REDECKER: Herman Wouk, yes it was. His hero in The Winds of War is a navy captain by the name of Victor Henry. Victor Henry and the totality of the book is drawn from three real life persons. The first one, I think, is drawn from Graubart.

Q: He was naval attaché in Germany.

REDECKER: Berlin. And what was described by Herman Wouk more or less crossed lines with what Graubart told me. He was a little, short, stubby, colorful individual who knew my father. Not personally, but he knew of my father, I ought to say. It was really quite interesting. It led me to think that possibly my assignment to Berlin may have been influenced by Graubart because it was strange.

The other thing about this remarkable episode: I had three other deep cover individuals who I was assigned to be aware of all day. One exciting female who was in bed with a high official SUB and had been cultivated over the years who knew about all the naval construction programs in east Germany and the Soviet Baltic area in the Baltic states. At the time, remarkable! These people I knew in the most dramatic and novelesque environments over those years. After about a year and a half I was looked at and seemed to be fit to receive really what the navy was doing there, and they were doing some pretty remarkable things including getting into the pants of the CIA.

Q: What was your impression of the CIA, and did you find yourself at odds with them?

REDECKER: All the time. We found ourselves at odds with some, especially this monumental army presence there helped out with the air force. They were falling all over each other at that time and producing very low level material of very, very dubious use or at least short term value. Loads of them! Actually, as I always say, "Bureaucracy's enjoying the situation for their own personal purposes." Living in Berlin at this time was a wonderful time. We lived like a king with very little money. You had status and all sorts of access. It was an extraordinary and unreal environment.

What I did want to say also is that apparently Captain ___, the arch-boss in Germany, naval presence, found what I was doing good and satisfactory. He sent me on TDY to our Munich office. The Munich office was run by a gentleman by the name of Commander Val Rychly who was an astounding human being drawn out of not reality but some series of novel heroes all blended into one. He lived in a castle outside of Munich. He produced colossal amounts of reporting on naval related issues as, when I found when I got there, much more. Val Rychly was like a potentate in a principality of this own and he, of course, was tied up with the Gehlen organization.

Q: An intelligence agency.

REDECKER: Yes. He was tied up with them. I lived in his compound largely excluded from any access to the city or anything but writing reports, interviewing individuals, and having dinner with Commander Rychly who lived in a sumptuous way. His evening meals were five-course meals with the most wonderful courses and served by self-effacing servants. He and I would debate. He was a very, very interesting man. He said, "I can't be in the navy! I can't possibly be anywhere except in some Never Never Land." We did some very interesting work. I had found to my astonishment that Rychly had penetrated into the Gehlen organization and had people inside there reporting to him. They, in turn, would deal with the CIA so that ONI through Rychly in Munich was monitoring what the CIA was doing in Germany.

Q: Looking at it in retrospect, we took Gehlen's organization over lock, stock, and barrel. In fact, it came over, so we were dealing with a former German organization. It's interesting. Not necessarily of interest in the United States.

REDECKER: Definitely they are. They were interacting with the CIA. That was reported to Rychly's plant inside of the German organization. He then reported back to ONI. That created tremendous potential power for a very small organization such as ONI office in Europe. Being a super junior partner in the whole complex and agencies but producing regularly devastatingly interesting reports. How accurate they all were I cannot vouch for, but that whole arrangement that I described to you occurred soon after I had left Germany.

Rychly liked me because he said, "You're competent, you speak German, you can get inside the heads of these people." He was, again, one of these very, very unusual individuals, fluent in Czech. I think he was originally from Czech... He was fluent in German. I had all of these things going on which were utterly astounding for a young man of my time. It was like heady, heady wine.

Q: Was there any attempt to get you discharged, left the service, to go into the CIA?

REDECKER: I was invited to do that. In fact, two very interesting things happened after I had left the navy. First of all, I got one of these letters from the CIA, "Would you be interested in a career in intelligence?" I think it's a fairly standard form, but I got one. I felt very proud of this at the time. A commander of the United States Navy made a tour of the New England area and put me on his list as a person to attempt to recruit. He came to our house, and my father thought this was great fun. He said, "You should be very proud of that. Somebody wants to recruit you into the organization that you just left." I, by this time, had been two months shy of five years in the U.S. Navy and I, of course, was thinking of all the marvelous assignments that people would drool over the opportunity to have one of them.

I was confronted with the dilemma, "Should this be my career?" Captain Tunney, as I said, a little short man, beautiful women around him all the time, big automobiles. He raced cars as a pastime. He had lots of money privately. He was a very, very interesting man. He had me down in Frankfurt several times at his home with lady friends, and we talked.

He said, "The one thing you should think about. If you do this, remember you are entering an organization whose principal purpose is fighting battles at sea. You don't know anything about that. Also, you don't come out of the Naval Academy. You are now approaching promotion to lieutenant. You'll be now in the third rank of an officer in the U.S. Navy without having ever served on a ship. That will isolate you. You'll never make it more than me unless you're like Admiral Franco, one rear admiral in the entire navy who is in the intelligence business. My advice is to take your talents or whatever you have and go to an organization to use those talents as the principal purpose of existence and activity, not in the navy where our world is just a peripheral part." I thought that was very good advice.

Q: That was very good advice.

REDECKER: Yes, and I took it. The other thing I wanted to mention about this lurid three years in Berlin is that's where I met my wife. My wife was an airline stewardess for Pan American. At the time, just to recall for those who don't know those times, being an airline stewardess was a very prestigious job.

Q: Very selective.

REDECKER: Very selective. They were all beautiful. They were all beautifully educated, beautifully spoken, and the elite of the elite. I was introduced to this blonde, very intense, we fell in love and I determined that I would marry her. I got her her accelerated citizenship.

Q: Was she German?

REDECKER: Yes, she's German. Her last name was Corinth like the city in Greece. A very interesting name. It's East Prussian. Her family is East Prussian. She is very, very polished: architecturally framed woman, high cheekbones, rather small eyes, blonde, very lively. Her family was East Prussian well into World War I and again in World War II. They had nothing. She was an only child, and her father died shortly after the war of a wound received in the war. She was very much alone, and she was a Berliner. Her family came to Berlin. It's not a long history of Berlin association. Her family was basically East Prussian, and they are truly an entirely different race of Germans than anyone else.

We were in Berlin nine months, and then my time was up. The navy had asked me to stay another year after the 1959 crisis in Germany when the tanks were rolled out to the borders and there was another emergency situation. There was a succession of these emergencies in Berlin, but that was a rather ugly one. I stayed there until 1960 and said, "I have to follow Captain Tunney's advice." I asked him again about it, what he thought about it. He said, "I think you should do it." I said, "I'll do it with great regret. "It's been such a marvelous experience." Few people, I think, can speak of their military service as a fantastic experience. We were very sad to leave, but that was it for me, and I left it in April or May of 1960 and started a new life.

I came back with my new wife to Greenwich, Connecticut, where my father, as I mentioned, had his house. We spent two or three months, and I simply had to cool down, to deflate somewhat from this experience and to recover my senses and find my way back into the real world.

Q: You were talking about 1960. You were back in Greenwich, cooled out. So what did you do?

REDECKER: I took the Foreign Service exam, failed it as I described earlier. This is what had actually happened. My father was terribly upset by it. He took me down to Washington and talked with several of his pals who were still in the service, and they were all upset for the reasons I gave in my previous time. They said, "This is unfortunate. We do need more than corn-fed Kansas kids to conduct our foreign relations, and if you

don't know where the Snake River is, okay. You ought to know it, but there are other things that you do know, and it's very unfortunate. Why don't you just go off, associate yourself with something really American, and then come back and see us in a little while?"

Father said, "I think you ought to do that. You couldn't ask for anything more. It's better than to go into civil service and try and do it. Just go out and do something completely different." I thought that was good advice, too. So many try to find a civilian job in the Pentagon or some other kind of civil service job, and then try to transfer. He said, "Don't do that. Go out and do what the examination board told you to do."

So I did. I began to look for a job with the help of a schoolmate's father who was quite big in the aluminum business, by this time almost retired. He built his own small aluminum fabricating factory. He said, "Why don't you apply to the Aluminum Company of America: Alcoa." I said, "Okay, that's always interesting."

Alcoa was a world monopoly until 1928 when it was broken up by the Justice Department under anti-trust legislation at the time. Alcoa ended up with only its domestic infrastructure. Its international structure built up from the 19th Century became Aluminum Company of Canada, Alcan. The two of them became the giants. My friend's father who put me on to this, he said, "I think they're going to move internationally, and they need some talent. All the talent went off to Alcan years ago. They might find you interesting."

Sure enough, they did. I applied. I went to Pittsburgh. There I was well received. They seem to have liked me, and they offered me a job. Toward the end of 1960, my young wife Ingrid and I moved to Pittsburgh, and I started in with the Aluminum Company of America at a special salary of $500 a month. It's a very conservative company. No Mickey Mouse, no hoopla about it. Very conservative. "We're going to start you the way we start all of our people. You may have talents. We will find out how we can use them. This is the way you start out." This was quite a shock, except I made more money in the navy.

I was placed in the international division. They were building up the international division. My business was to work for the boss in the international division. There were three of us. The person I replaced was an individual by the name of Dixon Boggs. What did Dixon Boggs do? He left the Aluminum Company of America to go to the State Department! The State Department! That's how I came to replace him! Totally remarkable.

We chuckled a little bit because I met him. He said, "Well, you're going to replace me? It's very interesting. Our business has got relations, finding out tariff requirements of overseas markets and all kinds of things, Alcoa International which was the artificial subsidiary in name only. Our business here is mostly to work on the government to get things done or to receive information from them that are useful for our overseas sales and

contractual reasons and, possibly, for new moves internationally that the company may make in due course."

That was what I was in. It's a small section, very elegant, beautiful, lovely office, 15th floor of the Alcoa building. I spent two years in Pittsburgh working essentially the Washington circuit. Alcoa had, of course, a very large presence here for marketing purposes and in government contracts in Washington. My exploits were largely information gathering and I picked up tidbits of information that would be useful for the company in its contract work.

Q: How could you pick up information in Pittsburgh? Did you have to go to Washington?

REDECKER: All the time. That's right. Our office was in Pittsburgh. There was never any thought about me being assigned to Washington, but that was a large portion of my activity. Another part, of course, was to prepare briefing papers, the usual staff work, the briefing papers for executives going overseas for different reasons. They call "private sector," lean and mean and profit directed. I found Alcoa to be a wonderful bureaucracy working very much like the bureaucracies I was familiar with in the government. I was essentially a bureaucrat, would be able to prepare position papers, briefing papers, background documents, and picking up information from Washington sources primarily in the Department of Commerce.

Q: Was Alcan a foreign company, an ally?

REDECKER: A total opponent.

Q: When this broke up, Alcan was not... I would think that you would find yourself having to monitor Alcan the way we monitored the Soviet Union.

REDECKER: We did to some extent, that's true. Of course, there were other majors in play. Pechiney in France was the large French aluminum industry. The French had a claim to the origins of the aluminum industry and were contemporaneous with Americans in developing it because the method of extracting aluminum from bauxite, from alumina and alumina from bauxite.

Simultaneously a man by name of Mr. Hall discovered the same process without them talking to each other, according to best research. They discovered the same process of extracting aluminum from bauxite, so the French industry is always an important one, even in the time of Alcoa's world monopoly. At the time they called it a "natural monopoly." There's no way to avoid it becoming what it became.

We were not in cahoots the best I can determine with Alcan although I imagine there were conversations at the very highest level, but they never involved me. They were true competitors, and we saw them always as competitors.

Q: Was there any particular area either type of alumina or countries that you found yourself most concentrating in?

REDECKER: This was sort of a generalized staff, I must say. I don't think it was. What was beginning to happen and what I would suspect I was really hired for was Alcoa International was planning the establishment of a new sales and marketing development subsidiary in Switzerland. I began to discover that progressively, by no means immediately. I was there perhaps over a year before they began to say, "What we plan to do internationally, we are going to establish an international subsidiary, and we think we might want to do it in the French part of Switzerland." I was picked to help out to deal with that.

The reason they wanted to do that was they had an enormous amount of offshore profits that had been kept offshore from sales of aluminum and aluminum products overseas. The profits derived from those sales were kept overseas so they wouldn't be taxed. Like good old middle man companies. But they had so much of it. They said, "We have to do something about it." I think the U.S. treasury was on their tail. They said, "We have to do something with this money. What are we going to do with it?"

They decided that they were going to establish an international sales office and subsidiary in Lausanne, and I was invited to be part of that primary team. That, then, broke off the work I had been doing in Pittsburgh for my boss and his bosses. We were, as I say, a team of three staff people working for the president of Alcoa International and his senior executives. They could ask us to do all the things they wanted on a wide range of issues. It wasn't geographically focused or even topically focused. It was just a general, "Here were these guys here to do what we need to do to turn up the information that we need in an international context which they know about and we don't." That's what I did.

Then I was invited to be part of the pioneering to go to Lausanne. There I was exposed to what the basic plan was. The basic plan was to find a location in Lausanne, buy it, turn it into an office building because there wasn't an office building already and to then deal with the local officials in getting all of this legally established and establish Alcoa itself. Alcoa has often, as I have discovered, moved in large ways to get anything done. It's a very powerful company. Even to this day, it cannot be taken over by anybody. It's tightly held, so nobody can get hold of it. So they need their own thing, and they are cash rich. When they decide to move, they move with lots of it. This move was going to be internationally important, they were going to set up in Lausanne. What's this Lausanne? And so forth and so forth. Great sophistication was not present, but they were very surely a group of businessmen in the aluminum business. I was dispatched there as their individual who knows how to talk to these people. He knows what to do. I became immersed in real American business environments at that time. I was something of an oddity.

Q: This would be '61 or '62.

REDECKER: It was the end of ’62. The long and short of it was that Alcoa purchased a hotel in Lausanne right next to the Geneva lakefront. Lausanne was close to where my school was as I described to you earlier. Here I found myself moving in with my pregnant wife at the time, moving into Lausanne, Switzerland, and finding myself back in a country I liked, knew quite a bit about and was able to deal with all the local authorities to get ourselves legitimated on the purchase of this hotel.

No less than 35 Americans over there to inhabit this building and give substance to this new subsidiary.

Q: Let me point out this was in the era where you brought Americans over. Today you would hire mainly local managers who were educated to the same extent as Americans. In those days, you brought American talent.

REDECKER: One did that, but of course, again, Alcoa is very strange, very jealous, very American, and very suspicious of this thing called foreigners. I was, perhaps, a bridge between the two that made me useful. We did indeed hire a lot of what we would have in our business called “locals” or Foreign Service nationals.

We acquired a building of some 68 to 75 rooms; a very big hotel right on the lake. We bought the Hotel Maurice right next to it. We gutted the whole building, converted a hotel into an office building. To this day I have artifacts that I bought on auction from the hotel that was being disposed of. They said, “Just get rid of it, hold an auction, do whatever you want. We just want to build an office building out of this structure.”

That is where I then proceeded to get installed. My first mission was to help get installed the people we need to have. It was like Franco putting an embassy together. It was astonishing! I had followed that when my father went back to Frankfurt after the war. I saw how that was done. I had nothing to do with it, of course. Here I was doing something like this! After we installed ourselves and brought over all the operating people to handle the jobs assigned to the subsidiary which managed the whole sales business of Alcoa worldwide. Then the question was, “What is Brayton going to do?” I was very worried that I might be shipped back somewhere else, all the way back to Pittsburgh.

It turned out they said, “Bray, we’re interested in looking at markets in which we are not present. Maybe you could do some intelligence-like work.” They had looked at my background. “We know about these places. Let’s see if you can be helpful for us in finding new markets, and how do we get into them?” What were the target markets that they had in mind? North Africa and, in Germany, they were saying, “We’re looking for a partner in Germany, a manufacturer, aluminum processing” -- I should say fabricating -- entity. Perhaps you could reconnoiter Germany to help us find something that would suit our purposes and be compatible with our world business.” I found myself with a new set of tasks that were quite different from the original ones that brought me there.

I began going into territory that I had been through before which is the time, perhaps, in this discussion for me to make the observation: I always seem to go back to areas that I have been to before only with the rarest occasional side trip to a country not far away from where I am. I've always been where I was before. You will find this out further in my own career description in the Foreign Service. I always ended up where I had been before. Almost nerve wracking! Somewhat disturbing. But there I was.

I went through Morocco, and I went to Tunisia. My purpose there was to find out what product would work for Alcoa. That is to say, "What product that could use aluminum but did not presently use aluminum would be the one for Alcoa to target?" Then, once Alcoa had targeted it, it would bring all its research and support capability -- quite massive, I must say, for a private company, but these were big, heavy companies. What was the product that would work?

I went to North Africa and found after doing research and doing a paper that nobody read because people don't read too much, but there the paper was, and I could brief them. Window frames. All of North Africa was still in wooden window frames, and the French for some reason never really worked that market. I said we have a very interesting possibility. The Tunisians were very excited. I was dealing with government officials. I went there several times dealing with government officials. "A new investor? A foreign investor who wants to come here! We don't have to attract any. He actually wants to come here!"

Life was made very easy for me. I produced for management in Lausanne the master concept of how Alcoa might move into a market presence using the window frame business as first point of penetration. That actually found some favor, and I was sent back to Pittsburgh and all the vast other infrastructure of the company, and they thought this was interesting. In fact, Alcoa made a move in Tunisia building up a window frame fabricating business.

Q: This was fairly new, wasn't it around the world, using aluminum for that?

REDECKER: Possibly you could say so, although in the United States it was much more common with insect netting and framing. What the problem was to make sure you get the right product to the country. What we talked about was we developed this fairly original concept of reversing the manufacturing. First you bring in the frames and little tools and screws into them and paint them, then put them in.

