The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

JILL A. SCHUKER

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy & Robin Matthewman
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INTERVIEW

Q: Today is the 24th of February 2006. This is the interview with Jill Schuker. A*nd this is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training and I am Charles Stuart Kennedy. You go, I assume, by Jill?*

SCHUKER: Jill, correct.

Q: OK. Well Jill let's start kind of at the beginning. Could you tell me when and where you were born?

SCHUKER: I was born in Brooklyn, New York. I was born on February 5, 1946 and grew up…is that how you would like me to proceed?

Q: Well actually I'm going to ask you first can you tell me about your family. Let's start on your father's side and back as far as you know where they came from and how they got to Brooklyn and all that.

SCHUKER: My dad came here when he was a few months old. He came from what was at that time Russia although it was sort of Poland, Russia, Poland, Russia. He came over with his parents and he ended up growing up in South Carolina and was there until he

was about 14 when he came to New York City. My dad went to Columbia. He was in the pharmacy profession working for Abbott Laboratories for his career.

He met my mom who was born in Brooklyn. Her mother was born in Brooklyn in the late 1880s—actually on the day Grover Cleveland was inaugurated in March 1889. I guess I should go back for a moment to talk about my father's parents. I don't know a lot about them. I never met my father's mother, my grandmother. She actually died of influenza.

Q: 1918 thereabouts?

SCHUKER: …early on, a little later than that but not much I think. My grandfather I did not know well. He died when I was 13. He had a shoe business in Brooklyn, he moved from South Carolina around the time my father was a teenager along with my dad's two brothers. His older brother went on to become quite a well-known principal of Jamaica High School in New York City and was much in the news for a number of years in terms of education issues. His younger brother was a lawyer and worked here in Washington for a long time at the Social Security Administration as a lawyer.

In any case my father's parents left Russia because of a pogrom …

Q: Do you know if they were city folk or sort of shtetl folk or what in Russia?

SCHUKER: I don't think they were city folk. I think it was closer to a shtetl as I recall and I actually know very little about it…I wish I knew more but I think my mother's family came from outside Minsk. What I know about my father's parentage and his background is that they came from a village called Chizeva (that's phonetic) and I am not sure it exists any longer—especially after WW11. Over time it was part of Poland.

Q: On your mother's side were they also Jewish?

SCHUKER: My mother was Jewish as well, a little different kind of background. My mother's mother was born here on the day that Grover Cleveland was inaugurated, which was then in March. Those were March inaugurations in 1889. I know a lot more about my mother's side of the family. My grandmother lived to 104 so there was a lengthy relationship and she lived with us for my entire childhood. She was the eldest daughter of six children with one older brother. Her parents came from Russia in the 1880s on their honeymoon, my grandmother told me, but they spoke of pogroms under the Czar. They came to New York through what was then Castle Garden and subsequently Ellis Island.

My mother's father also was a shop owner—groceries—also in Brooklyn. My grandmother met my grandfather who was from Vienna, Austria who came here as a young man, I think around his teenage years. I really didn't know his family. They met, married young, not so young in those days but she was about 17.

My grandmother was an important influence in my life actually--certainly from the time that I knew her, but in terms of her prior life as well. Her husband died when she was really quite young, she was still in her late 30s and he in his early 40s of something you wouldn't die from now-- rheumatic heart and they had already been married for over twenty years, but my grandmother ended up being a widow for over 60 years. She always worked for as long as I knew her; she was an interior decorator. She managed the store, Paris Decorators and then Selwyn Pomeroy. The stories both from her and ones I heard, she was the first woman to drive, to smoke, etc. in the area she grew up. She was an avid theatergoer. She started a book club. I mean she was a very interested and aware person, an avid reader. I hardly remember ever seeing my grandmother without a book in her hand---popular fiction. Her husband owned a grocery store, my grandmother worked with him, my mother and her sister and brother grew up in that environment and again I was always told that it was a very active educationally and culturally focused household. They certainly weren't wealthy people but it was a good, interesting and solid life.

My mother was the middle of three children. She had an older sister and…do you want all this?

Q: Oh yes, absolutely.

SCHUKER: An older sister and a younger brother. My father also was a middle child of three brothers. I mentioned their backgrounds already. My mother's older sister went on to college and ended up teaching Spanish, married a math teacher and lived in Brooklyn. My mother's younger brother actually became a detective. My mother, who very much wanted to go on to college, didn't. Her dad died when she was about 17 or 18 and she went to work and was always frustrated by not having been able to go further in school. Actually, it is interesting, she was a sweater model. She was very attractive …later she did some secretarial, stenography work, various things and anyway met my dad because he was the best friend of her sister's about to be husband and my parents married in 1936 in Brooklyn. My mother did not work at that time after she was married but later when I was in fifth grade I think, she worked near us at Downstate Medical University as a research secretary.

My sister, I have one sister, an older sister, who was born in 1941. She remembers the day she had her tonsils out because it was the same day that FDR (Franklin Delano Roosevelt) died in 1945. We both grew up in Brooklyn in a house in an area of Brooklyn called Rugby but it was basically Flatbush and we lived in a row house, single family home.

I don't know very much about my parents' backgrounds in the sense of how strictly they were brought up. I know my father was Bar Mitzvahed, my mother did go to Hebrew school and my mother told me that her father would say prayers, but neither my sister nor I were brought up with any kind of religious education nor did we attend synagogue. I did a little bit when I was a kid and boys were being Bar Mitzvahed and things of that sort but I was really not brought up with any kind of religious background. We were not a family that even went to temple although my grandmother did on what are called the

High Holy days, Yom Kippur and Rosh Hashanah. Actually we would celebrate Easter and Christmas as well as Chanukah and Passover –mostly with bigger family gatherings like Thanksgiving. My grandmother was a fabulous cook.

Q: Well was your neighborhood predominantly Jewish because I've talked to people who grew up in somewhat the same place so they didn't realize there was any, that it wasn't Jewish until they got practically beyond high school.

SCHUKER: My neighborhood was a mixture of Jewish and Catholic, Italian Catholic. Our next-door neighbors on either side of our home were both Catholic families. Italian Catholic, Nicky Scoles and Johnny Festa. So the neighborhood was very much a mix I would say of both. Certainly it was heavily Jewish and I must say on that score I think I knew one Protestant person, two or three maybe until I went to college except in the summers. Even the teachers were Catholic or Jewish. Elementary school was certainly a heavily Jewish environment. New York City at that period was, I don't mean New York City in general but certainly the area that I grew up in. Before we went to junior high there was an opportunity to take a special exam and if you did well you were able to skip eighth grade. I was of course not the only one but I did skip eighth grade and one of the shaping things for me is actually I went to college at sixteen. I was very young; there was another opportunity earlier on to skip a grade, which I didn't do, but I did go into school young because of my birthday.

So my classmates were predominantly Jewish …although in junior high and high school more mixed. Also I went to a "pilot" school for integration—it was about a quarter black and our class president was black.

Q: I don't know how it is today but looking back on it, what inspired this particular focus within the Jewish emigrant community towards education and all?

SCHUKER: That, of course, has been written about by historians and such at this point. You know, I don't have any special insight other than to say that I think I certainly was brought up by my family with an incredible curiosity and a great love of learning and it was given tremendous importance in my family.

But certainly for me—schooled in the 1950s and 1960s— there was never any question about going to college or anything of that sort. I remember when I was in high school I was a majorette, a twirler and I also joined a sorority. My father thought both were ridiculous and a waste of time. You know that these were things that serious minded young girls simply did not spend their time on, that these were really frivolous pursuits. I clearly did them with some encouragement from my mother I'm sure, but I'm sure it certainly was not something that my father was wild about. I think I was viewed as a bit of a rebel in the family.

Q: What about reading? Can you think back to early books that were formative or the type of books, what were you reading?

SCHUKER: Yes, I loved reading and I happened to be a very good reader. When I was a very young girl in elementary school, there was a young boy whose name was Isaac, that I do remember. He came out of I think a refugee camp after the war. He came to our school and I was asked to work with him on reading. I think it was probably quite smart to have somebody his age work with him and, of course, teachers did, but he needed to be sort of brought up to speed I think with language and I was a very early and very good reader. I remember when teachers left class there was another girl named Susan Rudd, no idea whatever happened to her, but we always were sort of in contention about who would be asked to read to the class while the teacher left the room. I loved it. My mother and father read to me and my grandmother did too but my mother read endlessly to me.

Early, early books I remember we used to read little Golden Books in those days, I don't, I mean some of them I certainly remember Dick and Jane when I was in school but books that I remember most fervently when I was…these are good questions by the way…when I was a little girl my mother had gotten me some books that I may actually still have at home because I have kept them and they were little paperback things but they were about the importance of being kind to other people and to recognize and appreciate ethnic and religious differences; they were very humanitarian, ecumenical in their outlook and they did have an impact on me. I do remember them; I can't remember the names of the books but I can picture the pictures and they had related verbiage as well. I certainly was brought up with that kind of sense of justice and it was, I recall, important to me.

Later on when I was still young but probably before I was a teenager but around that time, some of it was the world we lived in then but I remember being very interested in sort of two kinds of books. One was the sort of On The Beach sort of the end of the world.

Q: Nevile Shute's book. Yeah.

SCHUKER: Right, the spread of radiation that ends up…actually there was a movie made with Gregory Peck eventually but I also remember Child of Our Time as another book. You know the Diary of Anne Frank was certainly another must read. There was all this sort of genre and the other reading I was into for a while I was very interested in books like The Nun's Story and I Leaped Over The Wall, going back to your question about sort of religious upbringing. I had this view for a while about being fascinated by the church.

It was a valued experience that I grew up in a "mixed" area as I said. There was this school near us, St. Catherine of Genoa and the boys living on both sides of me went to school there. I played with a couple of friends who were Catholic and I just thought this whole idea of marrying Christ and all of this was terribly fascinating and so in any case those were sort of the books I remember. But one of the early books that I loved was Hans Brinker and the Silver Skates and another one was The Five Little Peppers and How They Grew.

Q: Oh, How They Grew and there was a whole series.

SCHUKER: That was the only one I read and I read all of Nancy Drew and I read all of the Bobbsey Twins.

Q: Nancy Drew seems to be the one sort of constant I think with almost all most all of the women I've ever interviewed

SCHUKER: Yes. Nancy Drew I read everything that was Nancy Drew, I read all the Bobbsey Twins; I was not particularly interested in Cherry Ames.

Q: You know my wife…I have a whole section…

SCHUKER: School nurse or something like it.

Q: I mean head nurse, intern you know the whole thing. She was the medical side, which didn't grab you.

SCHUKER: No that didn't grab me. I was also interested in Tom Swift. I read some of those books and, of course, I grew up with early television and I loved The Early Show, I always loved movies, always. I would always see as many movies as I could not just in the movies but also on television and Captain Video. I was once on Howdy Doody and when I was older I would go to the library and read plays.

I was in the peanut gallery one day. I remember the first time, it's funny, I don't remember the day we got our television but I do remember the day that my very good friend who is still a very good friend and a doctor in California Bobby Agulnek down the street got his television because he was the first one watching television and we would go to his house. On Kukla, Fran and Ollie we knew Fran so, you know, there were those kinds of things.

Q: Where did your family fall politically during this time?

SCHUKER: Interesting. My parents were married ten years when I was born and I was in the first year of the baby boom. I grew up not being uninterested in politics but I didn't think of it as "politics' then. My mother was president of the Parent-Teachers Association for a number of years (and the Girl Scouts) which was quite political then and it still is I guess. She was a very active parent and she was quite active as president. So I always remember hearing things about the Board of Education, she would go to Albany, the capital, sometimes and Brooklyn was clearly a Democratic bastion.

Stanley Steingut who was a prominent politico in Brooklyn for many, many years and ended up being Speaker of the State House of Representatives, and actually in college Steingut's son, Bobby, and I became very good friends but that goes forward a number of years. But I member when I would go to my grandmother's store, Paris Decorators on Flatbush Avenue which was one of the great thoroughfares in Brooklyn and right across from Erasmus High School. Down the street on Church Avenue between Bedford and

Flatbush was the Flatbush Democratic headquarters. I remember it, I think I even visited it once because it was next to the fire station, which we also visited, and across from another Catholic school and Yeshiva but I have visual memories of it. It never occurred to me to be anything but a Democrat. That was our political identification. One of my first political memories is listening and I assume I was six in '52 so I'm not sure it was that year, it may have been '56 but I certainly remember listening to not the whole thing but the political convention on radio, one of those two conventions on the radio. I remember my father listening to it and we were absolutely an Adlai Stevenson family. When I grew up Nixon was sort of the devil incarnate and the reasons that I remember were Helen Gahagen Douglas…

Q: He had done her dirt…

SCHUKER: That he had done her dirt.

Q*: Over the senatorial campaign in California.*

SCHUKER: Exactly. Calling her a Communist and that was the, you know, that he was just not a good man.

Q: Mother never forgave him because he beat Jerry Voorhees who was our Congressman in California at the time.

SCHUKER: Oh, you were from California. Well and then, of course, the whole red pepper thing and all of that (Senator Claude Pepper). But the one that I remember was that Stevenson was smart, he was very smart and you know the whole divorce thing never seemed to be—it was sort of whispered when he said he was divorced, but it wasn't a big deal and that he was the right man regardless. So that was certainly a formative and early political memory. I remember my mother voted for both Harriman and Rockefeller for Governor though.

Q: Was your family or people around you involved in leftist politics?

SCHUKER: I wouldn't call it leftist. Liberal though. I do remember my grandmother saying—this is from World War I—I have my grandmother on tape which I made before she died for many hours and which I'm very thankful to have; but I remember her telling me that she grew up on Hamburg Avenue the name of which was changed to Wilson Avenue in the First World War.

Q: Oh yes.

SCHUKER: And that was in Brooklyn. She could have told me that many years later in my life but I remember it as an early memory. Secondly, both my father's brother, as I mentioned, and my mother's sister were professors, I mean they were both teachers in high school and my uncle was a principal at Jamaica and his wife a teacher at Forest Hills High. There was certainly, I would say, a very strong intellectual streak among all four of

those particular people and the next generations. We read many newspapers in the house, but I don't remember the *Forward.*

I remember hearing, now I don't know if this is true but in my memory I remember hearing that my Aunt Ethel and my Uncle Ruby who was my mother's sister and brother-in-law and the one who introduced my father to my mother, threw certain books down their apartment incinerator during the McCarthy period or got rid of them somehow because of the fears of McCarthy. My uncle was a mathematician, my aunt, as I said, taught Spanish.

The only thing I remember most about that period was-- and again I was a little girl-- but hating McCarthy and I definitely remember listening on the radio when Ethel and Julius Rosenberg were electrocuted. I don't remember much and I actually don't remember what my parents' position on it was but I remember it being quite shocking and that it was the pictures of, you know, that famous coat that she always seemed to be wearing.

Q: With the fur collar.

SCHUKER: With the fur collar and I guess particularly that this mother would be killed. But I don't remember a lot about it in terms of what it was all about except that it was shocking the idea of electrocution and it was sad. But I don't remember sort of being informed as to whether they were guilty or not, you know, what my parents thought about it. I remember diving under the desks and all of that at school for civil defense drills every day, I can remember hearing the civil defense sirens going off when I was in elementary school and we would all duck and cover as they said.

Q:I'm trying to capture the spirit of the times.

SCHUKER: Well, the Brooklyn Dodgers were big.

Q: When did the Dodgers leave?

SCHUKER: Oh, not until late 50s. and I was there for the 1955 pennant and actually my friend Tommy Oliphant of The Boston Globe did a book last year and my mother…and he interviewed me for it. My mom was a big Dodger fan. It was the home team. Gil Hodges' wife went to the same beauty parlor!

Q: What about speaking of the Dodgers and Jackie Robinson?

SCHUKER: Jackie Robinson was a hero in my house. My cousins lived in the Bronx and were Yankee fans and I thought they should be Dodger fans.

Q: What about the great cornucopia of delights that were available in downtown New York. Were you able to sample some of those?

SCHUKER: Oh yes and that was important. Downtown Brooklyn—Juniors the restaurant shopping. My grandmother and my mother loved theater and I started to go to the theater uptown in Manhattan, and I assume that is one of the things you mean, when I was about seven years old. The first two plays I remember seeing were Pipe Dream, which was Rodgers and Hammerstein.

Q: Was it about Steinbeck's, about Cannery Row or something like that?

SCHUKER: I think it was. Two of the major players, Judy Tyler was actually one of them and she had been Princess Summer Fall Winter Spring on Howdy Doody and we knew her. She died very young in a car crash, as did the male lead. But I remember going to that and to see Shirley Booth in By the Beautiful Sea. Those were the first two plays, but I remember Auntie Mame with Rosalyn Russell, Peter Pan with Mary Martin. I mean I would go to the theater a lot. I spent a lot of time with my grandmother, my grandmother and my mother and the theater was big. My parents went to concerts and opera but my father was always working. We loved to eat out, movies, some ballet and things of that sort. I took piano lessons for a long time. I went to New York City (Manhattan) a lot as a young girl and so I would certainly see museums, I was very focused on my schoolwork too. I spent a lot of time at the Grand Army Plaza Library. When I was little the Botanical Gardens, Prospect Park, Coney Island, and Riis Park were wonderful in those days. The Botanical Gardens were just beautiful and Prospect Park had a zoo and a carousel. My sister remembers too-- there was like a big launch that was on the water then and you would go not just in little rowboats but would sort of go around the lake on a launch which seemed big. I did a lot of those kinds of things, roller skating, ice skating, bowling, you know all of that, Empire State Rollerdrome, Freddie Fitzsimmons bowling… I mean I did a lot with the Girl Scouts. And I liked sports—softball, bike riding. And I was a good runner. I remember field day at elementary school and our parents took us to Hyde Park and Oyster Bay.

Q: Well too, trying to capture the times as a young girl you could sort of go to New York on your own could you?

SCHUKER: I have to say I remember going a lot with adults as a little girl. I remember less about junior high but in high school certainly I would go into New York City a lot on the subway—"uptown". Those were the days you would have a purse on your lap and fall asleep and somebody would say, "Hey, wake up", and you would get off at your stop. I can't say that bad things didn't happen but it was definitely a more innocent time. I would go to the beach –Riis Park, Manhattan Beach--and I certainly went to the beach with my friends by myself and I mean I definitely remember traveling. I don't remember at what age I started to go on the subway by myself but certainly, this is ancient history, we went on trolley cars, then the busses and when I was in junior high I went, I think my father took me to school in the morning but I would come home on the bus. Again, I was in junior high but I wasn't a baby. I was eleven, twelve whatever, but I think part of living in the city is that you just got around by yourself. You learned to be street smart. You did a lot on your own, no one had cars, it wasn't like being in California where you know sort of like American Graffiti. That was not the way city kids traveled.

Q: Well going to school now sort of an elementary and through junior high what particular subject got to you and didn't?

SCHUKER: I always loved current events and I loved reading. I did read a lot.

Q: What papers or books?

SCHUKER: Well we would get at home and of course it was the days of a million newspapers but I think, you know it's funny I don't remember if we got the New York Times but I remember The Herald Tribune, The Mirror, the News, The Post, The Telegram, I think there was The Brooklyn Eagle or something.

Q: Well and the Brooklyn Eagle goes way back, Walt Whitman and all that.

SCHUKER: I think there was some Brooklyn paper but they were all at the house and I have to truly say I remember reading the comics or my grandmother would read them to me. But we always had newspapers around and I remember my father always reading the newspaper. I would say the paper that was most prominent at home seemed to be The New York Post. I forget who headed it then, a woman but in any case I always listened to Tex and Jinx and Dorothy and Dick on the radio in the morning before I went to school, we always watched the news. But in elementary school I remember all of my teachers. I think the unit that most interested me was about the American Indians. But reading, reading, reading, reading, reading I loved reading.

Then in junior high I had a really important, seminal teacher, Albert Kaminsky. This was, remember I skipped eighth grade, and so this was ninth grade but it was still, 7th, 8th and 9th were junior high then. It was a class called "core" and it combined English and History and all of that. I still have the paper I wrote for him at home. Two things about that year, this was '59. I remember distinctly when Castro came into power in Cuba and I remember being very excited thinking this was great and the triumph of the people and blah, blah, blah. I remember Kaminsky saying, "Wait, let's see what happens." I just remember that warning very distinctly to sort of pay attention to events and I remember paying a lot of attention and being very interested.

The other thing, which had a huge effect, was he had us all write about a country, do a project. It was my first real research project and he gave out assignments, i.e., France, Germany, Cuba, whatever to the class. There were 30 or so students and I could see myself sitting at my desk. He got to me and said, "The Central African Federation." I was practically in tears, I went up to him afterwards and I said, "I'm never going to find anything, everybody is getting France and Germany and England and Canada and…" and he said, "Jill, you can do it and you are going to learn more than anyone else." I thought oh my. Anyway, off I went to the library and the Central African Federation was then comprised of Nyasaland and Southern and Northern Rhodesia and I did learn a tremendous amount and I think it colored my interest in terms of don't always go for the easy, think sort of out of the box, an expression that probably didn't exist then, but

realizing that it can be more challenging if you don't always go for the known. I learned I really knew nothing about Africa prior to that. Clearly these were all countries that ended up over the years being so seminal--Malawi, Zimbabwe, Zambia. I mean it was fascinating. It was my first experience with Hastings Banda and of course Ian Smith and the deep issue of apartheid. I mean it was seminal, it was a seminal experience for me.

Q: That was the time that things were really perking.

SCHUKER: It was fascinating. He was a very tough teacher but I learned tremendous amounts that year. I learned very early on how to research and that year was equivalent to freshman year in high school even though I was still in a bricks and mortar junior high.

Q: OK let's talk about research. Nowadays somebody just goes to the computer and tickles the keys.

SCHUKER: I would spend hours, I mean I was a good, above average student and I had parents who we have talked about who encouraged me but I really did spend hours studying. I would "take out" not only books and books that I would either bring home or go through at the library but I spent hours on microfilm, microfilm, microfilm, microfilm, microfilm.

Q: Which is not the easiest thing?

SCHUKER: No, but it was fascinating.

Q: It goes in and out of focus.

SCHUKER: Right.

Q: I've done microfilm searching.

SCHUKER: Maybe I'm only remembering it as hours but I do remember hours and days at the library on microfilm sitting in a little dark cubicle. It was learning to be very disciplined, engaged, focused and having a certain degree of patience. I'm not the most patient person but certainly in terms of my work I loved it. I mean that is the other thing. I have to say I really did, it was tiring and I was exhausted. Also I had a very good role model in my sister who was a very good student, more disciplined. She would never have become a majorette or a sorority person. Classes were small enough then and people knew my sister and part of it was about trying to be as smart and as good as she was. You said what else was I reading? I remember going to the library that was right off Flatbush Avenue because that was sort of the nearest library, this is before I had to get into the heavy duty kind of research, and I would spend a lot of time just sitting in the stacks reading plays. That was something I did a lot. I loved reading plays and I would just go to the library and read plays.

Q: I remember I used to do that too. There was this series of best plays of 19….

SCHUKER: Exactly.

Q: Something or other. I used to read…

SCHUKER: Year after year after year compilations.

Q: …read through all those.

SCHUKER: Right.

Q: I don't know if people do that anymore.

SCHUKER: I used to also read all the film magazines as a kid. My mother loved them too. But there was a candy store around the corner from me and I would go there…we didn't eat as a family. I often had dinner by myself and with my sister in front of the tv.

Q: I've talked to people who sort of came in and you…you know, you want a lamb chop well I'll fix you a lamb chop, you just have it.

SCHUKER: Right. My father ate by himself and he had irregular hours, he would come home at different hours. My mother never ate dinner regularly that I can remember. My sister and I would sit in front of the television at dinner and eat but then my sister was four years ahead of me in school so during high school she was already gone and I would sometimes go around the corner and get a sandwich and just read. What I would read is the film magazines but specifically there was one magazine called Film Stories or Screen Stories, and it was the stories of all the movies. I loved to read those so I am a very good trivia person on older movies and things.

Q: I was wondering, it sounds like particularly with the eating habits that there wasn't time as with some families sitting around the table talking about what is the topic of the day or something like that.

SCHUKER: Which I always thought was wonderful if people did that but it wasn't the case in my family.

Q: Well then how about the sciences, how did they strike you?

SCHUKER: Well it is interesting because my father was very engaged in the sciences and cared a lot about that subject. I would say two things on sciences. One, when I was a little girl I was very interested in astronomy, and I thought I would want to be an astronomer but math was not my best subject. But I think what I sort of loved about it was looking at the sky. I did find it quite fascinating. And at camp I would often be the person who would provide the weather report in the morning at breakfast. My father was really a frustrated professor, which contributed to his sadness. I'm teaching right now at Fletcher and I really think more about him than anyone else. I think he would be very pleased. I

would ask my dad a fairly simple question, or so I thought, like what number president was Abraham Lincoln and instead of being told the number he would get 17 books in front of me about Abraham Lincoln and that used to drive me crazy but I got very in depth help from my father in terms of learning. And I always was a big questioner in classes. I liked biology and I liked chemistry. I never took physics. I actually took bio when I went to college as well and in New York City you had to take Regents, very serious, very comprehensive exams before you could graduate.

Q: The Regents exams were?

SCHUKER: …were tough and I think that is part of the New York City discipline when you went away to college, I mean you knew how to take exams. I'm not trying to be whatever on this, I do think the year that I took the bio exam it was really quite easy but I did get a hundred on it so that was my one perfect Regents number.

But, I don't think it was because I was particularly brilliant in sciences by any means but you do well, you like it too. So, I liked chemistry. I liked bio but I was never moved to go in that direction. In college as I said I took bio and earth sciences. The passion that I had was always in terms of politics and government. I think some of it had to do with the motivation, as I mentioned to you, in terms of starting off with the particular teacher I mentioned and others in high school. I think some of it was a love of reading and so I liked to absorb, I liked to read and reading was…history and things like that. The worst subject I ever had was geometry and I had a tutor in high school, is this something you want to know?

Q: Yes…

SCHUKER: … geometry. I really didn't like it and I went on in algebra and trigonometry not calculus, advanced algebra yes. I liked it, I found it interesting but it always scared me a little bit. It was not something I thought of pursuing as a life's work.

I think a very crucial moment was when John Kennedy ran for the presidency and I was starting high school. I just was totally blown away and very much into his presidency. Then my freshman year in college, again I went to college at 16, which I might add is much too young, but be that as it may that's where I was and that of course was the year of the Cuban missile crisis. I certainly was, I think, like many people I did not understand how dangerous it was…I was very scared but I remember feeling very confident in the President.. Maybe that was my age and the way I felt about Kennedy but I felt very confident that he would, that it would all work out. I think part of it was that I couldn't believe that…I don't think I had any sense of how totally dangerous things were but I certainly remember thinking it was quite dangerous but not life and death dangerous. But I think that also furthered an interest in the world that I was living in and certainly once I got into college I was reading newspapers avidly, the New York Times most specifically, Scotty Reston, Tom Wicker. To this day I read my five newspapers here. I still don't like to read online as a first choice. I like to read and feel the print.

Q: On politics, who was your congressman?

SCHUKER: My congresswoman was, I was about to say Edna Kelly. When I was in college my junior year Robert Kennedy ran for the senate and won. I went to Skidmore, I mean I went away to college

Q: Up in Saratoga Springs.

SCHUKER: Yes, in Saratoga. You know I went to a big city high school. Wingate was one of so many NYC high schools-- Tilden, Lincoln, Madison, Midwood, Erasmus, Jefferson, Lincoln among others. I mean there were lots and lots of schools. I had a small graduating class of 900 and that was considered small then. We were on double sessions and most of the high schools were on triple sessions. I was in; I think I was 42nd in my class. I mean I wasn't tippy-top but I was…you know I did well but there were really only a handful of us that went away to college. Someone went to Harvard, someone went to Radcliffe, someone went to Cornell, to MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) but I would say only maybe 25 of us went away to school. Lots went to college but mostly it was and I think this was financial as well as lots of competition, but went to Brooklyn College predominantly, some to Hunter some to City, some to NYU (New York University). So I really sort of broke in a way with my past at that time in many ways because I just started a different kind of life. As I said, it was the first time I ended up in the world of Protestants so to speak, I mean it was a very Miss Porter's school and all of that-- Dana Hall, it was a very important experience but it was certainly one that was quite different than my "big city" high school experience. My sister had gone to Vassar, my two elder female cousins had gone to Radcliffe and to Swarthmore so there was a legacy of going away.

Q: Of going away.

SCHUKER: And of serious work. One went to Hunter of my older cousins, University of Michigan was another, but my cousin Linda who was the product of my mother's sister and uncle who had subsequently divorced, Linda basically became an economist, she went to the Sorbonne , the International Monetary Fund, and then she was at the World Bank for many years. My sister, who went to Vassar, went on for her graduate work in public administration. My other older female cousin became a psychiatrist Eleanor, another a psychologist, and Susan probably led the most "normal "of lives, went to Hunter, married and sort of stayed, more rooted. But, so the idea of going on and going on in something that wasn't just sort of teaching per se was not an unusual experience. My younger female cousins became MDs, PhDs, etc. and so did the boys.

When I went to college I thought initially I would eventually teach. I liked little kids. I mean it never occurred to me seriously otherwise at that point…I remember the line for women at that time anticipated marriage and families always was, "Oh you will have your summers free." That was the line that I don't think rings true anymore as a mantra with all the pressures on teachers. But when I started my freshman year I just, I don't know, I just assumed that was what I would do but that quickly changed because I did

love government and the interests from high school in that direction continued. I was very interested in it. I remember my parents saying to me, "What are you going to do with this?" But flash-forward I decided freshman year and again it was my interest but also the professors I had, what I was learning—it all was stimulating and encouraging, and the impact of John Kennedy's presidency, etc. In my junior year I was the first one at Skidmore to become a Washington, D.C. summer intern and I assume there have been subsequent people doing so but I just thought then I would apply for an internship with the encouragement of one of my professors. I had heard that they existed and I applied to Edna Kelly and Robert Kennedy. I had done some work on Robert Kennedy's Senate campaign that he won. I never thought I would be chosen by his office but I was fortunate to also have this offer to work for Kelly, but the RFK opportunity was like a dream come true, and I came here in the summer…

Q: What year was it?

SCHUKER: This was 1965 when it was the first year he was senator and I had come to Washington only once before, which was after John Kennedy was killed. I came with my parents that December 1963, the following month, to go to his gravesite. So I had come to Washington and, of course, was very sad but found it was like nirvana. I thought it was, you know, a fascinating city and it was very exciting even though it was covered in snow. I was always interested in the political side of things although in college I also got very interested in the international side but less so at that point.

Q: What was Skidmore like? You were there from when?

SCHUKER: I was there from 1962 to 1966 and it is about to be my 40th college graduation anniversary. I went to college quite young, and I literally did a lot of growing up in those four years—I even grew almost four inches in college. I mean things that would have happened in high school but I think age wise the maturation process may have been a little later for me. So it was a big growing up period for me. Skidmore also was all women then. It was small, I mean the size of all of Skidmore was about 300 more than just my graduating class had been in high school and it was a wonderful scholastic period for me.

It was also a big growing up social time for me too. I loved the idea of a college town and all of that. I was not interested, I didn't apply to Vassar where my sister went. I thought it was beautiful but sort of a very staid kind of place and I knew someone who had gone to Skidmore and seemed very happy there. I visited her and liked it. Guidance counseling was nil. The financials were such that it also made sense. I had a Regent scholarship, which was just a few hundred dollars, but not inconsequential and you needed to use it in New York State. Guidance counseling then was also abysmal. I would have applied to a girls' school because that seemed to be what my family did in general whether it was Radcliffe's or the Vassar's or whatever's. So the idea of a girls' school appealed to me but I never really thought about Holyoke or any of those. I wish I had had some better knowledge and been able to apply for scholarships, but it worked out quite well. I was

happy and liked it and it was a growth time for me, especially enriching in terms of my growing interest in political science and international affairs and literature.

So many people talk about their old high school friends but it was really a break from the past for me. There were really just a couple of people who I am still in touch with over the years who were long-time friends even from before high school and I find that a little sad actually. It would be nice to sort of have that history but once again there were so many people with the name Levine for example, or whatever else that people either moved away, neighborhoods changed, at that time women who married changed their name, I really just never followed up with people, it was hard. Even reunions after a short period became separate from the life I was living.

Q: Well I went through the same thing and I regret it up to a point. Did you find for example that you had, you certainly don't have one now, but what I would call a pronounced New York accent? Did you work to get rid of it?

SCHUKER: That is interesting. I find that there are people from time to time who identify the New York Brooklyn accent not typically and I actually like that because the accent was not one that was viewed as cultured. My mother grew up in Brooklyn but my father grew up in South Carolina and then in Brooklyn. I was told very often when I was growing up to stand up straight and speak clearly and correctly and that sentences are declarative and don't end with inflections. So I think speaking well was certainly something that was fostered in my family. I remember a couple friends of mine had pronounced accents. I think it affected their job picture.

Q: Well, looking, I don't know how it is today but particularly in the movies all through my experience in the '30s up to '40s into the '50s and all the Brooklyn accent was always the lower class kid. It was a somewhat object of…

SCHUKER: Ridicule.

Q: Humor.

SCHUKER: Yes humor.

Q: The radio shows, the Brooklyn accent was something, it's like a Cockney accent in England. It is fine but it classifies you or at least it did at that point. I imagine it probably still does.

SCHUKER: Well what's very interesting of course now and I am always so amused by this and get such a kick out of it but Brooklyn is a very chic place to live now, to move to. People who when I was growing up in the '50s and '60s you know wanted to get out of Williamsburg, get out of Brownsville, get out of Brooklyn period except maybe Brooklyn Heights. These are all places that people seek to live in now-- Park Slope, all these places. I think it is much more cosmopolitan in certain areas but with gentrification there

is probably an ethnic identification for yet another pool of people. But it is interesting, I still think there is an old sort of identification as you said that sort of. Brooklyn was something to leave behind as opposed to an identification to develop.

One of the things was that I was away every summer, starting when I was a little girl and then once I was 16 I got out of high school and really never went home again to live. From my teens I was exposed to a lot of different kinds of accents and was very aware of what I thought was more toney or whatever and I hope that it didn't take on a falseness but I think it was something I was certainly made aware of.

Q: OK, college during the early '60s. Was there a focus on civil rights?

SCHUKER: Yes, there were sort of two aspects of this. Skidmore was a quiet campus. It was a girls school, we were not in the midst of a major or close to a big city and I think in that sense we did not, we were not on the cutting edge of activity. There were few black students on campus and I mean let's say out of 1,200 maybe five. So that did not, at least in terms of African-Americans, generate activity and I would say I can think of one black professor, I never actually thought about that before. When I think about it, it was not in that sense an integrated campus. I mean it was but it just wasn't.

I certainly paid attention to and was deeply interested in Martin Luther King. I remember thinking that Malcolm X at that period was sort of scary and on the fringe but I was very attuned to King. I was very attuned to the Freedom Riders. I do remember, and I don't remember how many, but I do remember some students going down to the South. I don't remember talking to my parents about that but I do remember personally not being ready to make that trip, I was a little frightened of the idea, supportive but frightened and guilty. I wouldn't say that there was any particular encouragement from the campus to do such things. We did a collection I remember for some money. I remember doing whatever I did at that time but it was not a big deal. I mean it was not a big deal in terms of activity and I'm sad about that. I mean that was one of the things in retrospect that I feel I'm sorry that I, and the campus, was not more engaged. The most aware and impactful for me was JFK's televised speech when he said "who among us" would change places with Negroes given their treatment. It was a profound moment for me beyond a wake-up call. So when John Kennedy was killed it was devastating on so many levels.

I graduated from college in '66. We did have a Vietnam teach-in and I remember Max Frankel from The New York Times coming to the campus but it was still not active. Once I went to graduate school and I was in Boston there was much more activity. But I would say I basically went to college on what I would call a quiet campus regarding political activity and much else. These were women, there were no riots, Nothing of that sort.

Q: Did you find being in a school where it was predominantly Protestant where all of a sudden you found that being Jewish was being different?

No, I really didn't. I don't think I ever thought about it. A religious lens was not the way I looked at things. I had always been away in the summers when I was growing up. Actually when I was 13 and 14 I traveled across the country and across Canada. I went on "safaris", in Edsels 1959-1960. One summer we had one Edsel; the next summer we had two Edsels. It was with a group of students/campers, I mean there were maybe ten or twelve of us and the young people who were our counselors—a young couple. He was a new minister and his wife. It is a riot now to think we called them mom and dad--they were in their twenties. The person who ran this camp called the School of the Outdoor was a guy by the name of Ben Cummings. The kids, even though there were relatively few of us, were predominantly Jewish but it was Protestant and Jewish and I even remember somebody who was Catholic at that time. There was a Mormon. But the counselors also at Camp Wapalanne which preceded the safari years before morphing into this School of the Outdoors, also were mostly Protestant and all studying to be teachers. It was all very granola. In college, backgrounds were quite different than where I grew up… more privileged, private schools. I was exposed to a different slice of the population—economically privileged, from Shaker Heights, and from little towns in Oregon, you know all kinds of people, women, and in that sense broadening. I sort of liked it.

My closest friend my freshman year was not Jewish. But the three people who I have stayed in closest touch with from college are Jewish—one, JoAnne, went on to grad school with me at Tufts in French. The second person who was in essence my closest friend in college and editor of the school newspaper while I was the editor of a publication called Politeia is now the chief judge of the Colorado Court of Appeals, Janice Davidson, formerly Janice Burnett. Janice and I have stayed in close touch. She went on to law school. She grew up in Queens and the third person also is Jewish Susan Polgash who is a friend in Chicago. All three share my attitudes toward organized religion as it happens, for whatever that's worth noting.

Q: I want to capture an era. We haven't talked about your time with Robert Kennedy…

SCHUKER: And that was great.

Q: And your internship and then with college when you graduated in '66…

SCHUKER: From college.

Q: Where you went and also maybe a little about the social life, what was going on on the campus?

SCHUKER: The Robert Kennedy experience was in '65, but then it translated to '68 because it was the first campaign that I was deeply involved in. It was absolutely seminal to everything that has happened subsequently in my professional life.

Q: Great, OK.

SCHUKER: So we will start right after college?

Q: You can tackle either the Kennedy thing or the college thing or the social thing. Which do you want to come first?

SCHUKER: I think I spent probably too much time on high school before but anyway…

Q: Well we kind of captured an era.

SCHUKER: Well you know one thing that I remember that I had wanted to mention just before I go on. I was talking about growing up in an Adlai Stevenson household, etc. But it was interesting. One of the things I remembered was in junior high I was awarded an American Legion medal which was certainly not what one would call a sort of flaming liberal sort of honorific or whatever.. I don't think I understood at that time much about the American Legion's politics but citizen honors of that sort were important you know at the time. I don't think politics entered into my thinking…..or perhaps my parents.

Q: Well they are important too, I mean for a young person getting awards means something much more than later on because they do show somebody is out there saying, "Gee, you're doing something."

SCHUKER: Right, right and I don't remember exactly what it was. I don't know if it was citizenship or whatever but anyway let's see. My internship with Robert Kennedy which as I said…

Q: When you went to your first internship you were still in college, is that right?

SCHUKER: I was 19, it was between my junior and senior year, I was at Skidmore; I was very interested in government. Robert Kennedy had run for political office and became a senator from New York. I had been, as you know, thrilled with John Kennedy's presidency and devastated when he died which was my sophomore year at college. It was a very shaping experience for the country and an unbelievable shock as a young and enthusiastic student of 17. So when the Senator ran, I was involved to the extent that I could be in the campaign--poll watching and all of that. And it was so thrilling when he won. Then I thought, gee, might it be possible to work in his office. I thought it would be a very long shot, but I did apply also to my congresswoman as well, whose name was Edna Kelly.

I fortunately was offered an internship by both. Of course, I mean it didn't take me twelve seconds to think, "My goodness if I can work for Robert Kennedy that's what I want to do." I did and that was the summer of 1965. It was his first intern class. Many people I met that summer are still people I know today and were important in my political and personal life and some of them-- Frank Mankiewicz was his press secretary, actually there was another press secretary—actually at that time Wes Barthelmes was still press secretary but Frank was coming in. Adam Walinsky, Peter Edelman, Peter is in town and I see him all the time. These were his legislative assistants and speechwriters; they were

young people starting out and brilliant. There was also this tremendous bench of professional Kennedy supporters. Mary Jo Kopechne worked in the office then for his Chief of Staff, Joe Dolan.

Then there was this whole network of people who knew the Kennedy family who I got to know at that time and the Kennedy experience has been a key factor in so many ways in my life. In 1972 I was deputy press secretary for Sargent Shriver, and traveled with him when he was vice presidential candidate for George McGovern and in the '68 campaign I had worked not only here in Washington for Robert Kennedy but in the South Dakota primary which was the same day as the June 4th California primary, the day of the assassination.

But it was during the South Dakota primary that I met Senator George McGovern. George McGovern to this day is a friend and Frank Mankiewicz worked for him as well. In 1968 after Robert Kennedy was assassinated, there was a group of people who had not been actively engaged in Gene McCarthy's candidacy in favor of RFK. I certainly thought McCarthy was extremely honorable and an important person for what he did in '68 vis-à-vis Johnson but I was a Kennedy person and there was sort of a split among McCarthy people and Kennedy people and a number of us who were "Kennedy people" then engaged with George McGovern for what was everyone knew was not going to be a winning strategy at the Democratic Convention in Chicago but who nonetheless went with McGovern. I worked with him in Chicago in 1968, another incredible experience. We were at the Sheraton-Blackstone hotel, which was right across from the Conrad Hilton where Hubert Humphrey's staff was and the Democratic National Committee headquarters, and I mean it was just an amazing time. So in any case that was a political network by-product of the 1965 internship experience.

Q: Two questions about the early times, the internship was a summer job?

SCHUKER: Yes, in 1965.

Q: Did you find there much connection between Ted Kennedy and Robert Kennedy who, I mean, did you all feel that you were Kennedy's together?

SCHUKER: Yes, the answer is yes. There was definitely a bonding between the two offices and there was very much a sense of being a little bit elite that one was sort of part of the Kennedy circle. Robert Kennedy's office was in what was then called the New Senate Office Building 1205, I still remember, his office was literally the first office you came to as you walked into the building and of course this was before a lot of the security you have now and you would walk in and show a card or whatever it was and walk through. His office was the first one you came to but there were certain security procedures for him even then. I remember we had one incident where somebody walked into the office with a knife when I was there but there was a constant flow of people. Ted Kennedy was in the I believe the Old Senate Office building even then and, of course, had been senator since '62 but he was the center of the joke that he was the younger brother and yet the senior senator to Robert Kennedy. Given Ted Kennedy's strong long

term reputation as a conscience of the Senate and an expert on legislation over time, at that time Bobby was called the workhorse and Teddy the show horse. Certainly for Edward Kennedy that became a misnomer.

