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John A. Lacey 1969-1972 Consul General, Perth
Howard R. Simpson 1969-1972 Counselor for Public Affairs, Canberra
Benjamin F. Dixon 1970-1971 Australia/New Zealand Desk Officer, Washington, DC
Hugh G. Appling 1970-1973 Deputy Chief of Mission, Canberra
Frances Cook 1971-1973 Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS, Sydney
Thomas F. Conlon 1971-1975 Political Counselor, Canberra
James T. Pettus, Jr. 1972-1977 Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Canberra
Marshall Green 1973-1975 Ambassador, Australia
William C. Harrop 1973-1975 Deputy Chief of Mission, Canberra
Arma Jane Karaer 1973-1975 Consular Officer, Melbourne
James W. Hargrove 1976-1977 Ambassador, Australia
Edward Hurwitz 1977-1978 Director of Australia/New Zealand Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Washington, DC
Charles H. Twining 1978-1980 Deputy Director, Australia/New Zealand Desk, Washington, DC
Michael G. Wygant 1978-1981 Political/Military Officer, Canberra
Herbert E. Horowitz 1981-1984 Consul General, Sydney
William A. Weingarten 1981-1984 Economic Officer, Canberra
Paul Good 1982-1985 Press Attaché/Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Canberra
David Lambertson 1984-1986 Deputy Chief of Mission, Canberra
Louis F. Licht III 1986-1989 Labor Attaché, Canberra
Q: If you were in the Commerce Department--there were such a thing--I was not a Foreign Service officer at any time, but I did have an acquaintance who was a commercial attaché years ago. He happened to have been posted to China. Now that was a commercial attaché in the Department of Commerce, was it not?

BALDWIN: That's right. Those jobs, commercial attaché and economic counselor. Commercial attaché was a functional job; the economic counselor was a diplomatic one. The general [idea] was to go into the foreign commerce as an assistant commercial attaché.

So I went to Sydney, Australia, as an assistant commercial attaché. My boss out there, who was a counselor, didn't have the slightest idea what he was getting, who this newcomer was, or what he was supposed to do; and nor did I. I really, in a way, pioneered the job. I was made a commercial attaché, and then later I was transferred to London, which was an embassy. And there I was given diplomatic status, and called an economic counselor.

Q: And you were posted there in a consulate?
BALDWIN: We were independent; we were supposed to cooperate with the consulate, but we were not in the consulate. I had a little office of my own, in Sydney. I created a little office of my own, and a little staff of my own, and I built up the job as I conceived it--what I thought I was supposed to do. In those days, what I was supposed to do was really be a traveling salesman. Those were the days when American business companies were beginning to establish branches abroad, with export managers. They hadn't had export managers before. These export managers wanted help, of course. I conceive it, as one of my functions, to give them help. So I found myself going around Sydney, Australia, and actually pedaling American products, as a government official!

RANDOLPH A. KIDDER
Consular Officer
Sydney (1939-1940)

Political Officer
Canberra (1941-1944)

Ambassador Randolph A. Kidder was born and raised in the Boston area. He graduated from Harvard University in 1935 and then went to Paris for a year and a half to prepare for the foreign service exam. Ever since entering the Foreign Service in 1938, Ambassador Kidder has served in various countries including Australia, Brazil, Canada, and Vietnam. On December 13, 1989, he was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: Well now, your first overseas assignment was to Australia? to Sydney, you went there when?

KIDDER: I went to Sydney in the very end of ’39 or early ’40. By ship of course.

Q: Could you describe the situation? Australia came into the war but really hadn't felt its full impact; what was the situation as you saw it in Australia?

KIDDER: Of course a great many of the young Australians were captured up in Singapore.

Q: But that would have been in 1941. So we're talking about when you first arrived.

KIDDER: Well, Australia was in the war

Q: But only against Germany then...?

KIDDER: That is correct, I don't quite know what to say...
Q: This is prior to our entry, did you feel the Australians were annoyed at the Americans for not entering the war?

KIDDER: No, not at all, I never had that feeling.

Q: What type of work were you doing in Sydney?

KIDDER: I primarily started out with Visas, citizenship and emigration.

Q: Was there much of an effort on the part of Australians to leave?

KIDDER: It was very much business as usual. They had been in for a bit and had settled down to it. I spent four and a half years there without ever going away.

Q: Looking at the Biographic Register, you seem to have alternated between Sydney and Canberra.

KIDDER: No, it wasn't really that, I was assigned while I was still in Sydney. I was made also a third secretary in Canberra, but I stayed in Sydney until I was sent down to Canberra full time.

Q: Where were you when Australia came into the Japanese war, this would be December 8th, 1941.

KIDDER: That was just before I left Sydney to go to Canberra.

Q: What was the reaction as far as our embassy and consulate?

KIDDER: It was a legation then; it had just been opened, they hadn't had diplomatic relations because Australia was part of the Commonwealth. In Washington, they had an Australian at the British embassy, and our consul general in Sydney was the key man. Then they opened relations with us and as third secretary I was transferred to Canberra. At that point, Foreign Service officers were very strongly advised...they didn't know where I was going to go...to get women and children out of the way, my wife and children came back to DC, and I drove to Canberra, it was ridiculous, in retrospect; my wife left the children at home and came back and joined me later.

Q: Nelson Johnson was our first Ambassador, he had came out of China; how was he as an Ambassador, he was the first Ambassador you had really run across...?

KIDDER: Yes, but he was a minister... It was an amusing situation in a sense. He and Clarence Goss had served together in China, and they didn't like each other. So I got a good deal of kickback on that. When I went to Canberra, Johnson was the minister. John Minter was the counselor, and he was in Canberra for a long period of time.
Q: What type work were you doing in Canberra?

KIDDER: Political reporting. We were four in the legation then: Minister, Counselor, and I was third secretary, and we had a commercial attaché. The military attachés at that time were located in Melbourne. I think the Treasury attaché was there too; at that time Canberra was a town of 12,500 people, and the Australian government offices didn't really move there until the Labor government came in, then Canberra began to sprout, the way it is now.

Q: Did you feel that you were almost superfluous, as part of the legation there?

KIDDER: No, I found it actually fascinating. Since being such a tiny place, my wife and I knew all the foreign ministers and prime ministers by their first names, and since they had a terrible shortage of liquor and we didn't...(we had a garage full of Johnny Walker Black Label at $1.10 a bottle,)...we did a great deal of entertaining. It was to me very interesting, I enjoyed it, I spent a lot of time on the Canberra hill, where the parliament sat, and we entertained a lot of the ministers.

Q: Since this was during the war and all, I suppose this was the best relations we have ever had...

KIDDER: Oh they were excellent, I had no problems at all that I recall.

Q: Did you have problems that you would get involved in regarding our military? You have all these young men running around, and troops...

KIDDER: No, you see they sent a lot of officers, the troops were mostly around Queensland, where MacArthur went when he came over. He did come down to Canberra a couple of times, where we saw him, but all the business was done in Brisbane and moved up into the islands. But talking about when the Japanese came into the war, we were in Sydney. Like all our friends, we fortified our garage, we put in all kinds of things, food, special timber... that we were all encouraged to do by the Australians. No one knew where the Japanese were going to strike.

Q: Can you think of any issues the legation got involved in at that time, or was it pretty much smooth sailing?

KIDDER: It was very smooth sailing, I don't remember any problems of any magnitude. The only problem was walking up a hill and going through the sheep. That was literally true, there were sheep all over the place. Of course there was black-out at night, but a lot of the roads didn't have buildings built along them yet, being only 12,500 people. It was quite fascinating and very informal.

RICHARD B. PARKER
General Services Officer
Sydney (1949-1951)

Ambassador Richard B. Parker was born in Providence, Rhode Island in 1923. He received a bachelor's degree in engineering from Kansas State University. Prior to joining the Foreign Service in 1949, he served in the U.S. Army as an infantry officer. Ambassador Parker's career included positions in Australia, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and ambassadorships to Algeria, Lebanon, and Morocco. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1989.

Q: Your first assignment was to Sydney, Australia. I'd like just a quick snapshot, how did you feel at your first Foreign Service post? I mean, how did this hit you?

PARKER: Well, Sydney, I was considered very fortunate to get Sydney. Originally, I was assigned to Seoul. They changed that because we had a small child. This is in 1949. And sent us to Sydney instead. We were very pleased about that.

We found the post was a medium-sized consulate general run by a named Orson Nielsen, whose first post had been St. Petersburg before World War I. An old-fashioned, what we used to call old-line Foreign Service Officer, who was very particular about his scotch and thought of himself as a connoisseur of wine and so forth. Very frosty. Actually, I had no idea that he had any opinion at all of me, but he apparently saw possibilities in me. He was very good to me.

We had a couple of bizarre people there. I had a very bizarre officer in charge of me. I won't mention his name. He is still alive. He is somebody who was terrible rude to everybody including visitors to the consulate. He had sold a Cadillac for an enormous amount of money and had it converted into gold seal, yellow seal, dollar bills which he housed in a big Gladstone bag which he kept in a safe behind my desk. Every month, he would come and count this money because he was expecting World War III to break out at any moment, and he wanted to be sure that he had enough cash to handle the situation. He must have had, I don't know, $15,000 back there in back of my desk. An enormous amount of money.

I was assigned to--first of all, we didn't call them that in those days--I was the general services officer. I did the pouches and files and liquor orders and got hot water heaters for the people in Canberra and so forth. Essentially administrative work. Then I was rotated to consular work and commercial work. I found it a very useful, very valuable experience.

The consul general, the crusty old consul general, left mid-way through our tour. We got a new name who was rather a S.O.B. and brought another S.O.B. with him as a hatchet man. The place deteriorated after that, and I was glad to leave.

EDWARD C. INGRAHAM
Consul
Perth (1951-1954)

Edward C. Ingraham was born in New York state in 1922. He received his undergraduate degree from Dartmouth College in 1942 and subsequently joined the war effort and served in the U.S. Army overseas between 1943-45. He entered the Foreign Service in 1947. In addition to Islamabad, his posts included Cochabamba, La Paz, Hong Kong, Perth, Madras, Djakarta, and Rangoon. He was interviewed on April 8, 1991 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: From that assignment you were assigned again to a one-man post?

INGRAHAM: Yes, to Perth, Western Australia. Somehow Perth came open and I guess because I had been at a one-man post before, I was direct transferred there. So one day in the fall of 1951, I flew directly from Hong Kong to Perth. In those days a flight from Hong Kong to Perth was not simply boarding a 747 in Hong Kong and getting off in Perth. I had to fly to Saigon; to Singapore; to Jakarta, where there was lots of arguing trying to get on another plane; to Darwin, where I had to hang around several days; and finally on a DC-3 with a few other passengers and a lot of mining equipment, to Perth. We spent not quite three years there.

Q: Had Perth been open before you arrived?

INGRAHAM: It was opened, I believe, a little before the War. It was more of a purposeful post than Cochabamba, Bolivia, because every passenger ship that came to Australia from Europe would land there first. Perth was a delight. We have been back in Perth...visited it in 1988, and it has turned into one of the most lovely, glowing cities you could find anywhere. After Hong Kong it was at first a bit slow. Hong Kong was glamour, excitement, etc. But Perth turned out to be an utter delight from beginning to end. We were very busy. We had a little bit of everything: even a USIS office that consisted of one Australian girl. I had to give talks, officiate at flower shows. I was also assiduously reporting on the politics of Western Australia, which was fun but not of any great consequence.

One odd sidelight: since we had come from Hong Kong, some of the Asian students who were at the university in Western Australia got in touch with us. We got to know some of them quite well. One, as a matter of fact, still is a very close friend of ours, living here in Washington. There was also a young Australian student at the university who...at that time most Australians were not interested in Asia, to them home was Europe, the world consisted of Europe and America. Incidentally they particularly loved Americans in Perth because in 1942 Perth had been totally deserted by the Australian Armed Forces. The Australians felt when the Japanese invaded they could hold Melbourne and Sydney and an arc in between, but Perth would have to be given up. Early 1942, the people in Perth told us, they looked out to sea and saw some large ships coming in from a distance. It wasn't until they got close that the people in Perth discovered they were American and not Japanese ships. So the Perth people couldn't have been nicer to Americans, which is true to this day almost anywhere in Australia.
Q: I take it you were pretty much at the end of the leash as far as the Embassy was concerned.

INGRAHAM: The farthest post from Washington in the world. I wrote an article in the Foreign Service Journal on this. And the farthest from its supervisory post of any in the world. So I was very much on my own. Although we were in touch by telephone, etc.

I wanted to mention the one young Australian student who used to join the Asian students when they visited. We had them over to the house quite often, because they were a bit lonely and the Australians didn't quite know what to do with Asians. This young man was interested in Asia and in them. His name was Hawke. He was the nephew of the then Chief Minister of Western Australia. Today he is the Prime Minister of Australia. I hadn't realized for years that he was the same guy until our Washington-based Asian friend said, "Remember good ol' Bob Hawke?" I said, "My God is that the same Hawke?" And he said, "Of course it is." Perth was nice.

Unfortunately, there was a strange little sidelight on all this. In World War II, in 1942, when the Japanese were advancing down the Indonesian island chain, the Australians had sent a small garrison to try to hold on to East Timor. They hung on after the Japanese had taken the rest of the island chain all the way to New Guinea. The Japanese then landed in Timor...the Australian garrison was still there...and the Japanese really slaughtered the Timorese. The Australian garrison was pulled out, but the Japanese punished the Timorese badly. Because of this, the Australians have always had a guilty conscience about Timor. There was also a little group in Australia that kept up a close interest in Timor, including one Jimmy Dunn, who was something or other in the Australian government...librarian of the Parliamentary Library, I believe...and who started a drive to "Save Timor from the Indonesians." When he came to the States, he testified before Congress and stirred up a lot of worldwide agitation. Also a number of the African countries lined up behind Frettilin, even though their leaders couldn't have located Timor on a map. A lot of countries went after Indonesia on this one. In fact a majority of the United Nations was against Indonesia. But we stuck with the Indonesians throughout the whole thing.

ROBERT G. CLEVELAND
Consul
Sydney (1954-1956)

Robert G. Cleveland was born in Washington, DC and received a bachelor’s degree in 1932. He grew up in a family that traveled extensively abroad, spoke French at home, and had many European friends. He was appointed to the Foreign Service in 1946. His career included assignments in Bucharest, Paris, Sydney, Bangkok, and Belgrade. He was interviewed by Horace G. Torbert on June 8, 1990.

CLEVELAND: After a certain amount of wrangling with Personnel, which was no doubt a
mistake, I was reassigned to our Consulate General in Sydney, Australia. Parenthetically, I should say that in those days, the negotiation of an assignment was not looked upon with favor, and the grievance concept didn't exist!

In January, 1954 the Cleveland family traveled to Australia by train and boat, a luxury no longer possible. We arrived in Sydney after 18 days at sea. With the exception of the Communist longshoremen, who were at the dock, we found the Australians to be more friendly toward the United States than people of any country we had visited.

Sydney was a big change from Romania, France or Washington. The pace was totally different, and life was very agreeable. My title was Consul, and though the consular district was only New South Wales, my own assignment was Australia-wide. The reason for this was that most of Australia's economic ministries were then located in Sydney. My successor went to Canberra as Economic Counselor.

The job was reporting on Australian economic matters, and trade promotion. We were a very small group in my office. In those days, American trade and investment in Australia was a fraction of what it is today. Australians wanted more. This gave me a real opportunity; I turned my energies to promoting American investment and trade. I traveled around Australia visiting banks and chambers of commerce, explaining to them the need for more Australian promotional activity and a better legal climate. Perhaps partly as a result of these efforts, things started changing. American interests grew rather fast in the following years. Compared to jobs I had previously and later, my duties weren't demanding. On the whole, it was a satisfying period, and especially good for my family.

Q: It was, after all, a variety of Foreign Service experiences which you need.

CLEVELAND: Yes. It was very different from anything I'd done in my two previous posts.

Q: What kinds of American investments were made in that period?

CLEVELAND: Several major companies had been in Australia for a long time, including General Motors, Ford and Chrysler. There were a few other rather small manufacturing branch operations. A few of these were branches of British subsidiaries of U.S. companies. Australia was having balance of payments difficulties at that time; when GM applied for authority to repatriate earnings, the press would compare the dollar amount of the repatriation to the amount of GM's original prewar investment. This made GM look greedy, and gave a negative spin to the idea of foreign investment in Australia. It made my job of pushing for liberalization of investment more difficult.

Q: Were there extractive industries such as mining?

CLEVELAND: Yes, but there was not much foreign investment there. A copper mine in Queensland was partly U.S.-owned; the oil industry was represented, but in the marketing area.
Some oil exploration had been conducted with negative results. Coal and steel and other extractive industries were almost entirely Australian, but there was probably British money in some of them.

That was then. Major changes have taken place since. When we revisited Australia thirty years later, it was hard to believe it was the same country. Sydney had developed from an overgrown very provincial village into a major metropolis. Nearly every major American company is now there in some form, not to mention the Japanese and others.

Q: Did you find a difference in Australian attitudes toward the United States in thirty years?

CLEVELAND: Yes and no. In the post-war period, including the '50s, we were extremely popular. They looked on us as their saviors from the Japanese. The battle of the Coral Sea was celebrated every year as a kind of tribute to the U. S. Every year, a prominent American would be invited to the celebration as a guest of the Australian Government. One year Admiral "Bull" Halsey came, and received extraordinary adulation. It was very heart-warming.

RUTH McLENDON
Consular Affairs, Labor Reporting Officer
Adelaide (1959-1961)

Ruth McLendon was born in Texas in 1929. She received her bachelor’s degree from Texas Christian University in 1949 and her master’s degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1950. Her postings abroad following her entry into the Foreign Service in 1951 include Sao Paulo, Manila, Adelaide, Rangoon, Bangkok and Paris. Ms. McLendon was interviewed in 1995 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: So, you were in Adelaide from when to when?

McLENDON: January of 1959 to June of 1961. I was there two and a half years because I had to be extended to get on the right assignment cycle.

Q: What was Adelaide like and what was the importance consular wise of Adelaide?

McLENDON: Adelaide had been one of our old posts, we had had a consulate there for more than a hundred years and then we closed it in 1953. Now we were reopening. Originally it had been there to protect seaman because we had whalers in the area that would come through the southern seas and other shipping of all kinds. Later on there was not very much justification. We kept fairly busy with visas. We had a growing number of American citizens there as American firms invested in Australia. We had a fairly active commercial program that was largely carried on by our senior Australia staff. We did some minor political reporting all of which the
Department could have lived without. It was my first chance to become involved in political reporting because John Ausland who was principal officer had been in political work most of his life and was rather blasé about it and practically willing to turn it over, most of it to me.

Q: I might say that John Ausland comes up in my radar all the time because I’m on an Internet connection. He’s continually commenting on things. It’s a diplomatic history connection on the electronic net and he’s continually making comments to people about they got it wrong, you know, this is what happened. He’s still doing his political reporting.

McLENDON: I would think John would be pretty up on it. He tends to do his background work pretty carefully. John was a very sensible, laid back sort of type. We didn’t really need to be there.

Q: Were there two of you?

McLENDON: There were two of us. It was fun, but I can’t think of anything essential in it.

Q: How were the Australians there?

McLENDON: They were overwhelmingly friendly. It wasn’t a case of getting out and making friends, it was a case of fighting off invitations from everyone, fending off I should say because you couldn’t spread yourself that thin. No, they were great and very easy to make friends. You could make friends anywhere. It was a little sticky. I was supposed to have the labor party for a beat and it meant largely trade union members and they were just as nervous as cats with a woman officer.

Q: Really?

McLENDON: Yes. It made them uncomfortable. They weren't used to women in that position.

Q: Well, they really were, my understanding is that the labor party in Australia was almost a direct import from England, I mean a very working class, very class conscious and all that.

McLENDON: Oh, very, yes. Australia as a country has a reputation for being not class conscious and that is largely true. They are very democratic as a rule. Adelaide at that time tended to be the exception because the south Australians were the first to tell you that south Australia was not settled, never settled by convicts. They were younger sons.

Q: Sort of remittance men and that type of thing.

McLENDON: They didn’t put it that way. The implication was that they were never of that class. It was a mixture because they were the younger Australians and the intellectuals and they were delightful. It was, the top level of society in Adelaide was like a step back into the 19th Century and in fact Mallory Ausland and I were both compulsive readers and I discovered Trollop about
that time and we decided that that was probably the best guide to Adelaide society. We were working our way through all of the Trollop novels and we thought that some of it might possibly be important, but that’s getting pretty far advanced here.

Q: Those were pretty racy crowds.

McLENDON: Pretty racy crowds. You’re better off. Anyhow. When John and Mallory left they gave me as a farewell present, they had found an old blotter with a silver cover over it and they had it engraved Adelaide 1861.

Q: I take it by this time you really were hooked on the Foreign Service, weren’t you?

McLENDON: Oh, yes and I loved Australia. I traveled all over Australia and loved it and went back later to visit my friends. The Aussies are great friends.

PAUL M. CLEVELAND
Economic Officer
Canberra (1959-1962)

In 1959, you then went to Canberra. How did that come about?

CLEVELAND: Before I went to Canberra, I went back to FSI to learn a foreign language. That was German in my case; that was the language that I had chosen because I had lived in Munich when in the Air Force and had some knowledge of the language. I had enjoyed Germany and hoped that sometime I might return to it for a tour. I achieved the 3-3 level and was then assigned, naturally, to Canberra, Australia--an English speaking post. I was somewhat disappointed with the assignment, but at least I had heard of the place. I called Carter, my wife, to tell her the news. When I got home that evening, she asked why we were going to Canberra. When I inquired further, she told me that it was in the middle of the Amazon jungle. She had found a place named "Canbra", which was in the jungle. I think she was quite relieved when she found out that our future lay in civilization. In any case, the assignment came as a surprise. I am not sure there was much rhyme or reason for it, but it was an assignment as an economic officer which I welcomed.

The Economic Section in Canberra was a three-officer section; I was the junior man. Unlike
some of my colleagues, I did not have a rotational assignment; I was the only junior officer in the Embassy; there were a couple assigned to our Consulate General in Sydney--one of whom was Tony Quainton--later ambassador to several posts--and another was Jay Katzen. I went right to the Economic Section and stayed there for two years of a three year tour. Bill Knight was the Economic Counselor--he was succeeded by Eddie Shott. Then there was a labor officer. Knight was very bright and personable. The Embassy also had an Agricultural Attaché who had an Australian assistant. Between the two of them, they did all of the agricultural reports, which were numerous.

I spent most of my time collecting economic data, which became the basis for reports. I did not initially write any of the reports, but later on, I participated in drafting those reports. I remember well the first one that I did; it was so full of blue corrections, that I was really upset. I talked to the labor attaché about what Knight had done to my report; he suggested that I forget about it. Then I went to Knight to ask him about my first report; he just said that I would have to learn to do better. He was right; I had a lot to learn, especially about writing, but my pride was certainly wounded after that first drafting experience. Eddie Shott was a better teacher; he would spend time with me going over each report to help me improve not only my analysis, but my presentation as well. Shott really became a mentor; he felt a responsibility toward the junior officers that worked for him and spent time with me to help improve my performance. He was meticulous about his efficiency reports and generally quite fair; he would make changes in the ER, if his original comments seemed entirely unfair to me. He was a good leader. I have always been grateful for the time he spent training me. At that stage of my development, I had to learn to write; I thought I knew, but I learned that I needed a good deal of tutoring and I am thankful that Eddie gave me the time. I believe that under his steady guidance, I did improve.

In those days, we still had a lot of mandatory reports that all posts had to submit. A lot of those were routine.

The Ambassador was William Sebald, a former Admiral who had been on Douglas MacArthur's staff in Tokyo and had been our Ambassador to Burma. He was a small, acerbic man, described by the Station Chief as "not a leader of men". He severely chastised me one morning because a cable had not gotten out the night before. I told him that I had completed and given the telegram to his secretary the previous afternoon. That didn't seem to placate him; he told me in no uncertain terms that it was an officer's duty to make sure that his or her work was completed by the day's end and on its way to Washington; that was not his secretary's responsibility. I didn't respond, but I thought that Sebald was wrong both on the merits and on the process. Sebald was a "hands-on" manager, but he certainly was not very popular with is staff.

In 1961, Sebald was replaced by Bill Battle, the son of the former governor of Virginia--an up and coming lawyer with political connections in Virginia who had been a PT boat commander in President Kennedy's WWII squadron. Through that connection he had been appointed Ambassador to Australia. He was extremely popular; he became a leading figure in Canberra almost from the moment he arrived, partly because he was a scratch golfer--in fact, he went on to become the President of the United States Golf Association. I liked Battle tremendously, and also
his lovely wife, Barrie.

The DCM was Bill Belton. He was not an Australian expert; in fact he had spent most of his career in Latin America. He was a good officer and we enjoyed working for him.

When we arrived, Canberra was a relatively small city--about 40,000 people. While we were there, it grew approximately 50%. Now it is about 300,000. It was a delightful small city with a fairly high concentration of intelligent people. It was the seat of government; it was the home of the Australian National University; it had a large diplomatic corps, as well as a large number of media people. The social life centered around the outdoors--tennis, golf, swimming, etc. As I said, it was the Capital of Australia; there was a Parliament building. Many of the delegates did not reside in Canberra. But most of Ministers and their staffs lived in Canberra, so that I would see socially a lot of those that I dealt with officially. The social life was very relaxed and pleasant. We had several circles of friends--one of government people--Foreign and Trade Ministries, some of whom we are still in touch with. One is the Australian Ambassador to NATO; he is the godparent of one of our children. Then we had a circle of friends who had nothing to do with our official capacity; it was a circle that we were never fully able to replicate in later years. These were doctors and lawyers whom we met here and there. We went skiing with some of them on several occasions. The third circle of friends consisted of people our age and rank in other embassies, some of whom we have kept track of. The social life was fairly active, although as you rise in the Foreign Service it becomes more active and more burdensome. In Canberra, life was extremely pleasant; it was great for raising our children--actually one was born there. We lived at 1A Mugga Way, which has recently been torn down. It was a nice house in a very nice neighborhood within walking distance of the Embassy. In retrospect, our tour in Canberra was a lot of fun; it may not have been professionally sufficiently challenging--although I learned a fair amount--but it certainly was pleasant enough. It was a good tour.

As I said, I did a lot of statistical research. I took what were primarily government press releases on economic conditions in Australian and translated those into reports for Washington. My first venture outside this relatively mundane task was a series of reports I wrote after taking the sole trip I took with the Ambassador, although I may have accompanied him on a couple of short trips to Sydney. He went all around Australia and I reported on our various stops--the asbestos mines in Western Australia, the "stations" in central Australia, the Kakatoo Island iron ore development. By this time, I had learned to write reasonably well--I might add that Carter had actually done some of the research on the mines for me which helped my reporting considerably. My trip enabled me to talk to a lot of people gaining a lot of knowledge that I could not have gotten from publications. So I was able to put together some brief reports on economic matters that had not been covered before. It was my first real contribution in the Foreign Service. The US Bureau of Mines wrote me a note welcoming my reports. Some of my findings surprised them.

The Cleveland family also traveled on its own in Australia--to Queensland, the Great Barrier reef--a grand and wonderful experience--to Melbourne and to some other cities.

There has been an almost time honored tradition of rivalry in Australia between the Embassy and
the large Consulates General, particularly Sydney. I became marginally involved in that because, as the junior member of the Embassy staff, I did consular work, which consisted of issuing diplomatic visas; i.e. a clerical job, stamping visas into the officials' passports. If I took action beyond that, Orrie Taft, the consular officer in Sydney, would jump up and down in rage because he felt that I was invading his "turf". From Taft's point of view, allowing me to give out diplomatic visas was already a great favor that he was doing me. I hardly shared his view; in fact, I thought that Taft was putting a real damper on any kind of initiative that I might have wished to take; it was the most bureaucratic attitude that I think I ever faced in the Foreign Service. In general, I think the Consulate General in Sydney did try to exercise as much independence of the Embassy as it could. Larry Vass was the CG; he had been the chief of the Aviation Division in the Department. He was a substantial character and he made a point of dealing with the top businessmen in Sydney. He would come to the Embassy periodically to report on his contacts; in fact, he did have a substantial operation in Sydney, which essentially ran itself.

My first tour as an economic officer was helpful in that I became trained as a reporting officer, even if much of the training was unconscious growth. I did feel at the time that I was certainly not yet a real economic officer; I had not had much academic background in the subject, and I had still lots to learn about GNP, national income, budgets, etc. In fact, I took a course in Keynesian economics at Canberra University College, which later became part of the Australian National University. That was very helpful in making me more aware of the "dismal" science.

My lecturer at CUC was a man named Coombs. I remember him primarily because he would often arrive in the classroom visibly inebriated. I know that some have accused the ANU of taking a leftist view of economics, but I think Coombs did not tilt his lectures; it was straight Keynes. There was some communist influence in the University, but I don't think that I ever viewed ANU as a communist front. The Labor Party, on the other hand, did harbor some radical leftists--people who advocated extreme measures. I don't want to leave the impression that the Labor Party as a whole was a communist party; it was not. The majority of its members were simply progressively oriented, but still in the main stream of political thinking--they were not communists by any stretch of the imagination.

I attended an Australian political association conference held in Albert Hall in Canberra--the coldest place in the Southern Hemisphere. While shivering, I listened to many speakers. One was Bob Hawke, then a young firebrand of the Labor Party. Even then, he was viewed by many as a potential future leader of the Party. At the time, he was a member of the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU). Hawke gave a fiery speech about bread lines and destitute workers and the downtrodden Australian masses. I was sitting behind Gough Whitlam (later an Australian PM), and I think it was the consensus of the attendees that Hawke was there to make an impression--that the substance was not as important as the ear catching phrases. There were in fact no bread lines, no major unemployment, no downtrodden in 1962.

We did become friends with H.W. Arndt, who was a German Jewish refugee who had come to Australia after WWII, and was certainly in the left-center part of the Labor Party--I guess he was basically a socialist. He was a well known economist--a professor at ANU. We became personal
friends and remain so still. Undoubtedly, by osmosis, I learned a little of how a socialist saw the world and gained some insights into their views of the capitalist world. But I don't believe that whatever leftist sympathies may have resided at ANU had any impact on my academic learning. As I suggested, we had a fairly wide circle of Australian friends. I liked them very much; they were very much like Americans, although they steadfastly refused to acknowledge any such comparison. We used to have long discussions on that subject, which made me increasingly aware of the growing sense of nationalism cropping up in Australia, particularly among the younger Australians. I think Americans and Australians always got along very well; there were some cultural differences, but fundamentally we were very much alike, and I enjoyed their company immensely. This friendship was of course helped by the fact that in the period of my tour, there were no major issues between the two countries. We had some differences over agricultural policies, but nothing major. During my last year in Canberra, while I was serving in the political section, I did notice the beginning of tensions concerning our bases and military forces in Australia.

Prime Minister Menzies was a great figure in my eyes. I met with him, shook his hand and exchanged a few words with him. I was greatly impressed with him, but then at that stage of life, I was highly impressionable anyway.

As I said, I spent the last of my year of my Canberra tour in the Political Section. One of the officers in the Embassy died and another resigned from the Foreign Service. So suddenly, the Embassy found itself short-handed. I had gotten along well with Eddie Shott and Bill Belton, and they asked me whether I would consider extending my tour for one more year. I would be switched to the Political Section to take the junior reporting officer position there, even though the job was rated higher than my own grade. I thought that it was a great opportunity and therefore went to work for Don Lamm, the Political Counselor. Lamm had been described by Belton as an "old shoe diplomat"; he had been in the Foreign Service for many years and had served in Canberra previously. Between Australian tours, he had served in Africa; he always recalled that President Nixon had visited his post and had taken exception to something that Lamm had done, which ruined his career. But he happily returned to Australia where he and Belton would spend some of their off-duty time bird watching. Don was also a mentor, although probably not as precisely or as doggedly as Shott had been, but he was very nice and attentive. I remember that almost every Friday evening I would go to his house, have a beer and discuss the state of the world or the Foreign Service. Don had a great big German shepherd named "Lilly", who would attack me whenever she saw me; that became a game after a while.

The Political Section was a two-men section; I was obviously the Number Two. Don was busy with the start of the negotiations on the new intelligence collection bases that we were trying to establish--a highly classified operation at the time. That left me to do most of what I would call the "routine" reporting. I did the WEEKA report, which required a meeting every week of the various components of the Embassy in which we decided what was worthy of reporting and analysis. I chaired those meetings even though much more senior officers like Shott attended. The WEEKA was intended to be a weekly summary and analysis of political events and trends. So the WEEKA became my major responsibility--putting it together, the editing and the despatch
of it. I learned a lot from that exercise about how to write and edit reports.

I also did some reporting of my own, mainly out of publicly available material; it was mostly a summary of media stories with sometimes a comment of my own added at the end.

In the last year, I started to cover Parliament. I had not done that before and I think I was probably too new at that kind of coverage, so I did not probably do as much contact work with Parliamentarians as a more seasoned officer might have. As in every deliberate body, there was always a lot of activity; without guidance, I did not have the experience to distinguish the wheat from the chaff. I did meet some of the younger Parliamentarians, including Malcolm Fraser, who subsequently became Prime Minister and Douglas Anthony, who became head of the Country Party. These politicians were all about my age and I used to talk to them periodically. I began to understand the process of talking to politicians, which obviously is an important task for a Foreign Service officer. And I liked it immensely.

I used to talk to these parliamentarians most often in large common rooms. Their offices were in an old Parliamentary building--very small and sparse and cramped. I would also see them socially, as in the Canberra Hotel Bar on Friday nights. I also called on Foreign Ministry people in their offices to talk about matters of mutual concern. We did not have any major problems with the Australians at the time. There was considerable interest in Washington about the Australian labor movement which kept our Labor Attaché busy. But international political problems--none that I can really remember. It was mostly a matter of coordinating common views.

During my last summer in Australia, at my own expense because the Embassy refused to pay, I went to Papua New Guinea. That was the most interesting experience I had during my first tour "down under". I had become more or less conversant with the requirements of a political reporting officer, although it was a slow learning curve. I realized from that work that the emergence of Papua New Guinea might well become a difficult problem. Australia was the trustee for that territory under a UN mandate, but there was considerable talk at ANU and in other fora that Australia needed to begin to think about how Papua New Guinea might become independent. Don Lamm had gone there during the previous summer and I wanted to see the land for myself. So I went at my own expense. I stayed there for about 10 days and talked to 80-90 people. It was absolutely fascinating. We had no representation in Papua New Guinea; its coverage was actually in the Canberra consular district. Because of that, incidentally, I had been deeply involved in Governor Nelson Rockefeller's son's disappearance. I was the contact point in the Embassy on all questions concerning that unfortunate event. The Dutch tried to help find him, but neither they nor anyone was ever successful.

I made appointments with various Papua New Guinea personalities through the Australian Ministry of Territories. I also got some help from the CIA man at the Embassy who used his good offices with his Australian counterparts. So I saw a lot of people. I went to Port Moresby and Rabaul and Lae and Goroka. I saw coffee planters; I saw patrol officers overlooking the far reaches of the Australian domains—they were literally going into the jungles shaking people out
of trees. I ranged far and wide by plane primarily; you didn't drive in Papua New Guinea in the 1960s; it was mostly jungle with very few if any roads connecting the cities. Once in a city, you could drive around and go a few miles outside, but transportation between cities was by plane unless you wanted to trek on jungle paths cut out during WWII.

I had talked to a lot of people in Canberra about Papua New Guinea. It was the first time in my career that I had become steepled in a single subject—the independence of Papua New Guinea. From all my conversations both in Canberra and in Papua New Guinea I came to the conclusion that there was absolutely no indigenous political development in the territory. The Australians offered their rules and regulations and processes, but no local organizations had actually been developed, even though some Australian officials were trying to encourage political development. So in the early 1960s, there were virtually no indigenous political organizations in Papua-New Guinea. Efrahim Jubilee of Raboul had gone to the UN along with an Australian--Dudley McCarthy; there was John Guise--part French--who could walk through a marketplace and be recognized by everybody. But there was no single local person who knew how to organize a political group. There were very few natives who had received a university education; in terms of political education and experience, there was virtually none. Approximately 13 years later, Papua-New Guinea achieved its independence. It had gone a long way from what I saw in 1962. Most of the people I talked to were Australians. I probably talked to no more than half a dozen Papua New Guineans largely because they were not that accessible. I think many of the Australians I talked to understood that Papua-New Guinea should and would achieve independence. They had seen the model in Africa and other parts of the world and understood that Australia would have to give Papua-New Guinea its independence sooner rather than later. As I suggested, it was this awakening in the Australian psyche that caused me to be interested in Papua-New Guinea in the first place. There were people who felt very strongly that Papua-New Guineans had to be turned into a modern political system as quickly as possible. Both Don Lamm and I focused on the questions whether the necessary indigenous leadership existed or was being developed. My conclusion was that such leadership did not exist nor were there enough people close to reaching the necessary level of organizing ability and sophistication.

Even on the economic side, the major developments were under the guidance of the Australians. Many retired military officers had been granted large plots of land for development and they built coffee plantations. It was a marvelous illustration of pioneering, particularly in the highlands. I met some marvelous human beings, particularly Australians--most of them homesteaders, some of whom had been extraordinarily successful.

I spent a very interesting evening with some Australians in Port Moresby, listening to what they had been doing to bring the Papua-New Guineas into the modern world. I took pages and pages of notes; unfortunately, the note book was lost somewhere along the line. I did send a brief despatch to the Department at the end of my trip, but I did so grudgingly because I was annoyed that the government had not paid for my trip. I thought that it was part of my official duties and that I had earned to some measure greater support than I had received from the Embassy. So my attitude was that this was my own trip and my observations were essentially mine, and since no one seemed to have cared very much, I didn't really extend myself in reporting my findings.
Nevertheless, I found the trip personally very rewarding; I learned a lot about a remote part of the world, which had been left behind essentially by progress.

This experience with Papua New Guinea brings to mind the issue of immigration to Australia which was being vigorously debated in the country in the early 1960s. One of my tasks in the Embassy was to put together a small reference library which included primarily material on Australia. Included in this small collection were a couple of books about the White Australia policy. I read them and became interested in the general subject of immigration. I called the Foreign Ministry to ask it about the "White Australia" immigration policy. My question was met by a long silence. Finally, the man at the other end of the phone suggested that I call the Ministry of Immigration, which I did. I said that I would like to come to speak to someone about Australian immigration policy. That was not easy, but I finally spoke to some one who claimed to be the Ministry's spokesman. I asked him about the "white" immigration policy. He denied that any such policy existed. I told him that I had just read a book which clearly documented that in fact there was such a policy. The spokesman said that he didn't care what I had read and that there was no such thing as a "white" Australian immigration policy. Despite the evidence to the contrary, the spokesman continued to deny that any such policy existed. I wrote all of this up in a report. I am convinced that there was an exclusionary policy and that only "whites" needed to apply for immigration. The Australians had a euphemism for it and denied its existence, but there was a clear exclusionary policy for all applicants, but whites.

As far as I know, we never made an issue of it; it may have been mentioned in passing at some private meetings but we certainly did not make an issue of it at higher levels. Perhaps the Australians thought that my inquiries were a prelude to some American initiative, which I am sure made them so defensive; little did they realize that I was essentially just satisfying a personal curiosity! I just naively blundered into a very sensitive issue.

I must say that the Australians were very sensitive to accusations on this point. They discussed their own views with us openly from time to time. I think most of my contacts--young Australians--reflected some concern about the potential "invasion" of Asians. The fear was that if the door were opened just a crack, the trickle would be followed by a flood which would quickly overwhelm the 12 million Australians living on the continent. I think that this fear has by now subsided, but it certainly was a major concern in the early 1960s. Although at that time the majority view was an exclusionary one, there were voices calling for a more liberal immigration policy basing their argument that Australia was in South Asia and that it had to find some ways to be a better neighbor. But I think among my friends and acquaintances, the existing immigration policy had strong support.

That tour in Canberra was a great learning experience for me. I learned a lot, and Carter and I also had a wonderful time. I believe our daughters Robin and Sandy remember it happily. And our first son, James, was born there.
Jay K. Katzen was born in New York in 1936. He graduated from Princeton in 1958 and then received an M.A. at Yale the following year and entered the Foreign Service in 1959. He served in Australia, Burundi, Romania, and Mali. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on September 6, 1990.

Q: Your first assignment was to Sydney, where you served first as a consular officer and then as a commercial officer. What was your impression of this job? How did it hit you? Was it what you expected?

KATZEN: It was even more than I expected. I had been trained in French for it, which was not all that appropriate but I did get to use it later on. It was a wonderful assignment. I had dedicated bosses who also believed in a geographical rotation program, so that I had assignments in Brisbane and in Canberra as well as my principal tour in Sydney. These were men and women who shared that dedication of my colleagues in the basic officers' course, and welcomed me warmly as another member of a very successful fraternity, if you will.

Q: You were dealing not only with the consular side but with commercial things. What was your impression of America and Australia as far as the American business response to developing things in Australia at that time? We're talking the early sixties.

KATZEN: Well, first, on the consular side, it was a moment when I became very conscious of the fact that the American vice consul was, for many Australians, the very first American whom they had met. And that, however busy a day, or what we thought were busy days, it was important to keep a smile and be very courteous, at a time when we had, as you remember, those laborious forms that we had to go through with applicants, inquiring whether they were coming to America to assassinate the president.

Q: Or engage in an immoral sexual act, which I always thought was a...

KATZEN: Well, I was a bachelor at the time and I remember I had a young lady of whom I asked that question, and she looked at me wistfully and said, "Only once, sir."

In any event, turning to the commercial side, we had a very aggressive section at the time. I do remember a period where I did use some of that French, traveling through French-speaking territories in New Caledonia and through the Society Islands, trying to sell American glassware, among other products. I recall being met by people who would pick up a glass and heave it across a room and it wouldn't break, and then being asked whether the American product could do the same. And those are the still very successful French plastic glasses, which, as you know, say at the bottom: Made in France. And we didn't do very well.
Within Australia, though, we had a tremendous reservoir of goodwill toward the United States, generated, among other things, by the Battle of the Coral Sea. And the Australians wanted desperately to be friends and be more like Americans.

I remember going to a place on Bondi Beach in Sydney. I went up for a meat pie at a meat pie stand along the beach and asked the man for one, and he turned to me and said, "You've been to Hawaii for two weeks and you talk like a bloody Yank." And I said, "No, sir, I am a bloody Yank."

But it was a wonderful experience, it still was. And I guess this is something I'm pleased to say about each of my assignments. They were early days. There was a lot of pioneering which we still were doing, and that's what made it a lot of fun.