Then you go back to an extrusion process -- just to go very quickly -- when you bring an aluminum billet, and you put it through the extrusion process. The extrusion process then produces the frame, and you start industrialization in reverse: the product backwards. They thought this was quite fun, and I got them all going on that. I did the same thing in Tunisia except what was the product of choice at the time: it was sardine cans. You may recall in decades past, sardine cans especially from Morocco, a huge producer of sardines because it's right near the vast, vast schools of sardines. The sardine cans are all steel,

and they all leak. Ghastly! You'd be horrified! Housewives would go crazy, bags would get wet.

Q: And the smell.

REDECKER: And the smell! So there I saw the product of choice in Morocco. I went to Morocco several times, coming back and looking all over the world I had been to in a different capacity. USAID was at the time working on the theoretical concepts of a new sardine industry having targeted correctly that sardines is really an industry that Morocco could benefit from and had not yet exploited to any degree up to its capability. In comes Redecker with this. They threw up their hands and said, "This is fantastic! We can cooperate."

I started, as not the case in Tunisia with windows frames where I had no American involvement. Here I was picked up at airports by USAID officials, going down to the sardine factories right along the coast between Rabat and Casablanca. There were four of them south of Casablanca. We were starting a whole new concept. Alcoa found this quite nice. They said, "Redecker really seems to be doing something useful. He's actually going to make us money, not do all this flibbity-jibbit stuff that bureaucrats do. He's actually working to make us money." So that worked very well.

I brought management down there, finally introduced them to USAID people, and they thought that was all very unusual to do something like this with government bureaucrats, but they're the ones who had the technical assistance. Alcoa said, "We have some funds that we can contribute, too." It worked out very well and you have seen today there are practically no steel sardine cans on the market from Morocco. We started it. I got into it. I don't know what happened to it later on after I left Alcoa, but we got started and the company found that very welcome.

I said this is another Redecker approach, a Redecker signature approach of looking into new areas and finding the product that will work for a company of this sort. This concept I carried with me for many years later and worked out even to the time I went to the Philippines forty years later and where I found my second wife. The Moroccan experience was very exciting and built up a concept. I think I actually began educating the Alcoa management people of how you deal with governments. A great American company supposedly never talks to governments. Governments are seen as bad. They're all trying to somehow complicate your life, want to have some money, cost the pound with silver. They're some real nuisance. Stay away from them."

That is the classic, virtuous American businessman's view in international activity which is, of course, not true, but I demonstrated to a group of people who had very little experience, hands-on experience, sales experience. You're selling to overseas customers. It's a whole different world, but actually starting with an industry in what we now call "developing countries," dealing with governments all the time. So I seem to be appreciated because I seem to be able to somehow with mumbo-jumbo get a mix that

would work for them, to their advantage, and to place them into a position of possibly impregnable advantage since nobody else had done this before.

They went me to Germany. They said, "Bray, we need to have a European partner. We think we need a German one." I had done research on all the ingot producers and fabricators of aluminum in Germany and what their corporate connections were. Were they captives? Were they independents? I went to Germany -- I was on the road quite a bit -- and, as the sales people said, "We'll never sell a pound of aluminum, and you're always on the road." It made it difficult for a company associated with sales. You're out in the field to sell. You're out in the field to do something else. Well, what are you doing?

I identified some companies and found great resistance in this. What did I do? I turned to Captain Graubart and Admiral Tichener and their consultants and said, "Can you help me with this?" They all thought that was very entertaining. They said, "I think we will. We can do some interviewing on your behalf." I said, "I would like to keep this anonymous." They said, "I don't think we can keep it anonymous. A company wants to acquire you to go in on a joint venture with you, but you don't know what the company is. Companies don't do this. You may think they do, but they don't. They want to know who the prospective suitor is, if there is to be a marriage." I said, "I can understand that," but I was given the authority to hire them for, I think, $10,000 for a six month period.

They went and traveled about, talking to different aluminum fabricators in Germany and submitting reports. I worked with Graubart, was on the train all the time to Frankfurt and Lausanne. There I was back in Germany again, back in Morocco again, centered in Switzerland where I'd always been before. Even then I held my head and said, "Will I ever get out of this extraordinary triangle?" The answer was no. But I was in Germany again and produced a number of reports to my management saying, "Where are the companies? They're very suspicious on the whole." They're very suspicious. They were suspicious of the technique that we used which I found also very interesting. "If Alcoa is interested in an arrangement with us, why don't they come and pay us a visit directly? What is all this subterfuge about?" I found the use of Graubart and Tichener may not have been as productive as direct contact.

Q: Was there a particular reason why they didn't want to open it up?

REDECKER: A large American company into Germany? With respect to the target companies?

Q: Yes.

REDECKER: They said, "Why isn't this above board? Why are you hiring these people to come and talk to us ? If you're interested in combining with us in some way, why don't you just come and go through the door and let us sit down and talk? I said, "We really didn't know what we wanted to do and wanted to see some reactions." I could figure out a lot of good arguments to justify this technique, but it had the effect of not

creating an association with them. I think I lost some credibility because I didn't perform the magic that I performed in the other two cases I mentioned to you so quickly, and I was supposed to be the German, knowing Germany, could make anything happen. The genie didn't pop out of the bottle! They said, "That's all right. Sure." I could see that it was, perhaps, this Graubart-Tichener bandit wasn't the best way to go.

Q: So what happened?

REDECKER: I lived in Lausanne. I had much to do with the consulate general in Geneva and with our Embassy in Berne. I always had a hankering for this Foreign Service. I, of course, went to embassies wherever I went. Wherever I went I went to embassies for supporting information. I made friends in the consulate in Geneva. The consulate and the mission there were quite separate at the time.

I had a friend whom I knew in Germany who was assigned to Berne. We got together again. I found myself very comfortable with the Foreign Service people. They said, "You will never go happy to your grave if you don't take that crazy Foreign Service exam and defeat it. It defeated you, and underneath all the skins that you've created for yourself is a feeling of very considerable bitterness and incompetence that you failed that exam. Take it again. Just *take it again!* If you want to go into the Foreign Service, bid; if you don't, there have been reasons not to do it, but at least your ego will be satisfied." I said, "Should I really do this? It's a lot of work to get the machinery set again to get ready for it." I decided I would.

I took the Foreign Service exam again. I passed the written again; I did it the first time. I was invited to the oral and to my great amazement, corn-fed kids from Kansas were no longer in fashion. They were desperate for a whole new type of individual, and if they could get an individual out of international American business, this was something. The aura was almost a *pro forma* thing. They said, "We're very interested in the things you're doing: international business, promoting American investments, and helping them happen. Rather than going through the promotion business and walking away which is so common, you're actually making things happen. We find this all very interesting." Very quickly I not only passed the oral but I was placed in a rank. Remember the rank order?

Q: No, I don't.

REDECKER: I was placed practically at the top of the rank order. Not up at the top, but up there. Some individuals who passed the exam spent two years waiting to be called. A long time. I was called in six weeks.

Q: What year was this?

REDECKER: It was 1964. I really didn't know what to do. I was in a terrible dilemma. Here I was doing quite nicely with a big, prestigious American company. I was living in a country I adore: Switzerland and Lake Geneva right in front of me, a balcony. Word came of the offer six weeks later, and I really didn't know what to do.

Q: How did it play out?

REDECKER: I said, "You will never be happy if you don't do it. You grew up in it. It's in your blood. All the things you do with Alcoa, what you did in the navy, is essentially what you've learned in the Foreign Service or observed in the Foreign Service. This is where you really should be."

I made the decision to resign from Alcoa, and that was a very serious undertaking because people do not resign from a company like Alcoa as I discovered. Alcoa has a life bonding process with its employees as different from what you have. If an employee resigns, the company generally says, "Well, if that's your choice, empty your desk, pick up your stuff, and come back at the end of the month to pick up your check." That is the way they were.

I didn't want that, of course, so I had to go through an enormous *pirouette* and dance exercise to preserve my credibility and preserve my *bona fides* and my connection to the company. I said who knows what the future could bring? I do not want to leave that way. I talked to the management. I said, "There are many reasons that the Foreign Service is, I think, for me." They said, "That's fine, Bray, because we're good Americans, too. If you're going to work for government, we can't see anything against that. The problem arises if you go to a competitor," which is the likely scenario. "If you go and work for Uncle Sam, this is an unbelievably simple way to leave the company." Executives say, "That's okay, you're working for Uncle Sam. You've got the striped pants on instead of a uniform, but you're working for Uncle Sam. Alcoa is a real American company, and we can't say more than that. In fact, that's fine by us."

I wiggled out of that without any great damage. In fact, they gave me a good-bye luncheon to say good-bye to me which I thought an extraordinary achievement against what I just told you about the general attitude toward this kind of situation. I moved out of Alcoa with considerable regret, I must say. I enjoyed it there.

I was a loner inside a corporate American salesman, really, selling products. But I learned a great deal. I learned a tremendous amount about American business that I might otherwise never have learned, and I found it rewarding, and I hope we can maintain warm relations. I had two little boys by this time in Switzerland -- Royal and Robert -- and I came back and packed my family with my parents as I had regularly done. I went down to the foreign service Class 23 at the Foreign Service Institute, lived in some modest little subleased apartment over across the river in the Arlington Towers, and went through the A100 course and was finding myself in very considerable transition. Very considerable transition because I was not young. I was 31 years old!

Q: You were at that point just starting.

REDECKER: That's right, and that was another factor in my thinking. "If you're ever going to do this, you better do it now because you won't have another crack at it." I did that, but I was not a spring chicken, you might say.

Q: How would you characterize the Class of 23?

REDECKER: I thought its depth and breadth of training was extraordinarily good. The economics teacher was very good in economics. I found the instruction very good. We did not have all these modern things of paying the consular officer. I thought the instruction was quite good. I had, of course, something of an advantage, perhaps, because I knew so much about the way the store is put together and what type of merchandise was in it. I may never have worked in it before, but at least I understand more or less what it's all about and how to react to certain things. I had no difficulty with the course. Then I was assigned to our mission to West Berlin. We arrived there one floor up from where I had been in the navy three years before! Here I found my first assignment back to where I was before!

Q: What were you doing?

REDECKER: I was a rotational officer at the time. I don't know if they still do it. We rotated the incoming JO's through the various sections, and I had a two year assignment with six-month assignments to different sections. The eastern affairs section, Frank Meyon was in charge of that at the time. He looked at me with curiosity and tried to make use of some of the things I knew something about. Then to the economics section, the political section, and the front office. At the time I also inherited the rotating job of aide to Ambassador McGhee.

He was with my father in South Africa. He was such a towering individual! My wife called him the "big pussycat" which I thought of as excellent. Other people learned about that. A perfect description. He had the ego of 20 men packed into one. He came to Berlin from Bonn about once every four to six weeks. The entire establishment stood on its head when he came. He always had an agenda to see Willie Brandt or to see this or that. He was certainly a larger than life individual when one got to know him. The junior officer in the mission was assigned for six months to this very, very stressful task.

In Berlin there is a residence for the ambassador that is only lived in by the ambassador when he is there. I was in charge of that house in the capacity of the ambassador's aide. I acquired great, great knowledge of how to be an aide very quickly but, fortunately, only once every six weeks. The three to four days he was there was jumping through hoops most of the time in a circus performance because he was very demanding, very expensive, very elegant, and his wife, I'm afraid, something of a tippler. That created problems because I had to take care of her as well, and things got difficult in the evening. He would go all over the city and take me with him and found me useful because of the language, and also he knew that I was the son of Sidney Redecker whom he had visited when he made that great big trip to southern Africa over a dozen years earlier.

Q: You were there from '64 to '66. You're back in Berlin; the wall is built up. How did you find Berlin at that time?

REDECKER: It was somewhat less romantic, somewhat less lurid than in my first period, but I for the first time was able to go to East Berlin in my new capacity. I could go with a diplomatic passport and was encouraged to do this. I went to East Berlin regularly. The contrasts were what they were, what everybody knows them to have been.

Berlin was already beginning to decline from the rude effervescence and dramatically lurid conditions that it was in when I was there as a naval officer and where I was out with attractive women in bars. One could live far above one's means because of the exchange rate at the time. Those things were changing already. Life was more expensive. The time of the '50s was gone. The time of the '50s was active. Berlin was a very special place with people living and behaving in very special ways. Later it all became much more bureaucratic. My business was very internalized. I was contributing a little bit where I could contribute. In eastern affairs I was given the assignment of looking into industrial development, planning, in different sectors of the East German economy, and I did a little reporting.

Q: Did you get to the East?

REDECKER: No. One could only get inside the Berlin sector, reclaimed access, unrestricted access to all the sectors, but not into East Germany itself. It was a sectoral arrangement, and we allowed reciprocity with the Russians to come rolling through the western zones so that we could assure our own access to the East.

Q: Were there any particular crises while you were there?

REDECKER: There was such a sequence of them. There was always a crisis. I would have to research it.

Q: Nothing particularly stands out right now that engaged you. Did you feel that there was a real threat of the Soviets moving in or had things reached pretty much a stalemate?

REDECKER: A stalemate, I would say, once that wall was up. The rush of people leaving the GDR or the Soviet Zone, however you wish to call it, had stopped. That stabilized their situation. Then it became a matter of principle of having this cancer of West Berlin inside the territorial boundary of what would be the constituted national East German state. There was always the tension with the border.

We had a public safety officer in the mission. The public safety officer was in charge of all of the police, the State Department public safety officer was in charge. That was a special organization like a quasi-military organization. They would be always going here and there for one reason or another. It was stabilized but, actually, in its stabilization, there were always tensions going on at one part of the border and people trying to escape, people trying to go over the wall, all kinds of arguments and fights about rail access with

trains being held up here, being held up there, and our insistence that nothing could be held up. It was a continuing thing as I recall. I don't have any recollection of a particular crisis as I do from the 1959 period.

Q: Can you characterize the impression you had and then your fellow officers and the situations, the dilemmas of western lives?

REDECKER: My own feeling was that the Berliners were actually doing quite well. There were rent controls. Life was not bad for the German population in West Berlin. It was always the frustration about isolation and getting out of there, but entertainment was as it always had been: excellent. Berlin is a natural place for theater, orchestras, night clubs, restaurants. I feel that there was a certain stability, as well as that they could get out.

Q: You were serving in this peculiar position when you were technically a junior officer, but you've been around the block a number of times, particularly Germany. Did you have a feeling that there was very much the German hands within the foreign service?

REDECKER: There were the German hands.

Q: Did it make you feel that you were one of them?

REDECKER: No. I was never accepted into that at all. I had never been accepted by any group in the State Department. It was one of the causes of my career having less than stellar performance, as one would say. I had never been a member of any grouping, and I was certainly not a member of any EUR group.

Q: I would think that your German credentials were strong? Being in Berlin as a junior officer, you didn't get sucked into that group?

REDECKER: I have difficulty answering your question. I was never taken into anything.

Q: Did you get along well with Ambassador McGhee?

REDECKER: In a very strange and tense way. He would make unbelievable demands on people. He would call for dinner parties in two days in his residence with senior officials in the German Government or the allied occupied powers. I was the one who had to orchestrate this and produce the dinner or the lunch and invite the people, an almost impossible task unless you could really get into the Germans and explain how strange your own boss was but to please go along with it and come and get a free meal if you would be so kind to do that. They said, "Yes, we'll go along with it." It was difficult for me.

I had to write so many letters. He was going everywhere. He would go to regularly to this porcelain factory of the 18th Century, from Frederick the Great's time.

Q: Not Meissen or anything.

REDECKER: No. He would go there regularly to buy the most outrageous quantities of porcelain artifacts: figurines, bowls, great things in porcelain and have them all shipped to the United States and sometimes to the residence in Bonn.

But he went to all kinds of extraordinary places. He was an indefatigable proactive presence driven diplomat, you might say also driven by tremendous ego. To get across him was very difficult. He just put you off. Very fast speed. I had to organize all these social events for him. He would, in fact, from Bonn call me, interrupt me, where I might have been in a staff meeting, call me and say, "I want to give a dinner party for such-and-such people. Please arrange it for this date when I am there. Send me a proposed guest list." I'd always do that. "Here's what I would like generally. Send me a guest list. As soon as I approve it, invite the people and make sure they come."

Q: How would describe the ambassador's relationship and, as you saw, the relationship where officers in Berlin with American military.

REDECKER: It was an excellent relationship. It was General Franklin at the time. He had very good relations with everybody of a certain level.

At a somewhat lower level, he was very, very intolerant and very dismissive, one could almost say of people who were not at his level. He was a tremendously present individual. He would go to operas and reserve seats for different officials that he wanted to have entertained. His parties were very, very good. To show you how dismissive he could be with Brayton Redecker. I was organizing. He said, "Put your black tie on, get over here for the cocktail period, talk to the people here with things you should talk about with these different ones. When we move to dinner, you can go home." I thought that was quite remarkable.

Q: Who was the ___?

REDECKER: The minister was Arch Calhoun. He had to suffer through these visits. He said, "He's a great man, but just keep him away from me. Keep him away from me! I can't get anything done. I know you can't do it. I know you won't be able to." The ambassador would want a big staff meeting where he would want performances from all the sections on a set agenda. This would take two to three hours. Arch Calhoun would say, "Holy moly." Pete Day was his political advisor who said it's just utterly impossible to deal with this man and get anything done. We were all servants of His Majesty or we'd take off when he was here. You take off and you're permanently eliminated, so you couldn't do that.

Q: After two years of this...

REDECKER: The final episode was charming. He knew I was leaving. He would call me all the time from Bonn. I delivered all his thank-you notes. I spent more time doing

thank-you notes than reporting. I was given little tasks to report and keep my pen on paper. He would have this mound of notes. Every time you'd see him, he'd have 25 to 30 or more thank-you notes to write. Who wrote them? Of course I had to. They all had to go down by cable to Bonn to be approved and came back often changed. Even though I knew his style, he changed them again, changed them yet again, and then they'd go out with my forgery: his signature which he approved. He said, "As long as you have that cable to me and I'm approved, I don't care about the signature on the letter."