But one of the things RFK did for staff since both he and Teddy tended to be away on the weekends in Hyannisport was that they would open up Hickory Hill Robert Kennedy's home. Robert Kennedy would invite us all to Hickory Hill so we were there every weekend, the pool and the tennis courts. I didn't play tennis in those days, and I wish I did now that I think back. Those courts were fabulous and available. But we would use the pool and there would be picnics and there would be food and there was the jukebox and basically it was open to the Robert Kennedy and Ted Kennedy staff. Some people who were sort of Teddy people then, for example like Jim Flug, are back on Teddy's staff now after being gone for many years. So there is still an old bonding experience from those days and there were and, of course, it was still early in the whole interning experience in Washington. But also certain invitations with prominent speakers were provided just for us as well as a wider group of Kennedy Senate friends like Scoop Jackson so his interns were part of it. I remember we met with Whizzer White who, of course, had been a John Kennedy appointee to the Supreme Court. It was very heady.

Things like that were just special to sort of a small group of us that were just incredibly wonderful experiences and opportunities that I cherished. But I do remember one thing that summer was that congressional interns were invited to the White House with President Lyndon Johnson. Even then, of course, it was 1965, there were deep concerns about the war that I had as well but everyone behaved at the White House. Robert Kennedy had started to question issues and decisions about Vietnam. But a whole intern crowd met with the president on the White House lawn. I mean it was fairly large. I remember it was the first time; of course, I had been to the White House in that kind of way. It was so exciting the idea of being at the White House and I remember I was impressed meeting the president because he was a much more imposing figure than I had seen on television—mostly black and white television. He was tall, he was very well tanned, he actually looked better in person than some of the pictures and Westmoreland was there, I remember that distinctly and…

Q: At that time was he the commander of our troops in Vietnam?

SCHUKER: He was, and he spoke to us along with the president and I can't say I remember much about what he said but the White House perspective on Vietnam certainly was the focus. Anyway, those kinds of exposures were quite…

Q: Did you find though that being part of the, you might say the Kennedy/Scoop Jackson entourage, did you find or did you have much contact with other interns or the rest of the senate establishment or did they sort of…did you feel that you were a part?

SCHUKER: Yes, actually in those days and even when I went on the Hill as a staffer there was and I don't know now but again I assume that security issues create some distance in ways that they weren't then, I mean there was a lot of communication with

members. They still had separate elevators for senators if they wished, the people just…there was just a lot more comfortable mixing and there was certainly more mixing with other offices of interns. Javits, I remember we did…

Q: Jacob Javits of New York.

SCHUKER: Jacob Javits.

Q: Who was sort of the model of the liberal Republican…

SCHUKER: Absolutely and we did as the two New York senators, Republican and Democratic, did a lot of intern things together as well. Clearly some of it also had to do with where you went to school because there were things in the summer that were more sort of Ivy League gatherings and invitations and such. I guess a question that you asked Stuart was whether I think my experience would have been different if I worked for Edna Kelly. I think it would have been very different.

Q: I was wondering. I mean this I don't know if it is appropriate but did the interns feel that there were predatory political types wandering around looking for young ladies?

SCHUKER: Well, there was no question I think that Robert Kennedy and Ted Kennedy, for example, were not only very attractive but you know came with an aura that was very exciting to be around them. It was easy, I mean I guess I would say that it is certainly and was certainly very easy then and for me to understand-- I'm trying to think of the correct word, the missteps that take place between interns, staff and members themselves. I think there is a power issue. I mean I remember even when Kissinger was dating Jill St. John and the view was it's the whole power thing. What would these two people sort of find in common or particularly I think the view was what would she find of interest.

But these are very interesting, bright, talented men and it was basically men, there were very few women. You have tremendous intensity of enthusiasm and work focus, which happens in offices too. You spend tremendous amounts of time with colleagues. There is an intimacy that is created in the office that really has to do with not just an enthusiasm about the work but about the person and they are by and large often very magnetic personalities. So, was I aware of certain things in those days? Were there members who had become sort of infamous John Tower being one of a lot of sort of you know don't get in the elevator with certain people.

Q: Yes, he was a guy you don't get into an elevator with, I've been told.

SCHUKER: There were people who we knew, you know, you kept your back to the wall kind of thing and if you were alone--don't. I remember Carl Hayden who was the dean of the senate…

Q: He was 90 years old.

SCHUKER: He was 90 years old even then and I remember he would…I mean there were really colorful characters or at least they seemed that way to me but maybe part of it was being nineteen and everybody seemed colorful but he would sort of walk down the hall or walk into the…he liked to eat in what was then a dining room in the basement of the Senate side of the Capitol that one had access to as staff. He had this cane and he would sort of sweep the table with the cane and whatever was on it sort of disappeared and he would sit down. I mean it may sound boring or crazy or ridiculous -- and that is anecdotal. But what was going on at that time seriously was the personalities of the people, the Scoop Jacksons involved in big, important seminal issues; people who were making history. You were there and you saw them and you were part of it; I felt proud to be engaged with government.

I may not have liked everything or agreed with everything but I was very proud to be working for Robert Kennedy, I was proud of what he had done on hunger issues, I certainly had a strong affinity for what I felt in terms of civil rights and I felt this was part of a legacy that this was somebody who was strongly committed on calling into question some of our international postures. So substantively it was very exciting and committed for me but certainly the whole sort of panoply of Kennedy history and Hyannisport and the linkage to John Kennedy and the family and Hickory Hill. I mean it was like, it was just, it was a very incredibly exciting time and I think you know all of that was the good news.

The bad news may be that it spoiled one in a certain sense and the expectation of what things would be was very heightened because I was working for somebody who was not an ordinary senator either in terms of perception or in terms of just talent because this is somebody who everybody assumed would run for president and the pressures were enormous on him, including legacy issues. We did spend some time with him, I mean as interns and his staff he was engaged with us and he was, I think, interested in what we were doing. There were twelve of us; so it wasn't like two or three people. It was a very interesting group of young people, many of whom I see to this day, some of whom went on in politics and business. Jules Kroll who was then in law school, Jules ended up heading his own very successful company Kroll, which is the first company that did intensive sort of security investigation and research, I mean he has become synonymous with this work…… It was just an interesting crowd. I guess it was difficult to come down to earth in certain ways after that.

Q: When you got back to Skidmore, this would have been your senior year wouldn't it be?

SCHUKER: It would be my senior year, right.

Q: In the first place was it is an anticlimax and two, what is this pointing you towards if anything?

SCHUKER: Well I, of course, I already knew that I was very interested in public service but my view of public service was I guess a political one in the sense that I wasn't really…although I did at one time, I wasn't really thinking about filling out civil service

forms It was to be engaged in the policy side but in the political piece of this meaning as someone who worked for a candidate first. So when I came back to Skidmore I think that I always felt that at some point I would be involved in a potential Kennedy campaign. I didn't know when that might be because at that time we thought that Lyndon Johnson would be running again and it wasn't sort of even really clear about what would happen in '68 in terms of anything with Robert Kennedy, of course. But I kept up my relationship with the office, I went back over Christmas, you know I would sort of be a helper. I would go to the office in New York as well, the Manhattan office. So I maintained that relationship.

In my senior year I was happy to be back at school and it was great that school was in New York because Kennedy was the senator from New York. I remember my senior year he came up and spoke in Albany and I helped set up that meeting for him and he came down into the audience to say hello to me and then I went up to the front of the audience. But you know it was all very heady and very exciting. The person at that time who was his upstate New York person was a guy named Jerry Bruno who became quite infamous overtime for all his political shenanigans but I would do some work with Jerry because I was in upstate New York. Also, in my senior year, I was the editor of Politeia, which was a journal of opinion in the social sciences and philosophy, which I edited at Skidmore. So I kept up my interest and engagement in terms of writing and in terms of editing and serious policy.

Then, when I left school I wasn't quite sure what I was going to do in the big picture. But there was no question in my mind that I would be going on to graduate school. Again it was parenting and I guess ambition. It never occurred to me to not get my Masters. I wish in that respect that I had gone for my law degree. I always regret not getting a law degree but even going into graduate school. There were very few women at that point and even fewer in law school or my chosen field. My closest friend from college--the editor of the newspaper-- Janice did go on to law school at Penn and is now the chief judge of the Court of Appeals in Colorado. We used to joke that one day I would be in the White House, and she will be on the Supreme Court. Well, she did pretty damn well. She didn't get to the Supreme Court but she's had a terrific judicial career, she lives in Denver. We are still in close touch and I did get to work in the White House with the President. We talked about it as though it would be great and exciting, but how pie in the sky it was too. But I think that it was always in the back of my mind that I hoped one day to have the opportunity to work for a president and I think I thought that Robert Kennedy would be that president. That is the one thing about politics and elective office in general….even without the specific tragedy. You never know.

Q: Where did you go to graduate school?

SCHUKER: Well, in my senior year I decided having been at a girls college I wanted to get back into the coed world and also I wanted to be back in a city and a place of action. I don't know, in those days you didn't think about the West coast, it was sort of out there. My view was still very East coast and some of it was the Kennedy thing I think too. I wasn't interested in NYC either. I had never been to school in Boston at that point and

Nixon was president so….I had ever been to Boston at that point. I thought that would be great. I don't remember applying to Harvard. I'm not sure I thought that I would get into Harvard but I thought a lot about Fletcher and the intersection of foreign and domestic policy. I applied to Tufts and Fletcher was on the Tufts campus and tied to Harvard and had MIT professors as well. It had sort of the two hats—international diplomacy and public policy-- and I knew I can take a range of international courses but I will also get a degree in political science. Also, I was offered again—and hard to resist-- a full tuition scholarship for graduate school and that took care of just about everything. That was quite exciting and I was quite thrilled with that and needless to say my parents were very pleased so off I went to Tufts. I got very interested in Massachusetts politics too and, of course, Ted Kennedy was one of the senators, but I really pretty much kept to my books. I mean I was always a serious student but I was also crazy about a guy there, my first great love in graduate school and I focused my attention on campus pretty much.

Q: You were in grad school from when to when?

SCHUKER: From 1966 to 1967 for coursework. It was the year I got my masters coursework …I did everything but my thesis. I did my comps and all of that. Then while I was in graduate school, I had kept up my relationship with the Robert Kennedy office and all of that too. The summer of '66 pre grad school Janice and I went to Europe on our Eurail passes. We were fortunate to get to do the Europe thing. It was fabulous. I was really the first person in my family who really had that experience. My parents were very good to me and I had always worked in the summers in college as a counselor. We were not wealthy people but even so in those days relative to income it could be Europe on "$5 a day."

And I had a fabulous summer. It wasn't my first time on a plane but it was certainly my first time overseas and we just went everywhere it felt. A true adventure. We went to Paris and we went to Italy, Greece, England, Austria, Germany and Spain. I was, I mean that was the other thing, I was just twenty but I was out of school so that's a whole other piece of my life. I mean I was ahead of myself and sort of working and dating older guys. For example, while Bill Clinton is my age, I mean we are the same baby boomer year ,but he graduated two years after I did which is when most of my peers did graduate. So I sort of…some of my experiences were just a little bit different than those who are my exact age because they were still on campus. It was really when I was in graduate school that I got very engaged in sort of the marching and the anti-war rallies and all of that. Actually, I was going to say, excuse me for one second, actually some of it was in graduate school but also when I worked at the state legislature in '67, '78.

Q: I was just saying after…while you were at Tufts and take it that the movements had already started at Columbia and at Berkley hadn't particularly gotten to many of the other schools at that point.

SCHUKER: Right. At Skidmore we had a Vietnam teach-in when I was probably in my junior year and then into my senior year. Vietnam was more of an issue for me because my brother in law was over there, I would say civil rights were more of an issue on

campus over the years. In graduate school that year at Tufts it was still a fairly quiescent campus or at least in terms of my engagement or riots…. It was really the following year that for me I became really engaged.

Q: Were you engaged in any of the repercussions about the busing problem in Boston? Or was that later?

SCHUKER: That was when I was working at the legislature and Congress. And Louise Day Hicks was a firebrand on this issue, and she went to Congress…

Q: Hicks was the…

SCHUKER: Anti-busing.

Q: Anti-busing, I mean she came from the local area Southie, I guess she was…

SCHUKER: Yes, she was deep into the issue….the leader…

Q: The problem, of course, was that an awful lot of this social legislation was being administered by people who were untouched by the problem.

SCHUKER: Right.

Q: I mean it wasn't their kids who were getting impacted by the change in the student body.

SCHUKER: I think that is fair to say Stuart but I guess my instincts on this as they have been, I guess, in general on things have always been reflexively liberal—moving forward-- I had very little use for Louise Day Hicks and her racist attitudes which seemed to underlie her positions. I can't say that I didn't understand the busing concerns and I wasn't directly involved but she was attitudinally so distasteful as were many of her followers.

Q: Which legislature are we talking about?

SCHUKER: Massachusetts.

There were lots of compelling issues going on, that being one of the biggest. But, I don't remember being personally attentive to that beyond reading and talking about it as well as when I went to work in Congress in 1970.

Q: Well then you graduated in '67?

SCHUKER: '66 from college and '67 I finished my Masters course work but I didn't actually do my thesis for another year and a half because of things that I guess we will talk about.

Q: OK, well let's talk about them.

SCHUKER: OK, I had done my bachelor's degree thesis on the New York state legislature. It was called A Study in Legislative Opposition. Albany, the capital, was not far from Saratoga and I ended up spending time at the State House, researching and interviewing. They had this wonderful library. Stanley Steingut who I mentioned earlier to you was one of the legislative leaders then—very powerful. Bobby, his son, went to college with me, he was at Union. You know I had the opportunity to do some interviewing and access and all of that. I had the New York Robert Kennedy background and worked in New York politics so it was a thesis topic that made sense and it was interesting. Flash-forward I go to graduate school and I wanted to do something different and that of course had an international component. I got very, very interested in science policy …and where did that come from? The whole interplay of science and politics and public policy—I had read C.P. Snow and I just had started to read a lot about it. I don't know exactly what triggered this particular focus except that when I was in college I had done a paper on the Nassau Agreement. It was something Harold Macmillan, the British Prime Minister and John Kennedy had wrestled over regarding the issue of missiles, placement …anyway…I was taken with the political process and the interplay of seemingly disparate issues that of course aren't.

There was this issue of transfer of technology early on in the '60s and I got interested in the role of the science advisor who at that time of this issue was the first science advisor, Jerry Wiesner. Anyway, flash forward. I am going to graduate school and I decided that I want to do my Master's thesis in this area. Gene Skolnikoff from MIT who was teaching at Fletcher as well on international science policy and American foreign policy became my thesis advisor. I ended up doing my MA thesis on Law of the Sea and the development of NOAA (National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration), which was just coming into being.

So, that was my thesis and as a byproduct of that work I remember I was trying to figure out what I wanted to do next and I now have the injection of international in depth education. I still love politics, of course. There were a range of possible next steps at that time which would have meant different roads taken, and one of them was working with someone named Stephen Lorant who was a Lincoln scholar who I had met and I was a Lincoln-phile and he was about to do another book … But, we met in Harvard Square and HE talked to me about me helping him with his book. So that was one thing.

Then in the summer of '67, which was after graduate school, I worked here in Washington in a program that was a science and public policy program that was part of George Washington University. That was sort of a byproduct of my work with Skolikoff. I liked it and thought about Woods Hole or some oceanography connected work but I absolutely missed the politics. So, I realized when I finished that summer that I wanted to do something that had a political mantle to it and kept me in the action.

Also it was at a time that the idea of the Foreign Service interested me, but I didn't want to go abroad at that point and the mantra was that women were not getting very far in the Foreign Service at that point on their own or even as part of a couple.

Q: That is true.

SCHULKER: So one of the other things that appeared on the horizon was from a professor of mine who said, "I think you should look into this." It was a Ford Foundation Fellowship internship at the state legislature in Boston and it was only a year which gave me time to think. Because of my work at the legislature in New York I knew that there were three legislatures, four I think including Illinois– California, New York and Boston that were starting a pilot program for legislative staffing and they each had four interns, one woman, as usual at that time everything was one of this and one of that. I thought, "You know that may be fun to sort of work in the state legislature for a year in Boston right downtown on state issues." Anyway, I applied and I was chosen. So in September or October I guess it started, anyway whatever it started in the Fall I went off and worked in Boston at the state legislature and had moved to Cambridge with friends. I had been living at Tufts for the year I was in graduate school, you know it was just great and I was having a very good time.

I went and started to work at the legislature—one woman was chosen out of the four interns-- and then was very upset initially because the Senate President who was a Democrat and eventually ran for the governorship and lost, Maurice Donohue, assigned me to work with the Senate minority, John Parker, who was the Senate minority leader. I thought what am I doing working for these Republicans. Well, he was a marvelous guy and Bill Saltonstall was one of the 12 Republicans, the son of the senior Senator from Massachusetts. Massachusetts Republicans were a pretty liberal lot and it was a very interesting time and they treated me very well. I also could apply the lessons of my undergraduate thesis to be helpful, which was interesting. I think I did well. We had a very good group, the four of us, one of whom, Sam Vitale, has remained a very close friend of mine to this day. We both subsequently worked for Michael Harrington together and presidential candidates along the way. Another of the Ford fellows ran for and was the prosecutor in that infamous incident and trial in New Bedford, actually they made a movie out of it with Jodie Foster, the rape –*The Accused.*

Q: The rape…

SCHUKER: Yeah, Ron Pina. Ron was another one of the interns that year.

Q: The woman who was raped in a pool hall and none of the men interfered to stop it.

SCHUKER: Exactly and she was portrayed as sort of "trampy" and the defense used that but anyway she won the case. So it was an interesting group. As a woman I am often being "the first". We all were the first real staff there and again as you would ask me about when I was intern on the Hill, there was an intimacy at that time and people just sort of knew each other, called each other by their first names in terms of the senators, or

the members of congress or the members of the legislature. You know my life certainly had the good fortune of timing and great, supportive bosses and hopefully good work on my part. The Republicans then in Massachusetts were more liberal than most including the Governor, Frank Sargent. The attorney general was Elliott Richardson and Elliott Richardson also went on to do the Law of the Sea negotiations. Another coincidence.

But in the legislature at that time were Mike Dukakis, Michael Harrington, sort of a panoply of people who became friends and who clearly as time went on did other big things and you know had an effect on my life. I mean I first met John Kerry when he was coming back from Vietnam and when he first was going to run, you know after law school and then you know became I think a DA (Defense Attorney). But there were just a lot of people floating around Massachusetts then and, of course, I still did have my Kennedy "connections". The people who were working for Ted Kennedy were people I knew and so that relationship was maintained.

Q: Well Boston or Massachusetts politics have a certain aura of one, an awful lot of corruption. I mean going back I don't know how it was then but also very much tribal or as Tip O'Neill used to say, "All politics…

SCHUKER: is "local" right.

Q: And in a way did you sense this was different from the way you said of the New York legislature?

SCHUKER: Of course I worked in the Massachusetts legislature not in the New York legislature but I loved the people. I had a real affinity for the Irish of which there were many in the Massachusetts delegation. I liked the whole Boston scene and the politics. I feel that I learned more about politics and how to get things done and the tribal nature of it, the local nature of it, but with many honorable people. I feel very lucky with a lot of the people I personally worked with. There was a sort of a looseness amid the growing professionalism I guess but I never felt—and perhaps it was a certain naiveté on my part—but I mean I think Tip, who I got to know and worked with in Congress, is one of the most wonderful people I've ever known. I feel very grateful that I knew him, and did you know there are corners cut in politics? Yes. Do I feel that Tip O'Neill was an honorable man? Yes, I think that he provided a great service for this country, absolutely. Do I feel that he was a generous and good man who had the best interest of our country at heart? Absolutely. Do I think that he made some very crucial decisions about Vietnam and other issues at important times, Watergate? Absolutely. Was he highly partisan? Absolutely. And was he a person who nurtured women. Yes. But the interplay among people was just different.

I just feel that I ended up being around people who had a certain generosity of spirit or at least that's what I learned from a lot of them. You know I'm certainly a partisan person but I will tell you one of the great things-- and I didn't realize it at the time-- but it helped me in work later in my life including when I directed the New England Congressional Caucus that was a big bipartisan coalition. Having worked with John Parker, having done

my thesis on the role of the legislative opposition, I really stood in the other guy's shoes and it helped me a lot. When I was directing the New England Caucus on the Hill, I had great contacts with Congressman Silvio Conte, and the Republican crowd in New England and I think I developed a respect and an appreciation for bipartisan government and it's one of the things that I think is such a tragic loss today. A lot of it has to do with credibility, respect and integrity.

Q: Yeah, we are talking about extremely divided and rather vicious, I mean not rather but really…

SCHUKER: No, vicious.

Q: Just plain vicious division between the parties.

SCHUKER: I mean there is no talking.

Q: It is disturbing, damn disturbing.

SCHUKER: And not that Tip and the leadership were not partisan and I know that many Republicans felt not included. One of the great mistakes Democrats made was not to have ever built up anything on the outside but I think there was this view over many, many years that congress was sort of rightfully Democratic, Big D, and of course that is not the way things are. So there was this tremendous dependence on always having congress as sort of a Democratic base nationally and it's been very difficult over years with the Democrats to understand the transition to not being in power in congress much less in the White House. There have been years clearly when we like now when we don't have anything nationally and without any real infrastructure on the outside. But I do think that there was a, I don't know there was a fellowship, I feel like I sound like somebody who sort of always says, "Well, those good old days". But I think there was a fellowship.

Q: There's been a significant psychological or whatever attitude or change.

SCHUKER: And certainly on foreign policy I remember meeting as an RFK intern with Senator Fulbright. I mean these were towering, overarching figures who had strong views even if many of the southerners were still backward on civil rights issues…. but really did think about the country internationally and who overcame at least some aspect of petty partisanship and this was the era of the ERA fight (Equal Rights Amendment) that I grew up in and learned my politics. There was the liberal Democratic Study Group in Congress but there were those who were less liberal on the Democratic side, there were the Scoop Jacksons. There were the Members of Congress for Peace Through Law, There was the Wednesday Group, a Republican organization. I feel that I got a tremendous grounding in terms of how one staffs somebody and how to be credible. My internships had certainly helped me. I think I was chosen for the legislative job, the thesis I had done, and all of that. But it was a wonderful experience in the legislature and I was there as I said on this Ford Foundation Fellowship, which was supposed to be for a year and then Johnson ended up announcing he was not going to run and Robert Kennedy announced

for the presidency and that was April 1968. I think it was March 31st that, well it was late March that Johnson said no and Robert Kennedy announced. I got a call, like a lot of us did, as to whether I would be interested in helping with the campaign. I mean sure but I remember being conflicted about my responsibilities to the internship, which still had about three months left. But that was when Maurice Donahue and John Parker said to me, "Jill this is a once in a lifetime opportunity at this point, of course you go and do this." I've always been impressed that they understood the opportunity that a twenty-one year old had and, of course, it helped that Donahue, the senate president said to me, "You are great and whenever you want to come back, come back."

So I had this notion that I had a job waiting for me. A safety net.

Q: Let's talk about the campaign. What were you doing and what was the spirit and what would you say was the thrust of the campaign?

SCHUKER: Well, of course, you know and this was only a 84-85 day campaign. Short-lived. That, of course, is not what it started out being in terms of what was expected or hoped for. I think there was a certain naiveté on my part and I think probably on a lot of our parts that Bobby would or could be the candidate in November because there was obviously this strong political machine behind Hubert Humphrey and it was going to be a long shot but I think we were deeply engaged and enthusiastic and, of course, the whole year that I had been at the legislature at that point, I mean I think I was down on the Boston Common every few days for anti-war marches and Peter, Paul and Mary and the whole, I mean I was deeply at that point into the active anti-war movement and clearly McCarthy having announced before Johnson got out achieved a huge win psychologically in New Hampshire in the sense that McCarthy did so well and Johnson so poorly. Johnson pulled up stakes. He had done so much good domestically but he just was so tarred and tarnished with the Vietnam brush that no one really at that time was thinking about anything else in his presidency but Vietnam, certainly people my age weren't.

So, Bobby announced, I remember I was down in Washington and the headquarters was at 20th and L. NW, 2000 L. Street, it was a brand new building and there were very few big buildings in the west end of the city and of course now it's not far from where we are sitting right now in the thick of Washington life. We had the 5th, 6th, and 7th floors in a building that had nobody else in it at that time. We were the only occupants and I remember there were construction materials all around inside and out. I was living with somebody I had worked with as an intern, a woman named Barbara Coleman who was terrific and let me stay with her and who was working for Robert Kennedy when I was an intern and still was at that time. I know I was here a few days before April 4th. The senator was going out to, among other places, Indiana to campaign on the Wabash Cannonball and of course Martin Luther King was killed. I still get the chills.

Robert Kennedy was speaking to a big crowd in Indianapolis that night and he did not give his prepared speech. I mean it has been written up in books as well as sort of one of those moments of incredible candor and non-canned speech that had measurable impact

because he spoke to the crowd that night in Indianapolis, I was not there I was here, but he said-- and this is I think the first time he had ever said anything about his brother's murder publicly to the crowd after he announced King's death. He said, "My brother, I lost a family member, my brother was also killed by a white man." That was part of the tension of what was going on right then, the country was a tinderbox, because of civil rights issues and the war and then of course Martin Luther King's murder. Indianapolis had been the founding place of the Klan many, many, many years ago…

Q: Indiana was a hot—

SCHUKER: A hotbed and a conservative state and there was a lot of tension in the street but there was no riot in Indiana and a lot of it was attributed to Robert Kennedy's comments. He asked everybody to go home, to pray and all of that and Indianapolis was quiet, which was quite different from here in Washington, which is where I was. I remember from our office windows we could see U Street, 14th Street burning, which was in the heart of the then called Negro/Black area of the city. There was a curfew imposed here in Washington. I went with a reporter to that part of the city. I remember we had a white flag on our car and we had to have special permission. There was looting. There was a tank on the White House lawn, there was actually more I think more than one, there were soldiers with bayonets fixed on most corners certainly in Georgetown. I remember walking in Georgetown. Stores were boarded up everywhere.

Q: I remember seeing the 82nd Airborne.

SCHUKER: Yep.

Q: I mean there were paratroops…

SCHUKER: In the streets of Washington.

Q: On Wisconsin Avenue.

SCHUKER: Right. Wisconsin. And this went on for a good part of a week. It was a very sad and scary time, but the campaign went on. Of course Robert Kennedy went to the funeral. I can't remember if he spoke, I think he did speak at the funeral but there was this mule drawn wagon with the casket and the full funeral procession.

In any case the campaign went on.

My role in the campaign at that point, I was here in the headquarters on the 6th floor. I remember Ted Sorenson; the speech writers were on that floor, and what was called then the boiler room, the sort of war room, the political center for ballot counting in the primaries and beyond, press was on the 5th floor and the 7th floor was where the senator's office was and Ted Kennedy's office was, he had an office there and all of that.

What I was doing at that time was assembling groups called Citizens for Kennedy, farmers and policy officials and members of congress and the military and all of that and working with the Citizens for Kennedy group under Lou Oberdorfer who had been with RFK while he was Attorney General under JFK. I remember going with the Senator to PRIDE, which was run by Marion Barry and the key neighborhood organizing entity for assisting young Negroes and building up decimated neighborhoods.

Then I was asked to go to work on the political stuff, the various political issues in South Dakota whose primary was the same day as California. The significance of that primary wasn't only the electoral votes but to show that Kennedy could win—which he did-- in a rural, agricultural state which was not his long suit but also because it was in Hubert Humphrey and Gene McCarthy's backyards, so to speak. Hubert Humphrey had actually been born in South Dakota, in Huron and he of course was the Minnesota senator running along with Gene McCarthy and the idea that Robert Kennedy could make any kind of impact in this area was an important political and psychological victory. It turned out that the "outside" person who was running the RFK primary there was the person who was the head of the Democratic party in Massachusetts, Dave Harrison who was also a state legislator and a friend of mine. I mean there were all these interconnections throughout my life as I said and David was the one who particularly had said come out, we need you to be involved in a primary…I had never done that deeply before. So off I went and we did win, the Senator did win and of course it was a pyrrhic and hollow victory.

Q: Do you have any feeling for what turned people away from their favorite sons?

SCHUKER: Well, you know I think one could say that it was two senators from the same state sort of perhaps taking votes away from each other. I think more importantly though was George McGovern, while having been a good friend with Humphrey particularly, he nonetheless supported Bobby and George McGovern was a very popular South Dakota senator. During the JFK administration McGovern headed the Food for Peace program. Bobby Kennedy also had spent considerable time on the Indian reservations in the state and he was working very hard against the scourge of hunger in the state and in the country both in the South—Mississippi-- as well as on the reservations --Pine Ridge. Window Rock and others in South Dakota and he had built up a profile. He also was just a thrilling candidate. He did come to South Dakota. John Glenn, also a great hero from the Midwest, was a very close friend of Bobby Kennedy's and campaigned in South Dakota. Teddy came to South Dakota; there were a lot of big guns that were pulled into the state during those couple of weeks before the primary.

Now the other thing, I don't know if you want all of this, but the other thing that made both of those states particularly important wins, two big wins, was that Bobby Kennedy had just lost the primary in Oregon to Gene McCarthy which was about a week or two before the California and South Dakota primaries and it was very important psychologically and tactically as well as practically that he not lose. Oregon was viewed and still is viewed as a very independent minded state, etc. and so forth. So it was a very important win as we moved toward, remember this is June, the convention was going to be in August. If there was going to be an upset, every victory was important.

Anyway flash forward the night of the primary election a group of us in the particular room we were working out of and the senator called, we spoke to him and he was very excited that we were winning and it was clear that along with California things were looking great and he called to say how excited he was and pleased and thank you and all that and he said, "I will call you back. I'm going down to the Ambassador Hotel and when I get back I'll call so I can speak to the whole group there." This was just a small group, when I say small, maybe 25 of us but he was going to speak to all of the people gathered when he called back. So we went off. I remember in my hotel room a couple of us watching, including Dave Harrison who was the head of the campaign there, to watch the senator's speech. We were watching him speak from the podium at the Ambassador saying "on to Chicago" and he left through the kitchen to go back to his suite.

We get ready to go back down to arrange for the Senator's call in, just turning off the TV and we hear Jeff Smith who ended up working for McGovern for many years thereafter, a truly great guy, banging on the door and you know everyone was feeling good but drinking and Jeff had been drinking and he said, "Open the door, open the door, I've got to tell you something." We did, of course, and he said, "The senator's been shot." I remember David took him by…he said, "You are drunk Jeff, that's not funny." He repeated, "The senator's been shot." We quickly turned the TV back on and at that time they were saying of course that he was shot in the hip… all these conflicting reports…and then his head. And of course the pictures. Anyway clearly it was a horrible aftermath and I flew back to DC the next day…do you want to hear about all of this?

Q: Yeah, I think it is capturing a slice of history.

SCHUKER: OK, well I flew back to Washington and it was just so sad. So awful. I remember, I mean we were all just shell-shocked. I remember thinking -- I don't know—that the world seemed very quiet. Anyway, among other things I went on the funeral train and we were involved in making all kinds of arrangements quickly for the funeral. Invitations; and the funeral was at St. Patrick's and there was a train that many of us were on with the coffin of course and Ethel Kennedy and the family and huge numbers of luminaries as well as people like myself and, of course, people were just lining the tracks the whole way saluting and crying. It was quite an incredible experience. There is a book with all the visuals. Then the funeral itself and then, of course, the same thing back to DC. Actually, I think there was some tragedy that took place. I think somebody was hit by the train on the way back. I mean little pieces of history in the bigger picture that people don't remember. Then the burial at Arlington and you know John Kennedy's grave close by.

I mean the first time I ever came to Washington was in December of 1963 with my parents after John Kennedy was killed and we wanted to come, I wanted to pay my respects and go to Arlington. They very much wanted to come as well. The gravesite was, I remember, just a little wooden fence and hats of the different ranks of the service and guards and the eternal flame, of course, was there right away. I remember it was snowing, it was a very, very, very cold December but anyway so here was Robert

Kennedy. It was just awful. I think then the hardest thing in a way was stripping the headquarters. I have a poster at home that hung in Larry O'Brien's office that had the Tennyson quote on it, a handmade poster saying "My friends tis not too late to seek a newer world."

What happened after that I think I felt quite lost and didn't know what I was going to be doing. I was twenty-two. It felt like the world came to an end. But again, sort of weird serendipity, there was a memorial for the senator in South Dakota that I went to and, of course, McGovern was there and we reconnected and that was in July. He said, "How would you like to help me?" He sort of was picking up the pieces in many ways of so many shattered lives and was going to make a run for the nomination. We knew it was ill-fated but it kept the Kennedy people together at the convention and gave us a voice. He said, "Why don't you come to Chicago with me?" Well, so I went to the Chicago convention, which clearly was one of the happenings of political history in our lives at that time.

Q: At that point, were you seeing Humphrey as being the evil one or something? I mean I'm confused. I think Hubert Humphrey is one of the most remarkable people and he just got in the wrong place.

SCHUKER: Right, I think I always had, you know when I was an intern and Hubert Humphrey was one of the people who we met in '65, you know. I always thought he was a little jolly and old fashioned in his demeanor. I was young and he just didn't do it for me I guess, but I admired him and his history. I was not happy with his position on the war. I didn't view him as evil but he was certainly not my candidate. However, I really felt and I guess this was sort of part of the practical politics that I learned in the ways that I have already talked about. I mean time was importantly lost for Hubert Humphrey's candidacy because people like me weren't ready right after Robert Kennedy was killed to sort of re-engage right away with him. But, come the Fall while I was not an enthusiastic supporter, I certainly got engaged in the Humphrey campaign in Massachusetts and I remember when he spoke on the Boston Common and these were the times that people did this although I'm sure it still happens but I remember there were a whole group of people, young people like myself, who when Humphrey spoke turned their backs to him. I thought that was horrifying, just horrifying. I remember thinking this is so terrible that people would do this, if you don't want to go don't …I mean I never thought about undermining our fighting men and women, mostly men at that time, in terms of my views and my actions about the war. I know that many of them felt that people back here were not supportive. People who I would see occasionally making comments or gestures to people in uniform I just felt were horrifying but it happened, it happened. And of course Jane Fonda and Tom Hayden were symbols of it all.

Q: When we talk about the sixties … the influence of the youth movement and all that and to my mind the most significant thing the youth movement did was end up by electing Richard Nixon as president and made me rather suspicious about goals of groups. But wasn't there anyone, I mean you were all saying "Wait a minute let's look at this thing, let's get our act together and Nixon is the real problem. Humphrey is obviously

uncomfortable with the war and would do a lot better and he is right on or left of a whole series of things, his whole life speaks of that and he would be a very good president."

SCHUKER: Right. Well Stuart, you just said that you know, I do think I've talked a little bit about my own evolution and my ultimate support for Humphrey and working for him in the fall. What I think in terms of sort of the historic backdrop of that year though in '68 that was quite, if someone were out of the country in 1968 for that year or fell asleep for the year and came back this was a very different country between 1967 and 1969. Those who dominated the headlines were basically LBJ (Lyndon Baines Johnson), Humphrey, Robert Kennedy, Martin Luther King. All were gone after 1968 one way or another. Malcolm X was already gone. It was a very uprooting period and the war headlines crystallized because of the presidential elections.

It is interesting what you say, I think this is often a complaint, or a problem about young voters that they end up because of their own passion and focus and activism electing the person they didn't want to elect, a la Gore and Bush, through support of surrogate or third parties which drain votes from the main candidates as you know, because someone in this telegenic age may not be the most exciting campaigner or whatever else and so people stay home or they cast a dissident vote. I mean so many I know certainly were extremely upset with Ralph Nader in 2000. I mean here was somebody who has played a very significant role in our more modern culture including what he has done about calling attention to auto safety and yet he was a total spoiler in 2000. But he attracted enough votes that may indeed have made the difference in the election for Gore and yet achieved a certain degree of support among those who felt that it was a protest vote or whatever.

Well I think by the end of '68, although maybe it was too late and clearly it was too late because Nixon was elected, those of us who had supported other candidates, many who I knew came around and supported Humphrey, but a lot of damage had been done to Humphrey's candidacy. Having said that, if one could rewrite history, I don't know that I would have done anything different in terms of Robert Kennedy. I still would have supported him because that's where my passion was but do I think that Hubert Humphrey got a raw deal and do I think the country suffered because of it? I do. The pundits and pollsters said a few weeks more and Humphrey might have won.

Nixon was a very talented, smart, capable, almost visionary person in some ways and he certainly pushed open the doors to China and probably a Democrat and a liberal would not have been able to do that and brought the country along with him during that period he was President. But, he wreaked terrible damage on the American psyche and our political system, our trust in our system, our trust in the presidency and he was a very troubled man. But the country slogged through it and we had these incredible hearings, which did the job that they needed to do in my view, which was to…

Q: You are talking about the Watergate hearings?

SCHUKER: The Watergate hearings, which showed that there was a system that was able to deal with in an appropriate constitutional way someone who was doing real damage to

the body politic. But do I think the country suffered but you sort of pay your money you take your choice kind of thing.

Q: There was a lot of intolerance on both sides during the 60s. Tell me how did you view the events in Chicago?

SCHUKER: Well, I was not protesting in Grant Park, during the actual riots. I mean I was with McGovern at the Sheraton Blackstone and at the convention itself at the Stockyards. As far as what happened on the street, I thought the police were outrageous and when I got to Chicago, which was a few days before the convention began, you could sense the tension you really could. I remember thinking the city was tense, the police were tense, I was tense and expectations were negative. I mean the whole mood was negative. So I don't know that anybody would have predicted exactly what would have happened but I would say that there was a lot of tension. I was outraged and horrified about what was happening on the street and I can still smell the stink bombs today even at the Blackstone Hotel that was across from the Conrad Hilton. But I mean noise and smells were just everywhere. I did see people getting hit mostly from our window at the Blackstone which looked out on the park. I remember McGovern was horrified, was so upset. And I was on the convention floor itself when Ribicoff…

Q: He was a senator from Connecticut.

SCHUKER: Connecticut. When Teddy spoke, of course, about his brother and then when Ribicoff nominated George McGovern he said, "There are Gestapo tactics on the streets of Chicago." Daley, the father of the present mayor who was mayor then went ballistic, I mean you couldn't hear his words in response in the hall because of the noise but you could certainly see them mouthed on television and we all knew what he was saying. He basically yelled these obscenities at Ribicoff, I mean the hall was as tense as it could be and then I remember they started to play Battle Hymn of the Republic, which we all started to sing and then the mayor shut down the band. I mean it was a mess and I was there too when Dan Rather, not Dan Rather, when Mike Wallace I think it was Mike Wallace and maybe it was Dan Rather too…

Q: Yeah, Dan Rather…

SCHUKER: But it was when he had come to our office in the convention center and the police hauled him out]…. Witnesses to history on some of those things. And of course, at these conventions you end up with everybody looking for rooms and a million people are sleeping on the floor and every place else. Mary Jo Kopechne was my official roommate. I had known her from Robert Kennedy days and, of course, this was before, I mean this was just the year before Chappaquiddick. She was a lovely woman.

Q: She was somebody, she was in a car which…

SCHUKER: She died in the car that the senator was…Senator Ted Kennedy was driving.

Q: It essentially stopped…

SCHUKER: Stopped his presidential future.

Although my own view of that was that terrible accident probably saved his life. I think there is no question that there was somebody gunning for him too. So, my sense is that he has been able to reach the age he has--and putting aside that whole horrible tragedy at Chappaquiddick and questions about it in terms of his own life and actions, it probably saved him from assassination as a potential presidential candidate.

Q: There is something about the Kennedys. I mean you take Oswald and Sirhan Sirhan, there is no particular tie between them.

SCHUKER: And somebody clearly thought it would be their job to hurt the last brother. Ted Kennedy has been such a towering Senate figure with his excellent career in congress but in any case, Mary Jo 's death was a tragedy. She had been working in Robert Kennedy's office when I was an intern so I knew her and she, like many of us, was engaged in the McGovern effort. I would just add too that at the time of the convention the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia and that added to the awful drama….also if I remember correctly McCarthy never asserted any leadership with his supporters in Chicago. A failure.

Q: Well, after the 1968 elections and Nixon won, what did you do?

SCHUKER: I went back to Massachusetts, I worked on my master's thesis on Law of the Sea, which was an interesting sort of combination of science and policy and then in the spring of 1969 I returned to the Massachusetts State Legislature now as a full-fledged staff person and working for the senate president, no longer for the minority which I had been doing on my grant and spent the next year and a half there. One of the people I met while I was there and came to admire was Michael Harrington. Not the person who wrote Poverty in America Michael Harrington but a very intelligent liberal who was the first Democrat elected in 100 years since the Civil War in a special election in his district on the North Shore of Massachusetts.

Q: What district was he in?

SCHUKER: That was the 6th district, which is a very beautiful area of Massachusetts called the North Shore, which is Rockport, Gloucester, and Salem and Lynn and Beverly Farms and all of that. In any case Michael's longtime Republican predecessor Bill Bates had died in office. Mike came from a political family. His cousin was then the State Senate Majority leader, Kevin Harrington. Mike asked if I would be interested in working for him as a legislative assistant in Washington and in August of 1970 I moved to Washington.

I worked for him for the next two plus years although in 1972 I, during the primary and then into the campaign, I worked for George McGovern and then for Sargent Shriver who

was the vice presidential candidate on the Democratic ticket with McGovern after another sort of historic debacle had taken place that unlikely would ever happen again. The person who was McGovern's initial vice president running mate, Tom Eagleton, senator from Missouri, had ended up as it turned out, earlier in his life, with a diagnosis of depression and had been treated at one point with shock treatments. It was something McGovern had not known about and more careful vetting processes after this became de rigueur.. But, Eagleton did not survive the scrutiny and he was off the ticket and the person who subsequently went on the ticket was Shriver, the head of the Peace Corps and OEO (the Office of Economic Opportunity) , the first head of both of those during John Kennedy's administration, a Kennedy brother-in-law, and an ambassador to France.

It was, I think, viewed by some as a ticket that was destined to lose given the timing and the issues. It was a second run for Nixon. Nixon was rapping "peace is at hand" in Vietnam and one of the strange aspects of the campaign was that McGovern who was a much decorated World War II hero was branded by Nixon as a pacifist and the label stuck not unlike the swift-boating of John Kerry by the Republicans in 2004.