**ANTHONY QUANTON**  
Vice Consul & Commercial Officer  
Sydney (1960-1962)

*Ambassador Anthony Quainton was born in Washington state in 1934. He graduated from Princeton University in 1955, Oxford University in 1958 and joined the Foreign Service in 1959. He served at overseas posts in Australia, Pakistan, India, France, Nepal and as ambassador to the Central African Republic, Nicaragua, Kuwait and Peru. Ambassador Quainton has also served as the Deputy Inspector General, Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, and the Director General of the Foreign Service. He was interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1997.*

Q: *Today is November 12, 1997. Tony, how did you get to Sydney?*

QUAINTON: Like so many officers of our day, there wasn’t a whole lot of choice of where you went. There was no bidding; assignments were handed out. When the day came to announce where we would be going, Sydney fell to our lot. My wife and I were fairly disappointed, having spent the previous four years in England in my case, and two years in the case of my wife. We had acquired many unfortunate attitudes about the Australians as slightly less civilized than Americans about Australia as an isolated, far away country with very little to offer by way of culture or anything else. So, coming into the Foreign Service with several foreign languages, a background in Soviet studies, the thought of going to Australia was not immediately attractive. In the event, the two years we spent there turned out to be some of the happiest of our Foreign Service career. We didn’t actually leave for Sydney until early February of 1960 after having taken the consular course to prepare us for my first job as vice consul at the consulate general.

We traveled out by air via Japan and the Philippines. My wife was eight months pregnant at the time, so the trip was something of a trial for her. We arrived and were immediately put into
temporary quarters by the consulate staff, a little house that we lived in for three months, and then moved into an apartment for the remaining two years of our tour. It was a small basement apartment which the real estate dealers advertised as having a harbor glimpse, which meant that if you stood on the toilet in the bathroom and looked out the window you could indeed see a portion of Sydney harbor.

The consulate was relatively small. There was a consul general, a commercial section with two officers, a consular section with four and an administrative section with a couple of officers and a communicator. It was in the upper floor of a downtown bank building. It is no longer at that location. The junior of two vice consuls was expected to do the non-immigrant visa work, and he stood all day at a counter in the waiting room without any of the protection or barriers that today characterize our consular sections. He in effect acted not only as vice consul, and non-immigrant visa officer, but as receptionist. Everybody who came into the consulate general was greeted by me and referred down the hall to the commercial or administrative sections, or, if it were a consular matter, I would deal with it.

Consular interviews, which were mandatory in those days, required the asking of a series of questions, which had to be asked directly, not read and then commented on. People were asked if they were members of the Communist Party; whether they had any intention of overthrowing the government of the United States; whether they were coming to the United States for immoral purposes; whether they had committed a crime involving moral turpitude; and other questions of that ilk. Many people thought nothing of these questions, but priests, nuns, clergymen, and others often were offended.

Q: Did anyone ever ask you what was meant by moral turpitude?

QUAINTON: Indeed. Within the first day on the job, when I got to the question of “Have you ever committed a crime involving moral turpitude,” one of the applicants said, “What’s that?” I said that it was a serious crime usually involving a felony sentence and the gentleman concerned said, “Yes.” I asked what crime he had committed and he said murder. As it turned out, this gentleman in 1919, having returned from the battlefields of Western Europe as part of the ANZAC battalion, killed a man in a bar and was sentenced to second degree murder and served 20 years. He was freed sometime in the early 1940s. This was now 20 years later, he had done his time, but he was ineligible for a visa to the United States having committed a crime involving moral turpitude. I remember seeking a waiver from the Attorney General and having it denied in what I thought was an unjust fashion. He was a returned serviceman and was going with a group of other servicemen around the world back to the battlefields of France crossing the United States, but no waiver was granted and he had to travel through Canada while the rest of his party traveled through the United States. That was my introduction to problems of moral turpitude.

Frequently, more often than one would imagine, when I asked this question one got shifty eyed answers and indeed we had a system of police checks with the Australian authorities. It turned out that a considerable number of men had committed a crime not much thought about today called indecent exposure. In Australia in the 1950s and through most of the 1960s, the licensing
laws were such that the bars closed at six pm. Men came out of their offices or factories at five pm and immediately went to the local pub and drank two or more pints of beer, at the end of which time the bars closed. There being no public facilities, these men took refuge behind the nearest bush, at which point the police pounced and they were sentenced for indecent exposure. That also created a problem for eligibility for visas to the United States.

The third category of visas that were troublesome were young single women traveling to the United States, according to them to visit friends for a short visit, but in fact frequently going to marry American servicemen that they had met during or after the war. At that time, there was no fiancée visa provision in the law and they were ineligible to go to the United States if they could not demonstrate their intention to return to Australia. The head of the consular section, a man who had traumatic visa experiences in the 1930s, which I will come back to in a moment, regarded these cases as opportunities to exercise his authority, and we were instructed to refuse these cases in a most vigorous way until such time as sufficient pressure built up by a sufficient number of important Australians calling up to express their belief in the virtue and integrity of the lady in question. After this charade, the word of the young lady would be accepted.

Q: With all due credit going to the consul.

QUAINTON: Yes. But, I certainly enjoyed the time I spent doing consular work. Almost immediately I was given additional responsibilities to do the political reporting on New South Wales, which was the consular district for the consulate general in Sydney.

Q: Did you get problems with “Are you now or have you ever been a member of the Communist Party” business?

QUAINTON: That was never much of a problem. There was a communist party in Australia but this was a time when there was a very intense battle going on for control of the Australian labour movement. One of the labour leaders who has stayed a friend over 35 years, Laurie Short, who was the head of the Ironworkers Union, had just thrown out the communist leadership in that union. As the political officer I got to know a fair number of the Labour Party leaders in New South Wales since the government in New South Wales was a Labour government, although the national government under Bob Menzies was a Liberal Country Party coalition government. So, I got some exposure to the politics of New South Wales. Then after a year I was transferred to the commercial section of the consulate. Another vice consul had arrived who is now a Burgess of the House of Delegates in Virginia. He, like me, was a Princeton graduate and had distinguished himself by being the Princeton tiger at all home football games.

Q: Was this Jay Katzen?

QUAINTON: Yes, Jay Katzen.

Q: I’ve interviewed him.
QUAINTON: Well, we will have to compare notes.

I was completely unqualified to be commercial officer. I had never sold anything significant, although I spent a brief period selling shoes at university to help myself through. We spent most of our time doing World Trade Directory reports and trade surveys for insignificant American companies seeking access to the Australian market. I was impressed then by the competence of the countries that had professional trade services, the British, Canadians, Germans, etc., compared to the amateurism with which we went about trade promotion. Although my first boss had been doing commercial work for a number of years, my second boss had been in the civil aviation business and knew very little about commerce.

Nonetheless, I went about the work of trade promotion with a certain enthusiasm selling everything from beach towels to machine tools to anyone who expressed an interest in the products being offered. My only significant success as a commercial officer was to sell an onion harvester to the city of Sydney. The municipality needed a mechanical device to rake the beer bottles off Bondi Beach on Sunday morning after the Saturday festivities on the beach and an onion harvester was ideally suited for raking up beer bottles out of the sand. Some middle west harvester manufacturer was the beneficiary of that particular effort.

Q: You mentioned that the British, Canadian and German commercial people were much more adept at this. Could you compare, contrast?

QUAINTON: Well, they had a trade commissioner service, the British and Canadians, for which people were recruited whose sole job and career was the promotion of trade for their respective countries. Whereas in our case, until the creation of the Foreign Commercial Service some 15 years later, we thought this was something that generalist officers could do as a sideline to their careers without any training, or exposure to the American business community and not much exposure to the Department of Commerce in Washington before they took up their work. The competition frequently had been briefed by the major exporting companies in their country and they knew much more about the market than we did. It seemed to me then, as it does now, that the Foreign Service has not distinguished itself in the nuts and bolts of trade promotion. Although it has done much good work in helping major corporations with contracts and other investment and trade problems with host governments, the nitty gritty commercial work has never been something which was much to the taste of the officers of the Foreign Service.

There was an enormous amount of representation in Australia at two different levels. The consul general was much in demand in New South Wales to preside over debutante balls, open fêtes, attend official functions, give speeches to Lions Clubs, Rotary Clubs, etc. After the Lieutenant Governor of New South Wales, he was perhaps one of the most important commercial figures in the area. He couldn’t attend all these functions, so the junior officers got a lot of the opportunities that were otherwise the consul general’s, to represent the United States in all sorts of ways. I can still remember going out to a little country town called Mudgee in the center of New South Wales to preside over a debutante ball with the debutantes being only several years younger than the arriving dignitary, the vice consul. The local citizenry was, I think, some what taken aback
and indeed the mayor said that he had expected somebody who was bald, fat and fifty instead of somebody who was 25 and looked younger than that.

But the Australians were wonderfully hospitable people and we were able to travel widely. The country in many ways was like the America of the 1930s. We had friends who still had outdoor plumbing in the center of the city. It is hard to image a major American city in the early 1960s where indoor plumbing was not absolutely the common thing. But, the Australians lived a fairly simple, straightforward outdoor life. On the other hand, Sydney was already a city with a very considerable cultural life. The Australians were in the process of designing and just about to begin the construction of the famous Sydney Opera House. There was a major symphony orchestra in Sydney, lots of artists, etc. So contrary to our expectations when we heard about going to Sydney, it turned out to be a much more cosmopolitan and interesting post than we had expected.

Q: Who was your consul general?

QUAINTON: The consul general was Larry Vass. He had been in the civil aviation business for almost all of his career. He was a real specialist in civil aviation and was rewarded with being made consul general in Sydney, a job which he loved and which he carried out with some distinction. The consul general in those days had a beautiful house, which since has been sold, located at the end of Darling Point, one of the major promontories in Sydney harbor. It had a spectacular view out over the harbor and was a wonderful place for the consul general to carry out his representational responsibilities.

We were all expected to do representation and I still remember the first time the inspectors came to Australia. We were called together by the consul general and given the instructions that had come from the inspectors. One of them was that every officer was to give a dinner for the inspectors and was expected to invite eight to ten of his or her contacts to that dinner. The inspectors would come promptly at eight and would leave promptly at eleven. There would be no lingering by the inspectors to show that they enjoyed this party more than another. It was all very highly choreographed. We invited the speaker of the New South Wales legislature and a number of people out of political life to our little apartment. There were two inspectors. For my wife, it was really her first major occasion to give a state dinner where you were being judged for the quality of your food and conversation, as well as natural charm. It went reasonably well, although in our efforts to be elegant, we served pigeon which, unfortunately, was so hard it could not be cut.

Q: You mentioned that something had happened to the consul there during the thirties.

QUAINTON: Yes, his name was Orrey Taft. He subsequently committed suicide after he left Australia. He had joined the Foreign Service in the beginning of the 1930s and either his first or second post was Warsaw, where he served in the visa section. In the late thirties under a rightist but not yet fully Fascist government there was already significant persecution of the Jewish community. As he looked back on that experience, the people who got visas at his hand lived and
those whom he had to turn down died. He felt he had been asked to make life and death decisions and not just administer a visa law. He was a very bitter and angry man as a result of those experiences. It left him with a kind of cynicism about the visa business which was not always a constructive one when it came to managing a visa section.

**Q: What was your impression of the Australian attitude towards England?** Unlike most of the Foreign Service where you just come from the United States, you had a good solid dose of the British system and there is an antagonism and snobbism on one side or the other. Could you talk a bit about what you observed at that time?

QUAINTON: Oh, I think there is no doubt that the hostility to the British was very real, even though these were the days of the white Australia policy. The only people who could immigrate into Australia were Americans or Western Europeans. There had been a major influx of Eastern and Southern Europeans in the thirties as a result of the rise of Nazism and conditions in Western Europe and again after the Second World War substantial numbers of Hungarians, Czechs, and others came. But, there continued to be substantial British migration to Australia and they did well in business and the professions. And yet paradoxically, Britain was still the country of preference in educational terms, and people who went on to graduate school were more likely to go to the UK than they were the United States, although that was beginning to change. The cultural links were very strong. The crown was still popular. The Australians had always been more than willing participants in the Imperial war effort. A large number of Australians took part in the Boer War, and the ANZAC battalion was justly famous in the First World War. To be an ANZAC was still something of great prestige on Armistice Day. There was always a parade in Sydney, and the people at the head of that parade were those who had fought with the ANZACs in the First World War. There was also great pride in the Australian effort in the Second World War, although there the linkages were with the Americans, not with the British. The great military event for younger Australians was the Battle of the Coral Sea, at which the Japanese were turned back from the area just north of Australia. Every year there was a major ball and a public holiday to celebrate this battle. The consul general was much in demand to preside over the festivities on the occasion.

But, one heard a great deal of criticism of the “Pommies,” of the British. The British had a tendency to look down on and patronize the Australians as being slightly uncivilized and uncouth. And, the Australians, of course, couldn’t stand being patronized by the mother country. Despite this, there were extraordinary ties between Australia and Britain, which were much stronger then than they are 40 years later.

**Q: You had a Labour government in New South Wales and a coalition Liberal Country Party in Canberra. Did you find that the Australian Labour Party then was as doctrinaire as some of the other Labour Parties, like the New Zealand Labour Party and other places where they had gone quite left wing, really very Marxist, although not communist?**

QUAINTON: The Labour Party was divided in many ways. It was resistant to communist influence, but on the other hand was very aggressive as a party. The Labour Party rested directly
on funding which it got from the trade union movement, and trade union leaders played an
enormously powerful role in Labour Party politics. There was tension between the working class
and what one could call the country class, the people who lived off the land, whose livelihood, as
Australia’s livelihood, depended on sheep, wool, and products of this sort. There was a certain
class difference, although Australia is not a society marked by class in the European sense or to
the European degree. There is no aristocracy to speak of in Australia. But, the real sense of
working with your hands as distinct from working on the land provided, I think, a profound
cleavage in Australian society which still exists to some degree. This cleavage is much
extenuated as Australia has become an urban, service-oriented society as much as industrial
based.

Q: You were there during the election of Kennedy. Had he seized the imagination of the
Australians as a bright young leader?

QUAINTON: Yes, I think so. I don’t have any specific memories of the Kennedy era as it
affected U.S.-Australian relations. Australians were in many respects very insular, and it was
then a country that was inward looking. It had not really begun to see itself, as it did in the
seventies, as an Asian power. Its cultural links were still back to the mother country, to Britain.
So, Kennedy was admired as Americans were generally admired, but it didn’t make much of a
difference in U.S.-Australia relations. It is very interesting that the American ambassador
throughout this period was William Sebald and it was said, and I have reason to believe
truthfully, that Mrs. Sebald was never received in an Australian home because she was Japanese.
He was an East Asianist who had married her before the war, but the Australians were not
prepared to deal with a Japanese woman even the wife of the American ambassador to Australia.
So, that gets to the heart of what was then a very strong sense of white cultural identity and a
very strong rejection of all things related to Japan. Today Japanese is taught in Australian schools
and the Australians see Japan as a major market. The white Australia policy is gone, and the
country is almost as diverse as the United States.

Q: Were we trying in some way to say, “Come on fellas we have to deal with Japan,” or
anything like that?

QUAINTON: I have no idea. The consulate really did only two things. It issued visas and it
promoted trade. There was some political reporting by me and by the consul. We were interested
in the tension between the parties and the roles of communists, etc. This was a great
preoccupation for American foreign policy in the Cold War period. We always wanted to know
were the communists gaining, winning, losing, falling behind, etc.

Q: You left there when?

QUAINTON: Well, there was a travel freeze. We were due out in February, 1962, after a two
year tour, but the Department froze all travel except emergency travel, so we stayed until May,
1962 when we were told we were coming back for a year of Urdu language training. That didn’t
happen accidentally. At some point in 1961, the Department made a conscious decision to
increase the number of junior officers who spoke hard languages. I believe this was in part a result of a congressional perception that the Soviet Union was winning the hearts and minds of the peoples of Southeast Asia because of their ability to communicate with the peasants in the rice paddies and elsewhere, a capacity which was not present in the Foreign Service.

_Q: This was partly as a result of a best selling book, “The Ugly American.”_

QUAINTON: Indeed. So, we were all asked to volunteer for three hard languages. I volunteered for Indonesian, Persian and Hindi. Indonesia being nearby, Persian because of its culture, India because I had been raised to think of British India as being something quite romantic. In any case I was chosen not for Hindi but for Urdu, the same language written in a different script, and returned to Washington in the summer of 1962. In August, I began a year of Urdu language training.

WILLIAM BELTON
Deputy Chief of Mission
Canberra (1960-1963)

William Belton was born on May 22, 1914 in Portland, Oregon. He received a bachelor's degree in political science from Stanford University. Mr. Belton entered the Foreign Service in 1938 and served in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Canada, Brazil, Chile, and Australia. He was interviewed on November 19, 1992 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

_Q: You left there in 958? You went to the National War College?_

BELTON: Yes. I was in the National War College for the 1958/59 year, then I went to a French language course in the summer of 1959. My tenure in the language course was interrupted by an appointment to the selection boards. I had been trying to learn French on the understanding that I would like to get out of Latin America and go to a French speaking post of some kind. I had thought maybe one of the French-African posts would be interesting place and provide me with new and valuable experience. I had particularly asked that I not be sent abroad before the end of the year because our daughter was entering a new college and we were anxious to be sure she was well adjusted before we left. As a result I was assigned to the selection boards and my name was up for assignment during that period. I kept hoping for this French speaking post until one day I was asked to talk to our Ambassador to Australia about going out there as his DCM. So that is where I went.

_Q: This was in 1959. Who was ambassador to Australia at that time?_

BELTON: It was William Sebald. I went to Australia in January of 1960.
Q: What was William Sebald's background?

BELTON: He spoke Japanese and had married a Japanese lady. I am not sure what he did before the war, but he was in the US forces during the war, utilizing his Japanese. I believe he was in on the decoding of Japanese messages and that sort of thing. He worked with MacArthur during the time we were making arrangements for Japan after the victory. Then he came into the Foreign Service, at exactly what date I don't know. He was in the Department of State and I believe he was either assistant secretary or deputy assistant secretary for Far Eastern Affairs for awhile and then he went out as Ambassador to Australia.

Q: You were in Australia from 1960 to 1963. What were our major interests with Australia at that time?

BELTON: Our major interests were collaboration and cooperation, because our space program was starting, and because Australia was a reliable ally in the Cold War. The Russian satellite had gone up in the late fifties and we were then in the process of developing our own space activities. We needed space stations in Australia, places to monitor our space activities. At the same time the military wanted to establish a large-scale base for communications with submarines, up in the Northwest Cape area of Australia. That involved large-scale negotiations, treaties with the Australians, not only for base rights but also a status of forces agreement. These were the major aspects of our relations during my time in Australia. At one time I remember counting that we had thirteen treaties or agreements of one kind or another under negotiation at the same time. Most all related to these things I have mentioned.

Q: How receptive were the Australians to these various proposals?

BELTON: Very. It was an enormous contrast; all my previous experience had been with Latin Americans, where you had to start from absolute scratch and tell them why this was important, and then why they should go out of their way to be helpful to you. Then argue all the other aspects and facets that they could bring up to make it difficult. When you went to the Australians, in those days at any rate, they would say, in effect: "Well yes, that seems pretty important, how can we work this out together?" So far as I remember, there was only one occasion when that didn't work; we went to the Australians for USIA, which wanted to establish a radio station to broadcast Voice of America stuff to southeast Asia. The Aussies did not want to be a base for US propaganda. They gave us a flat no on that; it just didn't fly at all. Except for that, everything else that we ever asked...obviously they always stood up for their own sovereignty and rights and so forth without any difficulty but it was always a good, collaborative and very fruitful relationship. I loved it.

Q: Was there a contrast between the, I am not sure what they call them there, labor and conservative governments? Was the labor government kind of left-wing in the British sense?

BELTON: Somewhat. They weren't seriously left-wing. There were extremists in the Labor Party, but they didn't weigh very heavily. I think it is accurate to say that the Australian Labor
Party in those days was not as extreme, that is not a good word, as the British Labor Party.

_Q: Or the New Zealand Labor Party._

BELTON: No, or the New Zealand Labor Party. During the time I was there they were not in power.

_Q: Vietnam, Laos, the whole Indochina thing was beginning to boil up at that point. This being in the backyard of Australia, did they pay much attention to it?_  

BELTON: Yes, they were paying a lot of attention to it. Interestingly enough -- this was the very beginning of these days -- we in the embassy had arguments with our military authorities in Hawaii, headquarters for the Pacific Command, about their reluctance to bring the Australians in on their operations. We thought they should be taking better advantage of what the Australians had to offer, while they at that stage of the game thought they could handle it all themselves. They didn't know that much about the Australians and didn't want to be bothered with the problems of working with the Australians. Of course that changed as time went on. But that was the situation back in those days.

_Q: During this period Sukarno in Indonesia was raising hell, getting very anti-American; we had this Ambassador, Howard Jones, who was very controversial, thought not to be tough enough with Sukarno. Were you getting any reflections of this in Australia's concern over that area? That was really in their backyard._

BELTON: We were interested in it and aware of it, but I do not have any memory of any particular occasion when we discussed any problem or issue of any kind. I have no memory of the Australians ever coming to us and saying, "Look, your guy up there isn't being tough enough," or anything of that nature. We had conversations all the time about what was happening in Indonesia as well as Vietnam; as you say the Australians were more interested then than we were in many respects. I think there was no difference between us as to what kind of a guy Sukarno was. I was trying to remember--Dean Rusk had a very colorful way of describing Sukarno, but I can't remember what it was, in regard to his instability.

_Q: I read a story from somebody in one of our oral histories who said that Sukarno in talking with Dean Rusk admired his watch and said, "Can I see it?" He took it off and Sukarno took it. Dean Rusk thereafter said, "That bastard stole my watch."_  

BELTON: I don't remember that particular story, but Rusk had an amusing and very accurate way of describing Sukarno.

_Q: I don't remember the timing, but were we involved in the East Irian business? How did the Australians feel about it?_  

BELTON: Yes we were, but I am trying to remember. I am not sure I am right. I think the
Australians felt the Dutch were being recalcitrant and that they had to get out and give it up, but at the same time they weren't looking forward to having Indonesians share the border. I am hazy on that, I haven't thought about it in years.

Q: Were there any other issues at that time? I assume that Coral Sea Day was a big occasion.

BELTON: In those days the Australians were still overwhelmed with gratitude to the United States for having saved them from being invaded by the Japanese. That was the way they looked at it and that was the way they spoke. From the point of view of a diplomat you couldn't have had more wonderful and favorable background circumstances in which to work. There was a great deal of overt pro-Americanism. The celebrations of Coral Sea Day and so on were great events and we were always invited to be leading participants in them, to lay wreaths and that sort of thing.

Q: You left there in 1963?

BELTON: Yes.
cake.” It was not as politically significant as working in postwar Germany, or as difficult as maneuvering amid the intricacies of the Caribbean. But the Australians were psychologically interesting. A people of British culture, they were isolated from their homeland in a remote portion of the world, and had deep-seated worries about their future, particularly when events in World War II demonstrated that their British mother country was no longer powerful enough to protect them. They had come to look upon the United States as a substitute protector, and Ruth and I found our hosts so hospitable and friendly that we rode a continuous popularity wave of popularity throughout our three-year sojourn.

My consular district comprised the Australian states of Victoria and Tasmania, with populations of 3,000,000 and 400,000 respectively. We found the inhabitants of our area energetic and prosperous, with a deep love of the outdoors. Many aspects of their character and personality fascinated me, and before I left the country I filed with the State Department a long despatch in which I analyzed the values and attitudes which it seemed to me were governing in Australian life, both private and public. I particularly occupied myself with the Australian future, concerned about what would happen to this nation of attractive people as they sought to work out their destiny so close to the teeming billions of Asia and so far from the peoples of European stock whom they regarded as their natural affinities.

Our Embassy to Australia was located in Canberra, an artificial capital which had been built in the sheep country of New South Wales. But Australia, despite its great distances, is basically an urban country which seeks to develop manufactures; most of the population lives in a few great cities, of which Sydney is the largest and Melbourne a close second. My position in Melbourne was a pivotal one for observing political trends, for Victoria was a “swing state” in national elections and the leaders of all four political parties lived in my area and provided me with much useful information. Thus I came to know five Australian prime ministers who were in office in my day or achieved the position in later years. Two of our good Melbourne friends were chosen by the British throne to hold the position of Director General at Canberra.

Ruth and I were fascinated to have the opportunity while in Melbourne to meet Queen Elizabeth II of Britain and her husband Prince Philip when they toured Australia on a royal visit. They were entertained at an official dinner to which we were invited and at which it was arranged that we should chat individually for a few minutes with each of the royal pair. As many had before us, we found the queen attractive and charming and Prince Philip a lively and forthright conversationist. The purpose of their visit was a fence-mending one; the British Government had aroused bitterness in Australia by choosing British membership in the European Common Market over the old system of empire trade preferences. The Australians made it clear that despite their affection for the royal family, they were determined from then on to act in their own self-interest, building up their own economy by continued European immigration and increased manufactures.

There were many problems which worried thoughtful Aussies. First of all, there was the security situation of a country with limited resources, needing help from its friends. Another was lack of population. Australia’s population was only about twelve million in our day, and is still only about fifteen million. Indonesia next door has over a hundred million, which frightens
Australians worried lest some of this population might spill over into lightly peopled portions of their own northwest. Australia would feel much safer if it could have forty to fifty million inhabitants, but it wants them to be of European stock, not Asian. A vigorous policy of selective immigration has been in effect many years, but results accumulate slowly. Another problem which gives Australian business leaders concern is that their industries cannot compete successfully on world markets because of Australia’s small-scale, high-cost factories. A much larger home market would provide economies of scale.

While I was deep in the midst of Australian affairs, I received a telephone message one day in 1963 that Lincoln White, the State Department’s popular press spokesman, had been appointed to be the new consul general in Melbourne, and that I would be assigned to a position in Washington. The decision was made suddenly, for reasons emanating from the top level of the Department. There was no reason to hurry home, I was informed. So Ruth and I, who had already used our time in the Far East to visit Hawaii, Japan, and Hong Kong on other trips, traveled by a leisurely round-the-world route, with stops at Bangkok, Teheran, Istanbul, Athens, Belgrade, Vienna, Stuttgart, and Paris. At each stop we were warmly received by old friends, and stayed long enough not only for sightseeing but for me to engage in useful talks with professional colleagues and inform myself more fully on world conditions.

This interesting journey of several weeks concluded the overseas phase of my Foreign Service career. During my various official journeys and recreational explorations I had managed over many years to visit six continents and obtain insights into many different kinds of human societies. Join the Foreign Service and see the world! I did not feel that I had become a diplomatic expert, but everywhere that I went I explored the minds and feelings of a great variety of people. And the effect of that increase in human experience was to expand my horizons and make me feel more of a world citizen, concerned not just about America but the future of our entire global civilization.

**BRUCE A. FLATIN**  
Consular & Political Officer  
Sydney (1961-1963)

*Bruce A. Flatin was born in Minnesota in 1930. He received degrees from the University of Minnesota and from Boston University. After serving in the U.S. Army, Mr. Flatin entered the Foreign Service in 1956. His Foreign Service career included positions in Afghanistan, Germany, Australia, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1993.*

**Q:** Then you left INR in 1961, and you went to Australia, which was really quite a contrast. How did that come about?

**FLATIN:** Well, I just got assigned to the Consulate General at Sydney. You know how it is in the
Foreign Service. And indeed this job was multi-functional. You know you're supposed to rotate around when you're young. I started as a political officer in Kabul, and I'd also had some experience in the economic, admin, and consular sections.

Anyhow, in going to Australia I was assigned to the Consulate General Sydney as a consular officer. This was to be my primary experience in the consular area, but I also became Sydney's political officer as well. I handled many political responsibilities as well as consular. And in those days Sydney was the largest city in Australia, and it earlier had been the only place where we had a mission. The embassy at Canberra, in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), was just launched shortly before I got there, and Canberra was a little tank town. The present lake you see in Canberra was just simply a dusty bowl that was being dug out by bulldozers at that time. The population was something like 40,000, and there were cows and sheep grazing in the meadows around our embassy.

So, therefore, Sydney maintained a lot of the functions that an embassy ordinarily would have. Sydney, for instance, maintained the administrative and the consular functions for the ACT as well, and most of the important political reporting was done there.

Q: ACT?

FLATIN: The Australian Capital Territory, is like our DC. Canberra is located roughly half-way between Sydney and Melbourne. At any rate, Sydney was more than just a regular Consulate General then. A lot of ambassadors for other countries were still in Sydney; they had not yet started embassies down in Canberra. So Sydney was where the action was. It was a nice place to be at that time, and very educational. An interesting thing about Sydney in those days was that Australia was still very sensitive about World War II. The two most important events that occurred in the history of the 20th century in the opinion of any Australian, down to a man digging a ditch, was that: (1) England lost Singapore, and (2) the U.S. won the Battle of the Coral Sea, saving Australia from a Japanese invasion. The way the U.K. lost Singapore destroyed forever any Australian hope that England would ever serve a role in the future security of Australia. On the other hand, our victory in the Coral Sea and subsequently made it clear that we were their only realistic defense option.

Q: A military defeat at Singapore.

FLATIN: That's right. If you will recall, the Japanese marched on the city from the land side. All the British guns were pointed the wrong way...

Q: There were fewer Japanese than on the British side.

FLATIN: From that time onward, no Australian seriously regarded England as being relevant to their security. As I noted, the second event that occurred was the Battle of the Coral Sea. Now the Battle of the Coral Sea is not regarded in our own wartime history as being one of the most important battles of the Pacific, but to an Australian its very important because in their minds this
saved Australia from a Japanese invasion fleet. Therefore, when we developed the ANZUS treaty after the war, the Australians insisted upon being reassured periodically that we really did intend to come to their support. You can see the Australian viewpoint. If you take a globe in your hand, and you turn that globe so you're looking at Australia, you just see a big water expanse all around with two exceptions, lightly populated New Zealand and heavily populated Indonesia, then a potential enemy. Indonesia was a country of ten times the population of Australia -- and was at that time fairly hostile in many ways.

Q: Sukarno, and anti-colonial posturing.

FLATIN: That's right. In fact when I left Australia at the end of 1963, Australian and Indonesian forces were already engaged in combat in New Guinea and in Borneo. You could see why the Australians very desperately wanted to be able to depend upon the ANZUS treaty. So this meant that every year they had the Coral Sea week--not just a day, but a week--to commemorate the victory in all the big cities of Australia. We had to have big naval vessels come to all these harbors. Sydney usually got about three big vessels; we even once had the USS Coral Sea, the aircraft carrier named after the battle. We had to have at least one four-star American officer come to Australia, a general or an admiral, and make speeches, once again reaffirming our intention to come to their assistance. We had white-tie affairs, as well as black-tie affairs, parades, etc.

We were invited frequently to Australian social events. If you were to have asked in those days what the most important job in the Consulate General Sydney was, it would have been representation. We had to be present at many of their events. Our Consul General would have to divide up the representation tasks among us. We'd have a meeting in his office and discuss the invitations of the week, and he'd assign us to attend various events. We obviously couldn't cover everything. That was our major responsibility, other than promoting American products and issuing visas.

Q: This was, "We're with you fellows," and reassurance.

FLATIN: That's right. Well, we obviously did reassure them. A great issue at the time I was there was whether we'd build a U.S. naval base in the northwest cape of Australia. And it struck many Australians that if you had American servicemen actually on Australian soil it would help ensure that we'd be involved if something happened. There were, of course, left-wing opponents to this base.

In those days they had a strong Australian communist party--and in those days also the Vietnamese war was beginning to heat up.

Q: You were there from '61 to '64.

FLATIN: From 1961 until the end of '63. This Australian communist party organized several anti-Vietnam demonstrations against us, but there was an odd thing happening to them. The
Australian communist party of New South Wales was a little bit more conservative than the Australia communist party of Victoria, where Melbourne is. And the one in New South Wales was pro-Moscow, and the one in Victoria was pro-Beijing. So occasionally they would get involved in fighting each other, and ignore us for a while. The N.S.W. wing had a daily newspaper in Sydney. The two branches would chop at each other more than us. Their demonstrations against us were usually not really related to any specific events in Vietnam, per se. They appear to have decided to address themselves to that issue from time to time in a pro forma fashion.

The Australian Labor Party was also like that. The Australian Labor Party in Sydney was more conservative than the one down in Melbourne. And indeed the one in Sydney had controlled New South Wales for years. It reminded me very much of the Democratic Party in Boston. Indeed, Sydney is an Irish Catholic city, and many of the fellows who ran the Australian Labor Party were exactly like democratic politicians from old Boston, like James Curley types. It was interesting to watch that antique political process in operation.

In those days, Robert Menzies was the Prime Minister. He was a very colorful person, a leader during World War II, and an interesting politician. He loved to give big political speeches, and yell down his opponents in the hall, calling them "silly yahoos." He was a great supporter of the monarchy. He regarded himself as "the Queen's man." She came out there twice when we were there. On one occasion, when he was introducing her in a speech, he recited the poem: "I did but see her passing by, and yet I shall love her until I die." Her face turned bright crimson. She knighted him Sir Robert the next day.

Anyhow, Australia was an important market, a country in which many of our primary interests were focused, including, of course, the promotion of American business. We had big American firms on the scene out there. The primary Australian automobile was a car called the Holden, produced by General Motors. We did our best to try to increase the already large American business presence in the country and we were fairly successful in this task. Australia was also certainly a very reliable ally of ours from the strategic viewpoint. You recall the Australians even contributed forces finally in Vietnam.

**Q:** I was in Vietnam from '69 to '70 and I remember going past an Australian brigade and watched them fire some artillery. I was on my way to the beach.

**FLATIN:** Have you ever been to Australia, incidentally?

**Q:** No, I never have.

**FLATIN:** There were many strange aspects to that country. The states of Australia all have different histories. They came together in 1901 to make a unified nation, but they were still so different. For example, each one had a different rail gauge. If you wanted to take a train from Sydney to Melbourne when I was there, you had to change carriages or wheel trucks at the border between New South Wales and Victoria. I found that really incredible at that late date.
Q: This was part of a CIA effort earlier on to overthrow Sukarno, wasn't it? We had to live with this for some time. Well, then you left the [Indonesian] desk and went where?

LINEHAN: To Australia.

Q: This was from 1962 to 1967?

LINEHAN: Yes, because there was no appropriate position for me in Indonesia and none coming up soon. By that time I had three children, was living in suburbia, and didn't have much money. So, when Personnel asked me, "Would you be interested in being Consul in Adelaide, in South Australia?" I said, "Well, let me look it up because I don't know where it is. I want to think about it." I looked it up and decided that it would not be bad. I was very eager to get overseas again...

Q: In those days wives usually didn't work in Washington. You didn't get a housing allowance in Washington but you did overseas. And the U.S. dollar went pretty far.

LINEHAN: The dollar went far indeed. In Australia, very much so. So, I said, "Yes, I'd like to be Consul in Adelaide." I was the first in my [Foreign Service Institute] class to get my own post--a two man post with three Australian employees. I went to Adelaide in July, 1962. I hadn't realized that being American Consul in Adelaide, as it seemed to me afterwards, was akin to being American Ambassador in Transylvania in 1913. The manners and mores of South Australia at that time were quite Edwardian--and delightful. Adelaide was the only part of Australia settled by free settlers [i.e., not convicts expelled from England]. There was a certain sense of family and so on which wasn't quite the same in the other parts of Australia. Furthermore, the Consulate was 1,000 miles from the Embassy, and my consular district covered the Southern half of the Northern Territory, including the Alice Springs. I used to enjoy telling Texans that South Australia was only 100,000 square miles bigger than Texas. I think that most Texans didn't think that any state was bigger than Texas.

The Consulate had largely representational functions, and I was involved in a little bit of everything. I appeared on TV and radio programs, I opened shows, I crowned beauty queens, and
I could do a 20-minute Rotary Club speech without looking at my watch. My wife spoke to every available women's group. As she said, they really never cared at all what she said, it was what she wore that counted. We really enjoyed Adelaide. It was a great, family place. A good office, excellent schools, and so forth. And the Australians are just terrific. It was the happiest post we had, I think. There were no major problems.

I had the luck of making a prediction in 1965 that the party in power in South Australia, the Liberal-Country League, was going to lose after 35 years in office. And they did. The Embassy thought that that was pretty neat. I had been asked to go to Adelaide by Bill Battle, a PT-109 buddy of President Kennedy's who had been appointed Ambassador to Australia. He felt, probably with justice, that many of our consular posts in Australia had been filled with people who were about to retire. He wanted young people. So he filled Brisbane, Perth, and Adelaide with young people. I was the youngest of the lot. It was sort of fun being there, because Battle was a nice guy. He left Australia shortly after President Kennedy was assassinated and was replaced by a friend and business associate of President Johnson, Ed Clark, from East Texas. Clark rapidly became famous in Australia because he never was without a yellow rose of Texas in his buttonhole. He went to great lengths to make sure that he always had them available. Actually, a sharp, very nice guy. I liked him very much. To give you an example, President Johnson made the first visit ever of an American President to Australia in 1966. Ambassador Clark called me up and said, "Jack, you want to come up and help?" I said, "Oh, yes." So he said, "Bring Jan [my wife], hear? Don't worry about money." We went up to Canberra the day before the visit and stopped at the Ambassador's residence to see his wife and have a drink. When we were leaving, he said, "Y'all come for lunch tomorrow." I said, "Mr. Ambassador, you've got the President coming tomorrow afternoon." He said, "Yes, but not till after lunch." So we went to lunch, and it turned out that it was in our honor. A dozen people were there. He visited us in Adelaide several times.

After that he came to Adelaide for the Festival of Arts, which is held every two years and is modeled on the Edinburgh Festival. They have had such participants as the London Symphony, the festival lasts for two weeks. Well, the Queen Mother was the patroness of the Festival, and she was coming for a visit that year [1966]. We arranged to get tickets to several things. The high point of the week was the Royal Australian Ballet performance for the Queen Mother. I got tickets, and it turned out that they were in the orchestra section. Well, anybody who was anybody in Adelaide sat in the Dress Circle. So I called the Lord Mayor, who was in charge of tickets, and said my tickets are for the orchestra. He answered, "Yes, I know, I put you there." I said, "I've got my Ambassador coming" and so on and so forth. The Lord Mayor said, "I can assure you that you'll like the seats." So we went, in full evening dress. Half way down the aisle a whole row of seats had been removed, and we were in the row directly in front of that. The Queen Mother and the Governor of South Australia, (a British lieutenant general), and his wife were sitting directly behind us. And at the first, as the British say, interval, the Governor said, "Oh, I say, John, do bring the Ambassador and Mrs. Clark up for a drink with Her Majesty." So we exited with the royal procession. About a dozen of us gathered, had a drink and were presented. Actually, my wife and I had a very nice conversation with the Queen Mother, who wanted to know where we'd been, how many kids we had, how we liked the Australian people, and all that sort of thing. Very
charming. Well, I got five gold stars for that episode from the Ambassador. He said afterwards, "Well, you know, Anne [Mrs. Clark] has never met a Queen." I said, "Oh, really?" I didn't admit that I hadn't either.

Q: Did the Vietnam War intrude at all into...

LINEHAN: It did, indeed. In the earlier stage, that is, before the Australians became directly involved, in 1965 or 1966, some time around then, there was a lot of hullabaloo. There were some demonstrations. And we had one in front of the Consulate, where students at the university burned the American flag. Well, the Premier of the state personally called me to apologize. The Prime Minister of Australia denounced this in Parliament in Canberra. The newspapers wrote that it was a terrible thing. The Vice-Chancellor of the University of Adelaide invited me to speak to the students. I had a vice-consul at the time who was as tall as I am, 6'4"--but much bigger, a football type. I took him along with me, and we spoke to an open air meeting of several thousand students. It went much better than I thought it would. We got some of what the Australians call "curly" [difficult] questions, but I think we handled it all right. That was during the days of my own innocence about Vietnam. I became disillusioned subsequently. Things got worse in Australia, after I left, particularly after the Australians sent troops to Vietnam.

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Q: Then you retired in 1984?

LINEHAN: No, I did four years [as a senior inspector]. Nothing else seemed to be exciting. But in the meantime Ed Cronk, a man who had himself retired as an ambassador, had been asked by the people on the Australian Desk to set up a foundation to organize our participation in the Australian Bicentennial celebrations, and they invited the United States officially to participate in theirs. The desk thought that if they could get an outside, non-profit foundation to do it, this would take the matter off their backs. So I was asked if I wanted to go on detail to help out, and I thought, "Why not?" It also gave me a chance to go to Australia again, where we had many friends.

So I joined Ed Cronk and became Executive Vice President of this American-Australian Bicentennial Foundation. Then I actually retired [from the Foreign Service] in 1986. At that point the job with the foundation became a salaried position. I think that the foundation worked quite successfully, in a small way. We raised about $3.0 million, in goods, services, and money. As I say, it gave us a chance to visit Australia once a year. So I was with that until we closed down the Foundation at the end of February, 1989. It had done its job, I think.

At that point I went back to the Inspector General and graciously offered my services. And much to my surprise, he said, "Yes, we could use you." So, from 1989 until January, 1993, I did a couple of inspections a year, working about five months annually. These were so-called "security inspections," primarily focusing on security with security people.
Ambassador Jack Lydman was born in New York in 1914. He received a bachelor's degree from Bard College in 1936 and joined the U.S. Army Intelligence Corps in 1940. He joined the Foreign Service in 1955. His career included positions in Indonesia, Australia, and Malaysia. Ambassador Lydman was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on April 27, 1988.

Q: Turning from here and working with Indonesia both as Economic Counselor and DCM, you were in Australia, in Canberra, from 1963 to 1966 as DCM. And there you really worked under a different type of Ambassador.

LYDMAN: Two political appointees, yes.

Q: How did you operate under people who really weren't very familiar with the diplomatic world?

LYDMAN: That really wasn't terribly difficult. The first Ambassador was Bill Battle, who was from Virginia. His father had been governor of Virginia a distinguished Democrat. Bill was a rather strong Kennedy man and Kennedy personally put Bill in the job as Ambassador to Australia. Bill was a lawyer by profession. He was a man in his early 40s I guess at that time, with a very attractive wife, a very attractive couple in every way. They were excellent representational Americans. They had all of what you'd call the presence that you would want a young American Ambassador to have.

I was his Deputy. He'd had a previous Deputy before I arrived. I succeeded Bill Belton whom you probably have met. Belton left on rotation and then I came aboard. The DCM was expected to run the embassy and the consulates. We had five, including two consulates general. The big consular operation in Australia, took quite a bit of supervisory time, just getting around from Canberra to Perth, or from Canberra to Brisbane or Canberra to Adelaide was a bit of a hop. So you had to do quite a lot of squirreling on the consular side.