At the end he said, "Bray, I want young uniformed Berliners. I want a party that all the commandants -- British, French, American, myself -- where political people ___ organized ___ different from others," -- because we had a real diplomatic mission in Berlin -- all beautiful people. Find a lot of beautiful women. Invite them all. I will let you. Try and get me the names so I can check them with security, but otherwise, they must be beautiful, and the gentlemen must be beautiful, too. Handsome and presentable. I want the party of parties at the residence."

I was on my way out. I said, "Oh, my goodness! I have to find 50 beautiful Berliners." My wife said, "Now we have to go and find 50 beautiful Berliners. You know Berlin. Find them! Invite them!" We did that. My wife desperately called some girlfriends she went to school with and said, "How can we find attractive, intelligent, beautiful women?" We finally stuck something together, but I left the room before the party took place. It was orchestras and off to the dreamland. That was George C. McGhee's way of doing things. The childhood girlfriend of my wife who helped significantly to identify people met them and said, "You're invited to this party." Can you imagine getting an invitation from the American ambassador to a black tie party under the stars with several orchestras? Cinderella was small time compared to this! She said actually it was a very successful party.

Q: I imagine it would be.

REDECKER: It was a sensational party that commandants of the other sectors... The ambassador said, "I'm so sick of all the bureaucrats and politicians. I want beautiful people." He had them, according to my wife. It was a sensational party. It went into the press. It was something that Berlin long remembered, but I had already gone back three or four weeks before it happened.

Q: Where did you go after Berlin?

REDECKER: I was assigned to Laos. I think the ambassador asked for me personally because of my French, and I was produced to support him.

I had a growing problem with my first son. It began to develop that my first son was autistic. It was a grave problem which really dogged much of our lives including special needs. He lived until 19 years old and committed suicide after several previous tries.

The whole thing was a ___ in my career. Terribly, terribly difficult that one would come to that. In any case, my wife had gone to several specialists in Berlin because of his unwillingness to wish to speak, not to talk, to be very introverted. He was non-social and all the symptoms that are much better understood today about autism than it was in those days. Pretty new stuff at the time. The doctor said, "You ___ take the time." I drew this to the attention of the Department and said, "I'm happy to go alone." No, that was not desired. Separate maintenance. They said, "We will cancel the assignment," and the assignment was cancelled. I think that was a major, major crack in my career.

Q: Of course it is.

REDECKER: Refusing an assignment which it essentially came out to be. It was accepted. The reasons were clear. The separate maintenance arrangement was not accepted, so I did not go to Laos. I went back to the Department and opened up an entirely new phase of my career. I think it imposed considerable damage on my own career.

Q: Sometimes it works very nicely; sometimes it doesn't. What did you do?

REDECKER: They said, "You've got to get back into your specialty." I had been an economic officer coming from where I'd come from, that seemed to be logical, and I should start doing some economic work, this gentleman felt. I laugh about that because I think two-thirds to three-quarters of my career in the foreign service was not econ, interestingly enough. Aside from that, he said, "You must do economic work." I was then assigned to Washington to the EB bureau and to the office of cotton textiles.

Q: This is 1966. You're in Washington, and you've just been assigned to cotton textiles. We'll talk about that next time.

Today is the 26th of September, 2007. Nineteen sixty-six. How long were you in cotton textiles?

REDECKER: I was there actually for under two years.

Q: It was '66 to '68.

REDECKER: Exactly. My time back in the United States was one of the most exciting periods of my life it turned out. I was assigned to cotton textiles. I should mention that I was assigned by Frances Wilson, Executive Director, a kind of tiger lady.

Q: Frances Wilson is one of the heroines of my oral histories. I never met the lady, but with people who were economics, she comes through as a tiger lady but really took care of her boys.

REDECKER: She took care of her boys. I was not a boy of hers; therefore, I was not well taken care of. I should precede this by saying I was originally assigned to the office of

aviation. I was assigned there because Frances had a job, and here was an available body, and she put the two together. It was a terrible mismatch. I knew nothing about aviation, and there was a great risk that I could have remained in that office because of the requirement for high levels of technicality. I could have spent many years in there because that's what most of them did. Most of them were civil servants, a few Foreign Service officers.

The job I was to be given was right at the bottom. I remonstrated and so I was put into cotton textiles. I spent under two years there, but it was a very exciting period because while I was a junior officer in Dr. Henry Hoppe's establishment, cotton textiles was, I suppose, for the professionals interesting because we were negotiating restraint agreements with supplier countries of cotton textiles to the United States.

Q: Would you explain what a restraint agreement is?

REDECKER: A restraint agreement is to limit free trade, to do exactly the opposite of what we preach the world to do and what we say we do ourselves. We were engaged in a bilateral restraint agreements provided by the long term arrangement in cotton textiles, the LTA, which the government bothered to sanction, what is contrary to free trade. Other countries took advantage of that, too, in Europe.

We in the United States engaged heavily in restraining the actual flow of cotton textiles. This was an inter-agency operation and it was, I suppose, interesting because I had to deal with commerce, STR -- Special Trade Representatives. I found that boringly interesting, one might say, because one was taking notes for Dr. Hoppe when he was negotiating with ambassadors in Washington on the provisions of an agreement and using talking points and note taking. Very standard stuff, but I learned a lot. In the meantime I was also engaged in the junior foreign service officers club.

Q: JFSOFFC.

REDECKER: JFSOFFC. Yes, sir! You have a wonderful knowledge of that! This period was a period of great ferment in the State Department. I found myself very quickly drawn into it to an important degree because I found myself coming to an office called the CCPS: the Comprehensive Country Programming System, an idea of the Management Bureau, one of the William Crockett brain children. Bill Crockett was a very controversial creature. This time he was tied up with Congressman Rooney. Representative Rooney was an appropriator of the Department of State funds, a critical person for the viability of the State Department. He took advantage of that relationship, and others around him who were simply outsiders to the State Department found this to be a fine opportunity to do something very dramatic -- to establish a State Department equivalent to the revolution that was going on inside the Defense Department under Robert McNamara.

They wanted to enter onto the stage of the State Department's internal management systems the concept of systems analysis, program budgeting, cost effectiveness analysis.

All this mumbo-jumbo of activities that State had no notion of reality with. Crockett set this up in an outfit called the CCPS, and it was called the Comprehensive Country Programming System. It was an annual document that was to be provided by posts to identify what they were doing, what they planned to do, what they had to do, and how much it was going to cost. It was the first effort, in other words, to link resource allocation to policy purpose.

This was a thoroughly radical idea at the time for people who worked in the Department of State culture where the notion of resources related to policy was a total alien idea. This idea was a State version of what was going on in the Defense Department under Allen Eindhoven and the program budgeting evolution that McNamara introduced into Defense. I had actually met one of the executive assistants of the CCPS in Berlin, a fellow named John Hirschfeld, an interesting sort of colorful lone player in the State Department, as it turned out, something like myself eventually.

He was the executive assistant in the mission in Berlin in an effort to establish on a pilot basis at say 11 to 12 posts worldwide, the CCPS as a system for requesting resources. What were you going to do with the resources that you wanted to have to run your establishment? This idea for so-called substantive offices is that it's way out in a different universe practically from the type of mindset most of my colleagues had and, I suspect, still have. The CCPS ran a couple of pilot projects and then fell into substantial disrepute. The "establishment" fought it furiously and said, "This whole idea is utterly ridiculous foreign policy. Foreign relations cannot be reduced to budgets and budget categories. You can't do it. What is the basis of the project? A program?" Bill Barrett is the head of that office.

I was fascinated by this because back in my Alcoa days I had been toying with the notion of planning. Planning in that time was quite a fashionable subject. Marxist planning, centrally planned economies, that's all rubbish, but some basic elements of the concept of planning is necessarily valid especially in the military when you are to engage in long term procurement. You've got to know what you want to procure and why you're procuring this over that, and what eventually is the substantive purpose of the things you're planning to invest in over a great, long period of time? That got me into this, and I got very, very interested in it as sort of a hobby, talked about it in JFSOFFC meetings, and people took note of my interest while I was doing my normal work back in textiles.

At a certain point, President Johnson -- just to accelerate the argument -- the CCPS was falling on hard times. ___ had great difficulty dealing with ambassadors who said, "This is all rubbish. I can't talk about my operations in terms of charts and categories. Resource codes, go away!" Eventually he had to close down his shop. Crockett was very upset by this. It greatly influenced Crockett's survival in future years. In fact, it broke him eventually.

When the CCPS crashed, it produced some occasional papers that you can find in the FSI library. A lot of philosophical subjects. Can you program foreign relations? The term at the time, program, was a completely unknown term in the Foreign Service. What's a

program? I'm in a program. Foreign relations is a program. What sort of foolishness is this? There are large philosophical ___ to our business. But I was very interested in it, and as I said earlier, President Johnson again in 1967 announced that the PPBS which was started by Defense under McNamara, systems analysis is the analytical tool to run the project, PPBS being Planning, Programming, and Budgeting Systems. It became *the* thing in Washington. President Johnson said the entire executive branch eventually is going to be subjected to this whole process for acquiring resources from the budget. I thought this was really very interesting, and I said there are ways to be able to do this in the Foreign Service segment of our activities, but you have to do a good deal of thinking.

I had a few allies in this idea. One of them was Charlie Bray. Charlie Bray ultimately was an ambassador, later on president of AFSA (American Foreign Service Association). I called on him, and we talked about this. He said, "Eventually we're going to have to be much more systematic in the way we announce what our policy initiatives are in foreign affairs. We have to somehow convert the weapons acquisition process that requires planning. We have to transpose that set of concepts into a foreign relations environment to show what we want to do over the longer term because we are dealing with longer terms as well." He had been in a university program at the University of Maryland to educate him in what PPBS was all about.

When President Johnson had announced that this is to be universalized throughout the executive branch, people had to be trained for this. The acolytes had to come forward, become disciples, and then eventually priests. High priests. So an academic program was organized by the then-bureau budget, today OMB, organized and coordinated by BOB involving 13 universities to train the ignorants that were being delivered to them to become these new high priests of the new technology, a new religion, and the new mysteries. This was to be a part of State now. State, of course, didn't know what was going on. This was all mumbo-jumbo to them. They were required by executive order to provide five trainees, and they couldn't find practically any of them. Charlie Bray was one of the first ones. The next academic year they said, "We must have five." Charlie Bray was just one of two, I think, in his academic field. In '68 they said, "We want to put five of you into our system."

I applied for this, and I was immediately accepted. I had some very interesting interviews with officials in the BOB at the time. They were very interested in me. They said, "We will try to get you a very good assignment." The good assignment turned out to be -- BOB is a very influential organization...

Q: The BOB...

REDECKER: Bureau of the Budget. OMB today, much more powerful than the normal mortal generally thinks it is. They said, "We'll get you into a very good university, and you'll have a wonderful experience." What happened? I was assigned by BOB to MIT in Cambridge, Mass. That is one of the very best universities. They had 13, and I won't go into the other ones. This was -- my goodness! -- an opportunity to go to school for one year at MIT. I jumped at it! Frances Wilson was furious because here comes Brayton

Redecker jumping out of yet another assignment. BOB said, “This is an absolute government-wide priority.” I was assigned to an IT where it required some confirmations on my part that had some intelligence and could deal with quantitative material and that I could do the differential and integral calculus. That was their most important consideration. I couldn’t do it, so they said, “Go to school.”

FSI obligingly provided me with some resources to get a poverty stricken student from George Washington University to bang the integral and differential calculus into my head. I got that, it was approved, and went off to MIT where I had probably one of the most exciting times of my entire life. It was marvelous.

I met Bill Kauffman, an MIT professor of also law and in defense policy analysis who had been in the Defense Department. His great statement was, “Policy is the function of brute sources. The only thing that you have to find out, what kinds of resources we’re talking about. There’s no such thing as a policy without a resource base somewhere hidden in the tail.” I thought that was a profound statement. These were all revolutionary ideas for me. Another great teacher was Lincoln Bloomfield who had been in the State Department and was a very attractive and interesting person. He was my guide and my mentor.

Although this was not supposed to be a degree program, I begged him to request the State Department to let me complete this and let me go into the acquisition of the Big D from MIT. He did that for me, and I came out with an SM from MIT, and I was pretty proud of that. For somebody who had been in English literature, this was an accomplishment, and I was not unhappy there. I had to separate myself from my family. My family never went to Cambridge. They remained with my parents in Greenwich, Connecticut. I had a third child -- a daughter -- and I said the priority was to get this one marvelous offering of a degree from MIT in a field that could well be of decisive importance in the future. I, indeed, got my degree.

Then I came back, and the Department had the inconvenient problem of figuring out what to do with me? What do you do with somebody? You’ve created a Frankenstein monster, and now you don’t know what to do with him!

The Western Hemisphere Bureau (later ARA), had been merged since President Kennedy’s time with the USAID Latin American area. In the time we are speaking of -- in the late ‘60s – AID Latin America and State’s LA had become a merged bureau. It was a very difficult merger. All the participants in the merger were mostly unhappy with it, but they forced it through. They had developed out of the required AID annual programming planning document a thing call the CASP: Country Analysis and Strategy Paper. Something like what the CCPS had originally thought of but couldn’t get through.

They got through only because you could identify 75-80% or even more of the resources going into a Latin American post because they were AID developmental funds not State administrative funds. Maintenance fund. They had the CASP going for two years with great resistance by some of the embassies in the AID area and said, “We have to do a

complete re-think of how the CASP is to be organized, what its content should be, and how you make this ever elusive link between policy and resources. They said, "Do you want to try your hand at this? We'd be glad to put you in this office."

It was an office right next to the assistant secretary for Latin America. It was a special office to begin to look at the CASP and see how we run the CASP. The CASP was a document that was prepared annually by every country team in every Latin American embassy to say what the next five year full projection would be on resource allocation. But what would the policy directions be to justify those resources? Many ambassadors said, "The whole idea is ridiculous. I don't know what I'm going to do tomorrow morning. There may be a revolution here; I may need planes to get us out of here. I may need this, I may need that. The whole idea is ridiculous." This is because so many people at the time said, "State thinks day by day, is quick on its feet, has to be quick on its feet. The idea of planning five years from now out in time is utterly preposterous! It's a fine academic exercise, but we are real people doing real work. To impose this system on us is far beyond the expectations of real management operations, out in Never Never Land."

They forced it on them. The LA side of the AID bureau said, "We get our money this way. This is the away the arrangement works. We get our congressional money through this document. You're going to have to play with us." That enabled us to do some interesting work. I was hired to redesign the CASP so that it had to use our favorite tiresome State Department word – "substantive." So it had this substantive cast to it that it wasn't a programming document in these tiresome quasi-military way of looking at the problem.

What's the program? What have we got to do? We don't know what we have to do! We have to have contingencies. How do you build that in and make the link in a way that is reasonably persuasive. I was then assigned to this executive office in M run by Don Easum. He was to become ambassador to Nigeria. We got along very well. He didn't understand anything about systems analysis among the mumbo-jumbo of PBPS, but he said, "You've got to do it. You've been trained in it. We've spent a lot of money on you. You go out and tell some of the embassies how they should do this." After we'd gone through a re-design of the CASP, I got some money to hire some young interns to help us out on it, and we had quite a thriving little office right next to the assistant secretary's office. I made quite a few trips through Latin America to embassies organizing them, helping them, guiding them into the production of the CASP.

Q: What was your office's relation to Crockett. Was he still there?

REDECKER: He was not there any longer. The whole Crockett period had crashed. The CCPS, his brainchild or his creature, had crashed with it. There is no CCPS. It fell down. There was a dramatic report from Bill Barrett who was his disciple in the CCCS who said, "It is finished. We are closing our doors." At that time, the CCPS formally collapsed.

I met Tom Hirschfeld again. He was up in the seventh floor somewhere, and I asked him about it. He said, "The CASP was the new idea. If we can get it to work in ARA, we will have something to tell the bureau of the budget and the PPBS people. We had our own programming, budgeting system, and please don't visit upon us the PPB that you're planning to impose on all the executive branch." Incidentally, they never managed to do it. PPBS eventually crashed itself because there were too many complications involved in applying it as a true management tool. It is an informative tool. It isn't a system that says, "If I have this much money, these are the objectives I'm going to accomplish over this amount of time." It just won't work. The mechanistic fixation of American culture that you can have quantitative analysis was very much in fashion, incidentally, at that time. Quantitative analysis: This was the way of the future. It didn't work, and it had terribly difficult experiences in other agencies.

Q: It was starting out at the same time that McNamara was trying to use it to end the Vietnam War.

REDECKER: It was one of the more important reasons that the whole PPB system began to crack in its architecture and began to crumble because of exactly what you said. It was a fascinating time. I traveled through Latin America visiting posts. They wondered who this strange little FS0-5 was, coming in here with all this hoopla and all of these magic tricks in his black bag. I saw many of these big embassies, little ones, some were quite responsive; most of them turned me over to the AID side. They said, "You were talking the same language. We don't know what you're talking about." Eventually we got some very interesting policy documents. We were rather creative in suggesting reasonably authoritative links if not mathematically exact, but approximations of how much we would have to pay to do certain things in a country.

Q: Some things amenable to AID are germane to USIA also. How much money do you put into newspaper influence, into movies. You can map that out. I was a consular officer, and there you have to predict what's going to happen. We've always in a way been doing that. When you get to the political and economic reporting, for one thing, there is so little money put into this. The big thing there at the time would be travel money which was essentially peanuts compared to anything else, but you try to get your people out and keep them informed.