But, it was during 1972 early on in the campaign, during the early summer, that what was then seemingly a third rate burglary attempt, as it was called, turned into what was the Watergate Affair which ended up two years later leading to the total undoing of the Nixon presidency and his resignation from office.

Q: At the time when you were in the campaign did this thing raise any warnings?

SCHUKER: Warning signs? Well it did, I mean I remember and I don't remember it in the sense that there were no brightly flashing neon lights at the beginning of all of this… it was a hapless, seemingly a hapless, bungled burglary attempt although I think everyone initially thought it wasn't just that given the target was the Democratic National Committee Headquarters in the Watergate building. But the depth and reach was unanticipated in general. That the focus was not to steal jewelry or money or whatever seemed clear but it increasingly was exposed that the goal was to unearth campaign secrets or dirty tricks and to lay listening devices within the campaign headquarters. The dogged investigation especially by Woodward and Bernstein was a death knell, including their revealing that a cover-up of the crime went as far up as the President and White House staff. There were separate McGovern candidate headquarters but a lot was still done out of the Democratic committee itself in terms of campaign activities so as things often do the initial unraveling came because a lone security guard did his job…he ended up seeing tape on a door lock, took it off, found it back again on the door and called it into police headquarters as a concern about a burglary break-in and the rest is history.

Q: Did you during this campaign, did you or your colleagues feel you were up against all these dirty tricks or were you pulling dirty tricks, I mean what was the game at the time?

SCHUKER: Well, there was certainly a historic view that Nixon was not adverse to dirty tricks going back to the '50s and maybe even the late '40s when he would participate in

red-baiting in California regarding Helen Gahagan Douglas' candidacy. (She was married to actor Melvyn Douglas)

Q: And Jerry Voorhees.

SCHUKER: Jerry Voorhees.

Q: I remember my mother was a devotee of Jerry Voorhees.

SCHUKER: Nixon accused them of being reds and communists and all kinds of things without proof and Joe McCarthy-like waving around charges and numbers none of which ever amounted to much of anything. As I think I said in an earlier tape, I was certainly brought up in an Adlai Stevenson family and to not like Nixon or his politics. Nixon of course was on the Eisenhower ticket as vice presidential candidate in the '50s. I just remember my parents never ever, ever liking Nixon.

Anyway to your specific question it was certainly a deeply held belief and I would say almost a gospel truth that there was nothing honorable about Richard Nixon and there was a passion I think among Democrats not to see him reelected. During the campaign, however, heads wiser than mine and I say this because I think for many of us particularly when you are starting out in campaigns and very excited about the newness of it and the crowds and the anticipation and the excitement and this can happen to the candidates themselves-- you, can forget that you are in the eye of the storm. The sense of momentum and support is often false or certainly not enough to get you to the goalpost. It has to translate into votes or certainly enough votes. Certainly what happened I would say to that campaign is that as time went on, because the Watergate issue did not really take hold until after the campaign, it was a slow burn for a while and had very limited, if any, effect on the election itself in '72.

But there was a sense that McGovern was just not making the numbers or the impact or the inroads that he needed. Certainly that was the view among others who traveled on the campaign --people like Mark Shields who was one of the writers and political people who traveled on the plane with us and Mike Barnicle of Massachusetts. I mean I think there was, we all thought McGovern was great and were highly supportive but I think some of the older members or more seasoned members of the entourage thought this was going to be a big loss….although not as big as it was. Of course, as it turned out, we only won Massachusetts and the District of Columbia, which tended to be Democratic regardless. It is hard to tell if Romney runs in 2008 what might happen but Massachusetts has always been the most assured Democratic state nationally usually along with Rhode Island although not in 1972.

Q: Sort of to move ahead after the election which McGovern lost what happened to Jill?

SCHUKER: '72. I'm just going to go back one moment if I might during the time that I was working for…because it's relevant to what happens next.

When I was working for Michael Harrington some of those who were part of the New England delegation and the Massachusetts delegation most specifically were an interesting group…after the 74 election they were called the Watergate class. Anyway another Member who came into Congress was Father Robert Drinan, a Catholic priest. He was one of two priests in Congress then…the other from Wisconsin was Father Cornell both of whom ran for Congress while Pope John the XXIII was in the Vatican. They were "asked" by the next Pope to basically make a decision between public service and their religious duties as priests and both ended up leaving Congress. Anyway back to 1973..it was a period when New England was not particularly favorably looked upon by the Nixon administration because it was viewed as a liberal bastion., Massachusetts was the one state he had lost and his biggest electoral numbers certainly didn't come out of New England and there were a smattering of Republican House members. It was also at a time of the rise of the Sunbelt's clout, including Texas and California with larger numbers of congressional seats and more people moving to those states. And energy costs were a huge factor in New England.

Q: Florida being one of those.

SCHUKER: Florida another with more political clout, as we know as Congress shifts in terms of the House of Representatives based on numbers, gaining seats as opposed to losing seats. There was the view, which I may already have mentioned, that the biggest New England delegation from the six New England states was Massachusetts with then twelve members whereas Texas in and of itself had over I think twenty-five. It was a time of a lot of energy concerns as there are now. So there was a sense of being at the wrong end of the political spectrum at that point in terms of heft even though Congress was in Democratic hands. New England was not being positively dealt with in terms of attention and federal monies by the Nixon administration.

But there were a couple of very important sort of aces in the hole and perhaps the most important was Congressman Thomas P. O'Neill, Tip O'Neill, who was from Massachusetts. He actually had been the person who after John Kennedy had moved from the House to the Senate won Kennedy's seat and went on eventually to become Speaker of the House and is a very special human being. But during this period of time he was already the majority whip and then went on to become majority leader. But whip was a position in the Democratic Congress at that point of significance and weight. So, it was interesting to be working with a member of that particular delegation and Michael Harrington's father had been quite close to Mr. O'Neill so there were all those sort of old ties as well and Tip sort of looked after Mike who often pushed the envelope on policy matters even within the delegation…Michael was an iconoclast in many ways but Tip took Michael under his wing.

It was an interesting time those couple of years working for Mike, working for a freshman although an outspoken one. He was on the Armed Services committee and Les Aspin went on the Committee at the same time. In any case one of the important things which as a Member of Congress, Mike Harrington' focused on foreign policy and he became one of the most outspoken members in the House and in Congress about Chile

and about the eventual coup in which the United States was involved in against President Allende in favor of Pinochet. He was outspoken on everything including taking on the seniority system.

So back to mid'72, actually November of '72, after working for McGovern and subsequently Sarge that Fall and after having worked for Michael Harrington. Then with the campaign ending one of the conversations that had taken place even before the campaign, was this issue of New England and its clout within Congress. We had some conversations, the Members did and some of the staff about how we increase our muscle, power and our strength.

At that time there was one Congressional coalition on Capitol Hill--the Congressional Black Caucus, which through the years has become,--and more so since then-- quite powerful and prominent comprising all the African-American or black members of Congress and has grown in numbers over time. The thought was maybe we need a regional coalition basically to be a counter weight to Florida but even more specifically California and Texas. It seemed like a very interesting idea to explore, and we knew we had real clout with people like Tip and some other significant senior committee members, including among our Republican members some of whom were liberal and weren't necessarily in tune with Nixon. In any case, this was discussed and after the election particularly through Michael Harrington's push with the support of Tip and others, this became a reality. I was both interested in running such a new coalition and happily the delegation supported that and I was asked to be the first director.

In January of '73 the New England Congressional Caucus was born and for the next three years I headed it and we started an economic research office headed by Paul London which basically focused on issues relevant to the Sunbelt specifically on energy, as well as another big issue, transportation. The northeast corridor congressional interest basically created Amtrak and we worked with the New York delegation as well on some issues. The Nixon administration created an energy "czar" , the first being Frank Zarb, I forget, perhaps there was somebody before him. We basically would have various Nixon officials come to Caucus meetings. The concept of combining the six New England states, for example Vermont had two Senators and one member of Congress; New Hampshire had two members of Congress, Rhode Island had two members of Congress. These were small delegations Maine, Connecticut. Massachusetts, of course, had the most members. Altogether we had 25 "snowbelt" members working together as a counterweight to the sunbelt. And for the more rural New England members we worked on agricultural issues, for example, as well.

My bipartisan background in terms of having done a thesis in college on the legislative opposition and then having worked for the Massachusetts Republicans at the legislature really came to be extremely helpful in terms of I think understanding how to manage a bipartisan coalition which was unusual to say the least because even the Congressional Black Caucus was heavily Democratic of course.

So, I have been asked this question through the years and I would say there is good news and bad news about this caucus concept. I think the good news at the time was certainly that it provided some unity and clout. The bad news is that there are now 50+ caucuses on the Hill and some seem quite frivolous but it may not be silly to the people who are its members but there is a beer caucus for example, there is this caucus, there is a that caucus. You know there is not an issue around which members have not joined by either interest or ethnicity or gender like the Hispanic Caucus or the Women's Caucus or whatever else. I think there is an argument to be made that this is one of the other ways in which the Hill is fractionated. Maybe it is a good debate topic about whether this is good or bad for policy making and for legislation and whether there should be guidelines but it was a reality and it was something that this caucus sparked and then it became the Northeast Midwest coalition which is how it remains I think to this day. In the Midwest, the Rustbelt issues, combining again with the older northeast states--New England and also New York. Of course, New York had a sizable delegation and clout of its own.

So anyway it was a very interesting few years. Then…

Q: By the way, Watergate came at this time. I would assume that you treated it…you didn't touch this did you?

SCHUKER: No, Watergate happened in 1974 and happened in the sense that in August of '74 between '72, of course, and '74 the hearings were taking place in the Senate and then the House. The Ervin and then Rodino hearings, the president, President Nixon, resigned in August, August 9th or 10th of '74. Gerry Ford became president. Among other historic moments was that this was the first time certainly in modern history and I think in American history, that we ever had an unelected president because Gerry Ford had never run for the presidency. Spiro Agnew, among other scandals during this period had had to resign from office earlier, who was our vice president under Nixon, and Gerry Ford who was minority leader of the House became the vice president and then when Nixon resigned became president and, of course, had never run for president, never been elected by the American people and then lo and behold Nelson Rockefeller became vice president and he hadn't been elected. It was a quite extraordinary time to have a president and a vice president neither of whom had ever run for office nationally. And Tip and Gerry Ford had worked together of course as House leaders and Ford had respect for Congress.

Q: They had run for office.

SCHUKER: But not elected nationally.

Nelson Rockefeller, of course, had been a two-term governor in New York and Gerry Ford had run in a district in Michigan and was Minority Leader. But this changed the dynamic certainly somewhat on the Hill and all this laid the groundwork for a potential Democratic win in '76 which then became a reality with Jimmy Carter. But for New England Tip O'Neill had a good relationship-- he was by this time majority leader --and

had a good relationship with Gerry Ford so the dynamic started to change as well in terms of the congressional relationship with the White House.

By the time '76 came about when Jimmy Carter who was another unusual person and unusual candidate in the sense that he was viewed as a very progressive governor in Georgia but his background was as a peanut farmer, a successful one, and an engineer. He was diffident, not sort of a warm and fuzzy kind of personality in a sense but he was elected over Gerald Ford in 1976. Almost from the moment that the election began there were issues between Carter's people and the Hill and at this point Tip was to be the Speaker of the House and the person succeeding Carl Albert. There had been a bitter primary fight with Ted Kennedy and there was a lot of intra-party tension. Carter's people were young and brash and new and they were not particularly respectful of Congress in general and I would say found Tip O'Neill to be very old school and I think totally underestimated him and subsequently caused tremendous problems in congressional relations for the Carter administration all through the four years. There was very bad blood between Carter and O'Neill despite being in the same party.

I went into the Carter administration though with Tip's encouragement as did a lot of Dems who were waiting to join the executive branch after eight years of Republican rule. But I think that there was a really tremendous opportunity missed and a missed boat in terms of understanding the relationship that needed to be forged on the Hill by the Carter crowd and Carter suffered for it. He did very poorly, not only in terms of relationships but also in terms of getting legislation through. I do remember one of the more prominent aides to Carter who was working on congressional relations saying you know we want to build our own team, we don't need to have a relationship with the O'Neill people, etc., sort of old hat and passé and all of this. They just didn't get it. While there were certainly some very good people, those who were running the Carter operation just were anathema for Tip. Democratic loyalty trumped everything but it was quite ugly.

I very much wanted to have the opportunity to serve in the Executive Branch and I loved the idea of possibly doing something…at first I had thought about doing something in Congressional relations but it was very clear that they did not want anyone who had any association with Mr. O'Neill.

Q: Well this is…we are going through this right now with the Department of Defense where Rumsfeld has sort of pushed anybody who had any dealings with Arab affairs aside because "they" knew best. This arrogance always ends up badly for the people who have it, the idea of getting rid of the experts because we know better.

SCHUKER: Yeah and it wastes a lot of the time of the American people basically and usually they… we …are the ones who suffer. But what fortuitously happened for me was that I reconnected right around the inaugural period with someone I did not know well but who I had known from previous political life and someone for whom I had a lot of respect because he was an avid civil rights person who had been very brave as his paper had been faced with a lot of pressure and his family threatened from the time he was a kid from the Ku Klux Klan and others of the same ilk in Mississippi, The Greenbelt

Democrat Times and Hodding Carter was much admired over the years. His father had won the Pulitzer Prize for speaking out at a time that it was tremendously unpopular to do so on behalf of civil rights. Hodding was brought in by Cyrus Vance, who was to be the secretary of state, as his spokesman. Hodding basically said to me would you be interested in working with me and I was thrilled at the idea of being at the State Department and back in the international realm and having the opportunity to work for him and for Cyprus Vance for whom I had a lot of respect as one of the major historical Democratic foreign policy advisors and leaders of the '60s into the '70s. So I segued into the Carter administration initially as special assistant to Hodding.

Q: OK, today is the 23rd of June 2006. Jill, you were with the State Department in public affairs from when to when?

SCHUKER: From 1977-- from the beginning of the administration probably February or March-- until November of '79 when I went to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in New York.

Q: OK, when you got in early on what was your impression? Usually when a new administration comes in and the files are gone, it's a real learning experience. How did you find this?

SCHUKER: Well it was very much of a new day in the sense that there had been 8 years of Republican control of the White House--Nixon and Ford, The tone was set quite quickly that this was a different sort of president and a different sort of presidency in the of way foreign policy was conducted. I think most specifically, the signature issue that in some ways at that initial period was viewed as "frivolous" rather than a core, realpolitik issue was human rights as a front and center, crucial foreign policy issue. Under President Carter there was a new assistant secretary position created and filled by a friend and colleague of his from civil rights days, Patricia Derian. It wasn't terribly typical to have women assistant secretaries either at that point although there certainly had been some but Pat was very outspoken. She made her mark and some enemies one would say both internally within the department and within the foreign policy community externally. She very much brought with her the view, and had the president's imprimatur in a strong sense behind her, that human rights needed to be an essential consideration of foreign policy decision making.

It was during this period that there were a range of issues, trade issues, particularly with Russia and elsewhere where the whole issue of whether human rights should be a major foreign policy consideration. This became very controversial. One of the people, for example, who fought a number of battles on this and where it fit into our foreign policy was Dick Holbrooke who has I guess one would say, out distanced Pat in terms of his personal footprint on foreign policy front and center over these many years. Some of the conflicts were basic personality differences. But what is interesting is that human rights as an issue as opposed to as a personality battle, has become totally interwoven into the U.S. foreign policy agenda and mantra and sometimes is not only important but dominant in terms of our overseas relationships.

Q: Well at that time, correct me if I am wrong, Hodding Carter and Pat Derian were romantically involved and they eventually got married. Did this affect the workplace?

SCHUKER: I would certainly say at a strong personal level, clearly they were simpatico in terms of the personal commitment to the human rights agenda level which clearly Hodding and Pat had and which the President introduced. Hodding Carter and Pat also were activist southerners from Mississippi, Hodding was a very strong, forceful and active advocate both as a publisher of a very forward looking paper in the Mississippi Delta but also as one of the people who as early as 1968 had supported politically and actively the Mississippi Freedom delegation at the Democratic convention. So Hodding was certainly on track in terms of civil rights, and human rights issues for many years. However you know that where the rubber meets the road is how you deal with policy and Hodding's Department responsibilities were different than Pat's and his responsibilities were as spokesman for Cyrus Vance and the State Department and Administration policy which he obviously took very seriously. While human rights were deeply embedded and ingrained within the administration there were certainly times that publicly Hodding did not necessarily reflect Pat's particular views on her portfolio. She had her portfolio and Dick Holbrooke as assistant secretary for Asia had his as others did too and they were not necessarily human rights driven.

Q: I know I was consul general in Seoul at the time and we were very concerned about talking about human rights and we saw that the North Koreans had I don't know thirty divisions within 50 miles of us. We didn't want anything to destabilize the place; I mean this was very nerve-racking.

SCHUKER: Right and Dick Holbrooke had some very firm views reflecting what you just said Stuart, and the president certainly supported his policy point of view on some key things. I mean it was not an either or but I would say the human rights issue constituted a sea change in foreign policy deliberation and decision making. It has become an institutionalized factor and part of the state department decision-making machinery and toolbox.

Q: How did Hodding Carter…how would you describe his relations with the press and did that change over a period of time?

SCHUKER: And I think this is said with some ability to stand back but I think Hodding would sort of go down as one of the most effective spokesmen that the department has ever had to date. Number one, he is extremely smart and has insight and understanding of foreign policy and journalism. Two, crucial to doing his role with credibility he had a very strong relationship with Cy Vance, the secretary of state and he had a relationship with the president and a good, trusting relationship with Jody Powell who was then the White House press secretary. He also got along well and respectfully with his State Department colleagues…although over time after the Administration ended he and Dick Holbrooke did have a falling out that lasted.

Third, he had and has a wonderful personality. I think Mike McCurry, for example, White House spokesman under Clinton was one of the most effective in that position. They are both Princeton men for whatever that may mean or not mean, both had the ability to be both firm and be respected but also have an ease of language and articulation, and win the respect of the press corps because they knew that they could be trusted. But also there is a good give and take and we've seen cases where that has not been the case. I would say Hodding got very high marks in that regard.

Fourthly, he also was there at a very important transition in the press to government relationship, most specifically in regard to the State Department. What I mean by that is that for the first two years of the Carter presidency beginning in '77 newspapers were dominant. Television was extremely important as well but no cameras were permitted in the briefing room. Therefore you had the Marvin Kalbs and the Ted Koppels-- Ted was then at ABC-- and others who had very important relationships with their news bureaus and got a lot of airtime but they were barred from filming the briefings. And as we all know when you let cameras into any situation-- the courtroom or wherever else, it creates a different kind of atmosphere.

However, in 1979 when our Iran embassy was taken over the first weekend in November of '79 two things happened in terms of the structural functioning of the government vis-à-vis the media. One, President Carter was going to be running for a second term in the next year's election and there was a strategy that was put into place basically that the bad news which it turned out kept coming for a lot longer than we were initially anticipating regarding the takeover of the embassy and the holding of the hostages; the day-to-day news was planned to come out of the State Department not out of the White House in an attempt to provide distance and even perhaps as needed, deniability. In other words there was an attempt to protect the president and the White House from the daily dishing of bad news-- the hostages were being held for yet another day or negotiations were not going well or whatever else.

So, Hodding's briefing became even more important every day and there was a firm time set daily for the press briefing. So the request came from a number of television reporters at that time to allow cameras into the briefing room and that indeed happened. This wasn't the first request but the situation and timing made it possible if not necessary. That was when Ted Koppel began his intensive ABC reporting called <u>America Held Hostage</u>, which grew into <u>Nightline</u> and remains <u>Nightline</u> to this day although right now without Koppel. But for twenty years Ted…that is the genesis of the <u>Nightline</u> program and the genesis of cameras in the briefing room. It became as it is now and, of course, this was still pre-cable and all that, but it became at that time essential news coverage, and subsequently, of course, the whole briefing is now televised.

Q: What was your piece of the action?

SCHUKER: My piece of the action initially was as special assistant to Hodding, which was sort of a little bit of everything he was responsible for. It segued into being a deputy spokesman (spokeswoman was not the terminology) at the State Department and I

believe I was the first woman to brief at State on a more or less regular basis. So this is now going back into the mid to late 1970s and I briefed as the other deputy briefers briefed on whatever the issues were. There was a particular issue that was the first time I briefed that I had been following in meetings about a deorbiting Soviet satellite that seemed to be falling directly into the United States and the question was where and what damage might be possible. I was very interested in science policy. This was one of the reasons I had been involved in tracking this issue and the question was how much do we tell the public, when and where might this satellite fall, the time of day and do people need to be evacuated, etc. As it turned out, it thankfully crashed in the Northwest Territories in a sparse location.

But, another big issue, gripping attention and in which I was –I tended to focus on certain specific issues that seemed to need more attention and had an element of uncertainty and longevity-- was a guy by the name of Bob Jones in Guyana. There were a number of Americans…

Q: A number of them? By God there were about 900 or…?

SCHUKER: I'm not remembering the exact number but it was a very substantial number of Americans and has coined the expression of taking Kool-Aid ,,,meaning believing something even though one knows it is untrue or can kill you. These Jones followers were basically slaughtered through a lethal mix of…this was a church cult called The People's Temple out of California that had settled in Guyana supposedly billed as a sort of a self-sustaining Eden like community. It didn't quite turn out that way. Then there was a member of Congress who had gone there to investigate the group, Leo Ryan, who was killed and subsequently, these hundreds of people were basically killed by Bob Jones. Mind control and all that. Anyway that happened on Carter's watch and I was the information liaison on that issue regarding what was happening on a day-to-day basis.

Particularly I was quite involved in the Panama Canal treaties issue and I traveled with our two special ambassadors Sol Linowitz and Ellsworth Bunker, both of whom are now deceased but were responsible for negotiating a new treaty with Panama that would in essence turn the Canal over to the Panamanians. It was an extremely controversial issue. Ronald Reagan actually ran on that issue prominently in 1980 and it was a very front and center foreign policy issue for when he basically said that Carter should not have given up our rights to the Canal in terms of turning it over to the Panamanians and this was part of his weak, sold out foreign policy. The Carter decision has proven to be extremely important and correct in terms of our relationship with Panama and our neighbors to the south but at the time it was very controversial.

Q: Well it got it off the table. We had been there as an irritant for so long.

SCHUKER: Exactly.

Q: And actually there hasn't been any real change in the practical use of the Canal.

SCHUKER: No, I was going to say it was never going to change in a very basic way. We had very established rights, I was in Panama for the signing with General Torrijos and with the president. I spent a lot of time on that issue—press and communications; we had a Task Force, and I focused on the press and communications work and did a lot of traveling, with the ambassadors across the country especially to swing states..

Q: How did you find…I mean you were in the fire on this thing because this was a major issue. I mean sometimes essential obscure issues become major political ones where both sides feel that they got a winner here or they can embarrass the other side or something and here you are an apparatchik dealing with this. How did you find this?

SCHUKER: Well, I guess I would answer in a couple of ways. One is that I think the issue was seminal to the success of the administration. It was also prior to the hostage taking in Iran so at the time it was a tremendous focus for President Carter and the administration and a win, like NAFTA was for President Clinton. So it was very exciting to be in the middle of it and as a political appointee I was working directly with those who negotiated the treaty and was in the thick of the political and policy battle. It was a very important public information and education and awareness effort and campaign. We didn't know that Reagan was going to be the nominee at that point but it was very much a political battle between the Republican and the Democratic party and between the Carter administration and those who were opposing this issue. It certainly seemed to me substantively that it was a very essential next step for the United States to take in its relationship with Latin America. And of course it needed Senate approval.

Q: How would you characterize the opposition?

SCHUKER: Vigorous and vocal and with a take no prisoners approach. It was tough slogging on the Hill although I wasn't directly involved on the Hill but it was very, very important to get the votes. I mean this was not an easy victory in the Senate and with the public. It was a very controversial issue for Carter to take on and it required and took a lot of people hours, diplomatically and in the trenches. There was a lot of need to play some very smart politics and some luck and a lot of influencing was needed on this issue, a lot of political capital. Public education really was a very important part of it because Americans had sort of assumed the Panama Canal was our canal, end of story. It was part of the historic litany going back to Monroe with the Caribbean being an "American lake" and all of that. So it was in a certain sense while an important and I think correct decision it also was a brave one on President Carter's part to spend a lot of political capital on this fight.

Q: Did you get out and address people and that sort of thing?

SCHUKER: Yes.

Q: How did you find audiences when they came?

SCHUKER: Curious and concerned. Skeptical. Americans aren't tremendously well versed in foreign policy in general but are always concerned about giving something up. You know or at least as it was being portrayed by the opposition and the opposition certainly portrayed it as we were going to lose our rights and that we were not going to be able to have access, that we were going to be in the thrall of one particular country and someone viewed as a somewhat authoritarian leader at that point, General Omar Torrijos, and you know that this would be problematic for the future of the United States for shipping, for business as well as importantly for our defense interests. But absolutely not one of those things turned out to be true, not one. It has been about as smooth a handover and joint operation as possible and we have had very effective ambassadors.

One of the people who were extremely involved in this issue with Linowitz and Bunker was Ambler Moss who ended up eventually running the North South Center in Florida, a career foreign service office with great political instincts and was appointed ambassador by Carter toward the end of the administration and was kept on by Reagan during his presidency. So I think Reagan played a political card, I think in essence he lost the battle and won the war. I mean he became president not because of that issue alone, I think principally that was about Iran and the hostage issue at that time and other issues but it worked to Reagan's benefit after all and added to his portrayal of Carter as snookered. Reagan also had a very user friendly personality juxtaposed to Carter and people were used to his face from his acting days.

Q: What was your reaction viewing sort of up close the press corps dealing with the State Department?

SCHUKER: The press corps at that time was an extremely sophisticated press corps. It was a very dedicated press corps in the sense that you did not have a lot of turn over. Stuart, you and I are sitting in my office now and behind you is a picture actually of me briefing and there are I think some of the faces that you see in that press corps, Jim Anderson, who was with UPI (United Press International) and still covering State up to the last few years. Barry Schweid, who covered it then, covered it before, is still covering it now for AP (Associated Press). There is a little bit of a sense of clientitis perhaps that sets in but I would like to see more people understand foreign policy with the sophistication and the interest of the State Department press corps. I mean we certainly were peppered with constant questions so I don't think there was a real clientitis at all—which often happens on campaigns actually. Others such as Marvin and Bernie Kalb, NBC and then CBS , I mentioned ABC's Ted Koppel, Bernie Gwertzman, *The NewYork Times,* Don Oberdorfer, *The Washington Post,* and many others. I mean these are people who have gone on to write books, to teach and to teach not just on the media side of issues but on the substance of foreign policy. They are solid foreign policy analysts.

It was a very, very good press corps and certainly I would say when you got up in front of them to brief you better know your issues. It wasn't just, and again it's always a reminder with briefing at State you are not just speaking to the press corps in the room you are speaking to press corps around the world, to officials around the world, to heads of state as well as to your own president and secretary of state and others and the public. The

briefing was fed into State Department offices and other Departments and the White House LIVE. Before we briefed we always got a range of policy guidances. There were certainly issues which we were not prepared for and sometimes took the questions for later, timely response even if the answers sometimes seemed unresponsive, and sometimes you would respond on the spot but we always met with the secretary of state or the deputy secretary of state before we went out to brief. Briefings were printed; follow-up answers posted.

Q: How did you find…you know when you are up there answering questions and then all of a sudden there is a dispute between Paraguay and Brazil or something and this requires obviously ARA (Latin American Bureau) and the desk to present you with answers, how did you find, did you find this a pretty good system or were you kind of left dangling a lot of times?

SCHUKER: No, we weren't left dangling—at least to the extent possible , I think in my own view very much of the time and yes, I don't know how the system works now but I think we got very good support from the bureaus and for all intents and purposes timely support. I mean it was a very intense morning, you had to be in quite early and you would get a sense of what the issues were going to be, read press clips, the papers and cables. There was a lot of subtlety at times that could be frustrating, however. There was an early morning meeting generally with the secretary to get an up to date take on what was the overnight news and all of that. But generally there were, I think, very good responses and responsiveness. There were certainly issues sometimes that were not, there wasn't a consensus in terms of the judgment and sometimes we would either respond on those with an interim response. The press corps could be unsatisfied. Hodding especially was a quick study that the press appreciated.

SCHUKER: We sometimes would take the question meaning that we didn't have an immediate response to it. We would post some things after the briefing or we would give some fairly benign interim response. Meaning the media could feel frustrated. There were certain policy mantras that went on forever. It seemed for example about the Palestinians at that time, I think it was resolutions 338 and 441 or 442, which tended to be our day-in and day-out response on settlement policy. That doesn't mean the press corps wouldn't ask about it but day-in, day-out response about our official view of the Palestinian state or relationship to the PLO or whatever. Clearly, many of these things, not just on the substance but sort of the approach the view has changed over time because news cycles now are so different. Also, the press always hopes for a different response and that is news. Often at the beginning of press briefings there would be announcements which often shaped the rest of the briefing---something the President wanted announced from State.

At that time news cycles were…they really were cycles and now everything's 24/7 I mean cable did not exist at that time. Initially we did not have cameras in the briefing room. There were down periods and there were certain periods, which we would say, were down periods. But now news is breaking every moment and there is no such thing

as anything but a 24/7-news cycle. In campaigns we would put a "lid" on which meant no news until the lid was lifted. Impossible now.

Q: Did you find, I know here within the State Department and I suspect throughout Washington everybody picks up the New York Times and the Washington Post and kind of what's on the front page pretty well dominates the conversation. Did you find they kind of led the way?

SCHUKER: Yes, very much so. I mean The New York Times and The Washington Post and I think there was no question that print press as I said earlier, dominated the news direction at that time. The three networks, actually Fox didn't exist, the three, it seems so far back now to even say that but ABC, CBS and NBC were the dominant news channels and very important and very critical but print press was key. Sometimes though there would be a question out of left-field based on some "secret" source. That always made it interesting.

On the comment that you just made and I don't know if you are Stuart, but I am an avid newspaper reader still and I tend to read the two papers, of course, that you mentioned plus the Wall Street Journal plus in these days The Financial Times and The International Herald Tribune. Now the print press, the Times, the Post and the Wall Street Journal, particularly the first two, still dominate on foreign policy news in print.

In terms of conversation at least still in Washington cable has definitely entered into the picture in huge ways, even more so now than the networks. But, the importance of newspapers I think and I view it sadly has diminished around the country in ways that people now get their news much, much more from television. It dominates or steers the direction of coverage. I think among what one calls influentials in Washington the print press is still extremely important for op eds, etc. but people get their news in much smaller bites now from television and very often those bites have no real gravitas or background behind them. The quick view from a moving train as opposed to the whole picture. It induces a certain laziness among the public I think. Not that there aren't good television journalists of course.

Q: Well would you find yourself, going back to when you were doing this, sitting down with a correspondent from one of the major newspapers or from television and all and giving pretty frank briefings, something that you couldn't do when you were standing up in front and being the spokesperson?

SCHUKER: Yes, no question about it and Hodding particularly as the key spokesperson and his deputy was someone named John Trattner at one point and Tom Reston both of whom were the chief deputies at various times and another career professional, Ken Brown.

Q: I have to say I've done Tom Reston and Ken Brown is the president of our organization.

SCHUKER: Right, Ken is…both of them are terrific and good friends and John Trattner would be interesting for you because he also subsequently worked for Warren Christopher. But on this issue the backgrounders as we called them then were very important. Hodding would spend a lot of time talking either individually or as a group to the press corps on background or on deep background, or even off the record and off the podium in terms of not being on a live mike. Very often at the end of a briefing there was sort of a gaggle of people that would come up when the microphone was off for some generalized conversations, where some of the blanks were filled in that official "on the record "comment would not allow.

And of course we would arrange things with Vance as well for him.

Q: What about foreign correspondents? Did they get much time or…?

SCHUKER: Foreign correspondents were certainly at the briefings. and I think Hodding made a real effort with foreign correspondents but the focus was on the U.S. press corps. I think that's fair to say and there, of course, was also a press corps relationship at the National Security Council as I found out more when I was there in the Clinton administration, up close and personal. But, there were times when different views were expressed on foreign policy within the administration because Cy Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski who was then the National Security adviser did not always see eye-to-eye. The National Security Council had its own press person, Jerry Schecter, a good friend to this day and Jerry didn't do briefings per se but he certainly did backgrounders and was a press source. We would have a conference call every morning with Jody, Jerry, Hodding, myself and others at State and the Pentagon usually but sort of the main players on the phone again prior to the briefing to sort of hopefully appear to be on the same page when people went out to speak because, of course, Jody did a daily White House briefing as well.

Q: Were there any moments that you wish you hadn't, I mean, when you are up there talking away, just to get a feel.

SCHUKER: Yeah, I remember I mean I particularly remember once I was ready to go out to brief and I just, it was as though just everything went blank. I mean I just couldn't remember a thing. It was really scary and we delayed the briefing by about 20 minutes. It was really a weird sensation. I was crying and I didn't know what had happened to my head. I don't remember what triggered it or what the specific issue was or particularly why it happened or whatever but I do definitely remember that it happened.

Q: You're too young but we call that a senior moment.

SCHUKER: A senior moment but it was a long senior moment although thankfully it passed. Then there were certainly times I remember—once it was something about Taiwan and some plane sale. I think I had made some comment and I misspoke and I remember as I was out there talking about other issues I kept saying I've got to get back to that issue and correct what I've said. We do have our briefing books too of course.

So you do have the sense that you're not necessarily thinking that the world is going to rise and fall on what you say but that you really need to be clear, articulate, truthful, accurate and careful because people of importance are listening and what you say can make a difference in terms of how they will act particularly if something is not clarified. We would post corrections after briefings or perhaps updates.

Q: Did you find, again we are going back to that era that things change but you give a briefing and you realize I've already spoken on this and you say I would like to put this in the correct form. Did you find that the media people would accept this?

SCHUKER: Sometimes. Sometimes they would give you a hard time. I think that in more recent times particularly when television cameras are on, we can see that there are spokesmen who have a very tough time with the press and are less effective because of it. Sometimes because they've been told or directed to say something that seemingly on the face of it is simply not born out by truth. I mean we saw it sort of maximally, I'm sure it will haunt Secretary Colin Powell forever regarding Iraq. I mean internationally who wasn't watching when he spoke at the UN. I mean those words are immortalized—slam dunk.. But, I think as we saw with Scott McClellan.

Scott McClellan, he had a very tough time with the White House press corps. The truth is he was there at a very tough time but he really had a difficult, not a great relationship…

Q: He was the president's spokesman…

SCHUKER: Spokesman at the White House. He never quit I think.

Q: He wasn't comfortable.

SCHUKER: You didn't have the feeling that he was. Now, the present spokesman is sort of one of their own and I think that they do like that but on the other hand I think his personality is such that he just is a more user friendly kind of guy for the press. It does make a difference giving the press a comfort zone.

I think Hodding was very special in that sense.

Q: It was early days for women to be up there. Were there some of these crusty old newsmen giving you a rough time? Did you find any rough ones?

SCHUKER: Yeah, I think that because I was young, and I was at that time just a little over 30, I was in my early thirties, I was very concerned and aware of being quite professional when I was up there. I think even to what I wore and all of that I remember and I still do like hoop earrings but I wouldn't wear them when I briefed because it just looked too casual I thought.

So, I think I was given a little slack by the press corps because I was new at it and I think they really tried with anybody who was new and perhaps was given a little bit more latitude initially because I was a woman. I'm trying to remember if there were any women, maybe one or two, Karen House at times was there, Diane Sawyer at times eventually was there but there were very, very few women covering foreign policy. So you basically were facing an all-male audience. I did not start briefing the minute the administration began. I had gotten to know some of the reporters and I think that certainly helped and Hodding didn't unleash me in a sense until I think he felt I was ready to do it.

Q: As a Foreign Service officer I've always been very leery of the press because I'm not sure, most of us aren't used to the give and take and if your name appears on the front-page of the paper you're in trouble. I had one brush with this and I spent a long, very difficult time I felt, mostly internal. But did you find that getting the State Department's people beyond the public affairs side to respond to the press, was it difficult?

SCHUKER: At times it was. There were certainly some who were more comfortable with it than others, some who were more comfortable with their portfolio or more comfortable publicly. Some of them had better press people they were working with in their own bureaus and that helped a lot, but it certainly varied. I would say that one of the most difficult things, I've been the press secretary to a governor and at State and elsewhere,

I think one of the most difficult juxtapositions is the following: everybody thinks they can do press. I mean I've never met somebody who doesn't say I could have said that better; I could have written that better, I think I would have said it that way. You are constantly second guessed and yet it is usually to a person, these people who never would want to get up and do the job, they love Monday morning quarterbacking but heaven forbid they have to say something directly and that's the other piece.

What's very difficult is that every morning when you are doing press, even if you are not a spokesperson in the sense that there is a story in the paper --if a story is good or a story isn't good, or the governor likes the story or the secretary likes the story or doesn't, it's always the same. If it's good, usually the person at the top of the food chain takes the credit for it because of the policy or how they articulated it or what they told you to say. If it's bad you screwed up. So I would say, which I can't say has always been the case with me, but you really do need a strong ego –and a sense of perspective and humor--because every day you are on the line. There isn't one day that as a press secretary your head isn't on a potential chopping block for either how a story is played or how it isn't played. Why is it in the paper or why isn't it in the paper? For your advice, for how you said it? So it's a very vulnerable job and I think it is a very difficult job. You can get tremendous visibility, as we know people have gone on to fame, fortune and you know whatever. I mean George Stephanopoulos, who wasn't a spokesman per se but there are people who have certainly found their way to both sides of the podium. And of course there are increasing numbers of pundits. It is just not an easy job and I really think including someone like Scott who had his problems. To get up there every day isn't easy. You are pounded to a pulp by people who expect you to be the person that has or should

have information they want or they don't like the information they are getting or they are convinced that you are not telling them the information or don't know and should. But it is exciting too.

One of the people who was a spokesman at the White House and I think the NSC during Reagan and who left very quickly is an old friend of mine named Les Janka. Les was very smart, a very capable guy. Les was not told about the invasion of Grenada and he basically had briefed some press people from the podium, I think-- I'm not remembering exactly but I think it may have been even the day before the invasion, the U.S. invasion of Grenada, and told them that nothing was going to happen and nothing was in the works and all of that. He really felt betrayed and lied to and resigned within twenty-four hours.

Now not everybody has done that. I mean a lot of people bite the bullet and take on the mantle of being the bad guy but I think that he felt that had he been told he would have been in a position to make his own decision or recommendation about how he would handle the issue and how he thought it would be best for the administration and how best to advise them. But he basically was kept in the dark and you can't be an effective spokesman and be kept in the dark. You've got to know what the issue is because at some point the press will say you have no access; they can't trust you for information. They are not sure what you know and what you don't know and information is power.

Q: I take it when all is said and done in your experience is that you have to have the right kind of personality to—essentially you liked it or loved it?

SCHUKER: Essentially I liked it. I liked parts of it better than other parts. I feel at this point in my life and my career I'm a lot more comfortable than I think I was then. I've learned a lot….more of a veteran! I guess this isn't surprising. Twenty years ago when I first started it was very exciting. The interim the middle part of it was I knew how perilous it could be and particularly on foreign policy, at least I felt that one had a great responsibility of being very careful about what one said because it could have really serious implications in terms of national security, what you said and what you didn't say. That's like walking on the edge of a tightrope or whatever, it is exciting and edgy but it's very difficult, it's not something that you want to do forever. It is wearing.

Q: Would you sometimes get a question out of left field from say the Romanian reporter who would ask you something about Romania which you had no idea but this is a major issue in Romania?

SCHUKER: Yes and often with due respect, sometimes there would be sort of a twitter in the briefing room like oh, for heaven's sake, how is she supposed to know that or he's supposed to know that and we generally take the question and get an answer. But, for example, there was someone—an American—who was accredited to the press corps who basically represented Lyndon La Rouche…a couple of people actually, one a woman….

Q: Lyndon La Rouche is?

SCHUKER: Lyndon La Rouche actually has run for president of the United States numerous times. Some would say far left wing, some would say far right wing. But he is a conspiracy movement theorist about the United States government and is convinced basically that the Queen of England and the Trilateral Commission, Rockefeller, et cetera are behind everything bad and sending the United States and the rest of the world down the road to ruin. Every briefing there would be a question from the particular person who represented La Rouche about something usually about nefarious control of the economy and some lurking conspiracy that was the death knell for the United States. We'd always try to take the question seriously in the sense of respectfully but basically there was never any real answer. Often it was the kind of question that got turned aside with a very limited response.

Q: Let's talk about Camp David and about Iran. Was this sort of tightly held and did you get involved in Camp David?

SCHUKER: Well I knew about it and was at State but I was not involved intently on that particular issue so I really can't speak to that with any gravitas or knowledge. I hope Tom Reston was able to talk to you about that. Hodding certainly could. I think Hodding went to Camp David with Vance but other than to say it was a huge moment in the life of the administration, I was really in a back-channel seat on that.

Q: There were a lot of problems with the Shah and after the Shah left. Did you know the storm was going on, before the takeover of the Embassy; the final takeover before there had been a takeover.

SCHUKER: I was very involved because I was briefing during that time. Actually at home I have the original cartoon by Mike Peters who is a wonderful cartoonist and there is a picture of the Shah, Bakhtiar, who was another person in the line of leaders of Iran after the Shah during that tumultuous year, with the last cartoon picture being Khomeini. One day I was saying from the podium that our best friend was the Shah, the next day I was saying our best friend was Bahktiar, and the next day I was saying whatever…, I was never saying our best friend was Khomeini but it was a very volatile period. Very messy. Anyway Mike sent me the original of his cartoon and I still remember what he wrote on it, he said, "I hope you find steady work," which was very funny but also very true and really punctuated the mess the Administration was in.

We had a special task force on Iran within the State Department, and interagency there was tremendous concern and uncertainty—and this is pre-Khomeini—about what might or might not transpire but I don't think anyone was anticipating at least no one that I remember in the policy discussions was expecting that the embassy would be taken over in the way it happened. The way one hears about it now is that some of the Iranian hierarchy was surprised and not even sure the students meant to take it over for the period of time that they did. Basically the takeover became a useful tool for Iran. And of course the 1980 election politics in the U.S. was deeply affected. It was a nightmare.