The embassy was not an overly busy one because we had no AID program, for example, in Australia. But we had a rather important scientific research program, up to $3-1/2 million a year in grants from NIH and other places in the U.S. government that were funneling into various universities, etc. in Australia. We had a scientific attaché when I was there named Paul Siple, rather well-known American type, who was riding herd on that. We had a very active mutual defense arrangement which took a lot of redefining, reinterpreting, re-agreeing all the time, with a constant series of conferences with the Australian government. We had mutual projects with the Australian government that were confidential between governments and from time to time...
would hit the fan in the Australian press and require managing. The damage control was not terribly difficult, but on the other hand you had to be alert to these things.

Politically of course it was a stable time because Sir Robert Menzies was still Prime Minister. It was the time of the Conservative Party coalition with the Country Party. The economic scene was stable and in fact improving and the strident voice of Australian labor was somewhat modulated. We didn't really have much problem there. You had in Australia a kind of undertow of anti-Americanism that was really an extension of the kind of anti-establishment views that are embedded in the Australian community. They have the same thing with their own government and their own establishment. Someone once suggested it really is a survival of the convict mentality which builds an adversarial response, almost Pavlovian, to management, to the establishment, to authority. And that extended over to us among certain groups in Australia. But it wasn't anything that was ever any trouble. The basic pro-Americanism in Australia was palpable all in all circles and it was a wonderful place to be because you felt terribly welcome wherever you were.

Q: Did the Vietnam war play much of a role there in our relations?

LYDMAN: It was an irritant, let's put it that way. But on the other hand the Australians at that period, and particularly under Robert Menzies' government, were inclined to be highly supportive. If anything they would I think have preferred, and much of the Australian community would have preferred a much stronger American response to the Vietnam situation, even involving a greater commitment on the part of the Australians.

The thing that bothered them more than Vietnam was the confrontation that Sukarno's Indonesia had started against Malaysia. You must remember that.

Q: This is the confrontation really, in what would you call Eastern Malaysia?

LYDMAN: The British had announced, right after World War II, that they were getting out east of Suez and they were going to liquidate their empire. Well, they liquidated Malaya, which became the Federation of Malaya, in 1957. And they gave autonomy to Singapore in '59. But they maintained two British colonies in Borneo in East Malaysia—that was what they called North Borneo at the time and Sarawak—and they had a protectorate role in the Sultanate of Brunei. In 1963 they had persuaded Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman and Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore and North Borneo and Sarawak to become a larger Federation of Malaysia. Brunei did not go into this because they wanted to maintain their independence for a lot of reasons, mostly personal on the part of the old Sultan who was running it at the time.

However, Sukarno took violent exception to the deal, claiming that it was simply a gambit on the part of the British to maintain colonial rule and influence in Southeast Asia, he was not going to stand for it. So he initiated what one would call an undeclared war against Malaysia.

This triggered the Five Power Agreement which was a defense and security arrangement that
involved the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Malaya. The Australians and New Zealanders had troops, as did the U.K., in Malaya, in the colonies of North Borneo, fighting the Indonesians from 1963 on. Now the Australians were concerned about this because they were at war, really, even though it wasn't declared, with the Indonesians. So it was a question of nervousness on the part of this big continent, with only 12 million people at the time, only 350 miles away from Indonesia, an aggressive Muslim nation of Indonesia with 150 million people.

One of my jobs in Australia was attempting to put Indonesia in perspective for them. I did a lot of this. For example, I became quite a customer for the Parliament; their foreign affairs committee would ask me to brief them, which I did about once every two months. They were appreciative of the fact that I was sharing my views about Indonesia with them. What I was telling them was that basically I did not think this "confrontation" on the part of Sukarno was going anywhere except what I call slightly beyond the limits of propaganda, that it was not going to be a lethal threat to Australia. They didn't quite buy that because many of them really felt that the Indonesians were inevitably going to be the main enemy.

THOMAS F. CONLON
Australia/New Zealand Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1964)

Thomas F. Conlon was born in Park Ridge, Illinois. After serving in the Army Air Forces during World War II, he attended and graduated from Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in 1948. He entered the Foreign Service in 1947 and has served in many foreign countries such as Australia, Cuba, France, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Mr. Conlon was interviewed by Arbor W. Gray on August 12, 1992.

Q: Then you were assigned as Australia-New Zealand desk officer. How did this happen?

CONLON: Dave Cuthell had arranged to have me assigned to the Indonesian desk, with a view to my ultimately being desk officer, since I had an Indonesian background and Ed Ingraham, the desk officer, was due for transfer to another assignment before long. In fact, he was assigned to the National War College in mid 1964. However, Dave had not discussed this assignment with me, and he quickly learned how strongly opposed I was to the established policy of support for President Sukarno. Other people might simply have dumped me at this point, but Dave was a very decent man, and he may have felt bad about not having asked whether I would accept assignment to the Indonesian desk. In July, 1964, the Australia-New Zealand desk became vacant, and Dave assigned me to it.

This was a marvelous assignment. Our relations with Australia and New Zealand had always been very close and cordial, beyond occasional differences on trade matters. Coming after
assignments to Vietnam and Indonesian affairs, it was like coming out into the sunlight. I did the usual desk officer jobs--keeping up with the reporting from the Embassy, arranging for calls by Australian leaders on the Secretary and other senior officers in the Department, and getting in three visits to Australia. It was very helpful and agreeable to work with the high quality Australian and New Zealand Embassies in Washington.

But I didn't escape Vietnam completely. I had gone around giving talks on Vietnam to university and public groups for a couple of years and I continued to do so even after moving over to the Australian-New Zealand desk. In fact, Dave Cuthell told me that he had been instructed "from a very high level" not to object to my continuing to go out on such speaking trips. He never told me what the level was, and I didn't ask him, since he didn't want to explain. He used to refer to these trips as "Tom Conlon's social engagements." Despite his having stuck me on the Indonesian desk without consulting me, he more than made up for it with the Australia-New Zealand desk. He was a very decent man for whom I always had the highest personal regard, even if I didn't always agree with his views on Indonesia.

EDWIN CRONK
Deputy Chief of Mission
Canberra (1965-1969)

Ambassador Edwin Cronk attended Deep Springs College in California and Cornell University before serving at the end of World War II in Japan. His Foreign Service career included positions in Seoul, Korea; Bonn, Germany; Canberra, Australia; and an ambassadorship to Singapore, Malaysia. Ambassador Cronk was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1988.

Q: How did you get this assignment as DCM to Canberra?

CRONK: Well, I had stayed my full limit in Germany, so I was on the list of available people. The story is, that Ambassador Ed Clark, who was a political appointee--LBJ's personal lawyer in Texas--he went over to this. He was a strange operator; he didn't believe in many rules. He would just do things the way that appealed to him. He was in the White House once, talking to someone--certainly not the President--but someone about getting a staff together. Jack Lydman was the DCM at the time, and due to go out--in fact, I guess, overdue.

He said, "I need a DCM," a second man; who have you got?

They said, "Well, that's State Department's business."

"Can't you find out for me?"

So somebody called over to the State Department and said, "Send us three guys that are ready to
go, who are at the right level, and who you think might be suitable for Australia." And they sent
my name over--a file, and two others. Clark went through and picked me, without any
consultation with the Department. He told the White House to call the State Department and say
he had picked me as the DCM.

The Department didn't like that, because they would prefer to make the choice, and discuss it
with Clark; but he had his way. So they then took the actions to assign me. So I was picked by
the ambassador, in that case.

Q: The relationship between an ambassador--especially a political ambassador--and his DCM
(or her DCM) is always dependant on the particular personalities. What did you do?

CRONK: Well, I sort of inherited the institutional bias against political ambassadors; but in the
case of Clark, I would say that he was the right choice at that particular time. He was a successful
lawyer and banker in Texas. Sir Robert Menzies, reportedly, had told President Johnson, "Send
me an ambassador who knows your phone number,"--in other words, has some clout in the White
House.

LBJ thought of Ed Clark; so he was at the very top in Australian political life. He was well
received, because in effect he'd been asked for--not by name, but by general description; someone
who was outside of the professional service, and someone that the President knew personally.

So he had no problem getting into the political circles in Australia; he had the carpet laid out for
him. Now I was a bit apprehensive, however; I wondered to what extent he would try to do things
without consultation with the staff, and so on--would go off on his own bat.

It was a time of some sensitivity with Australia, because they were involved in Vietnam with us;
there was a lot of local opposition to that. And problems periodically came up. We were trying to
get the Australians to increase their commitment; and I think they did, modestly, at the time--
during our time there.

But that was sort of the central issue between us. It could have been one that if the ambassador
said the wrong thing to the wrong crowd, or gave newspaper interviews that reflected the wrong
line--so I was a little nervous about it.

But anyway, Clark is a very wise man, I think. And he said, more or less at the beginning, "Now,
you're from the professional side. I'm not, I'm a business man, I'm a lawyer. I want to make a lot
of speeches, and meet the Australians, and travel around a lot. But as far as the nitty-gritty of the
diplomatic business, that's your bag. You let me know when I'm supposed to do something, and
then tell me what to do, and I'll do it." He said, "Because, I really don't know much about these
things--Vietnam and so on. I think I'm wise enough to know that I need some help."

So that was a good attitude. He let me, in effect, run the professional side of the embassy; and he
did, indeed, a lot of speechifying. He was sort of a funny man, but always had a point or two to
make. And he went over extremely well with the people in the general population, except the Vietnam protestors; and I don't think he ever confronted them, really. But the business men, and the political leaders, and so on--he was a hit.

I got along extremely well with him; I only had one real argument--run-in--with him. That was when LBJ came over the first time--he actually made two visits while we were there.

The first one was an official visit; at the end of about a three or four day stay, we had organized a big barbecue with hundreds of people to attend. I was the liaison with the foreign office, or with the prime minister of department, making sure all the details were agreed on, and so on. There was one issue that we locked horns on, and that was to invite the local member of parliament, who happened to be from the opposite party. He was kind of a negative SOB on things like Vietnam; he was not a friend of the ambassador's or the United States--let's put it that way.

But the people in the prime minister's department said, since this event was going to take place in the national territory--the ACT, the Australian Capital Territory, which is like Washington, DC--it was only proper, in fact it was important that you invite the local representative. Even though the ambassador might not like him, that had nothing to do with it, he had to be there.

So I kept putting this guy's name on the guest list, and every time Clark would cross it off. His crossings became more and more apparent, you know with thick felt pens. Finally, I went in there one day and said, "Mr. Ambassador, you don't like this fellow but we just have to invite him, because the prime minister's office is insisting on it. It would get in the press, and so on, that we were snubbing this guy. He is the official representative of the territory."

And he said, "Cronk!" I must say that he was very tired at this point, because the visit of the President took a lot out of all of us, and Clark was somewhat older. He was really worried about the visit, and tired, and irritable, and so on. He said, "Cronk, I want you to stop running my life. I don't want that SOB invited, and that's that. Out!" He more or less threw me out of his office.

I went in my office, which was right next-door, saying, "What the hell am I going to do now?" because this guy's got to be invited.

About two minutes later he came in and said, "Ed, I apologize. I never got mad at you before. I know you're right. I don't like this guy, but invite him, for god's sake." Other than that, we got along marvelously.

Q: Well, it strikes me from what you're saying, this is the strong argument that is used so often for political ambassadors, but seldom really reaches is. One, that a political ambassador can't have the President's ear. Usually you end up with a car salesman from some congressman's political district, who's ties are really very tenuous--to the President. He doesn't have the President's private telephone number, and it's just a political payoff. In this case, here was an important country at an important time, with somebody whom the President knew and respected. Did you find this gave you some clout that you might not have had, on certain Australian-
American issues? Were there time when you, the professional diplomat, could use the ambassador to go to the President and say, "Look, we ought to do this, or we shouldn't do that, as regards Australia."

CRONK: Yes, very definitely it helped, on both sides. In Australia, for example, we would get these urgent, eyes-only telegrams once in a while--maybe every month or so. Something that directed the ambassador to see the prime minister about this, and it had to be done as quickly as possible, and they hoped for an affirmative response, of course. And the relationship was so good--because he was a political appointee, I think, and had LBJ's ear--I could call up the prime minister's principal secretary and say, "We've got a message and the ambassador would like the see the prime minister as soon as possible about it."

Sometimes we could get in in five minutes; he'd say come right over. And we'd march over there, more or less read the telegram to him or show it to him, and say this is the problem, and get an answer, come back, and write the response without clearing it with anybody. I'd write it and the ambassador would sign it, and it would be back in the Department sometimes within an hour. The response was almost always the one we'd hoped for.

Now, without Clark I think we would have had some difficulty. First of all, getting up to the prime minister we'd have to fight our way through the secretarial maze, and eventually get to the man; and perhaps get a more equivocal kind of response. But in this case it was instantaneous.

On the other side, we had a few problems. One with a big naval contract for one of these American installations out there; and the contractor went belly up--or virtually so. It was a question of trying to get the US Navy to renegotiate the basic contract; and this dealing with the Navy would have been almost impossible. You know, a contract is a contract, and that's too bad if they went belly up--that's not our fault. But, again through the ambassador's intervention--people knew that he knew the President--we got that turned around. It was important to the Australians, particularly the prime minister.

Q: This is an Australian firm?

CRONK: And Australian firm who had built an American installation out there, and lost a few million bucks in the process. It was a big installation. So we got that turned around; the company still lost a lot of money, but in effect we'd helped save it.

There was also the sale of some F-111's that were negotiated, and I think the ambassador's involvement in that--and in bank financing of some commercial airplanes. The relationship, I think, did some good; it improved the effectiveness, because we had access. Even though it was the threat of the access more than the reality of it, people knew that Clark had some clout in Washington, and would hence take our recommendations a bit more seriously than if he weren't there.

I certainly agree with you that a lot of political appointees--and I've known a few--are disastrous;
and a few of them, you know, you've got the Mike Mansfields and others that are absolutely superb. If care is taken in appointing these people, they can make a tremendous contribution in particular instances. Clark was a good appointment, at that time, for Australia.

Q: Well, your principal problem—that you were dealing with—was Vietnam; and Australia being a major player on the Western side, dealing with Vietnam. As DCM, were you involved in keeping Australia's commitment to Vietnam going, and if you were what were you doing?

CRONK: Well, you know you have a minister for everything; a minister for foreign affairs, for example. Then you've got a secretary, who is a civil servant—a senior civil servant, like the British system. So I was, in effect, responsible for dealing with the secretary, and then the area of people who dealt specifically with Vietnam; and with the chief of military staff, and people on the military side who were involved—the secretary of the Department of Defense, or Military Affairs. So I would, quite frequently, go over and have a general session with them about Vietnam—kind of hold their hands.

We had frequent visitors. Vice-President Humphrey came, and Clark Clifford came.

Q: Harriman came.

CRONK: Just everybody made the rounds of Australia, because they were important, at least symbolically to the war effort there. So we had lots and lots of visitors, who made the case for Australian participation in the war effort. And I would program these people, you know, on the prime minister, and the foreign minister, and the defense minister, and the principal secretaries, and so on. So I was always involved in those visits. Occasionally they would see the [governor] general, but usually more socially. Dean Rusk came.

Q: So you were really in one of those areas where there was great interest. Maybe because of Vietnam?

CRONK: Exactly. The commercial problems were not great; Australia is a small country in terms of its market. We had a few problems, but not many, and they were a good market for the size they were; I can't even remember any discrimination problems that we had with the Australians. They played it pretty straight.

Q: Well, speaking as a former consul general in many places—this was the 1960's, I suppose, when he was doing his thing. The junior officers got very impressed with their own judgments, and abilities.

There's a question I forgot to ask, but I think it is important. Canberra, the capital of Australia, seems to be a rather isolated place. As the DCM, how did you use the consulates in Australia? I think these would be very important posts, compared to other places, say in France or England, where your capitals are the main centers.
CRONK: On general, political analysis, we didn't use them very much--I'm afraid to say. The political parties were all headquartered in Canberra; the political action was all there. The parliament, more or less, went year-round, so that we had access to the parliamentarians; they were readily available for cocktail parties, or lunch, or whatnot. So we had a pretty good fix on the national, political scene, and things like Vietnam and so on.

We got all the national papers: "The Sunday Morning Herald", "The Melbourne Age." There aren't that many; about four or five papers--all of them reputable ones. So those were read and analyses by our political section. So we didn't really use the political consulates a whole lot, for basic political reporting. And they had very little capability; they were staffed, basically, for visa work, and for commercial promotion.

We had, at least, annual meetings of all the principal officers and usually a couple of people from each consulate would be invited to be there; it would be either in Canberra or Sydney. So it was convenient for all of us to go down.

The ambassador traveled a lot, and often took me with him, or the political counselor, or our economic guy would travel along. So the embassy met with the consuls--and the consuls general--quite frequently on these trips, in their own backyard, so to speak. The ambassador, normally, would give a speech--meet more prominent citizens. So we had a pretty close-knit operation. We used the telephone a lot; if there any particular problems we could solve it quite readily. And these guys would come individually to Canberra, now and then; so we felt we were in touch with them.

The commercial work pretty much went its own way; and the consular stuff--we weren't involved in that, essentially, at all.

CLYDE DONALD TAYLOR
Economic Officer
Canberra (1966-1968)

Ambassador Clyde Donald Taylor was born in Columbia in 1937. After receiving his bachelor’s degree from Wheaton College in 1959 he received his master’s degree in interdisciplinary studies from American University in 1961. His career has included positions in Panama City, Canberra, San Salvador, Teheran, and an ambassadorship to Paraguay. Ambassador Taylor was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in January 1996.

Q: How did you get to Canberra?

TAYLOR: Well, this was interesting because we were beginning to pay attention in the U.S. to car safety. Here we were going to a right-hand drive country, and yet the regulations said you
could only have a new car every four years. And so we tried to appeal that, and did not win. So we sold our only two-year-old car in Panama, and got lower than U.S. Blue Book price because all those military there drove the price down. So then we bought a new Australian Ford Falcon when we got there. We flew to Australia, after home leave in Minnesota and driving to San Francisco on a Foreign Service rental car. And I remember the flight from Hawaii because it was for us the longest flight in our lives, although I’ve taken many longer since. Our son was three years old, and it was 13 hours from Honolulu to Sydney on a 707. There were no vacant seats, and he didn’t sleep a wink. It was a long flight, and then we were late in Sydney to our flight up to Canberra. That influenced us two years later to return by ship at the end of that tour.

Q: You were in Canberra from when to when?

TAYLOR: ‘66 to ‘68.

Q: Who was the Ambassador at that time?

TAYLOR: Well, it was a fascinating person. We had two, but the first one was Ed Clark. Ed Clark was a Texan of the old school, one of three alleged to have made LBJ’s career. Formerly Esso’s general counsel there, he was after being ambassador written up in Reader’s Digest as an “Unforgettable Character,” and he was. A delightful person who brought valued contacts and insight to the Embassy. We used to say that his Christmas card list would have been Fortune’s 500. He had people visit the Embassy that would normally never visit embassies: the Dillinghams, the Linkletters, the big contractors of Brown and Root, people doing big things in Australia, that typically don’t need the Embassy. And wisely, he left much of the running of the Embassy to DCM Ed Cronk, who later became Ambassador to Singapore. Later, we had Bill Crook, who had been head of VISTA; a Johnston lame duck political appointment, also out of Texas.

Q: VISTA being a domestic Peace Corps.

TAYLOR: Domestic Peace Corps. He was well-intentioned but temperamentally and ideologically ill-prepared for that post. He had very little public experience, and wanted to duplicate Vista in the Embassy and transplant the “ongoing revolution in the U.S.” to Australia. So he targeted Australian youth. In Canberra this was a stretch. When I left, the youngest officer in the Embassy was 38. We had an Embassy Youth Officer; there were very few youth in Canberra. It was an interesting period for the U.S., where the U.S. was expanding military ties with Australia, we were engaged in Vietnam, Australia became an R&R post for Vietnam, and we sold a wing of F-111s to the Australians. They became known as “the flying opera house” because its cost escalated more than the Sydney Opera house. It was a small Embassy, only 11 officers, relating to the entire Australian government. So my boss and I related to six departments. It was just a stupendous experience, as I developed relationships with people who later became Prime Minister and Ministers. Canberra was a small fishbowl of 90,000 people, and it was easy to rub shoulders with Australians from every walk of life in the city.
Q: What was the political situation in Australia at the time?

TAYLOR: Well, the Liberal Party, which was Conservative, was in power. Harold Holt was the Prime Minister, had succeeded Sir Robert Menzies, who was an institution. The Country Labour Party was in opposition, but agreed on many of the conservative policies of the government. The Labor Party was the main opposition; it wasn’t to come into power until some years after we left. And that’s when we assigned only our second post-World War II Career Ambassador, Marshall Green, when we took the Australia's politics less for granted. The 1960s was a period when we had a strong alliance politically and economically. The U.S. was, in any given year, either number one or number two buyer and supplier to Australia, competing with Japan. We had strong investments in Australia, a very pro-American position on the part of the government and the people, still reflecting their World War II experience. The Annual Ball in commemoration of the Battle of the Coral Sea was a big event in those days.

Q: Something that’s almost unknown in the United States.

TAYLOR: Exactly. When my wife was expecting, the end of 1967, I had annual leave to use or lose. I arranged with Richard Mueller, an officer even younger than I (and who's presently Consul General in Hong Kong) to do a safari of the outback of Australia. We drove 5600 miles in 23 days, and we should have written it up; it was a fantastic experience. Over half of it was on dirt roads. We went from Canberra to Port Adelaide, then north through the center via Cooper Peddy, through the Cobbie Desert, went by the missile range in Wommera, to Alice Springs, out to Ayres Rock and the Olgas, to Tennent Creek, visited the large mines at Mount Isa, in which the U.S. firm ASARCO had a 42% interest. Before that we visited one of the largest stations and one of the 14 King Ranch properties in Australia, called Brunette Downs, which had been, I recall, about the size of Maryland. We then went all the way to the east coast to Townsville, south and out to the Great Barrier Reef, and then out to Lightning Ridge, the world's chief source of black opals, where the expression is “fossicking the mullochheaps.” That means you're digging in the trailings of (hopefully) expired opal mines. And we found some opals of modest value. But it was a fascinating experience to meet people in that central and northern part of Australia, where a Toyota would have been stoned or burned on sight, where the pro-American feeling was still so intense and the anti-Japanese feeling equated. The U.S. Corps of Engineers built the roads in that area; we were very much viewed, still, as having saved Australia. Fascinating place.

Q: How did you find the economic/commercial side?

TAYLOR: Well, the issues we dealt with were areas of common interest and areas of friction, because we were a substantial trade partner. There were discussions over Australia's very high tariffs as well as U.S. investments, the latter including helping our investors move along their paperwork. And then, there was a lot of cooperation in the primary markets, in international commodity agreements, on minerals, on grains. We were both competitors and also allies on some of those market concerns. So it was a nice breadth of issues. I learned just before leaving the U.S. that I would inherit the workloads of both the Science Attaché and Minerals Attaché. The Ambassador with short notice dismissed both just before I arrived. We were running, back in
those days, $80,000,000 in science grants from the U.S. Government to Australia, mainly to its universities. That required a lot of monitoring of that. The minerals portfolio reflected strong U.S. interests and required a good bit of coverage and reporting. So there was more than enough work for two officers. In my second year we succeeded in combining the Minerals and Science functions into a third Economic position.

We had a relatively large military representation, owing to the alliance and military sales. We had both a Defense Attaches and a CINCPAC representative from the CINC in Hawaii. And that person, that attaché, was Alex Butterfield, well known in later days as a member of the White House staff that revealed under questioning that Nixon’s conversations had been taped.

Q: Did President Johnson come out while you were there?

TAYLOR: We had two visits by the President.

Q: Very unusual.

TAYLOR: It was unusual, and one flowed from the other visit. First was a regular official State visit, which might have been influenced by his strong friendship with the Ambassador Clark. I can recall one time picking up a ringing phone in the Chancery, and LBJ was already on line asking for "Ed," the Ambassador. They were very close. Johnson came out, and it was my first exposure to a Presidential visit. It left memories of both magnitude, ineptitude and chauvinism. There were a team of White House counselors that came out, one assigned to each of the Australian cities, four of them, where the President would visit, and for all intents and purposes, we sort of took over the visit, even though we were the invited ones. And I remember the huge books and instructions, and the requirements for each of his hotel suites - for seven-foot beds, the shower head and spigot, carpet pile of a certain dimension and the like.

Q: The height of the shower?

TAYLOR: Yes, the shower had to have one nozzle for hot and cold; the head had to be, I recall, seven feet. The most amusing part was, we were instructed what papers had to be delivered to the President by a certain time. This is very interesting when you’re on the other side of the dateline. But we inundated the cities with small American flags. The first thing that was amazing was when the U.S. Army Signal Corps came out and did an overlay of the Australian telephone system, so that we could, with three digits, could communicate with all key people in the Australian government from the Embassy. And you could pick up your phone in your own Chancery Officer and the answer would be, “White House switchboard.” Some of that got laid onto the first hotel before the rooms were all vacated, so we had some interesting stories of hotel guests in Canberra not being able to call out; they could only get the White House switchboard.

But anyway, he came, it was a very successful visit, although it left some bruised feelings on the official side, because we tended to take over the visit, as we often do. But then when Harold Holt, the Prime Minister, died within, I think, nine months...
Q: Was this the swimming...

TAYLOR: He was snorkeling; he loved that sport. And he got caught in currents or something, and was lost, and so we had another visit when President Johnson came out to the funeral.

Q: Well, now, looking at this, I mean, you had already been in one Embassy and you’d seen Jack Vaughn doing his thing. What was your impression about Ed Clark, as far as being an Ambassador; how effective do you think he was?

TAYLOR: Well, he seemed to be quite appropriate for that time. Australian youth weren’t making much of an impact, it was a very conservative regime, a strong military ally, our commercial relationships were very much on the harmonious side, so what we had was an Ambassador who was, in effect, promoting investments in Australia. It was hard for us, in all the speeches we wrote for him, to mention the United States; usually, when anything other than Australia was mentioned, it was Texas. But he was very good in relating to people. The Australians first took his accent as being somewhat of a putdown, but then they realized how authentic he was. He drove the very provincial diplomatic corps in Canberra nuts; it was a very provincial city, kind of stuffy. He drove them out of Canberra, because he traveled all the time, and he got such good press because of his travel, that the other Ambassadors started traveling. So it had a dramatic change on how diplomacy was conducted. Canberra was still in the transition, where ministries were moving up from Melbourne, and so our own Embassy was forming up, particularly in the intelligence areas. As I said before, he struck, in my view, a good balance exploiting his assets he brought to the job, but not distorting areas in which he didn’t have expertise. That isn’t to say he didn’t want to learn, didn’t want to be informed, but we had a very good DCM, and other good officers, and he listened to them and followed their good advice.

Q: You mention the next Ambassador was Cook; he didn’t seem temperamentally suited. How did that work?

TAYLOR: Well, he came with the notion that the U.S. was in an ongoing revolution and that that was a theme he was going to have from his Embassy. And so, everywhere he traveled, he directed the Consul Generals to put him in touch with youth. And he wanted opposition youth. And while there was certainly opposition to our role in Viet Nam and what have you, the movement of the ‘60s in the U.S. was not in parallel form in Australia. And so, he was constantly complaining and frustrated that he wasn’t meeting true revolutionaries, so it was kind of an artificial situation. I can remember after a farewell dinner for us, he took me out to walk on the Embassy property, and he said, “Now, Clyde, forget that you’re Second Secretary and I’m the Ambassador. I want your frank advice on how I’m doing and what I ought to change.” And I told him. I said, “Well, Mr. Ambassador, when I leave, I’ve been your Youth Officer, your new young officer will be 38 years old; as it is, the youth in Canberra were typically graduate students from the Australian National University whose ages ranged up to their 40s. They love to come to your residence and empty your liquor closet.” I said, “I know you’ve been frustrated by this; I think you’re putting too much emphasis in an area that doesn’t exist. It’s great that you are directing us
to turn attention to another segment of society that tends to get ignored in diplomacy, so that we build those relationships for the future, but there is not a corollary youth revolution in Australia, and the way you’re been going at it is quite artificial.” He took it fairly well. I wish I could answer the question you’ll ask as to whether or not he changed. He stayed there; he was one of those Ambassadors who got appointed in a president's lame duck year, arriving I recall with about nine months to give the job, and gone by the next January because the party had changed.

Q: Well, I was in a somewhat comparable time, a little earlier, in Belgrade, where they were pushing us to have Youth Officers. The Communist Society at that time were World War II veterans, and youth wasn’t getting anywhere. And I mean, it just wasn’t a society... We kept trying... Washington was having this idea of, you know, whatever the theme is, that that must be the way it is in other countries, and really, it wasn’t comparable.

TAYLOR: We did much better on the science side. We were in the post-Sputnik period, with Science Attaches, and that made a lot more sense. I think that kind of a program has to be calibrated by the country; in Latin America, it would have had much more resonance, I think.

Ms. Meyers was born in Virginia and obtained degrees from Southwestern University and Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. A Japanese and Burmese language officer, she served tours in Tokyo, Yokohama and Fukuoka in Japan and as Principal Officer (Chargé d’Affaires) in Rangoon. Other assignments include Johannesburg, Canberra and Washington, where she dealt primarily with economic matters. Ms. Meyers was interviewed by Thomas Dunnigan in 2005.

Q: Then you got your first assignment, which I had something to do with. You went to Sydney, Australia. Was that a surprise?

MEYERS: That was a surprise, because frankly I was hoping for a posting to Europe. I’d studied in Europe twice, lived there two years. I knew I liked it. I was willing to serve anywhere from Helsinki south to the Mediterranean. I thought my French -- I entered with fluent French, rated three, three plus I believe, would help in that regard. So when I got Sydney, I was surprised. The assignments were very dramatically done. All of us junior officers were seated in the FSI (Foreign Service Institute) auditorium. Then our administrators called us up one by one, to get our certificates. As you walked up they said “And congratulations, you’re going to X or Y.” One woman, I believe she was a USIS officer, was told “You’re going to Lahore!”, which, of course, is in Pakistan. And she had never heard of this place, so as she walked back to her seat she very carefully studied the regional maps on the wall, drawing chuckles from the crowd. When they
said Sydney, I did know where it was, but it was a surprise.

*Q: What was your job in Sydney?*

MEYERS: No surprise, I was assigned to the consular section. I think almost all first tour officers, at least then and I think still now, pull consular assignments as their first duty. It was quite a small section. There was a senior consular officer and two junior vice consuls, and I was one of the two. We handled, the three of us, all consular work -- American citizens services work -- as well as visas.

*Q: Was there any sense of rotation at the Consulate General, where junior officers were moved from one section, consular or administrative?*

MEYERS: No, not in our Consulate General. The only thing we did was to switch between non-immigrant and immigrant visas. The senior consular officer handled ACS (American Citizen Services) and the two junior consular officers rotated between immigrant and non-immigrant visas.

*Q: What were your problems?*

MEYERS: Few really. I think the biggest problem I had personally was my supervisor, the senior consular officer, not the first but the second one. As you probably know from your own experience, consular work never stops; it can be 24/7. And unfortunately, that’s the way this woman dealt with it. She was obsessed with work and gave it her all. My problem came when I wanted to take three weeks off in summer 1969 to fly home to be in my sister’s wedding. My leave was refused. I cut the request to two weeks but it still was no go. To be fair to her, there had been a significant change in the immigrant visa law so we were trying to process a lot of immigrant visas before the new regulations became effective the end of June. But I still maintain that the job could have been done and handled and I regret deeply that I wasn’t in my sister’s wedding. I appealed to the Consul General. He was about to okay my leave when my boss collapsed in a flood of tears in his office and he backed down. I was a junior officer. I was very inexperienced and respectful. I think a few years further along I would have said “Well, tough luck, I’m out of here; I will be back and I trust you can manage without little me in the meantime.” I didn’t do it then; I didn’t have guts enough. That was the biggest problem I encountered. But you see how vividly I remember it even now.

*Q: I understand perfectly. Did the Ambassador visit the post often or not?*

MEYERS: No. He came down a few times. Again, there was a change in ambassadors during the two years I was there. There’s something nice I recall. There was a political officer in Embassy Canberra, who handled labor affairs, John Dorrance. He sensed somehow that I was eager to do more. When occasionally he came to have lunch with a labor leader or someone based in Sydney, he would usually call up to see if I wanted to join them if I could get away. Maybe this just happened two or three times in the two years. But it was a great brightener for me.
Q: Did you get to go up to the Embassy often?

MEYERS: No, consular work was a full-time job and it was concentrated in Sydney. Of course, as a junior officer, you are so very dependent on your national staff, because they know the rules and regulations and all the ins and outs. Our senior consular clerk was terrific. We had some tough times in immigration. The Vietnam War was still going full bore and a large R&R program had been set up to bring young Americans to Sydney for five days R&R. A full 747 flew in three to four times a week. The Australians were terrific hosts, inviting these young men to everything from sailing on Sydney harbor to weekend stays on sheep stations, etc. It was wonderful. Australia became the most popular R&R destination after Hawaii. These visits also quickly generated, no surprise, romances. And after four short days together, many a young couple turned up on our doorstep wanting to get married or to go to the States to get married. And back then the fiancée visa didn’t exist. So we had several young couples who were sorely disappointed. And Joan, our senior consular clerk, would try to explain the regulations at the visa counter and then would come back to me and say “Miss Meyers, that American chap doesn’t want to hear it from me. I’m female. I’m Australian. He wants to hear it from an officer. So you’re going to have to speak with him.” And I’d say “Okay now, what is it I need to say?” And she would brief me very quickly on the points I had to make and then out I would go. Usually, the face fell as I approached (another woman!!) but at least I was an officer and I was an American; he didn’t have to deal with an Australian. So that was a tough situation – for them, for us. And we got a fair share of irate calls from distressed Aussie fathers and annoyed Parliamentarians. Then, eventually, a fiancée visa was created about the time we left Vietnam.

Q: Did we have bases in Australia at all, or did we have any troops there?

MEYERS: No, we did not have any military bases or troops stationed there.

Q: We had a space station, I believe, but that was far out in the country.

MEYERS: Yes, a monitoring station for NASA. When I was there the first landing on the moon, Apollo 11, took place. The Australians were every bit as proud and happy and excited as we were. It was wonderful watching the landing on that tiny grainy black and white TV screen.

Q: At the Consulate General were there other agencies represented, besides State?

MEYERS: At that time, no. We had a Commercial Section but it was all State because the separate Foreign Commercial Service of the Commerce Department came later. We had the U.S. Information Service (USIS) and U.S. Travel Service, part of Commerce, in separate locations.

Q: Did you get to travel around the country at all, see much of Australia?

MEYERS: Not much. Any traveling I did was on my own ticket. I did get to the Outback on vacation. A friend from California came for a few weeks. We flew to Adelaide and then rode a
bus north to Ayers Rock and Alice Springs. We stopped overnight in Coober Pedy where white opals are mined. The trip to Ayers Rock took almost a week – mainly over unpaved roads. I also went down to Tasmania. I met a couple of women when we were on the trip up to Ayers Rock who were from Launceston in Tasmania. So I went down and spent a couple of days with them. Tasmania is the smallest of the states. Sometimes you even find maps or drawings of Australia where Tasmania has been left off completely. Of course, the 400,000 people who come from Tasmania are quite upset by that!

Q: How about speechmaking? Any of that?

MEYERS: I can’t recall actually doing any. I was in the Junior Australian-American Association, which is how I made some of my Aussie friends. But I don’t recall any speechmaking.

Q: Well, in 1969, of course, President Johnson was replaced by President Nixon. Did that have much effect in Australia or not?

MEYERS: I would say no. The war in Vietnam was grinding on and the Australians were in there with us. They had made the decision to go in and stay, which of course we appreciated very much. But I don’t think moving from one administration to another really had much effect on our relations.

Q: How about demonstrations against the Consulate General?

MEYERS: There may have been one or two, but fairly small. Nothing that stands out.

JOHN A. LACEY
Consul General
Perth (1969-1972)

John A. Lacey was born in Illinois in 1917. He joined the Department of State in 1950 and the Foreign Service in 1955. He served in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia, and Rangoon. He was interviewed by Henry Precht on May 20, 1989.

Q: Well, that's great. Now, your next post overseas after that interlude was Australia. You were Consul General in Perth.

LACEY: First a Consul, but I made Perth a Consulate General. I want to again refer to Marshall Green who has been a--

Q: Did he become the assistant secretary?
LACEY: Yes. He succeeded Bundy. Thank God. Marshall, who has been a friend for many, many years, knew me well, respected my service under him in Hong Kong, realized that I had more potential than the fact in the file would show. So I received a call from him one day saying, "John, I have a job for you. You won't like it."

"What is it?"

"Perth. Consul to Perth, Australia." But Marshall added, "John, that is only a Grade 4 job, and you are a Grade 1 officer. What a comedown."

I said, "Marshall, good friend, all I want is a chance to prove that I can do it."

So I went off to Perth, Australia. And, again, I am grateful to Marshall Green for his friendship and support but also welcoming the challenge.

And, again, Henry, in every single tour I have had, I have always been there at a transition point. I feel sorry for young people today where the world has become so complex that you can no longer speak about transition points. Everything is a transition.

Q: *Constantly.*

LACEY: Constantly. But back in those days, whether it was Taiwan where things were beginning to change, or Hong Kong where things were importantly beginning to change, Singapore... every single post I have had, including Perth, Australia, was at a "visible transition point."

Q: *What was happening in Perth?*

LACEY: What was happening in Perth goes back three years earlier, maybe four, when the Australian government passed a law opening up the Australian mine riches to foreign investment. Now up to that time, they had been dominated by an Australian company, The Broker Hill Corporation. But many Americans--not many, but quite a few, alert American business types including Cleveland Cliffs which is very close to us here at home--had sent out explorer groups to test the ore and to initiate negotiations for the lease or actual ownership of iron ore and bauxite fields. That happened three or four years earlier than '69.

But in '69, things were beginning to open up. I have always been associated with the Chamber of Commerce. I found the chamber a good source of information because of their varied membership. But at the time, the Perth Chamber of Commerce numbered less than 200 people. In fact, it was far smaller than that. I can't give you the exact number. By '72 when I left, it was well over 2,000 people. That is a measurement of how rapidly Australia was changing in terms of U.S. interests.

Also what was exciting about that post was the Northwest Cape, a naval installation still runs the major world-wide underwater communications system with Polaris subs. So it was strategically
important to us.

A third thing that made it exciting was that in terms of our space age, Perth, Australia, or a point nearby, is one-third of the way around the globe. If you take off from Cape Kennedy, it is the first point of encircling the globe as you soar into orbit. If there is any trouble, that is the point where-

Q: Go or no go.

LACEY: Go or no go. There was yet a forth aspect that made Perth important and that was the U.S. Naval build up of Diego Garcia, our outpost in the Indian Ocean. Perth was a major transit point and I met lots of Navy officers and men. So that also made it exciting. Being a person of vicarious interests, I found all this heady stuff. And I thoroughly enjoyed that tour and usefully so. I was able to do what I think is the basic role of a Foreign Service officer, that is, to communicate with people. I have somehow had the good fortune to do so. My ability to communicate is not perfect but neither is it all that bad. I was able in Perth, as in other assignments, to get along with the laity, with the priesthood, with the money-grabbing businessman, with the scholar, with academic institutions generally, with the myriad institutions that comprise society. "Western Australia." I have been able always to count on entrée to almost any society that counted.

Q: That was an important ability in a place like Perth I think where public relations was certainly a large part of your job.

LACEY: That was the only part of the job, really, but yes, an important part.

HOWARD R. SIMPSON
Counselor for Public Affairs
Canberra (1969-1972)

Howard R. Simpson was born in 1925 and raised in Alameda, California. In 1943, he was drafted into the U.S. Army and served in the European Theater. He returned to the United States in 1945 and continued his education in California and Paris, France. Mr. Simpson joined the Foreign Service in 1951, where he served in Vietnam, Nigeria, France, and Algeria. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on January 10, 1994.

Q: I just say because of time restraints we're going to leave a big gap here for the time being which you can fill out when you get the draft transcript. And I'll leave you with a copy that you can play around with. But you served in Paris in '65-'67. You were in the War College from '67-'68. Then I have you in East Asian Affairs for part of '69.
SIMPSON: I stayed in the War College an extra year as an advisor to the President, after graduating from the School of Naval Warfare. From Newport I went to Washington...my first Washington assignment. I was Deputy Director of EA/P in State for about four months. I hated it. Preparing briefing papers each day for the Department spokesman and mouthing platitudes about Vietnam to visiting journalists. I'd joined the Foreign Service to work overseas. Washington wasn't for me. I let it be known I'd take the first overseas assignment to come along. That was as Counselor for Public Affairs at the Canberra Embassy. Australia was with us in Vietnam but we had anti-war protests to deal with there. Shortly after I arrived we had a visit from Vice President Agnew. A disaster. His advance team wanted to bar Australian newsmen from a wreath-laying ceremony at the Australian War Memorial! We finally straightened it out but it cost us some goodwill. I traveled to Papua-New Guinea and back to Vietnam on a USIA "orientation" tour. Visited the Australian infantry detachment while there. Also, lectured at their Joint Services College in Canberra. The Australian press were a hard-drinking crowd with no qualms about printing off-the-record comments. I learned that in a hurry. The Ambassador was Rice, a political appointee who worshiped Nixon. He meant well but had a very naive view of the world. Oh, after my arrival I was listed on the Australian diplomatic list as Counselor for Public Affairs. Unfortunately a typist in the Ministry dropped the l in Public. I became the 1st Counselor for Public Affairs in the history of our Canberra Embassy. The Australian media loved it. I served two years there and then returned to Newport to use up almost a year of collected leave and write another novel.

BENJAMIN F. DIXON
Australia/New Zealand Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1970-1971)

Born in North Carolina in 1918, Ben Franklin Dixon attended University of Virginia's graduate school and received his law degree from George Washington University in 1956. He served in the U.S. Marine Corps during the World War II. As a Civil Servant he was the officer for Greek Affairs in the Department of State. Entering the Foreign Service he was posted to Morocco, Thailand, Pakistan, and various assignments in Washington. While in the Foreign Service, he served in a variety of positions in the State Department and had tours of duty in Tangier, Karachi, and Bangkok. Charles Stuart Kennedy interviewed him on October 31, December 4, 1990 and January 29, 1991.

Q: Then you came back to the department, where you served from 1970, about a year, to '71, on the Australia/New Zealand desk. Were there any major concerns at that time?