REDECKER: That was one of the systemic problems of this entire approach to analysis. The State people replicated your argument over and over again. But other agencies did, too, like the Department of Justice. They said they have terrible problems with this idea because so much of the activity we engage in is all small change in resource terms. It has huge impacts if we do this or we do that. In other words, challenging the basic Kauffman doctrine, policy is a function of resources. We said, "We dispute that basic premise."

Q: Granted you were a sort of apparatchik. at your level, but did you get a feel for battles that were being waged in the corridors of the state department?

REDECKER: Battles were certainly waged in embassies. This is what, in a sense, some of the more cynical colleagues of mine said, "That's what we want! We want tension, and we want to see how you come out." I said, "I don't think that's a terribly good idea. You said I was a low apparatchik, a fair amount of influence in the way these things were put together and what was put into them. I was in Santiago, Chile, Paraguay three times. I went to three CASPs, even to Paraguay to help them out, Venezuela, Mexico, so I was all over the place and had very different reactions from different posts.

Certainly there was a generation question. People over, say, 45 or something like that, you couldn't really get to. The younger ones were rather intrigued by the idea. They had no familiarity, obviously, with what we were talking about, and it took me quite some time. Country team meetings, Brayton Redecker officiating on how we were going to organize this document. After all, remember, the document had to go to Washington, at the assistant secretary's level the ARA level. It was vetted in formal meetings, and it was either approved, amended, changed, rejected, and something happened to it. I said, "This is not just an exercise in academic speculation on your part. Something is going to happen to the document that you prepared here."

Q: A good admin officer would take a look at this and say, OK. How am I going to get more stuff for my embassy? That's the bottom line. How could I use this system to get more stuff?

REDECKER: There were agencies, other agencies doing precisely the same thing. "What can we do to get the maximum out of this funny exercise that they're engaged in for the moment?" There's no question about it. But the CASP did work sort of like a rickety Model T and worked for a number of years. It worked at least until the time that I felt that I should rejoin the Foreign Service and try to go and do something that the Foreign Service normally does.

Q: I would think that you would have gotten a recommendation. This always happens with somebody who comes with a new idea in business or anything else. He's a son of a bitch from outside coming in. This is not a way to popularity. You don't belong to anybody. All of a sudden you have Frances Wilson who doesn't think you're her boy anymore. The system was floundering in the administrative management side. So what happened to you?

REDECKER: It was, indeed, a very big problem because the ARA bureau didn't see me as one of theirs. Naturally not. Nobody saw me as anything. I was in, again, and I don't want to use the word "rescue," but I was again redirected. I said, "I need to do something that is relevant to my real talents, and I'm in this business to go deal with foreigners overseas principally." John Thomas actually was helping me...

Q: That was very much a factor. John Thomas was admin.

REDECKER: Yes. He and Don Easum conspired. They said, "We've got to do something for Bray. He's done very good work, but he is this isolated kind of animal who

doesn't," as you so correctly said, "belong anywhere." You will agree with me: The regional bureaus have their own holy orders, and if you are in them, you are protected. If you are out of them, you are a non-person. John Thomas essentially planted me in U.S. NATO. He did some mumbo-jumbo with the EUR office RPM, and I was offered...practically assigned, I wasn't offered, I was assigned to the U.S. mission to NATO in Brussels.

Q: This was when?

REDECKER: In 1971. I was highly recommended by linguistic things which had not been used. I had this wonderful MIT experience, and how I've been in all kind of activities through Lincoln Bloomfield who was an advisor to the Defense Department and how I had been so terribly involved in a system that had military overtones to it and that I had five years experience in the navy. That's how he put me through. I ended up in a job called the executive officer in U.S. NATO, a strange title. It belonged to a deputy of the DCM.

Q: You were in this NATO office from when to when?

REDECKER: I was from 1971 to '74. I first started out as a XO. The XO function...

Q: XO means Executive Officer.

REDECKER: Executive officer receiving deputized activity from the DCM to clear cables from the military side of U.S. NATO. A concern of the State people was that the defense organization, much larger than they, a defense advisor would be putting out documentation to the Defense Department which the State Department would have opposed. The way to solve that was to have control of everything that went out of the mission to both SecDef and SecState. We had a control that could be monitored if necessary. The individual that performed that somewhat boring function after a while, was the XO. I performed that job. It was interesting. NATO was a whole new world for me. Manuel d'Ambrosio was the secretary general. I was finding my way back into what was called "substance."

Q: Who was the ambassador to NATO?

REDECKER: I will have to get that for you. ...who did not last too very long, and George Vest who was DCM, was chargé for a very considerable period of time when I was there. I talked with him and said the XO function is interesting, but my goodness, is an introduction to what you are going to be doing, but as a permanent type of activity, it's really rather monotonous and not very intellectually stimulating and not very creative. He understood that.

I don't know if you know a fellow by the name of Arthur Woodruff. He was my predecessor in that job. He moved into the political section afterwards and was delighted, like Atlas giving Hercules the orb to carry on his shoulders. He was delighted to pass it

on. He said, “Bray, this is interesting to start with. You’ve never been around this unit. It’s very special. NATO is a very special universe, but you don’t want to stay in it. You want to do something.”

I worked with the division chiefs -- the advisors -- and Larry Eagleburger who was political advisor. He left and was replaced by Jim Goodby who was a wonderful man. I really communicated with Jim Goodby. He was one of the most wonderful people I ever met. I explained my situation to him, and he said, “I understand completely. We’ll have to find a way to deal with this,” and he dealt with it by eventually putting me into the MBFR negotiating seat.

Q: The MB...

REDECKER: The Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, the longest negotiations intended never to go anywhere ever to be mounted by anybody. It involved our mission in Vienna; it involved all of NATO; it was a very exciting business. The political committee and senior political committee decoded, both of them, they don’t want to deal with this on a day to day basis. It’s too absolutely mind-bending and soul destroying. They created a working group -- the MBFR working group -- to deal with this on a regular basis. The allies that had forces in Germany were participants in this MBFR meeting. It was a low-level venue, but it actually transacted quite a bit of business that eventually ended up in the senior political committee. Ted Wilkinson had done this job and was being replaced. He said, “It’s very interesting. You can make a name for yourself.” So Goodby said, “Yes, I’d like to put you in there.”

So I became an MBFR U.S. rep to the MBFR working group, and I spent two years doing that, happy to be out of the XO job. Somebody else received the orb to carry on his shoulders, but I had two very, very handsome and interesting years. We were engaged in fairly serious negotiating procedures with the allies. The purpose of the working group was actually to work out arrangements of who would cut what out of their forces that we could justify and that we would have allied consensus in NATO of the force reductions that we would be prepared to offer the Soviets in the Vienna venue.

Q: You were negotiating within the allied...

REDECKER: That’s correct. The allies, of course, were very suspicious at the time that the Americans wanted to find some sleazy way to reduce their troop levels without really telling anybody and still maintaining the facade *vis a vis* the Soviets by urging the Soviets to reduce their forces. There was an asymmetry in the forces so that the Soviets were required to take out two to three for every one we took out. To argue which one of our side was to be taken out was the raging debate around this working group.

Q: I would have thought in this working group there would have been an urge to cut. This was one of our big things ___ being the Europeans haven’t carried their weight vis a vis...

REDECKER: That was, indeed, going on at the time. But they were saying the Americans want to do a fast number on us. The whole question was not the principle of it. It was the accuracy of the numbers. What was the order in battle on the Soviet side? What were the forces? What kinds of forces were we asking them to reduce to compensate for our losses. A blue uniformed air force person is not the same as a combat Joe in the trenches. How did you work this? It was enormously complicated but largely political undertaking, but I made a very nice name for myself and pleased the Defense Department by protecting the American position and not getting it down too terribly much. I think they wanted to get two brigades out, and we wanted to see what we could get for the three brigades.

Q: I would have thought that the feeling would be that nothing was really going to happen on this thing.

REDECKER: Yes, that was it all the time. MBFR and CSE was another. There were two multi-lateral negotiations going on with the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union it was, first of all, CSE and MBFR.

Q: CSE, the Conventional...

REDECKER: Central Security in Europe.

Q: This is the Helsinki Accord.

REDECKER: Precisely that.

Q: I don't know if you picked this up, but I interviewed George Vest who was saying that Henry Kissinger was red hot on the arms negotiation and was denigrating the CSE which George Vest was trying to run. Did you pick up any of this?

REDECKER: Oh, yes indeed! MBFR was seen as a political undertaking to take care of what they thought was the transitional problem and probably a problem that would resolve itself technologically rather than numerically, that there would be reductions anyway because the force configurations opposing each other would find it in their interest to reduce their number of troops because the technology would have advanced. CSC was seen as something up in the air. Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe. They said this was fine, this is how we want to do this, but there isn't any hard stuff in there. The steel balls are not in the CSE rifle. But that was my business, and it was a very interesting business, and I performed reasonably well in it.

Q: Did you get any feel for the personalities or positions of some of the major allies in this?

REDECKER: Yes, indeed. The views of the allies was, "We are very suspicious of American intentions. We think that for numerous reasons, deployment reasons, budgetary

reasons, the Americans want to reduce and are trying to find a way that will reduce and cook the books of the Soviet sides to justify the American reduction."

The question was, "How do we minimize the American political imperative to reduce the number of troops in Germany?" That was basically the question. I had to talk in those discussions around the table with the six MBFR allies with beautiful, articulate instructions both from principally Defense. I was able to try and demonstrate as well as we could that we were not in that business and we were going to seek, for whatever we took out, double to triple equivalent removal on the Warsaw Pact side.

Q: Did you feel that we were dealing straight?

REDECKER: We were *not* dealing straight. No. There were competitive reasons even within Defense. I became almost a Defense spokesman. My principal backup in Washington was not State but was the Defense Department. They said, "You have to have a State person, not a Defense person," so ___ as Wilkinson had been before. They were good boys, and we got patted on the head by Defense for protecting their interest. There was great tension inside of Defense and, indeed, the DOD had a committee -- MBFR committee -- in the Pentagon giving us instructions and later locked in all kinds of battles as well.

Q: The French weren't in this. You had basically Germany, Britain, and Italy were your main.

REDECKER: The Germans were not in it because the Germans weren't reducing. It was the NATO allies with troops assigned that were in, as I recall. As I recall, the Brits were there, and we had some other allies. The Dutch, of course, were there, and the Belgians were there. I guess perhaps the Germans didn't seem to me a very major factor. I can't remember at this point whether they were in it or not.

Q: The British, Dutch, the Belgians. Were there battles with you?

REDECKER: Principally with the United States. Again, it was something of a repeat of what was going on in the Pentagon as to which forces could be offered up for reduction. What combat capable forces might be reduced which is what made the other allies nervous, especially the British. What are the Americans doing? Are they actually going to take out combat troops? The Russians said, "You've got to take them out if you insist on us taking them out." Then in Vienna, John Dean -- the American negotiator there -- with his boss. I was on the phone with John Dean all the time. They were dealing with the Russians but with the allies as well. What we were trying to do was to try to create a uniform NATO allied position for the delegations there to work from that they wouldn't start arguing among themselves in Vienna.

Q: You were there from when to when?

REDECKER: '72, '73, and the beginning of '74.

Q: Was much happening by the time you left?

REDECKER: We had Don Rumsfeld come as ambassador, and he was a very difficult individual -- with a wrestler body and almost a wrestler mind, one might say, but very dismissive of State Department people and their ways and, really, quite arrogant. I had a very difficult time in all my interactions with him. He wasn't there too terribly long. I have to get you the name of the ambassador I started with.

Q: *When you left there in '74, did you feel that anything was going to happen? Was this a propaganda exercise?*

REDECKER: That is what a great number of individuals thought of it. The political committees, our positions, we then put forward, the arcane hierarchy of NATO committees. The working group reported to the military committee and it reported to the political committee, and their findings were put forward, then further debated by a wider group of allies in most venues. The views of sophisticates was that this was simply an effort to get through a political imperative to reduce troops and how we were going through it MBFR as you know later on never got anywhere.

Q: When you left there, what did you do?

REDECKER: I came back to the United States to the Department and back to Frances Wilson. I was, after all, an econ officer. As you have now seen, I hadn't had an econ job other than cotton textiles in all the time I had been in the Foreign Service.

Q: Didn't you have your pall-mall stamp of approval?

REDECKER: Oh, yes, but here I was still an econ designated officer. I was assigned by Frances largely because of administrative, certainly not personal reason, I was assigned as deputy to the trade agreements division under Mike Goodman and Bill Barraclough. The trade agreements division was part of the Tokyo round of multi-lateral trade negotiations and establishing State positions that would go into USTR and into another whole universe of agencies in the U.S. government, commerce and principally agriculture.

I was deputy to the trade agreements division. Quite a large division in the EB bureau. Bill Barraclough was the office director, and we had about eight different officers in that addition. It was under Mike Goodman in the EB's agreements division.

Q: I wonder if you could compare the negotiations you were involved in with this with all these government agencies with NATO negotiations. How much difference was there?

REDECKER: A real difference because you're dealing with really declared, vested interests on the part of U.S. government agencies with powerful vested interests. In the case of trade agreements, State actually has no constituency behind it when there is only

the "we must prevail" principles: "We must preserve good relations. "We must preserve the ideal of free trade." "We must do this..." Whereas other agencies have major constituencies behind them which are driving for an explicit position which is not perhaps helpful to the larger position of the United States. I would certainly say that's one of the major differences with governments dealing with governments. It had an arm's length quality to that. When you're dealing with other sovereign governments, Americans are dealing with constituencies here where the role of State is almost an inconvenience to go forward.

Q: Did State play any particular role or was it a mediator between various constituencies or to get in between?

REDECKER: Yes, it was, and State used to have the lead role until the USTR, the Special Trade Representative, was into place. In the beginning I learned in the course, STR was more of a ceremonial outfit, but changed by the time I was there with Bill Barraclough who later became DCM in Brussels. I liked him very much. He was a very, very well trained economist and trade specialist. I didn't find him a particularly salient or remarkable diplomat, but he is very good in his field, and he taught me a great many things.

I found it a somewhat uncongenial environment. I was learning a lot, but my business I had hoped was dealing with foreigners. That was what I was good at! That's what I was raised in, and here I was going to meeting after meeting in commerce, STR. I was putting together positions and agreeing to and sanctioning, and addressing positions to my bosses if necessary on the position formulation process of the U.S. government for negotiations. This was a wholly different universe. Barraclough was very good at it but he didn't speak any languages; he didn't know very much about the world outside except as an American visiting, you might say. I found myself very, very far removed from some of the things I thought I'd be doing.

It was at that time that John Thomas found me again and said, "I think I've got something for you with the old business and policy analysis and resource allocation. We are trying yet again to get some kind of fix on getting this connection more palpably established, more persuasively established. Would you like to join us as we go into a new program that I have got started?" John Thomas was Assistant Secretary for Administration, soon to become transposed into Under Secretary for Management. We participated in that transition. It was a way to get control of the resource allocation process in some way that I can take in what you substantive guys do and somehow get that into my soup bowl. He made me a very nice offer.

He had a staff around him of somewhat gumshoe type of people, both outsiders and insiders, to build a new system. He said, "Bray, would you like to do it?" I said, "John, I'll do it if you want because I'm not terribly happy where I am. Will you give me a good onward assignment? It's the question of assignments, and I belong nowhere at the present time. I certainly don't belong in the RMP; I don't belong to the EUR bureau; I don't belong to the ARA bureau. The EB bureau doesn't want to know me. You have got to

extricate me from Frances Wilson in yet another move. It's up to you." He said, "I'll do it."

He did it. I moved from the trade agreements -- I was there about a year and a half -- and I moved onto John's personal staff to create what was called the "podrac system." Can you imagine anything so crazy in your life as that? Policy objective descriptors set against resource allocation codes. How do you build resource allocation codes out of the budget system of designation of expenditures? How do you link those to policy objective descriptives so you can begin to tell the congress what has priority. How do you tell the congress, "This is what I'm doing with the money I want. I want this amount of money. This is the kind of thing I want to do with it." How do you build that kind of a thing? I spent some time doing that for him.

Q: From when to when about?

REDECKER: About '76 to '77.

Q: This brings you into the Carter administration.

REDECKER: Yes. I was designing things. I got back to Lincoln Bloomfield. The McNamara revolution was by this time over. What was now coming up in this whole style of evolution was basically the same question that we discussed before and now (1977) called Zero Based Budgeting: ZBB. ZBB became the new fashion model on the stage with... I won't go into the principles of that because it's too tiresome, but Zero Based Budgeting. In other words, "What was the purpose of the increase beyond the zero base? What are you going to do with the extra amount of money that you want? Let's forget about the past. Let's go about the incremental increase that you want." That was going on, whirling around the executive branch. We looked at it and said, "It really doesn't terribly interest us." We were going to try to do this thing with policy objective descriptors and resource allocation codes. I gave John Thomas a template, semi-computerized at the time, of how one might do that and how we might sell that to the regional bureaus. He liked the work I did. It was interesting, exciting, and he came through with a very good post for me after about a year and a half of this. It was as economic and commercial consular -- that was still the case then -- in Rabat. I draw your attention to the fact that I continue to go back always to the places I have been to before. Quite remarkable.

Q: It was Zero Based Budgeting, but I loved it. It hit me when I was consul general in Seoul, Korea. We went through our section. We were taking in fees on passports and visas. I was able to say, "We're earning our way, and we have a little surplus" I turned to the political counselor there. "How about your section? How much do you make?"

REDECKER: It was a very widespread observation at the time.

Q: What happened with this? It sounds almost like they kept dragging you back to tilt this windmill of somehow to get a financial harness on the operation of the State Department and coming up a cropper every time.