The relationship with the Shah as I'm sure others have talked about but without belaboring it, went back many, many years in terms of U.S. policy from the time we overthrew, certainly helped overthrow, what was in essence a leftist but democratically-elected regime of Mossadeq in the '50s, installed the Shah and he was our guy henceforth. He was our guy right up until he was tossed out in the late '70s. The opulence he enjoyed was legendary but he was our bulwark. It was fully on display when—I don't remember the exact date—perhaps during the Bush or Reagan administrations-- when there was the big resplendent gala in Iran with lots of celebrities and top officials including Americans celebrating the Peacock dynasty..

Q: I think it was Nixon.

SCHUKER: It was the celebration of the Peacock Dynasty and I remember Ben Bradlee was there. In any case, there was a lot of intimacy not just in terms of foreign policy but in terms of socializing with the Shah and he was clearly our guy in that part of the world.

Flash forward there were roiling issues in terms of what was happening in Iran particularly during the 1978-1979 period within the Carter administration and what to do about Iran and the Shah was quite ill. The sort of tipping point was when we let him in the U.S. for treatment. He wasn't leaving the country officially as head of Iran. But it was pretty clear that he was leaving, never to return. When he left, he came to the United States and basically took over a floor of the Cornell Medical Center …he was quite ill and subsequently died of cancer.

But Iran was in a mess in terms of the political foment and ferment, corruption, et cetera. Ayatollah Khomeini, probably one of the more fascinating people of the last half of the 20th century and certainly one of the most seminal in terms of changes that were taking place in the world, was in exile in France, having been exiled by the Shah. He was a very powerful cleric but no one I think guessed how powerful, at least seemingly in our government. He was living in the outskirts of Paris I think before returning to Iran.

In any case, the Shah leaves and I don't even know if it was within 24 hours but, very quickly Khomeini comes back to Iran and it is a phenomenon. I mean he is greeted as-- it is probably inappropriate to say but almost Mohammad like. He immediately is the de facto leader of the country and then the actual leader of the country with enormous power. The takeover in Mecca had also happened in 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and then Iran so there was much activity and consternation and hand wringing and strategizing here but no full anticipation of Khomeini's enormous impact and what it would mean in full. Henry Precht, a senior foreign service officer and a guru on Iran headed, as I recall, the Iran task force that met seemingly constantly and had lots of arms and legs. I was involved on the media and policy strategy side of our work including briefing.

Q: Did you find yourself having to deal with the press much on this?

SCHUKER: Yeah, I briefed a lot at State and then at the UN after the Embassy was taken over and I went to NY.

Q: How did you find, I mean, was everyone somewhat bemused by this or anything?

SCHUKER: Well until the embassy was taken over. I mean I don't know that the word was bemused but not unlike what I said about the cartoon it was chaotic and I don't know that everyone fully appreciated the enormity of the changes taking place. Policy shambles. I mean everyday it was as though we were supporting a new head of state; it was just a stream of leaders one after another after another until it was clear eventually that Khomeini was the Supreme Leader and a complete about face from the Shah on every level.

Our foothold was gone. There was clearly nervousness before the deluge…but again in my memory I wouldn't say it was a law of unintended consequences. It was a law of inevitable consequences and profound. But I do not think we were expecting Khomeini to achieve the total gravitas and the reach and the importance and the depth and certainly the speed and the influence that he wielded and the vitriol against America. My memory is when the embassy was taken over; I believe that they did not plan a long-term siege. Then it took on a momentum of its own and Khomeini saw it as a target of opportunity and utility and the students as allies. It was certainly a huge embarrassment to the United States and it was more than anything else a total policy debacle for Carter although he had other problems I mentioned plus the energy crisis and the Olympics….all levels of problems, but from the minute the embassy was taken over, I think the election was lost. I mean Carter was just crucified on that issue.

Q: Also to a certain extent he did it to himself because he tied himself to the situation.

SCHUKER: Well he did and he didn't. As I said earlier, he tried, I mean let's see what happens for Bush now and his potential successor in 2008. Iraq is his legacy. But Bush still has two years before the next presidential election. Carter was running the next year. He had one year until the election and when the embassy was taken over, he still had to be out campaigning. It was very difficult to campaign and not talk about that issue when you have Ted Koppel every night Day 5, Day 50, Day 900, not 900 but Day 200. It was a constant reminder to the American public that for the first time since Vietnam we were in such a no-win situation abroad. Then when our submarine was taken over as I remember, it was not unlike Gary Francis Powers when our U-2 spy plane was shot down during the Eisenhower administration and he was captured. But I mean here were all these Embassy people blindfolded and trotted out every day. They were sort of trooped in and out in front of cameras all the time. No one was killed, thank God, but it was a humiliation and whatever the past wrongs, it happened on this president's watch. He suffered.

I guess what I was starting to say is they tried to move the issue away from the White House. But the president can't turn away from the intensity of this kind of issue. And the media was understandably relentless. I mean Bush has found that out--you can't push off the responsibility and then, of course on top of this was the failed rescue mission, which

provoked Hodding to leave when Cyrus Vance left. Here we had our helicopter, pre-Somalia and all of that, in just charred bits in the desert, clearly no one was rescued and indeed it was a failure and people died. Vance had not supported that operation and he resigned because of it and Muskie became Secretary of State.

Q: And The U.S. Mission to the U.N.?

SCHUKER: The embassy takeover happened the weekend I was with Mrs. Carter at the Cambodian refugee camps on the Thai-Cambodian border. First weekend in November. It was myself, Dick Holbrooke, journalists—about six of us on the small military plane and on the way back we got a message that the embassy had been taken over in Iran. I stayed at State for the next month and then went right up to the UN. Carter also tried to move the hostage issue to the aegis of the UN and Waldheim who was the secretary general at that time.

Q: Well, just one last thing. What was your impression of Mrs. Carter, Rosalyn Carter?

SCHUKER: Let me mention just one other thing if I might just because you had asked me earlier about big issues. Another huge issue was the PLO/Palestinian issue and one of the reasons that Don McHenry became our ambassador to the UN after being deputy was that Andy Young basically was fired. He resigned, but under pressure because he met with the head of the PLO's U.N. mission, which he had not been authorized to do. It was extremely controversial. Again, how times have changed. But that was in 1979.

As for Mrs. Carter, I didn't know her well, I think she was very hard working, and she did a very good job on that trip and that was basically going to the camps to meet with those escaping from Cambodia and Pol Pot and pledging support. It was not an unusual role for the First Lady but I thought she performed very sensitively. I remember a baby literally died in her arms when we were in the camps. Awful. She was very committed. She was religious, as was the President. One of the early controversial things about Jimmy Carter during the campaign was when he said that he was a born again Christian. I think he had a very open view of what that meant, certainly different than the way it has been portrayed by some others, but I remember on the plane on the way back we hit a very bad storm. It was quite scary, we were in a small plane and Mrs. Carter had us all pray on the plane, Dick, myself and maybe six or seven others in a circle, she had us join hands and my feeling was whatever works, because it was a typhoon. It was pretty scary. It had its moments but happily I am here to tell about it.

Q. Let's talk about the Andy Young-PLO incident and what happened and then about your time at the UN, at the UN mission.

SCHUKER: Great.

Well. Does one speak to a group that is considered to be a terrorist group, declared so or self-declared or whatever else? One talks about history repeating itself and I think it's always sort of the tension between how and where you draw the line and of course the

policy. And there is always the unexpected….and diplomacy comes into play. I remember being with Don McHenry at the Sandinista swearing in in Nicaragua and he had a "real" and quite fascinating totally unplanned brief conversation with Castro at the cocktail celebration. The policy at that period of time was that the PLO was a terrorist organization and there should be no conversation.

I don't really know what Andy Young may have been asked to do behind the scenes and I mean that, because as we all know there are things that are back channel and never sort of acknowledged—unless you are "caught" and then there is "deniability". What happened was that Andy Young, who was then our ambassador to the United Nations, Carter's ambassador and had a long and distinguished civil rights history and was a close friend of the President's and an adviser to Carter during the campaign. Andy Young was a Georgian and the appointment to a high level post like the UN of a Black person was a first.

Andy Young had a very high profile and what happened was that he met with the PLO representative accredited to the United Nations. There is often a representative of countries or of entities that do not have accreditation to the United States but do to the UN. But the operative policy was not to talk to the PLO. It broke in the media that it was not a situation where he just happened to pass him in the hall or nodded but there was an actual conversation. If I remember correctly, I think they met, I don't know if it was at Andy Young's residence or at the residence of the PLO representative to the UN but it was leaked somehow and became a huge cause celeb, extremely controversial. It was quite a brouhaha and basically Andy Young was asked to resign and he was replaced by his deputy, Don McHenry. Don McHenry was also Black and had career credentials. He had been part of the administration but was not a political appointee although operating at that level as a past Ambassador.

He had the imprimatur without question from the president but he did not come through the political route. He was an admired and effective career ambassador. Along with some others like Tony Lake and Dick Holbrooke, he had left the government over the secret Cambodia bombing issue in the '70s. So he in essence came back into the administration at the US Mission. But his career was much more along a diplomatic as opposed to a political or civil rights track. It was a great opportunity to work with and for him and the US/UN team at a fascinating complex time from 79-81.

Foreign policy is highly complex as you know. But, as to Young, I was part of the administration and there was a policy in place; and two, I admired Andy Young and was sorry to see him go. It seemed to me it was a bad miscalculation or a sad leak. But whether or not it was useful for the interaction itself to take place, as I recall, those with more knowledge about the specifics had better insight than I.

As we know, as time went on as often happens, the head of the PLO, Yasser Arafat, became a prime negotiator with the administration, not just that administration but subsequent administrations and was invited to Camp David and the White House and won the Nobel Peace Prize as part of the peace negotiations with Begin. But, clearly what

had been a pariah organization became a legitimate negotiator eventually but wasn't at that time.

Q: The fact that Kenyatta or Shamir…., I mean these were all terrorists at one time…

SCHUKER: Well at one time Begin headed the Irgun.

Q: Sure.

SCHUKER: But you know times make changes, … look at Libya today… the Bush administration's Libyan rapprochement enabled doing away with their nuclear weapons.

Q: I'm trying to capture the time. Did you feel that…I mean there is a staff at the UN and Andy Young is one of these charismatic people…

SCHUKER: Absolutely.

Q: I mean he is an easy person to admire. I do myself and I've never dealt with him. But was there a feeling that Carter was a sell out to pressure groups or something like this or did you feel this? Was your group full of enough political realists to say that well, there it goes, I mean…

SCHUKER: Again, when you say group I don't know what you mean by group.

Q: Well, I'm talking about the staff of the UN.

SCHUKER: Well first of all I was not at the UN. I was still at the State Department and there were a lot of Georgians around in Washington—including Hodding and Pat Derian—with a lot of fondness and respect for Andy Young. I think that Cyrus Vance cared about Andy Young and his abilities but it just became an untenable situation. The politics at that time simply would not allow that kind of a conversation to take place with official sanction and while the Iran hostage crisis had not yet happened, it was very soon after that that it did and I mean within a matter of weeks if not days, so the administration was having significant problems. It simply could not afford another one.

Q: You were with the State Department; did you move over to the UN?

SCHUKER: Yes. I was working directly for Hodding and I was a deputy spokesman at the time and I had been with Mrs. Carter the weekend that our embassy was taken over. We were at the refugee camps in Cambodia on the Thai border. On our way back, this is pre-cell phones and all of that, we got over the ticker tape basically that the embassy had been taken over. I had already spoken to Don McHenry at that point because the PLO issue had happened with Andy Young and Don was going to be the new ambassador and he had offered me the opportunity to come to New York as Counselor for Press and Public Affairs. So I knew that I was going to the U.S. Mission but I didn't know that I

was going with the atmosphere of the Iran hostage crisis. So I ended up going toward the end of November, in '79, which was less than a month, I remember, it was right around Thanksgiving. It was less than a month after the hostage crisis began.

I remember the first night, the first day that I got there I ended up briefing that night to the UN press corps about one a.m. after a Security Council meeting. It was, I mean, there were clearly other things going on but I would say for the next year plus—until Reagan came in and the inauguration and all of that. As one may remember the inauguration it was ignominious for Carter because the deal clearly had been struck that the hostages would be "freed" as a "sort of gift" to Reagan and lift off from Iran would be after Reagan was sworn in. So Carter never achieved the release of the hostages. Over that whole year were endless negotiations both at the UN and abroad, Don McHenry did a lot of the face-to-face negotiations abroad. We were in the Middle East a lot, we were in Europe and there was a lot going on in the attempt to free the hostages and we worked at that time with the secretary general of the UN, Kurt Waldheim and this was before his ties to Nazi Germany were revealed . But during that period Waldheim was very, very engaged in the negotiations to free the hostages.

Q: Your job was what?

SCHUKER: I was counselor for press and public affairs so I traveled with Don McHenry; I was involved in a lot of the spokespersoning at the UN on this issue and had many dealings directly with the secretary general's office and his key staff.

Q: How, let's take little bits of this. How did Don McHenry use you?

SCHUKER: Well, there were different responsibilities I would say. Number one, on the heels of Andy Young, Don was certainly relatively unknown and establishing a presence and a persona and visibility for him, that was one of the first things that we did and continually worked on. Actually it's interesting because the person who ended up doing a big article on him for The New York Times magazine—which of course was the key place to have his presentation of self was Michiko Kakutani who did the article before she became the NYT book editor—but Michiko was the one who I remember interviewed Don.

There was also a much more high profile presence to that job because of the hostage crisis. I was doing a lot of briefings, press and for the public, which wasn't particularly typical of previous counselors at the mission as far as I knew. Of course, I also ran our press and public affairs operation and that had about 15 people as I recall, maybe twenty. Things always were especially intense during the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in the Fall. The Secretary of State and often the President was there. We had offices both in New York and in Washington. So every week I would be back and forth with—I mean I traveled with Don whenever he traveled so I was back and forth to Washington as well when there were cabinet meetings, etc.

Because I had worked for Hodding, I had some relationship in terms of visibility with Cyrus Vance and Warren Christopher, I mean they knew who I was. Chris has been involved with the Panama issue as well with the OAS and other negotiations. So I think that provided another level of liaison at a time when the articulation of policy was particularly important because of the Iran situation and where the White House was really trying to keep the issue as far away from the White House as possible in terms of visibility because the president was getting ready to run for a second term. But of course the relationship with Hodding was critical to smooth liaison.

Q: Well, did you try to build up the persona of Don McHenry? I know Don and he is a very quiet spoken man and he is replacing one of the charismatic leaders of the civil rights movement and a politician Andy Young. I mean this sort of thing you walk into a room and you immediately send out your charisma rays or something and Don just isn't that type of person. He's very nice; he came out of the Civil Service more or less.

SCHUKER: One has to go back to the moment. One, there was an interest on the part of the administration for a relatively easy transition which having been the deputy to Andy Young was helpful. Two, continuity, that also was provided by Don and most staff. Three, lowering the profile after the volatile visibility of Andy and the problems that that caused and four, I think that Don had all the bells and whistles of the credentials that were needed then and was an extremely effective diplomat and as one may or may not know who ever is listening to this but so much of what goes on in the UN is conversation and listening and patience. We've seen endlessly over the years it's talk, talk, talk, talk, talk.

Q: In the delegates lounge.

SCHUKER: Exactly, the delegates lounge and Don was very patient and very effective at that. I would say fifthly, what was extremely important at that time was the ability to be an effective diplomat because it was all about diplomacy in terms of the hostage issues and dealing with governments who were not just traditional friends but who may indeed have a role to play or who we thought indeed could help us with the hostage issue. Some of these were governments in the area. We traveled—Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Lebanon, Jordan—and Don McHenry I think proved to be an articulate and effective spokesperson behind the scenes and out front as well.

The other thing is and this is always interesting because the moment has an effect on what kind of tenure you have. If the Iran hostage crisis had not happened, we probably would have had a very different kind of tenure for that year plus. Meaning, I think, Don had a lot more visibility than he would have had and there was a lot more interest in his tenure because of the Iran hostage crisis than perhaps had things been quieter at the UN.

Q: Of course, we are dealing with the taking of diplomats and the UN, if nothing else, is a diplomatic organization.

SCHUKER: Exactly.

Q: It was their rules that were getting challenged, across the board so with this it wasn't East, West or anything else. It was about diplomatic immunity and those were extremely important to everybody.

SCHUKER: Stuart, you are absolutely right; it was really the first time, I think. There had clearly been embassy issues before and bombings and problems but to the best of my memory this was the first time that hostages, that diplomats were taken, certainly the first time for the United States where diplomats were taken and not released.

This went on, as we know, for well over 300 days and was the creation of Nightline among other things with Ted Koppel.

Q: I think 444 days.

SCHUKER: Yes, certainly over a year, November to January so I don't know, whatever, it was certainly over 400 or so.

Q: I'm interviewing right now John Limbert who was talking about being taken by the Iranians, and he was saying around Christmas he got a package from his family and there were a lot of books in there, War and Peace, Dostoyevsky and he said, "They're telling me something." These were all long books.

SCHUKER: He's saying long books, right. Well, it was clear certainly I mean this began as I said the first weekend in November 1979, November 4th. But it didn't end of course until inauguration day in January of 1981.

Q: Tell me about your impression by the time you became the U.S. UN spokesperson. What was your impression of the UN officials you were dealing with and were there people you worked with there or were you on your own? How does this work?

SCHUKER: Well the U.S. mission was clearly not just geographically as it is situated directly across from the UN but remains sort of "the animal more equal than others" in many ways. The origins…we pay the biggest portion of the budget, we are on the Security Council, and it obviously the organization is based in our country.

Specifically, one has to remember it was a period of time when there was a pretty free flow of sort of walk in, walk out kind of thing. Security yes, but nothing like today. I don't know because I haven't really had that access at this point but you'd walk out of a Security Council meeting and there would be press right there and there would be a lot of, as I recall, I think even visitors were able to sort of watch what was going on.

What I'm trying to say is that there was a lot more interface and contact that went beyond just the very specific meetings and such between and among officials. I often, if not at my desk, would have lunch over at the UN and there would be a lot of flow of sort of chatter and information and contact.

There was, I would say, a tremendous amount of conversation and open contact during the year I was there—my whole tenure and pretty much during McHenry's whole tenure with Waldheim and his people. Waldheim had many meetings with Vance and conversations, meetings with Vance and the president. I mean the UN secretary general was playing a very involved role in the hostage issue. So I don't again know whether that would be considered a typical period in modern US-UN relations.

Q: I keep trying to capture that period.

SCHUKER: I mean I would think now well I don't know with Bolton and Bush and the problems of personality with Kofi Annan. I think it's important to remember that Waldheim ran into a lot of problems but they didn't surface until later from effectiveness questions to corruption issues to issues about his former affiliations during World War II. Iran was so dominant.

Q: Yeah.

SCHUKER: We were back and forth to the Secretary General's office a lot. There were definitely frustrations with Waldheim, there were conversations some which I was privy to, about negotiations or non-negotiations that were going on. But Waldheim was in the thick of it and it certainly added to the liaison role the U.S. mission played and Don especially. April Glaspie was Don's key Iran person. April ran into buzzsaws more recently regarding Saddam Hussein but she was a savvy and trusted advisor to Don.

It was also important to remember that Don's position at that time had cabinet rank as it did under Andy Young, I'm pretty sure this post-dated the Ford administration. This had actual and psychological muscle and is seemingly always an issue as to the reporting food chain for the UN for the UN Ambassador. So Don would attend Cabinet meetings, which is one of the reasons we went back to Washington, back and forth. While he had a reporting relationship certainly to Secretary Vance and a very good relationship with Secretary Muskie he also had a direct relationship to the President and other cabinet members.

Q: We've talked about your being spokesperson for U.S. UN and we picked up about the relationship with Don McHenry and with Waldheim and all but we will talk a little bit about more the next time. Since McHenry was part of the Cabinet, did you get involved with sort of Cabinet type things, your dealings with the White House press people and the State Department both of whom you had good connections with? Then let's talk about the press corps around there. What was your impression of the press corps particularly the international press corps and then your impressions of some of the other players in the international scene, the Arabs?

SCHUKER: Sure, good questions Stuart.

Q: What about the Iranians? They were in the UN and other players there and all these attempts to find an interlocutor or something all sorts of people coming out of the

woodwork who were saying they had an inside, in with the Iranians none of which really turned out to be true but I mean did you get involved with this?.

SCHUKER: OK, great.

Q: First Don McHenry and his relation to the White House.

SCHUKER: I would say Don had two important aspects of his tenure. One, the extreme focus on the UN as an interlocutor regarding the Iran hostage crises and accompanied with that the desire on the part of the administration given the fact that Carter was running in that next year for what he hoped would be his second term to keep things in check at the UN, be an early warning system, move the line of fire away from the White House Good staffing was key—the other deputy Ambassadors, etc.. But the overriding interest was in having good news come from the White House and having the tough stuff be any failures, any problems coming elsewhere as possible. It often wasn't, of course.

Secondly, the second line of defense so to speak was at the UN. I do think that my time in Washington the relationship that I had with the White House press corps and the White House staff working on press with Jody Powell who was the press secretary on down as well as having a close relationship with Hodding, having briefed myself at the State Department, knowing Secretary Vance and Deputy Secretary then Warren Christopher were all very important in terms of keeping the relationships tight and the flow of information appropriate as to what Jody wanted.

We did have press calls every morning that involved both myself, the White House and the State Department in terms of coordinating what was going on and also what was going to be said publicly. Also Don McHenry himself I think was very, what's the word I want, was very active in terms of his role at that time in terms of the Cabinet meetings and such. Don also had a very good relationship, a strong relationship and I think a very respectful relationship with Vance. It went back to many years of Don's tenure as a Foreign Service officer, so I think Don was what I would say very much in the loop. There was not that kind of relationship with Muskie and Madeleine Albright who was close to Muskie and worked with him when he was Secretary of State and who had ties to Brzezinski. Don did not have a special personal relationship with Carter but I think he was viewed as somebody who was an essential, not just important interlocutor with Waldheim who was very engaged in the Iran negotiations

There was a lot going on at the UN and while I don't remember or know of any direct or backroom negotiations that Don McHenry was having with the Iranians at that point. I think I would have known but perhaps not. Our direct bilateral relationship at that time had stopped with Iran. There was still an ambassador at the UN, there was certainly contact between Don McHenry and the ambassador as absolutely necessary on other issues or by staff in other UN forums but the negotiations even when we traveled were not directly with Iran. It was a piece of the action that Waldheim was more engaged in and it was this sort of careful dance with McHenry to Waldheim, Waldheim to the Iranian ambassador. But there was a lot going on at the UN, at the Security Council. It seemed as

though there were daily meetings, if not more, well into the wee hours about how to try to get our people back.

Q: How would you describe, from the public affairs point of view, the White House or State Department in dealing with this? You know here you were up against a government but almost a non-government at the time. It must have been very frustrating.

SCHUKER: It was very frustrating and clearly this was deeply involved in the realm of U.S. domestic politics at that point because of the election, the presidential election coming up in 1980. I met with a lot of outside groups and visitors and the focus always came around to Iran. The administration was never really able to get a full handle on the hostage issue, most specifically on having the hostages freed of course.

They were not freed until January of 1981. It was in essence on Reagan's watch--his very first day, minutes in office, his very first night in office. Not that the public didn't recognize Carter's efforts but it was humiliating and frustrating. The Iranians clearly played politics with this issue and I think Reagan played politics with the issue. The good news is the hostages were freed. I think for Carter it was the last of the legacy of frustration and disappointment despite everything that the administration tried to do to free the hostages.

I think the Iranians realized in certain ways that they had well a number of their own issues internally. One, I think there was surprise at the strength of the students. As you said it wasn't a real government initially and as we learned historically there wasn't a vision from the very first hours as to what they were going to do with these Americans. I think there was again, based on what we hear historically, there wasn't a view that they were going to be held hostage for as long as they were. This was an initial radical student takeover in a certain sense popular among young people in Iran and then I think they were surprised themselves to some extent.

And realized whatever tool they had hanging over the head of the United States they maximized it. Not that Carter was not having other problems, we had the energy crisis, I mean there were all kinds. It seemed like every day there seemed to be some crisis during that period, domestic and international. But Iran was the constant thorn and shame in the sense that the American public felt clearly that how could this other country, remember we are going back to 1979, have the United States in its clutches by having all these people, this group of diplomats basically jailed and incommunicado. And we didn't really know how they were being treated. But it was a daily shame and a really perfect coup de grace to the Carter presidency. I think there was a feeling certainly that there was some backdoor if not negotiations, contacts at least as we got near the election between the Reagan people and the Iranians--playing politics with people's lives. I'm certainly not saying it wasn't in the interest of the Iranians as they perceived it to continue this and to see themselves as having some kind of early, I don't know, edge with the Reaganites but certainly having the hostages freed on the day that Carter left office and Reagan coming into office was clearly a tactical and strategic calculation on the part of the Iranians and

one would think on the part of the Reaganites too. And after the election Carter of course was a lame duck in every sense of the word.

Q: Was there this suspicion that there would be some who would call it an "October surprise" or something? I mean as we are leading up to the election that something might be going on and sort of within your group?

SCHUKER: Yes, in one word yes. That as things got closer remember now we are a year later. There was also the attempt at rescue and a helicopter, which went down in the desert with resulting deaths. It was ill fated, it was viewed as ill-conceived and certainly poorly carried out, there was a dust storm, there were all kinds of impediments but it also precipitated Cyrus Vance's resignation on principle. Vance did not feel that he could support or publicly defend the rescue mission decision since he had not supported it. Vance spoke strongly against the rescue plan at Cabinet meetings. I assume, of course, he also opposed the decision in private conversations with the president and resigned over that. That is when Ed Muskie came in as secretary of state. But it added another crisis for the presidency and raised questions about decision-making judgment and effectiveness.

Q: Did you find that you at the UN mission were, because this crisis was so much both domestic and international, found your focus narrowed to the hostage thing and responding to all the hopes and dashed hopes and all that rather than getting on with the business of the UN?

SCHUKER: Yes. There is always other important work to be done and there were certainly other issues going on but I think that one had a consistent drumbeat about the hostage issue during my tenure with Don. It certainly was an almost total preoccupation and therefore, a very frustrating preoccupation because we clearly did not settle that issue successfully and everything else had a secondary place. It was bitter, it was very bitter. I think in some ways being out of Washington most of the time and the fact that much action was at the UN there was at least some sense of activity and again, the fact of being out of the sort of political mainstream that the White House was dealing with during the election day-in and day-out. We had perhaps less of a frustration but it was certainly, I mean, with all the respect that I have and did have for Ed Muskie it was a different time. I'm told that the Iran issue took a hidden cost on fellowship and mood. Some of the best days I guess one would say of the Carter administration, the Panama Canal issue and such, took place earlier in the administration. It was a fascinating and intense and interesting period. To say that it was a happy or upbeat period one could not call it that. It was hard to lose yourself in other issues.

Q: At one point President Carter sort of surprisingly epitomized this by getting up and talking before the Nation about a malaise within government. I mean malaise, like fish, starts stinking at the head. ...

SCHUKER: Right. I think that there is no question he was poorly advised. There was an understandable malaise but that speech didn't lift it….it exacerbated it. Carter as we have seen in all his years since his presidency is quite extraordinary and dedicated as we have

talked about in our conversations, Stu. He provided the first real focus on human rights and he was and has been true to that legacy. I'm sure this will be a centerpiece for the rest of his life with the Carter Center, with the kind of work he has done.

But even with the Carter Center, Carter is an iconoclast. I mean he does not go with the grain on a lot of issues. I think that was a calling card of his presidency. The country was in some ways not unlike it is today, very frustrated, there is a certain sense of a loss of direction. I would say the tin ear that Carter had as President in some ways Bush does not have exactly. I think the malaise speech as it has come to be known was bad politics. Carter basically said to the American public snap out of it and pull yourselves up by the bootstraps. It is simply not the positive cheerleading the public needed to hear. It didn't serve as the wake-up call I think he was expecting. There was enough of a depression already and the public heard it as only a scold—that the fault lay in us as opposed to what leadership is all about. FDR 's "We have nothing to fear but fear itself" and we are going to get it together and the responsibility is right here at the White House and everything is going to be OK if we just pull together. The Carter message further depressed the public. There was a sense that no one was in charge and we had to cheer up the President and the administration. Like now, I personally feel that when you look at the poll numbers right now, wrong direction right direction, people feel we are not going in the right direction and the Bush administration is not leading well. But I will say this for Bush, he is a cheerleader by nature and he projects a confidence about whatever direction he is leading is the right one. With Carter it was a lesson in leadership or a lesson in what leadership shouldn't do. It was really a big misstep.

Q: This is with President Carter?

SCHUKER: Carter basically said in a sense as it seemed to be heard--we are all depressed and we have a right to be and it was sort of like, "I'm not quite sure what to do" and it was not a message that the American public in its history of optimism either wants to hear or will react well to. It had a Jonestown ring to it as was reported. It was almost as though Carter was sort of saying, we all should be taking Kool-Aid, which is how those people died--Kool-Aid laced with cyanide which they were forced or lulled to drink. At the time that Carter gave his speech, some of the press said that this was sort of the equivalent of Carter basically saying to the American public here's the Kool-Aid. It was just, it was just terrible.

Q: You know you are one, a political creature and two, you are a public affairs creature and so I'm sure you picked these vibes up very quickly.

SCHUKER: It was a lose-lose. I mean this was not any kind of win situation. I guess it reminded me a little bit of 1972 and here we were in 1980 during the presidential campaign with all these difficult issues and the feeling that as the election drew closer barring some miracle this was not going to be a winning election for the Democrats and meanwhile the hostages languished.

Q: Well going back, let's go back to the UN and you dealing with the press. Let's first talk, what was your impression of the American domestic press? Or the interest in the UN and the type of people and how you dealt with them?

SCHUKER: Well let's say there was limited interest. For years the American public has had a lukewarm interest in the UN. There also was not a substantial, in terms of numbers, press corps at the UN and up until then there had not been. Foreign policy tended to be poorly covered in the media and generated little electoral interest generally unless it was around some kind of crisis—Cuba, the hostages, etc. UN activities more generally unless it was peacekeeping operations or UNICEF themselves were usually under the radar. Some of this goes back in general to the Washington focus on policy while the New York press focus is the city itself and Wall Street and corporate America. But, I would say once again and I am sort of landing on the back of a tiger. It became more of a focus in 1979-1980 because of the intense interest on the part of the American public in Iran and the hostages and not attending the Olympics. They all were downers. Iran of course was consistent front page news and there was a lot of activity and briefing coming out of the UN but little good news moving the ball forward. There were some very good people who covered the UN very seriously for a long time, Richard Hottelet who as a young man was one of the Murrow boys—Edward R. Murrow's gaggle. Dick was always interested in foreign policy but his CBS footprint was small at that point.

Q: Edward Morrow.

SCHUKER: Lou Chioffi from ABC among others as well. The very first night I got to the UN we had a late Security Council meeting and I briefed at the UN that night about what had gone on and not only was there American press interest but heavy international press corps attendance. There was no CNN in the '70s and you know it was just a different kind of access. There was not a set briefing but I would usually do briefings or more informal conversations after the Security Council meetings and I did press Don McHenry who unlike Andy Young who was very comfortable with dealing with the press, Don was not as natural but he began to do small gatherings in his office as well as speaking after the Security Council meetings in the Hall especially when they dealt with Iran. Some of them were on the record; some of them were off the record

Q: Was there hostility on the part of the international press or gloating about the US predicament pointing out all our faults…?

SCHUKER: I don't remember that attitude in truth Stu particularly about that but I guess there was from a certain gleefulness that America was in difficulty—the Soviet Union was still the Soviet Union in 1979. We certainly had our adversaries but there was something interesting about this and it has to do with the sort of diplomatic niceties and a certain kind of transference. This was, I believe, the first time an embassy was taken over and no country overtly supported that including our adversaries, except, of course, Iran. It was something that every country felt vulnerable to and as we all know the land on which your embassy is built in other countries is basically American, British, Iranian, Korean etc. sovereign property. So this was not a precedent that countries wanted to see or

support and we did have on that level a good deal of support internationally. There were countries, Algeria for one and others, who were trying to serve as interlocutors on this and one can ask exactly how hard they were pressing in some cases might be questioned but there were certainly stakes here that went beyond the United States, that were core international "common law."

Q: Was there concern on the part of our mission, maybe even things you were not overly familiar with that were going on on lines of inquiry? I mean we were trying every means known to man and God to negotiate something out of this. Was there concern that maybe the press was getting too close to something either the international press or was this…did you ever find yourself either being asked to tell the Die Welt correspondent to cool it or something like that?

SCHUKER: I don't remember that particular kind of situation but I know that there was a lot that one was not able to talk about and that would frustrate the press of course. There were a lot of negotiations going on that were behind the scenes and I would say that when Don McHenry or Bill vanden Heuvel or others up at the UN and here in Washington talked to the press there were certain public messages we wanted to emphasize or provide with an exclusive. But I would say it was a period in which there were more off-the-record briefings than perhaps at other times because there were things that simply were going on behind the cloak. But there were other things that we were not making certain headway with and we had made some promises or set expectations. There were periods in which we thought this was going to have a happy ending on Carter's watch but it always slipped. Then clearly when Carter decided to try to send this rescue mission over it was out of a sense of belief and frustration that nothing else was going to work. Did politics enter into it? Clearly this is not the kind of thing that you would say publicly at a briefing but there is no question that had the hostages been freed before the election it possibly would have enabled Carter to win the presidency. I don't know. People were tired. But it certainly would have helped.

Q: Earlier this week I was interviewing Tom Pickering who talked about his period as Perm Rep, Permanent Representative, to the UN during the Bush administration. Tom was saying that he used to be on his way to and from meetings and all and the press is always there so he would talk to them and all. From time to time he found himself getting a little crosswise with particular public affairs people under Margaret Tutwiler in the Jim Baker secretariat staff. More a matter of, it's hard to say, but at least according to the news accounts more because Pickering seemed to be getting more publicity than Tutwiler liked because Tom is a professional and stuck to the line. Did you run across any of that?

SCHUKER: I think that there is always a—I'm trying to think of the right word to use—a competitive issue among the press corps themselves, i.e., the White House, the State Department, about who is getting what information and who is first but also where you want the information to be emerging from. I mentioned this in terms of the coordination that we'd have in terms of the phone conversations in the morning. Did Jody want certain things to come out of the White House or to have certain news come out of the State Department or was there something the White House wants to have come from the UN. I

don't remember the Defense Department playing a particularly dominant role at that time in terms of this kind of information re: Iran but certainly they were on the coordination phone calls as well. I think it was Tom Ross as spokesman during that period.

Yes, I mean there was an access issue and there is no question that running across the street every day from the US mission to the UN building and, of course, some of the barriers literal and figurative that now exist simply did not exist in those days. There was much more access in sort of grabbing somebody and connecting. It was important to have clarity of the message. I don't remember a particularly problematic period in which there was frustration between Vance and Muskie and McHenry and I think part of it was that we had pretty good coordination. There were frustrations, however, between Vance and Brzezinski.

Q: Who was the National Security adviser?

SCHUKER: The National Security adviser and this has been written about. This gets to what model you have at the NSC and what model you have at the State Department and you know, Kissinger and Rusk had a relationship that marginalized Rusk at State. Kissinger wore both hats at one point during the Nixon administration and that made for easier coordination!! But certainly Vance and Brzezinski while collegial in terms of knowing each other over many years had differing views, for example, about the hostage mission, the Soviet Union….There is this intimacy that you have when you are at the White House. Does Condi Rice have a different relationship with the president as secretary of state than at the NSC? Probably although since she was national security advisor first the groundwork was already there. But, Brzezinski is somebody who the press seeks right up to the present for comment. He is a known scholar and is ready to comment on policy issues. I would say personality was more of a tension point.

McHenry and Muskie had a good working relationship but again not the same kind of relationship that Don had with Vance and, of course, it was toward the very end of the administration and things were certainly looking fairly bleak in terms of the hostage issue and the elections and such at that point.

Q: The election of November 1980 takes place. Carter loses. What does our UN mission do during this period? I mean obviously the hostage business is still going. What were you doing, what happened at that time? Did the air go out of everything?

SCHUKER: No, I mean we were still focused as I recall and it may have been because of the issue up until the last moments of the, I mean seconds, of the Carter administration. The president was hoping for a resolution before he left office and was involved in trying to get the hostages freed. I think some of it, 99 percent of it was dealing with the issue, i.e., getting these folks out of harm's way. But there was that one percent up until the last moment that I think of everything. I don't want to put myself in President Carter's head but I can't imagine that there wasn't an issue of pride, of desire to have this happen on his watch in terms of the resolution of this terrible year. It was very bitter and bitter is really the word when it did not happen. I mean clearly the Iranians were ready to free the

hostages, clearly they had decided they were not going to give that gift to President Carter, it was going to be for Reagan.

But, I don't remember any letdown in terms of the attempts to try to get this done. So right up through January, right up until the inauguration day for Reagan we were working on it. Now I think there is no question that the atmospherics changed. There was a view that it probably wasn't going to happen. Certainly those of us who were political people were depressed by the outcome of the election and the sweep of the victory that Reagan had. To be truthful and blunt there was also in part when you have this huge change in administrations, i.e., from party to party you have a total, I mean, thousands of peoples certainly hundreds of political appointees who need to look for other jobs so there is a personal agenda that in some ways takes over. Certainly it is on one's mind about next steps. So there are these realities that enter into the timing but I think in this particular case it wasn't as though the issue went away. It was certainly dominant in the life of Don McHenry and those of us dealing with this hostage issue with the UN. It wasn't over. So it wasn't as though there was a punctuation point at the time of the election. The work continued. But it continued under a cloud without question, an extra cloud and it continued in a sort of depressive atmosphere. No question.

Q: Was there a concern? Here you were working in the United Nations and a significant part of Ronald Reagan's support came from almost called an anti-United Nations crowd. It showed up early on later as most of these things do the facts of the matter dissipate, but at the time Reagan came out of the right wing of the Republican Party, which there were billboards in the south send the UN back to Europe or something like that.

SCHUKER: Absolutely.

Q: I mean was there a feeling that here are a bunch of wreckers coming in to louse up everything?

SCHUKER: Well there was certainly a feeling as I remember that people weren't wearing happy faces at the UN or at the U.S. mission about the expectation of either regarding the role that would be played at the UN by the U.S. mission, the people who might be coming in to run the place so to speak. Certainly during that year and during Carter's presidency whatever the issues, the UN had been given prominence.

There was concern when Jeanne Kirkpatrick was appointed, when she was named and, of course, had to go through confirmation and all of that but the likelihood was that she was going to be confirmed and, of course, she was. She was not viewed as a "friend" by people at the UN from top to bottom and US Mission staff were concerned. I knew that I wasn't going to be staying but there is a concern and a pride issue and a feeling about work accomplished and what would come next. It turned out that it was a rough period during her tenure…it wasn't that there wasn't attention at the UN but there were certainly a lot of scoldings which I think many felt were reminiscent and more so of the Moynihan period and so yes, there was a level of concern.

I guess—and this is an important point to remember—is that those who are career people whether it be U.S. mission or wherever they may be at the State Department or elsewhere are dedicated professionals and have a job to do and carry through. I mean there is a whole big policy world out there and attention must be paid and those are the people who provide continuity during periods of political and other kinds of transitions. But there is no question and I think we see it now and every day that specific policies of the president and the White House do color the way attitudes are formed and shaped and affect the people who carry out their responsibilities. There is no question that there was a marked change from the Carter to the Reagan administrations in terms of the attitude toward the UN before things swung back later on during the Clinton period for example.

Q: Did you get involved in the transition or did you just leave?

SCHUKER: I was involved very briefly in the transition. I did meet with Jeanne Kirkpatrick. Of course, she met with Don McHenry and others. She certainly solicited my views about work and what I did and how I did it and what I thought, which I appreciated. But she certainly had her own very strong views about the United Nations and what the U.S. role should be.

And it was less of a "works and plays well with others" than one of a sort of imposed dominance--adversarial. Clearly the Security Council, the role of the United States, was always a dominant one since the founding of the UN but there was no question that the Reagan administration viewed the Carter administration as a foreign policy failure, certainly they did not agree with our approaches at the UN and they were going to be much more hard-line and it was. I mean one just needs to open up the newspapers or history books regarding the attitudes of Kirkpatrick and others.

Q: As for Jill, whither?

SCHUKER: Whither, thither and yon. Well it was a very hard ending I would say, and it happened seemingly so fast. The four years with all the difficulties seemed a very good time that we—Democrats—were in power and a long time since we had been before then and here we were out again. I think had any of us realized that it was going to be twelve years before we were back in executive power, we all would have shot ourselves at that point. I wasn't absolutely sure what I wanted to do. I had just been in New York, living in New York for a year and I thought I would like to stay a while longer. I always knew I would come back to Washington but I also knew that the atmospherics and politics of the city at that point were not amenable to my interests.

I was not interested at that time in going back to Capitol Hill, which in terms of a public policy place for people of my political persuasion was the logical place to go back to since that was still Democratic. Think tanks were not in abundance then. I had worked with Tip O'Neill before and it had been great and the caucus that I had started and directed, the Congressional Caucus, was well launched. I really thought I would like to stay in New York for a while. I wasn't quite sure what I was going to do but I was immediately contacted by Governor Carey, by his chief of staff.

Q: He was governor of New York?

SCHUKER: He was governor of New York and he was just starting his second term and I knew him although not well when he was in Congress, There was just something written the other day in The New York Times about the history of governors of New York and their likely potential in being viewed as possible candidates for the presidency. They were talking about everyone from FDR (Franklin Delano Roosevelt) through Pataki now.

Q: Dewey and…

SCHUKER: And Dewey and Cuomo.

Q: Cuomo.

SCHUKER: And Carey and Rockefeller and Harriman and all kinds of people. So I thought as I said earlier to you on tape, my thesis in college was on the New York state legislature, the role of a legislative opposition. I was interested in New York politics. I had worked for Bobby Kennedy and I was in New York. More to the point I knew Carey and I respected him. He had taken New York through this terrible fiscal crisis along with Felix Rohatyn in 1976 and he was very well respected.

Q: This was when the headline Ford said to New York" Drop Dead".

SCHUKER: Drop Dead. Right, exactly.

Q: In one of the tabloid papers…

SCHUKER: Yes, I think it was the New York Post.

Q: It referred to budgetary support.

SCHUKER: Exactly, that there wasn't going to be any money from the federal government although New York was in a huge fiscal crisis. Also, I was really tired as one is at the end of an administration and depressed by everything we've already talked about. It was in a sense an easy transition-- I was being pursued and asked to take on the role of press secretary to the governor and I had some very interesting predecessors--Tim Russert and others like Dave Burke who had been chief of staff and then went on to run ABC. And I knew Dave from his Ted Kennedy days.