DIXON: Oh, yes. Two of the primary things were buying Australian and New Zealand products, and the air routes. Quantas and New Zealand and I've forgotten which other airlines were going out there, but we had constant fights over this thing. They were mostly aviation people, but I sat-in on all these discussions and tried to keep our aviation people in tow when they got too
rambunctious (which they did at times). But the Australians were pretty rambunctious, too. The New Zealanders were much quieter and much better behaved, I thought.

I went up to the UN, before, for the Assembly meeting, and I was the Far East advisor. While I was there, the Chinese were very upset about what was going to happen, and I had no end of consultations with them--conversational therapy--about Taiwan and what was going to happen and so forth. And, in talking to them, I developed an idea about what we ought to do to try to solve this problem.

And I wrote a paper, which I gave to Win Brown, who gave it to what's his name, you know, the wisecracking, red-headed guy who was assistant secretary for Asian Affairs then, Marshall Green. They sort of said, well, you know, they're not letting us in on the game, there's no sense in even sending this paper forward. But I sent it also to the head of UNP, Sam somebody, and he thought it was a great idea, but didn't know whether the Chinese would go along with it. It didn't get anywhere much, because Hitler... [great Freudian slip] I mean, Kissinger and Nixon were deciding the policy then and nobody was getting in it. But, you know, in the end, they did more or less what I suggested doing. I don't know that they ever saw the paper, but it was the only sensible thing to do.

What I suggested was that they get Taiwan to give up the Council seat, keep a seat in the UN, and tell the Communist Chinese we were willing for them to become a member and take a Security Council seat.

I had a long talk while I was up there with Ernie Gross, who was our representative at the UN when the Chinese decided not to join the UN back in '49. And I had a lot of discussions with him about this. He was very knowledgeable about the background on these things.

But when I first got back, they wanted me to write up some papers on this, which I did. And I wrote a number of papers about Chinese affairs and some other things that came up.

We had been pressed very hard by Israel to support them about a number of things. And they were pushing me hard to get the Asian delegations to support Israel. We had a varied success with that.

One of the funniest was the Philippine foreign minister, Romulo, who was a real joker. Well, I can't tell you some of the things he said, which were pretty below-the-belt, so to speak. He was very helpful, but a great joker, if I ever saw one.

The one that I thought was going to be helpful was a guy that I had dealt with when I was in Thailand, who was their ambassador to the thing. He felt that we were sort of making him a patsy for the United States, and so he was pretty careful not to do what we wanted to do--even if it made him look bad.

But I'd say, in large, the main problems we had were Asia and China. This carried over. I got
back, and then Win Brown said they were terribly short-handed in the Australia-New Zealand and would I help there until I got another assignment. And I said I'd be pleased to, so I went there.

Then, again, all the people in our area were trying to model their policies on China based on ours. We had no end of communications from the Australian prime minister, the New Zealand prime minister, and the new Fiji people about what we were going to do and so forth, and they'd write letters to the president. I'd write the response for the president to send back, they'd take it over to the White House, and never let me see what finally went out. We'd get another letter from the Australian prime minister, forwarded to us. Finally, I had a friend in the security advisor's office, I'd go over, he'd pull the files out, get the letter, and I could see how they had changed what I had done. (And they always changed it some, always for the worse.) So I could use that, you see, and then would try to follow up the correspondence. But they wanted me to do it simply by answering the letter straight away. I could see that they weren't really giving them a very full view of what our point of view... the president sent.

I tried, in conversations with the Australians... Of course, the embassy knew about these things. I tried, as best I could without crossing what the president said, to sort of tell them to take it easy, that they hadn't made up their minds yet, and that these things were still pretty fluid--hoping they wouldn't get themselves too tied in.

But, of course, they did. And when they pulled that recognition of China, the Australian prime minister, I think it was one of the prime things that caused him to lose out, because he had claimed to be such a great fighter, and they turned around and just did absolutely the opposite from what they had been telling him.

To a certain extent, that was true in New Zealand. The Fijians were sort of mad about it. But, of course, we had a terrible time with Japan, and all over Asia with this whole business. And if we could have, very carefully, clued them in to this, I think we could have avoided that. We lost a tremendous amount of influence in that area.

Anyway, I left there and went to the Coast Guard. The Australians were after us a lot. Two prime ministers came over. The New Zealanders had not gotten into the Common Market then, and they were very anxious to get their trade things up. And I saw a lot of their commercial guys, who came in constantly to talk about things they wanted to do.

HUGH G. APPLING
Deputy Chief of Mission
Canberra (1970-1973)

Hugh Appling was born and raised in California. He received a bachelor's degree in biology from the University of California at Berkeley and then served in the
U.S. Army. In 1945, Mr. Appling entered Stanford University for graduate studies in political science. He joined the Foreign Service in 1947. His career included positions in Austria, the United Kingdom (England), Germany, the Philippines, Vietnam, Australia, and Washington, DC. Mr. Appling was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

Q: From there, in the heat of the battle, you went to Canberra as DCM.

APPLING: Like champagne out of the bottle. I had had a long experience by then with governments that didn't work well, and it was good to land in a country that was well organized and well disposed. You could raise a problem and get a responsible answer. It might be negative but nevertheless it was productive. And I was again with my family.

Q: Walter Rice was your ambassador, was he not?

APPLING: For me, as DCM, he was just fine. He took pride in his position and wanted to do things that would be useful.

He was a non professional ambassador who supported his staff and, from long experience in business presented a face of the U.S. which is important in Australia.

Q: What were the issues?

APPLING: Being good partners who shared information of views fully, trade, access to American markets. I remember one long and difficult problem about meat inspection. The Australians saw our criticism as harassment and attempts to limit their access to our market. We had to be very careful with our facts and work with them to meet our standards. I had a skilled Australian opposite who understood the situation and who brought in American inspectors to improve their system for their own market as well.

American investment was growing at an astounding rate and we tried to make sure it was acceptable to the Australians. We wanted to make the conditions inviting to American investors.

Certainly the Nixon/Kissinger China opening was a shock to them since it came without any consultations. Sir Keith Waller was then Secretary for Foreign Affairs. He had been ambassador to Washington was very pro American--so much so that he could be one of our most useful critics.

Q: Perhaps there was a need for secrecy.

APPLING: I would like to think there were ways to cushion the impact but this is Monday morning quarter backing.

Q: How did the Australians view our commitment to Vietnam at the time?
APPLING: As you know they had substantial of forces there as well.

Q: Did they have political problems as home like we did?

APPLING: Much less than we did. This played a role in my future life. I'd been out of the States since 1965 and went from Vietnam to Australia and there saw a far out fringe squawking about Vietnam. I thought the resistance in the United States to policy was something like that. I really did not have a good understanding of the American political picture. I kick myself for not having insisted on being sent back to the U.S. before going again to Vietnam.

Q: I think this is very difficult for others to understand how things impact when you are overseas. The Watergate business for instance you miss these things without the daily television news coverage.

APPLING: I'll tell a Watergate anecdote. Sir Keith Waller had just recently returned from his position as ambassador here to take the position at the foreign office there. I was with him in his office when an aide came in with the press bulletin about the Watergate break in. He showed it to me and I dismissed it as trivial stupidity. He saw immediately the consequences this was going to have in American politics. I didn't grasp the significance of what he was saying until weeks later when events evolved further.

This illustrates how out of touch one can get abroad and how a skilled foreign diplomat may know us better than we do.

FRANCES COOK
USIS Cultural Affairs Officer
Sydney (1971 1973)

Ambassador Cook grew up in West Virginia and Florida and attended Mary Washington College, earning her BA in 1967. She took the Foreign Service exam during her senior year of college and served at posts in Paris, Sydney, and Dakar, before becoming Ambassador to Burundi. Ambassador Cook was interviewed by Ann Miller Morin in 1986.

Q: So you got Australia and you were homesick for a year. Now where in Australia did you go?

COOK: Sydney. I went to Sydney and I was the cultural affairs officer [USIS] out of Sidney, handling New South Wales, Queensland, and what was then the Territory of Papua New Guinea. I didn't get up there, but I did do some programming from there. I missed France a tremendous amount when I first got down there. I played my French records. That's when I taught myself to cook. I went right through Julia Child's book. Every time I had a dinner, every dish came out of
Julia Child, until I could do them! I finally relaxed and looked around and saw that the Aussies are about the nicest people in the world.

Q: Are they?

COOK: Oh, they truly are. Still some of my closest friends in the world are from Australia. I have a goddaughter there whose father was an IV grantee, who's a young member of parliament. He has since been minister three times. I think he'll be foreign minister and prime minister one day. But his little girl is my goddaughter. Australians, being the most intrepid travelers in the world, even came to Burundi to see me. I left Australia ten years ago and they still showed up.

Q: The whole family?

COOK: Oh, yes, everybody. Senior people, chairman of joint parliamentary committees and such. They came to Egypt to see me. I've seen them here. Another group is coming in January. This fellow I knew was just a labor union worker in Sydney who's coming in January. He's coming as chairman of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense. He was a labor union worker. He's Labor party. I know them from both sides. The thing that I got intrigued with in Australia was not the wildlife and the animals and the swimming, which is what everybody else likes. I loved the politics. It related more to American politics than anything I could imagine existing overseas. I would just go around to all of these political meetings. I used the cultural department, because I was programming all these people on International Visitor grants. So I'd go off to these things. I would frequently be the only foreigner at various kinds of political meetings. I was sitting on the front row of the Labor party meeting when Gough Whitlam announced his candidacy to be prime minister of Australia. I thought they were going to get me into trouble because they put the picture on the front page of the Labor party newspaper down there! I used to go around and talk to the Black Panther aborigines. I just found all of it absolutely fascinating.

Q: I didn't know there were Black Panther aborigines.

COOK: Yes, and they have taken their constitution directly from the American Black Panther party. They wore the black berets and the whole thing. I would fly out to visit aboriginal reservations with various people we were programming and I really enjoyed it. I found the society fascinating. I'd go back in a minute. I just loved it.

Q: Now you were there as CAO, but it seems to me you sort of operated the way a political officer would.

COOK: We didn't have a political officer in our consulate, so the field was wide open.

Q: I see. Did you do any reporting?

COOK: Yes, I did.
Q: Oh, you did?

COOK: Yes, voluntary.

Q: Did you? For heaven's sakes! Did you see the art, the aboriginal art?

COOK: Yes, and bought some of it, yes. I used to have aborigines attend my parties. I lived in this very trendy section of Sydney called Paddington, which is like Georgetown here with brick, terraced houses. I think many of my Australian friends met their first aborigine at my house.

Q: Is that so?

COOK: Yes, it was fascinating to me. The whole thing that they were going through there, there were so many echoes. It's different, but still there were things I could recognize as being the same. The openness of the society is wonderfully like ours, not the sort of choreographed politics that you have in France.

Q: But the people aren't particularly racist, are they?

COOK: I think those issues are so different from here, that that's where it separates itself enormously. The aborigines really do, at least at that time and I think things have changed since, did live very separately. They are on reservations. The comparison is more to the American Indian than it is to American blacks. But there are elements that go back and forth, because, first of all, many of them are very black. There is some racism, I think, involved. I met some Americans down there, some expatriate Americans who had moved to Australia. I'd meet them out in the outback. I'd go to these big sheep stations and so forth. And they would assume that because I was an American that they could make racial comments to me that I would find acceptable. It was clearly one of the reasons they immigrated to Australia. I would go right back at them every time. They didn't make them to me twice, but they would initially try that out frequently. It wasn't true of all Americans who'd emigrated out, I don't want to give that impression, but I did meet some, particularly in the outback and farming areas. And they made assumptions.

But it was just a wonderful time to be there. It was when Australia was going through this great cultural revival. When they started making all the films that have become so famous now. A lot of that was really launched by Gough Whitlam when he came in. He had an unhappy ending to his prime ministership, but a lot of that was this great political ferment going in the arts. It was almost like the early sixties here. So much was going on. The emphases were very different, their problems are different, but they are wonderful allies. I'd go back in an instant.

Q: What about the rock paintings? Did you see those?

COOK: No, I didn't get out. I was only there about nineteen months. I didn't get out to Alice
Springs. I did go to Queensland, I did go to Victoria, I went to Canberra a lot.

*Q: It is such a vast country.*

COOK: I used to go to Canberra and do the same thing like I did, I told you, when I was in high school. I used to come up here and sit through hours of the Congress. I did the same thing in Canberra. I went and sat through hours of question time at Parliament because that was fascinating to me. I'd never seen one. Friends of mine who were in Parliament, some of these young people I was sending off on IV grants [who] subsequently became ministers, would take me in and I would just sit there and listen for hours and listen to the debates and so forth. I loved every minute of it.

*Q: Did you? How about the Great Barrier Reef?*

COOK: I did get there on a vacation, yes. Lovely.

*Q: But you are more oriented toward people and the issues, aren't you, than, say, the culture of the people? So about that time you began to think that maybe you didn't belong in USIS, you belonged in the political [branch].*

COOK: It had been a big fight the whole time that I was there, because for example in Paris, out of my three years, I worked one year for USIA. Then when I left the peace talks, Bob Miller, who was Phil Habib's deputy ambassador, came back, I think, to head EXSEC [Department of State Executive Secretariat] and invited me to join EXSEC. And USIA just absolutely refused to even talk to him about it, because they felt I was going to be one of these officers that would be going back and forth. When I left Australia, I saw the Bruces in Hong Kong, just happened to be there when they were in Hong Kong on their way in to Peking for the first time. Then later when Bruce left Peking - remember he went to NATO after that? He was in his eighties and he was still working as an ambassador! He took, I forget who the head of USIA was - I guess by then I was in Dakar - took him out to lunch, to ask if I could be on his staff in Brussels. That was just one more red flag to them, it kept coming. With Bob Miller they purposefully reassigned me very quickly out of Australia. I was moved after nineteen months.

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**THOMAS F. CONLON**  
Political Counselor  
Canberra (1971-1975)

*Thomas F. Conlon was born in Park Ridge, Illinois. After serving in the Army Air Forces during World War II, he attended and graduated from Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in 1948. He entered the Foreign Service in 1947 and has served in many foreign countries such as Australia, Cuba, France, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Mr. Conlon was*
interviewed by Arbor W. Gray on August 12, 1992.

**Q:** How were you assigned to the Embassy in Canberra?

CONLON: The assignment to the Army War College was only for one year. One morning I was shaving, before going to class, when I had a phone call from Harry Holland, then in Personnel in the Department. He had gone with me on a rather tumultuous speaking trip in the spring of 1966, which focused on Vietnam. He recalled that I had been Australia-New Zealand desk officer at the time. The post of Political Counselor in Canberra was opening up, and he asked me if I would like that assignment. After a quick consultation with Joan, I called him back and agreed to accept it.

**Q:** How did you find living and working in Australia?

CONLON: It was one of the most satisfying assignments I had. My family certainly liked it, probably the best of all assignments we had. We spent four years there--1971-75. There were two officers in the Political Section--Bill Nenno and myself. There was a steady amount of highly interesting but non-crisis work. Australia is a stable, democratic, complex society much like the U. S. in so many ways. Language is, of course, no problem, though some Australian words and phrases took some getting used to. I had the good fortune to serve under three particularly competent Deputy Chiefs of Mission: Hugh Appling, Bill Harrop, and Roy Percival, all very different personalities but all willing to let me do my job as I saw fit. The Ambassador was initially Walter Rice, a retired R. J. Reynolds executive who preferred economic and financial questions and rarely troubled me. He was replaced in 1973 by Marshall Green, one of the best Ambassadors I knew, who was enormously stimulating to work for. Marshall had spent most of his career in Northeast Asia, apart from four years as ambassador to Indonesia, 1965-1969. He had been recruited into the Foreign Service by Ambassador William C. Grew, when Grew was ambassador to Japan. Marshall was evacuated from Tokyo in September, 1941, as war in the Far East was looking more and more imminent. One wonders how we missed the clues at Pearl Harbor.

Anyhow, Marshall had kept up a correspondence with several Japanese businessmen and government officials over the years, and it must have been painful for him when the post of ambassador to Japan became vacant in early 1974. Marshall was the logical candidate for the job, but he had only been in Australia for four or five months, and it was impossible for him to make the shift. A pity because he had prepared himself for the post for decades, only to miss it for stupid considerations of timing.

The principal problem during my time in Australia was adjusting to the change between a conservative, pro-American government led by the Liberal and Country Parties, and an Australian Labor Party government led by Gough Whitlam, a figure much in the image of Democratic Party leaders in the United States. The change occurred in December, 1972, when President Nixon was already embattled over the Watergate Affair and the "Christmas bombing" of Hanoi and Haiphong. Several Labor ministers were outspoken in their criticism of Nixon,
although they said nothing beyond what was commonly being commonly said in the U. S. by Americans. The problem was that Labor had been in opposition from 1949 to 1972- -23 years. Neither Whitlam nor any of his cabinet colleagues had been in government before. They just didn't know how to behave. Moreover, there were joint Australian-American defense facilities set up during the period of the conservative governments, some of which performed highly classified functions. One of the conservative prime ministers, John Grey Gorton, had refused to allow the Labor leaders to be briefed on their significance, though previous Labor leaders had been informed about their purpose and functions. To his credit, Labor Prime Minister Gough Whitlam knew that the U. S. had wanted to inform the Labor leaders about them and correctly blamed Gorton for the problem. Ultimately, after some alarums and excursions, we completed the process of transition to a Labor Government without significant damage, and enjoyed good relations with Whitlam and his principal associates.

The situation in Vietnam, of course, continued to engage our attention during our years in Australia. More specifically, after the Paris Accords were signed in January, 1973, purportedly bringing an end to the fighting, I was included in a group of some 45 Foreign Service Officers with previous experience in Vietnam who were sent back for a period of three to six months' temporary duty to beef up the Embassy in the new situation thus created.

Q: This was 1971 or '72?

PETTUS: That was 1972. I left in '77. I came back. I was PAO in Australia in a turbulent time. There were lots of major difficulties with Australia at a time when Australian labor government took an even stronger stand in some ways than the British labor government did against certain things. We had two very large--and still have--military installations. We have very close military relationships, although we didn't have any active troops there. The only active station we had was the one Navy station at Northwest Cape. We had no combat forces there. But there was always a tremendous problem with the visit of warships, nuclear or non-nuclear. This was a problem. Vietnam was an active running program, especially after the Australian troops pulled out of there. But here again, it fragmented on left-right lines.

The Australians had a more independent idea. I think they felt, for instance, that they could deal
with things, and I think they subsequently found a lot of them they couldn't. Like they felt they could deal with North Korea. (laughter) Well, they couldn't deal with North Korea. Nobody could deal with North Korea. They opened an embassy in North Korea, and then the North Koreans came down. It wasn't a full embassy. They bought a motel on the outskirts of Canberra, and they had a few diplomats in residence and people there.

They had a big problem with these North Koreans, because the North Koreans didn't have any money and they were always running out of money. Then the North Koreans suddenly seemed to have a lot of money, and they couldn't understand. They finally found out very quickly where the North Koreans got the money: they were selling cigarettes and whiskey. It was all duty-free. They had to explain to the North Koreans that this really wasn't the proper thing to do, in diplomatic parlance.

Then they had a row with--came up every year a vote in the U.N. of whether or not the support for the U.N. resolution as far as the forces in the Korean invasion and whether or not we would support the United Nations Command and so forth. Well, they felt that it was a purely nominal thing. I think the U.N. command at that time only had three people in it. [Tape interruption]

But it was a gesture in the U.N. If they could get the votes, the status would change somewhat. The fact that Australia had established a modicum of diplomatic relations, they felt Australia would vote with them. The Australians felt that they would alter their vote only to abstain, knowing that the status quo would be sustained and it wouldn't be voted down. So the North Koreans took this as a very unfriendly act. So when they told this to the North Koreans, the North Koreans protested vehemently and they sent a note to this effect to the headquarters, and the note was refused. The next day, they sent another note back. When they got there, the North Koreans had all packed up and left. They went to Sydney and got on an airplane. Then they released a note back to them saying it was an unfriendly act, and therefore they were leaving.

I don't know what they've ever done since, but we got a great charge out of this. (laughter) They felt that they could deal with these things. They had a lot of knowledge about China and they had some good people in China. As it turned out, they had some good contacts in China. Their policy in China is very close to what ours is, of course, today, in many ways. They were perhaps in advance of us. I don't think they've ever done much good in North Korea. They tried the same thing in North Vietnam.

I think they felt, especially the labor government, that they were representatives of the people and they could do this. This was not a thing shared, of course, by the conservatives.

The biggest problems we had, there were a lot of trade problems, whether or not they'd increase the meat quota or whether or not there were trilateral trade problems with Japan. But the bases problem, the fact of these bases which were space research, deep space stations, they were intelligence-gathering communities. It's possible that they might have been targets. I doubt that the Russians would have wasted any kind of highly sophisticated nuclear device on wiping them out, only because if they were winning, they didn't need to waste a nuclear device on them. If
they lost, it didn't make any difference; they wouldn't be bothered.

But one of the assistant secretaries, I think it was Packard, was down there one time, and I tell you, boy, this is out in the outback, this is way back, this is way out, and it's big stuff. Enormous installations! Great big radar domes and enormous stuff. But it's out in the middle of nowhere, about 140 miles from Alice Springs and out near Wolmer and the Rocky Range. There's nothing but a few kangaroos. One of the British correspondents made the remark in a question to Packard, she said, "Sir, in the event of nuclear war, wouldn't this be a target area, don't you think?"

And Packard thought about it, and he looked around at this vast expanse of nowhere, and he said, "If it comes to nuclear war, I can't think of a better place to be than right here." (laughter)

The Australians, we had some problems with them, especially on the bases. This was a fact. We had an ambassador by the name of Walter Rice out there. He was a political appointee from the Nixon Administration. Walter Rice was a very sincere man. He was a smart lawyer and so forth, but he didn't understand certain aspects of the labor government. When the conservatives took over--I've forgotten who the prime minister was--anyway, Rice thought that what he was going to do, he'd just gotten there and he thought it would be a good idea that what they should have is a kind of bipartisan defense policy similar to American bipartisan policies, wherein the leaders of both parties have knowledge about what went on in these bases.

Well, the conservatives, the liberal party--liberals and conservatives, as they call them--had never divulged to the Labor Party the function of these bases. So the ambassador thought it would be a good idea and it would ease all the problems that if the liberals would brief the leaders of the Labor Party on the function of the bases, and they were jointly tenanted, there was no doubt about it, the Americans had footed the bill, but the Australians had a lot of scientists down there and a lot of people, and they were as many Australians as there were Americans there, but the Americans were in a higher category somewhat. But I didn't know it was still highly classified.

So the ambassador asked for an appointment to see the prime minister, and he goes over to see the prime minister, who was the one who got deposed because of his girlfriend's [unclear] problem and so forth. But anyway, he was a cantankerous bastard (laughter). The ambassador had been warned not to do this. So he goes over, and the prime minister listens to him and then sits back and says, "Mr. Ambassador, when I want any advice from you, I'll goddamn well ask for it. And I'm not gonna tell 'em nothing. That's all," and stood up.

Well, the ambassador got back to the embassy and he was white as a sheet. (laughter) He just couldn't understand. And there was an election coming up, and the liberal government lost and the laborites took over, and there was great concern because by this time Whitlam was the prime minister and a man named Cairns was the deputy, who was an extremely left-wing type. But after all, they were the government of the country. You're going to have to tell them what goes on in the country.
I, of course, was not involved in it in any way except peripherally. I had been briefed on what they did, because I would get the questions first as PAO. In fact, I knew more about the bases than anybody in the embassy except three or four people.

Well, when they went over and briefed the inner corps, about three people in the government, Cairns was, I think, the only one that they didn't have. In fact, the Australians wouldn't give him a security clearance, I don't think.

Whitlam said, "Well, we pretty knew what they did, anyway. This is very interesting. We feel that this is vital to Western defense. It is still classified, and the status will remain the same." (laughter)

So the former ambassador had been proved that it was a good idea, and they did. It has been written as to what to do, but it's never become an issue. Once the Labor Party knew and were involved and endorsed it, it was no longer a great issue, except for the rabble-rousers. The Communist Party is extremely active in the labor movement in Australia. The Australian labor movement is a thing of something to be concerned.

Well, my time in Australia lasted four and a half very nice years and I was then told that I had to come back to Washington, because somebody had figured out in Washington that I had never been to Washington to work in a tour.

Q: You were in Australia [as Ambassador] from when to when?

GREEN: I was there from 1973 to 1975--the middle of 1973 to the middle of 1975. About two years there.

Q: Could you explain how you got that assignment?

GREEN: It was one of those assignments--and about the only one that I got--which I worked out for myself. I was Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs at the time and was more or less in a position to get the next job that I wanted. There were two countries that were "open"
in our area for Ambassadors; the Philippines or Australia. Bill Sullivan, my deputy, had been head of the Vietnam task force, and was very close to Henry Kissinger. He had traveled with him, particularly during those frenetic moments before the Paris Peace Conference, in January, 1973. So Bill Sullivan enjoyed great "clout" over at the White House. He could get pretty much what he wanted.

Since I was his superior, and since both of us were looking for new jobs well removed from the war in Indochina, I said, "Bill, you see a lot of Henry Kissinger on your trips down there [to Key Biscayne, Florida, to meet with President Nixon]. You and I have been in this job for four years now, and it's time we got out. I know there are two key jobs now about to open in the bureau, Australia and the Philippines. I also know that you want Australia. Well, so do I and I'm older and I'm your senior. So please feel free to accept the Philippines." So on one of his trips down to Florida, they really settled this matter. Of course, they had to talk to the President. I think that the President was only too glad to have me go to Australia.

Now, the reason why he was glad to have me go to Australia was not so much that Australia was a wonderful place. I've liked the Australians and always have. It had nothing to do with that. It had to do with the fact that our relations with Australia suddenly had plummeted when the Australian Labor Party [the ALP] came into power after being in the opposition for about 23 years. During all of those years, when the ALP was out of power and when the Liberal Party, in coalition with the Country Party--more or less the "conservatives"--ran the government, the Liberal-Country government campaigned on the basis of its close ties with the United States. In other words, they claimed, "We are the parties that have the friendship of the United States." One of the campaign slogans of the Liberal-Country coalition had been, "All the way with LBJ"--that is, with President Johnson. LBJ loved Australia. He always thought that Australia was the next, rectangular state West of El Paso and treated it that way.

In late 1972 there was a change in the government, and Labor came to power for the first time in more than 20 years. Labor was influential in getting Australia out of the war in Vietnam, which, I think, President Nixon took amiss. The idea that our great, staunch ally suddenly had "opted out" of the war, largely due to the influence of the Labor Party, which was now the governing party, [was less than agreeable to the President]. When the Labor Party came to power, some of its ministers began to make some very nasty statements about American foreign policy, Vietnam, and all the rest of it. There were the same anti-Vietnam feelings in Australia that we had in our country.

Q: Wasn't there a relationship between their Labor Party and the left wing of the Labour Party in Great Britain? They had some of the same "class attitudes" and so forth.

GREEN: There was a "left" and a "right" in the Australian Labor Party. There were some left wingers, but there were also people whose views were politically almost the same as those of the outgoing, Liberal Party.

What we didn't know in Washington was that some of the statements that were being made by
Labor cabinet ministers, which were outrageous, were not officially endorsed by the government as such. Cabinet ministers of the Australian Labor Party--this was not true of cabinet ministers of the Liberal and Country Parties--were considered to be speaking officially only when discussing matters within their own portfolios. So the statements by ministers like Cairns, Connor and Cameron criticizing the US, Nixon and our policies in Vietnam were "non-official" and not to be taken seriously by the US. But we took it as an official expression of what the government felt. I should have known better, but we in Washington were uninformed on that point since it had never come up before, Labor being out of power for so long.

The White House was absolutely incensed. Nixon then left instructions that nobody at the rank of Assistant Secretary or above could speak to any Australian officials in Washington or elsewhere. This made it very difficult for me because one of my closest friends was Jim Plimsoll, who was the Australian Ambassador to Washington and later was the Australian Ambassador to Moscow. He was also a real authority on the United Nations. We consulted with him quite a bit on the "Chirep" issue, as we called the Chinese representation question. He was enormously helpful. The idea of cutting off communications was foolish. I went to Secretary of State Rogers and said, "Mr. Secretary, I cannot do this." He said, "Well, you do just what you think you have to do. I don't think there will be any problems." So I had meetings with Jim at his house, where we talked over things. I kept him apprized, and so forth.

Q: Did you let him know about this unhappiness [in the White House]?

GREEN: Yes, of course. He knew all about it. By the way, Ambassador Plimsoll told me that in Australia they also had problems around the beginning of the year. That's their summer. He said, "That's our silly season. People make all kinds of asinine remarks." He said, "Your silly season is the reverse of ours," occurring during August when everyone's off on vacation, physically and mentally.

True enough. The beginning of the year is the serious season in Washington. There is the State of the Union speech, the economic message of the President, and all that. Here were Australian cabinet ministers coming in with irresponsible remarks. Nixon was absolutely furious.

Anyhow, Nixon called me up and asked me to be Ambassador to Australia. He said, "Normally, Marshall, I wouldn't send you to a place like Australia, but right now it is critically important. I think that you're the man for it." I said, "Thank you, Mr. President. I will do my very best. I really welcome this assignment." So I got it despite all of the nasty things Nixon had said behind my back--and he "fired" me a couple of times. Basically we always maintained a friendship that lasted right through to his death. When I was about to go to Australia, I happened to be walking with the President from a White House luncheon toward his oval office. President Nixon suddenly expostulated: "Marshall, I can't stand that...." And he used some expletives to describe Prime Minister Whitlam, which was a strange kind of parting instruction to get from your President.

So I arrived in Australia against this background. Meanwhile, the Australian trade unions had
declared a boycott on handling any American vessels coming to Australia. Acting on his own Teddy Gleason slapped a counter-boycott against loading or unloading any Australian vessels in American east coast ports.

Q: *Ted Gleason is the president of the International Longshoremen's Union in the United States.*

GREEN: Yes, on the East coast. Since Australian exports to the United States were mostly perishable cargo--we are talking about meat, dairy products, and things like that--non-servicing Australian vessels was a far more serious situation. Anyway, that eventually brought the Australians back to their senses.

So, when I arrived in Australia, it was against all of this background. But the very fact that I had been an Assistant Secretary of State and a career man, going to Australia, was regarded by Prime Minister Whitlam as such a feather in his cap that he played it for all it was worth. There were statements that came out in the press that at last America realized that Australia was important and that, at last, Australia has a career man as American Ambassador. I was the first career man assigned as Ambassador to Australia in a long, long time.

During my time in Australia I guess that my principal task was one of trying to redefine our relationship, which had been too much a dominant US relationship, with the United States telling Australia what to do. The whole question of consultation was involved. And by consultation I did not mean merely advance notice but really consulting. This became a really important issue. We failed on occasion to do it, and it caused a real blowup in Australia. For example, we announced our intention to develop a submarine base in the middle of the Indian Ocean and didn't give Australia advance notice. This is the kind of thing they flared up about.

Q: You're referring to the defense facility at Diego Garcia.

GREEN: Yes. By the way, there was an interesting story about Diego Garcia. We got a circular telegram to all of our posts in the Indian Ocean littoral, asking them to report on how the respective host governments felt about our base at Diego Garcia. I saw Prime Minister Whitlam on frequent occasions. He was a very close friend. He told me how Australia felt about it, and his reaction was generally upbeat; and we got copies of telegrams to Washington from Ambassador Moynihan in India, and from other American Embassies. There was a one-line telegram from Dave Osborn, who was our Ambassador to Burma. He said, "As far as the Burmese are concerned, Diego Garcia is just another damned Cuban cigar." That was probably the most accurate of all of the mission reports to Washington.

Quite apart from the usual trade problems, we had some difficulties regarding our bases in Australia. We had these highly secret "facilities," especially West of Alice Springs [Northern Territory] and Nurunga [South Australia], and also at Northwest Cape [West Australia], where we had a naval facility, basically a communications center for our submarines in that part of the world. It transmitted signals underwater for long distances [Extremely Low Frequency--ELF--messages]. The use of our other bases and what our bases were doing were always difficult
questions to handle, because we have not stated publicly, even to this day, the precise functions of the facilities we had at Alice Springs and Nurunga. That was one problem.

The other problem was that earlier we allowed American Congressmen to visit these bases but didn't let Australian Parliamentarians do so. By the time I arrived in Australia, Dick Sneider, who had meanwhile moved back to Washington to be Deputy Assistant Secretary, was enormously helpful to me. He had been my deputy in Washington. He helped to work out arrangements with the Australians regarding Congressional and Parliamentary visits. In other words, we allowed members of Parliament and of Congress to visit the facilities at Alice Springs and Nurunga. We didn't tell them all about it. They saw the facilities, but they didn't know everything about these highly classified bases.

The top leaders in Australia were privy to the mission of these facilities. Prime Minister Whitlam knew about them. However, I don't think that Whitlam ever fully understood, until near the end of my stay in Australia, why these facilities were so important for world peace. When he did understand this, he turned around from being more or less a "reluctant" ally to being an "enthusiastic" ally on this operation.

We worked these problems out. We had some difficulties because Whitlam's deputy [Jim Cairns] was one of the people who had been critical about our base facilities. The question arose of whether he would be informed. Normally, because of his job, he would be. However, it turned out that he didn't want to be informed. So that solved that problem.

We had a lot of issues that related to things of this nature. By and large, it was a question of redefining our relationship. I gave many speeches in Australia, all over the place. We had our own aircraft available which belonged to CINCPAC and was used by CINCPAC for ferrying personnel and members of our otherwise inaccessible bases in Central Australia and the Northwest Cape. But when the sizeable Convair Metropolitan was not in use by CINCPAC, it was made available to me, and I used it often to get all around Australia as well as to make trips to remote areas in Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Nauru to which I was also accredited. The plane also enabled me to accept countless speaking engagements in many towns and cities of Australia. A typical such engagement involved arrival at noon for a city hall reception, followed by an afternoon of golf in which my plane pilot colonel and I challenged the local talent, followed by a gala dinner and speech and then spending the night at the home of an Australian friend in that area. Anyway, I gave many speeches--close to a hundred--and made many friends.

Q: *It was good for your golf game, too.*

GREEN: It did a lot for my golf game. The Australians love golf. They have 69 golf courses within 30 miles of the center of Canberra, to show you how culturally advanced they are. So I had a great time in Australia and I think that we successfully redefined our relationship.

As I had frequent occasion to say: the US and Australia, though enjoying many ties of friendship
and common interests in world affairs, still retain their independent roles in the world. Neither of us should look for a locked-step relationship, for such a rigid relationship could only snap in the winds of controversy. Today our relationship must be both friendly and flexible, based on common values, and quite frequent consultations, and true equality.

May I just say one other thing about Australia, because it is something that most people probably don't realize. That is, the importance of the Battle of the Coral Sea. The Coral Sea victory...

Q: This was back in May, 1942.

GREEN: May, 1942. This was a critical moment in Australian history. You must remember that Australia has never been invaded and has never had a revolution or civil war. The only time that they nearly were attacked and occupied was when the Japanese were poised to occupy Australia [in 1942], and the Battle of the Coral Sea turned this around. This had a tremendous impact on Australia. So they had a Coral Sea Week. When I was there, a well-known American like Defense Secretary Cap Weinberger and Mrs. Weinberger would come down and spend a week going around Australia. These sentimental contacts were all-important in our relationship, contributing to the depth and warmth. The fact that Australia hadn't had the revolutionary and civil war experiences which we have had as a nation left them a bit more vulnerable to tides of opinion.

I think that the American relationship was always very central in Australia, and that I left it that way. I might say, though, that the left wing of the Australian Labor Party did give me some problems. There was one man in particular, Senator William Brown, from the State of Victoria, who charged that I was the principal CIA agent in the Western Pacific and that I was in Australia to "undermine" the country, and so forth. These charges attracted a good deal of prominence. Prime Minister Whitlam, of course, rejected them. Then Senator Brown said that on July 4, [1974], he was going to say all that he knew about this. He had a big meeting in Melbourne, Victoria. Thousands of people jammed the streets. He climbed to the podium and then said nothing that he hadn't said before. People just turned away and said, "This guy is a crumb." I was very high profile when I was in Australia and was very much at the center of press attention, because of the fact that we had sent...

Q: Because we had sent, not necessarily political "hacks," but they had been friends of the President. Australia was regarded as a nice place to send "political people."

GREEN: On one occasion I went back to the US on leave and found that the Australian Ambassador to the United States, whose name was Snow, had been in Washington for six months and hadn't called on Kissinger. I went to Henry and said, "You've got to receive the Australian Ambassador. After all, Prime Minister Whitlam receives me all the time." Henry said, "Well, if you say so, Marshall, I will." So I set up a meeting and was sitting in Kissinger's outer office with the Australian Ambassador, waiting to go in. Ambassador Snow said, "You know, I've been asked by my government to invite the President or Henry Kissinger or both to visit our country. We've had no visits from the President for some time. We used to have them all the
time. People are beginning to wonder. So if I invite the President or Henry Kissinger, what do you think his reply will be?" I said, "As far as Henry is concerned, he'll probably say that if he has any business in Antarctica, he'll be glad to stop off in Australia on his way down there or coming back." Well, damn it, that was exactly what Henry said when Ambassador Snow invited him to visit Australia. I told Henry this as the minister left the room. Henry then said to me, "Go down and turn that man off. He's going to report this." So I rushed down and caught Ambassador Snow's limousine by the handle, just as he was leaving. I said, "Look, Henry was just being amusing. Of course, he's honored to be invited," and so forth. But Henry never went to Australia.

WILLIAM C. HARROP
Deputy Chief of Mission
Canberra (1973-1975)

Ambassador William C. Harrop was born in Maryland in 1929. He received a bachelor's degree in English literature from Harvard University. Prior to joining the Foreign Service in 1954, he served in the U.S. Marine Corps and studied for a year in the graduate school of journalism at the University of Missouri. Ambassador Harrop's career included positions in Italy, Belgium, and ambassadorships to Guinea, Zaire, Kenya, and Israel. He retired from the Foreign Service in 1993. Ambassador Harrop was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1993.

Q: Then you left Policy Planning in 1973 and went off to Australia? What were you doing and how did that come about?

HARROP: Marshall Green was Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and a most distinguished Foreign Service Officer. He had been Ambassador to Indonesia and Chargé d'Affaires in South Korea and had held various other positions in Asia. He simply did not "get on" with President Nixon. He didn't really approve of the policy in Vietnam, although he loyally carried it out. From a personality point of view they didn't mesh. Nixon is a very serious man, I would say, without much sense of humor. Marshall Green tends to be -- not flippant, but witty, a clever, a quipster, a punster. He is able to look at things in a light way, and makes jokes about issues when tension rises. I understand that Nixon just hated Marshall Green's puns -- couldn't stand them. So whether for policy or personal incompatibility Marshall was going to have to move. He was named Ambassador to Australia.

He had to choose a DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission]. Although I was only an acquaintance he chose me to be his DCM. He called me down to talk to him, and off we went. Well, I'd been replaced as Chairman of AFSA and I was at the end of a normal tour in the Department of State. I was flattered that Marshall Green would ask for me. So I accepted the proposal and had a perfectly fascinating two years in Australia.
Q: You were there from 1973 to 1975?

HARROP: Yes.

Q: How did Marshall Green use you as DCM?

HARROP: Marshall Green taught me how to use a DCM. By happenstance, we arrived the same month in Canberra. The previous Ambassador, [who was] a former chairman of Reynolds Aluminum [a businessman], left just after I arrived, and Marshall came in three or four days later. We were both new to Australia, although he had a long, long contact and experience with Asia, where I had never worked.

We had a Country Team meeting the day Marshall Green arrived. He and I were there at the head of the table of 15 people -- it was a large mission. He went around the table, saying, "I'd appreciate it if each of you would introduce yourself and outline some of the main issues that are facing us in your area of concern." After he did that, the Defense Attaché spoke about our defense facilities in Australia, and the fact that under the new Labor Government they were under public scrutiny and pressure. Ambassador Green turned to me and said, "What do you think, Bill?" I said, "Well, I don't know. Let's look at that further." I knew nothing about the subject at all. Somebody else described another sector, and the Ambassador said, "What do you think, Bill?" I finally figured out that he was systematically trying to build me up to the group there, showing them that my views were important to him and that they'd better listen to me as well as to him. It worked and I was off to a strong start. I've since done the same thing myself as Ambassador five times. It is an effective technique and builds a strong leadership team.

Q: What were the main issues that you were involved in in Australia?

HARROP: I arrived in Australia shortly after the new, Labor Government came into office. There'd been a conservative government -- Liberal, as it's called there -- in office for 21 years, under Prime Ministers Menzies, Holt, and others. So for the first time the Left came into power. They were just itching to get at it and to reverse all of the "criminal, reactionary policies" that had been followed the previous 21 years. They pulled their forces out of Vietnam in a matter of days. They brought to the top of their agenda the three major American defense facilities in Australia, which were highly classified but which people knew vaguely to have some relationship to space or to atomic energy or communications. They whipped up public opposition to these facilities. There were marches on two of them. One was near Alice Springs or Pine Gap, as it was called. Another was at Woomera, in South Australia, and the third was at Northwest Cape in western Australia, a naval communications facility north of Perth.

The atmosphere was actually quite tense. The government was very critical of the United States. It seemed determined to demonstrate, on a daily basis, that Australia was no longer a "satrap" of America. It established relations with China right away, sent an ambassador there; other such steps were taken very, very quickly. So we Americans felt a certain amount of pressure. It was an interesting and exciting time to be in Australia. We had about $5.0 billion in American
investment there, but the country was in economic difficulty, partly through mismanagement. It was a time of particular political excitement and confrontation because of the policies of the new Australian government. Gough Whitlam was the new, activist Prime Minister.

Q: Did you find, when you were dealing with the Australians -- was this sort of a reflection of the British labor movement?

HARROP: Well, some of the extremes in Australia were a reflection of the British labor movement, because Australian labor had been very much "tutored" by their British counterparts. I'd never been in a society so persecuted by strikes, by industrial action, as Australia. I don't think that there was ever a day in which some group was not on strike -- if not the airline pilots, it would be the mailmen or the bakers or the autoworkers or the engineers, the health workers or the teachers. The society was crippling itself. A pervasive self-conscious radicalism which had been kept under wraps for a long, long time had burst free. Even stronger than the opposition to American leadership, was the outright hostility to the [British] Crown and to London and toward even being a member of the [British] Commonwealth. We had to be careful not to appear to be in alliance with the conservative elements in Australian society. People from the older generation would come to us and say, "You understand that we don't agree with any of this radical nonsense. You Americans are our friends. We remember how you saved us during World War II. We remember the Battle of the Coral Sea. We are your allies, and don't you worry." And the [Australian] Ministry of Defense and the armed forces and the intelligence community maintained the firmest possible links with their American counterparts, as a kind of bastion against their own government. The period 1973 to 1975 in Australia was quite something.