REDECKER: Because it doesn't basically work. It will not work. The approach is a fine theoretical model. In fact, John Thomas read my thesis from MIT where I set up for my master's thesis. You need a master's thesis at MIT. I did a template, a grid of input and output, policy outputs and resource inputs. I did a Paleolithic type of grid that attempted to make some connections of the sort. He rather liked that, and that was the basis that he said, "Well, we should try to refine that. You need obviously some more help." He tried to get me some more help. We did a top level of resource allocation codes which means the codes that related to State Department activities, not budget codes because budget codes don't mean anything. There was a transliteration there.

The next transliteration was budget codes that we created set against what we then called "policy objective descriptors." What are you trying to accomplish with these different resources flowing across the horizontal grid if the vertical part of the grid goes up to policy objectors descriptors. What is the policy objector descriptor? How do you get to that?

I argued for a concept which had never been done before, that we should take these national interests. What is the national interest that is operating? What are the U.S. national interests that remain constant over time? What are the national interests operating in our relationship with this particular country or this group of countries? These are constant or more or less constant conditions that we wanted maintained. U.S. interests.

What objectives do you need to have to maintain those interests, let us say, in good order? This was the first basic idea of breaking what had previously been described in the literature as national interest objectives. I said, "Let us take national interests as a constant." Let us talk about the next question which I thought was the contribution that I really made in this whole thing and that even Lincoln Bloomfield found interesting to do and that was some small achievement. "Is the national interest challenged? Is it degraded? Do we have to do something about maintaining the national interest like free and innocent passage through a channel by two countries?"

If there is no challenge to the interest, you don't pay any attention to it, and you don't do anything about it because it's in great condition. If somebody starts putting gunboats in the channel or guns from the shore and your vessels are jeopardized, something has happened to that national interest. It has been challenged. You have to do something about the challenge.

This was an analytical exercise to get to the idea of, "What are we trying to accomplish?" I think this was fairly pioneering work. I have never seen that in the literature. The idea of the national interest as a constant. If the national interest is in good condition, nobody pays any attention to it. It goes on. The interest is still there, but nothing happens to it. If

it is challenged in some sense, then you have to do something about it. If you want to do something about it, what is it that you do about it?" That logic was at the time something of a pioneering sequence of analysis. John Thomas liked it and said, "I think we could do something with this." That was my contribution there, but then I said, "I really have to get on with my Foreign Service career."

Q: You were moving to Rabat as economic consular. You were there from when to when?

REDECKER: Seventy-seven to eighty one. Let me tell you what I did. You're dealing with something of a maverick in the case of Brayton Redecker. I went, of course, to the NEA bureau. They said, "Phosphates is the big thing economically. We have been engaged in a difficulty with the Moroccan government and the phosphate monopoly in that they had been trying to put an OPEC type of grip on producers of phosphate rock. We had some really tough times with the Moroccan government because we were not ready to accept that. One of your jobs is to look into this and see how this is going to play out and how to protect our interests in whatever the Moroccans try to do." One should say parenthetically phosphates are to agriculture -- or that used to be the statement -- as petroleum is to industry. It is not a trivial subject and not a trivial product although very few people know much about it.

Q: Fertilizer.

REDECKER: Fertilizer. I thought like quite a few people that phosphates were a fertilizer, a white powder in a big fat sack that you get at the hardware store to put on your lawns or in the agro fields. It is not really white nor a powder, and it is a very complicated product, very sophisticated in manufacture.

What I did, I said, "I really want to get on top of this. This is apparently quite a big thing." The Department of Justice was involved with this and the Department of the Interior. I said, "I think I want to get my hands on this." I began to do rounds of the executive branch who were involved in this agriculturally, paid a visit to it.

In Interior, I ran into an individual whose whole life was phosphates, Bill Stowasser, a very interesting, neglected man, older, much older than I was. He was the guru of phosphates in the U.S. government, and he sat in the Interior Department. I explained that I was being assigned to Morocco. That was approved, by the way. John Thomas got his way, and I got my assignment. I wanted to do some work and really understand this subject that I was told was a really big problem for the Americans in a relationship that was otherwise very good with Morocco.

I then decided that I was going to learn all about phosphates. Being a total ignoramus, I told Bill Stowasser, "What can we do to teach Brayton Redecker about phosphates?" He was quite happy to oblige, and he said, "Would your bosses approve your going to Florida and spending two weeks with the phosphate industry?" I said, "I don't know, but I'd love to do it. I'm going to make every effort to do it."

I was able to discuss this with the EB bureau, the petroleum bureau. We sent people into our petroleum industry to get trained before they were sent to Saudi Arabia. I said, "This is the same thing. I should be trained by people who really know what they're talking about and get a whole sense of the American position on what appears to be not a trivial product even though I don't know any of the background." Stowasser said, "I will arrange it all."

The long and short of that exercise is that I went off to Florida which is the principal base of our American phosphate production. We used to be the largest producer of phosphates, but Morocco is the largest resource base for phosphates. At the time we had 9% of the world's reserve; Morocco had 62%. Principally Morocco is the player; the Saudi Arabia of phosphates.

I spent two fascinating weeks in western central Florida where deposits are, in and around Tampa. I was greeted there as some individual from the moon. Nobody ever heard of the State Department in Tallahassee. "What are you doing here?" They finally got to know. "Is this guy a diplomat? Coming here?" "You're to teach him all about the business. You have an interest in doing that because he's going to be reporting to us on what the Moroccans are doing." "Oh, those damn Moroccans! We'll show them! We'll teach them!"

I was out in the fields with these drive buckets, these colossal American things that take 10 tons of earth out of the ground at each bite. I say the phosphoric acid plants. I was treated to visits through the laboratories of the two major phosphate producers. I saw the whole thing. They were helpful, they were quite amused. They said, "This has never happened to us before, a diplomat coming, and our job is to make him conversant with what we do. We'd be delighted!" Once they got into it, typically American way of doing it, afraid to start, but once they do, roared ahead!

I got a marvelous comprehensive view down there of the American phosphate business, but much more important the technology. I really went into it. I told Stowasser when I came back, "I want to be trained in the chemistry. Do you have somebody who could teach me the chemistry of phosphates, phosphate rock, and the process, phosphoric acid, sulfuric acid into phosphates, and the mixing?" "We'll find you one. He produced one for me, and I spent six weeks, three times a week, with my teacher, learning the chemistry of the business. I began to accumulate quite a specialized knowledge for a diplomat, I would say, almost unique knowledge of the product and the industry. When I went to Morocco, I was quite well equipped to deal with a subject that I was told was going to be an important element in my dossier.

Q: Can we talk a little about Morocco? Who was our ambassador? How did you find the embassy, and how were relations with the country at the time?

REDECKER: Robert Anderson was ambassador at the time. He's a down to earth, undiplomatic type of individual but hard driving, down to earth, nuts and bolts almost -- though he was well educated -- a "dems" and "dose" type of individual. A deliberate

effort at being a hard charging ambassador, something like Bill Sullivan. He and I got along splendidly. He saw that I had made a really serious effort to understand this industry and that I knew a lot about it. He didn't have a good setup with the political section. I inherited a nicely organized, well staffed econ section. I moved into and I made good friends with the AID mission. I would meet them in due course as it turned out, but I made it a point. My past that I have discussed with you in the ARA bureau stood me in good stead. The AID people said, "This is one of these diplomats that we can deal with. He's really a guy who has his hands on the subject matter, not the fluff stuff that they usually accuse us of having.

Ten days after I moved into my house which happened to be my official residence was next to his official residence, the Ambassador said, "Brayton, I'm having this key individual from Gibraltar," ten days after we moved in. I have to have him to lunch. I can't have him to my house because my house is being stood on its head by alterations. Can you entertain him? Can you give him a lunch? I'll come to it if you invite me." He was this kind of person I should definitely add to my life. A beautiful lunch. A Mr. Boudroit and Mr. Doug Jerrell, a very important individual in Gibraltar, very influential, secret bank accounts. These are the people we want to learn about. I did this. He was happy with it. He got invited, of course. He loved the lunch. He said, "Your wife does a marvelous job." This set the tone for our relationship in the duration of his ambassadorship.

Then I went and started making my calls on the Moroccan government. It worked beautifully for the first time -- for the *first time* -- in my Foreign Service career. I started using my French capability. Isn't that remarkable? They were charmed with this. The educated Moroccans speak better French than most French people do. It's a strange phenomenon. They speak magnificent French because they like French. It's a remarkable social insight to see how this works. The are really into the literature and the subtlety of the French language. They saw an American also capable in the language, and they loved it. Strangely enough, an Arab country to have this conjunction of reality. Very strange. You take former Spanish Morocco. There isn't a knowledge of Spanish today in that place because they don't appreciate Spanish. They are actually hostile to Spanish. You would think it would be the opposite having had a hundred years of interaction, but it's quite the reverse. A strange insight. They like the French. They really like the French. They like us, too, because we'd had a long association there.

As you may know we have the old ___ building in Tangier that's now a national monument. It's under the U.S. Monument Administration. It is said that they are the first to have recognized George Washington, the person of the individual, to recognize that Morocco and Morocco the first to have recognized the United states. They feel very proud of this. We have a marvelous relationship with the Moroccans in general. Our military bases by this time were gone, a lot of the SAC bases were gone, the naval base where I started out and told you about earlier was on its last legs, but there were no Americans there and had not been any Americans there for many years. We had a sunshine type of relationship.

Q: Although you were an economic officer -- before we move to the economics thing -- how did you view the political situation? This was King Hassan. Were we concerned about his tenure there?

REDECKER: I don't think so. The monarch by an individual who was careful to allow certain aspects to open in society, so I things did not get terribly pressured but, certainly, you couldn't call it a functioning democracy. It's highly controlled to this day, and to this day a highly patrolled police managed state. It's well managed. They learned how to manage it from the French. The French system is the basic concept for the arrangement of the internal security system of Morocco. It's an authoritarian system. There is a great deal of moderate poverty, but the country on the whole was and still to this day is reasonably successful and reasonably open.

Q: With the events in Iran with the Shah and the takeover of our embassy; this must have made us very nervous.

REDECKER: That something like this happening in Morocco?

Q: Yes.

REDECKER: I don't think so. Actually the king had met the shah. They had met in Rabat. He was on his way back from some trip. I recall vividly, and I was so surprised to hear the whole thing in Iran had collapsed a few weeks after he'd been in Morocco. We had no sense of a similar situation. The monarchy's strong in Morocco. It is highly supported by the population and has a long, long history of support and legitimacy. Remember, he is the commander of the faithful.

Q: A descendant.

REDECKER: Yes.

Q: How did you find the business community at the mega level, the major firms and made phosphates?

REDECKER: Except for phosphates the American presence very small. American presence, industrial presence we counted on, private investors. Hilton Hotels one of them, and King Ranch, an interesting investment that created all kinds of difficulties for me personally that even in my tenure and with what I regarded as superb relations with the Moroccans we could never resolve.

Q: What were the problems?

REDECKER: The King Ranch, the Kings of Texas, established a pioneer ranch in Morocco and, to be brief, it was taken over and expropriated by the Moroccan government. There had been no proper compensation paid, and it was a constant irritant that the ranch should not have been expropriated to begin with and if it had, it should

have been properly paid for. That was an irritant that I could never get resolved. You might say they gave me the smiling face and, "Yes, we love you," but actually nothing happened.

Q: It sounds like there must have been some political pressure, financial shenanigans. Was somebody within the King's couturiers who wanted to take over the ranch? What happened?

REDECKER: You could possibly explain that it wasn't overt. It was just managed as a state enterprise. The Moroccans have numerous state enterprises, not a few of which were taken over by the French protectorate and nationalized at the time of independence. It was something we never wanted to play up to. The King Ranch people in Texas were never too aggressive about it. They weren't putting the gun to our heads all the time. There was a manager. It was taken over, but nothing much was done with it. It was not fully exploited. There was a manager who came to visit me, Estrada Cod. I remember him as Cod like Estrada, Philippines. Cod would come and report on what was going on at the King Ranch once every six months. He was there running it. But it had been expropriated.

We had a number of other expropriations which were awkward, one of which was a charming American lady who married a Frenchman and had a beautiful ranch south of Marrakesh which was expropriated, too. She was an American married to a Frenchman. She continued to come to see me, and I made all the representations I could with the Moroccan government about it, but it never got solved. It never got solved.

Q: I take it this was sort of a Moroccan notice of envy.

REDECKER: To some extent I could confirm that. We were talking to other embassies, and the French said, "My goodness. You're complaining of your little three or four expropriations. Think about us, all the things he did!" Let me push these things. There are too many much more important things. We need Morocco as an anchor of the West in this Arab world next to this Algerian problem; such a mess, and you don't know what's going to happen. We know at least that we can control the Moroccans so don't overdo it with these kinds of little moralistically driven plans.

Q: Did the Polisario movement cause problems for you all?

REDECKER: No. The Moroccans went into Spanish Morocco, and there they were so we looked the other way most of the time. We were not in favor of the Polisario because the Algerians were behind it. The Algerians kept that thing alive merely to drive the Moroccans crazy because the two countries just can't stand each other. They hadn't been able to stand each other for reasons that to an outsider make no sense at all. They should be cooperating and could gain so much from cooperation. The Algerian mind, I'm always one who tries to go into the mind of people, is differently constructed from the Moroccan mind. It seems to be a less agreeable mind. Never to forget that Morocco is an aristocratic mind. That's why they get along with the French. Redecker's interpretation of why the

relationship with France is so peculiarly successful is because it is an elitist culture talking to another elitist culture.

Q: I'm told that the Algerians are very down. They're not much fun to work with.

REDECKER: The ones I've seen tend to corroborate your observation.

Q: How about the phosphate thing?

REDECKER: The Moroccan phosphate monopoly is called the OCP (Office Cherifien des Phosphates). Strangely enough, after independence, it happened that the French colonial administration of ___ agencies were turned into ministries, were turned into different names by the independent government. The Americans kept the term. This is a French colonial term to describe what the French made considerable investments in this back in the early '30s, late '20s. They were a major producer, and they called it the ___ which means The National Monopoly. Independent Morocco kept it and enlarged it enormously. When I was around, the ___ as they called it OCP was run by Karen ___ who was a former prime minister and had been a former OCP manager before that and was managing it again when I came there.

I made my courtesy call on the OCP. They were actually in Casablanca. We had an immediately falling in together. Karen ___, a larger than life person, with a big sunny smile, could kill 100,000 people with the tap of a finger or would bring dancing girls on the other side of the room into it. Sunny, expansive, typical Moroccan aristocrat. He and I hit it off instantly. He was tremendously impressed -- and he said so to me -- that I had gone to the trouble of learning his businesses so carefully and attentively. He said, "I'm astounded what you told me." I told him what I did. I said, "I didn't know anything about it. Here I'm coming to your wonderful country, and I really wanted to know about your premier resource. I tried to educate myself." He thought that was charmed. He said, "For a diplomat to do that? Utterly unbelievable." This started a relationship of remarkable intensity. We began to deal quickly with the problem the Department of Justice had and the alleged effort, the alleged monopolizing of the world phosphate market by Morocco as I mentioned to you before.

Q: OPECization.

REDECKER: Yes, exactly. He was terribly upset that the Department of Justice had issues. He said, "I can't believe this, but here it is," and he showed me the paperwork, a restraining order of himself and ___ played on ___ to be arrested if he entered into any territory that the United States could somehow control or induce another government entity to do forth. He said, "I haven't heard of anything like this." I started my relationship with him on this subject and, with the ambassador's help, I explained all this. He said, "Yes, I'm aware of this thing that's been around. You've got to stop it!" We went back and in effect got Justice to retract that restraining order, I think it was called. He was terribly offended. He said, "This is international highway banditry. You're coming in and arresting a person like this? A restraining order for the whole..."

Q: Was there any cause for this?

REDECKER: Yes, because he was apparently engaged in unlawful activities that was restraining the U.S. phosphate industry. I think the U.S. phosphate industry was claiming that he was setting up a monopoly that would exclude American exports of phosphate because they had this monopolistic position. He got over that. I said, "I want to learn all about your wonderful industry. I've been down to the phosphates in Florida." They knew all about the Florida establishments and our industrial arrangements there. He said, "Yes, we know all about you Americans, but I'm happy to tell you about our arrangements, too. You don't know enough about them."

We became really good friends. I visited every one of the OCP's facilities from mining to the sulfuric acid conversion process into phosphoric acid and then the phosphoric acid conversion process into actual fertilizer and manufacture later on. I went through all these phases and reported in detail each one of my visits. The Departments of Commerce and Interior were absolutely amazed. They had never seen reporting of this sort, of narrow, limited interest to most people and certainly of no interest to the State Department but of great interest to Interior, the American phosphate industry which got it all, and Commerce.

I was commended. I said, "Here is Report #1 of a series of ten reports on the Moroccan phosphate industry, detailed designs, chemical formula, the way they do the solutions at different stages, the throughputs of inputs." Really something. Commerce was quite charmed by it and patted me on the head for that. I was doing quite well. Also with the industry ministry I became close. I got along with Moroccans, somebody who works well with Moroccans. I don't know why, but some people say there is a certain electricity that works. The Moroccan Ministry and Mines minister became a good friend.

I entertained heavily, and my wife became as good an entertainer and hostess as my mother had been. We gave really elegant dinners, and they like elegant dinners. They don't like to come in for some casual sitting around the pool arrangement. They would like formal dinners but with a lot of life to them that would end up at two or three in the morning. We offered the goods and were accepted. I had intimate relations with almost all my Moroccan interlocutors. The industry minister said, "I want to tell you about oil shale." I said, "Oil shale. Really?" He said, "Let me tell you a little bit about it."