In any case, it was an interesting group and Hugh Carey I thought would be interesting to work for. You always want to be on a learning curve and I really felt that I would learn a lot. That it would match up with some domestic experience that I had. Carol Bellamy at that time was city council president and I had met her during the course of the time that I was in New York. Her chief of staff was a good friend and I thought this would be an

interesting time to be engaged in New York politics and would give me a sort of extended life line of being in New York.

I thought very seriously actually about the private sector but I really was not, when all was said and done, ready for that transition, I still wanted to stay in public policy. I met with Carey and he defined and offered the job. I was living in Manhattan; he had an office in New York City as well as one in Albany, of course. The office in New York at that time was right on 55th Street between 5th Avenue and Sixth. It eventually moved to the World Trade Center some years later. I mention that in the course of the history of all of this. Carey wanted to spend part of the time in New York City where I had an office and some staff as well as an office and staff in Albany and I liked that combination. I thought I would learn a lot about budget issues and such. One of the things I may have mentioned when I first went into the Carter administration I really thought that the Office of Management and Budget which was still a relatively new office at that time would be a very central place to work because all roads intersected. Economics was not my thing but I always wanted to better understand it. Fortuitously, however, I went to the State Department of course.

So, bottom line, in February a month or so after Reagan came into office I started to work for Carey as press secretary to the governor. There were a number of people on his staff who I knew and respected, very talented, smart as he was. I was there for the next two years but I guess if you sense any hesitation in my voice this became yet another strange set of circumstances in terms of an intensive focus in an area that I was not anticipating and it became a very personal focus on and for the governor, in which I got deeply involved. There were a million other substantive things that were going on of course but what basically happened was that Carey who had been sort of touted and viewed again as a potential presidential nominee sort of entered what some would call a rapid descent and it had to do with the person whom he married that year.

Q: He didn't have an affair was it?

SCHUKER: No, not an affair, a marriage that became a very public mess in New York ranging from a whisper campaign to a public embarrassment. Carey had been married for a long time and had 14 children, a good Irishman, a good Irish Catholic and had a long and quite happy marriage, but she died of cancer. At the Reagan inaugural Carey as governor attended. In any case, he met someone named Evangeline Gouletas. She was from Chicago, her family had a real estate empire and she was viewed as a very successful businesswoman by the Governor. She had been married before, had a daughter, and this is basically what we knew about her then. In any case, it was quite a whirlwind romance and they were married in March I think. I don't know whether this is very relevant—

Q: No, it's fine, go ahead.

SCHUKER: Because some of it I am actually not going to get into on tape. But in any case they were married. As press secretary I had a very public role on behalf of the

governor. There were many problems between her and staff which happens of course. The governor had been a bachelor/widower for a period of time and there were various people in his life including Anne Ford of the Ford motor family and others. There was a closeness with a lot of his staff because he would have time to "hang out" which he liked given the usual intensity of political life and staff relationships. But when there is an injection of someone new into the picture it can change the equation and she and his key longtime staff had lots of problems.

One of the key issues I think was that she had very little knowledge of politics or understanding of what it really meant to have a public life. I personally believe that she viewed politics as sort of a rarefied existence, you know, moving from limousine to limousine and in a sort of very protected environment. I think he thought she was someone of deep substance who was a very serious businesswoman and who sort of knew the ropes. They both lived in fantasy. The marriage unraveled publicly, very quickly with a lot of repercussions. They are no longer married and haven't been for a long while. Even during the period that they were married it was a very difficult marriage pretty much from the get go. As press secretary, instead of having a lot of budget focus briefings I ended up having to deal with a lot of personal stories that the press was very interested in dissecting. It wasn't quite what I had anticipated. Did I learn a lot? I did in a whole other realm of dealing with media. For example, she said that she had been married once before but she had been married three times before. There were lots of issues; lots of dissembling issues of that sort. All this ended up coming out and, of course, the press was absolutely mesmerized and fascinated-- as was the staff. I think the governor was pretty struck by all this himself and it became a pretty ugly period. A saga. But again I had a very intensive press experience in a whole other way. Very challenging. After all one had to stay focused on the substance through all this as well.

Q: Did you feel that you were playing out the Hollywood press agent in a way?

SCHUKER: Yes I did in some ways. Clearly there was serious work to be done but there was such a patina of personal interest especially on the part of the tabloid press and such that it inevitably interfered with serious work for all of us. I mean there was a bumper sticker--her nickname was Engie, not many people called her Evangeline but Engie --there was a bumper sticker 'Honk If You Have Been Married To Engie'. I mean it was just a nightmare, and it was very difficult for the governor. Humiliating. He had a very strong substantive record but the potential of being on a national ticket and all of that faded away quickly. There was a lot of unraveling as I said.

Now, it certainly was a vast difference than dealing with the hostage crisis and I mean one could say it was almost a respite but it was also not quite the respite I had envisioned. Some very interesting issues-- very interesting political issues. Mario Cuomo was the Lieutenant Governor and he and the Governor had their issues as one would expect but there were really terrific staff people, Bob Morgado, Mike del Jiudice, very smart, substantive, Sandy Frucher. You know, people who were deeply committed. New York State always attracted real quality staffing and I certainly learned a lot but there was this drumbeat of preoccupation on this issue that created a two-year nightmare.

The potential of this Carey period was lost. Trade missions that he wanted to do and things that were my sort of background and expertise did not happen or certainly didn't happen in the way that we had anticipated because of this other mess.

Q: Well then in '82, just to put it in here, what did you do?

SCHUKER: In '82 I came back to Washington as head of international public affairs at a major trade association that is to this day prominent and controversial in terms of its clout but very conservative—and of course it was still the Reagan presidency. It was the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, now called Pharma.

Q: Jill, when did you leave government?

SCHUKER: So in 1982 sort of mid-way in the first Reagan term I came back to Washington. It was a very different Washington as someone who had been here previously in the Democratic administration and, of course, it was now a Republican town. Washington does very much take on the coloration of the White House, of the party that is in office. The sort of dominance, which has become iconic in more recent years but the dominance of the Reagan presidency was new and I sort of spread my wings to see what the private sector was like.

I had been offered a position while I was still in New York with a group called the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, now Pharma, as their head of international public affairs which seemed to combine my various interests and skills and I wasn't motivated to do a lot of looking around, I thought it would be a new challenge to work for an association that was known to have clout. On a personal note my father had worked for Abbott Laboratories and I sort of had a passing interest for that reason as well.

However, from my perspective--I would say of all the positions that I have held in and out of government-- it was the one I was least happy with. One a trade association sort of definitionally at least in my experience is only as unified or strong as its weakest link and some animals definitely are more equal than others. So there is very much a push-pull on issues trying to achieve consensus in a very conservative industry. You need the right sort of person to head the organization but it doesn't make for a lot of interesting creativity or out of the box thinking and very different from the stimulation of public policy formulation. It is also definitionally a conservative industry while of course an important one in terms of how important life-saving medications are and so forth, but it is a pretty conservative industry politically and intellectually.

The person who headed PMA at that time had been a former FTC (Federal Trade Commission) commissioner, Lou Engman, a Republican. Lou was a very talented, smart individual with a very strong personality which in a consensus building organization had its problems although he had some very brave ideas and the big issue at that time was something called patent term restoration. Opponents would call it patent term extension,

which is probably in the lexicon of Washington the way these things happened the industry saw this as a restoration of patent rights for medications that were going off patent and those who opposed it, many of the generic companies, those who were looking for lower cost medications viewed it as an industry financial push to extend their patent protection, that is, the patent life of certain medications.

Q: Which it was? Wasn't it?

SCHUKER: Well yes to some extent I think it was…my personal instinct would be to have in this sense to have called it in the real sense extension. Working in this trade association it was certainly working with the idea and the message being restoration. So in some ways for me it was working against the grain of my own sort of political instincts. However, these research-based companies indeed did have a strong point about protecting patents for medicines they worked on and discovered in their labs.

Q: Well this is also a period when generics were really coming on line weren't they?

SCHUKER: Exactly, very much so.

Q: Prior to that it hadn't outside of maybe aspirin I mean there wasn't really much of a generic, generics being lower cost.

SCHUKER: Lower cost medications. I did learn a lot. Generics, however, are not exactly equivalent to brand name medications. They may have a coating that is different and can affect effectiveness and efficacy. There are some differences. I mean the industry has a reasonableness behind some of their argumentation. In truth a lot of the research and development which is done by the industry is often dismissed by the public in terms of cost factors. The public doesn't really understand and I think to this day as completely as they should about the really dedicated research work that is done within the industry to come up with new medications. There is a profit motive of course and I think that one of the real difficulties of the pharmaceutical industry is this notion that for those of us and there probably isn't a person in the world who doesn't take some kind of medication is that this should be a right not a privilege –to wit the arguments about coverage. As long as this industry is one that is on the big board and has shareholders they have a responsibility as we've seen now in 2008 with some of the issues that have come up with Merck and Bristol-Meyers, people—CEOs-- lose their jobs when they don't produce for their shareholders.

So it was a very hard issue, a hard time for me. I did have friends who said, "How could you be working for this industry? They are the black hats," and it really was troublesome too and I did think the industry was overly maligned.

Q: For God sakes they are producing life-saving products.

SCHUKER: Exactly.

But some in my peer group were saying, "Jill, how could you do this with an industry that is talking about restoration as opposed to extension," in other words sort of dancing on the head of a pin. I remember one of those who is still an old and good friend, Mark Green, who has run for many offices in New York--he just lost to Andrew Cuomo in the primary for attorney general, but Mark was a good friend and originally had been a Nader's Raider and was head of Consumer Protection in New York. One of the Nader people was the nemesis of the industry Dr. Sydney Wolfe.

Q: This is Ralph Nader.

SCHUKER: Ralph Nader's group, right.

Q: A group that is looking at products, the safety of products.

SCHUKER: Looking at everything, right, and clearly has made a real contribution. One of the initial things was calling attention to the Corvair and the Pinto and…

Q: These are automobiles that were…he wrote a book called Unsafe At Any Speed.

SCHUKER: Unsafe At Any Speed, exactly. There was certainly attention as you have just said Stuart on other products and one of them was certainly medications and also this view of making products more available to the public and sort of damning the industry for high prices and all of that. So Mark was one of the people who said to me, I remember distinctly, "Jill, I don't understand you with your background, how could you work for these guys?" It was a very conflictual time for me. I wasn't particularly happy as I've already expressed why about the association's work style but I also felt like I had sort of betrayed my peer group or whatever. Of course, I had other friends who said, "This is ridiculous. Of course you are doing legitimate things," but it was troublesome.

Q: Sure, could you talk a bit about what did Jill do? What sort of work? How did you operate?

SCHUKER: In and out of government …skills are very transferable in Washington and whether one is trying to put together a team within government to pursue a certain issue, a certain priority of the administration or one is working for a trade association pressing forward on an issue that needs Congressional support, or you are looking for support within the administration where you are pursuing a public strategy. I was not the head of congressional at the association but I worked closely with the person who was and who also faced some of these same devils internal and external that I did and who also came out of a big D Democratic background.

But what we did was seek to build coalitions, trying to get favorable attention to our positions. Working as I did with all the major pharmaceutical companies, the Merck's and the Bristol-Meyers and the Pfizer's and such with the heads of public affairs to put together an outreach strategy. To keep the natives happy in terms of those who were more dominant in the association as well as those who were not as big or as powerful but still

had a stake in this issue. We had to make the internal case as well as the external. It really is the job of the trade associations in Washington to represent their full membership whether it's on a trade issue, or another political legislative issue, or other issues. We certainly tried to highlight the work that the companies were doing on some of these terrible developing world illnesses which actually Jimmy Carter at the Carter Center has spent a lot of time with some of the companies seeking a cure for Guinea Worm and other especially horrible killers of people in Africa. Merck particularly was very, very active on river blindness.

The delicate dance for PMA was, and these companies also had their own representatives in Washington and wanted individual recognition, so it was important to highlight the good work that the industry was doing but not sort of have a favorite child which was one of the tricky balancing mechanisms. So my job was to run public affairs and work with the press and the public affairs professionals of the different companies in and out of Washington and really to minimize the bad news and highlight the good news and to create some better mechanisms or ways in which we could promote the positive industry message to the public.

As often happens during a particular period of time an issue begins to dominate and the one that began to dominate as I've mentioned was this issue of patent life and intellectual property which is the life blood for these companies because when they lose patent life protection they lose the right and the financials that accrue to their bottom line and of course to their stockholders. The companies spend tremendous amounts of money to research and develop these medications and they argue they should have the ability to keep their patents as long as possible. As I said, we called it restoration; others argued that the word was extension..

It's still an issue within the industry and I'm sure it is still an issue that they fight for but one of the arguments on the other side beyond the ones I've mentioned is that these companies spend too much of their money on promoting themselves. It is not an unusual argument. Like now, is the Bush Pentagon spending money on promoting the Iraq war to purchase more weaponry rather than body armor or are they using public funds to sell the war to the American public. This is not just an issue with this administration; it's been an issue before when we talked about the Panama Canal treaties earlier or whatever else. I mean there are certain priorities and it happens in and out of government.

But of course government has a public trust and there are certain industries like the pharmaceutical industry which are expected to have the public trust first and foremost in mind even if they have shareholders and that, of course, is one of the difficulties and one of the big issues in Washington regarding lobbying. Whether you are a teacher or a consumer advocate or a trade association everyone has issues in which they are interested in promoting. I think one of the things the American public doesn't understand well enough is that they themselves have interest groups that represent them on a whole range of issues but there is the view that lobbyists are "the other".

Q: During the '80s how did you find dealing with the press? Were they coming out of the same beehive that you were, sort of liberal types or was it a mixed bag? How did you find the press looking at the pharmaceutical industry… I mean were they instinctively thinking this is a great target to kick around?

SCHUKER Yes, I think the industry was a good political football but it was also for me yet another learning curve in terms of it was a new knowledgeable press corps to deal with. I was dealing with business press, with health press, with trade press, trade not just about trade issues but press specific to certain industries, like the Pink Sheet that follows the pharmaceutical industry and very much focused not just on how business itself is doing but also what medications are being researched or close to being discovered or internal tensions. But within the press that covers the industry there were certainly those who are what I would call investigative types and who were certainly looking beyond the surface of "Gee, what is Pfizer or what is the industry doing in general?" They wanted to know why they were doing certain things, why certain kinds of research were being pursued and not other research.

For example a nemesis of the pharmaceutical industry and he remains so to this day and is a controversial although respected member of Congress is Henry Waxman. He is a California Democrat, of course not now in the majority but at that time was and always holding hearings about the pharmaceutical industry particularly how money was being spent or wasted and on what. One of his very big issues and not an unimportant one was his focus on "orphan drugs". These are drugs for various kinds of illness that are used for individuals who have more unusual maladies home and abroad . The companies do make decisions on what research they are going to pursue with their budgets. They obviously choose—they can't do everything, and so part of the concern that Waxman had was that certain illnesses were not being addressed by pharmaceutical research and there should be ongoing investigative research.

This was an easy issue for the industry to be criticized for its priorities. In some ways the industry is damned if it does and damned if it doesn't, so I mean I think there is some unfairness. I certainly felt it when I was there but I had my own conflicts as I mentioned.

Q: So then where?

SCHUKER: Then in 1984 I went to what was then sort of not a new industry in Washington but began in many ways after the Kennedy administration when Larry O'Brien went out on his own…

Q: Well he was Kennedy's political operative…

SCHUKER: A key political and congressional guy who started representation in and of the private sector. He was a "go to" get things done operative. Many people say, and I don't know if this is absolutely true, but that it was after the Kennedy presidency that people who had been in government didn't just return back to where they had come from prior to their government service and changed the demographics of Washington as

permanent residents, many lawyers and lobbyists and public relations-public affairs professionals.. Eisenhower of course had warned of the influence of the military-industrial complex and its clout.

Q: Would you throw the think tanks in there into that?

SCHUKER: Yes, I mean I think a lot of that grew up after this period certainly in terms of more politicization of the think tanks as opposed to just the earlier intellectual more neutral analysis and perception of a Brookings, for example, with Joe Pechman at that time. He was sought for comment regularly as a known expert on budget and health issues. Think Tanks started to take on more of a political correlation with agendas as opposed to more non-partisan or neutral but informed analysis of raw data.

One of the things that blossomed was smaller boutique kinds of firms that did public affairs and domestic and international representation. Through Frank Mankiewicz who was a friend from RFK days and had been press secretary for Robert Kennedy, before he headed National Public Radio (NPR) and other things, I ended up at Gray and Company for the next 8 years until Bill Clinton became president. Frank was someone I knew through a lot of political work and he had gone to Gray & Company, headed by Bob Gray who ran the Reagan inaugural and also had been the head of cabinet affairs for Eisenhower. He was a very, very political guy and very successful and he started a Gray & Company. I think he was one of the first to realize that he needed to incorporate both sides of the street politically to be optimally effective. He brought in Frank as the head Democratic guru and the firm was small then, maybe it was 30, I can't remember exactly but it started after Reagan became president so 1981-82 and a year or so before I came in 1984.

I was part of the Democratic side of the shop and I loved working with Frank and other colleagues there and I really felt like a weight had been lifted leaving the association. Before I left Lou Engman was in a sense summarily let go which had to do directly with the patent issue and his strategy but mostly to do with his personality. He stood up to the PMA Board, so it was again a complicated and not happy time within the association, and which created its own set of tensions. But there were not a lot of wet eyes when he left, especially internally.

I went to Gray & Company and one of the very first issues I was asked to deal with was tobacco. I had hoped to be injected into the international work which I eventually did but the company along with everyone else it seemed in town had tobacco clients. Not unlike China today in a sense everyone in town seems to do something with China as a client. Then it was like there wasn't a firm in town that didn't seem to be doing something for the tobacco industry or the petroleum industry. Anyway, It was something particular to a tv show in Florida. It was a sort of talk show but an important one in Florida and the interviewer happened to be somebody I knew who was dealing with this issue of smoking and such. The client was going to be on this show and I was asked to smooth the way and I did. But I wasn't happy about the involvement so I said "OK, but this is the only time

that I'll do it." Not the best way to start off in a new job. I must say in good faith that was the only time I was asked to work on that client.

But in the private sector it is different --you may not agree with certain policies in the public sector and either you are quiet or not unlike Cyrus Vance you leave after arguing internally. Actually I think it's one of the things that will haunt the Colin Powell legacy for the rest of his life. Vance left when he couldn't support the policy. I think Powell should have left when he was marginalized by this administration over "slam-dunk" regarding Iraq. I understand and I can't get into his psyche or his head but actually I think it would have helped the American public had he done it. I think it would have raised needed issues…

Q: Oh, I don't think…I think he should have resigned on principle.

SCHUKER: I think he should have resigned and it would have set the tone of the Iraq debate differently. It was really very, very unfortunate. But anyway in the private sector, not unlike government, your bottom line is you take on clients and maybe there are certain clients you don't take on. I was at Gray & Company, which was then bought by Hill & Knowlton, the big public relations firm two and a half years later and all the hopes that some of us had for a Democratic presidency in '80, clearly that didn't happen, Reagan, of course, was reelected in '84 and then Bush 1 so I ended up staying until I went into the Clinton administration in '93.. But it was a long interregnum in the private sector and I did get to do some very, very interesting international work I have to say. But there were clients that we represented who were troublesome and some who we decided not to represent. One centered on the Catholic church, when the women at the firm said no we won't. We won't work on this and we don't want the firm associated with this position. It was over the issue of choice and…

Q: The abortion issue.

SCHUKER: Right to life and the choice issue. It wasn't that all of us were in sync on that particular issue but it was the view that we were going to be asked to deal with that issue publicly and in a sense promote a particular point of view. It was our collective view and a number of the men there too, but certainly the women, that this was a matter of personal conscience and not something that we wanted to take on as a position on behalf of the church. But it was…we went against Bob Gray and others in the firm and it caused quite a controversy internally. But we did not take on the client.

But another client that we did take on was Scientology for a short period of time. The firm seemed always to be in the news in that period. We had people chained to our front door because we worked on Angola –the country, not the prison—during its transition from a pariah state to a friend of the United States, and that was during the first Bush, father Bush, administration. But this was sort of post, again your point about the politics in the policy, Reagan pursued a very determined policy of support as we well know from the Contras to what his administration called Freedom Fighters and to them that meant support for Savimbi.

One of the rebel groups in Angola was UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) headed by Jonas Savimbi and the other side was the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) headed by Jose Eduardo dos Santos. We worked with the MPLA.

One of the issues was that dos Santos had some support from Castro, from the Cubans. Angola produces a lot of oil especially from Cabinda province, and in essence we had sort of a Libyan situation where the oil companies and the US government had a great deal of interest in Angola for that reason especially. Basically Cuban troops were protecting Cabinda in essence protecting US interests so nothing had straight line clarity and strange ironies although the US government supported Savimbi as "our" freedom fighter. There was similar support in Latin America for freedom fighters as they were called. This was still viewed as a bulwark against communism. Then Bush came into office and the transition began from support for Savimbi to dos Santos and we were hired to work with Angola during this transition, for which I did a tremendous amount of work. There were lots of attempts at peace agreements over time between the rebels. But at this point it was a period of rapprochement. Actually we worked with Angola twice—once with the MPLA and then again when they were transitioning to govern the country. The firm that had been representing Savimbi and UNITA had especially close ties to the Reagan administration and the Republicans-- Black, Manafort and Stone. At one point we arrived at our office work and there were people organized by that firm, chained to the front door and the gate of Gray & Company protesting Angola and our representation. Bill Casey at that time was CIA director and Bob Gray had talked with him and he had "okayed" our representation with the Reagan Administration as we understood it or Gray would not have taken dos Santos on as a client. Interesting. The interplay of the public and private sectors. I think in part the Administration wanted an outside interlocutor with the MPLA.

You inevitably are doing a lot of talking with those who are now sitting on the inside of government while you are on the outside and part of it is knowing the ropes and the pressures which people in government are facing. It really does help to have been there, the same goes for the Hill and to understand sort of how you try to work out a policy. I do think that the input you can get from those who do not necessarily have to represent the policy itself in a sense can be very helpful, you can be a very helpful interlocutor. My view always is that the important thing is to be credible, whether you are in or out of government, and to be an honest broker. You can't make it about the money. And you have to believe in the client's position if you are really going to be effective and live with yourself. I think if you are really going to be effective you have to say "I have to be honest with you, if you trust me then you'll know that I'm being credible, that I'm going to tell it to you as it is, I'm going to tell you what I believe you need to hear and what the truth is, not just what you want to hear." A lot of clients don't want that, much less people in the administration. Clients understandably but often problematically want to call the shots regardless of the "right" or "wrong" of actions or messages or reality. This is not a good client situation to be in.

Q: Well I think that's a big problem today, a major problem; most of the public realizes this but what about Angola? You were representing sort of one side. Did you find…could you tell them don't do this? I mean was it PR (public relations) stuff or was there something to do in the field? We were having a terrible problem with mines there…

SCHUKER: Still.

Q: Small children being armed, I mean, I don't know, it was horrible.

SCHUKER: It was a horrible situation and one of the issues, I mean I went to Angola a few times and there were more landmines…I don't know if that is still the case but Angola had more land mine victims than any other country in the world. You would go and see, I mean walk down the streets in Luanda, the capital, and you would see many victims of landmines, all ages, legs blown off, limbs, it was horrifying. Savimbi ended up in essence falling on his own sword. He was anti-Castro and I think that was a key ingredient for the Reagan crowd. That position really has had so many things to do with U.S. policy responses over the last fifty years. I mean, a lot of issues have been centered around who's been for or against Castro.

Our job on the second go around was really to work to transition the Angolan government to a functioning non-Socialist government and to provide and set up their embassy and staffing here. One of the first things was focusing on civil society but also as basic as changing the country's name identification from the People's Republic of Angola to the Republic of Angola and changed the connotation from terminology like the People's Republic of China and similarly North Korea and all such names and what they implied.

It may sound so obvious but it was reintroducing them in many ways because they had been kept out in the cold by the Reagan administration. It was transitioning them into a legitimacy and to basically inform them, teach them, I don't want this to sound so missionary like but I mean it really was to provide insight into some of even the basics of how America worked, how democratic government and governance worked. Some of it was introducing them to people on Capitol Hill to get members to visit Angola, outreach to the Black Caucus, Charlie Rangel and others. It certainly was important from the perspective of Angola to build up knowledge and its bonafides. I mean they were looking as you said for help on health issues—landmine victims, on economic issues. The country was as many of these countries in Africa had been, colonial in its past. Impoverished and without education infrastructure. Angola was Portuguese. Luanda is set on the water, with some beautiful old mansions, but then you open your eyes wide and the town is an absolute shambles from fighting, from incompetence, everything is unavailable like street cleaning. The exterior of things may sometimes look one way but the interior was crumbling. I remember staying at the hotel, the main hotel the first time I was there and you would hear shooting at night. There was still lawlessness, there were kidnappings, things that one still hears about in other countries as well. But, of course, part of this is that the African continent faces general inattention over many years and then the scourge of AIDS and other serious diseases.

For me it was a tremendous opportunity to really work with a government in a country that was coming in from out of the cold and help create positive change. We met directly with the president and there was a sense of real opportunity and interest in transition.

Q: How did you ,and I hate to use the term, interface with the Bureau of African Affairs and all that? Were they part of your strategy?

SCHUKER: Yes absolutely and we certainly took cues from them. We were not in government, Certainly we provided a back channel of sorts and we were able to offer the opportunity to present to the administration and congress some of the concerns that the Angolans had and we did and could move things along. It was another channel.

We worked with the Department of State on the first State visit, dos Santos came to the United States and met with Bush. We worked very hard to accomplish that and it was quite a breakthrough after all those years. When you think that three years earlier we were officially supporting and encouraging his sworn enemy Savimbi, it was incredibly significant.

Q: Did you find your counterpart that was dealing with the other side public relations firm, I mean were you in battle with them?

SCHUKER: Yes, we were in battles with them earlier but you know the balance not unlike Democrats and Republicans shifts; the official balance had shifted because Bush was seeking rapprochement with the now president of the country as opposed to with the insurgency leader, or with Savimbi, the Reagan administration favorite. But it was quite a battle royal in terms of press, in terms of the Hill, I mean there were strong supporters for Savimbi still, including in the Administration. So leaks and backbiting were not unknown.

Q: Did you have friendly newspapers and unfriendly newspapers? Or…

SCHUKER: We had friendly reporters and unfriendly reporters. But people like Jeanne Kirkpatrick and others were still very strong Savimbi and UNITA supporters and were quite outspoken that Bush was wrong. This was a major foreign policy shift.

The American public is not well versed in foreign policy and not well served in terms of being educated and even informed in its complexities. Life is complicated and there are times when subtleties have to be continually explained. Like right now I don't think the public is being well served. Things don't change overnight. There are transitions, osmosis. Which is why doing away with exchanges and things of that sort is so shortsighted.

Q: Did you find that you or your colleagues were acting almost like political advisers to…

SCHUKER: Absolutely. Bob Gray who headed the firm being one. I think Bob was a very good businessman. I don't think that we would have taken on this client if Bob had not been given the initial nod. Bob himself was very much a Reagan man and was never really thrilled with the representation which is why he had very little to do with it. I mean he did work on some clients; this was not one of them. Lauri Fitz-Pegado then Lauri Fitz was a key lead on this client. She was a former foreign service officer, spoke Portuguese, very knowledgeable…and Frank Mankiewicz as well.

Q: Well then are there any other sorts of international clients that you worked with?

SCHUKER: Yes and one that was extremely controversial and also received a lot of media and Hill attention was Kuwait. After the invasion of Kuwait.

Q: By Saddam Hussein.

SCHUKER: By Saddam Hussein in 1991…

Q: '90 wasn't it?

SCHUKER: 1990, exactly, August of 1990. The backdrop was we had supported Iraq in the Iran-Iraq conflict in the '80s. Saddam Hussein was our horse in the race and just like our initial support for the Mujahideen in Afghanistan when they were fighting the Russians –before Al Qaeda was birthed and found a protected home in the country—there was some sense that Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait would not be met with strong U.S, resistance which turned out not to be the case. Well without getting into all the complications the fact is that Iraqis crossed the Kuwait border in August of '90. Exactly how we were going to deal with this blow to sovereignty was questionable initially with concerns such as what the implications were going to be for Saudi Arabia, our oil supply, much less the issue of invasion itself and sovereignty issues.

Basically after the invasion, the government of Kuwait became a government-in-exile and there were reports at the time that Iraqi troops were inflicting torture and killing—even hanging people from flagpoles or whatever, it was terrible stuff and our firm was solicited to represent Citizens for a Free Kuwait (CFK), Kuwaitis in exile. We took them on as a client with the understanding of course that they sought to get their country back. We often worked with polling firms and we did so at this juncture with The Wirthlin Group known to be a well respected "Republican polling firm" headed by Richard Wirthlin. We were asked-- I don't know whether there was a bidding war, but in any case we ended up representing Citizens for a Free Kuwait with Wirthlin. It was extremely controversial --Saddam Hussein again was supposed to be the good guy in the past but also what was our role to be in the region. Our firm's work over time was deemed to be quite effective even too effective and the underbelly question became whether Hill & Knowlton and Wirthlin had sort of laid the groundwork for America to enter Kuwait militarily and expel the Iraqis. This of course had many, many, many implications for our troops in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. But a blown up public issue

was whether we on the outside had convinced the American public by our work to go to war. This issue found its way to a 60 Minutes story.

My role was very much about message and strategy and working with the polling company. Lauri, who I mentioned earlier and who is a very close friend of mine to this day, was heading H&K's international division and she got caught up in a tangled public relations web about our work for CFK and was the person designated to speak on 60 Minutes which turned into a nightmare. An interesting but unhappy Washington kind of story.

Basically, a key issue became did the Iraqis remove babies from incubators in the hospitals? Given other documented atrocities that took place there was every reason to believe that this was true as we were told by someone who claimed to be a credible eyewitness. It turned out that the young woman—the eyewitness-- who testified on Capitol Hill to this grotesque observation in a hospital and whose correct name was not used at the televised congressional hearing because she had family still in the country and Congress agreed not to use her real name and not show her face to protect her and her loved ones, was the daughter of the ambassador, the Kuwaiti ambassador to the U.S. which became a subsequent and huge brouhaha about whether she actually did see this, whether she was being used by us or the government in exile to put forth a point of view and false information to "sell" the war to the American public. Now the truth is that members of Congress did know who she was, we had every understanding that she had been in the country and had escaped with her mother and her aunt. I think that she had been in the hospital and saw a baby removed from an incubator. It wasn't babies, one baby is horrible enough—but she said babies and it became hugely controversial, specifically was the American public sold on a war?

My view at that time was certainly that it was a very clear issue: a country was invaded, a country who was our ally, a country that was important to us for oil by someone who we of course learned subsequently, Saddam Hussein, was a pretty dismal and untrustworthy character. I think our firm behaved honorably based on what we sincerely believed. The invasion in my view as a citizen was the absolute right thing to do; clearly it was a slim vote. When Congress voted in January we went in and got out within a month. Kuwait was restored to its borders. Our relations with Iraq were never the same after that. It did create a period in which we began to have troops on Saudi soil which, of course, bin Laden said among other things is one of the things that absolutely set him off against the U.S. because we defiled the Holy Land—Mecca-- and he formed al Qaeda and all that followed.

In terms of delivering messages on behalf of CFK we tested messages with Wirthlin using focus groups. It is valid to say that the Kuwaitis always wanted the U.S. to go in militarily and I think correctly thought it was the only way they were going to get their country back. I know for me and I believe for those I worked with, Frank, Lauri, others we never viewed it as our job to convince the public that the solution should be a military one. There were negotiations to avoid conflict. Interestingly, as you know one of the questions about our Iraq policy now is whether Bush 2 always felt that he had to go back

into the area, specifically into Iraq and sort of finish the job his father didn't complete by not pushing our troops to go on to Baghdad. It was always a source of controversy whether Colin Powell at that time should have marched the troops on to Baghdad and gotten rid of Saddam Hussein. Who knows what the world would have been like if that had happened. But the fact of the matter is that it didn't happen and we marched in and we marched out. Here we are twenty years, fifteen, sixteen years later. It's interesting to ponder.

Q: Did you find yourself dealing with the Kuwaitis? The Kuwaitis don't have the greatest reputation in the Arab world…

SCHUKER: And that was part of the perception issue. And the public really knew nothing about Kuwait.

Q: Yeah.

SCHUKER: The issue of sovereignty, of course, was the critical one in the Arab world and at the UN but, yes, the Kuwaitis weren't particularly well loved. So part of our job was just introducing the American public to what Kuwait was, where it was, who it was, its relevance for the U.S.

Q: How did you find dealing with the Kuwaitis?

SCHUKER: Well actually fine. It was somewhat of an unbalanced situation, of course. The Kuwaitis needed the United States. There were tensions but I've never been involved with a client where there weren't some tensions. But they certainly appreciated and recognized that we were being helpful and I think we were. As it turned out we were very helpful and I think that is one of the reasons that H&K's involvement became so controversial. It was a study in success with many different parts coming together to achieve a just resolution.

Q: Was the example of Belgium in 1914 the rape of Belgium and the atrocities that were put out by the British, which turned out not really to be true. I mean was that something that was lingering still with you?

SCHUKER: I honestly don't remember that being a talking point or in our minds or whatever. I mean the country was invaded. People were arrested, people were killed and there were atrocities committed. It wasn't the rape of Nanking on that scale but it was certainly a precedent in a very troubled neighborhood in which we had security interests and the United States was not prepared to allow it to pass. It may have been viewed at that time too as an opportunity to get a further foothold in the region.

Q: I was thinking but again I am a retired Foreign Service officer and to my mind there was no doubt you couldn't let this thing as George Bush said, "This cannot stand." I mean you couldn't let this tyrant take over a quarter of the world's oil or something. But

was the feeling that to sell it to the American people you had to personalize it, i.e., children ripped untimely from the incubators and all of that? Was that…

SCHUKER: There was certainly a sense that yes the public needed to relate to what was going on inside Kuwait. As I recall, we didn't know what the messages were going to be in terms of those that had the most resonance, which was one of the main reasons we did focus groups. We saw our role in terms of familiarizing the American public with the country and the situation, I never recall up until the very end when Bush made the decision we would go in, our intent was not to convince the American public that we needed to go in militarily but educate them about the seriousness of the issue and assess views and opinions. Saddam did himself in.

There was no question that any demonizing wasn't very hard to do…

Q: No.

SCHUKER: But the "demonizing" of Saddam Hussein was a very powerful message based on Iraq's actions and the concern that people had in terms of human rights issues was another very powerful message. Oil was also an important message but it wasn't at a time of "an oil crisis" and all of that. But this issue about sovereignty and national interest and Iraqi actions were very powerful at home.

Q: Could you describe what a focus group was in your context and what you were getting from this?

SCHUKER: Right, you would bring in a group of people together as we did in Maryland and perhaps Virginia, for example and Wirthlin also did polling in different parts of the country.. Basically you are bringing in more or less a random group of people, although from a particular community so it isn't like you are shipping people in from all 50 states. You are getting them in a room to talk about an issue, in this case about Kuwait, about the invasion, with someone who leads the group who has experience in sort of group dynamics and there may be a set series of questions, everything from have you heard of Iraq? Do you know where Kuwait is? What are the three characteristics you would say about Saddam Hussein or George Bush or do you know what sovereignty is? Do you care if a border is crossed without permission? Is this any business of the United States? You get a sense about what a range of people think and the hope is that it's enough of a range that you're getting a perspective that is representative of a way of thinking and takes on a deeper meaning. As we know when you do polling per se and you call people up and you have a very rigorous set of questions, you develop a sense of reactions. In focus groups you can look at body language not just people's verbal or oral reaction but also their visual reaction on certain things and the group dynamic.

Q: And you have them together as a group?

SCHUKER: Right and the group dynamic-- does one person influence others? What are the influential arguments? And you watch them.

Q: You are looking for what, from your perspective, you are looking at what resonates to what gets people concerned about Kuwait?

SCHUKER: About Kuwait--what resonates and what doesn't and do nine people out of ten say they never heard of Kuwait? Then you have a big public education issue ahead of you; whether they associate Kuwait with murderers or do they associate them with movie directors or oil companies or whatever. So that you sort of know what the lay of the land is. You are watching the group through a one-way mirror, identifying their reactions and listening … or you may be watching on a video camera.

Q: Anyway obviously through your efforts completely you were able to expel Saddam from Kuwait at the time.

SCHUKER: Absolutely –that is what some people thought. But we played a role I think we did in messaging effectively.. I think it was an important role and an effective one. 60 Minutes did a hard-hitting segment on Hill & Knowlton and its role in the U.S. decision to go into Kuwait and basically the piece at that time said that the company "convinced" the American public to go to war. That was an exaggeration of multiple proportions. Bush was very clear about what he wanted to do. I do think we played a role in educating the American public about what was going on and readying them for the possibility. Also, the CBS piece was very, very critical of not just the company but of the person who was the spokesman on television at that time, Lauri, who basically had to deal with this issue of the ambassador's daughter and why Congress supposedly did not know who she was and wasn't she coached to say certain things that weren't true and none of that was true. None of that was true. But, be that as it may, it was a very ugly situation.

Q: Well 60 Minutes was and I guess is still a…

SCHUKER: I don't encourage most clients to do 60 Minutes if offered unless you are Baryshnikov and they talk about how wonderful you are.

Q: I mean it's really designed to expose, to find something and to say isn't this awful, aren't these people awful?

SCHUKER: Yeah, 60 Minutes has done some great stuff but I also think they have done things that set up straw men, Lesley Stahl is a good friend and other people on air and who work there and I respect its purpose but in general when it comes to fairness I think you need to be discerning.

Q: I think this is probably a good place to stop Jill…we will pick up the Bush-Clinton campaign this would be 1992?

SCHUKER: Right, '91 into '92. Once again, we Democrats were hoping we might be able to win the presidency that hadn't happened for quite a while. I had done just a little bit of outside work with Bill Clinton while he was governor. He was very interested in

trade missions and Sandy Berger-- who became the National Security Advisor-- first deputy and then National Security advisor for Clinton when he became president.-- I had known Sandy for a number of years. I had met Sandy on the McGovern campaign in 1972 in California. I didn't know Clinton then but Sandy and someone named Eli Segal who eventually became head of AmeriCorps ran the McGovern primary campaign there in '72. Clinton was doing Texas for McGovern I believe at that time. In any case they all knew each other. Sandy had been in touch with me about Clinton as a potential presidential candidate to support in '91 and was excited about his candidacy and I became an early supporter buoyed by his enthusiasm especially. I thought it was the right candidacy for the time and then Ron Brown who eventually became the secretary of commerce in the Clinton administration was running for chairman of the Democratic National Committee and I supported him for that position and knew Ron somewhat through Lauri. Anyway in one-way or another I got quite engaged in the '92 campaign although not as an in-house staff person.

As I often did, during campaigns—like 1988 when I took a leave of absence from Hill and Knowlton to become communications director for Dukakis in California for the general election period—I worked at the Democratic convention in '92, which I think was in Chicago and then back in Washington DC during the campaign on policy committees while I worked. In any case, Clinton as we know became president and I was so ready and excited and interested in being reengaged in policy on the inside, not just campaign politics every four years. Ron Brown, as it turned out, was asked to be Secretary of Commerce and one of the issues that I knew Ron was very interested in and Clinton seemed to be very interested in along with his close friendship with Ron (who supported his presidency strongly as DNC chairman), was international trade and the desire to have a much more active Commerce department on this issue and others. Ron Brown offered me the position of heading public affairs and press at the Department of Commerce and I went into the administration with that understanding.

I guess the inauguration was, of course, late January and I went to Commerce in February. Ron had hoped to be considered for Secretary of State but he knew it was a long shot. With all of his ability Clinton needed someone with the pedigree of a Warren Christopher since he himself was viewed as a newbie to foreign policy. But Ron was very clear that he wanted to be in a more expansive role with an international dimension. Ron had been talked to about UN ambassador as a direct report to the President but Ron viewed this in some ways as a Black position—Andy Young, Don McHenry-- and was not interested. I think more than any other reason he wanted to stay in Washington in these early days of a new administration. As you know, there is often a tension between the ambassador to the UN and the secretary of state or can be in terms of the structure. Ron, who was always in a groundbreaking sort of mode, had a strong sense that Commerce would enable innovation as Secretary, an ability to be engaged in the trade agenda, and there was a lot that he wanted to do. Also that it would be the first time that someone who was Black headed the Department of Commerce and I also may say that it has often been a cabinet position filled by a close ally of the president.

Ron had very good, very strong appointees at Commerce, staff and line. Jeff Garten who was undersecretary for trade had been at the State Department during the Carter administration. He subsequently went to Yale to head the management school there after he left the Clinton administration. Ron fostered a strong international dimension for the Department. There, of course, were and are many other facets to the Commerce Department. At that time there were fourteen bureaus and many of them had to do with trade and export policy and such but also the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Census, the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), the international communications bureau and export controls. As to NOAA, as I mentioned, 25 years earlier I did my masters thesis on Law of the Sea and the formation of NOAA so it was a bit of a homecoming on that score for me. NOAA also was the biggest budget piece of the Department. NIST dealt with a range of emerging high tech issues. NIST set standards for building construction and when the Towers came down on September 11, 2001 for example, NIST was very involved in the analysis of what happened and why and what structural changes were needed to prevent any chance of another such calamity. NIST was involved in intelligence/intellectual property issues intersecting with the Defense Department's DARPA as well.

What was very interesting from my perspective was I had a direct and close working relationship with the secretary that always makes life very interesting, and because of his relationship with the president that made things even more interesting. Secondly, there was a political as well as policy component in terms of what things the president wanted to accomplish in the administration and do through commerce, writ small and large. Thirdly, Ron had a macro view of his position as opposed to a micro view and that made it very engaged. Knowing him from before the administration also provided a trust that certainly was tested at times through some tough, contentious and highly political issues.