Q: How did you deal with the Labor government people?

HARROP: [Prime Minister] Gough Whitlam was a man of parts. I found him fascinating, a joy to work with. Intellectually, he was quick and sharp personally, charming and decisive. A little volatile at times, but a man of great energy. Ambassador Green was very skillful in getting to know the Prime Minister, learning how best to work with him, to earn his trust.

Some of Whitlam's cabinet ministers were incorrigibly hostile to America, men like Jim Cairns. They were real Labor radicals. They disliked the United States and made that fact very clear. I recall that I had difficulty being received by one of these ministers, a man named Cameron, at one time when the Ambassador was away and I was Chargé d'Affaires. He didn't want even to see the American chargé. However, by working through the Prime Minister we could find more balance. We sought to operate as much as possible through the Ministry of Defense and the foreign affairs and intelligence establishment (without undermining their position). These groups retained an intuitive pro-Western stance and were embarrassed by the excesses of their own government. And the public at large retained a spirit of English-speaking unity. We had not yet reached the point when the dominant generation had no experience of World War II. So it was possible to manage a difficult relationship.

Q: I was in Greece at that time. The Greeks just couldn't understand what it was all about. I
think that most Europeans had a very hard time because Nixon hadn't done anything that any self-respecting European political leader hadn't done, and in spades, a number of times. How did the Australians react to Watergate?

HARROP: It was mixed. Some Australians felt that all is fair in love and politics. They just found the way the American nation turned against its President on moral and ethical grounds incomprehensible. But there's a tradition of honor in British politics, which Australians very much reflect, a sense of lines one must not cross. So there was some understanding. I think that there was a very real worry about the implications for Australia, the sort of worry found around the world. The United States was the greatest power on earth, and we were still in the middle of a tremendous bipolar confrontation with communism. People were looking at America's troubles in introspective terms. They were very worried. Was the United States going to falter now as the leader, and what was going to happen? There were many discussions of that sort.

The Australian press is a brawling, robust institution. Rupert Murdoch is from Australia. There were speculative reports coming out all the time about the Watergate affair. It was just a very emotional time there, as it was everywhere else.

Q: How about our withdrawal -- in disarray is probably a mild term -- from Vietnam? That happened during the time you were there. How did that play?

HARROP: There you also have the different political segments of the country. It was a matter of great worry and anxiety to the conservative elements, to the defense and intelligence community, and to the pro-British, pro-Commonwealth, Western conservative and traditionalist groups. It was really welcomed by the Left and by the Australian government itself. I don't think that they were cynical or bitter, in the sense that they wanted to see the United States humbled in that way, but they did welcome our departure from Vietnam. They felt our policy had been badly mistaken, and it was best that we get out. I must say that the Australian government was dallying a bit with North Vietnam during part of that period.

Q: Although you say that the [Australian] intelligence and defense communities were strongly with us, did you get the feeling that elements within the government wanted to get out of the alliance with the United States and to play it alone...?

HARROP: Yes, but views were mixed. There was a sense of the need to address the social ills of Australia. Labor was in power with a feeling that they had much more important issues in health, education, and employment than they did in Vietnam or anywhere else overseas. They tended to shrink their defense budget below what we thought prudent. They were faced with a political quandary. How could they insult the United States and shrink their defense budget and yet still continue to depend upon the United States for their global defense? That was a theme that you heard often. The defense and intelligence community were very concerned about Australia's security under the new Labor Government. They leaned over backward to cooperate with and fully support their counterparts in Washington -- and in the Embassy, too.
There was an interesting dichotomy. In fact, there was some question for a time, I felt, about the loyalty of the defense and intelligence community -- the establishment in Australia, which has always been a strong body -- to its own government. They had a profound disagreement with what they felt were the dangerously lax and radical policies of their government, and its failure to appreciate the continuing threat of communism.

Always another issue there was immigration from Asia. Australians were chronically concerned about immigration. In addition to the perceived "yellow peril" they were having difficulties with Yugoslav and Croatian immigrants. There was considerable terrorism, strangely enough, in Australia, caused by and among Yugoslav newcomers, who were a fairly substantial community.

Q: *What about Indonesia? What were Australian views concerning that country?*

HARROP: It was and probably always will be a preoccupation for Australia, which is more sensitive to Indonesia, in some ways, than to China. Papua New Guinea was not yet independent. It was still an Australian trusteeship under the United Nations. That was a great concern. The Left in Australian politics was very exercised about East Timor and about Indonesian repression of the population there.

Australia is a very interesting country -- quite unique, very different, I think, from other political systems. There is something unformed about Australia. It's a country without a long history, without a past. An industrialized, developed country without a history. There actually is, to a surprising extent, a conscious, individual awareness of the convict background. People blush at the notion that their ancestors might have been convicts. It's a peculiar society, but highly attractive.

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**ARMA JANE KARAER**

Consular Officer

Melbourne (1973-1975)

*Arma Jane Karaer was born in Minnesota in 1941. She received her bachelor’s degree from University of Minnesota and during this time also attended Osmania University in India. During her career she had positions in Australia, Zaire, Turkey, Pakistan, Swaziland, Finland, and ambassadorships to Papau New Guinea, Soloman Islands, and Vanuatu. Ambassador Karaer was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004.*

Q: *You were in Melbourne from ’73 to when?*

KARAER: To ’75. My first daughter was born there on October 23rd, ’75. We had to wait to leave until she was allowed to travel by airplane, and by that time the fellow who was replacing me had arrived and had taken over the consular section.
Q: What was Melbourne like when you were there from ’73 to ’75?

KARAER: Oh, it was wonderful. It was a lovely place. Before we arrived, the consulate had gone through lots of demonstrations because of the Vietnam War. By the time ’73 came along, we and the Australians had left Vietnam, and the consulate had been moved from a building that was a ground floor easy access place, but at which everyone had thrown rocks, to a multi-story office building. We were on the two top stories of that building. During the time I was there, we didn’t have any demonstrations about the Vietnam War, but in 1974 we had things thrown at us over the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. There were a lot of southern Europeans of all types that were immigrants in the Melbourne area and therefore there were Turks, Greeks and Cypriots of both types. A demonstration by Greeks and Greek Cypriots took place outside our building on a weekend when we were closed. They threw rocks and shoes, of course.

Q: Shoes, oh yes.

KARAER: They were so angry with the United States for not having stopped the Turks. They broke some windows in the premises of the insurance company that was on the lower floor of the building, but we didn’t get affected by that at all. Then they went away. I always wondered about the history of that particular incident. Of course you know, I lived with a Turkish-born person, and so I hear the Turkish side of the story, but we know what politics went on before that whole thing happened. Our Ambassador was killed in Nicosia before the Turks invaded.

Q: By the Greek Cypriot police actually.

KARAER: Right. We know that what was going on there was an attempt to take over the government and to incorporate Cyprus into Greece, which was completely against the treaty that Britain and Greece and Turkey had made when Cyprus became an independent country. Looking back over all the episodes when there would be tension between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, it always seemed to me that the international situation there was similar to a little skinny, bratty kid, Greece, and a big, tough, older kid on the other side, Turkey, and the bratty kid would stand on the corner and throw rocks at the big guy and say, "Nah, nah". Then, when the big kid started to come after him, he’d run and hide behind his big Uncle Sam. "Save me"! And we always did, except that time. The Greeks throughout the world were just furious at us.

Q: Yes, I have to say I had just left Athens the first of July and the thing happened I think on the 14th of July, ’74. It was a very nasty show on the part of the Greeks. The Cypriots named a guy named Samson who was a...

KARAER: Who was a real thug.

Q: Who was a thug, I mean who was I think had been an assassin, a sort of a nasty assassin who went around and killed British women and things like this.
Q: Yes. You talk to particularly Greek Americans and Australian Americans even today, they have complete amnesia about what happened that instigated the Turks sending troops in. I mean it all starts somehow, the Turks did this to the poor Greeks. It's a very peculiar thing. Very representative of as you say the little kid throwing rocks at the big kid.

KARAER: The lesson that foreign policy makers are supposed to take from that kind of history is that big, strong Uncle Sam has to be so careful about the signals that he sends to his erstwhile allies about what kind of behavior he expects from them. For example, "We'll protect you Taiwan against the Chinese, but you better not indulge in rock throwing." It's not easy to control those situations.

Q: It's a very hard thing and also American ethnic politics get heavily involved.

KARAER: Absolutely.

Q: The Greek American lobby is second only to the Israeli lobby and the Jewish American lobby as being very powerful when it kicks in. Anyway, but in Melbourne what sort of, who was your consul general?

KARAER: Okay, I've been trying to remember the name of the first one and I can't. I had two while I was there.

Q: Do you remember the other one?

KARAER: Robert Brand was the second one.

Q: What was the atmosphere of the post?

KARAER: When I first arrived there the Labor Party was in power in Australia for the first time in a long time. They had been very anti-United States and their own government's involvement in Vietnam. The people in our embassy and consulates who had to deal with the government there had difficulty with some of these guys who had partly built their image as anti-American.

Q: It sounds like the leftist movement in British, the labor types.

KARAER: Right, exactly. As far as individual Australians were concerned, their attitude toward the United States depended a lot on their age. My husband was enrolled in an Australian technical university. The students he knew were considerably younger than he was. They hadn't fought in Vietnam or any other war and were very much into the line that Americans were warmongers. Our neighbors were older than us, Second World War generation, and they loved the Yanks and everything about them. In fact, the people who were getting it in the neck from the older generation of Australians were the British immigrants. It was a sort of cruel teasing more
than anything else, but every time an Aussie opened his mouth he had some wisecrack about the Brits.

**Q: The POMMIES.**

KARAER: They just loved to pick on them because they believed that the Brits had looked down on Australians for so many years. Anyway, as far as my job was concerned, we had a city that was full of people who were relatively recent immigrants to Australia. While 99% of them were well settled there, and so well settled that they were now getting ready to apply for tourist visas to visit their relatives in the United States. The only people who I believed were real risks of not returning from a visit to the U.S. were people who were relatively new immigrants to Australia and who in many cases had relatives who had successfully immigrated to the United States. Some of these folks were still country shopping.

Oh and the other thing that was a true shock and a revelation to me was the custom of the young, Australian-born citizens who all took long trips abroad before they settled down to a career. They could get special visas from the British Government which allowed them to work in the U.K. temporarily. Of course their travels eventually took them across the United States as well. They usually said they wanted to stay for three months in the United States. Not an unreasonable thing when you’re traveling around the world and usually it was going to be at the end of their trip. They were going to go to Britain, work, now they didn’t have the job yet, but they planned to get a job there and with the money they made, they planned to travel all over Europe. Then they planned to go to the United States and spend three months there. Great plan, except that we wanted to know how they were going to have enough money to live in the United States without working. Now, I was not born yesterday. I knew that all of them were going to try to work when they got to the United States. I figured the best I could do was to have something in my hand that said there was a reasonable reason to believe that the applicant would not have to work while he was in the United States. Usually a letter from their father saying he would pay for it was acceptable. When I got that, I would send them merrily on their way with their American visa. If they couldn’t or wouldn’t give us some evidence of support, and sometimes it was just pure stubbornness, we refused them and told them to apply in for their U.S. visa in London after they got the job they hoped for and could show they had enough money to travel in the U.S. without working. Of course that made our officers in London very angry. I got a couple of nasty telegrams about that. I told London, look, either he's got the money when he leaves here or his travel in the U.S. is going to be paid for by his job in England. If it's the latter case, then he’s got to show you guys that he’s got the job. He doesn’t have it here. Anyway. Oh my God. I got calls from newspaper people about what a bitch I was, and why on earth did I think that any Australian in his right mind would want to stay in my country when they had this wonderful country to come back to and all this stuff.

Also, the other thing that was new, compared with my experience in Turkey, was that travel agents would bring in the applications for the tourist visas. They would come with big stacks of passports and applications that had been signed in their offices and leave them with us. Actually that wasn’t unreasonable, because, like I said, 99.9% of these people were eligible for tourist
visas. A lot of the calls I got asking why the visa wasn't issued without question were from travel agents. So I asked to speak at one of the monthly meetings of the travel agents' association. I ended up talking to a great big gang of these people. I explained our law and pointed out that Australia, which is also an immigrant country, potentially had the same problem with illegal aliens as the United States. Of course Australia at that time hadn’t yet had that many illegal aliens. It was just too hard to get there and get into the country. Now, they’re stopping shiploads of illegals trying to get in. But then they didn’t have that many. Also, for crowd control, I set up a system of numbers, like in a bakery, because Australians, while they are the world’s greatest people when you meet them traveling, in their big cities they act like anybody else in a great big city. They’re extremely aggressive. The only place in my life I literally got shoved off the sidewalk just walking down the street was in Melbourne. They come in there and boy it’s just nose to nose and my people across the desk from them. The number system helped maintain some order.

When I first got to Melbourne that consular section was a real mess. The man that I replaced had had a serious alcohol problem and had drunk three years away in Melbourne. He had literally closed himself inside his office after lunch and slept while the Australians ran the office. I discovered when I got there that the FSN's were making the decisions about who got visas. Not only that, but they had no system for the huge amounts of passports and applications that were being handed in every day. On the desk in the front of the room were just heaps of passports. They didn’t bother to check the lookout files before they issued the visas, and we had a fair number of applicants on the lookout list who had been members of the communist party because they were active in the labor movement in Australia. After the visas were issued, they put stacks of passports in a big heap in the middle of the desk. As each Mr. Travel Agent Messenger came in with the list of passports he was supposed to pick up, they pawed through those stacks and looked until they found the ones they were looking for. Of course this was very slow and the FSN's were totally stressed out. The customers were always angry because of this mess. On top of everything else, the visa card file was not in alphabetical order anymore. They just jammed the stuff in there helter skelter. God knows why they bothered to keep it. When I noted that we needed a system to keep the passports in alphabetical order, they said, “Well, the admin officer offered to make us a box with slots in it for the alphabet letters, but it was so big and heavy we couldn't use it.” Because of security, at the end of the day all of the passports and applications and so forth had to be moved into the big communications vault and locked in there in case a mob got up there and got into the consulate.

Anyway, the big wooden box was way too heavy, couldn’t be moved around, and so they couldn’t use it. I said, “In the United States, in the stationary stores, we have these manila folders. They open up like an accordion and they have A, B and C on them. Do you have stuff like that in Australia?” “Oh, yes we’ve got that.” I took out my wallet and I gave the guy some money and I said, “Please go out and buy us four of those.” We used those folders to collect passports by the initial letter of the last name and to organize the visaed passports we were returning. So at least when somebody came in looking for Mr. Anderson’s passport, we only had to look in the A slot. I found that of all the strange and new cultures that I lived and worked in, Australia's was the hardest for me to get used to. The reason was they looked like me, they talked
like me mostly, but they did not organize their business the way we do, and stuff that I had taken for granted as basic to management of keeping stuff moving in offices were alien concepts to those folks.

Q: That’s very interesting. I mean you would think that, it’s just astounding to hear that.

KARAER: Well, what astounded me was that they had moved that consulate just the year before I arrived. We have a lot of forms in consular offices. Now we can print them off the computer, but in those days you had to buy them from a supply place and they got shipped to you. Those forms were moved from the old consulate to the shelves of a storeroom. My employee would be back in that room for 20 minutes just looking for the form. The first two months that I was in Melbourne I'd spend the whole day processing visas and then I’d stay after work, just me, going through that mess in that room finding the forms. I put a filing cabinet in for forms. During those first months in Melbourne I just didn’t do anything but work, and it was stupid, housekeeping stuff like that.

Then on top of everything else, by the time I got to Australia the Department had decided to require that every person transiting the United States had to have a transit visa, something which we hadn't required in the past. Before if you were transiting within three days you didn’t have to have one. Every Australian in the world goes to Europe or to the UK all the time. They all cross the United States in order to do that. The word had been put out to the travel agents about the transit visa requirement, I was told, but certainly the travel agents out in the outback hadn’t gotten the word. Every single weekend the duty officers would call me. Oh Arma Jane, there’s somebody who doesn’t have a visa, he thought he was going to leave today and they turned him back at the airport because he doesn’t have a transit visa to the United States. You have to go down and issue him a visa. I did that miserable thing for a year. I tried, I mean I sent out more reminders to everybody and I was getting tough on some of these folks if it wasn’t emergency travel. I told their travel agent, let them wait until Monday. You’re supposed to have told them about this. Nevertheless, there were people with genuine emergencies. Finally when Brand came there as consul general, I said, “You know, every American who is assigned to this consulate has got a consular commission, and I will be very happy to teach them how to operate the visa machine. If they’re the duty officer and they think that somebody should come down here and issue a transit visa for somebody, then they can do it themselves. They’ve got the authority.” Oh boy. Was there a huge drop-off of telephone calls from the duty officers about issuing visas. And they didn’t issue any either. They managed to convince the person they were talking to that they had to wait until Monday.

During three months after I got there we had an inspection. Now, they told me that we were scheduled for the inspection when I first arrived. Here I was with this mess. I mean everything was wrong, but I was slowly getting the office fixed up and the procedures rectified. As you know, inspection questionnaires include a package that the section heads give to the C.G. that includes all the questions about how things are arranged in your section, but then there’s a sealed envelope in which you respond to personal questions. The first question in that second set was, "How is your morale?" I responded, “I feel as though I were sent here not as an officer exercising
my judgment to enforce the laws of the United States, but as somebody to take the blame when something goes wrong, and something is going to go wrong because of the chaotic situation here.” When the inspectors arrived, I was told that the consular section was going to be one of the last places inspected. I went home one night during the inspection and I said to my husband, “You know, I think I’m getting paranoid because it seems to me every time I pass one of those people in the hall, I feel as though they’re looking at me after I walk by. I don’t usually have those feelings.” Finally, the inspector came to my office to start the inspection of our section. She asked, “Do you want us to transfer you?” I said, “No. I put three months into getting this place back into shape. I don’t want you to send me back.” She said, “Well, from what we read, we thought that you must be terribly unhappy.” I said, “Well, I’m terribly unhappy about the situation. Somebody bad is going to get through our visa process here unless we put our files and our procedures straight.” In their report the inspectors said that the Department should get another officer out to Melbourne as fast as they could and until that officer arrived the Embassy had to make some arrangements to get somebody else out there to help. It was up to the Embassy to figure it out, but they had to have somebody else down there to help. Well, there were no extra consular officers anywhere in Australia. Then they said, well, there should at least be an American who could assist in the consular section. This was long before they let civilians issue visas. Well, the embassy couldn't send anyone and told the consulate to figure it out. The only two people in our consulate community who had previous experience in consular sections were the admin officer’s wife and my husband. The admin officer did not want his wife to work. I don’t know, maybe she didn’t either. I didn’t discuss it with her. I said, “Well, Yashar is available, he can do it, but isn’t that against the nepotism rules?” “Oh, that’s okay,” The Admin Officer said, "Don’t worry. This is a special thing and we’ll take care of it.” They did. Yashar was hired for three months and one of the things he did was put our visa file back into alphabetical order, so it could be checked.

During that time I discovered that one of my employees, a very pretty young woman who, I at first thought was just not too bright because she got such strange things wrong. One day it dawned on me, and I said, “Heather, have you ever thought that you might need glasses?” Because when she typed she made mistakes and didn't correct them. She wouldn't get the filing right, although she certainly knew the alphabet. She admitted, “Well, yes. I have glasses, but I don’t like to wear them.” I suggested that she get some glasses to wear at work. Sure enough all of a sudden she could type, she could see where she was putting the papers in the filing cabinet.

Oh, another interesting thing that happened there. When I first arrived in Melbourne, the admin officer had a little party for me to meet the FSNs. In the consular section all of the employees except one were women. I had talked to the young man, who seemed quite pleasant and happy, but when we got home my husband said, “You're going to have trouble with that guy.” I said, “Why?” He said, “After he had had a couple of beers, he made it clear that he didn't like the idea of working for a woman.”.

I decided to begin my assignment there by having every employee come in to speak with me individually. I asked them what they liked most about their job, what they liked least, and whether they had any difficulties with their work. I could get to know them that way and also get
to know about perceived problems in the section. When the young man, and after we had gone over the other question, I asked if he was worried at all about working for a woman. He looked at me and said, “Not anymore.” We got on just fine, and he was one of my best people. I was so glad that my husband had picked that up and let me know about that.

Q: *Did you find for example Australian society I mean I've never served in Australia, but I've heard people talk about it say it's the damndest thing that when on social occasions, all the guys go off to the bar and drink beer and all the women go off to the other side and there really isn't much intermixture between the men and the women on social occasions.*

KARAER: I think you could say that about American society, too. Actually what was strange to us was the whole idea of "mateship", of mens' men friends being their most important relationship. For example, when you went out in the evening, back in those days, you’d see a few married couples like yourself going to the movie, but otherwise it’s all young fellows together, and young women together. You didn't see young couples. Women’s rights, women’s lib, got to Australia a few years later than it got to the United States and open war between the sexes was beginning in Australia.

At first, my husband wondered out loud if all of these guys were gay. I told him that I didn't think so. That it was just the culture. Later, in my husband's conversations with the young guys in his class, they explained that, fundamentally, women were good for only one thing and that didn't take very long, leaving plenty of time to hang around with your mates. One of the women's lib issues that erupted while we there was the male/female integration of the public bars in the pubs. Each pub is divided into a public bar, which at that time was men only, and a lounge, where ladies or entire families could drink and eat meals. The same food in the public bar cost significantly less than in the lounge. So the young feminists organized sit-ins in the public bars. They had bottles thrown at them by the other patrons, and, if anybody got arrested, it would be the women for trying to cause trouble.

Now, of course this has all changed. The last time I was in Australia men and women were in the public bars without any trouble at all. In Australia there is this fixation on beer. Not too long before I arrived in Australia, they had liberalized the hours that pubs could be open. Before this happened, men would come into the pub after work and drink as fast as they could in order to consume the maximum beer before quitting time. Of course a lot of people would just make themselves really sick and throw up all over the place. This led me to another interesting comparison between my culture and theirs. I’m not much of a bar person, but those few that I'd seen in my life in the United States were dark, really dim. If they had furnishings it was black velvet or red velvet curtains.

Q: *Blue tinted mirrors.*

KARAER: Yes. When you walked through that door in America, you knew you were engaging in some kind of vice.
Q: Yes, absolutely.

KARAER: Now in Australia, what are the pubs like? According to the book The Lucky Country, because of the frequent throwing up that went on in them, the floors and the walls, up to above your head, are usually covered with white tile. The bars looked like nothing more than public toilets. They looked like a place where you performed a necessary bodily function. At the same time, there are hard core teetotalers in Australia as well, particularly when it comes to hard liquor. Once when my husband and I were traveling in South Australia we had gotten a room in a motel owned by some German immigrants who were about our age. They invited us to go with them to the town’s Oktoberfest. Afterward, back at the motel, our host had another drink of whiskey, and left the bottle standing on the buffet in the motel's breakfast room. While we were eating our breakfast the next morning, an Australian family came in, and the lady spotted the whiskey bottle on the sideboard. "Spirits!" she hissed to her husband in a stage whisper. For all the beer that gets drunk in Australia, spirits were considered evil.

Q: Well, I have to say this about the male, female thing, from ’69 to ’70 I was consul general in Saigon and troops would get their R&R and a significant number would go to Australia. Our guys would come back just glowing because they said these stupid Australian guys don’t know what they have. There’s gorgeous girls and nobody pays any attention to them. Of course our guys when they went there were essentially trained killers in the art of dating. They would zero in on an attractive young woman and pay a lot of attention to her. Of course the Australian women would lap it up.

KARAER: Sure they did. The young woman that was sent out to be the second consular officer in Melbourne was single. Margaret was a very pretty red haired girl. She spent quite a bit of time in Latin America and certainly knew how to take care of Romes, but when we were there she was flummoxed by Australian men. Once she came to my house after dinner about something. She said, “I’ve had it with this guy.” This Australian she had been dating would show up at her house every evening just before mealtime. She’d offer him some food. He’d eat it, they’d sit and talk for a while and then it would be okay, see you, and off he’d go. This had been going on for a couple of weeks. Finally she said, that’s it. He showed up the next day and she said to him, “Just exactly what are your intentions?” A terrified Australian fled her property.

Q: Given the state of the society at that time, did you find being a woman official, a female official a problem? Did this cause problems or not?

KARAER: No more with them than it did with my own American officials. No, when you identified yourself in your official capacity, they would treat you in a proper way. It wasn’t on the official basis that there was a difficulty. It was on a man/woman, sexual basis. I warned my daughters, that Australians are tall, they’re handsome and for the most part, they’re great people, but remember that as far as women are concerned, their attitude is only slightly to the left of the Saudi Arabians. Now, hopefully things are changing in Australia.

We had a big naval exercise with the Australians at the time that I arrived in Papua, New Guinea.
There were some bar fights in Australia during those exercises because the Australian men didn't like the American sailors talking to their girls. Now, I'm told that the Australians weren't talking to the girls. They were doing their usual thing, talking to their mates, watching the footy, but they didn't want the girls paying attention to the Americans. They treasured their women only when somebody else might be take them away apparently.

**Q:** Had the Australians changed their no Asian rule for immigration by this time or not?

KARAER: They had, but it was still very much controlled, but they had. The Labor Party changed it, as I recall. When I was there there were a lot of people coming in who worked for organizations that were handling Vietnamese babies being adopted in Australia. There were some forms and stuff that we had to deal with there. Oh, this is not answering your question, but that reminded me of something else that maybe one of the worst experiences I had while I was there. It was so sad. A family came in, a young woman, her mother who was a real witch, and the young woman's child who was a mixed race. The child and the young woman were applying for a tourist visa to visit the boy's father in California. The father was married and had a family in California. The child had been conceived when the man was on leave in Australia from Vietnam. The young woman applying for the visa didn’t have a job. She lived with her mother. I had to refuse the visa. And I couldn't issue a passport to the child because in California the only way you can legitimize a child is to marry the mother. Then her mother, who had insisted on coming into the interview as well told me that I was a racist. I’m thinking to myself, "Lady there is a racist in this room, but it’s not me." I thought, "Oh, that poor little kid. The child’s mother seemed to be kind to him, to love him, but grandma was not a nice person to live with. Then in due course I got a letter from the father’s congress person asking why we didn’t let his son come to join him in the United States. I explained to them what I understood the law to be and asked them to let me know if they knew of another way to legitimize the child. Never heard from anybody again.

**Q:** You were there at the time things collapsed in Vietnam?

KARAER: No, it had already happened. The Americans were out of Vietnam by the time I was there.

**Q:** But in ’75? The beginning of the boat people. Did that have any effect on you all?

KARAER: Only, as I recall, that many more people came in regarding adoptions of Vietnamese children. We discovered another interesting thing there that ended up contributing to our bureaucratic procedures. Because a fair number of Americans emigrated to Australia over the years and married there, we had an unusual amount of citizenship questions to deal with. I took the correspondence citizenship course after I got there so that I could deal with these problems better, and I really got to be quite an expert on all this stuff. In the course of doing these things, I discovered that in Australia in order to protect the identity of adopted children, when they were adopted, they were issued with a new birth certificate that showed their adoptive parents as their birth parents. Our whole operation in Australia had been cruising along for years totally oblivious
to this. I don’t even remember how I found this out. I think an American woman who was applying for a passport for a child that she’d adopted volunteered the fact that the kid was adopted. My assistant confirmed that that was the law, and I had to tell everyone that the child had to get an immigrant visa. That wasn't a happy situation. Then I informed the Department and the Consulate in Sydney which was the overall supervising consulate for Australia, and we designed a special form that we had to have every American parent sign when they were applying for passports for their kids that this child was their birth child and not adopted. It looked so odd. It was so hard to find proper wording for something like that.

Another thing was police reports. If an applicant indicated that they had been convicted of something in the past, we needed the details in order to determine if it was a crime of moral turpitude and therefore excluding. I had form letters that I sent off to the police departments in my consular district, which was the provinces of Victoria and South Australia for this information. One day the Consul General, not Brand, it was the first guy whose name I can’t remember, came into my office. I must add it was one of the few times he ever showed his face on our floor, much less in my office. He said he had gotten a call from the South Australian police complaining about my letters. I didn't know it until that moment, but he had had trouble with the authorities in South Australia which had a labor party government, and had made a rule that the only person in the consulate who was to deal with the police in South Australia was the administrative officer, and I had broken his rule. Of course nobody had told me there was such a rule. I told him that he knew what my job was and that it included contacting the police on official business. If he wanted someone else to do my job, he should have told me. His response was, "Well, now you know," and off he stomped. That was the kind of thing that just made you hate to be a consular officer, and considering that he presided over that consulate the whole time that the alcoholic was there letting the place be run by the Australians, really made me angry.

Q: I guess this is probably a good place to stop for this time. How did your husband fare there?

KARAER: Oh, he enjoyed it. He got a certificate of graduation from the Melbourne Institute of Technology in radio and television communication repair. All of our holiday time we spent driving around Australia camping. We got to go to the Barrier Reef twice and we had a really good time. As I said, the Australians are absolutely superb people when you’re dealing with them out of the big cities. The country of course is magnificent. We never got further west than Ayers Rock and Alice Springs. We took our car on the famous train, the "Ghan." We saw cowboys in northern Australia and people mining for sapphires in northern Australia.

JAMES W. HARGROVE
Ambassador
Australia (1976-1977)

Ambassador Hargrove was born in Louisiana in 1922 and raised there and in Texas. He attended Rice University and served in the U.S. Army during World
HARGROVE: …I was in my office one time downtown when the phone rang. It was the Personnel Office of the White House. By now, Gerald Ford was President. I think this happened because of a series of circumstances. I'll tell you about them in a little while. Well, the phone rang, and a voice said, "I'm in the Personnel Office of the White House, and we've been reviewing some records of some people who have been up here doing different things in the government, with the idea of encouraging them to come back and do some more." And I said, "Well, I don't think so. I'm all set down here, and I'm happy with what I'm doing. But as a matter of curiosity, what did you have in mind?" And he said, "Well, we wanted to talk to you about an ambassador position." And I said, "An ambassador's position... Which central African republic are you talking about sending me to?" And he says, "Oh, no, no, no, we wanted to talk to you about a couple of them, Australia and one other." I said, "Now let me get this straight. Were you calling me to ask me if I would be interested in being named ambassador to Australia?" And he said, "Well, we'd like to talk to you about it." I said, "I'll be in your office tomorrow," because you don't get the opportunity to be U.S. ambassador to Australia every day. So that's the way it happened.

Now why it happened that way, I speculate this way: in the first place, Gerald Ford was a short term President, and anybody who took the job, me included, was going to go down there with the possibility that it would be a short-term appointment, and maybe it wasn't worth disrupting everything you were doing. Second thing was our ambassador to Australia, Marshall Green, a career diplomat-

Q: Whom I've interviewed, by the way. He's just died recently.

HARGROVE: Yes, I knew it wasn't very long ago. Well, Marshall had come home from Australia. His wife never did like it down there, and she didn't want to stay there, and ultimately, he told them he had to go home and be with his family. So he left there - I think it was in May or maybe April of 1975 - and the position of ambassador was vacant, and had been vacant for some months at the time I was called. The Australians kept saying, you know, when are you going to name an ambassador - we think we're significant in your future, and we need an ambassador down here. So there had been some pressure to go ahead and get somebody named. And the third thing was, the election was coming up, and I think the theory was that if Ford named some ambassadors from Texas, it would help him in the election. At the same time he named me, he named as ambassador to Trinidad and Tobago Al Fay, somebody that I knew pretty well here, and he also named the ambassador to the Court of St. James, Ann Armstrong from Corpus Christi, a Texan and a very charming and very capable person. So the three of us were all named. We went to the hearing together, and were voted on at the same time. I think it was partly a political move, but I think it was a mistaken political move to think that he was going to get any political help out of sending me, for instance, to Australia.
Q: *Ambassadorial appointments don't seem to do anything, in a way.*

HARGROVE: I don't think so, no. But I know we were never asked - I was never asked, and I presume the others weren't either - to make any contribution in order to get this, and my contributions to the Republican Party, while they'd been constant, had never been very big at all, never of that nature. So I think he thought, or the people thought, that they needed more representation from Texas and it was a short-term appointment and the post had been vacant for a good period of time, and it wasn't going to be too easy to get folks to go down there and cut loose for that short term. In addition, I'm confident that somebody related to my postal service suggested me. I don't know whether it was Red or whether it was Peter or who might have suggested that this was a possibility, but for whatever reason, I got this out of the blue.

Q: *Well, you were there from '76 to '77 because the Ford administration lost, rather closely, to Carter.*

HARGROVE: Yes.

Q: *Before going out, did you go through any sort of preparation for going to Australia?*

HARGROVE: Yes. Let me preface this by saying these conversations took place in the fall of '75, and it had been pretty well decided by about October that I would be appointed. The FBI checks were going on, and they were expected to be concluded pretty promptly. At about that time, a great upheaval occurred in Australia, when Sir John Kerr, the Governor General of Australia, was persuaded to dissolve the Parliament. Malcolm Fraser, who was head of his party, was in opposition in the lower house, and his party was in control of the upper house. They had just about put an absolute gridlock on anything happening in government, including money for the budget, and people weren't getting paid. So Fraser and his compatriots went to Sir John Kerr and persuaded him to dissolve the Parliament, even though the leader of the lower house, the Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, didn't want to dissolve the lower house. It was a strange and unique situation, because there's a written constitution that the Australians adopted in 1901, and it's modeled a good bit after the U.S. constitution, but there's also an unwritten constitution that is modeled after the British procedures. The unwritten constitution decrees that the sovereign dismisses parliament only when the prime minister asks her or him to, and the written constitution says simply that the governor general may dismiss parliament. So he had the written authority, but he didn't have the unwritten authority. But he dissolved. And people rose up in the street and said this was treason, you know, and was unconstitutional. They pelted his Rolls Royce with rocks and things like that. And a new election was called, which was to take place in 30 days, so the State Department in Washington very properly said to stop everything till this gets over with; we can't send a new ambassador down there and put him in this situation, in addition to the fact that the U.S. intelligence community in Australia was being given credit for toppling the government, and may in fact may have been partly responsible for it - I don't know. But at any rate, they said, just wait till this is all over. So there was a delay of maybe two or three months before I could actually go down there. My appointment was announced right around
Christmastime, and I did go to Washington and went through an indoctrination and briefings series in Washington with the various agencies that would be involved.

Q: How did you find this? Was this useful?

HARGROVE: I thought it was very useful, yes. Of course, every agency was pushing its particular purposes. I mean, the agricultural people were interested in making sure that we got the right kind of a deal on beef quotas and so forth. Admiral Rickover, who in effect ordered me to come by so that he could tell me what I was to do... Did you ever know Admiral Rickover?

Q: Well, I've heard stories of him.

HARGROVE: I think most of them are correct.

Q: "Imperial" is a moderate word.

HARGROVE: Well, I wouldn't call it "imperial." He was certainly strong in his convictions, but his office, for instance, was very spartan, very small, just a steel desk in it, with a silver chair or two. I had heard before I went up there - some of my "shepherders" had told me, "Now, when you go up there, you sit in this chair, don't let it bother you if it leans because what he's done is to cut off one leg of the chair about an inch shorter than the other legs so that the person sitting there keeps tilting. That's to distract the person." When I got up there, actually, the chair was cut off like that, and it did that. But at any rate, he was a pretty testy gentleman - of course, he had a great reputation and he said, "When you get there, they've been fussing around not letting our nuclear submarines and other nuclear vessels come into port in Australia. You've got to get that straightened out. You've got to get that ban against nuclear vessels taken off. That was one of the things I got from my briefing.

I walked in on George Bush, later to become President, when he was just moving into his office at the CIA. It was the day he arrived there, and he and I had known one another for a long time. I visited with him, and I think I made a few points with the CIA people by being able to call him up and ask him could I come by and see him. The whole briefing overall was very good. It was a concentrated thing, taking only a week or 10 days, and you can't learn everything in a week or 10 days. Fortunately, I didn't have to learn another language.

Q: You arrived when in Canberra?

HARGROVE: February the 6th of 1976.
Q: What were your priorities, including Rickover's order? Every ambassador arrives with an attaché case with a certain number of issues that they hope to either solve or mitigate or do something with.

HARGROVE: There were a number of priorities. The first one, I guess, was to maintain the military alliance that we had with Australia and New Zealand, the ANZAC Treaty, which was a very helpful thing for Australia and for the United States. We needed Australia as a local base for some of our facilities, and they needed us to keep potential enemies away from their shores. They've got the longest shoreline in the world. So the military relationship is a significant one.

The economic relationship is also significant. The most vocal aspect of that was the beef quota, which was being negotiated all the time. But there were lots of others. Since we cut off the sugar from Cuba, we've been importing more sugar from Australia than anybody else. Then there was the economic relationship between Australia, the United States, and Japan. Australia had a balance of payments deficit with the United States, but they had a surplus with Japan, and Japan had a surplus with us, so if you go around the whole triangle it fairly well evened out, and to maintain the economic relationships was another priority.

As an aspect of the military cooperation, we did want to get the ban against nuclear vessels lifted.

Q: New Zealand, by this time, had already gone that route.

HARGROVE: No, they had not.

Q: They had not.

HARGROVE: They did later, but at that time they were included in it. They had a ban too. Both of them had the ban. We had to get the ban lifted. And we knew that the likelihood of New Zealand being willing to lift their ban was much less than it was for Australia. Malcolm Fraser and his group were very much in support of lifting the ban and permitting the nuclear vessels to come in. Once again, the labor unions came into it. They were very much opposed to it. And the populace was afraid that we were going to have a nuclear explosion or whatnot, radiation was going to contaminate everything. So we devised a program, in conjunction with the federal government and with the state of Western Australia, where the conservatives, under Sir Charles Court, were much stronger than the other state governments in terms of being willing to do this sort of thing. Besides that, Perth was a long way away from anything else and the base that they had at Fremantle was an inconvenient way from Perth, and we decided to begin our effort by bringing a nuclear sub into the naval base at Fremantle. We did that. Everybody was holding their breaths to see what kind of problems we'd get. It went off like a charm. Nobody paid a whole lot of attention to it. The next thing we did was to bring a couple of frigates, which we never said were nuclear powered or not nuclear powered (but everybody knew they were nuclear powered and had nuclear weapons), and we brought those into the harbor at Melbourne during the Melbourne Cup race, when everybody would be caught up in the Melbourne Cup and probably wouldn't be looking too much at the harbor. That came off fairly well, but not nearly as
well as it did out in the west. The garbage collectors union in Melbourne refused to service the ships, which meant that we had to store all the garbage until they could get back out to sea. But it went off fairly well.

And then later, we were having exercises, which we had every year with the Australian armed services, and among the vessels that were down there for the exercises was the Enterprise, the aircraft carrier.

Q: Nuclear carrier.

HARGROVE: Big nuclear carrier, 5,000 personnel. We wanted to bring it into port because it was a showpiece, you see. These other things were just minor. And the question was, where do you bring it in? Well, we couldn't bring it into Perth; that was too far away from everything. And the people in Melbourne were reluctant. They said, “Well, we'll maybe do it, but if you can find some other place, we’d rather not.” And they pointed out that the threshold across the bay at Melbourne is fairly shallow, and on some days we would have trouble getting the Enterprise across it. So we were wondering what to do, and about that time we got a phone call from the premier of Tasmania, which had a Labor government.

Q: Down in Hobart.

HARGROVE: Yes. And he said, "We want you to bring the Enterprise into Hobart." We said, "Are you joking, or are you serious?" He said, "No, we want you to bring it in." We said, "Hobart is a small town. You've got 5,000 sailors coming in there. What are you going to do with them?" "Oh," he says, "we'll take care of them. We've got everything arranged, and we're going to have shuttle flights available to take them to Melbourne or Sydney if they want to go to Melbourne or Sydney, and we will support it very strongly." So we took the Enterprise into Hobart, and we didn't have any problem. Everything worked out very well. And that sort of broke the back of the nuclear thing. We never got into New Zealand, and of course, later on they withdrew from the alliance, in effect.

Q: I'm confused about during this time who was the government in Australia?

HARGROVE: The government was headed by Malcolm Fraser, who was prime minister.

Q: He was what party?

HARGROVE: He was of the conservative party, which is called the Liberal Party.

Q: Oh, okay.

HARGROVE: And he, I think, is a very capable man. He's about six feet five inches tall, has got a pretty sharp nose, and he needs glasses to read. The result of all this is that when he is reading, particularly over television or something he's looking down his nose at his notes. He's a very dour
sort of person. I mean, he's got a sense of humor, but you don't see it unless you know him pretty well. And he just had no charisma. He ran the government very well, a tough prime minister, and his different policies, I think, were good. They maintained economic stability well. After I left down there, they instituted some policies that I think really made them a light among Western nations in terms of budget discipline. So this was the government, the Liberal Party, in coalition with a party called the National Party, which was more conservative than the Liberal Party and was concentrated in Queensland. Joe Bjelke-Petersen, who is a legendary figure up there - he's dead now - was pretty close to a despot. I mean, he said what was going to happen in Queensland, and by golly, that's the way it was going to happen. So that was a coalition, and that's still a coalition now. The National Party has diminished in power and significance. We've got some even more conservative groups that have come up. But basically, it's still a Liberal government.

Q: Did you find the labor movement - this was Gough Whitlam, wasn't it? - to be almost more socialist than the British labor movement, which at the time was quite militant and still with taints of theoretical Marxism and all that? Was this a problem for us, or did they have such a thing?

HARGROVE: They were socialist. There's no question about it. I did not find that they were Marxist. It was more an economic socialism. They were very interested in such things as the national health system and how much percent of the cost of it would be borne by the federal government versus the states or the individuals. Gough Whitlam went way overboard on what he was going to do, and he paid for it, because he didn't stay very long. The public didn't buy that. I saw Gough Whitlam quite a bit. We tried to keep in touch with the opposition as well as the government, so we had him and some of his shadow cabinet people over to dinner and talked to them and so forth, had a dialogue. We were reasonably good friends, although at bottom we each knew that we were on the other side politically. I don’t think Australia was at that time anywhere near as socialist as it had been. It was on the road back to a much more open type posture and a much more free-enterprise type of a situation. Since then, they have done a lot of privatizing, so that the socialist movement, I think, has been hurt very badly, by the sale of gas companies and electric companies and airlines.

Q: Well, did we get involved in the politics, or was it hard to stay away?