I said, "Well, I don't know anything about it." "Come for a weekend, and I'll teach you all about it. So I did. Morocco turned out to have large oil shale deposits of somewhat lower oil content than the Canadian ones which are the world's biggest. The Soviets had some of this, too, in ___ and Estonia in the Baltics. He educated me into oil shale, and he said, "I'm desperately interested in getting American technology to my underused resources. Morocco is as full of oil shale as it is phosphates." I found that I was now building up something of some interest because I said, "Why don't we organize a symposium and bring American companies over here? Would you receive them and then host a symposium?" He said, "By all means! Go and get them!"

I was somewhat amazed and was able to get in touch with the key people, trade development programs of USIA, and the trade development people said, "We're interested in this. This is a way to expand American exports," which is their purpose. "We'll send somebody over." A gentleman by the name of Mr. Ron Bobel arrived who has become a friend to this day, one of the oldest friends I ever had. He came in 1978, and we started conspiring to set up an oil shale symposium for Morocco. It had never been done before. I had no money. Bobel has money. Most of the money is for feasibility studies, but he said, "I think I can persuade my masters to recommend money available for a symposium," because one could argue that his work was within the same direction of promoting American exports.

He was able to do it, and we held it with the minister Musaffabi, and nine American oil companies in the oil shale business. We had a thousand person symposium in Rabat. American flags, Moroccan flags. Musaffabi, the ambassador, myself, this swarm of humanity talking about oil shale. I knew practically nothing. They concluded that Moroccan oil shale, to be brief about it, would work. We can do the retorting of it if oil gets to $50 a barrel at that time. What was of interest is that I just heard that the oil sands of Canada are now being exploited vigorously because the price of oil is where it is. The issue of oil shale has always been the price is not high enough to justify the investment at $10, $12 a barrel. That was another thing. Big, big... The ambassador was pleased with us, and it really, really showed a tangible effort to put the relationship beyond mere words and into territories of some value to both parties.

I did the same thing in the fish business, the fish-can business which I had taken back from my Alcoa days...

Q: Back to Alcoa.

REDECKER: The Moroccans had the basic cans, but not the whole industrial backup to make this work in a really efficient way. They were still having this wretched, leaky... If you remember, Morocco itself until recently had nasty cans that got your hands all filthy. We had another symposium. I said, "With Redecker's brain and Bobel's money, we can do a lot of things here." We did another nice symposium on sardines but not just confirmed to the can, though that was an important part of it, again with the idea of getting American investors in it. There were only 13 of them as I said before, and we wanted to get them numerically much higher. The Moroccans said, "Please come any way you want!"

We were trying to find places to do it. We gave another symposium on the potential not only of sardines but other species of fish: anchovies, herring, and things like that. That worked well. The concluding point of all of this was that I was beginning to establish a presence in Morocco, my old country from my Navy times. I had quite a presence there. When Ambassador Anderson moved on as he did, he was replaced by Angier Biddle Duke, a political appointee, an elegant gentleman of the American aristocracy. He took quite a shine to me. We worked fairly well together.

I worked in the meantime on the home front having considerable difficulty with my son whom I had to come back to the United States with to get him into psychiatric support situations. When I got him out of there and taking him to school. We tried to keep him in normal schools -- private schools -- and they wouldn't hold him. My wife went over, then I went over, and we brought him back to Morocco. To compress a long and terribly tragic story, all contemporaneously with what I had been telling you, my son was increasingly in difficulty. I said, "We have to take him back to the United States to a psychiatric institution." He took flight from that institution and committed suicide. It was painful, and my wife was in a state of... I was devastated by it. The whole wonderful landscape of what I told you was quite exciting. I was quite, quite rolling high on the roller coaster. This thing underneath was sapping one's energy in a terribly destructive way and removed much of the enthusiasm for the things that I was doing and some which I was going to do.

The final thing was out of the phosphate business came yet another dimension which I exploited with the Westinghouse Corporation. Within the phosphate stratum is an interesting streak of uranium and that uranium can be extracted. There is so much phosphate rock in Morocco with consequently quite interesting uranium to be mined.

The Westinghouse Corporation had been engaged in putting an air defense system into Morocco purchased by the Moroccan government. The Westinghouse people were frequently present, and I was exposed to them when they came to Morocco. I drew their attention to uranium extraction. Mr. Merr who was executive vice president -- he became Secretary of Commerce some years later -- of Westinghouse. I said, "Would you be interested in looking at this uranium extraction process?" That was a new direction which I initiated with Westinghouse behind me looking at the possibilities of making an investment to extract uranium. I had advanced quite nicely on this.

This problem with my son started to overwhelm me, started to crack the whole edifice until I was not able to do much more on that, but that started, too. This was, I thought, in terms of created self-generated diplomacy. I thought the Moroccan experience was the high point of my career and, indeed, practically much of my life, certainly on the level of what I did with Alcoa earlier but on a much lower commercial level. I thought I had done some really nice things in Morocco.

Q: It's all fascinating. Let's stop at this point, and we'll pick this up in 1981. What did you do in 1981?

REDECKER: The problem was what to do with Brayton Redecker? I was afflicted by this problem with my son. It was terribly shattering. I didn't know what I wanted to do or anything. Angier Biddle Duke, who was favorably disposed to me, said, "Bray, I want to help you get an assignment." NEA didn't know I existed, and I'm not an NEA type. I couldn't speak Arabic. NEA didn't know who I was. I'd been there in some ridiculous capacity in Berlin. He said, "You need help. I'm going to see what I can do for you." He went to bat for me, Angier Biddle Duke. I think his personal prestige was what he could

work on. He produced an assignment as economic counselor in Madrid. So, back to where I was before!

Q: We'll pick this up again in 1981 when you're off to Madrid.

Today is the third of October 2007. Bray, you wanted to add a few pieces about Morocco before we move on.

REDECKER: Yes, thank you. I thought it would be useful to try to describe and lay out the scenario of my last year and a half in Morocco. What I was involved in was extensions of my involvement, the OCP: the phosphate monopoly. These worked themselves through in interesting ways involving me for the first time in so much activity such that my staff was running the econ section and doing all the normal work. This included: six month economic reports on different segments of society; doing our fisheries report because Moroccan fisheries is an important area in which the U.S. had relatively little interest only to prevent them from being monopolized from, perhaps, Soviets or other predatory fishing fleets such as the Spanish which would have excluded us. Quite a separate issue.

The final year-and-a-half was almost a whirling dervish activity for me. My good friend in the OCP was financial director, Azeddine Guessous. He became Minister of Commerce of Morocco. We had an intimate relationship. He wanted to make a trip to the United States shortly after becoming minister, and he made the most extraordinary proposal to me: Would I be part of his Moroccan delegation traveling to the United States? He said, "I think this is an interesting move. You know about your own country. I know nothing about it. You can be helpful to me as intermediating me and my 12 companions." I said, "My goodness, I will have to ask permission for this."

I got permission, which was enthusiastically given. My boss said, "It's marvelous to be inside the other guy's delegation! You can tell us all about what's going inside the delegation." So that's what we did. I traveled with Guessous and his approximately 12 companions to New York, Atlanta, Chicago, and then Washington. We had a greeting and sendoff by our Secretary of Commerce and all the people who had been so supportive of the activities I had been engaged in with respect to phosphate reporting which they valued as practically unprecedented. In Washington Guessous asked -- the Secretary of Commerce was a lady, I think at the time -- would she produce investors for Morocco. She said she would do it. We all said, "That's wonderful," and he wondered how we would arrange an industry mission given the limited investment profile of the United States in Morocco and a limited interest for most industries even possibly phosphate related. But that was a monopoly, and Moroccans didn't want anybody in there.

The Commerce Department went to work furiously and actually produced a delegation, an investors mission. We got some fisheries people. We got Westinghouse strangely enough. Westinghouse had already been, as I described to you before, heavily involved in Morocco. They set up this great radar protective system for the Moroccan air force which

could look well into Algeria and was seen as the highest tech available at the time. The Moroccans were happy with that because of their usual suspicions of Algerians. They could look in and see, "Oh, Westinghouse came." The investors mission was a lot of hoopla again, but I got quite a few benefits out of it because I actually produced something that Guessous had wanted for some time.

They made a tour of about a week seeing different things, but what emerged was the participation of Westinghouse was a interesting development. The Westinghouse people -- now United Technology -- was principally in the nuclear power business, not in the electric light bulb business anymore. They were interested in uranium trace -- I think I mentioned this last time -- element in the phosphate rock that could be extracted from the phosphoric acids without damaging the phosphoric acid after extraction.

They came, but they were there sort of like intruders just looking around and telling me what they actually had in mind. I put them in touch with my OCP friends. The Westinghouse man was executive vice president of Westinghouse for international operations. He said, "We are prepared to consider constructing a nuclear power plant for you and fueling it if some of the uranium could come from the extraction process." This was an interesting chemical plan and controversial at the time. The Westinghouse people were protective about it. They faced a problem at the time. The price of uranium for nuclear power plants had gone through the roof, and they didn't have enough uranium to supply different contractual relationships with the power plants they had built, and they built a great many of them. As I found out later in Spain, they built eight of the new plants. They were desperate to get their hands on uranium, and they spent a great deal of money on this proprietary technology.

It emerged with me to start marketing this for Westinghouse. I could do that because I was not in a competitive situation with several American countries where you can't play that game. But there was only one of those companies, so I could help it. A man and his delegation came and said, "What we want to show the Moroccans is that you're really committed to Morocco."

That went down well. Tom Merns came and said, "We're going to come and hold a corporate executive meeting, a board of directors meeting of the subsidiary of nuclear power plant development in Morocco. Where do you suggest, Redecker, that we should do it?" I said, "A clever way would be to do it in the old legation building in Tangier. You could make a big hoopla out of that." They said, "It's a great idea!" So that was done. It was widely reported in the press. We did a wonderful job, and the staff of the legation building was really something. We were moving forward nicely to interest Moroccans who were quite suspicious of the project. They said, "Are these acid streams going to be in perfect condition after the extraction process is taken care of? After all, our bread and butter is the acid stream for fertilizer production, not nuclear. We're glad to have the nuclear power and the uranium out of it, but the main priority in our business is the phosphate fertilizer business."

It turned out that Westinghouse gradually began to lose all of its supply problems world wide with uranium and began to lose interest in the extraction process that was, perhaps, expensive, pioneering, and was controversial as I gathered within the company. I began to develop intimate relations with the company, with those that were there, and they told a lot to me about what was actually going on. That began to languish, unfortunately, whereas the Moroccans began to press on the nuclear power plant.

This introduced all kinds of new problems with the U.S. nuclear regulatory commission, the old AEC and a lot of other considerations.

Q: I would have thought the French who had a huge affinity towards Morocco and preeminent nuclear power. I would have thought they would be all over you.

REDECKER: There was certainly that, and I think I had warm -- at least superficially warm -- relations with the French embassy. You are right. As this started to build up, we did this on the QT, but they picked this thing up. "What are you Americans really doing?" I said, "You haven't done anything." They said, "We couldn't get a satisfactory relationship established with the Moroccans that was financially satisfactory to us, and we have languished on it. You had better be careful what you're doing there because you may get into some quicksand later on if you pursue this."

I reported that carefully getting this to the Westinghouse folks. Mern came several times with a number of people and left some of them there for some time, so we had ongoing discussions about this. The U.S. government eventually came around to say, "We're not entirely satisfied with the nuclear power plant in Morocco, at least certainly not financed by U.S. government sources because there would be financing involved, and we don't know whether we want to pursue this." This was all roiling around as yet another dimension of my activity there which took up quite a bit of time as you can imagine. The term "economic counselor" began to dissolve, marketing and technology analysis, so it became all further removed from the normal type of activity.

Back to the phosphate business, Bill Stowasser wanted me. I was sort of the sorcerer's apprentice. Bill Stowasser was the individual in the Department of Interior who taught me all about phosphates and sent me to Florida to learn more on the ground about it. He wanted me to go to the International Phosphate Association's meeting in Paris. That phosphate producers manufacturer of fertilizer, a whole crowd, a vast industrial grouping. nobody actually think about, certainly not in the State Department. He said, "I can't go. Could I ask you to go?" I didn't know how to deal with that. I said, "You've got to get State to allow me to go because of the meeting in Paris. I have to have a headquarters in Embassy Paris."

It was worked out eventually, and I found myself in Paris attending the ISMA... It's a misnomer. It's International Sulfuric Acid Manufacturing Association. It's a misnomer for what it actually was. It was recognized as such, but they could never change the name, at least not then. I worked out of Embassy Paris attending this meeting that nobody in Embassy Paris knew anything about, no understanding about.

I attended that meeting and found myself into a whole new vast universe with interests and parties including Occidental Petroleum. Its chief hatchet man, a Polish man by name of Bodgan Bogdonovich, took a great shine to me when I was there. He said, "Oh, my dear Brayton, I want you to go with me over to the Soviet Union to the Baltic where the Soviets are building a super phosphoric acid plant which we want to duplicate." I said, "Look, come on. I'm supposed to be in a place called Morocco," and he laughed at that. Bodgan called me up over the phone from California. He expressed great interest -- or his boss's great interest – in putting up a super phosphoric acid plant in Morocco.

Super phosphoric acid is used not entirely in fertilizers but is principally a high value metallurgical product for high strength tensile metallurgy and products for aviation. Very special, high advanced. They wanted to put a super phosphoric acid plant in Morocco, and what did OCP think of this? I confronted my friends in Morocco with this idea, and they were utterly speechless. They said, "You've got to understand this is a monopoly, and we cannot tolerate another company engaging in some process." It was a long, involved activity and discussion where I was trying to explain to Occidental that you just can't move into a country and decide you're going to build a plant like this, certainly not in a developing country of this sort in Morocco.

That was another development that had me caught up. Bogdonovich came to Morocco a couple of times, and I introduced him to the OCP folks and explained to him I thought it was unlikely that something like this could really be achieved. They would not give up control. Occidental would not give up control of the proposed facility to anybody. The Moroccans said, "We have no interest in it. We'll get super sulfuric acid from wherever we can if we need it. We don't need it now. You need it, but we don't."

The general high level of activity I had in the last part of my time in Morocco led to, "What are we going to do with Brayton Redecker?" Angier Biddle Duke as I mentioned before, a nice man. He'd been an ambassador to Spain before, years earlier. He said, "I will try to get you a job." I was unemployable in the State Department.

The NEA bureau, I tried to get a job in the Middle East. Nothing was there. I'm not an NEA boy, I don't speak Arabic, etcetera, etcetera. Mr. Duke got me this job, and while all of this was going on, my son had this terrible misfortune which ended with his suicide. I was traumatized; my wife was traumatized; and we were directly assigned from Rabat to Madrid. Apparently, my assignment to Madrid was not greeted with great enthusiasm because who and what was Brayton Redecker and why is he here, and how did he get here in EUR? After all, these are big priesthoods in the bureaus jealously guarding all of their property.

The ambassador was Terry Todman who was an interesting individual. A marvelous man, a marvelous individual. He was not an EUR person by temperament. He said, "I'm told that Redecker knows Spanish and he grew up in Spain and I'm interested." To clinch the deal, I had to go to Madrid to be interviewed by Ambassador Todman and the immediate

associates of the ambassador including the DCM, a small man by name of Robert Barbour.

Robert Barbour was one of these classical EUR small men. He was a short man who lived in an office which was darkened all day long and only had two lamps in it. Somebody who does his work with two lamps in darkness is, perhaps, illustrative of the way one looks at the world and deals with people. In any case, he was aloof to me. Todman said, "Redecker has a wonderful record, he's been promoted in Morocco, he's done all these things. And he also speaks Spanish."

I had not registered my Spanish with the Department because I never wanted to get assigned to Latin America. He said, "Well, then, let me hear him speak Spanish." That's what got me to interview. My Spanish was not great, but the Spanish was all right. The rumor was put out that Brayton Redecker was trying to co-opt a really fine job. It was a first class job, economic counselor in Madrid -- first class -- with the knowledge of Spanish of a 12-year-old. Todman said, "I talked to him, and he talks pretty good Spanish to me for my money." He forced through the assignment on my behalf. I didn't really work on anything.

Todman said, "I want somebody who speaks good Spanish because Spain is entering the European community. It is engaged in delicate negotiations. We do not want to have to pay for Spanish accession to the community in terms of restricting our own trade; so the Spanish trade could be advantaged, restricting our own trade into the community so that the Spanish could get in, notably with citrus. Citrus was the big factor. We would be holding the ball in the European community because of the volume of Spanish citrus that would have to be absorbed in it." He said, "We're not going to pay for it. All this has to be covered. I need someone who really knows Europe, and I need somebody who speaks Spanish."

As you perhaps know, Spanish is not, as I like to say, a European language. No one in the EUR bureau knows Spanish. They always import the bodies from ARA.

Q: It's one of the positions in Madrid used as a rest and recreation spot for people who have been serving in Uruguay and Paraguay or something like that.

REDECKER: And who have spent all their time in Latin American and who would return to Latin America after have an R&R assignment. You're perfectly right. Todman said, "Indeed, I can't tolerate this. This is too important a time for this. I need somebody who really knows European affairs. I think that Redecker is the best candidate."

I actually had to go for an interview. I've never known anybody in the Foreign Service that had to be interviewed unless he's a DCM. But a low life like myself, I found that remarkable that I had to be interviewed. The interview went well. Terry Todman liked me, it seems to me, quite well. I knew the political counselor, Ashley Hewitt, another chap 6'9" in size, a fascinating man. I met him quite a few times ago, and we eventually became close friends.

The Department, with Ambassador Duke behind it said, "This chap deserves something after the four years in Morocco and the catastrophe that happened to him with his son. He needs something." I was exhausted, I must say, emotionally, and professionally exhausted in some of the things I've been telling you about. Morocco was an astounding assignment for me and probably the most fascinating assignment I had ever had. But it took its toll.

I arrived in Madrid and found, of course, that I had to close the curtains on the stage and begin something entirely new, entirely different. It was a stressful time for me. I don't think I was vastly supported by anybody other than the ambassador who was up there in the stratosphere and certainly Barbour exhibited no interest in myself or my activities.