Brown also had a lot of interest in trade and expanding the U.S.—and specifically the Commerce—footprint. I did a lot of traveling with him and I think the very first trip we took was to South Africa. Ron was deeply interested in Africa and one of the things he did during his tenure was to increase the visibility of Africa, its trade importance and helped design a higher profile relationship with the continent. From his previous legal and representation work he had deep contacts that proved to be transformative. Making South Africa his first trip overseas in the new Mandela administration was so significant and he had the authority to name a special ambassador and advisor and did so with that new person based in South Africa. Millard Arnold, an excellent officer, would represent the Department and the Administration in furthering trade and commerce. He worked directly with and for the Commerce Department's Foreign and Commercial Service headed by Lauri Fitz-Pegado. Millard also would in essence ride circuits on the continent to improve and to enhance relationships between the business community and the United States government. Millard's appointment was announced on the trade mission which included high profile business leaders and was the first of many trade missions to follow around the globe. So it was a very interesting and heady and exciting time, at the beginning of the administration particularly and a new era.

Q: Commerce, speaking as an old Foreign Service hand, Commerce, people thought of Commerce as being a rather stodgy outfit which for years had been a place where they rotated political appointees through the assistant secretary and equivalent level limiting its effectiveness. Did you find that?

SCHUKER: Well there is a part of me, like anybody, that would react to that on a personal level and say no, no, no, no everybody was very competent, etc. and so forth. But I do think that Ron was aware of that issue and he had a highly effective chief of staff, Rob Stein and highly skilled and motivated appointees. He was a lawyer and a very well educated one and knew what the President wanted. He was a groundbreaker all of his life. I think he was the only Black in his class at Middlebury and then received his law degree from UVA (University of Virginia).

Q: Middlebury College up in Vermont.

SCHUKER: In Vermont, yeah, people go for language training, very special language training.

A lot of the career people especially at the higher levels of the SES, the Senior Executive Service were extremely competent. I had 40 direct reports in my office, with 14 other line reports as well from the bureaus and had a hand in the hiring of some of those public affairs officers. But one of the mandates was to sort of clean house…clean out some of the sinecures, those who were not pulling their weight and perhaps leading to the perception you mentioned.

For example one guy who had been at Commerce for many years basically spent his afternoons sleeping in his office. It required a change. That was I must say, atypical however and I am sure not unique to Commerce but it certainly needed to be addressed with the proper legal and grievance procedures and the civil service union. That was a learning curve for me and a challenge in terms of redress procedures and all of that.

So I mean there were certain challenges that you managerially have to handle ,in government and out.

Q: Sometimes there are scandals.

SCHUKER: Yes, you do have the public trust to think about as a given and there are challenges. Coming into this position as a woman was difficult for some of the older males who were used to a different pace. People get used to sort of burrowing in. Anyway it was interesting and Ron had a strong commitment to diversity and to sort of shaking up institutions, as his history demonstrated.

Q: I don't mean to sound cynical because I don't mean it that way but in Washington power is how you get things done. Part of your perception is to get on <u>Meet the Press</u> or to be high-profile. The Department of Commerce is not a high-profile place, like Defense

and State. Some of the other departments fade into the woodwork unless somebody is working hard particularly to raise your boss's profile, to be out there to be effective.

SCHUKER: That's a very good question Stu.

Q: It's not an ego question; it's a quest for power.

SCHUKER: No, no, no it's a very good question and actually I was going to get into it and this is a good segue because there is good visibility sometimes and not good visibility. I've mentioned I think in our conversation that there have been times when you are happy not to be on the front page on certain issues. I never have totally ascribed to this sort of "as long as they spell your name right" kind of thing.

Ron, by definition, was someone who was a media magnet because of his previous life as party chairman and because of his personality, which was very quotable and outgoing. He liked people and connecting.

Q: And he stood out as having a movie star quality.

SCHUKER: Yes, he had a very magnetic personality; all of this is in the past tense now, of course. He had a very magnetic personality and also had a close relationship with the president so I mean all of that sort of gave him a certain star quality. In addition, Ron was not uninterested in attention. I mean he was not one who ran from the media, as some tend to do. He liked the challenge. He also was someone who, and I've worked with many people now in and out of government, of very high profile, and we all know Clinton's skill on communications. Ron had a lot of that, he had the gift of quick thinking, of being able to construct a full sentence when he spoke, of having a thought that had a predicate and a noun and a verb, things that, as we know, that have certainly been parodied enough with our current president not having in great abundance, so that helped Ron as well.

Now having said all of that, Ron also, not unlike President Clinton, had a bit of a colorful past. He did not shrink from that either in terms of certain perceptions publicly and in the press. There are certain press corps that cover the Energy Department or the Treasury Department or the Commerce Department or whatever and part of my challenge was to get beyond the obvious, as important as they are to the business community which has a great interest in Commerce but to get beyond the essential trade press. So you are interested in the Wall Street Journal and the Journal of Commerce and The New York Times and Business Week and Forbes as well as the weekly magazines Time, Newsweek, etc. I had a good product and I had a good person to work with and that helped a lot and he was not unknown and that helped a lot.

The challenge again though was and one of the things about a sprawling department like Commerce was to build an umbrella brand, if you will. As I think about this and I go back in time, one of the interesting challenges was to have somebody not just say "I am the head of NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) or head of NIST

(the National Institute of Standards), but I am the undersecretary or assistant secretary of Commerce. Branding of the Department itself.

When you are in a big department with many strong bureaus within them with their own relationships on Capitol Hill, the umbrella identification takes on meaning for budget considerations and battles. NOAA actually was the biggest money sponge; I mean it got the most money within the department. It's very easy to think of the department as segmented but Secretary Brown, Ron, wanted the department to think of itself as a unit, as a whole. So that was a challenge in and of itself. That was one of the challenges, thinking departmentally and what would be good not just for your bureau but for the department. It may not sound like a big deal, but it is.

When you are dealing with press in this regard that's sort of important too because it's not just the secretary who is speaking it is the undersecretaries and others. So part of my challenge too was having a good relationship, a close relationship, a good working relationship, a sort of top down relationship to some extent and to an important extent with the different bureaus and the press people who had, as I said, a dotted line relationship to me and, of course, inevitably to the secretary but had a more direct relationship with their own either undersecretary or assistant secretary. So that creates its own set of challenges when you are trying to have a coordinated message for the department and to be sure that everyone not only knows what the secretary would like said on a certain issue but that there is a certain coordination and, of course, as we all know in Washington there are always anonymous sources and people who have their own way of viewing an issue that finds its way into the media. You don't want to find yourself refereeing public battles among your department principals.

Ron was a magnet for press—and President Clinton himself tapped Ron a lot as a spokesman on issues—because of Ron's background. He was very political; he also had been at a well-known law and lobbying firm Patton, Boggs at that time called Patton, Bogs and Blow; Patton, Boggs is viewed as a very politically connected firm. Ron had been engaged with some clients such as the Government of Haiti, for example, so Ron brought with him certain controversies. Haiti, which has always had a difficult history and reputation…corruption issues, etc.…

Q: Particularly in sort of the boil broke during the early Clinton administration too. People fleeing.

SCHUKER: Right, exactly and it actually has been controversial for the Clinton administration. In general, when one looks back at certain issues—Rwanda and Somalia for example—being perhaps the most controversial and unhappy in the sense on how the Clinton administration handled those issues and, of course, President Clinton has subsequently, in particular on Rwanda, apologized publicly for not dealing with what he has called a genocide as quickly and as forcefully as he says he should have. Haiti also was not viewed as the administration's finest hour. Some of Ron's background on that became controversial and there were a couple of buzz saws that we ran into at Commerce, that I ran into, that he ran into and my staff as his press and public affairs and

communications people, that we had to wrestle about with the press. One of these dealt with some earlier business deal that was viewed as possibly questionable in terms of how it was negotiated and this was before Ron actually became Secretary of Commerce but it clearly carried over when he became Secretary.

You know, something that you said Stu, which I think, is very important. You've made the point that State had always sort of been one of the most sought after, elite places to work in government as viewed by the press and even the public .You said Commerce was not and I think that has been true. But, I think so much of it has to do with the issues at the moment but also the personality of the Secretary and more than anything the way the president deals with the particular department, I mentioned the president and Ron Brown. Bob Rubin, for example, who was viewed as a very powerful Secretary of the Treasury, James Baker. Of course, when Clinton came in there was sort of the campaign mantra "it's the economy stupid", so I think that Treasury had a profile at that time under Baker who had been a former Secretary of State as well. The president sort of viewed certain departments as, I don't know, higher profile as power brokers. So I think Commerce had a higher visibility and expectation with Clinton and in some ways it was good news and bad news because there was more focus on Ron Brown, there was more attention and Ron was a sort of lightning rod for certain controversy.

Now, there was an investigation during the time of Ron's tenure as secretary of Commerce that had to do with this Haiti issue that I mentioned, whether there had been some sweetheart deal basically. So that was an issue I was dealing with and another issue had to do with how people were chosen for trade missions. Because Ron made this, made trade a key focus, as I said, because of the president's interest and his own and it was a key theme for the Clinton administration writ large. And Mickey Kantor who was the U.S. trade representative—

Q: Special trade representative.

SCHUKER: After Ron's death, Kantor came over to Commerce. The whole trade portfolio was huge—especially NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement)—there were just big trade issues during the Clinton administration so there was a lot of concentration on that and on Commerce and questions about business people on trade missions in ways that the press sniffed politics. My own view, having been there, I think there was a lot of care about participation—who, why and legitimacy. Yes, some participants had been Democratic supporters but there were Republicans too. So I think that it was more of a tempest in a teapot but it became a cause celeb and took on an outsize role.

So what I am trying to say is that some of what I was engaged in during the time I worked with Ron was sort of chasing or putting out fires which seems to be a pattern when one is working on big issues with big personalities. As we know every press secretary at the White House and any place else that seems to be a part of the job. It certainly has seemed to be part of what I have done in various jobs. So you have a very

serious portfolio on the policy issues but you also have this very personal portfolio for the person you are working for and Ron was, as I said, a lightning rod.

So I seemed to be having a lot of dealings with the Department of Justice and others at the time.

Q: Let's come to that but first a question. Did he have any natural enemies? I mean within this Washington world?

SCHUKER: Yes, he did. It was natural. Ron always said he was a great respecter of Lee Atwater's talent. Lee Atwater died very tragically at a young age of a brain tumor. Lee was a very effective Republican operative. He was viewed as sort of a James Carville, that kind of person attitudinally, a quite brilliant, extremely tough, some would say ruthless, political operative on the Republican side. He and Ron were sort of natural political enemies from Ron's DNC days especially but Ron had a lot of respect for Lee's ability. I mention that because Ron had a lot of political enemies on the Republican side of the ledger. He was, after all, chairman of the party, and as Clinton acknowledged played a major role in getting him elected. He was very outspoken in general, and he was very outspoken in his political views. He had a lot of charm as well. He also had been in Washington for many years and had in the rough and tumble of Washington client work and was well-versed on the political side of things. I mean even in terms of what one could call Black politics Ron had created certain enemies and controversy, provoking interest and respect, but also perhaps natural jealousies. I think Ron was quite embraced in general by the African-American community. He had worked for Ted Kennedy as head of the State-Justice-Commerce committee at one time. He had spent a lot of years in the Civil Rights movement. Ron had paid a lot of dues but along the way had certainly been in the midst of plenty of controversies. So some thought that he invited controversy. I wouldn't phrase it that way at all.

Q: Let's talk about Haiti. In the first place, what does one do to deal with problems like this? Sometimes, your main client may not quite level with you on everything. Things keep unraveling and all of a sudden you find something else that crops up. How did you deal with this sort of thing?

SCHUKER: Well I guess first I would say as I said in previous conversations with you, Stu, it was not the first time I had dealt with controversial issues on behalf of an important political and elected official. I mentioned the issue with Governor Carey but there have certainly been controversial policy issues too. Ron was complicated in some of the same ways that President Clinton was complicated. In other words, he could play a little bit with how he responded to an issue or question—being savvy, knowledgeable enough about the English language and about things political. These are people who are used to revealing certain things and also sometimes stopping at the water's edge and feeling that they are able to do so. That it's not the public's or the press' business and, of course, that line has sort of disappeared over time. But it also can trip you up as we know. Frank Mankiewicz always said it is very difficult to argue with those who buy ink by the barrel.

The other issue is what is privacy and what isn't, in the world we live in. These are very astute politicians who play the game of politics in a very profound and professional way but also very close to the vest. A baseline decision about going into politics is are you ready to make your life very public. Some people will have more trouble with that issue, ethical issues, family issues for example. I want to just underscore that I think Ron Brown was a great guy and a terrific politician and a terrific Secretary of Commerce and a deeply good and talented man. He also had his flaws and it wasn't always easy to parse the issue of privacy—what I needed to be privy to in terms of correct information.

Because if there is one thing I totally believe, it is that you've got to have all the facts to sensibly consider how to deal with what is coming and what you want to say about something and be credible and what the consequences will be if you say or don't say something. If you don't know all the facts, you can't make, it seems to me, an intelligent judgment and cannot provide good solid advice to somebody as a good counsel or you are caught in a mess, both you and the principal and your credibility is just shot. So whether it is the infamous sort of Monica Lewinsky issue-- Michael McCurry hopefully knew what he needed to know when he briefed the press. Very, very tough. I mean we've seen it a lot in the Bush administration on various issues. I mentioned an old friend, Les Janka who resigned over the Grenada issue during the Reagan administration, because he was not told about the invasion of Grenada and basically lied to the press but he didn't know he was lying to the press. You've got to be credible.

So what do I think? I think that Ron was very forthright with me. I met with lawyers in the administration and as appropriate outside as needed but then it gets into these things about what is public, what is part of his Department of Commerce role and what is relevant only to his personal life and therefore what is my role in discussing certain topics. It's challenging and I do feel that I was sort of brought into counsel and knew what it was I needed to know and knew the truth of the situation and was able to deal with it effectively and I think we dealt pretty effectively with the issues or when I needed to point the press in another direction. Again, I don't want to make this sound like it dominated his time at Commerce but it was certainly a factor. I mean Ron was not an invisible Cabinet official and his life was quite public. But what happened was and there was a special counsel called which was a way of dealing with these kinds of 'non-commerce" matters. It was a Republican Congress at the time-- the 1994 Congress, the Newt Gingrich Congress-- and political enemies can be powerful and relentless. He was. I think that some of this investigation regarding Haiti for example was sort of made into something that it wasn't but there was a special counsel identified.

Q: the Haiti issue….

SCHUKER: I had gone over to work at the National Security Council in 1995, which I guess we will get to later, but the special counsel issue was still going on when I left Commerce and a few months after I left Ron went on an official trade mission. This was during the period that we were still engaged with the whole Bosnia issue even after Dayton (the Dayton Accords signed in November 1995) and Eastern and Central Europe

writ large in terms of the continued fighting. In any case, Ron went over on a trade mission with a small trade group as well, and wanted to stop and visit our troops based in Tuzla in Croatia. I almost went on that trip because one of my major responsibilities at the National Security Council--I was dealing with setting up a hopefully well-oiled effective communications network regarding Bosnia and Washington during the continuing conflict. I arrived just as Srebrenica happened (July 1995) which was another horrifying event and made the peace talks that much more focused and crucial. In any case, Ron's plane went down the following April, April 1996. I still get the chills thinking about it. It was just horrifying but for the moment for the purpose of what you and I were talking about, the special counsel issue died with Ron but at that time it was still an on-going investigation.

Q: These special counsel operations —the Whitewater investigation and other ones— have a life of their own. Some of these are going on as we speak today. It was a poor system of sending out special investigators essentially for political purposes.

SCHUKER: Well I would say that there are some who had good intentions in terms of what seemed to be an independent way of investigating a particularly controversial issue that presumptively was supposed to take it out of politics, but it didn't. They never seem to.

I would say with maybe a rare exception, it basically became a political football and tended to be used by the political opposition for embarrassment and exposure and sort of drum beats that went beyond even what the original issue sometimes was about and as you said are still going on today.

Q: Getting involved in this, did you find yourself sort of getting between the Department of Justice and your principal and all of that? I mean was this…

SCHUKER: Well there were difficulties. I wouldn't say getting squeezed between the two was an issue but clearly as I was the spokesman for the Department and for Ron. We had administration-wide meetings on various issues and there were certainly some departments I dealt with more than others. I mean I dealt a lot with the State Department and, of course, the National Security Council when I was at Commerce and on various issues there were a lot of interagency or White House meetings. On this particular issue, I did deal a lot with the Justice spokesman. But there was a sort of Chinese wall, there were certain things that Justice because of the nature of an investigation and whatever else can or cannot talk about. So, dealing with the Justice Department, in some ways, was not unlike the CIA on certain things. There are certain issues that you can get into and certain things that cannot be discussed ,just like when I was at the NSC, there are some issues that are clearly classified and all of that. So one has to be careful. There were certain things that his lawyer-- and he had an outside lawyer-- I'm sure he dealt with Justice and perhaps shared with Ron things inappropriate to share with the spokesman at the Department of Commerce. So part of it was having to deal quite sensitively with different hats and responsibilities and sensibilities and legalities.

I don't mean for this to sound saccharine. But you are very aware when you come into government you take an oath of office, I mean you take an oath there is a public trust and basically you are there to serve the public so there is that.

Q: Did you find though given the climate turned just plain vicious.

SCHUKER: Vicious, yeah they were vicious.

Q: Vicious is the best term, but anyway, saying let's not put too much away that's if you are doing something awful but things, the more of a paper trail you had the more fertile the fishing ground was and were you sort of policing yourself and your work?

SCHUKER: That is interesting. We had a lot of our files, in the department itself and the General Counsel's office was deeply involved in a lot of this as well, of course, and had responsibilities about paper trail. Many of us were deposed because there was an outside group called Judicial Watch which was very conservative and I don't think it would stretch it to say anti-Clinton and they pressed forward on an issue in court about the make-up of the trade missions and how they were put together, etc. and so forth. Anyway a number of us were deposed so this issue about a paper trail again I don't want to sound like Pollyanna but you feel…I mean there are certain things that are important to have on paper that are part of the public record out of not only necessity but out of good public procedures, good governmental openness procedures.

But there was also, I would say that these kinds of investigations certainly have a chilling effect on what you commit to the written/typed word. I mean you do think about committing pen to paper or computer or whatever. I might say that we tend to forget but it was really at the beginning of the Clinton administration that computers became I mean sort of at the end of the '80s is when the hard drives and all of this began. It is the dawn of all of this. I remember at Commerce I had a computer and typewriter but, of course, I was a hold out on the typewriter for a while, but yes, you do certainly think about memos and things that you are writing. Can a word be misconstrued? Whatever.

I will say this I do remember seeing a letter, it's funny I can't think of who was chairman then, I want to say Chris Dodd, Chris wasn't chairman, but I forget who was chairman of the party but I did see a fundraising letter that was sent out from the Democratic National Committee I think in 1994 that talked about trade missions and contributions, and the party needed this and that and business execs would have the opportunity to go on missions. I did call it to Ron's attention and I did speak to the Democratic National Committee about this seeming linkage. They were presumably talking about certain things that were happening via the Democratic National Committee itself but I felt that it could be easily misconstrued and pounced on as quid pro quo and be seen as directly-Commerce connected. It was removed from the letter, and when I was deposed that was raised.

Q: Well now moving to issues. One, could you talk about the relationship between Ron Brown and his department and the special trade representative who was Mickey Kantor.

Now Mickey Kantor, as with most trade representatives, was sort of renowned for having some of the sharpest elbows in town. I mean this is what you do; you hire a pit bull to go out and beat up on other countries about trade. But how did this work?

SCHUKER: Well, Mickey and Ron got along fine and after Ron's death, Mickey as I said, became acting Commerce secretary. Having said that, there were certainly some issues about division of labor at times and it became even more important that there were good staff communications so that there would be coordination but separation as well. Clearly the roles were different; Ron had a different portfolio, a bigger portfolio in terms of his responsibilities and many other issues, but he clearly was interested in the trade issue and that was the key issue for a long time—NAFTA.. The whole administration was turned on to be very active on NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) but Ron was not negotiating that, it was Mickey who headed the negotiations and strategy. Ron was an important spokesman. A lot of other officials addressed the issue from different perspectives. It was all hands on deck. Mickey and Ron definitely had their frictions and vying for the President's ear and limited time. I think what was important and I mean if the two people had not been friendly it could have created total havoc and someone may have had to resign. Two strong personalities. They both had a close relationship with Clinton, with the president, which was important.

Mickey's relationship went back to the early '70s. Mickey had worked at the top of the McGovern campaign and had worked with Hillary Clinton on legal aid issues as well early in his career. There was even some question, if I'm remembering correctly; that Mickey may have gone to head Justice but that didn't happen. There were people including Ron, as I said, who didn't necessarily get their first choice of Cabinet post. But Mickey was highly regarded and effective in his USTR position.

Q: Wasn't there essentially a hostile relationship?

SCHUKER: It wasn't hostile. As I said, there were frictions and jealousies but I would not call it a hostile relationship. That conjures a different view to me. But I would say there was built in friction.

Q: Yeah. Well what about domestically? I'm looking at the Department of Commerce, of course, from the foreign policy point of view but what about internally? What was your impression of the general American business community and its relationship and what did the Department of Commerce was doing internally?

SCHUKER: Clinton was very focused on economic issues and I think one of Bill Clinton's greatest strengths was and is his understanding and projection about the interface between foreign and domestic issues and foreign and domestic economic policy. I think it's one of the reasons why he gave such a high profile to the National Economic Council which didn't exist before Clinton and I think exists in some form under Bush but is a totally different kind of animal under Bush. Both Bob Rubin and Gene Spaulding, two very close Clinton friends and advisors, were given great prominence during the Clinton administration. This is despite the fact that the business community is and

remains traditionally Republican. While Clinton got support, he worked very hard like pushing the NAFTA agreement that was not a favorite among rank and file Democrats.

Q: No, the unions were particularly unhappy about the…

SCHUKER: Right, there was tremendous opposition and not just unhappiness in a silent way but very active opposition to the North American Free Trade Agreement and Clinton really pushed back on that and, of course, the agreement went through. Ron had a lot to do with dealing with the business community on that but also, of course, had union ties from his former background. If there was a tension level it was really between him and Bob Reich who was the Secretary of Labor. They were sort of more oil and water and not just because of the portfolios of the departments but their personalities. Ron was a very practical politician, Bob Reich was much more of a liberal firebrand and had problems that were known during the administration with Clinton himself like on welfare policy and he wasn't thrilled on NAFTA either. Of course that was also Reich's portfolio as labor secretary. Ron had not only a sort of a big role to play with the business community and generating support for NAFTA but it had a political component too and with an interest in building greater support in the business community for Bill Clinton and for the Democrats in general.

Now, do I think that that happened? The business community is still a Republican base but there was some chipping away of that during the Clinton administration and I think the union movement has gone through a lot of incarnations over 30 years, 40 years, but has lost a lot of what is viewed as its political clout. It is still a very important get out the vote mechanism for the Democrats when you deal with the rank and file on election day. I think the unions were not all that happy with Bill Clinton's presidency but made their peace with it but have tried to reassert power subsequent to his presidency. But they have a deep fissure within their own community between the AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations) and some of the other unions. Anyway that's a whole other issue. But I think there would be no argument to say that the unions felt that Bill Clinton was leaning in the direction of the business community, certainly more so than previous Democratic presidents and they were not happy about it. The word "fair "entered into a lot of the rhetoric on the NAFTA agreement, but the unions weren't buying it and had greater concern about the word "free" and what it would mean for the outsourcing of jobs and all of that and some of that certainly has happened.

Q: From your perspective with the Department of Commerce how did you view relations with the State Department? Commerce had taken over the commercial side of the State Department and I was wondering how you, at the time, were dealing with it. How'd you feel it was working?

SCHUKER: Well you said something earlier Stu which I think is absolutely true, having been at the State Department during the Carter years and through my work at the NSC. The State Department is sort of the elite unit of the guard and it is both viewed that way and resented by probably many other departments with overseas interests and responsibilities as Commerce does. There are skill sets that one must be schooled in and

there is a strong sense of self and professionalism on the part of the Foreign Commercial Service at Commerce, for example. Now I know that the FCS has been more or less upset with various secretaries and the feeling that they have been marginalized at Commerce and ignored by State. And the Foreign Service officers at State have issues of being treated as second class citizens in favor of political appointees or not respected enough. I think there is a view, however, that whenever other departments, Commerce being one, engage in foreign policy issues that they basically are treated as outsiders so there is a built in resentment of the State Department by other professionals that State is a closed-shop and acts as a bunch of know-it-all elites.

So with a very assertive group at Commerce some of whom had served at State I would say that there was an aggressive attitude toward inclusion. Ron, as well, wanted to be sure that people like Jeff Garten or David Rothkopf or others of us were participants in meetings on certain policies or Lauri Fitz-Pegado who headed FCS but it wasn't a natural fit and there was a sense of resistance.

There was a very strong deputy group in Commerce, the level below secretary and Sandy Berger ran the deputy group and people like Larry Summers and David Rothkopf and Leon Fuerth who worked for Gore and others were part of that. There were a lot of strong personalities not always in agreement on procedures or substance but a lot of things got done and accomplished at that level, agenda setting and direction. There were a lot of sharp elbows everywhere and the need to use them but I think had people not been well regarded Commerce would not have been as engaged a player as hard as Ron might have pushed. Sandy also was an inclusive leader.

Q: Well too, Ron's opposite number was for most the time Warren Christopher who was not a Washington tough bureaucrat. He was more a lawyer so probably, if another person was in there, there could have been more friction.

SCHUKER: I worked with Warren Christopher during the Carter administration when he was deputy secretary and I respect him and like him but he and Ron were oil and water. If you hear somebody with two last names they are probably at State—a sense of upper crust that many feel. I mean for Ron who had wanted to be at State there was a little bit of resentment that he wasn't there. I think he respected Chris intellectually but saw him as quite stiff and not especially welcoming. Ron was not that way. Ron was always impeccably dressed and all of that but he had a very different kind of personality. He also had the imprimatur from Clinton that Commerce would be engaged in a lot of these State issues. So a built-in tension.

Q: How did you find, again from your perspective, the policies of Mexico and Canada? We are talking about the North American Trade Agreement. Were there problems there that you had to deal with?

SCHUKER: I wouldn't say anything that comes to mind uniquely other than the NAFTA Accords particularly as it related to Mexico. It was extremely controversial, it was a big, big issue during Clinton's first term and it was sort of all hands on deck. Everybody was

engaged in it. It required a lot of messaging and it was an educational process and heavily political for Capitol Hill given constituent interests and members were concerned about what NAFTA would bring. But I would say in general the relationships at that time with Latin America and pretty much everywhere were pretty good for Clinton. Of course we bombed Afghanistan, we tried to get Bin Laden, the Bosnia war, Sarajevo and so forth but I can't think of a particular Latin American issue aside from NAFTA, unlike when I was in the Carter years and the Panama Canal issue or clearly now Bolivia and…

Q: Venezuela.

SCHUKER: Venezuela and Bolivia too but particularly Venezuela. I mean Castro was always an issue and has been since 1959. Clinton has remarked on this that he would have liked and was ready to try to move forward on relations with Cuba. What happened at that particular moment in time and one could ask was it purposeful as a provocation was something called The Brothers… I can't remember exactly what they called themselves….it was an anti-Castro group of exiles out of Florida and they flew a mission, a small plane to Cuba, and it was fired at and shot down.

Q: They were shot down.

SCHUKER: Shot down and someone died. And that ended talk of rapprochement. Strong voices within the Cuban community didn't want any relationship with Castro. There was always I think somewhat of a question whether this mission was sort of sent in order to create an impediment. I think that was when Madeleine Albright, then UN Ambassador used the term cojones when she was talking about the shooting down of the plane and comments that were made on board.

Of course, we are still there today in terms of Cuban-American relations.

You asked about Canada as well. So much of the NAFTA focus was south of the border but there were certainly trade issues with Canada but it was a smoother process.

Q: You were in Commerce from when to when?

SCHUKER: I left in 1995. I was there from 1993 to 1995, and then I went to the National Security Council.

Q: Today is November 22 (sort of a black day for a Kennedy supporter,2006. Jill a question I want to ask not dealing with but I think it's apropos with what we are talking about. Here you are, you are a PR (public relations) person, and we have just at the beginning of this month the Democrats have taken over both the House and the Senate. What does this sort of mean for you and some of your colleagues? I'm just curious what happens here on K Street where so many of those public relations firms are concerned. Do doors start to open or do you expect…I mean is there going to be a change?

SCHUKER: That's a good question and clearly one that has been discussed a lot.

Three things that you said I just want to take a little bit of issue with your question Stu and part of this is sort of the gestalt of Washington. One, people may say it's dancing on the head of a pin but I think there is a serious difference in my own view and between what I would call public relations and public affairs. I think Washington is a very public affairs focused city where you are dealing in many ways with public policy issues. There is such a porous relationship between government and outside of government for good or for ill at least in terms of the work I've done and that's not casting aspersions on public relations, I just think it has a sort of different kind of connotation. PR is More traditional Madison Avenue, product and advertising focused.

Number two, on lobbying. I have been registered just a couple of times—probably overreach--basically working with governments on reform issues but really have not lobbied in the course of my career as defined by either the lobbying act or FARA Registration Act (Foreign Agents Registration Act), and

Thirdly, I'm not on K Street literally with its implication although only a couple of blocks away downtown. I get the point however…

Q: I'm using the generic K Street, the greater boundaries of….

SCHUKER: Also, this election was a sea change. Not sure how long it will last but it is significant.

So much depends on what one does with the power one has been handed by the public. It reflects tremendous disappointment with the policies and perhaps the attitudes and actions of this Bush administration, the people or the profiles themselves and I think there is no question it was a rejection. How much of an affirmation it is for Democrats, I'm not sure. The off year elections often bring change. I'm very pleased that the Democrats are back in office for policy reasons and I think it was a very good campaign for the midterm elections. But it remains to be seen whether we are going to use our time well. Clearly there is still a strong executive branch that is Republican and I think the public wants answers and wants bipartisanship which they have not gotten and hopefully the Democrats and the new leadership even with the obvious fact that between now and 2008 we're getting into a presidential campaign and it's going to be intense and there is going to be political jockeying. I don't know that we are going to come up with an Iraq answer specifically but I think there is no question that there is going to be a different kind of focus in terms of policy as well as hopefully politics. Also, more bottom-line, I think Americans like it when both parties share power—congress and the presidency.

What it means for the downtown crowd is your direct question; a few very clear things. One, there has been something called the K Street Project since George Bush got into office in 2000 which has been written about but also clearly worked for the Republicans and was a very determined effort on their part to sort of denude downtown of Democrats. With a Republican Congress and Republicans on Pennsylvania Avenue this sort of mantra of the Republicans was you don't need Democrats for much. I think the lack of

partnership sort of resulted in part in what happened in this election. There is no question that because of the return of Democrats in Congress the public will be looking to have a stronger Democratic profile or certainly a more bipartisan profile. I think this K Street Project, which in essence was getting rid of Democrats, is basically over.

My own sense is that politically if nothing else hopefully Democrats are at least truly "compassionate" and also act smarter and that you absolutely need to have Republicans and Democrats who are thinking together about issues and working together to be much more effective in terms of public policy but absolutely in terms of politics and thinking about how to get the country on the right-track rather than the wrong-track.. But also, it's just more effective; it is smarter if you are going to put a firm together for example to have both Democrats and Republicans. I do think that this is certainly going to be a period where you are going to be hearing more of the Democratic voice and not just in opposition but hopefully and presumably in constructive politics. So I think the face of Washington will now start to change.

Also just inevitably even if Bush was the most popular president or not, he has entered the period when one is approaching lame duck status. He will be thinking a lot more about legacy and that will be very interesting because there may be a lessening of the sort of very strong political profile that has come out of the administration for six years and more of an historic perspective. He clearly isn't running again, I don't know whether there are any other family members in mind, and this is not to say he is not a very strong partisan but I think there is a bit of a shift in perspective. We are in a different town on November 8th than we were in on November 6. I think the Bush press conference on the 8th which was really interesting theater as well as a sort of different presentation of himself even though he quickly reverted to a more partisan profile within 24-hours. This sort of appearance and the commentary at the press conference was a more realistic assessment of where things are now. Hopefully it will mean more business for Democrats both domestically and internationally.

Q: Yeah, well it will mean more open doors all around.

SCHUKER: Absolutely.

Q: Going back to when you went to the National Security Council?

SCHUKER: It was sort of mid-year '95 toward the fall following the departure of my friend and colleague Tara Sonenshine. Tony Lake was the National Security advisor then, Sandy Berger the deputy. The focus at that time was very much on Europe, especially Bosnia and what the Europeans were and were not doing and our role pre and post Dayton. This was, of course, pre-Dayton Accords so negotiations were intense. As we are sitting here in my office Stu, I'm looking at a photograph where the president was briefing a range of key policy people from outside the administration presenting the position of the administration on Bosnia in the cabinet room and how to deal with Milosevic etc. and what I'm remembering most intensively was that major focus and principally something that Sandy and Tony had asked me to engage interagency as well

in setting up a communications structure. Internal and overseas to keep things coordinated.

Q: Well your job was what?

SCHUKER: My job at the National Security Council, the title was senior director for public affairs. I also had the role of deputy communications director at the White House among the titles at that moment, also special assistant to the president for national security affairs. But when one puts it all together it really was to focus on longer-term foreign policy issues and pressing communications issues as opposed to day-to-day press duties. There was someone else, David Johnson, a terrific guy, who really was the day-to-day press person. So I was looking at the bigger longer-term issues that we were dealing with and Bosnia was the animal more equal than others.

Q: The National Security Council, of course, is a different thing with different presidents and different national security advisors but the idea is that the National Security Council is to coordinate all the government dealing with national security, which is essentially foreign affairs. So one would say that your job if you were the public affairs advisor would be to coordinate and make sure that the Pentagon, the State Department, the Treasury, Commerce spokespeople were all speaking the same line. Was that part of it?

SCHUKER: Well it was coordinating communication activities that dealt with the issues such as Bosnia. In terms of sort of the press mantra when I was at the U.S. Mission to the UN or spokesman at the Department of State, that was David Johnson's portfolio. My day began with reading the Intel, the intelligence, and certainly the press clips and making sure we were all totally up to date on all news. Tony Lake would hold a meeting very often with Sandy Berger with President Clinton to brief him on the key breaking foreign policy concerns and of course the president had his own intelligence briefing as well. But that took place after a small NSC group-- David, myself, Sandy Berger, Tony Lake, Nancy Soderberg, the Congressional person, Bill Danvers, the special assistant, and depending on issues there could be a couple, two or three others, who would participate --this was about 8:00 in the morning in Tony's office. We would discuss what we anticipated would be the day's issues in terms of where the press would be and what needed coordination and where Congress would likely be focusing their attention. And Tony and Sandy of course would brief us.

Tony, I think twice, perhaps three times a week also would have senior director meetings in the Situation Room, which is in the basement of the White House West Wing. The National Security advisors office is, of course, in the West Wing one flight up, the National Security staff basically works in the Old Executive Office Building (OEOB), at least we did, I think it's being refurbished right now or whatever but all senior directors and staff are there. Clearly you are dealing with a lot of sensitive information, doors are locked, etc.

The day would begin as I mentioned and then there would be meetings that we would have that Tony or in his absence Sandy would run that usually followed his meeting with

the president and that would be both reporting back but also tasking us in terms of what the needs and focus would be for that day and moving forward.

Q: When you got to the National Security staff then how would you describe it as an organization and sort of the spirit of it at that time?

SCHUKER: Well, Tony was the National Security advisor the first term and Sandy Berger the second term. Sandy had known Bill Clinton for many, many years. They had met actually on a political campaign, in 1972 with George McGovern, and Sandy was very involved in the 1992 campaign and I believe I am correct in this, had brought Tony into the fold on foreign policy. I think Tony was supportive of Clinton but it was through Sandy that the connections in that sense were made. Tony and Sandy had worked together at the office of policy planning at the State Department during the Carter administration when Tony Lake had run policy planning and Sandy had been, I think, the deputy then as well. Tony Lake's credentials included being a former Foreign Service officer who had resigned on principle along with some other individuals--Dick Holbrooke, for example, over Nixon's secret bombing of Cambodia in the 70s.

At Sandy's recommendation Tony became National Security advisor but he did not have the history with the president and was building that relationship during the campaign and subsequently. Somalia had happened, that was a very bitter failure with horrible images on television of American soldiers' bodies being pulled through the streets and Black Hawk Down, the movie that was made about it, etc., and so forth.

So there was some very rough two-year history already by the time I was recruited to the NSC, so I think it would be fair to say that during the second term there were stronger personal foreign policy team relationships with the President, not unlike the Condi Rice-George Bush relationship. Sandy Berger also had a long professional relationship and friendship with Madeleine Albright who along with Sandy had conducted early salon type of foreign policy sessions for Bill Clinton with Sandy during the '92 campaign, and she became Secretary of State. Those relationships just worked better than the first term. Tony Lake and Warren Christopher left after the first term and their personal relationships with the president were more distant, good but not as strong as the second term relationships and that does have an effect on how the State Department and the National Security Council certainly operate together. As we know, Colin Powell during Bush had basically been moved to one side and the State Department suffered in that sense thereafter. Of course Vice President Cheney had a lot to do with that. Sandy, however, had a first among equals role when he assumed the National Security Advisor position in terms of the relationship that he had with the president. Madeleine and Hillary Clinton also had a strong relationship.

One of the interesting things in Clinton's first term that I'm not sure has operated in this or other administrations, was the Deputies group which I have already mentioned and which Sandy Berger chaired during the first term. A number of the deputies—like Larry Summers at Treasury—went on to run their departments upon the departure of some of the first term principals. Larry is a very controversial guy, very outspoken but highly

intellectual. The deputy group performed a key discussion and vetting for key policy issues so there was real camaraderie in working together for four years. Sandy had a very strong international business background from his law firm days especially with Asia and he also had a real feel for the domestic interplay which, of course, made him valuable on issues like NAFTA in the first term.

There was a lot of coordination that was done through the National Security Council. It was certainly a role that I was playing at that time with USIA and the Department of State and Treasury and Commerce. The National Security Council communications apparatus focused on helping shape and coordinate messages as well as oversee implementation. So message strategy was key.

Q: One thing. You served with the Carter administration and Zbig Brzezinski was obviously playing almost the same role that Henry Kissinger had played in that turning the NSC into a power center almost as opposed to the State Department or certainly often at odds. I didn't get that feeling from the Lake-Berger time or not but did you find that or not?

SCHUKER: The National Security advisor is in the West Wing literally down the hall from the president and unless there is I would assume an extremely difficult or unproductive relationship then I think whoever is in the job won't be there for long. The access that you have to the president in terms of just propinquity is just very special. The secretary of state has a different role to play, he is usually viewed as first among equals in the cabinet and I think we can see it even with Condi Rice as close as she is with the president, there is a difference between National Security Advisor and SecState. I think there is no question that she is a first among equals when one looks at the NSC and State but I think it was more of a balance wheel under Clinton, but the relationship between the president and Sandy Berger was also a really good friendship and that created a linkage that for example Tony did not have, Christopher did not have and less so but even Madeleine did not have.

Now in terms of the point that you raised there weren't the tensions to the extent that there were during Carter and there is no question that Brzezinski was very powerful in terms of both his force of personality and his views themselves. Vance was a negotiator, a diplomat. I thought the world of Vance but he was cut from a different cloth than Zbig. He had been deeply involved in the Vietnam negotiations of course; he was someone who was always looking to bring people together. Brzezinski was much more of a lone player and perhaps ideologue.

Q: Well you are really talking about the lawyer versus the professor.

SCHUKER: Right, exactly, and a power player. But more profoundly I think even than personality there were real differences in terms of both perception and approach on issues. Brzezinski and Vance had different views about dealing with Russia, for example, which, of course, was a very strong suit of Brzezinski's. He and Vance had both personality and policy conflicts and there were tensions without question between the

NSC and the State Department operationally. Of course, it was only one term that Carter had so we don't know exactly what would have transpired in the second term, it is hard to say. I think it's rare that you see, and maybe never, that you will see a Secretary of State going to the NSC; but I think there is always an itch on the part of the National Security advisor to go to be Secretary of State. Kind of interesting, actually. Of course, the unusual moment was when you had Henry Kissinger wearing both hats which was an anomaly…Kissinger clearly was sort of the animal more equal than others and when he was at the NSC you saw a diminution of the Department of State, he was so powerful. But Vance did leave, as we discussed before, before the end of Carter's term because of the very strong disagreement on the hostage rescue mission. He did not think that it could work, and green-lighting the mission was something he and Brzezinski profoundly disagreed about. The president clearly decided to go in and Vance resigned on principle. He was a man of great principle and felt he could not publicly defend the decision. And I think felt he had lost the President's confidence.

Q: You were in the NSC from when to when?

SCHUKER: I was with the NSC half of '95, all of '96 and '97.

Q: What were the issues that you were trying to bring together, I mean the ones you were particularly concerned with?

SCHUKER: I was very focused and I don't mean to sound like a Johnny one note, I mean there were all kinds of issues that we were dealing with clearly Africa, Rwanda, there was China, there were sort of a range of key issues but Bosnia dominated as happens sometimes as things are right now I guess one would say with Iraq. There is Iran, there is North Korea, there is this and that…but it is sort of a tremendous focus. We were engaged in a war, in negotiations that were fraught. The Middle East was also a key focus for Clinton. He deeply wanted to see that issue resolved and Sandy was especially involved in that. But a lot of personal diplomacy on the part of the President.

But, what I guess I am trying to say Stu is that the sort of day-in and day-out internal video conferences, coordinating the administration, public messaging and what was heavily going on in Bosnia was my focus. And we were very concerned. Richard Clarke was at the NSC on the intelligence side and getting a lot of feeding from the CIA of course. There were certainly deep concerns about terrorism and what was going on with the Taliban at that time—destroying cultural symbols and repression of women. Ruining lives and the life of Afghanistan. But my primary focus continued on Bosnia and acquainting the public with the issues we were dealing with in Bosnia, Serbia and of course leading up to the Dayton Accords signing in November. Clinton at that point also had great rapport with the public.

Q*: Well there is a sort of division of power. USIA which was still in place at that time and was forbidden by statute from publicizing things viewed as domestic matters influencing the public and the State Department to a certain extent is not really equipped to do that*

but in order to get something done in foreign affairs you've got to educate the American public. Was that kind of almost thrust on your office would you say?

SCHUKER: You have to remember that the first couple of years of the Clinton administration when I was at Commerce. The administration's focus was very heavily domestic—the economy, healthcare, even NAFTA.

When I came to the National Security Council the president really had not even sat down with the foreign policy press corps to any extent. I mean he did an occasional interview of course but I remember the first briefing because it was the first time I was really in the Oval Office and had helped brief the president beforehand with Tony Lake, Sandy, McCurry…we were getting ready for a sit down with key press covering foreign affairs—columnists, etc.. So a lot of that began in terms of sort of laying out the agenda and looking ahead and preparing for the effort that was going to be made in Dayton and in Europe, especially in the Balkans. Also what I was doing was setting up a series of meetings for the president and the vice president to brief and listen to the policy community about what we should be doing, and not doing, with Bosnia and elsewhere.