HARGROVE: We didn't really get involved in the politics. We tried to keep our fingers on the pulse of what was going on, and that was one of the big uses of the consular corps in the four cities where we had the consular offices. Bob Brand, who was consul general down in Melbourne, was very active in political intelligence, but not in political activism. And in every state we got some pretty good reports on what was going on. Bob Gray was political counselor in Canberra. He's now over in Geneva with the disarmament group. He was a very astute political type. And then we had a number of other people who were classified as political counselors, but in effect probably were more CIA than political counselors.

Q: How did you find, coming to Canberra, you were received by the embassy and the staff, and
HARGROVE: We got along fine. There was a period of time where we had to learn one another, but it was a fairly brief period of time. This was true not only with the embassy but also with the press corps. But the people in the embassy, I found, were very anxious to work with me. The fact that I was non-career didn't bother anybody - on the surface, at any rate. The way the embassy was structured - and I think this is probably true of most embassies - the ambassador didn't have to do anything if he didn't want to. The DCM was going to handle it unless the ambassador wanted to. I wanted to. I wanted to get into what was going on and find out everything. We used to have periodic meetings of the whole group, so that everybody knew what was going on in all the different areas. We had a tennis court at the residence. We played tennis together. We had a group from the embassy staff that came over and played once a week or so and had sandwiches for lunch together afterward. We got to be good friends with them and I think knew them pretty well.

The press corps was a little bit different situation. The press corps is naturally aggressive, and Australia's is as aggressive as any I've seen.

Q: Rupert Murdoch is a prime example.

HARGROVE: He is. But you know, the Australians are very straightforward people. When they want to know something, they just come right out and ask you instead of beating around the bush. Between Christmas and New Year's, when I first got word that I was going to be appointed, I got a couple of telephone calls from Australia. Now this was back in 1975, when telephone calls from Australia were not ordinary like they are today. One of them, from the press in Sydney, said, "We just want to find out something about you, as for instance why did the President appoint you as ambassador?" I said, "I don't know why he appointed me. It was his decision, and I'm happy to come down there. I'm looking forward to it, but I can't answer you that question." And he said, "Well, what have you done to deserve this appointment?" I said, "I'm a reasonably intelligent person, and I'm reasonably moral and have had a reasonably successful business career. I don't know what else I have to do to deserve it." "Well, did you give a lot of money to the Republican Party?" I mean, there was no disputing the directness of the question. I said, "I've given them money ever since I've been a Republican, but I've never given them any big sums." So we had some fairly frank discussions, and the embassy sent me clippings of the articles when they appeared before I went down there. The clipping on this conversation said, "The new ambassador to Australia is a very modest person, and on the surface, it appears he has a lot to be modest about."

The one that really shocked me the most, I guess, was an interview that I had on live television in Brisbane. The interviewer and I had had a very pleasant conversation, very friendly, right up till the time the red light went on and then his immediate question was "Mr. Ambassador, in view of the fact that the United States did not keep its pledges of defending Vietnam, why should we believe that it's going to keep its pledges to Australia and the ANZAC alliance?" I was a little bit nonplused. You know, it's not a very polite question. I said, "Well, in the first place, let's set that
record straight. We did not get out of Vietnam until everybody else, including Australia, had
gotten out of Vietnam and we were all by ourselves without any support." He left the subject
then, but he’d obviously wanted to upset my cart a little bit.

The other thing about the press corps was that one of my explicit instructions was not to talk
about the CIA. That was something we were just not going to talk about. So before the first press
conference I had in Canberra, people in the CIA said, "You're going to get questions about the
CIA involvement in the Kerr dissolution." The charge had been that Johnny Walker, who was the
head of the CIA office in Canberra before I got down there - he left before I got there - had been
instrumental in causing the Gough Whitlam government to fall.

Q: What were they supposed to have done?

HARGROVE: They were supposed to have authored a cable from the U.S. military to the
Australian military saying that it was going to be very difficult to continue our military alliance if
they didn't have a change in the government. Now, that's not documented, but there was a cable
which everybody denies ever having seen. I don't know whether it existed or not, but there was a
public claim that it did. Johnny Walker's house had been leased to somebody else that they tied
into this as a very sinister move because he'd leased it to this particular person. At any rate, the
feeling was - and we consistently denied that there was anything to it - that the CIA had messed
around in the politics and caused the government to fall. So immediately as this press conference
began, I was bombarded with questions like, "What is the CIA doing at Pine Valley?" Pine
Valley was a secret joint U.S. and Australian operation near Alice Springs. I said, "I'm going to
lay down one rule for this press conference: I'm just not going to talk about the CIA. You can ask
me all the questions you want to, but I'm not going to talk about it." "Why not?" I said, "Just say I
don't want to. That's a good enough reason for me. If I don't want to talk about it, you know, I
don't have to talk about it." They weren't very happy with that, and later on they began asking
questions again. There were good answers to some of the questions, and I'd find myself starting
to answer them, and then I'd say, "Wait a minute. I said I wasn't going to talk about that, and I'm
not going to talk about it." When we got through, the CIA folks said, "That's great. You did what
we wanted you to do, and there's nothing there for them to talk about." But the Australian press
corps was difficult. But we began to do our best to get acquainted with them and cultivated them,
went out to lunch with them, and by the time I left, I think we had a good relationship, or before
that.

Q: Well, we have this - and I'm not sure of the name - it's not coming to my mind - but this large
complex of communications, monitoring of undersea traffic and all that someplace out in the
middle of the desert, I guess.

HARGROVE: No, it's on the west coast.

Q: The west coast, is it?

HARGROVE: Cape Carnarvon line.
Q: Well, did this come up as a problem of being threatened by saying this is doing nasty things?

HARGROVE: It came up in the context of all of the various installations that we had in Australia. That was one of them. There was one at Woomera, north of Adelaide. There was the other one at Pine Valley, up in the middle of the desert. We had quite a bit of space operations down there also, of course - a big space presence. Everybody was aware that the Cape Carnarvon operation out there in the west, on the Indian Ocean, had the function of transmitting low frequency signals that could be received underwater so that the submarines wouldn't have to surface to get them. Everybody knew it. There wasn't any particular secret about it. When I went out to the northwest, I went by this installation, and they were conducting public tours through it. There wasn't anything secret about it. That didn't mean you understood everything about it after you'd been through, but we went and did see almost the whole thing. Only the heart of it was off limits. The rest of it they took you through. There was a feeling that the U.S. was operating all of the facilities and that Australia didn't have anything to do with it. In fact, the facilities were jointly operated. Of course, we did have more people at them than the Australians did. We got demonstrations on that aspect. We had people who were getting on the train in Adelaide and going up demonstrating at Pine Valley, without really knowing what they were demonstrating about. They just didn't like the CIA being there. Of course, we didn't say it was the CIA, but everybody knew it was.

Q: With the Australians, what was their outlook? I mean, were they seeing Indonesia or China as the problem rather than the Soviet Union, or how were they?

HARGROVE: The Soviet Union. They were very anti-Russian, even more so than the United States - that is, the Fraser government. With the Whitlam government I don't think that was the case, but with the Fraser government it was. They never really bothered a whole lot about Indonesia, which always made me wonder why not. Indonesia is one of the most densely populated countries in the world, and Australia is one of the most unpopulated countries in the world.

Q: And that long coastline there.

HARGROVE: It’s a long coastline, and it's just 50, 60, 70 miles across from Timor. Australia got very much involved in East Timor, but the Indonesians didn't pay much attention to them and went on and did what they wanted to do. I don't think that Indonesia or China was regarded as a real threat. Japan was always regarded as an economic threat, along the lines that the United States used to be, that is they were going to own everything in Australia before long. And they do own a lot. But it was Russia that was the main concern, and not as a threat against Australia as such, but as a threat against all the West. Australia, certainly under the Fraser government, always regarded itself as a part of the West. I remember when one of the Soviet ministers came down to Australia and was on television talking about their base on the horn of Africa. In Mogadiscio or someplace like that they had a very long runway. It was supposed to be 7,000 feet, which is a tremendous runway, and it was regarded as designed for large military planes from
Russia. The interviewers were asking him about it - wasn't that a threat to any country around there? He said, "Well, you only have a threat when people are liable to do something bad, and we're not going to do anything bad." This was his explanation of it. It didn’t win him any friends. The anti-Russian feeling was pretty strong.

On the other hand, Australia was among the first western nations to acknowledge the Chinese Communists and to permit them governmental representation. That became something of a diplomatic dance. We couldn't go to an event where the Communist Chinese embassy was represented. Only by accident did we ever come into contact with them, on a few occasions. The Australians were more or less pro-Chinese then and I think they have become more so in terms of economic relationships.

Q: I notice you're Australia and Nauru. How do you pronounce it?

HARGROVE: Nauru.

Q: What's Nauru, and how did that play in your-

HARGROVE: Well, it's a good question. When people sometimes ask me where I was ambassador, without mentioning Australia I would say I was ambassador to Nauru, “What is Nauru? I’ve never heard of it.” TI always replied, “Nauru is a little island, 12 miles around and eight square miles in area, about half-way between Brisbane and Honolulu, 50 miles south of the Equator. And it is a mountain of phosphate.

Q: It's bird dung, isn't it?

HARGROVE: Yes, bird dung, phosphate that's used as a soil enrichment; it's a mountain of it, and it has been mined since the beginning of this century. The Germans took it over before World War I, and then after World War I they had to give it back. They gave it back to the tri-trustees of Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand. Later, Great Britain opted out of it and said they didn't need to be a trustee, and ultimately New Zealand did the same thing, and Australia wound up as the only trustee. It was taken by the Japanese in World War II, and after World War II, under the leadership of a man named Hammer DeRoburt, it became an independent country. The way he did that was fantastic. He lobbied the United Nations constantly until finally they said, "Okay, we'll approve the independent status if Australia will yield." And Australia yielded. So it is now independent. At the time that I was there, it had the second-highest per capita income in the world, next to Kuwait only. I think the per capita income at that time was about $30,000 per citizen. There were only about 3,500 citizens. They mined the phosphate, and they stored the money up. Partially it was given to individuals on the island, and partially it came to the government. The government accumulated a pretty big trust fund. They had a lot of money in it - I mean billions of dollars. Among other things, they built a 55-story office tower in Melbourne, called Nauru House. Later, I understand, they lost a good bit of that money through injudicious investments like musical comedies in London. They had their own airline, one airplane that flew back and forth from Nauru to Australia. But it was important from
an economic standpoint. It was the second largest producer of phosphate in the world. So the U.S. appointed an ambassador down there because they wanted one. It was a presence. I went up there from Australia and presented credentials, along with Bob Simpson, who was the economic attaché, and we went to a party at the president's house. Did you ever see the story about "The Mouse that Roared," that movie?

Q: Yes, Peter Sellers.

HARGROVE: Well, it had a lot of similarities to that. I remember when I went to present my credentials, they wanted to do this thing up right. They had a little one-story shack, really, that was the government headquarters, and they had a little loudspeaker on top of it. When I got out, they had the full armed might of Nauru at attention to receive me. It consisted of 10 police officers, all of them pretty fat and all of them dressed in nondescript clothes and of much different heights - some tall and some short. They stood at attention and "The Star-Spangled Banner" came on very scratchily over the loudspeaker, and I presented my credentials to Hammer DeRoburt. It was really... It's hard to keep from laughing at it.

But they're very important economically, and Hammer DeRoburt was an exceedingly capable person, to have accomplished what he did in getting the independence of that country. He really deserves a lot of credit.

Q: I know your time constraints, but what about Coral Sea Day? Did you get involved in that at all?

HARGROVE: Not really. We recommended somebody for the U.S. representative to the Coral Sea celebration. It was seldom taken, our recommendation. Somebody else was usually sent over because there were political reasons to send him over. Coral Sea Day was a big thing to the Australians. It was a decisive answer to the question of whether or not the Japs [Japanese] would take - excuse me, the Japanese would take-

Q: That's a generational reversion.

HARGROVE: Right. But it was crucial, and while there was no clear-cut victory in the battle, as I understand it, nevertheless it blunted the Japanese attack on Papua New Guinea and Australia. So it was very significant. But as far as Coral Sea Day was concerned, we didn't have that much to do with it.

Q: It was hard to get top level visitors, wasn't it there?

HARGROVE: For that purpose, you mean?

Q: Well, I mean to get to Australia. It's pretty far along the line.

HARGROVE: Well, we got a lot of Congressional delegations, you know. They love to go
places, and, particularly if they happen to be going on a round-the-world trip, that's a good place to stop. About two weeks after we got to Australia, I succeeded in getting the Governor General to see me to accept my credentials so that I would be official when Nelson Rockefeller arrived. He was coming on a round-the-world trip.

Q: He was Vice President at the time.

HARGROVE: He was Vice President, and he and Happy came in. I wouldn't have been able to meet him, you know, because I didn't exist until I got my credentials accepted. Fortunately, I got them in time, and he came by and visited people at the embassy, and then we flew with him to Sydney, and he gave a speech in Sydney and bought everything in sight. He was a compulsive buyer.

We got quite a few visitors. Henry Kissinger's wife came down and spent, it think, a couple of weeks. And other folks of considerable notoriety or fame came by. James Michener and his wife we had for lunch one day, that sort of thing.

EDWARD HURWITZ
Director of Australia/New Zealand Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Washington, DC (1977-1978)

Born in New York City in March 1931, Ambassador Edward Hurwitz attended high school at Jamaica High School in Queens, New York. He entered Cornell University in 1948 and graduated in 1952. After college, Ambassador Hurwitz served in the army from May 1953 to May 1955. He passed the Foreign Service exam in 1955 and has served in various foreign countries including Afghanistan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, and the former Soviet Union. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on August 15, 1996.

Q: So, you moved on to the Australian/New Zealand desk. In a way this must have seemed like cold potatoes or something like that after your previous jobs.

HURWITZ: Well, it was, but it was a new area entirely and sort of interesting. There were a lot of things going on. Our relations with the South Pacific were developing. It was hardly front page news, of course, but it did get me a trip out there to Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Samoa. The issues involved with Australia and New Zealand was New Zealand not letting US naval ships pay a port of call unless we specified that they didn't have nuclear devices or anything aboard. That finally evolved into New Zealand leaving ANZUS, I understand. Is that right?

Q: I'm not sure.

HURWITZ: At the time they had not. There was an ANZUS meeting here in my tenure in
Washington. It was an interesting tour but not a gripping one.

Q: *Was the Carter administration trying to be more flexible with New Zealand on this nuclear issue?*

HURWITZ: Yes, I think so. That was the bedrock of policy, you know, you don't negotiate for hostages, which we probably do, and you don't acknowledge the presence of nuclear weapons. We didn't deal in a cavalier way with New Zealand.

Q: *Other administrations sometimes like to have a good confrontation thing, but this wouldn't have been done.*

HURWITZ: No, no.

Q: *How about Australia? There is always the problem of our involvement with various classified intelligence gatherings.*

HURWITZ: The biggest thing, perhaps, was our ban on the importation of kangaroo skins.

Q: *Why, because kangaroos are cute?*

HURWITZ: Well, we considered them endangered, but of course the Australians didn't because they were running all over the place. What else was a big issue? One issue was Australian concerns about Americans pulling out of Asia. I think they regarded Carter and this whole Korean pull out plan as a serious step on the part of the United States to withdraw from Asia, and they were very unhappy about that. We had to reassure them constantly. I remember, Robert Oakley, who was the other DAS at the time in charge of Southeast Asia, Australia and New Zealand, was supposed to go out and give a speech to some Australian foreign affairs organization. He couldn't or didn't want to do it so he sent me. The text that I developed was very big on the idea that we were not pulling out of Asia, it was very important to us.

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**CHARLES H. TWINING**  
*Deputy Director, Australia/New Zealand Desk*  
*Washington, DC (1978-1980)*

Charles H. Twining was born in Maryland in 1940. He received his BA from the University of Virginia in 1962 and an MA from the School for Advanced International Studies in 1964. After entering the Foreign Service in 1964 his assignments included Tananarive, Dalat, Abidjan, Bangkok, Cotonou, Douala, Ouagadougou, and Honolulu with ambassadorships to Cambodia and Cameroon. Charles Stuart Kennedy interviewed Ambassador Charles H. Twining in 2004.
TWINING: Coming out of there, I was all set to take a job in the State Department dealing with, I thought, Southeast Asia. I found none was available. I became the desk officer, the deputy office director for Australia/New Zealand in the East Asian bureau, still under Assistant Secretary Holbrooke. That was a good two years.

Q: From when to when?

TWINING: 1978 to 1980. It was an interesting period of time. It not only gave me the chance to work on two countries that had very important alliances with the United States, but it also gave me a bit of a backseat to continue to look at Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos. It gave me a chance to offer advice, for instance following Vietnam’s overthrow of the Khmer Rouge regime. What was striking about working on Australia in those days was just how intense the relationship is in so many different areas. You would go from following scientific exchanges to intelligence exchanges. You would deal with trade questions. The Australians would become very tough when it came to issues involving entry of their lamb into the United States, or sales of Australian wheat, for example. They were hard negotiators. It kept you on your toes, and increased your understanding of your own national interests. New Zealand was a bit less forceful. In those days, before the strains developed in our relationship in 1985 with the banning of U.S. nuclear powered war ships from New Zealand ports, that alliance was also very strong. Indeed, then as now, we could not do so much in Antarctica within New Zealand’s support and assistance.

Q: What about multilateral issues?

TWINING: Our consultations with both countries on major developments in the world, particularly in Asia, were constantly ongoing and intensive. Remember that, with Australia, we were just emerging from the dip in the relationship from the early 1970s with Prime Minister Gough Whitlam’s opposition to the war in Vietnam. With Malcolm Fraser as Prime Minister, our consultations regained the intensity they had had during the 1960s. With the Muldoon government in New Zealand, we also saw eye-to-eye politically. Thus, it was normal that we consulted closely with both on developments such as the evolution of the situation in China, the Chinese-Vietnamese relationship, and events in the countries of Indochina and in Indonesia. I have to note that both Australia and New Zealand kept top flight diplomats in Washington who did not miss a trick. From the point of view of status, we had two politically well connected envoys in Canberra and Wellington, Philip Alston and Anne Martindell, respectively. During my time, I believe there is nothing we did that caught our two allies unaware. Both governments wanted to see us move ahead to a more realistic position of that relationship in 1979.

Q: How did we see the New Zealand government at the time? Was it one that was more conservative, and less labor oriented? I’m using labor in the British term.

TWINING: Absolutely. You’re exactly right. The Muldoon government was a conservative government. Although it kept tariffs high, which we felt was self-defeating, it was very easy to work with the Muldoon Government, politically. With both Australia and New Zealand, then and now, we have so many common interests that regardless of who runs the government, we can
always find ways to work together.

Q: How did you deal with issues like lamb, or wool or wheat? Were these bilateral or multilateral issues?

TWINING: The main contentious issues were primarily bilateral in nature. They centered around access to our market with their often cheaper products, and sometimes vice versa, and that of our agricultural subsidies, which they felt gave us an unfair advantage in the world market. What we tried to do was to get our experts together, to talk to one another and see if we could work things out. Aviation negotiations were another area that with both Australia and New Zealand were very tough. They had their interests and we had ours. It was always important to get the experts together and keep in mind our overall relationship.

Q: What about the outer possessions, the islands and all, of both these countries? Were these of interest to us?

TWINING: Yes, we compared notes a great deal on the South Pacific, where Australia and New Zealand were far better informed than we. I suppose what was of most interest to us was Papua New Guinea. The Australians had controlled Papua New Guinea, almost up until that time. Papua New Guinea is the largest of the South Pacific island nations. No one knew whether a country with a third to a quarter of the world’s languages, rugged topography, and a reputation for violence, could hold together as a nation.

Q: Were the Australians making news about East Timor then?

TWINING: East Timor had basically come and gone as an issue, by that time. Indonesia invaded Timor in 1974-75. By 1978, 1979, 1980, East Timor had really gone down on everyone’s radar screen.

Q: What about our joint monitoring facilities? We had a lot of these things in the outback, I guess, of Australia. Was this a point of friction at all, particularly with the newspapers, the left, of Australia?

TWINING: Some of the newspapers on the Australian left were always trying to create controversy over shared facilities, in particular that at Alice Springs, Australia. The Australians and we tried to coordinate, very carefully, how we would handle such controversies with the media. Our coordination was good. So, while some journalists might do their mudslinging about whether the U.S. was putting Australia in danger with these facilities, we both found common interest in supporting them. We were both able to manage the public affairs aspects.

Q: Did the Australians sort of have a special “in” with our government? Were they able to get things done, Congressional contacts, or anything like that?

TWINING: The Australians and the New Zealanders were very good diplomats. They were very
good both with the Congress and with the administration. The good feeling extending from World War II had not disappeared. An Australian foreign minister wanting to see the Secretary of State had no trouble whatsoever seeing him or talking with him on the phone. The atmosphere among our three governments was very good.

MICHAEL G. WYGANT
Political/Military Officer
Canberra (1978-1981)

Michael G. Wygant was born in Newburgh, New York in 1936 and was raised in Montclair, New Jersey. He received a bachelor's degree from Dartmouth college, where he passed the Foreign Service exam during his junior year. He served briefly in the U.S. Army before entering the Foreign Service in 1959. Mr. Wygant's career included positions in Zimbabwe, Togo, Vietnam, and Gambia. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on August 14, 1990.

WYGANT: In 1978 we were transferred to Canberra, Australia. And there I was in the political section, mainly dealing with political/military matters but also with the party that was in then in opposition, the Australian Labor Party.

Q: You left there in '78 and went to Canberra, Australia, and you were there until '81 as the political/military officer.

WYGANT: Yes, in Canberra we had a political section with three officers: the counselor, myself, and a labor attaché. Australia was our only country of assignment that could be termed modern and westernized. It was a great change from all the developing countries that I'd served in previously, and also from the Soviet Union.

The family, I think, particularly enjoyed Australia, as I did. Canberra is a pleasant place to live and a good place to raise a family. Our two oldest girls went through high school there and then on into college in the United States.

The Australians are close allies of the United States. The ANZUS Alliance was then in good shape, but it also required constant attention. The government was then headed by Malcolm Fraser, a Liberal (which is the more conservative of the parties in Australia).

The Labor Party, in opposition, has always been somewhat suspicious and concerned about the several joint facilities that we have in Australia. We have several such facilities in remote areas of Australia where we can monitor space activities and rocket launches. We also have a major naval communications site in Northwestern Australia. I think elements of the Labor Party have always been suspicious, not to say distrustful, about what these facilities do. Therefore, we were constantly responding to questions and trying to explain just what was going on, obviously
without giving away classified information.

The most important single item that I became involved with was related to the Soviet's 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. And in order to respond to what looked like might be a Soviet incursion down toward the Persian Gulf, or at least in the warm-water ports, we greatly expanded our military presence in the Indian Ocean. This meant, among other things, that we were sending B-52 bombers on reconnaissance missions from Guam out over the Indian Ocean, and surveilling the Indian Ocean as far as the East African coast.

Now a B-52 is pretty good; it can stay up in the air for a long, long time with aerial refueling. So the extent of its usefulness is really based on the amount of fatigue and wear and tear that you can put on the crew. As I recall, the crew consists of four or five people. And when we began this surveillance of the Indian Ocean, the crews from Guam were flying all the way from Guam, through the sea between Australia and Papua New Guinea, out over the Indian Ocean, over Diego Garcia, then to within two hundred miles of the East African coast, north up to the Arabian Peninsula, and back. The crews had these enormous, twenty-nine-hour sessions in the air, in a very uncomfortable aircraft that was built for utilitarian military purposes not for human convenience. We asked the Australians if we could bring the B-52s into Darwin, where they could rest up for twenty-four hours, refuel, and then go on out and do their Indian Ocean surveillance. In principle, the Australians said sure, they could work something out like that and it wouldn't be a big problem. But in practice, the proposal required some rather careful negotiating over a period of better than a year to work out the terms of the U.S. use of Darwin and also some Australian airspace in order to do this surveillance of the Indian Ocean.

And I was deeply involved in those negotiations. Australia's biggest concern was what these aircraft might be carrying. We had made it clear from the beginning that these were reconnaissance flights, that we were simply going up to have a look around, and that they wouldn't be carrying a lot of armament or nasty things on board. But the Australians had to have absolute assurances on this, so it took a long time to work out, finally, a formula of words that was acceptable to both sides.

In any event, it was successful; we did sign the agreement. The first B-52 came into Darwin, as I recall, early in 1981, which was shortly before I left Australia. I was up there with our Air Force colonel who was the CINCPAC Representative in Canberra, and we greeted that first plane.

A little footnote to history: several months ago the B-52s were removed from Guam (we don't have any B-52s based in Guam anymore). The last B-52 to leave Guam had been completely refurbished by the command at Anderson Air Force Base and was flown off to Darwin to be part of their air and space museum.

Q: I wonder if you could talk a bit about the relationship as you saw it between our embassy and the Australian Labor Party, which was out of power at that time. This is an aside, but I remember one time I talked to an Australian ambassador who said, "You know, we try very hard not to get too many immigrants from England, because they're usually working class and they
come with all those labor antagonisms, and we don't want any more of that brought over here, because then you end up with a situation as you have in New Zealand." I mean, how did you find this?

WYGANT: The Australian labor unions are very strong. I believe somewhere around fifty percent of the Australian work force is unionized, which would be an incredible percentage compared with the United States, and, I think, compared with almost any other industrialized country. Of course there is tremendous variety in the way the unions approach issues, but there are some strongly left-wing unions that are inherently suspicious of the United States, and they carry weight in the Labor Party. In fact the Labor Party itself is composed of a number of factions, and the left-wing factions have been highly critical of the defense relationship between Australia and the United States.

There is something of a generational thing, too. Most older Australians (by now, we're talking about Australians who are in their mid-fifties or older) recall the Second World War and understand the basis for having concluded the ANZUS Alliance, and are very grateful for the kind of support that the United States was able to provide in the 1940s and the early Fifties when Australia was feeling rather isolated and out on its own. But that feeling is dissipating as the older generation passes on, and the younger people don't have any knowledge of that period, other than what they've read in the history books.

The Labor Party has, I think, finally, to a great degree, come to terms with the American relationship under the present prime minister. Now this has all happened, of course, since I left Australia. But Bob Hawke was an extremely popular figure in Australia when I was there. He was still the leader of the labor union movement. And then, I guess in the last year I was in Australia, he resigned from the union and ran for and succeeded in winning a seat in parliament. Just a few years later he became prime minister, which was an extremely unusual thing to happen under the Westminster system. Usually you have to serve a long time on the back benches before you can end up being prime minister. But he leapfrogged over a number of hurdles and eventually was able to spill Labor's then leader (who had been leader when I was there, Bill Hayden) and go on to become prime minister at the next election.

I think we had a reasonable working relationship with Bill Hayden when I was in Australia. I met with him a few times. Of course the ambassador met with him, and others.

Q: Did you have trouble getting to these people, meeting them?

WYGANT: No. The Australians are very open and easy to talk to, easy to meet. At that time the Labor Party was out of power, and it's usually easier to see people who are out of power than those who are in. They've got more time to spend with diplomats. So I had a chance to meet with other leaders of the party. In fact, when I was in Pohnpei last year, Gareth Evans, the present foreign minister of Australia, came through. I had met him when he was a senator and fairly junior member of the Labor Party establishment back in Australia ten years earlier. I had also gotten to know the secretary of the ALP, so that we had pretty good channels of communication.
with the Labor Party. Remember, along with political/military affairs, I also followed the Labor Party as it was the party in opposition, and that was the way we divided up the pie in the political section. The political counselor handled the Liberal Party in government, and I handled the opposition.

HERBERT E. HOROWITZ
Consul General
Sydney (1981-1984)

Ambassador Herbert E. Horowitz was born in New York in 1930. He received his bachelor's degree from Brooklyn College in 1952. He received a master's degree from Columbia University in 1964 and from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1965. He served in the US Army from 1953-1955. His overseas posts include Taipei, Hong Kong, Peking, and Sydney. He was ambassador to the Gambia from 1986 to 1989. Ambassador Horowitz was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on December 9, 1992.

Q: Then you went back to China again?

HOROWITZ: No, to Australia. At that point I had been back in Washington about four and a half years or so, and Treasury hadn't quite worked out to be the center of things I thought it might be on China or on the Soviet Union. I thought it was time for me to go overseas. Australia became available, I was posted to Sydney as Consul-General, and was there for four years.

Q: From when to when?

HOROWITZ: From '81 to '84.

Q: What were our prime interests in Australia and what were you dealing with?

HOROWITZ: Sydney was primarily a commercial post. Yes, we did political reporting and I did most of that myself; we did some economic reporting; we ran a big and busy consular section but most of that took care of itself. It was a big commercial post because we had a large commercial unit in Sydney and we also had the regional trade center. At that point Commerce Department had set up trade shows in different parts of the world; the center for the south Pacific was in Sydney. Also, the Foreign Commercial Service was organized and the first Senior Commercial Officer for Australia went to Canberra. He was in Canberra for about six months and realized that there was no business there, so he moved to Sydney. I then had three segments of the Department of Commerce in the Consulate: I had the commercial unit for the consular district, I had the trade center for the South Pacific, and I had the senior commercial officer for Australia. They didn't get along; they reported to different people in Commerce. I spent a lot of time with them, and with the American Chamber of Commerce, to keep our commercial program in focus.
Q: Sort of bring them together?

HOROWITZ: Yes. Also, the IRS had its regional office in Sydney. And, we had an excellent and very effective USIS office. So it was a fair size consulate. I enjoyed the political reporting a great deal, but there is a limited amount of interest in Washington in political reporting from one of the states of Australia. In Australia, New South Wales is really important, but what I had to do was find what was important to the United States. We had a very good embassy in Canberra, received good support from the embassy, and vice versa. It was a very good experience.

WILLIAM A. WEINGARTEN
Economic Officer
Canberra (1981-1984)

Mr. Weingarten was born in New York in 1936. He received his BA from Colgate University and his MSFS from Georgetown University. He served in the U.S. Army overseas from 1958-1961. His postings after entering the Foreign Service in 1962 included Paris, My Tho, Belgrade, Brussels, Canberra and Ottawa. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on July 29, 1999.

Q: Australia '81 to '84 - Reagan Administration is in, how were our relations with Australia during this particular time?

WEINGARTEN: Oh, they were terrific, really. We had very good relations with them. Initially, Malcolm Fraser was a Conservative prime minister, and after he was defeated in '83 by Hawke, Labor. But we had good relations with both governments. Back in the '70s, Australia had really been a sort of Foreign Service resort, and when they had a change of administration, they had a Labor prime minister and nobody in the embassy knew anybody on that side of the policy divide, and so the embassy was out of it for a long time, and so we determined that would not happen to us again. They sent Marshall Green out there as ambassador, and we got relations reset, and then after that, since then for the most part we've sent political appointees to it. The ambassador at the time I was there was a very nice man, a Cadillac dealer from Thousand Oaks, California, who was a friend of Reagan's. So we had a very good DCM, whose name was Steve Lyne. And of all the embassies we've been in, the embassy was one where everybody got along well, everybody worked together, and- (end of tape)

Q: I would have thought it would be difficult to be in Canberra and be economic... I assume you were in charge of the Economic Section. What were you?

WEINGARTEN: No, I wasn't. I was just the number two guy.

Q: But I mean to do economics, because economics aren't a Canberra thing. Politically you
might be able to do something, but economically I would think you would be looking to Sydney, Melbourne, other places.

WEINGARTEN: Yes, we did. At the time the Australian economy was very much state-controlled in a lot of ways, so we had a lot of activities - trade and financial issues - with the government in Canberra, but we used to travel quite a bit to Sydney and Melbourne, and the commercial attaché there had got himself transferred from Canberra to Sydney, but he didn't have the first clue what he was doing, so I wound up taking that over, doing mostly commercial work.

Q: How does one take over something which is run by another department?

WEINGARTEN: Ha, you just do it. Cables come in asking you to do this, that, and the other thing, and the other guy doesn't pick it up, you pick it up yourself. And so at one point, I think it was in '83, I went to Tokyo. They had a meeting of Commerce reps in Tokyo, and they wanted all the commercial attachés, so the ambassador said, "Well, you should go; you're doing it." I went it, and I went to the meeting, and they said, "You shouldn't be here. You don't work for the Commerce Department. You work for the State Department. In fact, you're our enemy. We don't want you here." And so, well, I said, "That's fine." So I went off and had a three-day holiday in Tokyo. I just went around Tokyo. And these guys didn't want to have anything to do with me, didn't want to talk about commercial work while I was there, assuming I was a spy. That's great. I'll take three days off. And then they fired this guy finally, the Commerce Department.

We just took care of all of the stuff for him and kept his files, kept his accounts, and he was a nice guy. He liked it. We got along with each other fine, but he just didn't know the first thing about operating in the government.

Q: What were the main economic concerns in Australia from our point of view?

WEINGARTEN: Oh, trade restrictions that we had, that we would threaten to impose on the Australians. What else? It was not all that much, I guess. We did a lot of reporting from Australia that I suspect nobody really paid much attention to in Washington, but we kept ourselves busy. But basically trade restrictions, ours and theirs, were the major -

Q: Where were the trade restrictions?

WEINGARTEN: Well, we would sometimes have trade restrictions on things like imports into the United States of Australian lamb. We would annoy the hell out of the Australians by subsidizing our exports of wheat to third countries where they were major exporters - that sort of thing. We would object to the tariff structure that they had in Australia, which kept foreign products out. They had a very high protective tariff on a lot of things that we wanted to sell into Australia, and one of them was automobiles. They had a high enough tariff rate - 100 percent on luxury cars - so as soon as you get there people would say, "Would you like to buy a BMW?" And you'd buy a BMW for about a third of what it cost an Australian, and then you drove it for a couple of years and then you could sell it back to the dealer or on the market for about twice what
you paid for it. So that was just kind of anomaly of what happens when you have very high tariffs. People do this kind of thing. Once you said you'd sold your BMW or Mercedes back into the system, the Australian who bought it didn't have to pay there tariff on it, so he got it for a lot less than he'd have to pay for it new.

Q: I imagine unions were quite powerful there.

WEINGARTEN: Yes, they really were. They were extremely powerful. We had a labor attaché who took care of them. Of course, they were Labor supporters. They were very fragmented. They had a lot of small unions. We calculated once there were 36 unions between the coal mines and the ports and loading it onto a ship, and 36 different unions that could go out on strike and cut off the supply, and often did. There were a lot of strikes. A very politicized labor movement.

Q: Did you find that the unions were taking sort of an anti-American view. I'm thinking were they picking up almost a classic leftist view shown in the British unions and some Canadian unions?

WEINGARTEN: Yes, in some respects they did. But I don't know, the Australians are so friendly and so outgoing, they never seemed to have a grudge against Americans personally. They had a big problem with... we had a number of bases in Australia, one at Alice Springs, another up on the upper northwest part of Australia that tracked Soviet submarines and things like that. They were very secret, and the Australians and the New Zealanders at that time were very worried that these kinds of bases were very excellent targets for the Soviets in case there was a war, so they were very resentful of these bases. And I recall in '83 that the White House wanted to send President Reagan out to do a trip through Australia, and the idea was to get a lot of campaign footage that would show a lot of smiling little white kids waving flags and so on for the campaign coming up in '84. And we had to tell him that if you send him out here to make a speech or to do that sort of thing, it would provoke full-scale riots. They had been in Vietnam, and Johnson had twisted their arms. They sent troops to Vietnam, and they felt they'd really been euchred by us on that, and so they were very suspicious of us and what they regarded as our bellicose attitude. Now they didn't send Reagan out; Bush came out. Bush did a -

Q: He was Vice President.

WEINGARTEN: He was Vice President then. He came out and did the Coral Sea celebration. Every year they celebrated the Coral Sea Battle, which was the battle that kept the Japanese from invading Australia and was one of the setbacks to the Japanese in '42, one of the few setbacks they had. And so that was always kind of the touchstone of U.S.-Australian relations because the Australians were unable to defend themselves at the time because their troops were all fighting for the British in North Africa.

That's a terrific... have you ever been there?

Q: No.
WEINGARTEN: Terrific place. You really should... Very friendly, very outgoing, very much an outdoors country. We played tennis, swam all the time. Great place.

Q: How did you find Australian industry?

WEINGARTEN: Very small, protected by high tariffs. The only really world-class firms extracted minerals - Broken Hill Proprietary, the big iron-ore mines, coal mines. They were very competitive, but they were hampered by labor unions. They could produce coal as cheaply as anyone else in the world, but by the time they managed to run the gauntlet of all these unions and get it on the water, it was no cheaper than American coal or South African coal. So there were a few industries that were world class, and everything was... They had some automobile firms that were established there behind this very high protective law. General Motors had a couple of plants there. Ford had some plants there. They produced cars that really looked like the previous generation of U.S. cars. They weren't modern at all. If they'd permitted tariff-free imports of automobiles, these companies would have gone out of business. Agricultural products, of course, they were world class, too. World-class wines, wheat, and so forth.

Q: How did you deal with the commodities tariff subsidy problems, both American and Australian?

WEINGARTEN: How did we deal with them? Well, we just tried to damp down the outcry, I guess. We had restrictions put out from Washington. We didn't have much input into that decision. And then as far as... the structural problems that the economy had through this high tariff law, we could never persuade the Australians to bring that down. I don't think the embassy had much impact either way.

PAUL GOOD
Press Attaché/Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Canberra (1982-1985)

Paul Good was born in Kentucky in 1939. After receiving his bachelor’s degree at Cascade College he received his master’s degree from Ball State. His career in USIA included positions in Thailand, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Nigeria, Australia, Yugoslavia, South Africa, Morocco, and Senegal. Mr. Good was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in August 2000.

Q: You were then in Australia. Where in Australia?

GOOD: In Canberra, the embassy, I was press attaché, information officer.

Q: You were there from when?
GOOD: ‘81.

Q: ‘81?

GOOD: Well, actually ‘82.

Q: ‘82, yes.

GOOD: To ‘85.

Q: Who was the ambassador, or who were the ambassadors?

GOOD: We only had one, and I never remember his name (Robert Nesen). He was a Cadillac dealer from Thousand Oaks, California, had been the finance chairman of the Republican Party in California and had gotten this reward. A very nice fellow, his wife was even nicer, grandmother type. She didn’t want to stay because her grandchildren were back in California. But he was a wise man in that he realized that he didn’t know how to run an embassy. He had never had this kind of training. So he really said to the DCM, Steve Lyne, he said-

Q: Who was the DCM?

GOOD: Steve Lyne. He was one of those that got stuck in that, what eight months or so, hold by Helms, the weird guy.

Q: Yes, Jesse Helms.

GOOD: He was on his way to Ghana as ambassador. So he ran the embassy, and the ambassador would be trained, and he did what was necessary and was guided along, and there were no problems with that. Canberra’s complex, the embassy complex, is particularly beautiful. It’s built in the Williamsburg style with the lovely chancellery and residence on a hill near the parliament, the new parliament. We had branches in Sydney and Melbourne and Perth. State had consulates in those places as well. We had libraries in each of those posts, as well as one in Canberra itself. Oddly enough, the libraries in Australia at that time were under the information office control. The press attaché ran them. Normally, and every place else I’ve ever been, they were run by the cultural officer, which having the libraries gave me something fun to do. The Australians were great.

It was however, not the society I expected to find. I should have been alert that something was going on, because before I left, I had been invited out to a farewell party by my old boss from Thailand, Rob Nevitt. He invited a couple of other people who had also been to Australia on assignment. Rob had been PAO. In retrospect I look back and realize that nobody that night had said anything good or bad about the place, and that just isn’t normal.

Q: No, no.
GOOD: You’re going to get opinions.

Q: Yes.

GOOD: They didn’t express opinions on anything of any substance. They chatted about the kangaroos and the koala. Then within a couple of months I understood what they had been trying to tell me about this. That is that it may look like California in 1951, but it isn’t California in 1951. This is another culture. Americans are tolerated, but feared in a cultural sense, a chip on the shoulder, the idea that our culture is going to smother theirs.

Q: A little bit like the Canadians?

GOOD: Yes, although with less basis for it. They, however, do think of the Americans on a daily basis. For one reason, it may be from the movie, it may be from the book, it could be from radio, and whatever style, clothes, hair, and they’d then think that we probably think about them that much. Well, you ask somebody in the US about Australia, “When was the last time you thought about Australia prior to the Olympics?” And you’d probably hear, “Who, where, never.” You know. So they were prepared to be defensive when it came to cultural.

On a personal basis I never had a problem. They’d ask me occasionally on the squash floor about something that the U.S. had done, and they think, “It’s your fault.” But it wasn’t meant serious.

What was most difficult to adjust to was, well, there were two things that were difficult to adjust to. One was the terrible racist attitude, and the other was the gender problem. The women don’t really count in Australia. The men are number one, and their male mates are right there with them. If they have any attention to divert from that, if they are married, the children will be of significance. But the wife, generally speaking, isn’t seen in public, at least on a professional basis. I would go months sometimes without finding out whether my sports buddies were married or not, or if they were married, if they had a family. Certainly I was going to have a hard time finding out what kind of education they had. Education is not something that you inquire about. They assume that everybody went through grade school, and after that it doesn’t matter. So don’t brag about having gone farther than that, because that’s gauche.

Q: There is a concern in making sure that you’re not sounding like you’re trying to be above anyone or not, or is this?

GOOD: Yes, you have to watch your assumptions. I was a bit annoyed one day. I went over to the university to sign up for the university club. They said, “Do you have a college education?” It’s sort of insulting to a Foreign Service officer to be suggesting that we don’t, that we might not. Of course, the word college I shouldn’t say, because college in Australia is a high school, not a university. They do understand that the universities like Oxford have colleges, but in the Australian context, the college is a high school. I ran into that the other day regarding a proposed trainee for a J-visa program. He said he had a college diploma. I had to explain to the office
where I was consultant that that doesn’t mean university. In this case, it didn’t matter because the
guy’s going to be an air conditioning trainee, but colleges are different.

Racism definitely is a problem. A friend of mine, a department head at the Canberra College of
Advanced Education, where my wife was earning a degree in communications, had blocked his
advancement completely. He was at the top of where he could go. Although he was from the
right college and he had gotten his doctorate at Oxford, he married a mixed Chinese Indian. Her
father had been a doctor in Hong Kong, I think. While his buddies, were already ministers of
state, he wasn’t even going to make it any farther than the university administration because of
this taint.

Q: We have, at least we really make a real effort to have, a gender race blind Foreign Service.
So I assume we have minority officers in our apparatus in...

GOOD: Not that I can remember.

Q: How about women?

GOOD: We had women. If they were single, they were usually a bit unhappy because you don’t
happily date an Australian man. They tell you, “The bags aren’t right.” If you could find an
international, okay. And the tours were long. You’re talking four years for these single women.
It’s a long time to be without a reasonable social life if you’re single there.