Q: You were there from when to when?

REDECKER: From '81 to the beginning of '85.

Q: Would you describe the political and economic situation in Spain when you got there?

REDECKER: Spain was coming out of the Franco period, and then most recently, some months before my arrival, the big revolt where the Franquistas moved into the Parliament and tried to take it over. There was grave instability when King Juan Carlos came in and placated everybody and said, "We're going to go ahead with democracy, and we're not going to allow this revolt to go through."

The country was still coming out of its Franco period. Its efforts in democracy were coming along, but it was fragile. The prime ministers succeeded each other rather frequently, but the Spanish were most interested in accession to the European community. This was the big goal. The American purpose on another territory -- mine -- was to get them into NATO, and that was an undertaking that was going on as well.

It was a country coming into itself. The political fabric of the country was still fragile. It was looking for its way. The socialists were coming to power, fairly big on Gonzalez who came into power while I was there. The country was emerging into democracy with a good deal of uncertainty in the steps it was taking.

I had a wonderful staff, four talented officers, one economist, "Big Bobby" my wife called him, a rich chap married to a German girl. He was an outstandingly astute economist. He was also totally disorganized. His office was piled high with books, statistics, things strewn over everywhere. It was difficult to get him to do his periodic economic reports, but when they came out, they were masterpieces of insight and perception.

I found myself -- again -- in a whole slew of operational activity somewhat to my surprise. We had going or entering into no less than six agreements that my section was responsible for pushing forward. To illustrate, we had all in these specialized fields that

are always stuck on the econ section because you don't know where to put them. Where else to put them? You can't put them in political. You don't put them in pol/mil because they don't fit anywhere, so econ gets them all.

We had, for example, two FAA -- Federal Aviation Administration -- agreements in process to upgrade security in armed Spanish airports. Another one was control of individual aircraft, periodic control for Iberia, a Spanish flag carrier aircraft. We were engaged in a continuous process of receiving instructions from Washington and having to deliver these to the appropriate authority, and engaging in a mini negotiation.
I had another officer, very talented. I think he's become an ambassador. A charming man. I had him do all the FAA work for me, and I worked on him and guided him, but he did wonderful work. I support my staff. I push them, but I also acknowledge their accomplishment and give them good efficiency reports when the time comes. I'm not, as happened to me, not stingy in my acknowledgement of their accomplishments.

They had a double taxation treaty. That was bubbling along. They tend to last years before they are accomplished. I had a remote sensing agreement with the USGS -- U.S. Geodetic Survey -- and I had met them in Morocco. They came there with their dog and pony show, and that came fairly late in my time in Morocco. They said, "We're coming to Spain, too." They wanted to do a remote sensing project in Spain. They said the Spanish were going to get a big benefit out of this. Remote sensing is a high tech remote technology that can look into the ground and more or less find out what's inside the ground.

We had a fisheries agreement. Spain has a big fisheries fleet, predatory, all of them destructive to other people's interests. We wanted to get them into control in U.S. waters next to Canadian waters with which the Canadians were hand and glove trying to get the Spanish to behave themselves and to restrict their high seas fleets which were numerous and globe girdling fishing fleets that drove New Zealand crazy and Australians too.

We were really quite busy. They required receiving U.S. positions by cable, getting to the Spanish interlocutors involved, making the positions, and then reporting on the Spanish reactions.

Another one was with the NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission). We had negotiated this U.S. supply of uranium to the Spanish nuclear power facilities. These agreements were running out. Spain had eight nuclear power plants, all but two constructed by Westinghouse, the other two by General Electric. All American. Different ones were running out of agreements for the resupply and the return of used fuel rods. A complicated business that I tried to educate myself about. I didn't do too well. I was receiving positions from the NRC to pass to the Spanish, and that was a continuing activity.

The DCM found all of this untoward. I tend to throw myself into these things and start building them up. The NRC appeared to be pleased with what I was doing, and they were

especially interested in Spanish reactions to what their proposals were. They said, "This has great importance in areas that don't concern you, but please report in detail."

Barbour looked at these reports drawn from my experience in MBFR, and Jock Dean who recorded every cough, hiccup, and sneeze was the interlocutor in endless cables from MBFR in Vienna. I didn't do that, but I reported in some detail what the Spanish response and what the Spanish proposals were. I had some experience in putting these positions forward and eliciting reactions and giving my thoughts about how the Spanish were reacting under the comments section on the cable.

Barbour said, "You're not supposed to comment on all of this. Why are you putting all this detail in? The more detail, the more they're going to be confused." The whole idea was to give them the basic overview of it. What I would suggest is a typical response of a political officer to a situation. I thought it important to give precise detail and reaction of mine as interlocutor when I presented the American position. Then the reaction could be played back to Washington, the NRC in this case, so they could understand where this thing seemed to be going.

Barbour was totally caught up in the CSCE that was going on in Madrid. This was not in my territory at all, and he was caught up with it, so he didn't pay much attention to me. Unfortunately, Ashley Hewitt, who was political counselor, a Latin American specialist imported as they all had to be, didn't get involved in any of this. The DCM was always going to the CSCE and reporting on them, and that was his territory. He didn't have much time to deal with me other than to intervene unhelpfully in some of the comments he would make. He would red pencil some of my reporting! I had not been used to red penciling by superiors since I had been an FSO-7. It was, I found, damaging and discouraging. This was all of, "You're not really one of the insiders."

Todman protected me, and Todman did very well with me. I thought I did well with him. Todman left eventually, and who replaced him but Tom Enders, another very tall man.

Q: Called "Too Tall Tommy."

REDECKER: With this very tiny wife. Guy Connor took at one look at my wife, blonde, Germanic, very attractive even then and decided this was not somebody she was going to like. With the arrival of Enders, my life began to get quite difficult. I thought I was carrying quite a few things. Before his arrival but just as he had arrived, the Century 21, a very prestigious organization of industrialists, the crème de la crème of Spanish economic society invited the ambassador to give a speech. The ambassador wasn't there. Todman had gone. The DCM was not available, and anyway wouldn't have wanted to do it. He wouldn't know what to say to this world of economics. We were to talk about the high dollar at the time and how the U.S. policy was going to adjust its relationships with other countries given this terribly high dollar which was driving many Europeans, especially a fragile country like Spain was, into severe strictures.

I was invited by the group to replace the ambassador and give the speech. Enders came, and I deferred immediately to him. I said, "Mr. Ambassador, I've been invited to speak in the absence of an ambassador. You're now here. You're an economist, an advanced economist, couldn't I please tell them that you'll replace me?" He said, "No, no, no, no. You do it. It wouldn't work at all well." That was the correct choice. He had just arrived; he hadn't got his suitcase empty.

I spoke and was widely reported in all the Spanish press. Others began to wonder what Redecker was up to. Was he trying to do another Morocco number where, one could say, I came off as the Beau Brummell of the embassy in Rabat. Was this what was going to happen here? I could see that a lot of people said, "We're going to fix this guy."

I don't know how it all worked out. Enders got a replacement for Barbour, a very small man who had been actually ambassador to some little country in Latin America or Central America, I think, and had come back. He volunteered to be DCM again after he had been ambassador! He said, "The reason I did was the residence in Madrid is such a grand, marvelous building," which I had actually known as a 12 year old. A magnificent palace. A little, small man, and apparently very opposed to myself.

Things were difficult. Enders played a strange hand, but I wondered whether he was behind it. I already had established a position with the Spanish, and I had gone on home leave. I got myself qualified in Spanish at FSI and certainly got four. I think somebody corrected it and said it was actually four-plus because I was almost fluent. It isn't as much as French or German, but it was fine. He said, "You're way up." That doesn't sit well with a lot of people who claim to be experts in their respective languages. Here comes somebody from nobody knows where and speaks it better than they do. Enders used me hard. He wanted me visiting companies, visiting institutes, visiting this and that. I had to prepare briefing papers for everything we did. He somehow anchored me into the work that he wanted me to do: supplying briefing papers, talking to reporters, the usual things for ambassadors.

Then a very strange thing happened. I received a telephone call from Robert Barbour who was passing through Madrid. I said, "Oh, how nice." Wouldn't I like to have a drink with him at a bar, like in two hours?" I said, "Well, I guess." I had never been in Barbour's house as a guest. He had been a guest in mine, a very handsome apartment. I should say not an apartment; it was diagonally across from the school I went to when I was 12-years-old. It's always the story coming back to where I was before.

Mr. Barbour said, "Let's to a bar and have a drink." I said, "All right, when?" "In a couple of hours." I said, "All right, I'll do that. I'll arrange it. We'll just pass it through. I look forward to seeing you and having a little chat." I went to have the little chat, and he asked how things were going, how did I like Tom Enders. "I'd known Tom Enders before. I used to be in the EUR bureau, and I know him. He's very hard driving."

Then out of his mouth came, "Bray, don't you think you might like to... You're having a difficult time. Don't you think you ought to curtail." Curtail! I'm having a difficult time!

Here I was really knocked over, knocked off my bar stool. He dropped that on me. I didn't know how the whole thing...my composure, my thought processes easily together, but I did manage to come out with, "Bob, is this a set-up job? Have you been sent here to tell me this? You're not part of the embassy, but you were, you know me, but you're not part of the embassy. Are you telling me this now for a group of people for whom you don't work?" He said, "Oh, no! Just a little advice. Good advice. I think you would do well somewhere else."

Q: Where was he working at the time?

REDECKER: He was between assignments. He had this strange trench coat on. I'd never seen him with a trench coat on in Madrid and this was the substance of the whole thing. He said, "You ought to think it over." I said, "I should think it over?" He said, "I think you ought to think it over."

There was a newer DCM who was also a Bob, but I can't remember his last name, I'm sorry to say. He was ambassador to Nicaragua or one of these Central America countries, not very well disposed to me. I wondered if there was a real plot or not. "We want to get this guy out of here."

Q: But not through the personnel system but a group within the ARA Madrid or Mafia or something trying to screw around.

REDECKER: Possible, especially an EUR Mafia because with all my knowledge and time spent in Europe, I was not an EUR creature by any means. I'm not one of them at all.

I found this an utterly astounding development, and I didn't know really with whom to consult. What I did because I dearly respected my young officers, I sat down with them. I said, "Guys, let's go and have a few drinks this evening, and let me tell you a story." I shared it with them, and maybe that was not a good thing to do. I'm a collegial guy. I like to take high power young ones. I said, "I was young not long ago. We're a co-optivity. I'm giving you the general direction with my experience, but you all have talents that I admire and respect. I'm going to support and push you forward. I've always gotten a lot of my young ones promoted because I believe in that." They looked at me and said, "Bray, you're being set up."

This is pretty remarkable. He said, "I think it's a set up, John." I said, "should I fight it?" They said, "Our view," and this was after some discussion, "is you shouldn't. It will destroy you if you fight it. We're talking the powers who are part of the system, not Angier Biddle Duke or people who are external to the central system. I think you probably ought to do it; that is, curtail."

I don't know whether it was the right choice. I confronted the new DCM. I imagine firmly that this was a cabal job. He was part of it although he is not an EUR type, either. Enders is a powerful man. Institutionally powerful: Not politically powerful but

institutionally powerful, and not a peep out of Enders. I was so derailed by all of this. My wife had to take me off a few days to recover myself. We went to another training post. I didn't know what hit me. I went to the DCM, and he said, "I think you ought to do this." So I did. I said, "I'll do it under one condition, that you get me another really good job." He said, "I think that's fair enough."

What eventually developed was the idea of minister for economic affairs in Embassy Geneva. I keep holding my head. Can I ever get beyond anything that I've not been to before? The machinery started. I did a curtailment job on the understanding that this would happen. I did a curtailment letter. They said, "Yes, we have this vacancy in Geneva." There I really know where I am. The language. What happened again is that I was requested to be interviewed again in Geneva.

I went to Geneva, and I wish I could remember the name of the ambassador newly appointed, a political appointee, a gumshoe, a man from Texas. He had very recently arrived. His DCM was Martin van Buren. I knew Martin van Buren very well from the beginning. Martin was in Berlin when I started in the Foreign Service. We knew each other. I had a long chat with him before I met the ambassador. Martin said, "I would attend this, but I might be booted out in weeks. I don't know that I am going to survive this new ambassador. I don't think that he's going to want you." Sure enough, I had my interview with the new ambassador. He said, "I really don't think I need anything. I went back to Martin. We had lunch, and Marin chuckled. He said, "Well, this is not interesting." He said that to me on several positions in this mission. He said, "I have the feeling that he says the same thing of my own position of DCM."

Q: Sounds like he wants to put some Texans in.

REDECKER: That's the answer completely, except I didn't realize that at the time. Sure enough, very soon thereafter it was determined exactly what you said. He wanted to put his fellow boys in there. State did not stand up to him. Martin left after two and a half months from his DCMship, and the job I was to have come to was not encumbered for quite a few months merely to prove his point. Then he had some people put in.

What I found reprehensible was the State Department didn't force him to do it because this is not the way we conduct anything. If State isn't going to insist on the assignments it makes for its own individuals, they will cut around the system. At least not the kind of system we have.

I went back to Madrid and found that I didn't have an assignment. The assignment cycle was so well advanced in 1984 that there was no job anywhere in the system for somebody like myself. My interlocutors in PER -- personnel -- said they were very upset about what happened to me. I was curtailed. The curtailment was exercised. The paperwork was going on, and now I had no onward assignments. They said, "We're distressed about this. What we propose to do -- if you're willing -- is that we put you in as diplomat in residence in a university in the United States so that you can bridge the period." That's what this type of a function is for, for people who are in this sort of situation. Normally

ambassadors. I guess I had sufficient professional qualifications. They said, "The only thing preventing us is we don't have more universities. We filled them all up by this time! If you had a university that you could induce to receive you, we'll assign you there." I said, "What about my Alma Mater, Williams College?" They said, "That sounds fine. We've never done a similar thing, but it's a top notch school. It's very good." I said, "Would you get things started? I would alert them myself, but I don't know who's at Williams now, who is the management of the school. Would you call them? After I call them, would you then come in with the heavy guns?" This is what transpired:

I had a couple of classmates who were in Williamstown. I asked them, "Could you see this idea?" Williams thought, well, they'd never had anything like this. It sounds fascinating! We can have a diplomat in residence? From the Department of State actually living with us for a year, ready to do anything we want him to do?" And at no cost. There's always that. They said, "This is fantastic!"

PER moved in. They were very helpful to me or maybe they felt a little sympathy for the situation I had been in. They said, "Fine. Let's do it." So from Madrid I came out somewhat after the September entry time three weeks later. I entered into Williams College as a diplomat in residence. This was quite interesting and quite exciting. I found myself rescued in a certain strange way. A life preserver was thrown at me. Here I was in Williams College going through another whole world, utterly unanticipated from all the different things I've been telling you the last four or five years in Morocco and Spain. That tended to work out quite nicely.

Q: Who replaced you in Madrid?

REDECKER: Ah, yes. A gentleman was produced magically called Walton Jenkins. Walton Jenkins was a nice... I hate to say this, some milquetoast type person: soft, gentle, soft spoken. I don't know that he was an economist, but he was economic counselor in Rome, I think. He was produced to replace me quite suddenly, quite magically. I was humiliated, and I felt deeply, deeply about being so shabbily treated.

Q: Let's talk about a different subject. You left Williams Class of '55, and I was the class of '50. Tell me about Williams in '85. What was it like?

REDECKER: Males and females. No fraternities. A vastly enlarged scientific establishment and presence on campus and very astute political scientists. Some younger ones not so shaped by the little tree or the small prep schools but from larger schools bringing experiences into a place like Williams that one could not have in my time. Before you had professors who were there for very long periods of time and were institutionalized, who became fixtures of the Berkshires.

They were a whole crowd of people who were not fixtures in the Berkshires, but they came from Southern Methodist, UCLA, and a whole different world. The students were of a high order, I must say. If you want me now to tell you why I reached that conclusion...

Q: Yes.

REDECKER: I said, "What is Brayton Redecker going to do as a diplomat in residence?" All the diplomats in residents give hot lectures, some may even be allowed to teach a course, participate in teaching, or they write a book. They always write a book.

I said I thought I might do something differently, and I discussed this with the college leadership. I said, "I would like to do something that none of you have done before," another Redecker gambit, I suppose. "Why not play a strategic game on foreign policy issues, the Lincoln Bloomfield game that I have been so attached to so many years ago. I've always been fascinated by simulation," and what they call exercises. "I have been on a number of occasions, when on assignments in Washington, co-opted to play in the OD games: war games. I had some familiarity with the gaming business. It is a subject I haven't raised before with you.

I did that as a leitmotif in different things, and I always kept up with Lincoln Bloomfield. One of his great big principles was to play the war game without the war. The problem with war games in the Defense Department and military is you always have to end up in a war because that is what the purpose of the exercise is: How to you get in the war? How do you fight the war? How do you win the war? You always have to win the war, of course. He said, "I'm not interested in this. I'm interested in how do we avoid a war? The military isn't so interested in that. That was Lincoln Bloomfield's great thrust forward. I consulted with Bloomfield from Williamstown, and he was very intrigued by what I was going to do.

He said, "Give it a try, Brayton." So I sat down and wrote a foreign policy crisis management book. One of the subjects that has always interested me is the "intervention dilemma" of major powers. What does one do with a very awkward situation in part of one's area of influence of strategic importance when temptation for intervention is always very strong. It's an historical fact. I've always been intrigued but that. I wrote a couple of papers. I said, "Why don't we write a game on a situation where the students or the players have to deal with the problem of should we intervene in this situation or not? Once you intervene, maybe it is of less interest. At least let us get to see what happens in a situation where there is a serious challenge to one's interests and the uncertainly of what should you do given that other players may do something else?"