Q: The policy community being what?

SCHUKER: Think tanks, when administrations change clearly not everyone finds their way or wants to find their way into administration positions nor do those who have left and are thoughtful interlocutors find their way into think tanks. So you seek connections, advice, conveyor belts, validators, interlocutors, thinkers. So people who were at Brookings, the Heritage Foundation, etc.--yes even those who may be quite conservative such as Heritage but who might be idea generators should be part of those briefed. The American Enterprise Institute, CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies), the Wilson Center, places where there was a sort of say ferment of ideas where policy people were thinking about a whole global range of areas including Africa, Asia, trade issues, Fred Bergsten's group which is now called The International Institute of Economics. It was to get these people hopefully on board in support of policy but it was also as I said to listen and to inform and hopefully to identify publicly supportive advocates or thought leaders so that when people were writing Op Eds or speaking on campuses or speeches they were informed and had the opportunity to hear what the president and the administration were thinking about on a whole range of issues. And frankly to hear their opposition arguments as well so we could better counter them.

Q: You are fortunate in a way that you had an extremely bright president but also a president who listened, who was…

SCHUKER: He was a sponge. So smart. Not intimidated. Such a great communicator. We all were lucky at that point.

I had the privilege, of course, of working with President Clinton in some close proximity when I was in the White House. Obviously everyone is flawed but he has an extraordinary intellect and he is a discerning sponge! I mean he clearly has his own

thoughts and processing but he loves information and strong intellect and the give and take and he is a blotter for information and in processing information Actually I think Hillary is very much the same way. In that sense I think they are very good intellectual partners. Bill Clinton really liked to hear what people thought; he really liked the dialogue and not just from the Einsteins of the world. He is very interested in hearing what "the people" are thinking, the popular culture kind of information as well. It helped make him a very effective President until it all came a cropper.

We all like to think, we have interesting thoughts and things to say but when I had mentioned this particular briefing prep to you earlier before we went to the Cabinet Room the president seemed interested in what I thought about what would be important messages. You do realize that you are sitting in the Oval Office and it is imposing and it is the president of the United States and clearly you are hoping that you are being both concise which I am often not on this tape but concise and articulate and thoughtful. Even brilliant. But the fact that he is interested enough is a very compelling feature of his presidency, I think. Having seen him in a number of meetings with real policy intellectuals—men and women-- he really was very interested in not just hearing people saying yes, yes, yes. He wanted to know what their thoughts were and it was clearly highly educational and an intense broadening experience for me as well. A great experience.

Q: I interviewed Wes Egan who was our ambassador for four years in Jordan and after what turned out to be the very last meeting between King Hussein and a president of the United States because Hussein died shortly thereafter. But Wes was saying you know the only person in government whoever debriefed him about his four years in Jordan was the president. The president said after they waved goodbye to the king, "Come into the Oval Office." They went in and they talked for about an hour and it was question, after question, after question on this.

SCHUKER: He is the most intellectually curious person I would say I have ever met. There are others who I would put in that category but given who he was and the demands on his time I mean part of it is literally even on Air Force One or on plane rides he hardly slept, whether it was playing cards or conversing, he is somebody who likes a lot of stimulation around him. I've been to some things outside of government with him in attendance like these Renaissance weekends in South Carolina and he just loves the intellectual give and take.

Q: Well now talking about Bosnia obviously there was a period of time when it first happened when the Europeans rose up and sort of said, "This is a European matter, we can take care of it." Now it turned out they couldn't.

SCHUKER: Right.

Q: The United States was at one point James Baker said, "We don't have a dog in that fight." Well, we had a very big dog in that fight and it was pretty obvious and it became more obvious that we couldn't sit idly by. Did you in your position you are talking about

getting the press who dealt with foreign affairs but what about particularly the European press. This is an important area and how did you deal with the European press and not just in Bosnia but particularly the focus on Bosnia, how did you deal with this?

SCHUKER: Right. Absolutely and I was sort of talking about the American profile and the learning curve but the international press was absolutely key. I worked with David Johnson on who headed up this effort—who needed backgrounding etc. One of my frustrations working with Tony was that he didn't like to do press and he wasn't particularly comfortable with it. So that was an issue. And yet he was not especially willing to have others replace him in the arena.

Q: This is a typical Foreign Service reaction to somebody.

SCHUKER: We had our work cut out for us and, of course, part of it was that Sandy was more willing to do it and I do think Sandy would be the first to say he had his own learning curve in dealing with the press at that level. Dick Holbrooke of course, was very engaged both intellectually in policy and strategy in terms of Bosnia and he and Tony had some old baggage from Vietnam. So with the international press an important part of it was making sure that we were getting the right people in front of them. When I say the right people, people who were comfortable in talking about the issue. Dick did a lot. Warren Christopher although he wasn't great with the press either.

So it wasn't a period in which we had those who worked at the top of the foreign policy food chain function as great communicators. But there were others who did a first rate job. Sandy Vershbow, Wes Clark, others. We had a very strong spokesman with Mike McCurry. And the President of course But it's tricky because you don't always want the president out there. It's too high level. We made a lot of use of Madeleine Albright too with her European background and her position at the UN was very helpful at that point and she was always more comfortable and quotable.

The National Security Council as a rule has not been the most visible on speaking out on foreign policy. It is viewed as more of the inside adviser to the president and to sort of explain off the record or on background about policy. It also meant that setting up the right structures abroad was very important. Every morning we had a video conference call, the Department of Defense, State, the NSC, others and people on the ground in Bosnia about what messages would be communicated, who was being talked to in the press, who we needed to talk to…

Q: This is before the Dayton Accords?

SCHUKER: Yes and after. The video conference would be people sitting in Tuzla or elsewhere in the Balkans or where our base…

Q: Sarajevo.

SCHUKER: In Sarajevo, and so what was needed and where and how we were going to articulate the message and set up the systems that needed to be set up.

Q: I'm confused now. The Dayton Accords allowed us; I mean that's when we put the first armor division and everything in so we didn't have anything essentially on the ground. Did we accept observers prior to that?

SCHUKER: Yeah, we had observers prior to that but we were actively concerned about what the next steps were going to be in terms of the U.S. and clearly the message that we wanted to shape and how and what the U.S. role was going to be… so VOA (Voice of America), Radio Free Europe head Geoff Cowan who was involved in running all of that at the time was engaged in messaging, working with our allies. . What we would do at the BBC clearly Blair and Clinton were quite close. How we would frame and articulate the message and then with Dayton exactly what we would be doing in terms of and where and how the communications would work.

Q: Were you picking up, I mean picking up obviously you were in the middle of it, a growing frustration with you might say the European-UN approach to this thing which essentially was sort of sitting there while the Bosnian Serbs and the Serbs themselves were shelling Sarajevo? It was all very nice for…

SCHUKER: Absolutely. The Sarajevo market that was the center…

Q: There was a volt or mortar or something that hit the market.

SCHUKER: In the market and, of course, the pictures of loss of life were horrendous. Remember too if I may say theoretically these were in the early days of CNN. It was a different kind of…

Q: Instant news, instant TV.

SCHUKER: It was all news, all the time with CNN then as opposed to now with Nancy Grace and this one and that one. If you don't tune in at the right moment now on CNN you can hardly find any news. Sorry to interrupt but that was a very important conveyor belt of information and a new one in the '90s.

Q: Were you sensing a growing frustration in saying, "God, we've got to do something?" I mean this is sort of the American ethos; you don't just stand there, do something.

SCHUKER: The answer is absolutely yes and Europe was not doing the job needed--Blair wanted us in. Part of the backdrop was the post-Somalia experience and Rwanda --there was no way there was going to be a repeat….Let me think, I don't think Powell was there then….. I'm not sure but…

Q: I think Powell was…

SCHUKER: Maybe on the cusp of being there and going because I remember seeing him but I'm not sure what month it was. But the idea of going in was I don't know what the terminology that we used was an overwhelming force but it's going to be this was not going to be a sort of gentle effort and clearly the pictures of the Bosnians, Muslims and the camps and the bodies and the slaughter…

Q: Srebrenica had happened.

SCHUKER: Absolutely Srebrenica had happened and it's hard to say I don't know that I would use the term popular war but it was something that I think we did a pretty good job of educating the public about and the view that it was important that we engage. I think you know there was also Stu a more general mindset in America that even though the Europeans weren't pulling their weight, there is more of an acceptance threshold among the U.S. public about engaging in Europe as needed.

Q: Were there any sort of people within your purview who were saying, "Oh, let's not do this?" I've talked to people who served in Belgrade at the time and were saying Milosevic and company were banking on the Somali experience that we couldn't take casualties.

SCHUKER: Right.

Q: Therefore we wouldn't do anything.

SCHUKER: You know it is interesting. Clinton was not going to repeat the Somali experience and hang back. If anything I think it drove him forward. He was not going to let that happen again on his watch. I think that what he understood was that the American public needed to be educated so that if we went in, or more when we went in there was going to be a grounding and a structure in place that the public was going to be ready which no one was regarding Somalia.

Q: Well now the NSC always has a military component there. They had gone through Viet Nam and also Somalia although they had the Kuwait thing that came out very well. Were the military people on board or were they saying, "Oh my God, don't get us involved in this, or do you recall?"

SCHUKER: Not as I recall. Also Perry was there then and, of course, eventually it was Bill Cohen. I do not remember any kind of strong opposition to going in at the NSC or elsewhere. Wes Clark who worked very closely on the negotiations and then, of course, we had the tragedy with a Humvee, I think that went…

Q: It was armored, it was not a Humvee but it was a…

SCHUKER: The negotiators, which went over the side of a mountain, which was horrible, personally horribly tragic, but just very, very tragic in terms of the talent and expertise lost as well. There were long negotiations and a lot of preparation and still

clearly concerns about going in but there was a whole discussion about exit strategy and is there an exit strategy, when will there be an exit strategy. How do we get our troops out? And when? And safely? And what is the end game? It wasn't perfect but we did end our engagement. And we didn't ignore the perpetrators. Milosevic was eventually tried and Karadzic and Mladic the bloodthirsty military guy and the…

Q: The political guy in Serbia and Bosnia.

SCHUKER: The political guy wandering around somewhere and presumably there have been a million sightings and they haven't been captured yet. I'm not reading intelligence any more so I don't know. But, they are still clearly, what's the word I want, wanted for war crimes and will be pursued. One key lesson on policy is that the public needs to be better prepared. And Clinton's personal issues half way through his second term affected his connection with the public. He lost trust and his "voice". Tragic on every level.

I think about Iraq is that there is still the profound question of what are we doing there? Where is the raison d'etre for U.S. engagement?.

The public can be forgiving but they don't forget and there are consequences at the ballot box.

Q: Were you there during the Dayton Accords?

SCHUKER: Yes. In Washington.

Q: How did that play? It meant for a peaceful, if you want to call it, a peaceful solution to this thing. They had the American male fist stuck right in the middle of Bosnia with many other countries.

SCHUKER: It was a negotiation, we sat with Milosevic, we sat with the parties but that doesn't mean these others won't eventually be tried for war crimes at another time. So I think all this stuff about we shouldn't be talking now to this country or that country is really an irrelevance in a sense that it doesn't mean that there won't be consequences. But it does mean that you are trying to settle an issue and save lives and presumably, hopefully not give up your principles in the process. I think Dick Holbrooke did an extraordinary job with the other negotiators. Wes Clark went on to take over the NATO Command. I mean the times were different; it is a different time now but still...I think Americans were prepared and made their peace with our engagement, negotiations and boots on the ground to not have a repeat of the atrocities.

Q: During this time did you sense a certain sense of guilt about Rwanda that there was the idea that we and I say we including other forces including Canada and all would, should have done something in Rwanda or was this with everybody so occupied that this at the time kind of passed as an unfortunate thing but that's Africa or something like that?

SCHUKER: I hate to say that…I hate to sort of latch on to your words Stu but as has been reflected since then, we didn't take it seriously enough in terms of what actually was going on. I know Susan Rice who was at the NSC and then State subsequently, literally had nightmares about what we didn't do at the time. Tremendous regrets and guilt. And the President too. Both really intelligent and caring public servants. It was just a terrible mistake. What should have and could have been…

Q: I've interviewed Pru Bushnell who was the office director and that was her black sheep.

SCHUKER: I mean it is I think we have rarely heard a president of the United States provide both an apology and a mea culpa and a sort of hair shirt about a policy and I've heard him speak so often about it with deep pain and regret. I think it was an unfortunate combination of preoccupation, of not appropriate recognition of what was going on, of unfortunately concern then about a reaction to the Somalia experience.

Q: Somalia played a very large role.

SCHUKER: Somalia played a very big psychic, psychological role within the administration. I know it did with Tony. I'm deeply impressed with those who have been desperately trying to put Darfur on the front pages. It clearly is genocide, not that there aren't certain things being done but here we go again. We are bogged down in Iraq, we have problems, huge tension filled problems with nuclear proliferation et cetera. It's just as I sit here, what am I doing about it? Am I sending money or whatever? And what does that do? But I mean as these ads in the papers have said when people look back, what will they say about us? We stood by. It happened in Cambodia with Pol Pot, I don't know. I don't know what it says about humanity or certainly our country but…

Q: It doesn't speak terribly well but…

SCHUKER: We tend to stand by and wait and clearly that should not be happening. I think to myself even if we had all the money that we are using in Iraq would we use it for this or use a goodly percentage of it? I don't know, I don't know.

Q: Well, of course, it isn't just we but this is a problem getting other people involved, other countries involved.

SCHUKER: Well and clearly I mean I'm personally a believer in the covenant of the United Nations and was very enthusiastic about Kofi Annan as UN Secretary General and I think what has happened is tragic because I think his tenure has become sullied. The UN right now is in a broken state and I hope that the new secretary general can provide fresh eyes as they say to revivify what is an essential institution including dealing with issues like Darfur.

Q: At the time of the Dayton Accords, this is close to the time when you left the NSC wasn't it?

SCHUKER: Yes, I'm trying to remember the exact date, later in1997.

Q: Was there the feeling, boy, we've really done the right thing?

SCHUKER: There was yes, I would say there was a very strong sense that there was relief certainly but there was a strong sense that this was an important, not perfect but good, resolution on Bosnia. That lives had been saved, that lives would be saved, that there were loose ends but this was an essential step and sort of we, ourselves, but also helped others dodge a bullet. I think it energized the president, President Clinton, to tackle in some ways the Middle East in a more vigorous way. He felt very close to Rabin, as you know, and was devastated about his assassination but felt the bravery of Rabin and Mandela's reconciliation actions in South Africa and the Dayton Accords negotiation were sort of role models in terms of conflict resolution. He was very, very intent on conflict resolution.

Remember another big thing during this period and the NSC was very involved in this --Nancy Soderberg—was Northern Ireland reconciliation working with Gerry Adams and others… how quickly we can forget but Northern Ireland was a huge mess at the beginning of the Clinton presidency and we spent a lot of time and diplomatic skill pressing negotiations forward.

Q: George Mitchell wasn't it?

SCHUKER: George Mitchell eventually, yes absolutely. This was an issue that the NSC was really dealing with more than the State Department.

Q: Well did you feel…

SCHUKER: There were certain issues that got divided up in terms of lead and long-term focus….

Q: Were you sort of treading on eggs because of the Irish-American communities, Senator Kennedy and all? That whole Massachusetts crowd and some sections of the New York crowd too with so many Irish-Americans were against terrorism but were strong allies with the British but at the same time the Irish thing sets off nostalgic tremors within the Irish-American breast or something like that.

SCHUKER: Absolutely and I think a very helpful aspect was that Nancy had worked for Ted Kennedy and beyond doing an excellent job, was a very trusted liaison. Of course Mitchell had served in the Senate with Kennedy too. There was a lot of work done preparing the atmospherics home and abroad for the negotiations themselves, a listening and sharing of views and information and a lot of back channel work that of course is crucial to success. I think at the end of the day people were pretty much on the same page in terms of the Irish community.

It was another example of bringing opposition figures together like Dayton-- Arafat and the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) Sinn Fein and Gerry Adams' "political wing," of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) George Mitchell was deeply involved in the Middle East peace negotiations as well, of course. .

Q: Did you get involved much with the Middle East side of things?

SCHUKER: I didn't. Somewhat as part of my portfolio along with other issues, but not heavily. I was deeply Bosnia focused, home and abroad. I almost went when Ron Brown went over to Croatia and wanted to stop and speak to the troops in Tuzla. Of course I didn't. The timing didn't work out to leave Washington then. Then there was the horrible morning when Tony was the first person who got the call about the plane going down so he was the one who actually told the president. And I remember he –Tony, brought me into his office privately. We still didn't know the truth. There were a number of inaccurate reports about location and survivors. It was horrendous. And I was asked to go over to the Commerce department to help with the media and logistics for Dover.

Q: Then you left the NSC in '97 was it?

SCHUKER: Yes, Mickey Kantor had come over to Commerce. I needed to fill out a month or so with Commerce given the way the government operated—the issues of secondment-- I needed to go back. So I, in essence, left Commerce officially, it was '97, and actually there was serious discussion of going to Paris to work with Ambassador Pamela Harriman getting ready for the big NATO Summit but two weeks before I was to begin to liaise on that for the NSC she died unexpectedly. Actually on my birthday. Awful. Anyway after the NSC I started to do international consulting work and set up a global policy office at a public affairs firm.

Q: OK, well I think we will probably have another session to talk about the international part….but what about Al Gore and Hillary Clinton? I mean these were two quite active people compared to some vice presidents or president's wives who aren't around for a lot of the things. Were they a presence in your time?

SCHUKER. One of the essential members of the Deputies group I mentioned earlier was the foreign policy advisor for Al Gore, Leon Fuerth who is now teaching at George Washington University. Leon had been with the vice president on the Hill, very talented, smart, long-time advisor to the vice president and deeply engaged in administration foreign policy issues.

Gore, having been in the Senate, was immediately plugged in on the foreign policy side of things in the Administration. Some of the kinds of structures that were set up during the Clinton administration had Al Gore sitting at the top of the food chain, so to speak, and things like the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission which was looking at U.S.-Russian relations at that time That was also the case, with the Gore-Mubarak Commission, back channeling on Middle East issues. Gore served as a close advisor to the president. Bill Clinton had a high regard for Gore, The VP also had an office in the West Wing which

was not typical for Vice Presidents historically. So Gore was very much a player out of interest and experience and regard I would say between the two of them.

Q: Was there an NSC tie to Gore's office?

SCHUKER: The NSC tie to Gore's office was Leon and he had a deputy named Bill Wise. Bill, for example, would attend the senior director morning meetings I mentioned with Tony Lake or Sandy-- the Dick Clarke's, Sandy Vershbow, others, sometimes it would be Leon but usually Bill …there was always an invited presence from the vice president.

That was not the case with Hillary or with the First Lady's office. Her policy portfolio was health initially and she did a lot of traveling with or on behalf of the president , and she was extremely engaged on human rights issues and issues involving women's rights of course and the empowerment of women internationally including her seminal attendance at the Beijing conference on women when she famously stated that "women's rights are human rights." She and her staff were always briefed before overseas trips and of course she had a direct line to Sandy, personally and professionally. She certainly created a strong and highly visible international profile and I would say a very positive one for the United States abroad.

When she visited other countries these were not show and tell kinds of meetings. They had to do with issues like microfinance for women, the leadership and economic empowerment of women, civil society issues and one of the things that she began which is still on-going and actually something I'm involved in—and I am going to South Africa next month with the group-- is now an NGO (non-governmental organization) Vital Voices Global Partnership. This really started in her office as a post-Beijing conference action extension. Vital Voices at its core deals with training and bringing women into the body politic in a much more engaged and participatory way—politically, economically and socially. It teaches specific skills to women who often become the breadwinners and key communicators within their families and communities. So we are really talking about both political and economic empowerment. That was something that as I said began on her watch, on President Clinton's watch, but was her portfolio as First Lady and she continues her very active engagement to this day.

Q: Was there an NSC connection to her office?

SCHUKER: Not formally but there was appropriate interaction The door was always 'open" so to speak.

With Mrs. Clinton as I said --we did not have someone from her office sitting in on meetings as I have described with the Vice President. I don't remember her having a designated liaise foreign policy person. Again, Sandy had a long-term personal relationship with the president and the first lady, a familiar relationship, and a political relationship over many years. Sandy was very cognizant of the interface between domestic politics and foreign policy given his work experience in and out of government,

and their influence on each other. She had a very good, serious and policy oriented staff as she was herself, so women like Melanne Verveer, her chief of staff who went on to become Chair of the Vital Voices board, also became the first Ambassador for women at the Department of State.

Q: I'll just mention a connection. I interviewed Teresa Loar and she was part of this.

SCHUKER: Yes, absolutely, she was part of Hillary's staff.

Q: While you were on the NSC was there ever talk because we were just talking off microphone about what was happening about Darfur and particularly in Africa but the feeling of our resources are getting stretched pretty thin that there are areas that it would be great if we could do something but we can't go everywhere.

SCHUKER: Yes, I think that is a truism for every administration. You have to make resource decisions constantly and clearly the president's goals very much drive priorities. There are also, as we know times, when resources can be squandered or over directed or under directed or badly directed or thwarted in terms of where they are really needed and when. Rwanda for example was tremendously underestimated on many levels and therefore under-resourced. What I guess I'm saying, Stu, is that I think that in a sort of Monday morning quarterback kind of way there, if wishing would make it so, we would have made some different decisions—this is a long time problem with Africa. I do think a strong positive decision is Bush's serious commitment to Africa with the African Opportunity Act and of course PEPFAR.

Q: I think about his administration, I think there was considerable interest in Africa on his part.

SCHUKER: Just so much waste with Iraq.

Q: Well dealing in public affairs at the NSC when you were there did you have any trouble sort of keeping the kids in line? The NSC is every columnist newspaper person and interest peddler wants to have lunch with an NSC person at the White House and all. Was this part of your job to say…?

SCHUKER: Well you know as I said previously mine was not the day-to-day press, that was David Johnson, but there were certainly a number of people I knew and David and I talked about those kinds of things all the time. I certainly was part of the outreach and planning as to who we would be "serving up" to speak on specific foreign policy issues—often as back channel briefers either before or after the president would t be talking on the record. There was no question that if we were interested in presenting a perspective on policy for certain key journalists especially we would strategize as to who and when. There was a lot of this on Bosnia that was very complicated as to timing, goals, negotiations, long term strategy and the controversy over exit strategy. I mean there was a lot of dealing with the press and a lot of education on our side for them and

clearly a lot of questions from them to us. We had close coordination with the White House spokesman and of course with the various cabinet departments.

Two things I would say about the NSC. One of them being true elsewhere in government too is that some staff are just more comfortable with the press than others and some do better with the press—print and television-- than others, speaking whether it's on or off the record, there is just a different kind of comfort zone. And sometimes these are different people. There were certainly some who tended to be more active on camera, some of it had to do with what the issues were but some just had to do with who they were and how they in a sense performed or were able to articulate on camera. Some were just deer in the headlights.

Having said that, the second thing I think is somewhat unique on foreign policy anyway to the NSC, which is that the NSC staff by design is a lot less publicly visible than the State Department, than the assistant secretary of State for Europe or Africa or fill in the blank. Part of this is that the National Security Council staff does not go through Senate confirmation and therefore does not have the same kind of reporting responsibilities formally even informally, but certainly formally to the Congress and in a sense are viewed as advisors to the president in the White House. Now clearly it depends on who fills these positions, Sandy Berger grew into his press role and liked it more over time. Tony who was very uncomfortable basically on television did not, I mean, he was much more comfortable speaking with a print reporter than on television and yet so much information clearly comes from TV these days or lack of information but certainly even bites of information. So it's important to have that visibility. There is a dance of some sort between the NSC and the State Department too as to who will speak on certain issues and all of that. And of course, the source is often disguised (or attempted) by referring to a background briefer as "a senior official" or some such designation.

Q: Was there concern on your part because you are trying to control…

SCHUKER: The message.

Q: The message.

SCHUKER: Right.

Q: To have the press, I assume, kind of outside, kind of ready to pounce on anybody who is willing from the NSC to go out and have lunch with them. There is nothing wrong with a lunch but I'm just saying…

SCHUKER: Well you do hope and I presume every administration does try to control the message. You set up what you hope will be a chain of command in terms of knowing who is talking and knowing who is responding and sort of being clear on what is a comfort zone whether on the record and what can be said off the record or on background. Understanding the ground rules is key—as are coordinated messages. And you always have to deal with leaks and sometimes with huge implications. The Pentagon papers as

the key example, of course. There are always people who have information who feel that it is incumbent upon them because of a disagreement on policy or whatever their view that they should get it out to the press and the public or even Capitol Hill. It may not be the view of the particular administration, but all the controls in the world unless one does not have a free press-- which would not be advisable-- there are limits to what you can do but you do hope that people are on the same page in terms of describing or expressing the views of the administration most specifically the president, on policy at least in terms of those who are engaged in the policy and those who are speaking on behalf of the policy and that they provide appropriate insight and "education". Hopefully there is enough information that you are being informative and not just sliding off of questions or not responding or whatever else. But there are always things that come up that the press, of course, wants to know that you are not always in a position to discuss.

Q:Well Jill, did you have any forays or heartburn while you were doing this as something not necessarily a leak but a misstatement or a statement off script that you had to sort of cover, not cover up, but put right?

SCHUKER: I'm sure there was Stu, there is nothing and this is something that when I review this more accurately or thoroughly when I do there is nothing that leaps to mind. I would say that one of the issues that required a lot of planning and thinking about timing and what to make public and who was the person speaking really had to do with our strategy on Bosnia, and the timing and the briefing and the exit strategy and Dayton and all of that. It was important to…I think whenever you have people at risk on the ground—civilians and military—you have to be extra vigilant and what you say and when you say it and how you say it is particularly important. There would be disagreements sometimes as to what that should be. So hopefully by the time you are ready to go public there is an agreement on what will be said and how and what the timing of any kind of announcement will be. And it doesn't exacerbate an already volatile situation, I've always said dealing with the press, everyone thinks they can do it. Everyone thinks that it is not a big deal and then you are first on the firing range every morning or now on 24/7 news cycles something comes out. If it is good news, it's the old thing about success…

Q: Has a thousand fathers.

SCHUKER: Has a thousand fathers and defeat is an orphan. But if something comes out not exactly as one had hoped then you are on the chopping block all the time, which is why it is very tough. Some are great at it and some are not as good. We didn't have this exact situation at the NSC because we didn't do briefings everyday. But be it the spokesman at the State Department or at the White House or the Pentagon, it is very tough and rough. I've certainly had my share in my career so far as we have discussed. But it is empowering and exciting and at times you feel that you have helped deliver something important and helped make it understandable. And when you are ok, your parents love it! And there is a pride in speaking on behalf of your country. There are moments when I pinch myself with the reality of the trajectory I have been fortunate

enough to travel. It wasn't planned from Brooklyn. My parents did ask me my freshman year of college about why I wanted to major in political science. Well…..

Q: Of course, you were fortunate to have a president who was so bloody articulate.

SCHUKER: Exactly.

Q: So you weren't having to kind of rephrase…

SCHUKER: No, no he was very…and I think that is actually an important point. Clinton was extremely articulate and very interested in engaging with the press. Harder with Carter. Even though there were issues, as we all know there were journalists who felt that Clinton didn't give them enough time or the full story but when I came to the NSC which was two years into the administration I remember we had a sit down in the Oval office. I say we, I mean I was there, Tony Lake and I think Sandy but it was the first time I believe this to be the case that we had pulled together a group of foreign policy journalists who were doing columns and I brought in I think five or six people. So Clinton was early on a presidential learning curve on foreign policy too for the first part of the administration and he very much wanted to engage with reporters on issues. Part of it sometimes was he loved to talk and sort of share ideas. He was a great briefer. I said this already I guess but I mean I think he knew enough that there were things that he wasn't sure he knew as quickly and it took time before he had a total comfort zone on those issues with the press.

Q: Well then you left the NSC when?

SCHUKER: I left the NSC in late '97 and the administration in early '98.

Q: Why did you leave the administration at that time and what did you do?

SCHUKER: I had been at Commerce initially and then at the NSC for four years so it was very intense and part of what was intense was, I mean it was great, but part of what was intense was really in some ways what happened with Ron Brown. It was a very sad happenstance and it was not just his death but so many others I knew. Actually those of us who had been sort of direct advisors with him everybody really left at one point or another. It was so very enervating and I'm not sure there was any sort of full recovery. I don't really quite know how to phrase that. I don't want to put too fine a point on it. I guess I just think there was a sort of sadness and a sort of exhaustion from that. A "what if" about myself and I think many of us had a survivor's sense of guilt. That was just one piece.

Another was that the time that I was with Ron there were a lot of issues that were going on that were very high visibility complex issues not just policy but things that he was being hammered on by the Republican Congress at the time and all of that. So it was a very intense period with him. Then it was an intense period with the NSC and I think there was a part of me that was just ready to move on to the private sector for a while. I wanted to have that experience with hopefully some accumulated wisdom. I thought it

would be a good time to do that while Clinton was still president. I went to the NSC through a procedure called "seconding" which made the transition quicker and easier and had I stayed longer at the NSC I would not have been able to maintain that particular pathway so it got complicated. It would have changed salary issues and all kinds of things so there was sort of a personal piece of this as well. There were a couple of outside offers that I thought would keep me very much in the foreign policy loop of things but also could segue my life to a bit calmer period at that point which seemed like a good idea. Once again I thought Gore would win the election in 2000 and I would go back into government. And we know that story…..

Q: Briefly, what have you been doing since 1998?

SCHUKER: It wasn't without a lot of push and pull that I made the decision to leave especially because Sandy was NSC advisor and he is an old friend and a solid professional. What I did was I went and began an international division at a small public affairs firm where I was doing work both for some American companies and foreign companies like Yukos but also I was invited to be on a lot of civil society advisory committees and non-profit boards and engaged in issues which I continue to do until today meaning things like Vital Voices working on democratization and rule of law issues and a lot with media reform particularly, which of course has always interested me. I was an election observer abroad, including for Ukraine and Bulgaria. I've also been engaged with writing a number of published Op Eds most directly on public diplomacy issues. It has been very interesting and very satisfying but I do miss the intensity of public policy action within government and the feeling that you are in the arena and directly contributing as a public servant.

Q: This is hard, I think.

SCHUKER: Washington is a very in and out of government town by definition because Republicans, Democrats, people come and go. There are election defeats and tragedies and unexpected happenings. But it is essentially a policy-oriented place even if you are outside of government. but if you really care about public policy and are excited about the processes and have respect for the public officials and public life, and believe in trying to better our democracy, there is nothing like being part of that and feeling that you are engaged in something that is just so stimulating and energetic and interesting and hopefully makes a positive difference. You are dealing with high quality people who are very committed as well. If that is what turns one on there is no more interesting place to be.

Q: I've been doing oral history now for let's see now for twenty years and there are interesting people. I couldn't do it otherwise.

SCHUKER: Yeah.

Q: Well sort of a last bit. We are now in the sixth year of Bush's two administrations and I sense I think it's almost too polite a term, but unease with the turn this administration has

taken in foreign affairs. As somebody on the outside with all sorts of contacts, have you found sort of the, what I call the, unease or the unhappiness or even stronger permeates the area or is the Washington area still pretty well divided right and left? How would you see this?

SCHUKER: Well I think that there is tremendous unhappiness. I have a colleague in my office-- an office we share-- who is a Republican and a very thoughtful one who had been in this administration in the first term and she is very distressed. Distressed about her party, distressed about the policies, distressed about sort of the fate of the country. I found it interesting just this week, of course it may be that the question was asked in a different way but I don't remember seeing a poll before with quite this response. There was something this week saying that the American public has lost faith that the administration sort of knows what it is doing, its direction.

Now I see things where people don't like the policy, they don't like the president but I've never sort of seen it where there is a sense that there is a real concern that the, I say the president, but the administration is sort of befuddled about what it is doing. A sense of drift. Even in Viet Nam there was a sense of I don't like it but there is direction. I find that very, very interesting but very troubling. So I think with that there is a reawakening-- some of it was reflected on November 7 in the election-- a reawakening of the public that we need to be more aware and do better at what it is we are trying to do abroad. People are certainly well aware of the whole September 11 tragedy but I think there is more of a sense-- and I may be wrong about this ---but that we need to not be looking at the world totally through the prism of terrorism. That we need a little more distance from the 2001 mindset and subsequent decisions. I think there is a real disillusionment with the administration in terms of its decision-making. Clearly Americans are very unhappy about Iraq and the lack of veracity. I think the hope has been, in my view, and maybe I have said this on an earlier tape that this election is not one that the Democrats should say, "Gee everybody loves us." This is a disappointment with the Republicans and the administration and disappointment with policy and decision-making.

There is a lot of work that needs to be done and restoration of public trust in governance and governing. I very much hope and you know my background that I would like to see a Democrat back in the White House in 2008 but more importantly I would like to see real bipartisanship going forward. I hope we are not just going to have a lot of vindictive feelings being the norm.

So I feel as though I can almost discern a sort of mood shift from the election to the sense that maybe we have another chance here to sort of change things. I do think even though people may not agree with the Iraq Study Group Report that there is a sense with the firing of Rumsfeld that there is a movement that there wasn't before. There is at least the opportunity for movement where there was just total stagnation. I think people are very disturbed about the scenes on television of not just our troops but of the slaughter of innocents in many cases in Iraq and the real question about what the shape of the world is going to be now and looking ahead. I don't think anybody is quite sure. There are problems everywhere and America has lost its moral authority. Would de Gaulle today

say I don't need to see pictures of the missiles in Cuba? I mean that is a big one and I think that is the thing that America has always been proudest of. Trust. Credibility. I think that there is really a sense that we were the good guys and now there is some concern, deeper concern about that.

One of the problems has been that George Bush may be sort of a user-friendly kind of guy but he hasn't been able to really, other than using September 11, engage the public in a way that they need to, to really understand what we face as a country. I think he is just not trusted in terms of understanding that and helping America come to grips with the future. So it's a problem. Having said that, I think there is an opportunity for new voices and clearly candidates are already out there talking and they range from the McCains to the Hagels and the Obamas and the Hillarys and all that.

Q:. I guess this is a good place to stop. We are looking toward the future.

SCHUKER: Thanks, Stu.

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Q: It is February 7, 2022. I am Robin Matthewman and I am talking to Jill Schuker about her time after her government service, working for the multilateral organization, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), running its North America office, or Washington Center. This is an important addendum to her oral history, as it represents foreign affairs work she did as an employee of a multilateral organization. Jill, welcome back after some time to ADST's oral history program. How did this new position at the OECD come about?

SCHUKER: Sure. Thank you, Robin, for doing this. Appreciate it. Yes, when I last talked to Stu Kennedy, it was 2007. I then was off on my own doing consulting, international consulting with various clients for the next year and a half or so. And someone came to me—actually a couple of people, one of whom was a former Deputy Secretary General at the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Sally Shelton Colby, who's an old friend and colleague. They knew of my interest and my background at the United States mission to the United Nations in terms of multilateral institutions, and said that there was an interest on the part of the OECD in reenergizing their professional presence here in North America. Wonderful people had been part of it, but it had pretty much become a publication office, in the sense that policy was lower down on the equation in terms of activity. Angel Gurría, who was the Secretary General during the full time that I was at the OECD (which were the years of the Obama administration), was interested in a much more lively and active office in Washington.

The Washington DC office was, and I believe still is, one of just four centers around the world for the OECD, which is headquartered in Paris. The four centers are Berlin, Tokyo,

Mexico, and the United States, Washington, D.C. office. My responsibilities covered North America, specifically Canada and the United States, since there had been the addition of the Mexico office which provided coverage for OECD's Latin American work.

Ángel Gurría had a very illustrious career. In Mexico, he had been foreign minister and finance minister, and clearly he was very interested in opening an office in Mexico that had a wider aperture looking toward new OECD membership in Latin America . He served three terms. I was Head of Center primarily during his second term. So, Sally and David Aaron both served as ambassador to the OECD, at different points Anyway, there was an interest here in the United States as well, in terms of Obama coming into the presidency, to have a much more engaged office with a somewhat different tilt and profile from the Bush years.

There was—as there is in many, if not all, multilateral institutions—a formal process for application and such. And I offered my name for consideration. I had some very strong support, not only from the people I've already mentioned, but also from Jessica Einhorn who had been treasurer at the World Bank and was then Dean of Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Others who had multilateral credentials, background. The OECD has a definitive time for retirement. I mentioned that because I know that there were people who were younger than I who applied for that position and therefore might be able to fill the position for a longer period of time. As it turned out my tenure in the job was extended. In any case, the vetting process was transparent and quite lengthy—most of a year—and I wasn't sure I was still in play.

Q: Because it took so long?

SCHUKER: Yes, because it took so long. I would say, it took almost a year and then as often happens, things moved rapidly. There was an interview process here in the United States, although I don't know how many there were, but I think it was a relatively small group. I believe that there were a few hundred people who had applied for the job or had been part of the initial vetting process before it was winnowed down and then I think there were maybe ten of us who were asked to come to Paris for an interview. I thought that my weakness was the fact that I was not an economist. And I had not, in terms of my work history, an economic precision that I thought could be a minus.

Q: So you went to Paris, and did you interview with Gurría himself?

SCHUKER: So no, I did go to Paris. I think I was the final interviewee. It turns out that those before me and we're talking now about 2008, when there were things that are no

longer new now, but were new then. A lot of the others who had applied or everyone who had, did a videotape presentation about themselves as part of their interview format. I did not want to do that. I feel much better in terms of one-on-one in the interview process. I also did not have an expertise in French. So I knew that questions would be asked, not all but some questions would be asked in French and I was concerned about that. Okay, I went for the interview, and among the people who interviewed me… it was maybe eight people…one of whom was the Chief of Staff, Gabriela Ramos, who was very close to the Secretary General and a marvelous person and professional, basically his first, second and third hand on just about everything. You may know the name—

Q: I met her later.

SCHUKER: Oh, you did?

Q: Yes, sometime around 2016, in Costa Rica actually.

SCHUKER: Yeah. Very smart. Very impressive. Just, you know, on all cylinders. In any case, at the interview, I felt it went very well. But, there were others, I'm sure who were on the shortlist for whom things went well. I happily was asked a couple of questions in French. And for those couple of questions I was able to respond in French and then I said I'll be much better at talking in English if we can do that, and they seemed to be just fine about that. So the interview ended and I felt good but certainly not confident about the decision to be made by the committee.

I got a call later that day. And I thought it was the best way I've ever heard of somebody asking about age. Because the call came and they said, I think we must have your wrong birth date. And I said, what birthday do you have? And it was correct. And the person who called was kind of incredulous. And said, well, we have a limit, particularly in France. We have people who retire at 55 here, you know, and I said, I understand that. And they said, well, that may be a problem in terms of how long you could stay in the position. And I remember distinctly saying, well, I would hope that I would do the kind of job that you would forgo the age proscription, and be so happy that you'd want me to stay, which is exactly what happened. Anyway, I got a call the next day and was offered the job. So it was very quick and I ended up staying for seven years. I mean, until just pretty much toward the end of the Obama administration.

Q : That's fascinating. Just for readers who may be new to the organization, the OECD started as the outgrowth of the Marshall Plan and helping Europe get back on its feet. Over the years, there has been a push to bring in more countries to broaden it away from Europe, Japan, the United States and Canada. And so Mexico was the first I think or

second, from Latin America, to join. Korea was also a part of that wave of accessions. At that time, accessions were going on, changes in the purpose and the reach of the organization were ongoing. Can you tell us about the OECD Secretary General's priorities?

SCHUKER: Sure. Just to pick up on something you said, this organization was one of the shining lights of the Marshall Plan. And it was basically to rebuild Europe. And so even at that time, Japan was not a member of the OECD. Mexico therefore was not the first country outside of Europe to become part of the OECD. Japan was first, under President John F. Kennedy and subsequently South Korea. Our Tokyo center is responsible for and to our Asian members Japan and that has had some lingering issues between South Korea and Japan as Korea would like to have the Center located there. I mean, there are all kinds of political and geographic and demographic issues that the OECD has tackled over the years among its own membership of course. The organization did move in the direction of its first Latin American member with Mexico. And of course, now there are a number of other Latin American members as well, among them, Chile and Costa Rica and others on the accession track.

Now, I would also say that one of the interesting things about the OECD is that it has also grown among the Eastern and Central European countries and the Baltics, which was not the vision initially. You know, in that sense, one can almost say it has membership akin to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in terms of the principle of expansion and there have been agreements and disagreements about not just accession itself, accession meaning who would come into the organization, but about from where, how many, timing, and who would be those members.

And one of the issues was that for every member outside of Europe, there has been a push inside Europe to have an additional European country. So part of the growth of the OECD has been that, as Mexico or fill-in-the-blank has become a member, there has also been a member simultaneously from Europe that has come on board. And that very much came from the desire on the part of the European membership, to keep the OECD basically a European based organization. And we can talk more about that if you choose.

But in terms of accession issues, this became a very central focus, I would say during the Gurría years, I don't know with the new Australian Secretary General, who began this summer if that will be a priority. And clearly anyone who works or is part of the OECD is part of a member organization. So you obviously have members outside of Europe is where I'm going on this. The OECD started off and continues as an organization of industrialized, democracy focused countries.

Now, I would just say, parenthetically, there was and continues to be a concern as times change. For example, Turkey, is a member of the OECD and has been for a number of years. There could be, I think, and perhaps is—and I am not involved in this kind of discussion internally or externally at this point, of course. But should Turkey be a member of the OECD if we're talking about not industrialized, but democracy-based countries given what is going on internally? So there are some very interesting issues on the political as well as the economic and social side, which were certainly issues that we dealt with during the Obama/Trudeau/Gurria years.

And I think one of the reasons that I was chosen, or so I came to understand, was very much because of my background. It wasn't as I've already said my background as an economist. but the range of foreign policy experiences and responsibilities, whether it was in communications, whether it was in terms of my understanding and my work on Capitol Hill, within the executive branch, my knowledge of the White House, my knowledge of the State Department, the National Security Council, the fact that I had been at the U.S. Mission to the UN. I think those were all quite attractive to the decision to hire me. I think the Secretary General wanted someone who understood the intersection of the political and foreign policy as well as the economic. I had over the years professional relationships with a lot of the people who were in significant positions in the Obama administration especially and this was an attractive feature of my being hired. Knowing how to talk the talk, and being able to both understand the foreign policy dimensions, but also the political dimensions during that period of time. It was time to set a new direction.