Q: My big experience in Australia was when I was constantly juggled in Saigon during the war.
A lot of American soldiers went there because they found it heaven.

GOOD: Absolutely.

Q: An American kid from the beginning, a boy, is trained to be nice to women and to say nice
things and all this. They found that they’re in hog heaven when they got to Australia because
they’ve got beautiful women, smart, and these Australians were sitting around goofing off and
drinking beer and doing what God knows what with sheep or something like that, but they
certainly weren’t paying any attention to these women around.

GOOD: Well, they might pay attention to them sometimes, but they didn’t pay attention in the
proper civilized fashion from what these women know is going on elsewhere. A female journalist
friend of mine had gone to the States for a month, I think, and came back. I asked her, “How did
you find it?” Well, she said, “The American men are 15 years more advanced than the
Australians, and the Australians are falling farther behind by the day.”

Q: (Laughing)

GOOD: We had problems with the Navy, of course. Perth was a stop for the Indian Ocean task
force. It was a conflict because of course these guys came with money. They’d been out months
at sea, they had money built up, and they were ready to spend it. So the fathers in town who had shops really liked these guys because they bought, went to restaurants, they filled the hotels and all this sort of thing. But, of course, they had mixed feelings because their daughters were excited about these fresh men in town, and had money, and had a reputation of being nicer to women than the guys here in town. They would come in from, (laughing) now there’s not a lot of places to come from down here in Perth, but they would come in from everywhere in the area and help the guys have a good time. After a visit, the navy lawyer in Canberra would have to go out and settle the damages in the hotels and so forth. A ship could lay out $6,000,000 in a three-day stop easily, plus the money that might be going into reloading the ship. Yes, I should have immediately brought in the fact that the American single men at the embassy had a great time.

Q: (Laughing) Back to the other issues of foreign relations, in the first place, did you find yourself having to pussyfoot around the perception the United States might be trying to overwhelm the Australians? Was this something that one as a press officer had to be concerned about? I mean actually the whole effort, in particular, the USIA effort?

GOOD: Well, it wasn’t a major policy line because the best way to address it was in the long haul, in making sure that they had a well rounded view of what we were like, which is what we pushed through our speakers, and our libraries, satellite programs and so forth. By the way, Australia does have censorship, and so everything we brought in for television had to be censored.

Q: Censorship in what?

GOOD: It had to cleared by a censorship board.

Q: I mean what were they looking for? Was it sex, or violence?

GOOD: Oh, God knows. Anything that would be harmful to their culture, and it was up to them to decide. We didn’t have trouble with our programs, even our series, because we had in events Science World, for example. That’s fine. Once they saw what our program series was going to be, they would just say, “Okay, we don’t need to see every show.” But if we brought anything in special, like Let Poland be Poland, (chuckling) - you remember that was one of the few movies that Congress allowed us to show in the States - even that one wanted to see first. They let that one in; it was all right. We had more concern with the problems of nuclear powered ships. The Liberal Party there is the conservative party in policy and they’re opponents of the Labour Party. John Howard, who is now the prime minister, was the foreign minister at that time. While we were there, Fraser the Liberal PM lost.

Q: Fraser being?

GOOD: Fraser being the Liberal candidate and he turned himself into Elder Statesman, a group the Commonwealth put together and shipped around to troubled spots to consult on how to be better?
He was replaced by the Labour group, which had not been in since 1972 when the Governor General had thrown the prime minister out for a number of reasons that remain controversial. The Labour Party stayed in throughout the rest of my time. The defense minister replaced prime minister. He’d been an antique furniture businessman I think. But they used us as the fall guy, the straight man if you will. We would be blasted, criticism shoved over against us by the Liberals so that criticism wouldn’t come under them. They’d say, “Well, it’s their fault. Labour then would sort of claim us as being a front for the Liberals. It was frustrating as a press attaché. Our standard response to any questions on the nuclear power issue was, “No comment,” and that was 90 percent of the questions.

Q: Yes, well now, nuclear power in the context we’re talking about is on ships? Is that right?

GOOD: That’s right. Ship power. Well the question of nuclear weapons would be there, too.

Q: Because the New Zealanders forbade was it just weapons, or was it death ships, too?

GOOD: Battleships, too. We had a no confirmation policy on any accusation that we had nuclear weapons on board our ships. So while they assumed that we did, there was not official confirmation, so they said, “Okay, we don’t want nuclear powered ships here. So we don’t want U.S. ships. U.S. ships that are nuclear powered, U.S. ships that may have nuclear weapons, we don’t want them,” and because one of our closest relationships is the ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-United States Security Treaty) relationship there.

Q: I don’t know if you take it, but the NZ was taken out of ANZUS wasn’t it?

GOOD: Yes.

Q: I mean we haven’t had, I mean I think it’s getting a little nicer, but at that time, New Zealand, from our point of view, was put in the deep freeze militarily.

GOOD: Well, because they had gone off the deep end on the social policies as well.

Q: Were we concerned? Were the Labour government and Labour Party looking at New Zealand and saying, “You know, these people got out of hand?”

GOOD: The Liberal people were saying that of course, but Labour people weren’t quite as unhappy with it.

Q: Was there a strong anti-nuclear movement?

GOOD: Oh, yes, yes. That was a convenient platform on which to hit us. They didn’t need anything else. That was so sexy that they could just keep hammering us on that one. They didn’t really find us offensive as people; they didn’t find our culture anything more than threatening.
They liked our clothes, they liked our books, and that was what the worry was. There was no danger that we were going to Americanize Australia, of course, at all. It’s just too far away. They come from the same place we do, and they’ve got the common law. But they don’t have the bill of rights, which, startled to me as a lawyer. Its absence makes a huge difference in a court system. So much of our legislation and our court work is involved with due process. Without the Bill of Rights, where’s your due process? You’ve got it, but you don’t have much to appeal on. There’s not much for people to complain about.

Q: Let’s talk a bit about the Australian press. What about the sense of Rupert Murdock, who owns most of the United States media?

GOOD: There you got a rotten Adelaide; I visited Murdock’s original press room in Adelaide.

Q: What was your impression?

GOOD: But remember they’re not educated. They’re not educated in the sense that we think of education. The odds were that they didn’t have a high school education.

Q: There wasn’t much of a push for the-

GOOD: No. Thirty-seven percent of the population had a high school diploma in 1981. Now it was higher than that in Canberra because the collection of government officials.

Q: Yes, yes?

GOOD: But even there it was only 45 percent.

Q: Was that almost attitudinal?

GOOD: You don’t want to think of yourself as underprivileged, so here, I’m Dad, and I left school at 15, which was the normal age. I was a school dropout. I left school. So I’m going to criticize my kids because they quit too? If I criticize them, I’m going to make myself look like a slob. Now you can look at that another way. For example, my kid should have the opportunity that I didn’t have. It wasn’t a lack of opportunity that was, it was the attitude that there’s more to life than school? Why stay in school? You can work on sheep ranches, you can going work with cattle, you can work in mines, you can work on the sea, and anybody can be a bureaucrat with a high school education or less. Who cares? The military, they’d care. So no.

There was another one of our employees, a woman who I guess was about 35 at that point. She said, “My dad wouldn’t let me continue in school past 15. He said, ‘There’s nothing that you can get from school beyond that that’s going to be of any good to you. They spoil you, ruin you, whatever. Get out and get a life.’” With the dole automatically available to any school leaver at 15, there was no particular economic reason to stay in. They’d get together and go up on the Gold Coast, five or six of these young people, and use their dole money to rent a nice apartment and
live on the beach and every month go back home and check into the unemployment office and see if there’s anything that they had to turn down. The artisans were having trouble finding apprentices to work in the trades, because that meant a commitment for a number of years. It wasn’t fun; it was work. They were frustrated.

*Q: What about the papers? Were the papers sort of the British ilk, you know, mostly, to use a diplomatic term, “tits and ass” on the third page and highly sensationalized over the one or two, sort of like The London Times?*

GOOD: Yes, Melbourne, Sydney both had good papers. But yes, it was popular stuff, so boring though. I had to read them. I had to report on what they were saying about our policies of course. I think I spent too much time doing that, in retrospect, because it wasn’t of that much interest in Washington because reactions didn’t vary. It was predictable what they were going to do. Now they were a rambunctious bunch. Shultz came through on a visit. He was Secretary of State.

*Q: George Shultz?*

GOOD: George Shultz. We set up a press conference in Canberra for him. He took it good naturedly, but he said to them, “You guys, you’re the roughest bunch I’ve had on the whole trip.” And there was nothing off the record.

My friend, Peter from Melbourne was the reason I got the opportunity to go to Canberra. He was yanked out of Melbourne. The lady who had been assigned to Canberra as press officer went down and took Peter’s job. Peter got yanked out because at a cocktail party he had by chance mentioned the CIA base in Alice Springs. It was well known. There had been a book out about it, *God’s Little Acre*. But it was something that you didn’t talk about. You didn’t acknowledge its existence. When you flew into Alice Springs, there it was sitting over on your left as you pulled in landing from the south. I got into trouble on an Alice Springs visit because I drove my rented a car out to see what the base looked like. I chatted a couple minutes with the guards, and they reported me to the embassy. I got back, and I guess Steve Lyme had been called by the CIA and said, “What’s this guy doing up there.” And I said, “I was touring.” Well, it blew over.

But Peter had made reference to that to a journalist, and the journalist said, “American spokesman talks about CIA base,” and he was out. I can remember getting up at five AM a couple of mornings to dash down and find the paper it’s earliest out time to find out if they had blasted me on the front page or credited me with something that I hadn’t said in conjunction with the visit of a VIP.

*Q: I would have thought that this would have, doing this sort of thing, I mean for journalists it’s cute to do this thing, and you make points, but at the same time, you’re cutting yourself off at the knees because you’re not going to be talking to them. In other words, I would think this would cut down the relationship with the press.*

GOOD: It wasn’t important enough to stop them from putting out everything they could find,
even if it wasn’t well researched. One lunchtime, I was eating my sandwich in the conference room, and the CAO was on duty.

Q: That’s the cultural affairs officer?

GOOD: Cultural affairs officer. A journalist called in and asked a question about one of our bases, and he answered it. He was kicked out the next day. Our side pulled him out because he had gotten into an area that was not for comment.

Q: In a way it sounds like the mirror image of living in the days of the Soviet Union.

GOOD: (Laughing)

Q: Because you essentially have an irresponsible press.

GOOD: Which is played off by the political factions.

Q: Which is used by the politics and so it’s in a way, no fun.

GOOD: That’s right, it isn’t fun; I didn’t like to say, “No comment.” It would be much better if I could have been able to have a decent relationship, go off the record, and give them a little. The best we could do was to give them our wireless file material for background, so that they would have a broader picture. But they really weren’t interested.

Q: It does sound like these were almost “untalkable to” (not able to talk to) people.

GOOD: Yes, exactly and even in a social setting you had to be very careful. But remember I said they didn’t have a university education generally. They were not truly professional.

Q: One of the things striking to me would be that as the world is changing, particularly in the technical field, you have countries like China and India which are producing hundreds of thousands, if not more, of highly educated people, particularly in the science fields and all that. Here’s Australia sitting down unable to compete on that level or not?

GOOD: Well, it’s true. A couple of other things I should put in for background. New Zealand was slightly more educated by about a tenth of a percentage point. There had been no increase in slots at the universities in Australia from 1972 on, certainly in ‘85 when I left. The Liberal government had not expanded the system, so there hadn’t been a place for people to go. Now this was at the same time it was becoming much more difficult to go to Europe to get your education because you couldn’t work with the EC (European Commission) coming in. There was a definite divide between the people in 1981 too, who were 35 and above or 35 and younger. Those who were over 35 were more likely to have done a year or more in Europe.

Q: Yes. They almost all had that Wanderyahr or some sort.
GOOD: Exactly and it was at least a year. If they were going to leave Australia, they were going to stay out a while. While they didn’t necessarily go to Europe to go to school, they were able to work. They could earn their living so they could stay, and they traveled. Back in the ‘70s you would see Australians, you remember, all over the world.

Q: Oh, yes, all over the place, yes.

GOOD: I remember seeing them in Brazil, in Bolivia, everywhere. After the EC closed down job opportunities didn’t have a large group of people under 35 who had been abroad because they couldn’t afford it. Since your younger journalists are going to be under 35, of course, the active ones, that’s where your noise was coming from. When the Labor government came back in, they did begin to open up more slots in the universities. But it took them time because they were having a depression there for a little while as well. They had, unlike most countries I’ve been in, a policy that adults could go to college, that is adults who had had a break, or had not finished high school, could get their high school equivalency and go on to the university. But they were beginning to have to cut those people back in order to have slots for the younger people to come in. By expanding the slots in the university after I left, they intensified the paranoia if you will, the tunnel vision. It meant that where students had been able in the past to go abroad to study, there were now fewer economic opportunities for them to do that and more opportunities to stay. So they tended to be more inside the corral than they had been before. You had still people traveling, and more people who were going to the States than had been the case before. It didn’t mean that a lot of people were going abroad for their higher education. When they came back with the American degree, it was still sort of secondary. If you had an Oxford or Cambridge degree, that was the best. Anything else is less than the best, and always an American degree was less than the best.

Q: Where the United States excels is in the sciences, I mean, our universities.

GOOD: Oh, the Australian schools are good in science as well.

Q: Yes, but the United States, it’s not that it’s something American. Most of our sciences, I mean our international, oh, hell, this is just where the world scientific community settles.

GOOD: Sure, and if you wanted to be world class in anything, you had to leave Australia. The problem was that if they did leave after having gotten their education, they didn’t come back. It wasn’t just in the sciences. If you wanted to be an astronaut, of course, you had to come to the States. Olivia Newton-John, Mel Gibson.

Q: Yes, movie stars entered a similar scenario.

GOOD: This fellow who just did the public television broadcast series on Australia, the art critic for the Time Magazine. He’s never gone back seriously. They go back to visit, they keep their contacts, but they’re not going to live back there. So I think that it was becoming more closed as
a result of the European Community and the fact that you had to get your education in Australia
to the extent that you got it. I’ll have to look up the figures to see if they’ve gotten their high
school diplomas above 50 percent or not.

Q: This is, of course, during the Reagan administration and early on when particularly when we
were taking a pretty tough line on the Soviet Union and all. How was that plane?

GOOD: We’d occasionally get campers, protesters in front of the embassy in Canberra, not the
Russians usually. It was the Yugoslavs, the Croats accusing us of not being even handed in our
treatment. We would be reporting on any Soviet activities there, but no, that didn’t seem to be a
big problem. Their problem was China, not Russia.

Q: Yes, you were saying the big problem is China?

GOOD: Yes, from their perspective China is a threat. They were trying to develop relations.
CCA (Canberra College of Advanced Education) which I think is now called the University of
Canberra, and the main university in Canberra, the ANU (Australian National University) had
exchange programs, bringing students down, sending students up, exchanging professors, that
sort of thing. They have a fear of this monster on top of them; this billion-population country that
they feel definitely must be interested in this empty country down below. The truth of the matter
is that the Chinese aren’t. They’re not interested in taking it over from a political point of view.
It’s too far away, it’s too empty; they’ve got resources, but it’s easier to buy them than it is to
steal them. But if an Australian saw an Asian on the street, it ruined his day, or did back then.

Q: I take it this was before the Australians allowed more Asians, because they had an Asian
exclusion?

GOOD: Well no, they had been bringing them in from the Vietnam War, and this was really
disturbing to me. But it’s kind of like this policy now of the government, most of the Labour
government pushing it, to apologize to the Aborigines. Now you notice John Howard refuses to
apologize. He says it’s a shame that they have such a tough time, but he won’t apologize. The
Labour government however felt sympathy for these families, and they instituted the kind of
thing that we have, and that is to gather the family together, if possible. So they’d get one
Cambodian down, and then you’d have 55. They had a higher per capita take of refugees than we
did from the Vietnam War, and we thought we had a lot. They didn’t get as many of course, but
there were fewer of them.

Q: We were getting from other places too, of course, too.

GOOD: And other places. Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos were strong. Cambodia, in particular,
bothered them, I guess. If they stayed, they weren’t so much in Canberra; they were down the
coast. Sydney got the bulk, I think.

Q: The fact that there were Orientals coming into Australia was that beginning to make a
difference or not?

GOOD: No, they’d had, of course, Orientals. They had brought them in for the gold mining like we did, but then they put a freeze on, even stronger than ours. They also had some resistance to the buying of properties, but that wasn’t really a legal resistance. There was just this residual resistance to people coming from Singapore looking to invest their money in Australia. But frankly, the Japanese put a lot more money into the Gold Coast area. A lot of it was a tourism kind of thing. They’d buy apartments from which they could go to in the Barrier Reef area up along the northeast coast of Queensland.

But it was just the fear of the numbers. And of course the Asians work and they’re willing to postpone the realization of their desires to the next generation if that’s what looks like the better way to do it. So they’ll live above the store, and they’ll work more hours than the Australian would be willing to work or interested in working. Now the Australians still had the restriction on how many hours you could have your shop open. That put a kink into how much they could, but then they were pushing this as well, so that if you opened up a gas station, you had an all purpose gas station that would sell everything from ice cream to gas. They would stay open on Sunday, whereas the ice cream store might not be able to. The furniture store certainly couldn’t. Each major city had a different night of the week that they could stay open. It was Thursday in one town, Friday in another, Wednesday in the third. So these people were willing to work. They were interested in education. They were different. They put a premium on education. So they just weren’t fitting in, but they were inevitable. That was the fear. Because they were inevitable and there were so many of them to come, ultimately if not sooner than that, Australia would find itself overwhelmed in a different culture.

Q: What about, speaking of other cultures coming in, back in my time when I was in the ’60s, there was considerable migration from Yugoslavia, what was then Yugoslavia, to Australia? How about these groups that were coming? They had had a big emphasis on European migration.

GOOD: They had, after the war of course, accepted people from displaced persons’ camps in Europe. But they were not accepted in the first generation as Australians. Second generation blended in because obviously they’d been born there and were educated there. But it was going to be the third generation before they were considered Aussies, and they were still not going to be considered real Aussies, just like the Brits, Poms, as they called them, were not quite equal. We probably rated just a little bit below the Poms. The Poms were probably more threatening to the Australians because they had the closer link with the Commonwealth. For example, my landlord was Hungarian. His wife was German. They didn’t associate much with the real Australians. They had their clubs. You had ethnic clubs all over the place. You had Yugoslavs, you had Spanish, and you had the Greeks. Greeks were big; I think there are more Greeks in Melbourne than there are any places outside of Athens. Maybe they’ve beat Athens by now. They ran the restaurants. The Italians were into vegetables, delivering to the market. You don’t eat better than you do in Australia. I mean the vegetables are great; foods are great; and the meat was good.
They brought with them this tradition of hatred for the British because there were a lot of Irish. Now how many actually were descendants of the Irish who were brought over as criminals, I don’t know, or as dissidents, I don’t know. The academics would say this, “It’s more of a cultural tradition than it is a blood lineage.” But that was one of the problems with the education. The Irish had not been allowed to study back in Ireland. They came to Australia, and they had tried. But of course you see, that works against the idea that we lack it, education. We don’t want them to have it, because we don’t have it. If they get it, then they’ll probably be a step up from us. But the Australians who were not born in Australia were very much a part of their own groups. There was some mixing in the social clubs, but it didn’t go much farther than that. In squash club, for example, my team was one Australian, one New Zealander, one South African, and I. You’d find an occasional Indian. But they didn’t like South Africans. They felt a little closer to the New Zealanders because they were in their own neighborhood. But of course they’ve taken South Africans, migration in recent years because of the change of the apartheid policy. They do want people, and they’re willing to take people who are going to offset this (chuckling) horrible hoard of Chinese that they fear will be coming down. I remember meeting, I think I mentioned earlier, this family that had been from Rhodesia. They’d sent one of their families to southern Australia so they’d have a place to leap if it were necessary. Australia had lots of opportunities. If you spoke English, fine. Although it’s not quite the same English, it’s close. So they liked the whites; they didn’t like the Latins, and they didn’t like the blacks at all. A friend of mine from the Nigerian embassy went up to Brisbane before the Commonwealth Games one year just to sound it out and report back on what the facilities were and so on. He came back, and he said, “I’ll never go back there again.” After dark they were not liked; they felt threatened, because they really don’t have up there any blacks except the Aborigines. The Aborigines have been treated as really underclass.

Q: Did you find that there was sort of a divide that used to be anyway in the UK (United Kingdom) between labor and conservative and that it was really a class divide and all that? Was that translated, or was it a different system in a way?

GOOD: There was a divide I guess, but I wouldn’t call it class because the Australians didn’t recognize class, and they didn’t have a noble class, of course. They didn’t like anyone to show himself or herself as better economically either. There, of course, were people that were better off than others. But they all wanted to be considered at the same level. They, as I may have said earlier, were willing to accord a bit of notoriety to some who had made it big outside the country. Paul Hogan was able to come back, and they gave him that special, but then he’d been sort of special because he was a crazy guy. When I was there, he was one of the comedians on the television. They liked his eccentricities because it catered to their prejudices. Basically, they didn’t want to have a class in a hierarchical fashion. They had to devise on a horizontal basis in that you would have your labor, the people who actually worked with their hands in machines as opposed to the sheep ranchers, as opposed to the miners perhaps, as opposed to the bureaucrats. But they weren’t this way; they were horizontal.

Q: You’re saying they weren’t vertical; they were horizontal?
GOOD: They weren’t vertical; they were horizontal, yes.

Q: And in a way dressing down or dummying down?

GOOD: To be considered like everybody else, yes.

Q: Yes, because that wouldn’t allow for them a class divide and parties?

GOOD: Yes, the only class divide was between everybody and the aborigines.

Q: Yes. Did we get involved? I mean were any of our policies particularly, aside from the nuclear thing, I mean we’d been pushing a lot of things, which sound innocuous. I mean we push education, we push diversity and ethnic diversity, and we push women’s rights. Even though it was the Reagan administration, it was still going on. Did this clash at all with Australians or just didn’t resonate or what?

GOOD: It didn’t resonate. I mean they had democracy; I pushed democracy there. We might suggest that they have more libraries, but their libraries were free. They had no travel restrictions. The education was there if you wanted it. I mean, gender, we weren’t into gender with that problem at that point.

Q: Of course they were doing was a hard one to fight with anyway. I mean it’s just the way guys were. Hah!

GOOD: Sure. We’d, I remember, brought one lady over who only reinforced their opinion that women didn’t belong, didn’t have the whatever to make it at the high level. She was dumb, and they didn’t think that that did us any good to have this strangely ineffective...

Q: Who was she? She was what?

GOOD: Oh, she was a radio type on the Voice of America. She had a morning show, and of course, she was noted because they could hear her on short wave. They thought that maybe she’d resonate with an audience, and she didn’t. She later on made ambassador. (Laughing) I knew her DCM. It was in the back... (Laughing)

Q: With newspapers and all, did you have sort of a daily press briefing, or a non-weekly, or monthly or what have you, press briefing?

GOOD: Do you mean at the embassy?

Q: Yes.

GOOD: Yes, usually it was the PAO who did it over at the country tea meeting. We were reporting back on a daily basis to Washington. Papers were in English. People could read their
own papers.

Q: As you say, there really wasn’t much change, then?

GOOD: No, no, the papers were there. You could read them. You could listen to the radio. You could watch television. You knew what was going on. We did a little bit more effort on it because we were looking for themes and focuses and anticipated problems that we could let Washington know about how our policy was being bashed this week as opposed to last week perhaps. While I spent more time than, in retrospect, I think I should have, and certainly more than I thought I wanted to, watching television and listening to the radio and reading the newspapers, anyone else could have done the same thing, if they’d been interested that much.

Q: You mentioned the relative low level of education. What about our libraries? Was this reflected in the type of books we’d stock in Australia?

GOOD: No, we stocked our books based upon our interests, not theirs. In Canberra we had a very special situation because we were most interested in servicing the parliamentarians and the government bureaucrats; so we were into documents. We had an online service. That was one of our early ones. They could come back to the computer to pick up information that they needed. We had a lot more than the usual number of magazines available for people to come in to read. We were located, close to the Parliament, a couple of blocks, and in the National Press Center. We were not in the embassy. They could walk over if they wanted and send their staffs over to make requests, which was our top priority for servicing the government officials, whether they were legislative or executive. The circulating library itself, had the standards; art, American literature, some history books, and so on. We focused I’d say more on the documents and government publications. We didn’t want them to have to reinvent the wheel. They didn’t want to either. So if they had a project that they were looking on to do, they came to our sources to see what Congress might or had produced, and get that first.

Q: What about these people on the cultural side? Was there much in the way of American studies?

GOOD: In the schools there, no, some. I can remember visiting some high schools that had some focus on that. But it was the exception, not the rule.

Q: I imagine this was almost, as a tour, it was more maybe frustrating, maybe sterile, or something like that, what I’m gathering from you.

GOOD: What made it wonderful was squash.

Q: Yes?

GOOD: That’s where I had good contact with the more normal people, and they could be bureaucrats. I didn’t know them because they were government officials, I knew them because
they were people in the community. The facilities were good. We had good competitions. I knew wherever I went I could stop into a squash court, because we had reciprocal relationships. Distances were immense. It was an expensive country. I wasn’t paid well enough to be able to vacation much. So my wife and son were pretty well stuck. We had the usual holidays, pretty well stuck in the Canberra area. I mean, we wouldn’t think of driving for the week into Chicago very often and that’s what you’re talking about.

Q: Yes.

GOOD: We might and occasionally went to Sydney. It was a four-hour drive. To go to Melbourne, it’s an eight-hour drive. That’s a lot of driving. You’d fly down, but expensive! Flight is more expensive.

David Lambertson was born in Kansas in 1940. He received his BA from the University of Redlands in 1962. He entered the Foreign Service in 1963, and his assignments abroad included Saigon, Medan, Paris, Canberra and Seoul with an ambassadorship to Thailand. Ambassador Lambertson was interviewed by David Reuther in 2004.

Q: How does one get chosen DCM? I mean this is a senior position in the Foreign Service. Country director is an incredible accomplishment, but DCM is a very important position in the whole system.

LAMBERTSON: As I recall Steve Lyne, the incumbent DCM suggested the idea to me at some point, maybe late ‘83 or very early ‘84. Steve had been in the political section with me in Saigon. He was our man among the Montagnards.

Q: The Saigon mafia?

LAMBERTSON: Yes. I guess it was kind of a Saigon mafia connection. He said it was an interesting place to live and work and I ought to give it a try. He recommended me to the Ambassador, Bob Nesen. I guess I had no other immediate alternatives. I was fairly sure, however, when I went off to Australia that when Paul Cleveland left Seoul, Dixie was probably going to want me to come to Seoul. I went to Australia knowing or at least assuming that it probably wasn’t going to last all that long. It turned out to be a highly interesting and enjoyable experience. We do have a special relationship with the Australians. They are good political and security partners, and we have an uninhibited intelligence relationship.
I remember at one point when I was there Bob Gates, who was then DDI, came out to Australia to talk with the Australians about his take on the world basically. This would have been probably sometime in ‘84. Gorbachev was new on the scene and Gates told the Australians that he felt Gorbachev was fundamentally different from his predecessors and that there were going to be remarkable changes in the Soviet Union as a result. I was very impressed at the time, and even more so later, as those things indeed happened.

We didn’t have any serious bilateral issues with our Australian friends, but there were often political controversies occasioned by our presence. There’s a left-wing in Australia that’s noisy if not necessarily powerful. They’re certainly well represented in the media, so there is a lot of press criticism of the U.S. There’s a certain strain of anti-Americanism on the left. There was always a little bit of tension, stuff that would get my blood going occasionally.

We had this remarkable technological phenomenon out there at Pine Gap that was important to us and extremely sensitive, and the Australians were very good about helping us with it and maintaining and providing political defense for it if we needed it. The Hawke government was rock solid. Bob Hawke himself was an appealing personality. I got to see him from time to time accompanying visitors.

The best part about that tour is that I was there 18 months and I was the Chargé for fully 12 months. Bob Nesen, the incumbent ambassador, was a political appointee. I got there in August of ‘84, and he left in the first half of ‘85. Then Bill Lane, another political appointee, arrived I believe in early ’86.

Q: Yes, I’ve got that he presented his credentials on the 29th of April ‘89.

LAMBERTSON: No.

Q: That’d be too long. ‘86, that’s ‘86. So, it would be May of ‘85 to April of ‘86 basically?

LAMBERTSON: And Nesen was often gone during the few months remaining in his tenure. He was involved with the ’84 campaign. Nesen was a major contributor, and he loved horses and loved the Aussies. He was an extremely nice man, although he wasn’t too much interested in the details of running an embassy.

Q: Under those conditions a lot falls to you, the DCM.

LAMBERTSON: Yes and I enjoyed that very much. Then Bill Lane was his successor and I…you say April of…?

Q: ‘86.

LAMBERTSON: Must have been March, or maybe even February. I left just days after that. Sacie and I went with him and his wife for his presentation of credentials to the Governor
General in Sydney, at the summer residence under the Harbor Bridge. It was pretty clear that Bill Lane was a very different kind of political appointee ambassador, one who intended to be fully in charge of every detail. I handed off to my successor Dick Teare, my old Vietnamese language partner. So, we had three political section Saigon guys in a row. Steve Lyne, myself and Dick Teare as DCMs in Canberra.

Q: Into the DCMship business, my recollection is actually the State Department runs you through a course?

LAMBERTSON: That’s right, there was a DCM course.

Q: How long is that? What does it cover?

LAMBERTSON: It was several days at some offsite location in West Virginia or Pennsylvania. I don't remember much about the content. There was a certain emphasis on the public affairs aspects of an embassy and the DCM’s potential responsibility in that area and some discussion of broader management and dealing with your ambassador, those kinds of things. In fact I’d totally forgotten about the course until you mentioned it.

Q: I talked to a lot of people out of it at FSI and they were saying that that course was cranked up because the Department was finding something like 70% of the DCMs were being fired by the career and non-career ambassadors because they weren't getting along. The issue was you need to run your DCMs through some course of awareness training as to how to get along and how to handle yourself in these circumstances. I don’t know when the course started, but...

LAMBERTSON: I once heard Marshall Green say that a good DCM is one who walks around with a smile on his ambassador’s face.

Q: That’s Marshall. Wasn’t he ambassador in Australia at one point?

LAMBERTSON: He had been, yes, he was there in fact when I was in EA/RA. I have a nice letter from him in response to a paper I wrote on Soviet policy in East Asia, and Marshall Green very kindly responded. He said he thought it was good.

Q: Because I remember reading something by him that I’d like you to comment on. He was there at the time that the Labor Party came to power for the first time in 12 years or something like that. This was the Vietnam War period. Labor had been critical and he suddenly, this was an unanticipated victory on Labor’s part, and he sort of realized that they hadn’t been talking to Labor Party officials for a long time. He gets into the defense attaché’s airplane and is flying around Australia trying to get to the Labor Party guys to get them to not say anything silly about Vietnam in the euphoria of their victory. Which brings another point, academics and pundits now talk about how great it is to have democracies around the world and it strikes me that the Foreign Service’s job is complicated by the fact that there are democracies. I mean you’re saying okay, there’s an anti-American component to Australia, but you can’t laugh that off, you have to
deal with it. You have the public affairs officers there. You have to have somebody in the
government section touching bases with those people so that you understand their viewpoints.
Because the domestic politics of democracies have a new importance increasing the job of the
Foreign Service, America’s first line of defense overseas.

LAMBERTSON: Think how much more complicated in a way it is to conduct bilateral relations
with South Korea today, now that it is a democracy.

Q: There you go. As you were saying here, you know, you’re actually moving from the
authoritarian Korea to the Aussie situation and we do have these facilities. We have this
incredible military relationship. In fact it’s incredibly deep. All the Anglo-Saxon nations have a
special relationship and share things among themselves that they don’t share with anybody else
and yet you have the democracy aspect spinning in there and it’s not easy even though they are
our allies.

LAMBERTSON: Yes and in some respects it’s more complicated.

Q: I would suspect even at that, this is not an easy as falling off a log thing to go through
because you have to be very much aware of what the Australians are doing.

LAMBERTSON: No, it was not by any means a simple place to do business. It is, in its way,
very complex, and therefore far more interesting than you might think. It’s not dull being in
Australia. Of course it’s also a marvelous place to live.

Q: Oh, yes. …In Australia would you entertain at home or entertain at restaurants?

LAMBERTSON: I did one-on-one lunches a fair amount in restaurants, but we entertained a lot
at home too. We had a house that was the smallest representational house you can imagine – a
nice bungalow and a very attractive one that Sacie made even more attractive. We could have
dinner for a dozen people without too much crowding. That was about the limit. We did quite a
lot of entertaining at the house, as we did in Japan.

In Japan more often than not it was lunches. But we did stuff at our house in Tokyo frequently,
thanks to Sacie’s organizational abilities and the help of a Thai maid. I think that’s less common
now in the Foreign Service, isn’t that right? I’ve heard that. There’s less at-home entertaining -
and therefore less necessity for representational housing in some places and in some positions.

LOUIS F. LICHT III
Labor Attaché
Canberra (1986-1989)

Mr. Licht was born in Maine and raised in New York. Educated at Yale
University and the Fletcher School, he served in the US Army in Vietnam and joined the State Department in 1974. Mr. Licht served in Washington, dealing with Latin American Affairs as well as Arms Control and Nuclear matters. His foreign posts were Santo Domingo, Lima, Canberra, Yerevan and Chisinau (Moldova). Mr. Licht was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

Q: In 1985, you were off again. This time to Australia.

LICHT: Yes, as the Embassy’s labor attaché from 1985 to 1989.

Q: Wow. That’s a good, solid time.

LICHT: Yes, it was a great, solid time. It was wonderful. Canberra is wonderful.

Q: Who was the ambassador there?

LICHT: During my tour, the ambassador was a non-career appointee, Lawrence W. Lane. I think he was the publisher of the Sunset Magazine. [Editor’s Note: Ambassador Lane served from January 1986 to April 1989].

Q: How were relations? This was still the Reagan Administration and how were relations?

LICHT: Relations were fine. We had our normal disputes with the Australians on lots of things; but there was also settled disputes. We knew where the Australians were coming from and they knew where we were coming from. Of course, it’s very easy to work with the Australians because at least you knew what you were getting in each case. They were professionals and when you went in to talk to them about something you knew that they knew what the game was. It was a situation which I’m sure you’re familiar with, when you go in and you had your brief and they had their brief and you pretty much knew what each other was going to say. And sometimes you get excited about it and then we’d go out and have a beer.

Q: What was your impression of the labor movement at that time?

LICHT: Well it was certainly different, the whole system was different from the one the United States, because the labor legislation was different. There’s a court in Melbourne that adjudicates labor disputes and has a legal basis for what it does. The interesting thing about Australia and the labor movement was that in some ways it was like us and in other ways it was very much different. And that’s true in parliamentary government, too. The labor movement was pulling itself into an era where you had to be competitive, where you had to realize that Australia was part of Asia, as much as the rest of the world, in fact, Australia was part of Asia more than the rest of the world. But there were some left wing elements that still held to what seemed like very old ideas about what capitalism was about, free enterprise was about. And there were some people who’d been there for a long time who were not going to change.
Q: I have a feeling that the situation in New Zealand and Australia was that you had some real sort of hard liner left wing labor types, reflecting the sort of coal miners of England around this time. That this was actually class war.

LICHT: There were people who still had that feeling and then there were people and mainly it was in Melbourne, Melbourne was a place where, when you get there you’d gone back thirty years or forty years. There were very strong ideological viewpoints. Left wing people, who eventually I got to know and right wing people, people from the Catholic side, life was struggle that would continue even if the world went on. They’d continue to be locked in that struggle and in that time warp. So that’s a whole scene.

Q: Were you seeing any reflection of the immigration from Yugoslavia, from Greece, from elsewhere into Australia at that time?

LICHT: You certainly saw it in the taxicabs in Melbourne. In fact you saw it in the taxicabs in Sydney, too. So it was there and the questions still arose, were Japanese welcome, was Japanese investment welcome, was Bond University along the Gold Coast welcome, which was catering to Japanese or other Asian students. Australia was still going through that, probably still is.

Q: How about the American facilities, I’m told the Australians keep referring to them as the “American bases” and we kept referring to them as the joint bases, the ones, communication bases, naval communications type bases up in

LICHT: They required constant attention to make sure that their reception was favorable. At that time New Zealand’s nuclear policy vis-à-vis our ships was such that we couldn’t visit. Australia’s policy on our ships was such that we could visit and within the Australian polity there were some with more sympathy for the New Zealand position than ours. That was a constant concern of ours, to keep that relationship on an even keel, with no major flare-ups.

Q: Did you find Canberra, was it sort of a small town?

LICHT: It was a wonderful place. It was a wonderful place for a family. The boys, my two boys were just going into their teenage years, the oldest one was. In Lima you had to watch them, wherever they went. In Canberra you could say, “Go off to the store, get on your bike and go where you want” and drink the water. There was very nice musical life there, too, because of the Canberra Music School, which would bring in professional people.

A real throwback to when Canberra was an outpost, there was a record library, like a library here where you’d get a book and they had these wonderful records that you could bring home and tape. I’d go there every weekend. It was a small town, but big enough, very nice for a family.

Q: Did you run across, was there sort of an anti-American hangover from Vietnam or anything else or anti-Americanism that
LICHT: No, there were groups and people, actually they were more concerned about our selling wheat at a subsidized price than about Vietnam when I was there.

Q: This is tape two, side one with Louis Licht. Were there any presidential visits while you were there?

LICHT: Vice President Quayle came. So, there wasn’t [laughter]. But, it could just as well have been a presidential visit.

Q: How did Vice President Quayle do?

LICHT: He did all right. No one was upset. He came with the usual pre-planning and planning, and other entourages, and turned the embassy upside down. That was the first time we began to see young men wearing suspenders. Do you remember the suspender years?

A whole bunch of people with suspenders arrived, and then they arranged a trip. Mrs. Quayle came, and was quite effective, actually. Mrs. Quayle was very good. Vice President Quayle came in and was greeted by the embassy on the embassy grounds and he met the people. That was right after he had been to Samoa. He talked about the happy campers there. He said something along the lines of “It’s very nice of you people here to help us arrange our trip, and take care of us.” It was something along those lines. Mrs. Quayle got up and said, “Of course, we know you do a lot more than arrange trips for dignitaries, that you represent the country,” etc. She sort of put it right back into the court where it was supposed to be. Bill Lane, who was the ambassador there, and as I was saying, he was from Sunset Magazine. I guess he handled that trip very nicely. I remember it was important to have a fire in the fireplace when Prime Minister (Bob) Hawke came. Of course, you had Quayle, and that was arranged. The normal nonsense occurred.

Q: I’m told that for most Americans, the Battle of Coral Sea is some obscure little engagement, but to the Australians, it is quite important, isn’t it?

LICHT: Yes. I was very impressed by Anzus Day. The Australians are not flag wavers like the Americans are. They are pretty subdued about such things, but on Anzus Day, people show up and show a real respect for...many people, from Australia and New Zealand, just like Europe. In their low-keyed Australian-wearing sandals and shorts way evidences a real respect for those people who have served. Yes, I guess the Coral Sea was more important there. Like everywhere in the world, you look at it from a different perspective. Different things become important.

RICHARD W. TEARE
Deputy Chief of Mission
Canberra (1986-1989)

Richard W. Teare was born in Ohio in 1937. He received his bachelor’s degree
from Harvard University in 1948. His career includes positions in Barbados, Philippines, Vietnam, Laos, New Zealand, and Australia. Mr. Teare was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in July 1998.

Q: You were in Canberra from ’86 to when?

TEARE: Until August ’89.

Q: And what was your job?

TEARE: I was again the Deputy Chief of Mission. The previous one there, David Lambertson, had been pulled out after only about eighteen months of his tour to go to Korea as DCM there and specifically to be on hand during what was anticipated and I think proved to be quite a long gap between Ambassadors. So the Canberra job came open a little bit short of my three years and my early negotiations with Personnel had not shown that there was anything particular in store for me anywhere else so I put my name in for the Canberra job. The brand new Ambassador, Bill Lane, interviewed me. I think I was one of two finalists and I got the job. So we transferred over there as I said in March of ’86. My wife was still recovering from a broken hip incurred in a riding accident in New Zealand in October ’85, but we managed the transfer. We enjoyed the tour in Australia very much.

Q: As you saw it, I mean you had come from this place where really for a small country you had had a lot of controversy there and to arrive in Australia, what was the political situation and relations with the United States at that time?

TEARE: They were good. Relations were good. There had been doubt I think in the minds of a lot of the Reagan people, including Reagan’s first Ambassador out there, Bob Nesen, about the responsibility of the Australian Labor Party once in office. In fact I think Nesen hardly knew anyone in the shadow Labor cabinet his first couple of years there. But Labor came in with Bob Hawke as Prime Minister and Bill Hayden as Foreign Minister and after a few months Kim Beasley as Defense Minister. It turned out to be quite a responsible government. It got along well with the Reagan people and later with the Bush people.

Lane was I would say a moderate to liberal Republican himself and he had very good relations with Hawke and cabinet. It was rather easy, in other words. I remember my first working day there. Lane was calling on the Prime Minister and he took me along. Our mission was to complain about something that Bill Hayden, the Foreign Minister, had said publicly about US policy in Central America. So we delivered the complaint. We had several other items of business. The whole atmosphere was very relaxed and pleasant. And then as we were going out the door Hawke pulled Lane aside and said in a stage whisper loud enough for me to hear it “Ah, that’s just Billy mouthing off. You don’t need to pay any attention to him, mate.” So that was the Prime Minister undercutting his own left wing Foreign Minister, but off the record! So that was sort of the way things got going.
A couple of days later Lane had gone back to the States and I was Chargé. The US bombed Tripoli and killed Qadhafi's daughter. And didn’t we damage the French embassy in the process?

Q: Rightly so.

TEARE: They wanted me to go on television and talk about our action. I ducked that one. It didn’t seem to me there was much to be gained in that. I had only been in the country a week or ten days and I forget who was to be speaking for the other side.

So that was sort of the way things went in Australia. There was usually something going on but many of the issues involved third countries. When there was dispute, and there was over trade matters, it was often very good-natured. The Australians wanted to sell more wheat and of course we had wheat in abundance. They protested our market access policies. One day a bunch of wheat farmers came to the U.S. embassy and they brought television cameras with them. They wanted to have a little demonstration.