I set myself down and wrote over the next four and a half months a strategic political-military game which I called "Crisis in Al Jazira." This is before anybody knew what Al Jazeera was.

Q:: This is the name of the premier Arabic broadcast services coming out of Qatar which is not particularly on the Qatari government but extremely influential.

REDECKER: Well, I cooked up this name. Then I decided that if we're going to have a real game, we want to have it highly publicized. We want to show the students they're

getting into something big. I decided Al Jazira would have to be a fake country, not a real country. It was going to be a fake country set in a situation of real countries. My Al Jazira was an island between Sicily and Tunisia which had been a French protectorate along with Morocco and Tunisia, so was Al Jazira. The French had left and now there is an emir there. The emir was now confronted with a potentially dangerous general.

The Russians were there thinking this would be a nice place to put the Soviet Mediterranean fleet. So I built a whole artificial historical reality and tactical and strategic situation for the constructive island but sitting around real things, real countries playing on it and the United States' problem with, "What do we do with this place?" When the emir found himself beset by forces inimical to his rule, what should the United States do? I had four different alternatives? The French were willing to reinvade the place if we supported them. We could invade the place and keep the French out. We could make a lot of noise but do nothing, or we could find a proxy group of people, a proxy collection of people who might do it for us.

The students had to work this through. I built this game; it was quite an elaborate game. I played it at Elm Tree House, as you may know today is part of the college. It's been pushed off again from the college, but at the time it was part of the college's property. They didn't know what to do with the beautiful mansion. So I moved into the mansion and said, "This is where we're going to play the game."

I advertised this to the Williams students and to the political science department. I got a tremendous response, so much of a response that I had to run three totally independent teams of the U.S. mission in the capitol of the island which was called Tie Weak.

So I had three embassies playing on the same scenario, an elaborate message is being sent in and coming, going with great pressure involved. Pressure mounts, impressive, the local press, the Berkshire Eagle, the North Adams people. We even got the Boston Globe present. We advertised this. Williams is doing a game. It was a two-and-a-half day, classical two-and-a-half day game with the students. It was a gigantic success! I felt the game was pretty well prepared, but the students were simply magnificent! To see a young DCM and a young ambassador with his country team, with cameras watching all of this, we were on the North Adams television. "Hey, there's a crisis broken out again." And they did it! This was a game going on at Williams college.

Why, it was astounding. In anticipation of the game, I got two senior officers from FSI come up. One of them was John McDonald, quite nice, a very big supporter of mine, who came up with a colleague who was visiting me, and they were utterly amazed at what we were doing. Here we had a real embassy with the three groups with a control team. We had the government of Al Jazira, all laid out ministers, and the emir himself. I put a lot of theatrics into it. The emir would come out and speak from the throne, and all the teams were ordered to rush people in to take notes: What does the emir say? Then we have the bad general. We had him come up and he says the new revolution must come. We must get rid of all these trappings of the past.

The students, however, were extraordinarily sophisticated. We had press conferences regularly, fake press people: professors. We threw in a few real ones.

I have to say another thing: I believe telling them why we engage in social activity. Probably in a form to educate the students why we had so much social activity in the Foreign Service, just sipping martinis and talking wasn't for itself. I said cocktail parties are where critical information is sometimes passed between participants it the cocktail party. So I built into my game a whole cocktail party. A real cocktail party where the ambassadors and their teams, all the teams in there, so everybody could take a crack at playing a different role with instructions: Find out what the mysterious 16 other ambassadors -- all professors playing the role.

Sixteen professors came to the cocktail party, and the students' job was to find out from the ambassadors would their countries support the position of the United States? They were elaborating on it. Would they help Americans out? What were the reactions? Get it back, get it on paper, send it over to headquarters.

We had about 150 people playing this gave for the weekend (April 1985) at the mansion. It was a devastating success! Crisis in Al Jazira went on to be taken back to FSI and then began to get played continuously. A chap by the name of John Tkacik found the crisis in Al Jazira and put it in as part of the A100 course. It was played at Harper's Ferry and down at the place where we always go in eastern Maryland, at the Early House in Brandywine. We played this game, and then he played it years later. I think it survived for about five years after my adventure.

The provost of the school thought it was so wonderful we did it again, so we actually came up. They prepared most of it for me, but we played the game a second time a year later after I had left Williams. I felt that was quite an accomplishment. I enjoyed it. It was terribly instructive as I am a believer of well constructed games or exercises, if you want to call it. These students were absolutely mad about it! They said, "We've learned more about foreign relations, the conduct of foreign relations, the issues to be dealt with, how you deal with them, than we would in fifty classes. Except what happened to me? The professors looked at this and said, "What is *this*?"

If you've been in any of these games, you may know that when the game is over with, right after the game is finished and the curtain comes down abruptly, you have a thing called the "hot wash." The hot wash is when you get all the players together, all the control team together, and you work through major things. How did you feel about? How do you feel about what you've done? What were the problems? Did you have problems? Did you get into a cul-de-sac somewhere in formulating your policy? Did Washington respond adequately?

They said, "We learned far more than we did in all our courses in European politics." You can imagine the professors listening to this were not especially pleased. With my tail between my legs, I made an exit getting out of there without them all beating up on me

and denigrating, more important, the process that I had done two years in a row, I did this.

Terribly informative and teaching ways how to put out a press conference, a press statement, how to talk to the press in front of you, meeting the high officials of foreign governments, how you are going to deal with, and how you are going to get the American position over to them. What I think is fantastic training.

After my Williams hoopla year, Mavis Cook got in touch with me and said he found all of this work that I had done in Williamstown very, very interesting. Would I be available for an interesting job in the Continuity of Government program? I said, "Well, it sounds interesting. I think it could be helpful to you both professionally, and would you like to come and talk about it?" I did, and I became his deputy. I moved directly in practically without any PER involved right into Dennis Kux's operation.

Q: That's spelled K-U-X.

REDECKER: That's correct. A very interesting individual, and I became his deputy for the next year and a half. After the next year and a half for reasons that become only explainable if one knows what is going on which I think you do, it was decided that perhaps I could do better at FSI.

I came to FSI and was placed there but was not part of FSI staff. I was Dennis Kux's staff. My job was to begin to shape the acceptability of gaming to our community in the Foreign Service and to get them to start playing games on substantive issues of importance. This was a fairly tall task. Our colleagues do not find the idea of gaming edifying or instructive basically. One senior officer we requested for one of the games that I was helping to build up said, "I really don't have any time to play games. I'm too busy trying to solve the real world's problems, and here you want me to come over and spend two and a half days playing a game somewhere up in Warrington, Virginia."

This was the attitude that you have to overcome. We struggled with it. We had what they called in the business "table talks." We had one day exercises on specific issues, nothing like the thing I did at Williams, of course. That was being actually the A100 course, but that was a hypothetical situation. When you get real officers out of the State Department, it doesn't excite them to be in something that is non-real world. So you have to be in the real world. That means you have to classify the whole thing. You have to get into it with real high professionals who are going to replicate the opposite party's reactions to what you're going to do.

We did a bit of that and made some progress on it. We held several of these on the issues the Seventh Floor thought might be of interest in examining. I won't go into the subjects. We did several of them, then I said, "Really, I had now two career LCD's -- limited career extensions -- and I could see that all of this activity wasn't getting me anywhere.

Q: It wasn't in the main line.

REDECKER: No, it wasn't, but of course you could argue that almost everything I had done...

Q: But within the system for one thing pays more attention to education or to even something dealing with a humanitarian crisis. That's not real diplomacy anyway. So what happened?

REDECKER: I did some work in crisis management. I started holding seminars on crisis management, and I started out with a monograph which I composed myself but vetted around. What is a crisis? What kinds of crises do we in the foreign policy establishment actually confront? We talk about a crisis, but it's a good word. We most of the time assume that what we mean by it is conveyed to other people. I said that's often a mistake. If your interlocutor doesn't know really exactly what you're saying, he can draw false conclusions from it.

Let's talk about crises. I developed a typology of crises, a kind of universal template, back to my systems analysis days. I talked about different kinds of crises and how little seminars in the regional bureaus are crisis management. Looking at different kinds of crises, what would you as an embassy do in these kinds of different crises? We took topical crises that were appearing in EA and NEA.

It was all frivolous, like a Christmas tree decoration to the real people because they say, "You have this fixation. You're either in substance or you're not. Substance is too important to take time away from to engage in frivolous activities." That was the main mindset. I did that and waited for somebody to produce an assignment for me because I was in a very poor position to be able to do that myself. I had no parentage to any regional bureau or organization. I just had my little bag of tricks, my kittle kit bag of tricks that I carried around and had made some impression with some people. But a lot of people, I can assure you, found all of that terribly frivolous, wasteful, and self-serving for myself.

I ended up this period in Washington for departing. Fortunately, I wasn't able to depart. I had a symposium on gaming in the conference room in the Main State building.

Q: Lloyd Henderson.

REDECKER: Lloyd Henderson. And I had Lincoln Bloomfield with whom I was continuously in communication clapping his hands on the side. He's now quite old, retired, but he agreed to become the moderator of a symposium, a two day symposium on the value of gaming as a crisis management tool. I held two days of seminars in the Henderson conference room on gaming with Lincoln Bloomfield officiating. Four hundred and twenty-five people attended that. That was very considerable on a subject that often was really disregarded if not highly denigrated by professional Foreign Service people. "Don't get in my way with funny little gimmicks because I know what I'm doing, and my experience inside and superior intelligence leads me to these conclusions and

here you come with this baggage of little tricks and circus gambits, and you want to invade in my territory of analyzing situations."

We did this for two days, and it was open to the official public. Open, in a sense, by invitation. We had members of other foreign agencies join us. The military was there. I have always retained a connection with the military in various capacities. The military was very excited by what I was doing, came and supported me financially because State didn't have enough money for all of it.

We had two days of seminars and lectures by real heavyweights in the gaming business: gaming in the private sector, gaming in the strategic nuclear contract, gaming in what do you do after a bomb blows up, what do you do in the Al Jazira type situation I described to you. They thought that was quite good. In fact, I got a superior honor award for this whole period that I was doing the gaming business because I think nobody frankly in the Foreign Service would have done anything like this.

Q: It takes one person to do it.

REDECKER: At least Dennis got me that superior honor award. Then the question was, "What happens to poor Brayton Redecker after all of this?" I guess forces combined to get me a job -- the last one as it turned out to be -- as DPO in Frankfurt, Germany. So what was Brayton do? He comes back to where he started from in the very same city of his birth.

I became DPO.

Q: That's deputy principle officer. Oscar Holden was there when I was a brand new Foreign Service officer.

REDECKER: Alex Rattray was the consul general. He was very ill. A very interesting man, I thought. A big fellow, but he had deep, serious, crippling diseases in his legs and in his joints. He was in pain much of the time and was often out of action. I was acting, in charge often.

Q: You were there from when to when?

REDECKER: That was 1988 to '92. I was there as DPO. Frankfurt had become the third largest post in the world with 17 agencies including a congressional and budget office in this vast seedlum establishment, seedlum being these apartment buildings where all these civilians working in the consulate were housed. I think we had a staff of 380 people at the time I was there.

Q: I was at the seedlum. It was named after my great uncle.

REDECKER: So I came to that, was acting CG a great deal of the time, a visit back home. I was at home and perhaps can one day show you the charming newspaper article

on myself in the Frankfurt paper. It was a drawn likeness of myself by FAZ's chief cartoonist.

I had a very exciting time there. I was moving around our consular district and reporting extensively on the resurgence of the right parties called the *publicana*. I visited and consulted with Oskar Lafontaine. Oskar Lafontaine was an outrageously arrogant man and couldn't stand Americans. He said, "If anybody's coming to visit me, why do you send some visa person from a consulate? Where's the embassy person? I want the ambassador here." I said, "You're not going to get the ambassador here. We do other things than issue visas." That was not a good way to start a conversation.

Of course, I had an automatic way of developing instant relationships with all these people because I'm talking their language, and they cannot distinguish me from their own people. I had very much to do, of course, with the military.

Q: The Gulf War must have really hit you hard.

REDECKER: Later on, yes. One thing that hit us very much was the Lockerbie event. Lockerbie, after all, the plane...

Q: The plane had been loaded in Frankfurt.

REDECKER: Yes, indeed. The embassy was running around. In Frankfurt I was acting CG at the time. I set up a crisis management group in 24 hours, busy using my own precepts from years of simulation into a quasi real thing. I dealt a great deal with 5th Corps General ____ from whom one is heard much later was then 5th Corps commander. I became very friendly with him, and I was also very involved with the Air Force and downsizing of the Rhein-Main Air Force facility. I had a lively time in Germany because I could go anywhere automatically with the city government. All the city government people took me in as one of their own. I could report, I think fairly innocuous things compared to what I had done in the past. I would see happenings in Frankfurt and the political machinery that was, perhaps, animating things that were going on in Bonn and, as you said, the Gulf war and the real opposition of what we were up to.

Q: By the Greens.

REDECKER: By the Greens. I never got along very well with the Greens. I found them very small and socially disagreeable. That's my personal view. I had to deal with some of them. My time in Frankfurt was very pleasant. I had a beautiful residence. My boss wrote me wonderful efficiency reports. We got along splendidly together. If I only had such splendid relationships in places like Spain! I had a wonderful time, but I never got promoted, so the famous TIC...

Q: Time in class.

REDECKER: ...comes into effect. I felt my boss did all he possibly could to try and turn that around, but it didn't happen, so I ended my Foreign Service career in the city that I was born in.

Q: What about the Greens? What was your impression of them?

REDECKER: I met some of the Greens, but I just temperamentally don't work well with people like that. I sent one of my junior officers who could interact with them. I had two reporting officers.

Q: What was the German reaction to the Gulf war? It had a major impact on Germany. It helped flush out an awful lot of our troops that never came back. Was there a feeling of relief on the American and the German side that we were downsizing our military establishments?

REDECKER: I think the downsizing, yes. Definitely. Too many Americans around and, in the case of Frankfurt, were all sitting right in the middle of the city and not outside. At least Rhein-Main Air Base was somewhere that you couldn't see, but the rest of them were plunk! right in the middle of the city. That was a great relief to get them out.

The 5th Corps disestablished itself, I think which provided a great deal of relief. On the whole -- to come to your point -- the Germans looked at the Gulf War as something that had to be done with respect to liberating Kuwait. Perhaps the Germans are especially sensitive to this kind of a problem, their own country having gobbled up nation states before World War II, terminating what was a constituted nation.

Q: Czechoslovakia, for example.

REDECKER: That's the first thing that comes to mind, but then you think of Austria in a slightly different way, Danzig and then, of course, Poland itself. There is a sympathy for saying, "You can't do this." The consequences of allowing Kuwait to disappear off the map as a constituted entity are sufficiently problematical and foreboding, and you better do something about it. I think it was largely support for that. The second Gulf enterprise was entirely different. No comparison. That would be my response to your question.

Q: When you left in 1991, what have you been doing?

REDECKER: I stayed in Frankfurt and wanted to build up with some German friends a consultancy that would offer gaming. I concluded just to compress a long rumination about it: Europeans will not do gaming. They are temperamental and unsuited to think of a game as simulation, as a solution to a real-life problem; that you can lift yourself out of a real life situation, put yourself into a contrived artificial situation, manipulate it by controllers. To derive insights about what you should do in the real world when you're finished with the game and come back to the world is an idea fundamentally that I think doesn't work in European culture. The mindset doesn't work.

Q: One of the great moments when one talks about D-Day was all the high commanders around Normandy were back in Paris and nearby going to a kreigspiel. The German general staff used this.

REDECKER: They did, indeed. All militaries in my way of thinking -- perhaps not the French -- work, and it's an interesting psychological question that you raise. In general, militaries work well in the gaming context or, let us say, the gaming instrument is congenial for the way the military thinks about its existence and its purposes. In European civilian life, the idea of playing a game is ludicrous. Utterly ludicrous! I said, "It isn't ludicrous. You will actually learn a tremendous amount of things out of your own organization and the flaws in it."

We did some gaming. I built a game using Finland to illustrate how a Finnish plant manager confronted with a sudden unexpected strike, a fire, production lines ceased, didn't know how to satisfy its customers. Couldn't you learn something about a sudden, unanticipated crisis that might attack you in your commercial situation?" It is almost impossible for Europeans to make that leap. We didn't have clients, and our consultancy didn't prosper.

Q: You came back here.

REDECKER: I had my house in France as I mentioned to you, and my wife went to France. There was an amusing little development. The courier office in our consulate had urgent need of couriers. They were running out of couriers, and they were desperate to find people who were willing to work, do courier work on a part time basis. Actually, the director of the courier office received approval from Jerry LaFleur, director of the diplomatic courier service in Washington who had been in Frankfurt before. They also had the same circuit because their universe is so small.

He asked me, "Would you like to be a courier for us? We have an urgent need for couriers. We can't get enough couriers. For the moment we need U.S. security clearances. Would you play in our little sand box?" I said, "That sounds interesting." That turned into a 15 year relationship to the present time, until my operation that I had earlier this year. I played with the couriers on and off. They were somewhat embarrassed in the beginning to say would a senior officer be interested in joining us, low end couriers. They were not lowly little couriers. "You exercise a fundamental activity in the entire Foreign Service establishment."

My father had great respect for them, and Bob LaPlante who was director of the courier service actually had Christmas dinner in my father's house in South Africa. He remembered that when he met me. He taught me the elements of courier work. Bob LaPlante who was probably in the newspaper reports. He's a colorful individual. He trained me in the basics of couriers and courier responsibilities, but he always remembered my father saying, "Bob LaPlante is visiting Johannesburg. Have him to my Christmas dinner at the residence." He never got over that, and he reminded me of that 45 or 50 years later.

Q: I think this is probably a good place to stop.

End of interview