If I could just say also, because I think it's important to understand the internal OECD dynamics. I mentioned Sally Shelton Colby who had been one of the OECD deputies to the Secretary General. There was usually a deputy who was an American and there was during my time there as well. Richard Boucher was a former spokesman and ambassador at the State Department. Richard was great. We got along very well and are still in touch. Richard has been teaching at Michigan and at Brown subsequently. I think he would be the first to say that the Secretary General—who had a very forceful personality, which worked for good and for ill at times—did not listen as carefully as he could to his deputies. Gabriela played a very deputy kind of role. I could explain that further, but I think that's important to understand. The person who was our US ambassador to the OECD at the time I was there was Obama appointee, Ambassador Karen Kornbluh.

Q: Was she there long,

SCHUKER: She was there for much of the Obama administration. Karen is very smart and very talented, and she is now at the German Marshall Fund. Karen had—and I do

think this gets into the importance of State Department background and such—had no diplomatic experience, per se, and I think it created some issues with the Secretary General. For the Secretary General, for Karen, it was a relationship that was viable and essential, of course, but it wasn't close. Two very different personalities. And that resulted in some of the issues that the Secretary General had with the Obama administration. Although I would say on balance, things worked very well and we got a tremendous amount accomplished, but some of it was the personality of the Secretary General. And I think the lack of a strong relationship between the Secretary General and the U.S. Ambassador in terms of the formal relationship was complicated.

And in some ways, in many ways, I think, without putting too fine a point on it, I think my role and my background and my relationships with people I knew in the administration and on Capitol Hill, gave me a presence that the Secretary General turned to very often and perhaps created some distancing from others, if I am clear about that. Which gave me a tremendous portfolio, but also had its difficulties in terms of the formal vs. informal lines of responsibility. And of course I formally reported to the Secretary General, and Karen to the White House. But we worked together as colleagues of course.

Q: So, you know, even with bilateral U.S. diplomatic missions, there's that dynamic all the time. For example, when I was in Costa Rica as deputy chief of mission, we hoped the Costa Rican government would come talk to our Ambassador and our embassy on issues, but at times the Costa Rican government may have preferred to go through its embassy and go directly to the United States government in DC. So that tension between who's working with whom, you know, and how the foreign policy message is being delivered, happens all over the world. But I think you're pointing out that in that particular case, and that particular time with those particular personalities, that there appear to be a variety of reasons for why the OECD Secretary General was trying to work though it's Washington office more.

SCHUKER: Yes, I think that everything you've said is valid and true. The Secretary General and the deputy, Richard, who was there for most of the time I was, and then it was Bill Danvers later on, and that relationship was not the best with the Secretary General. Bill and I had worked together at the National Security Council too. So in any case, it was as many things are, and as you've described, at times a little fraught in terms of the formalities versus the informalities. Gabriela and I had a very good relationship. We brought the Secretary General over to the United States more than he had been before, for example and had him and staff more engaged with the Administration and Capitol Hill. I had frequent communication by phone, certainly by email, with the Secretary General's office, and with the "Chateau," which sounds like a very ritzy name for the headquarters. It was certainly a working environment. But the OECD was

housed—at least the Secretary General's office and some of his staff—were housed in what was a former chateau, which was quite beautiful. But of course, the OECD has a couple of thousand people. So offices were all over the place.

I would say that the strong suits of the Secretary General were that he was brilliant. He is a brilliant man, and he has energy to spare. He speaks twelve languages and has depth and vision. He's like the Energizer Bunny that used to be in the commercials. I mean, he has tremendous, you know—

Q: Stamina.

SCHUKER: —stamina, energy and thinking ahead. Personally, I loved that job. I loved the job I had, and I loved working with him, because he was always stimulating and the people around him were and he chose very good people on his staff. And I had my office staff, which had eight people as a small office in Washington, but a terrific staff as well, some of whom I had hired, others who had been there, but it was an exciting, active, and productive time for multilaterals, including the OECD. I guess I would say I'm a strong manager but not a micromanager, just sort of how I guess I operate. It was a very congenial time. The fact that we had a Democratic president who cared about multilateral institutions made it a very interesting and active period for the OECD portfolio.

Q: And then the Secretary of State was Hillary Clinton. And she had a very big focus on development.

SCHUKER: Indeed, and no question. I mean there was no one we didn't meet with, up to and including the president. Now, having said that, I would say the following: that the downside of this particular Secretary General, was that he loved to talk. And he could over-talk. And I knew from my own contacts—I mean, this isn't something I ever shared directly with him, although my advice to him reflected what I knew—that President Obama was not Mr. Chatty and I think there was that piece of the Secretary General, which drove him a little crazy.

There were a couple of instances where I know that my particular intercession with the people close to the President, below the president, but who were in high positions, was valuable both for the OECD and its presence and participation and to smooth the Secretary General's relationship to the White House. I think it is fair to say there was not a close relationship between the Secretary General and the President but it was respectful and things that needed to get done, got done. Certainly it had to do with personality. I mean, in some ways, it had to do with their way of operating, their modus operandi, and of course the vast difference in their responsibilities.

So the Secretary General was always included in meetings that he should be included in. But sometimes it took a little doing by my office to be sure that happened. The other downside of the Secretary General was he was very, very proud of the OECD, as one would hope anyone heading an institution would be of their people and product. But in that regard, he loved all our publications. And whether it was in Canada, or whether it was with various people, within the administration, at whatever level at the United States administration, at whatever level they were, whether it was on Capitol Hill, whether it was you know, fill-in-the-blank, he would come to meetings with so many publications that they were, and I'm not exaggerating, sometimes up to here (gesturing very high). Instead of saying we have these fabulous publications—whether it was on development, whether it was on accession, whether it was you know, on bribery, anti-bribery, education, whatever—he would present them to the principal he was talking to and dig down into numbers while placing them on the table and it would, I think, be a turnoff to a number of the people. As opposed to saying we have these publications, I'll give them to your staff, etc.

It was not a learned behavior that the Secretary General was able to rid himself of. He got better, but it was an issue. And that is not the most effective way of speaking to a foreign minister, or whatever. It doesn't mean that what he said wasn't important. But there were times that the meeting would get lost in what I thought was not the most effective way of presentation. And I did have enough of a relationship with him and with his chief of staff and others to make that point in I hope, a diplomatic way, but it didn't always work. So calibrating your audience is, of course, critical.

Q: I think he had a good relationship with Bob Hormats, the US Undersecretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs.

SCHUKER: A very good relationship with Bob.

Q: I remember being a notetaker for a meeting between the two of them on the margins of a World Bank meeting once and it was a very comfortable meeting. And it did go long.

SCHUKER: Yeah. The meetings did end up running often long. He had a very strong relationship with Bob and Bob was great. Bob was an old friend of mine. I knew him from graduate school. I mean, that's sort of what I meant by some of these relationships. The Secretary General and Bob had worked together over the years beginning with the Mexican financial crisis.

Q: This was Hormats' second time as Under Secretary, right?

SCHUKER: Exactly. I feel like I've perhaps over-stressed some negatives, but I mean, every relationship has positives and negatives. The Secretary General had a strong personality But the fact of the matter was that he had a lot of respect in terms of his dedication to the organization and how he handled himself with a growing number of member states. But with the United States being the animal that was more equal than others, if the United States had not wanted him there, he wouldn't have been there, to be blunt. And he served two full six year terms.

Q: Okay I was just going to propose a structure for our conversation. I think it will probably be a two part conversation. I'd like to have a short list of topics that you think were most important in terms of what Gurría and the organization were trying to achieve in the conversation. So I think accessions was a big one, a strategy for dealing with that. Another might be the recovery from the financial crisis. Development issues might be another. The OECD had launched some very important initiatives to try to help the developing world and development assistance and aid to be more tailored to the needs of developing countries, including the Arab Spring countries. I think the OECD tried to respond by trying to be helpful on the technical side, but what have I missed? What other issues were important in your office over those years and how did they change over time?

SCHUKER: Okay, well, I'd say you've hit on some key ones. The environment started to be an issue, not the way it is the focus in these last number of years. But a guy named Andy Wyckoff was—and still is actually—the key staff science person-- fantastic and an American. And Andy was the principal contact with the United States on environmental issues. I want to go back to a couple that you mentioned, but a major issue and work I would say the OECD is known for is our work on education—PISA, the Program for International Student Assessment data study that is a signature study and publication of the OECD covering 60 countries and comparing science and math competencies of 15 year old high schoolers.

But I'd like to just say parenthetically that one of the things that was troubling, from my perspective, and one of the things I had tried to work very hard on, was to better familiarize the United States and Canadian public with the OECD, despite the depth and breadth of work. Multilaterals have a rough time engaging the US public and the alphabet soup of acronyms is often confusing.

You know, I am sure that if we did a poll today that there would still be a very low profile understanding of the OECD whether it's the full name, the acronym, what it does, what it doesn't do. For an organization that at one time had, during the time I was there, the second biggest budget appropriation in the 150 accounts next to the United Nations, it

was troubling to me and I think it goes very much to why foreign policy tends to never be the big issue in presidential campaigns. The public just doesn't pay the kind of attention that those of us who are in foreign policy would like them to. And when they do it is often about financial costs as opposed to the work accomplished and why. The lack of positive, consistent media attention doesn't help.

Q: Am I right that with PISA, the OECD measures achievement, educational achievement, and that gives countries an understanding of impact. For all that we spend on education, it answers the questions of how well are students learning? What are the outcomes?

SCHUKER: Exactly, and yes, that's a very good articulation of it. And one of the sad issues is that the United States does not come out very well comparatively. And this was pre-COVID, and pre-zooms, and pre-so much else. So I have a feeling, and I should say, I haven't looked at what the Programme for International Student Assessment study came out with this year, but I have a feeling that we were doing better than then we may be even now. Be that as it may, that was an area of considerable interest to educators in the United States.

Now, as to the things that I was most engaged in, some of this went to US/Canadian interests of course and where I thought the OECD could make the biggest impact, in terms of lifting its positive visibility especially in the United States, as well as my own priorities as they crossed with impact for and in the United States. Some of it came of course, from where I thought the Obama administration had their interest, and the Hill as our funding came as multilateral assistance out of the 150 account. Actually in some ways, flying under the radar was helpful to us. So I made certain judgments as to how high profile I thought we should be in certain ways on certain issues, because there were always those who wanted to zero fund us on the Hill. Actually, that did happen at one point for twenty-four hours, I might add. And we got that reversed but it was heart-stopping. But there were issues that had very much to do with the kinds of things that Canada was very interested in, as well as the sweet spot of the United States. Anti-bribery and accession were two overlapping concerns. It was vital that the United States be happy with what was going on at the OECD as at that juncture it was the animal more equal than others.

So clearly, it was not just because I was based in the US, but also because it was important to pay close attention to the political climate. On accession, the United States was very interested—for obvious foreign policy reasons, as well as, again, being the animal more equal than others—in who would become members of the OECD. And there was a level of concern that the Secretary General was expanding the portfolio of the

OECD, in terms of Latin America perhaps too rapidly, and that it likely was because of his relationship to Latin America and the fact that he came from Mexico. And of course there were considerations vis-à-vis other international and regional organizations, There was support, however, for doing so, but it did create issues such as the one I already mentioned, which is for every Latin American country, or Asian country that was being looked at, in terms of expansion, that they would need to be another European country added. So much about accession is about, is a country ready? And what comported with readiness, again democratic? And, I mean, we're probably not going to get into that, but no doubt, the last few years have gotten much more intensively interested in how one defines democracy, including within our own country. And, not unlike NATO, the size of the OECD membership.

Q: Was there also a lot going on with what's called the codes—the investment codes, the financial codes—of how professionally a country handles things, like, rules on investment rules on business?

SCHUKER: Absolutely.

Q: Rules on corruption?

SCHUKER: Well I was going to say, that was one of the key sort of checkpoints that had to be advanced for membership. And which is why the accession process is long. It is multi variegated. as issues relating to social issues have become more important. They became areas in which one had to check the right box, if you wanted to become a part of the OECD. Meaning, how you dealt with the independence of your media. How you dealt with your court structure. What kinds of laws, as you have said, regulations were put into place about your economic viability and how you dealt with business. State owned enterprises. Issues relating very much to the issues surrounding anti-bribery and corruption. How were you building your industries? Was there fairness, transparency? Relationships with the particular country that wanted to join the OECD and their bilateral relationships with other countries.

The one piece that the OECD really did not get involved in ever, including now. Not that it wasn't perhaps, you know, sort of a back of the mind issue, but the OECD does not get involved in military questions, and defense issues. But for example, Israel became a member of the OECD during the time that I was there, and this was under Netanyahu, and clearly, there were public questions in terms of corruption relating to the leader of the country, not as profound as they became over the last years after the Obama years. But that involved some of the defense contracts that Israel was involved in and what their laws were on anti-bribery. So I mean, just to use that as an example. I've mentioned

Turkey, the early years of Erdogan's administration were very positive in terms of democratic moves that Turkey was making. That has become much more contentious over these last number of years, and when I say last year, every time I say last number of years, I mean, it's during the Trump administration years. And now.

So, again, I am not paying the exquisite attention that I was at one point. But what I would say is twofold. Accession issues were very tied into issues relating to corruption. And the process was under the responsibility of the OECD legal counsel Nicola Bonucci. And Nicola left a few years ago now, but had been at the OECD for maybe 25 years. Anyway, Nicola was the key person on accession issues, but also given his responsibilities, was the key person on corruption and anti-bribery. Nicola was in the United States a lot with the Secretary General, but also on his own meeting on these issues.

When I was at the Commerce Department during the beginning years of the Clinton administration, I was involved with the business community relating to assembling model business principles, and all of that. So I was very interested in these anti-corruption issues. And for the last few years, I have actually been on an international board called Integrity Initiatives International. We can get into that another time, if you want, but, but what I'm getting at is that was an area that the Secretary General had a lot of interest in, I had a lot of interest in. The Obama administration was very engaged in terms of these issues and they were crucial to accession decisions. This was something that the Brits were very involved in at this point, too. So anyway, that was one issue that was big.

Accession was another. And there is an interesting history with this regarding Russia. There had been a point—focusing on the Russian reset— in having Russia potentially be part of the accession process, just as it had become part of the G7, expanded to the G8. When, before Putin, Medvedev was the head of state there was an active interest on the part of the United States to incorporate Russia into the OECD and Russia was interested. This changed during the course of the Obama years and it was a very delicate and involved question about how the OECD would handle what had begun to be an accession process with anti-corruption laws being passed in Russia, and then there came the 2014 Crimea invasion. The invasion of Ukraine.

There was a pullback, for all understandable reasons, even though, in my own view, the global order was challenged in a way that, globally, we never responded to. I mean, sovereignty was, you know, even given the interesting history of Russia, but the global community did nothing about this break with international order except some sanctions. Anyway, one of the things that did happen was a reversal on the support for Russian accession including most specifically pullback from the U.S. The OECD had been

moving forward on that fairly aggressively—at the behest of member countries—to get Russia involved. So there was a period of difficulty and turmoil moving back from that.

And the Secretary General was not as comfortable in moving back as the Obama administration. That was a very delicate diplomatic period between the United States and the OECD. And it was something I ended up being deeply involved in. It was a fascinating, as you can imagine, period, but it was globally difficult for the United States, problematic in the US-Russian relationship. It had implications for the US-OECD relationship, for the OECD itself in terms of accession. You know, and one might say, Well, how could one even think about Russia being part of the OECD? Well, you know, flash forward, there are countries that have corruption issues, even deep corruption issues, that are members. So it's not just a matter. It's a matter of process, too, that sometimes has to be reversed. So this reversal was a delicate and difficult dance

Q: Yes, there was a time in which we were deliberately trying to integrate Russia into the global community after the breakup of the Soviet Union. So we expanded the G-7 to the G-8, we were talking about membership in Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and OECD, the World Trade Organization (WTO) accession. It was an effort to get the former Soviet Union countries to accept international norms and to start moving in a different direction. Should we cover this next time?

SCHUKER: Just to me, it's one of those perfect political processes, perfect storm kinds of situations that are fascinating to see from the inside. But you realize how very, very complicated it is and how many bodies are sort of rotating around the sun.

Q: Just to sum up this particular issue. Your job was to represent to the United States what the Secretary General hoped would happen, and in the organization as a whole, because it wasn't just the United States? And also your role was to report back to Paris, what was feasible, given what the United States wanted? And so, what did you do to help make that process work itself out?

SCHUKER: Well, a couple of things on that. First of all, I was, as one should be as a diplomat, acutely aware that the U.S. had our own ambassador to the OECD. So part of it certainly was respecting Karen's role and her relationship. She had been appointed by the President. My responsibility and relationship ultimately, and day-to-day was to the OECD. Part of it was how to better engage the OECD with the United States. And I think my wealth of background in terms of U.S. domestic policy and foreign policy, and the understanding, having also been at the U.S. Mission to the UN during the Iran hostage crisis, and, you know, through some pretty interesting times, that I appreciated the pluses and the difficulties of a multilateral relationship with my country. I think I was able to

smooth over some rough patches. I think I was able to be sure that some things did not reach a critical mass. I think one thing that I instituted for myself, which I know the Secretary General and Gabriela Ramos appreciated, was that I started to do memos for them maybe every couple of weeks, every month, more often as needed, on the political dynamics in the United States. Meaning what was happening here, that would help better inform them and provide context for their actions and my recommendations.

It is something that I had subsequently told my successors that I thought would be an idea for them. I don't know if they thought this would be as useful for them. I mean, Will Davis—who's the head of center for North America now— is fabulous. But I think my background had a certain tinge to it that I was very comfortable and felt that I was able to bring something to the table with this kind of analysis, and I think that is what was helpful on a range of issues as well as building trust with Paris Headquarters and specifically the Secretary General.

Q: So on this particular issue of Russia, then ultimately, the US prevails and the accession process stopped? Is that right?

SCHUKER: Yes, the accession process stopped and it was dealt with very directly with the Secretary General, at a very high level. The message was delivered and I'm not saying by the President, but it was delivered at a very high level.

Q: Okay. Very, very good. Well, this is fascinating, because I see great parallels between what you did as head of a field office for the OECD and what US diplomats do when they are serving in a foreign capital. For example, US Ambassadors often will talk to their counterparts in Washington on a regular basis. They try to work together to help both sides understand. And of course, our bilateral mission, we often do reports to help policymakers understand what's going on in the host country, and so you were playing a very interesting role.

SCHUKER: Before we adjourn, can I just add something? Today I focused a lot on the United States. But I really strove very hard to—I met with the Canadian ambassador to the United States regularly. There were always OECD ambassadors. When I would go to France, I would meet with the Canadian OECD ambassador. I tried to pull together all the OECD country ambassadors in the United States so that we would all meet together or their senior staff so that they would be aware of the OECD office in the U.S. and its availability to them. This was another initiative I had tried, and of course, with my fellow heads of center, we would do calls every week so we would have a sense about Japan's concerns or Mexico's concerns or whatever, and that was very important. So I mean, there were elements that clearly were of interest to me, but which I also thought would be

positive ways of inserting the OECD into my work to bring together a stronger sort of global perspective and conjunction of interests. Of course, there were always the World Bank meetings, and those annual meetings that took place, which we were very involved in and day to day relationships with other multilaterals.

Q: Thank you so much. I will see you at the next session.

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Q: Good afternoon, it is January 11, 2022, and we are continuing our conversation with Jill Schuker about her time leading the Washington office of the Organization for Economic Cooperation Development, the OECD. So, Jill, I found it very interesting, as you were talking about the fact that the US actually puts quite a lot of money into OECD programs, and you had mentioned that some of our domestic agencies find it very useful. You had mentioned in detail the work that they do on education, which helps compare educational achievement around the world, including for US students, and how they stacked up with others. But I'd be interested in knowing if there's other work that the OECD does that our US government agencies find very helpful.

SCHUKER: There is really no area in which the work of the OECD does not delve down whether its environment, whether it is anti-bribery, whether it is education, whether it's development assistance. Brian Atwood, who is a former State Department official, and led the Agency for International Development (AID) was the head of the Development Assistance Committee, (DAC) which was composed of other OECD country representatives. But the focus of the OECD, and it celebrated its 50th anniversary while I was there, the tagline of "better policies for better lives" was very much focused on development assistance. Brian had been Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's choice to head the DAC and Brian maintained a close working relationship with the U.S. in carrying out this portfolio. Obviously, a lot of things come under that tagline description. The United States government, the cabinet offices, and others, all have offices with international responsibilities as part of their work, whether it's agriculture or the environment, or health or whatever. So there was a lot of interest and a lot of contact directly from OECD bureaus with cabinet counterparts that we usually were in the loop about. When OECD officials came to the United States they would come to the Washington Center to coordinate with staff as well as to work out of our office..

I'm sticking at the moment, I know you want to ask something about Canada, but for the moment, that would be for the United States, but similarly, for Canada as well. Both their structures obviously are different, their federal structure. It is not unusual for the United States to be a dominant money supplier for you know, whether it's the World Bank,

whether the UN, whether it's various international institutions. The 150 account— which is basically a State Department budget account—is where the OECD's funding is based, as opposed to for example some of the Bretton Woods institutions who get their funding from different budget sources. Assistance, all come under this particular account, and it turns out that the OECD, which I learned once I came on board, received the second largest budget funding. It was many millions less than the UN, but at the time, it was $1 million, so we had a visibility that needed to be addressed since there were those in congress who wanted to defund or cut OECD funding. I and my staff paid a lot of attention to monitoring this budget item and hearings and sought support among the cabinet to remind their key congressional members of the value of OECD's work and why it warranted support in the budget. I think the OECD budget item is now just below a million dollars, cut during the Trump years

The OECD along with various European countries morphed from the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) after WWII to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1961 under President John F. Kennedy and expanded beyond Europe to include Japan. But during the time I was at the OECD, during the 50th anniversary, the US was the head of the ministerial that year (rotating chairmanship among the members), and Hillary Clinton spoke at OECD Headquarters and ran the ministerial, and so the U.S. was very much in the driver's seat for the period that I was there, both officially and unofficially.

Q: So let's move over to Canada a little bit. Was there a very big difference, a stark difference, between what the Canadians were looking for out of the OECD versus the United States?

The Washington Center focus tended to be more heavily focused on the United States and from the U.S. But having said that, whenever the Secretary General came across the Atlantic, he would usually spend time meeting with officials in Canada as well as meeting with Canadian officials in the U.S. as necessary and appropriate. We worked on some cross border transportation issues and with cities in both countries. Major meeting at which the Secretary General spoke took place in Chicago, when Rahm Emanuel was mayor, to announce a study on transportation networks, and how to be most effective in terms of regional action. Canada also was particularly interested and engaged in the anti-bribery issue and provided leadership in OECD work.

And at the recent summit for democracy in Washington, Canada, as well as a few of the European governments, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, played a substantial role in the side conversations that were taking place about new anti-corruption steps. We worked with Canada green issues, as well, and we did certainly try to be sure that there was a sense of

community that Canada did not feel like a second cousin, so to speak, and made sure that there was strong interaction with their ambassador to the OECD, Judith LaRocque. When in Europe I always met with Judith and solicited her ideas and input consistently, hopefully providing Canada with the sense they were getting full value from the OECD Washington office. But there is no question that quantity varied with the U.S. focus although hopefully not quality.

Q: Canada also has a very good foreign assistance agency. Did you have much contact with them as well as the foreign ministry?

SCHUKER: We did. We met with them. I know the Secretary General did when we had our Canadian meetings most of which were in Ottawa. I would say, however, that again, I think that, Brian Atwood was the centerpiece when it came to development work. I really sort of looked to Brian as did the executive wing of the Secretary General's Office.

Brian had been Administrator at AID and before then at the U.S. Department of State as well as on Capitol Hill and head of the National Democratic Institute at one point at which is an entity supported by the United States Congress, very focused on democratic assistance.. So he had a lot of very strong expertise when it came to development and diplomacy and we worked together effectively. Brian was active on both sides of the Atlantic.

Q: You mention anti-corruption. So I know that in a lot of these conventions and instruments, one key aspect is implementation. And one part of implementation is doing annual reviews or periodic reviews of the members to see how they're doing on implementation. So was that something that you were relying on?

SCHUKER: Yes. And the answer is periodic reviews. One of the important aspects of the OECD is and was its peer review. So a lot of things that were done, particularly in terms of areas such as the anti-bribery Convention, which came about in 1999, and there was a peer review in 2009 when I was at the OECD. The peer review process was an important part of the way the OECD successfully functioned. Any potential OECD member has to go through the accession process, one piece of which was that their work and progress regarding anti-corruption and anti-bribery was key to approval. And this was true whether it was Israel and Turkey during the time that I was there, and Estonia and Costa Rica, which came later into the OECD. But Costa Rica, for example, was already a member of the anti-bribery convention. There were increasing numbers of members to the OECD anti-bribery convention, as it went along. After 1999—

Q: You didn't have to be a member of the OECD to sign on to the convention, right?

SCHUKER: No. For example, Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, and Bulgaria did. And these presumably were countries that wanted to become members of the OECD, and knew that they needed to check that box for eventual membership. So becoming part of the convention, such as Chile and Estonia, they were working with our legal office, out of self-interest.

The accession process wasn't automatic. There were lots of boxes that had to be checked. But a very significant one had to do with anti-corruption. We were looking for laws that that country was ready to put into place to make sure that their legal system was being strengthened in terms of anti-corruption, but also, that they were being very careful that their public officials were not being corrupted by those who were on the demand side of the equation. And also that laws were being passed within those countries to make sure that their own laws were being strengthened, so that corruption was not rampant and in essence robbing their citizens.

One of the interesting things was that, and I mentioned this last time, that Russia was one of the countries that was part of the OECD convention, and was making certain legal changes as was Israel for example. Particularly in Israel's case, there were issues dealing with—I want to say the right words—Israel's issues dealing with the sale of armaments and to whom. And there were things that Israel had to do in that regard before they were able to join the OECD. While no country is perfect, some had more issues to deal with than others. The issue of enforcement was always the big missing piece. The OECD did not have enforcement power beyond naming and shaming, good faith, and the hope that the right laws and regulations would be enforced, and enforced fairly.

Q: Was the United States hoping that this anti bribery convention would help level the playing field since we had earlier put in place the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which made our US companies liable under US law for paying bribes? Was this something that we were hoping that would prod other countries to do something similar so that there was a level playing field?

SCHUKER: Yes, absolutely. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) was— You know, the OECD sees itself as the gold standard on anti-corruption. But the gold standard of the gold standard is FCPA. I mean, the United Kingdom has been dealing with this anti-corruption issue. Canada has in terms of anti-corruption law come closer and closer over the years to what the US has done on anti-corruption with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. But Biden in terms of the Summit for Democracy, one of the outcomes of that over this next year of action is supposed to be a greater adoption across the board

internationally, particularly in Europe, of standards that are much more related to our FCPA.

And part of it is the complaint that and I think it's one of the reasons there's always been this very high interest on the part of the United States is that we have heard from our business community, that they are being penalized in terms of their ability to function fairly abroad, because other countries do not have the same strict laws in place that we do. It was, as you said, to level the playing field.

Q: You mentioned Costa Rica. I believe there, two or three presidents were felled by, actually criminally prosecuted or self-exiled for a time, because of allegations they had taken large bribes from foreign businesses.

SCHUKER: Peru has had this issue too for example. They are still not a member. I don't think there's any country, right, that is part of the OECD, which could not have improved its status when it comes to anti-corruption. But the fact of the matter is, as you have pointed out, that US companies felt they were at a dagger point, in some ways, because other countries did not have to fulfill the same responsibilities. And therefore the notion was not to retreat from these laws, but to put them in place to be sure that more countries were indeed not just saying they were paying attention to the things that needed to be done, but were actually putting them into legal form.

So, you know, if someone would say, Well, why was the US particularly interested in this? Was it just that the head of the OECD center was more interested in these issues that this was a priority for us? The answer I would give is that I was interested because of past work that I had been involved in and such, but also it was very much of an interest of the United States to be sure that our companies got a fair shake and integrity was a fact of life in international and internal commitments regarding corruption.

Q: I appreciate you doing the deep dive on anti-corruption. I wanted to ask you about how the relationship with the Secretary General evolved.

SCHUKER: I also wanted to say just back on anti-corruption, that this was also something we did a lot on with USTR.

Q: With the US Trade Representative?

SCHUKER: The US Trade Representative's Office, first with Ron Kirk then Mike Froman. The issue of corruption was, you know, a deep concern of USTR and with the companies that they were dealing with. This was also something that the National

Economic Council, the NEC, which works very closely with the NSC was very concerned about and so I mean, there was, I would say, of the many things that we were involved in, directly from the White House and from the executive office, this was an area of, of high level, considerable interest and concern, including, of course, on the part of the Secretary General.

Q: Okay, so my next two questions will be about the US relationship with the Secretary General that seemed to get more fraught over time. And then maybe related to that, what change did you see when Daniel Johannes became the US Ambassador to head the US mission to the OECD? So first on Gurría. How did you see the evolution of his relationship with the United States and other members over time? Rough spots?

SCHUKER: As I mentioned in our last interview, Secretary General Gurría, who was in his second term when I came on board, had and I'm sure still has a forceful personality. And he was very focused on expanding the portfolio and the visibility of the OECD. He was someone unlike his predecessors. To give it some context, he had been foreign minister and finance minister of Mexico. So he was very used to having a seat at the grown-up table. And at the big table, at the front table, and voicing his views and his opinions, so I think he came in with an expectation of a certain role that he wanted to have for the organization, as well as for himself.

And he is beyond that, just as a person, a man of expansive abilities. He speaks 12 languages, he's very energetic, you know, person and personality. And during the Obama years, he was most anxious to present the organization as the can-do place for the G-7 and for the G-20 for not just for the United States. And the OECD was not always called upon to be the interlocutor, the Secretariat, so to speak, that he wanted it to be and thought it should be given its credentials and staff.

Q: For the G-20, or the G-7?

SCHUKER: We ended up doing a lot of work for the G-20. Gabriela Ramos, who I have mentioned before, was the G-20 sherpa for the OECD. And few were active with the G-7, but definitely more engaged with the G-20. Although not enough for the Secretary General. And I think there was a sense of sharp elbows on the part of the Secretary General because of his frustrations. Like the play Hamilton says—he wanted the OECD and himself to be in the "room where it happens" and strongly felt he and the organization had the bonafides to be there. I certainly was happy to present the OECD as the can-do forum. But I also obviously understood the perspective of the U.S. And I think one of the things that I said in the past was that I brought to the table insight into the U.S. perspective of the US in a way that the Secretary General was willing to hear and

understand because I was part of his staff. And not just the US staff, so to speak, if you know what I mean. But it wasn't necessarily smooth sailing.

So I would say that there were a few things that were problematic for the US. One being, as I said, the sort of personality and the interest on the part of the Secretary General in representing his organization and wanting it to be front and center on everything that the US was dealing with. That simply was not going to be the case. But that did not stop him from being a squeaky wheel. I think over time, there was a very strong view that the OECD could provide real value added and quality. But sometimes that was done through others at the OECD. President Obama and the Secretary General certainly met. But my sense is they would have met more often if the personality connection was one that was more comfortable for the President.

One of my responsibilities was to make more of a presence for the OECD, vis-a-vis the United States, and I think the value that I brought was that I was able to deal with others who were in high positions of responsibility within the US government, to effect the kinds of things that needed to be done without absolutely having it happen at the Secretary General-Presidential or Vice Presidential level. And I think that was part of the value. Part of it was that the relationship was perfectly appropriate and useful, but it was not warm and fuzzy in terms of the relationship between the Secretary General and either the first or second US ambassadors to the OECD during the Obama administration. I was not there for all of Daniel Yohannes' tenure. I certainly worked with him on his confirmation and his transition and early days at the OECD. I did briefing books for him and such regarding the OECD and insights about the Secretary General and the people he'd be dealing with and all of that, in hopes of creating a smooth and productive transition and a better relationship than the one between the previous Ambassador and the Secretary General. It developed as a better but not close working or personal relationship. This piece of the diplomatic equation just didn't work well.

The Secretary General's relationship with the Secretary of State was very good–Hillary most of the time and then with John Kerry. But there was work that I needed to do—that I had the imprimatur of the Secretary General to do but also that I had to do sort of behind him—when you're sort of cleaning things up sometimes. And I think, you know, I like to think that I did it well, from the aspect of my responsibilities. We also had a good relationship with the Deputy Secretary of State and with our direct interlocutor, the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs as well as principals at the White House and other key cabinet agencies.

But your question also was, what were some of the rough spots? One rough spot was just personality as I have said before. It just wasn't, you know, a love fest. The US didn't

want the expansion of some of the work that the Secretary General was pushing for. The OECD is a very effective organization and has terrific people. But I think if it was up to the Secretary General, he would have, you know, been the point person on any issue that you could come up with for both of those entities.

Now, we've already touched on one of the most difficult issues, and this was a change in policy by the United States. The whole issue of Russia's accession. There was a period, as you know, when the G-7 was the functioning G-8. And we talked about that a last time, where there was this sense of a reboot with Russia and Russia was being welcomed more into the larger international community and organizations which the United States was seemingly supportive and happy to encourage.

But this changed dramatically after the invasion of Crimea. Russia's accession was moving forward. Russia was putting certain laws into place, which we specifically wanted to see happen. Well, Russia was dealing with various laws that supposedly were being put into place when it came to anti-corruption but there was a lot of concern about how real and functioning those laws were or would be.

But once the invasion occurred, sovereignty was violated and basically, I mean, this is not for this conversation. But you know, I mean, talk about red lines. I mean, what's a bigger red line than that? And we never, we the international community, obviously never did anything that approached a red line. Sanctions, yes. But the real response stopped effectively at the water's edge. The notion of Russia joining what was supposedly a coalition of democratic industrialized countries was not going to happen.

And I do think that the Secretary General had a point. There were a lot of discussions and I wasn't part of all of them, but I was certainly part of a number of them. He asked, was there not some wisdom in trying to bring the camel's nose in, you know, inside the tent, as opposed to leaving it outside. And there was concern in that regard that we should continue, even if it took forty years, to bring Russia closer into multilateral engagement and should continue those conversations. But part of the US. opprobrium, you know, against what Russia had done translated into that this was not going to be something that they were going to be welcomed into or awarded. And so that became an interesting sort of national policy versus a multilateral kind of policy.

There were other officials, who felt as the Secretary General felt. Obviously, as you've mentioned, a few moments ago, they felt there should be a continued communication with Russia on accession but in essence everything was closed down and shut down. And obviously, other deep tensions have developed since then with Russia that make this the

right course of action, but going back in time while it was certainly a contentious moment and decision, and a fascinating challenge for diplomatic handling on many levels.

Q: Thanks for that clarification.

SCHUKER: I would just say on that, I remember we would get work updates on what the OECD was doing for the G-7 and the G-20. The OECD never became an official secretariat but over time increasingly filled that role. Practically but never formally.

Q: Looking back, were there any other key issues on the OECD that you felt we haven't covered?

SCHUKER: You know, one thing that might just be useful to mention. I was always looking for targets of opportunity, you know, for us to be involved in, especially with the U.S. to achieve a win-win, or win-win-win, including Canada. And, you know, when the Sustainable Development Goals came about—

Q: Can you explain what the Sustainable Development Goals were?

SCHUKER: Yes, excuse me, these sustainable development goals (SDGs). I mean, there were many but whether it was gender, whether it was green, growth, whatever there were areas of relevance to OECD work. The one I focused on more than others I think was 16, was about the resilience of institutions. And so, I guess what I'm trying to say is that there was on the part of the OECD, which unlike some of the other institutions, the World Bank, or the International Monetary Fund, or whoever we were always looking for ways to increase our heft, and how we could best do that for the White House specifically .

The four of us who were Heads of Center, were looking for ways to build the relationships with the governments that we were working with. And I know that that was something that I felt was always an important part of my portfolio.

Q: So just to back up a little bit, the Sustainable Development Goals were considered to be the next generation of the Millennium Development Goals, by both developing countries and donor countries to help guide their development assistance, their development work, things like cutting poverty or extreme poverty in half, that kind of thing. Around this time that you're discussing, there was an effort to come up with the successor to the Millennium Development Goals.

SCHUKER: You were mentioning Daniel Johannes. Daniel, had been the head of the Millennium Challenge Corporation which was the main interlocutor and

executor/watchdog for the SDGs. And I actually thought that him coming on board was a plus for the OECD/U.S. relationship and for OECD engagement in the SDGs, but there never developed a tight relationship between this Ambassador and the Secretary General.

Q: So I'm intrigued by your mention of the SDGs and the OECD. Because one thing that happened in the course of the negotiations is that they became goals for all the countries of the world, no longer just development goals for the developing world but also for developed countries. In some ways, that was a perfect opportunity for the OECD, because it had been doing this work on behalf of developed countries on how they were meeting milestones for a long, long time.

SCHUKER: Right. So absolutely and again, Brian's involvement was key as the SDGs had much to do with development issues. That's just a big example. But there were always ways in which we could most effectively insinuate ourselves. And some of them were deeply appreciated, and utilized, and others such as wanting to be the secretariat for the G-20 were not. It was sort of like, "Great, we'll use you when we need you kind of thing."

The OECD has more of a presence in other countries, certainly in Europe, where it has a deep history and of course its location is Paris. The OECD is part of the complicated soup of Washington acronyms.. But I do think that the Secretary General strengthened the OECD very much during his tenure.

And as it turned out the Secretary General did serve a third term, which came about during the Obama-Trump transition period. Trump had a different attitude toward multilateral organizations than Obama and the relationship became quieter and more tenuous.

And just back on the corruption issue, we met with the UN Secretary General on a number of occasions, but when it came to the corruption issue, the UN has a widely-signed convention called UNCAC, the UN Convention Against Corruption, but it is viewed as a very weak document, at least by the OECD. The UNCAC meeting late last year was viewed as unproductive. Some of it may have been timing or poor organization or whatever else but nothing of significance emerged. But where I'm going on this is that there was a view that the OECD convention remains the gold standard although it obviously has considerably fewer signatories than UNCAC. But there was a very strong feeling, and certainly on the part of the Secretary General of the OECD, that we the OECD have a much more meaningful document. Part of my responsibility was also as an interlocutor with the U.N. although this was not a primary focus. The OECD did not have a separate office or person in New York.

Q: Okay. And then you left before the administration changed?

SCHUKER: Yes, I was there until the end of 2015. It was then election year and all of that. And of course the presidency changed parties and hands and focus. I have a strong impression that during that election year, and subsequently that there was a more limited relationship with the Trump administration and the OECD. And then Will Davis, who I had worked with as Head of Center for the United Nations Development Program came on board as OECD Head of Center after the person who replaced me had a very short tenure and was then followed by an Acting Head of Center for a period of time.

Q: Jill, thank you so much. I think this has been fascinating to listen to how you combine your experience working for the US government with working for a multilateral institution where you were playing the opposite role.

SCHUKER: I very much appreciate the time you've taken.

Q: You have been working for the United Nations Cultural and Scientific Organization (UNESCO) during the last couple of calendar years? What have you been doing and how would you compare it to your work at the OECD?

SCHUKER: Well it has been a really interesting period to be involved with UNESCO. I am working as a counselor and advisor to Assistant Director General (ADG) for the Social and Human Sciences (SHS), Gabriela Ramos who previously had been Chief of Staff and G-20 Sherpa at the OECD. We have always had an excellent working relationship and I was really pleased that she sought me out to be helpful in working with her in her new position and portfolio. My specific area of strategic support has been in the area of technology, most specifically Artificial Intelligence and ethics, although this is expanding to ethical concerns in areas such as science itself, sports, race, gender, climate, biotech and other areas of SHS focus. With AI I have been given a tremendous opportunity to learn about the cutting edge issue of human centered ethics and to explore the very timely issue of human-machine dynamics and what the future holds. Needless to say, the acceleration of AI in our everyday lives and the challenges ahead require a deep dive to understand what is happening now and what lies ahead--the policy implications and competitive challenges.

The issue of ethics is always a complicated one in shaping policy and I am focusing on how UNESCO and the work being done there can provide real value-added experience and insight for the policy changes that are happening or needing to happen in real time in the United States—in the U.S. Government, in the private sector, at think tanks, and academia and how this new disruptive technology issue is being addressed. Kissinger, who co-authored a book on AI this year, said this period of discovery could be as important and challenging as the Enlightenment if not moreso.

In November 2021, UNESCO passed the first global Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence (AI) adopted by all 193 members of UNESCO. How that is and can be relevant to actions in all the aforementioned entities, including both the executive branch and the congressional branch of the U.S. federal government and the states is the issue at hand. Actually in the U.S. many states already are ahead of the federal government in their embrace and thinking about AI regulations and its ethical challenges and considering guardrails and modalities to deal with bias and other long-term as well as cutting edge issues. This also relates to the issue of STEM (science, technology, engineering and math) education as well and the range of ethical challenges it faces when it comes to gender especially.

I am following legislation and executive branch action, participating, observing and reporting on related activity and action in all the areas mentioned, introducing the Recommendation and its elements into the internal and external conversations, seeing how relevant work in the U.S. has the possibility of being internationalized including training, and raising the profile of the issue of AI human-centered ethics into the relevant conversations as part of work being done in preparation for the second Summit for Democracy in 2023.

This is all happening at a time when raising the profile of UNESCO's work in compatible areas with the U.S. is especially important because after decades of being both a member and leader of UNESCO, the U.S. left the organization during the Trump administration. The Biden Administration and a wide range of bipartisan Members of Congress are seeking to have the U.S. rejoin the organization and have passed a necessary waiver to do so that is part of the Omnibus funding bill that went through congress at the end of 2022. Of course the process is not yet complete but hopefully will be so in 2023. So the politics and the policy juncture once again are coming into play as I seek to provide insight and value with the ethical dimension of this emerging technology, the competitive landscape, and its national and international importance. And I'm looking forward to being more deeply engaged in the other policy areas of ethical challenge as well.

It has been a terrific and stimulating learning curve and an extension of the various skill sets and interests I have honed during the years as already discussed, applied to yet another multilateral challenge vis-à-vis the shared interests of the United States and the challenges it is facing in this new technological dimension.

When I think about my career I realize how integrated so much of it has been and yet the many different directions I have explored and paths I have gone down. I especially have had the privilege of being challenged, learning so much, meeting and working with so many different and absorbing people, being exposed to a world of cultures, and never, ever being bored. And it all has been tied into diplomacy and public service.

End of interview