They cut open a sack of wheat and poured it out into a flowerbed and then another television crew arrived. They had missed the scene. So they asked the farmers to do it all over again and so the farmers good-naturedly scooped up some of the wheat, put it back in the sack and did the whole pouring exercise again. Everyone went away happy. A few weeks later we had sprouts of wheat coming up in a bed of tulips outside the Chancery.

Another time an anti-nuclear demonstrator, an Independent in the Senate, Senator Jo Valentine, wanted to demonstrate against U.S. policy. I forget which particular one. She let it be known in advance that she was going to nail something to the door of our embassy. That got the Australian federal police worried because putting nails in the door would amount to desecration of property. We were a little worried about her intentions too. So we were watching out the window when she arrived in a taxi along with three or four of her Senate colleagues, a couple of whom were members of the Labor Party I think. They had brought their own door and they leaned that up against our gate and she hammered the nails to attach her position to that door and not to our door. The federal police were there in force and I think they were breathing sighs of relief!

I don’t mean to suggest that it was all sweetness and light and theater, but Australia was a very easy and very satisfactory place to work. I have often said that there you could get information over the telephone from a government official in five minutes that might take you might five months or five years or you might never get in some other country by any means. The Australians were very open and set great value in the alliance with us. Our policies were similar, are similar, on a large number of issues. Not totally uniform in this regard; there are differences. But in the defense area it was solid.

In the trade area it was sometimes dicey. There were Australian politicians saying that if the U.S. did not give them more access to our markets for grain and meat and so forth they ought to retaliate by tossing the U.S. out of the defense facilities in Australia, which were always referred to as U.S. bases. This was a characterization that we tried to avoid because first of all they
weren’t bases in any operational sense. We didn’t have troops or aircraft based there.

Q: They were basically listening posts weren’t they?

TEARE: Yes, and secondly they were joint! One of the developments over my years there, ’86 to ’89, that I was very glad to see was a demystification of the joint facilities. That was the term adopted by the then Minister of Defense, Kim Beasley, now leader of the opposition going into an election here in just a couple of weeks, October 3, 1998.

Beasley, a good friend of the United States, an academic by origin, a shrewd politician, a good judge of public opinion, and farsighted. I think no one else, certainly no one on the U.S. side, looked down the road the way he did. He didn’t foresee the end of the Cold War probably. But he did foresee a situation in which so long as the facilities remained shrouded in mystery they were going to continue to be the targets of the left wing of his own party, of Greens and others outside of the main parties. So what he did was to press us for a greater level of Australian participation in the management and direction of the facilities which we granted. He pressed for a more candid discussion through the media, through encouraging academics to write articles and so forth, to put before the Australian public what the facilities do. At least in general terms. That helped. It was a demystification, to adopt his words.

Q: Can you explain what the facilities were?

TEARE: Yes. There were and are several of them. The biggest and best known is the one at Tine Gap near Ayers Rock.

Q: Right in the middle of the continent.

TEARE: The red heart of Australia! Another one is called Narrungar. That is down in the northern part of South Australia. It was primarily Air Force. Both of those were, without going into further detail, ground stations for satellites collecting all sort of things.

The other facilities were not so much of intelligence value as actually of scientific value. There is one right in downtown Alice Springs, the joint seismic facility, which essentially collected earthquake data. Of course that has its utility in detecting tests but this is pretty far away from Chinese and Russian testing areas. All of its data went straight to the relevant department of the Australian Government, Minerals, I think it was, the scientific and research organization.

There were a couple more out on the West Coast, north of Perth, in Western Australia. One of those is called the Harold D. Holt communications facility and that one was very low frequency for one way communication with submarines staying submerged. Another one very near by was for the collection of solar data. It was operated by the U.S. military but it was essentially a scientific undertaking. There were other non defense related facilities including a NASA tracking station not far from Canberra, which continues to operate.
The Harold D. Holt station has been turned over to the Australians. The Narrungar station I believe is going to close in a couple of years. But Pine Gap is going to continue in operation and it is truly joint nowadays. Some of Narrungar’s residual functions will be transferred to Pine Gap. It remains very important to the intelligence collection business.

Q: Did you find that you get into the sort of traditional problem of the military, and this is true of any, but American military where they don’t want anybody to know anything of what is going on? This is good military posture but there is the political side of, you know, if you are going to stay here you have to be more transparent? Did that play itself out during the time you were there?

TEARE: No, fortunately that was not really an issue. And of course there is some civilian involvement in Pine Gap in particular. But the people involved were all very reasonable and I think we picked up from Beasley and came to realize that he was correct that the continued acceptability of the facilities on Australian soil depended really on a better public understanding on the part of the Australians. There were occasional demonstrations where people would try to get through the fence at Pine Gap either symbolically or maybe with intent to do some real damage. Those things were contained relatively easily.

Q: What was your or you might say the embassy’s impression? While you were there it was the Labor Government, is that right?

TEARE: Throughout.

Q: Could you do a little compare and contrast with New Zealand and all as far as when you got there coming from the New Zealand experience? Did you find it a different bird?

TEARE: There are considerable differences. Most fundamental perhaps, is that while both countries are primarily English in background, and while the Anglican Church is, I guess, the most numerous in both, in the case of New Zealand the next largest population group was of Scottish background and the Presbyterian Church is next in line. In Australia the next source of immigration is Irish and the Roman Catholic element is very strong. That may explain some of the differences.

New Zealand ever since the early years of this century had had only a unicameral legislature and it had until very recently a system that guaranteed majority government just about. You could get sixty percent of the seats with forty or forty-five percent of the vote and that is what usually happened. It was very easy for a government in power in New Zealand to get legislation through. In Australia the parties were perhaps more evenly balanced. There was an upper house that could delay legislation and indeed it was a crisis there that caused the dismissal of the Whitlam Government in '1975, the previous Labor Government. So it was not so easy for a government there to work its will.

In New Zealand, starting with Lange and continuing through both his terms, the remarkable thing
was a vast transformation of the economy. I don’t know if I talked about this last time. Nobody played according to form in New Zealand. The Prime Minister from about ’77 to ’84 was Sir Robert Muldoon of the National Party. He was in theory a Conservative but who in fact believed strongly in a managed economy to the point that when I got there in ’83 they had controls on rents and wages, which were very unpopular. He was a State-ist, you could say, whereas in theory he ought to have been a free-enterpriser.

Lange came in and particularly his Finance Minister, Roger Douglas, swapped things around. They liberalized the economy, they removed the controls, and they started selling off government assets. They behaved like free marketers. Again, contrary to form! The transformation of the New Zealand economy from 1984 to 1990 was something to behold. It was until at least very recently being held up as a model to the rest of the world including Australia, which needs to do some of the same things. But Australia has stopped short in particular of liberalizing the labor market and of going after some of the areas such as stevedoring. The whole operation, the port system in fact, is full of featherbedding, heavily encrusted with union traditions and principles. The Australian Labor Party simply has not been willing to bump heads with the unions there whereas in New Zealand the Labor Government was.

So I guess Australia is slower to move, maybe a little harder to govern. Also in Australia there are strong state interests and that can affect the ability of the federal government to move on a number of things including taxation for example. So Australia is quite a bit slower, more ponderous, not given to dramatic change the way that New Zealand was in that era.

Q: Was there any relationship between Hawke and Reagan? I would have thought those two, both very tall and big men....

TEARE: Hawke is short.

Q: Okay. I was wondering whether there was any relationship there or not?

TEARE: Contrary to what you might have expected, relations were very good and I think it had to do a lot with Reagan’s geniality and Hawke’s own outgoing manner. Hawke and Bush got along too. Now maybe that is somewhat less surprising because they were closer in age. On one of Hawke’s visits here during the Bush Administration he was invited to Camp David and he got to pitching horseshoes with Bush and it could not have been closer or more harmonious. Of course Australia put up a good contingent for Desert Storm and so forth.

Q: Bill Lane. Could you tell me a little bit about his background and how he operated?

TEARE: Yes. Bill and his brother, Mel, inherited from their parents the Sunset Publishing Company. Sunset Magazine is known today as the magazine of western living. For a long time they wouldn’t sell subscriptions to anyone East of the Rockies! Now they do. They have branched out into several regional editions for the Pacific Northwest, the Desert Southwest. The parents had bought the name of the magazine from I think the Southern Pacific Railroad at the
bottom of the Depression when it was a very different sort of publication. The parents, L. W. Lane, Sr., and his wife, made it into a going concern and the brothers took it over gradually in the fifties and sixties and built it up into a very valuable property with books. There is a whole series of cookbooks and *How to Build Your Own Patio* type books and they got into educational films and other things. They were both very much involved, still are, in Stanford University alumni activities and the national parks and all kinds of things.

They are Republicans, and Bill had supported Ronald Reagan. But in particular on some aspects of domestic policy, Bill was a good deal more liberal than the Reagan line. He had his own good connections in Congress. He had been to Australia many times and knew a lot of people there. He wanted the job and got it as Reagan’s second Ambassador. He got there at the end of 1985. He loved the country and the people and moved around a lot. He was a very good outside man at developing contacts. One year at the Sidney Easter Show he got to be marshal of the parade and to ride a horse. He was also a great horseman. He got to ride his horse down the main street of Sidney to open the parade. He enjoyed life there.

As an internal manager of the embassy it was a different story. I think I’ll leave that for some future time.

*Q: One of the things we are examining is sort of the relationships of both career and non-career and we are finding a very mixed bag so these interviews are not designed to show up things but I wonder if you could talk in some sort of general terms? I mean some people are better managers than others are. It is just a fact of life.*

TEARE: Well I think in Bill’s case, despite his vast success in private life…you know he and Mel later sold the company about a year after he finished for I believe it was a hundred and twenty million dollars to Time Warner. They got some in cash and some in stock. None of their children was interested in carrying it on. I think Bill was not altogether sure of himself in the position of Ambassador on the internal side. He didn’t believe that the career Foreign Service was going to support him. That was very unfortunate. I tried over time to make him realize that it was in the interest of the career officers to make him look good but he didn’t believe that; he didn’t altogether trust us. Some people on the staff in particular he didn’t get along with. We lost one Economic Counselor who got himself curtailed and out of there or I think otherwise might have been sent away.

It was difficult all around. Lane would try to get into the process. He would try to write his own Reviewing Statements on principal officers at the consulates. A couple of those I was unable to head off resulted in Grievances. A couple of people had their careers prolonged as a matter of fact as a result of having grieved Lane’s Review Statement.

To the outside world he looked good. In dealings with his own staff it was not easy.

*Q: I would like to examine a bit the role of the Deputy Chief of Mission in this because this is not unusual. In the first place a Political Ambassador would come and I don’t know where in*
particular it comes from but the well was often poisoned beforehand. They are told to watch out for these career people who are some smart cookies who are going to try to run rings around you or do things to you. Those of us who have been on the inside know this just isn’t so. Sometimes you get the wrong mix and you do get some people who sort of disdain the Ambassador, but generally you accept him and try to make him look good. Also there are strengths of people coming from outside. How did you deal with this?

TEARE: I’m not sure I had any conscious approach for dealing with it. I think I tried to soldier along day by day and to some extent interpose myself as a buffer between him and the rest of the staff and the principal officers. I generally talked to each of them on the telephone at least weekly and tried to let them know what to look out for. I tried to make sure that our reporting product was first class and to give him an opportunity to look at everything when he was in country although he often wouldn’t read the incoming traffic. So it was not easy to keep him current on things.

I don’t know that I succeed particularly but we lasted through that time and I have the sense that people were grateful to me for trying to maintain an even keel.

Q: I was wondering... with the Economic Counselor...were you saying to get with it? This is the situation...rise to the occasion and deal with it?

TEARE: I tried that. In this case however this guy was there when Lane arrived and in the ten weeks or so that they were together before I got there the die was cast. There had been a couple of exchanges and relations were already frosty. In another eight or nine months the guy was gone.

Q: What about dealing with the Australians at the state level. Was this left more to the consular posts?

TEARE: Well inevitably they saw more of the state premiers than we did. But, again, we tried not to step on each other’s toes and to make it clear that we had no objection to their talking to cabinet ministers when cabinet ministers were back in their own constituencies and so forth. But the way it worked out in practice was that most of the federal business was done in Canberra. That was where ministers were to be found and when they were at home they didn’t want to be disturbed. When I would go to one of the states where we had a consul general I would let him know, of course, that I was coming. I would ask him to set up appointments as he saw fit on the state governor, who was a ceremonial figure, on the premier, on other state and cabinet ministers and of course to go along. That seemed to work very well.

Q: Canberra has been the capital for some time but like Brasilia it sort of sits off there. Did this cause a problem or was it in a way handy? You could meet everybody a lot easier than if they were in Sidney or Melbourne or something.

TEARE: Canberra is an artificial capitol. Its location was chosen by compromise. The building of the city was supposed to start in 1912 or 1915 but was delayed by the First World War. The first
bureaucrats didn’t really arrive there until the late ‘20s and it was still hardly more than a village at the end of World War II. But it has grown and grown since and it is I guess now a metropolitan area of maybe 400,000 people which is still tiny compared to Sidney and Melbourne but it is getting there.

Australians generally tend to speak of Canberra very disparagingly both as a place to live and as a concept, sort of the ‘inside the Beltway’ syndrome. I found it not that way at all. I thought some of the best people in Australia had migrated to Canberra to work in government. I knew several three-generation families in Canberra. It is becoming a real place. As I said a moment ago, the Feds, the federal politicians, tended to do their business there although they often professed to dislike it. There is a tradition furthermore that state premiers do not usually go on into federal politics. It has happened occasionally. The shadow Foreign Minister at the moment, Laurie Barrington, is a former Premier of New South Wales. But the more typical attitude is one that I heard and saw in print from Jeff Kennett, the Premier of Victoria, who is rumored to have federal ambitions of his own. He said a few years ago that there are two things in life you don’t want, one is to die a slow death and the other is to go to Canberra.

That may have been disingenuous on his part but there is that feeling still to some degree. I have never been to Brazil but I don’t think the animus toward Canberra is quite what it is toward Brasilia. I don’t know about newer capitols like Nigeria’s and so on.

**Q: What about Australia? One thinks of this as being a very large country with these settlements sort of scattered around the coasts and a hell of a lot of nothing in between. Is it a hard place to report on? As far as we are concerned is the action pretty easy to take care of?**

TEARE: Australia, and this I found hard to believe, is one of the most urbanized countries of the world. I think 85 percent. An even higher percentage of the population I believe lives within fifty miles of the coast. You have got five cities of a million or more in descending order Sydney, Melbourne, Perth, Brisbane and Adelaide. And then there are a lot of other people on the coast up and down New South Wales and in Queensland in particular. There are not too many people in the interior.

Distances are vast. Domestic travel costs are exorbitant even after they encouraged some competition between a couple of domestic airlines. So we thought twice before committing to a trip around there. It was not that difficult to cover in the sense that people were open and willing to talk. The local media covered things very intensively and so forth. So for federal elections for example we tended to coordinate the reporting in Canberra. For state elections and local and bi-elections the posts handled if they could. Melbourne would cover South Australia for example, Tasmania.

One footnote. The consulate in Brisbane has had a checkered history. It was closed by the Department of State in 1980 and ordered re-opened by the Congress in 1983. This is one of those Executive-Legislative disputes. There were seven posts closed in 1980, five of them in Europe. The other two were Mandalay in Burma and Brisbane in Australia. So the Congress in 1983 said
to let all seven re-open and they included special line items in the Budget for those posts. So Brisbane was duly re-opened. The Burmese would not let us re-open Mandalay but that is because they are who they are.

So for the first couple of years that I was there, ’86 through ’87-’88, that separate line item still existed in the Budget. I think it extended even to the representation. Brisbane had its own representation account, not under the control of the Ambassador. And now of course we in our un-wisdom have closed Brisbane once again. That was the Administration’s doing but I guess Congress went along with it this time.

We had only one American there when we re-opened in 1983. We really needed two if we were going to make it a full service visa post, non-immigrant, but I think the Department's hangdog attitude was shown by its failure to send a second officer. As a result we never did get back into the visa business in Brisbane so Queenslanders had to continue to send their passports to Sydney which bothered them a lot. Queensland is, at least in this period and I think still is, relatively booming. It is the fastest growing part of Australia in terms of population. There is quite a bit of industry now and investment. It would be a very good place to have an active consulate but we’ve shot ourselves in the foot once again by closing it.

Q: Did you notice the change in Australia as far as its opening the immigration policy and all that? Were you seeing anything different as far as we were concerned?

TEARE: The White Australia policy was officially jettisoned in the early ’70s, more than ten years before I got there and of course the big influx of refugees from Indo-China took place in the second half of the ’70s after the fall of Saigon and so forth. So by 1986 when I got there the Asian population was becoming noticeable. It was still very small in percentage terms, I think only around two or three percent and projected to rise to maybe four percent. But the Vietnamese in particular had congregated in some numbers in several areas. There is a town in the western suburbs of Sydney called Cabramatta, which is an aboriginal name. It was becoming known as ‘Vietnamatta’ in the popular press in the late 1980s. I think one Vietnamese had been elected a Counselor in the town of Fairfield, another western suburb of Sydney, by 1989. This was seen as perhaps a sign of things to come.

There was also of course the tension and guilt over the aboriginal population and what had been done to it. Again the figures are the subject of some dispute but its generally considered to be less than one percent of people with pure aboriginal blood.

So there was resentment of immigrants and the typical story that they are eating up the social welfare and they are all on relief, or the dole as they say there, which I think was exaggerated. So there was a sort of racism which has really flowered just in the last couple of years in the person of this Queensland politician, Pauline Hansen, and her One-Nation Party which could be a factor in the federal election next month. That side was not pretty just as racism is not pretty anywhere. At the same time I was there for the 200th Anniversary of European Settlement in 1988 and a lot of people began taking an interest in their past, which frequently included convict ancestors and
some miscegenation with aborigines. A couple of people at least published articles in the Sunday supplements about how their quest to discover their roots had turned up this convict or that aboriginal ancestor and some people seemed to be taking pride in it. So it was two edged, I guess you could say.

But my impression now ten years later is that the racism side has become uglier and is of more concern to the mainline political parties. Indeed the current Prime Minister, John Howard, has been criticized for not coming out earlier to criticize and combat Pauline Hansen and the policies she represents.

I should say that during the same period, the late ‘80s, Australia was becoming very popular in the United States. A lot of it had to do with the actor Paul Hogan and his film Crocodile Dundee which was a smash hit here and then the television commercials he was doing. Australian wines were being imported into this country in quantity. Other things were happening that gave Australia a higher profile in the United States.

Q: How did we view Australia vis-a-vis Indonesia? Here you’ve got that almost deserted northern coast and one of the most populous countries of the world and not a stable one. It is a difficult country out there sitting just to the North and I would have thought that we would have watched this relationship with some care.

TEARE: We did indeed and it again was a subject of considerable interest right at the time I got there. An Australian journalist named David Jenkins with the *Sydney Morning Herald*, a guy whom I had known in Laos in the ‘70s, published an article about Suharto, the family, their wealth, influence and so forth that got hyped up by a headline writer.

Q: You say they expelled some journalists?

TEARE: Yes and refused to issue visas to new ones or replacements. They were very unhappy about the article and things stayed rather frozen for a couple of years. They were beginning to warm again around 1989 when Try Sutrisno, the Commander in Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces, finally accepted an invitation to visit Australia. He went on to become Suharto’s Vice President in the 1993 to ’98 term.

Anyway, Australia had six journalists killed, that is had suffered the loss of six journalists who were covering the takeover of East Timor in 1975. There is strong reason to believe that the Indonesian Armed Forces killed them quite deliberately. That was a major irritant from the Australian standpoint and one that is remembered down to this day. Despite that, however, the Hawke Government early in its tenure, in 1983 I believe, decided to accept the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia. The United States did something similar. We have this strange formulation in which we say that we recognize Indonesian control over the territory without maintaining that a valid act of self-determination ever took place.

Maintaining seems to me a strange word for it. Accepting would be more like it perhaps. But
anyway we in Australia have done that but when you hear East Timor referred to otherwise the frequent tag line is “whose incorporation into Indonesia has never been accepted by the United Nations”. Well that is true, but I think in practical purposes what was important was that Australia and the United States accept it and that others such as Japan and China not challenge it, which they don’t.

So, Australia had mixed feelings about Indonesia just as Indonesia did about Australia and, yes, we did watch the relationship quite closely. As I mentioned, by ’89 Try Sutrisno visited and the Indonesians had sent a very savvy ambassador, a journalist named Saban Seigyan who started to improve relations. But in ‘86 when I got there, due in part to the Jenkins article and the freezing of relations, things were pretty frosty. I remember going to pay a courtesy call on the Foreign Secretary, that’s the senior public servant in the Department, and he kept me unusually long and got off onto subjects of conversation that I hadn’t imagined he would raise. So the result was that our meeting went maybe half an hour beyond the appointed time. On my way out I saw the Indonesian Ambassador waiting to see him. I think what happened was that he used me as a device to keep the Indonesian waiting and demonstrate, or make a point, shall we say?

Well this goes way beyond my direct experience, but later on, in the ‘90s, Paul Keating, who had succeeded Hawke as Prime Minister, worked out a sort of loose defense cooperation agreement with Suharto and did it in great secrecy. We did not know that was coming. There were only four or five people in the Australian Government who were involved in the negotiations and I think a similar number on the Indonesian side. That came as quite a surprise, but we thought at the time that it was a good thing. One reason the Australians did it, I think, was to assuage any feelings of isolation on Indonesia’s part because Australia has been involved for many years in a five power defense agreement which links it with both Malaysia and Singapore. So now there is something more like parity in Australia’s relations with those countries.

But Australia in my time at least paid a lot of attention in intelligence terms to what was going on in Indonesia.

Q: Did we ever find our embassy in Australia sort of offering its good services for any problems between Indonesia and Australia or not?

TEARE: I can’t remember that that came up. I think the Australians knew plenty about Indonesia and were fairly confident of their ability to handle things over time.

Q: Later you’ll have, I’m sure, a closer view when you were in New Guinea, but what was the feeling about Australia’s colonial or custodial role in the islands in the South Pacific?

TEARE: I had developed some feelings at that time partly because several people on our staff were accredited also to Papua, New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu and used to travel there. I did not. I never even saw those places until I became Ambassador in ’93.

I knew some of the Australians who themselves were posted up there. I remember one of them
who came back to Canberra after his first six months in Papua, New Guinea, for consultations and I saw him and I asked him for his shorthand appraisal of that country. He said he was “cautiously pessimistic”, which turned out to be a very good characterization. The one point I heard in particular was that the Australian military contingent in Papua, New Guinea, a training mission of several hundred people, were not very successful with the Papua-New Guineans because of the Australians’ racist attitude. That came from U. S. officers who had observed them in the field and I later saw some of that for myself.

There was also a sort of a competition between the Australians and New Zealanders. To some extent they had different spheres of influence. New Zealand’s influence was strongest in Samoa and in Polynesia and the rest of Polynesia. New Zealand having administered Samoa before it obtained independence. Australia was stronger in Papua, New Guinea, which it administered and the rest of Melanesia. But the Australians would say that they knew their way around the Pacific and were not ignorant and clumsy the way the Americans were. The New Zealanders would say they were much lighter on their feet than the Australians were and much more simpatico with the islanders than the Australians would ever be. And I think there was some truth to that.

So we were conscious of it, but it was not a subject in which we immersed ourselves. We were aware of Australia’s participation in the South Pacific Forum and other bodies for which we were not eligible not being located directly in the Pacific. Some of our territories and freely associated states could participate more directly. We are and have been in the South Pacific Commission all along. We, of course, knew that the Australians were devoting a large percentage of their aid budget to Papua, New Guinea and other South Pacific nations.

Q: What about Tasmania? Is it just a little offshoot, the equivalent of Alaska for an Australian diplomat in Washington or something?

TEARE: I’m sorry to say I never got to Tasmania. I had a couple of invitations and it just never worked out somehow. The consulate general in Melbourne covered it. I don’t think it’s that remote. There are lots of jokes about Tasmanians being isolated and in-bred and so forth. But not having seen it I find it difficult to say. I know plenty of Tasmanians and they seem to me like normal people. I think maybe the more ambitious ones leave and come to the Australian mainland. It is the seat of their Antarctic program, by the way, and there were suggestions that the United States as a result of its dispute with New Zealand over nuclear capable ships ought to transfer its Antarctic operations to Hobart. But Hobart is farther away from McMurdo Sound than is Christchurch and there would have been a lot of expense in relocating and the conclusion was that we didn’t need to leave New Zealand for doctrinal reasons so we didn’t. But I hope to get to Tasmania some day. I would like to see it.

Q: Were there any major issues between the United States and Australia during this time?

TEARE: Not that I haven’t covered. The big one was trade. They wanted freer access for beef and they wanted us to stop subsidizing, through the export enhancement program sales of grain to what they regarded as their traditional markets in places like Egypt and so forth. There was a
lot of back and forth about that. What I strove to do was to separate trade issues from defense issues as I mentioned earlier.

There were occasional calls for cutting back on the joint facilities. The leadership of the major political parties shared my view. The call for defense retaliation usually came from backbenchers in the Parliament, aggrieved wheat farmers or whoever it might be. I used to kid the Labor politicians and ask why did they care about wheat farmers, they were never going to vote Labor anyway; they always vote Liberal or National, the two parties of the Conservative coalition. But obviously the Labor Party couldn’t ignore them. But thanks again to Beasley primarily we were successful in sort of removing the defense facilities as a subject of controversy.

Q: I’m not sure where the North American Free Trade Agreement was. There was one between Canada and the United States. We were seeing the European Union developing its own dynamics but particularly a concern about being a closed market. Australia is sort of outside this and the United States has its own market. Was this a problem that the Australians were seeing?

TEARE: Well, the Australians have been hurt by the Common Market. Not to the same degree perhaps that the New Zealanders were. But they’ve been sensitive about this at least since the early ’70s and, as I’ve mentioned, wanted a bigger share of the U.S. market for various products. In general the Australians and we were on the same side in the international trade picture though.

I remember the Uruguay Round. The Australians were encouraging us to make it big and dramatic and we were duly reporting this back to Washington. Then Reagan came out with his proposal, was it in 1988? It said we were going to eliminate all tariffs by the year 2000? The Australians came back the next day and said that was too dramatic and would never sell, we’d never get the votes for that internationally or domestically. And I asked well which way did they want it? They urged us to be sweeping and dramatic and the President was and now they were saying it was too much. They should decide.

But also in that period Bob Hawke came up with the proposal for APEC, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. This took everybody by surprise, including his own staff. He developed this on a flight to Seoul in January 1989, as I’ve always heard it. He didn’t staff it out with anybody. His own people who stayed behind in Canberra were dumbfounded when they read about it. He delivered it, put it before the world in a speech in Seoul, the first stop of a trip he was making through three or four countries.

So the question became what did it all mean? Hawke’s original idea was to provide some way of implementing on a continuing basis the agreements reached at periodic meetings of heads of government and ministers of trade and foreign affairs. He said I think in that speech that we get rhetorical agreement but then there is no follow through and APEC he envisioned as a mechanism for follow through.

The United States at first was a little bit suspicious of this idea. There was some question as to whether it was going to include us but it was made clear that it would. Implicitly this was perhaps
an offset to European Union. It was certainly a trade-expanding device as we saw it. And from skepticism in the first few weeks the United States went very quickly to wholehearted support for it and indeed Secretary Baker made a speech by June of 1989 I think in which he almost seemed to be taking over the idea. I began to wonder if it was going to be co-opted.

Well it wasn’t and APEC has continued down to the present day. At first it was going to be without any bureaucracy then it established a small secretariat in Singapore in which our colleague, Bill Bode, was involved. Then President Clinton sort of upped the ante with the first meeting of APEC leaders at Blakely Island, Washington, in 1993 and that has now become an institution in its own right. When Clinton did not go to the APEC leaders meeting in Japan in 1995 because of the shutdown of the government here at home that became an issue. So traditions get established rather quickly.

The basic point was, yes, Australia wanted to be part of a larger economic bloc, if you will. It already had a very good relation with New Zealand, a closer economic relations treaty. But it wanted to lower trade barriers and indeed that has been one of APEC’s pushes and of course the Southeast Asians have come to that only with some reluctance. But nevertheless APEC is a going concern.

Then there was the subsidiary problem of Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia wanting to establish EAEC as he called it, the East Asian Economic Caucus. This would have excluded the United States and Canada and maybe Australia and New Zealand but left Japan in with Southeast Asia. We didn’t much like that idea and we have resisted it down to the present day. But again I think the crisis over the last year or two has put EAEC off to one side.

Q: We are talking about the financial crisis?


Q: Well when this Australian APEC proposal came out originally was there a great scurrying at the embassy to figure out what he was after, what this was all about and that sort of thing?

TEARE: There was a certain amount of scurrying. Yes. Definitely. I remember a couple of sessions with one of the third echelon guys at Foreign Affairs and Trade, Andrew Vilek, about exactly what Hawke had meant and he had to do some scrambling himself to find out. But it quickly became rather evident what Hawke was driving at and as I say the United States went from reluctance to enthusiastic adoption.

The first APEC ministerial meeting I believe took place in Canberra shortly after I left. Things have come along with other initiatives in subsequent years including the Chemical Weapons Treaty. They like that sort of thing. They do it well. They generally line up their support. They have a very skilled Foreign Service and they are good at it.

Q: Did being part of the Commonwealth mean much at that time from the way we looked at it?
TEARE: Less and less. There were some Commonwealth exercises going on particularly trying to mediate things in Africa, South Africa and elsewhere. I recall just before I left in 1989 there was a Commonwealth ministerial meeting to deal with the issue of South Africa. My successor as DCM, Gib Lanpher, had just arrived. He was an expert on Southern Africa. His next post after Canberra was as Ambassador to Zimbabwe so he knew all about this and knew a lot of the players and I steered him over to that meeting.

Just before I left there had been a group of eminent persons from the Commonwealth. I forget now who they were except that the Australian one was Malcolm Frazier, the last Labor Prime Minister…sorry, the last coalition Prime Minister before Hawke came into office. Frazier has a reputation for arrogance and being difficult so the guys at the Australian Foreign Affairs Department refer to him as ‘the’ eminent person although in fact he was only one of a committee.

But in general day to day did the Commonwealth account for much? No, not really except maybe in sentimental terms. There has always been a certain streak of republican sentiment. Again it is substantially stronger in Australia than in New Zealand. Again another of the differences between the two countries. It has become considerably stronger in the ‘90s to the point now where I think Prime Minister Howard, who is himself not a republican, has had to commit to some sort of referendum on the subject. So Commonwealth means less and less in short.

Q: Were there any state visits or visits that were important while you were there?

TEARE: None at head of government level. I think there was some thought that Reagan might have liked to come but it was too much of a trip for him. Bush talked about coming from the day he took office and I think the original intent was for him to come in late 1989, which would have been shortly after I left. But he didn’t get there until the end of ’91 and that was the start of the famous trip on which he vomited in Japan and did serious damage to his re-election prospects.

Dan Quayle came.

Q: The Vice President.

TEARE: In April 1989. In fact Bill Lane, who had officially said his goodbye and gone back to California with his wife, returned in order to be on hand for the Quayle visit. Then he left again I think even before Quayle left Australia and I became Chargé at that point again and stayed so until I left in August.

The Quayle visit was not particularly notable or successful.

Q: Dan Quayle as Vice President certainly by the American media has been portrayed as a lightweight. What was your impression?

TEARE: I saw nothing to contradict that. Furthermore he failed to keep to schedule and
inconvenienced a lot of people along the way although this was after he had cleared Canberra. I didn’t travel with him outside of Canberra. He stayed for a couple of extra hours of skin-diving up on the Queensland coast, I think, and as a result was late arriving in Djakarta when President Suharto was expecting him at Merdeka Palace. One doesn’t keep Suharto waiting. So my impression was, in all candor, that he was rather self-indulgent and he was not particularly well briefed.

The first thing he did on arrival in Canberra was go play tennis while there was a group waiting to talk with him, people at the embassy, staff. So he arrived late for that with his hair still wet from the shower. That in turn kept the school kids, Americans, children of embassy people, waiting out in the cold where he was going to plant a tree on the Residence grounds which was one of the traditions.

The most fun was an Australian-US ministerial meeting or AUSBEN in 1987 at Sydney. This was a successor to the ANZUS Council after New Zealand had disappeared from it. That was attended by George Shultz and Casper Weinberger and Admiral Ron Hayes who was CINCPAC at the time. That was a great event.

It was all sweetness and light for one thing and for the Weinbergers it was a sentimental journey because they had met on a troop ship going out to Australia in 1942 and had been married in Sydney. Everybody enjoyed it, banquets, toasts, and communiqués. A lot of good feeling!

Q: George Shultz’s experience in the military…he was a marine who fought in the Pacific....

TEARE: Yes, he did. He liked it there too and they liked Shultz and Weinberger. And again this was a Labor Government but....

Q: The problem was that Shultz and Weinberger didn’t like each other!

TEARE: Well, yes, but the town was big enough for both of them at least for those couple of days.

Then we had some drama at the end when the NCO from our Defense Attaché Office in Canberra who was in charge of passports overslept. He had switched hotels because he thought the place he was assigned to originally too noisy. Nobody knew how to reach him. The result was that the Shultz party took off without their passports. However they were stopping in American Samoa, I think, maybe Western Samoa, on their way back to Hawaii. Somebody else who was traveling straight to Hawaii from Sydney got there ahead of them with their passports.

Q: I’m told that to anybody who serves in Canberra the Coral Sea Day is always a big deal.

TEARE: Yes, yes it is. It is not as big as Anzac Day but in terms of U.S. involvement Coral Sea Day, Coral Sea Week for that matter, officially known as Australian-American Friendship Week, is important. The Australian-American Association organizes events in the capitols, state
The United States always has a Coral Sea visitor who hops from one to another of these. Somewhere at home I have a list of all the Coral Sea visitors up through 1989.

One year we got kind of nervous. Although it sounds attractive it is difficult to get people to do it. One year the guy who came was Fred Fielding, who was White House Counsel. He didn’t bring his wife, which was not good because there are banquets and balls. And furthermore there was considerable speculation that he might be indicted himself for something. So we rather sweated that one out. Another year it was John Marsh, the Secretary of the Army, who was not bad but was only found a few days beforehand after several others had declined the honor.

One of the most successful Coral Sea visitors of all time, not in my time, was Fess Parker. Lots of Australians had grown up watching him as Daniel Boone on television…or was he Davy Crockett?

Q: Davy Crockett.

TEARE: That was it. So he was a popular figure and apparently carried it off very well. Usually it has been an Admiral, government official, Secretary of the Army.

JOHN E. KELLEY
Political Counselor
Canberra (1987-1991)

John E. Kelley was born in California in 1936 and raised in Washington, DC. He attended Pasadena City College and the University of Virginia. He then went to Hawaii with the Weather Service and joined the Coast Guard, receiving a degree in government from the University of Hawaii. Mr. Kelley later obtained a master's degree in international relations of Northeast Asia from American University. In addition to serving in Japan, Mr. Kelley served in Korea, Portugal, and Australia. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on May 21, 1996.

Q: Where did you go after that?

KELLEY: I went to Australia to be Political Counselor.

Q: When were you in Australia?


Q: How did you get that assignment?

KELLEY: It was back in my home bureau, the Asian bureau and I had done a good enough job in
Portugal to get promoted out of it so I was at a level where it was qualified for the job. My former DCM in Japan was DAS for Asia and he knew what kind of work I could do. I had worked for him in Seoul as well as in Japan. He was very generous and he agreed that Australia would be an appropriate assignment.

Q: *Who was the Ambassador in Australia when you were there?*

KELLEY: Bill Lane was the Ambassador when I got there and then Mel Sembler was the Ambassador when I left.

Q: *Were they both political appointees?*

KELLEY: Yes, very seldom do we ever have anything other than political appointees in Australia.

Q: *How did they operate?*

KELLEY: They operated pretty much like amateurs. They operated based on what they knew, what they had done in their previous careers. Lane belonged to a family that owned the Sunset magazines, so publishing was what he knew. He concentrated on public opinion and what kind of image we projected. He didn't have any real political connections in Washington that I could determine. Sembler was in the building business in Florida and his main claim to fame was that he was a major fund raiser for George Bush. Both of them were terrific guys.

Q: *What was your impression of how they were received in the Australian political world?*

KELLEY: Among politicians being popular with the public was an extremely important component and so Bill Lane was a consummate worker of the public vineyards. He worked the press, he worked the public in general. He made sure that got out to meet and greet people all over the place. He would use his own money to that end. He was regarded as one of the most effective Ambassadors around by the professional politicians as opposed to the government bureaucrats and the actual members of the government with whom he dealt in Australia. The parliamentarians thought that Bill Lane was the greatest thing since sliced bread. The guys that had to deal with the issues in Australia who were trying to work out an agreement probably found him a little hard to deal with. Hard to deal with in the sense of trying to reach some kind of accommodation with somebody who understands the issues because often I think, they would get the impression that Lane was more focused in on the public perception of the issue than he was on the areas of disagreement themselves and how they might be resolved. It was particularly true of anything that had to do with military or base issues. In a whole host of areas we would often get phone calls from the Chief Assistant to whoever it was that the Ambassador had been seeing, to try to find out just how much of what he had said had been under instructions and how much of it was just creative. [laughter] I'm pretty sure that they were able to divine most of this themselves. There would be times when none of what he said had anything to do with the instructions he went over with. Sort of like a big-shot politician laying a cornerstone--you'd have
a mason and a foreman standing over in the corner and the foreman would say to the mason, "As soon as this crowd leaves knock that block off and put it on right, will ya?" [laughter] That was sort of our job in the Embassy, as soon as the Ambassador got done we had to go back over and put that block back on right.

Q: What were the major issues that you dealt with from the political point of view, during 1988 to 1991?

KELLEY: They would divide into three or four categories. You'd be dealing with the major international political issues of the region, the aftermath of Vietnam and everything derived from that. There were a host of Asian regional issues, security issues, etc. A major issue would always be trade, in particular would be wheat or any other product in which the United States and Australia were competitors in the world market. Then we got the issues regarding the various U.S. military facilities on Australian soil. All of which were actually run by the Australians, on which we were tenants. Many of those facilities had important strategic roles. We tried to keep those from being compromised.

Q: What type of government was it? Was it labor government?

KELLEY: While I was there it was labor government.

Q: Within the labor movement was there sort of a visceral sort of anti U.S. feeling do you think? Caught from the British labor movement? I'm thinking from the left of the British labor movement.

KELLEY: The labor movement was interestingly divided in Australia into left and right, it was reflected in the party was always in the labor movement. You would get a substantial sort of visceral anti-American component in all of that. You had some antiquated labor practices that were reminiscent of Great Britain and which were jealously guarded by the left wing of the labor movement while the right wing of the party, which controlled both the party and the government, was trying to do something to create a more reasonable labor market. The right wing wanted a market that would be more responsive to conditions, allow Australia to react more flexibly from changing economic conditions, etc. But, a short answer is that we did have some sort of visceral reactions out of the left wing of the labor movement which were reminiscent of what we were getting in Britain.

Q: Are there any particular issues that were particularly challenging during the time that you were there?

KELLEY: All of the problems were pretty much perennial. There was residual suspicion in the USG about any Australia labor government, although a lot of that had been dissipated in the immediate aftermath of the takeover of the government by the labor party, which happened years before I got on the scene, in 1970 or thereabouts. There were some suspicions that some elements of the labor party were still unreconstructed and sufficiently anti American that they would try to
sabotage our ability to use the facilities that we shared with the Australians effectively. I must say that a lot of the problem was on the U.S. side and not on the Australian side, although the Australians brought some of it on themselves. One of the more difficult things that I had to deal with was to try to create an environment in which we could work with the people in the Department of Foreign Affairs in particular who had been colored by past associations with politicians that had left people in the Unted States government suspicious of them. These were guys who rose to very high positions in the Department of Foreign Affairs on the bureaucratic side. It just became very difficult for us to work problems because of the residual suspicion in the United States government that some of these people--one guy in particular, had an agenda of their own. That was one problem, and that never did get totally satisfactorily resolved. Just trying to keep it from becoming an obstacle to a good working relationship was a constant effort. The other thing was our base agreements were constantly up for renewal--different agreements, agreements for use of facilities, and getting these extended without great political turmoil was essential.

Q: As seems to happen so often in Australia, there are revelations that the CIA is doing this, or that this base is being used for something that sounds sort of inflammatory as far as the press coverage. Did you have anything like that?

KELLEY: Most of that type of politically tainted effort was eviscerated with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The people who took that kind of approach became laughing stocks early in the piece. When I first arrived there was the peace movement, and an anti-nuclear party with a few representatives in the Australian Senate. They used their positions as a platform for anti-U.S. vitriol of various kinds. But that was only a public nuisance. It was never an impediment to our relations with the Australian government. Then, as the communists worldwide became more and more discredited, it just faded away. The anti-nuke people were defeated in succeeding elections and the Australians pretty much took care of the problem themselves. There were demonstrations and that sort of thing against the various facilities as they would come up for renewal. These began to lose force as the communist empire began to unravel. In any event, our working relationship with the Australian government and the right wing of the labor party, which controlled the government, was such that this was never a threat to the relationship in any way, shape, or form. We were able to work together with these people in the Australian government to neutralize the anti-nuclear, anti-U.S. contingent who the right wing of the labor party probably hated more than they did the conservatives in Australia.

Q: How did you find the universities? Were they "hotbeds" of the left or were they a mixed bag?

KELLEY: They were more "hotbeds" of the left than they were a mixed bag. There was a growing conservative component but it was a minority. There was more of the "ivory tower" approach to international relations and the view that Australia should be the champion of the downtrodden native peoples of the Pacific and somehow had a better claim to understanding Asia. There was some feeling there that whatever the United States did was bad and Australia should play a role in rectifying all of that. That particularly applied to the Pacific Islands more than it did to Asia per se, from the optic of the universities. Nonetheless, they were open to
contact with us. There was nothing hostile about the relationship and we made substantial effort, which was welcomed, to communicate with people on the campuses--professors and students, whatever their political complexion.

Q: What about the media? How did you find the media? One always thinks of Robert Maxwell, rather a sensationalist, and "tits and ass" type journalism.

KELLEY: There wasn't that much of that sort of thing, there was some sensationalism. Mainly the problem was just very shallow reporting. There were some very notable exceptions. You were dealing with reporters who didn't go very far below the surface in their efforts to understand international issues. There were very few people who were qualified to deal with international issues. There wasn't enough depth to the profession to allow them the luxury of that kind of specialization. In domestic politics there were some excellent people. In economics there were some excellent people. I thought that we got a very fair shake with from all of those folks. I think if anything, they were handicapped by a lack of experience and a lack of resources to really dig into the issues. Perhaps that was to our advantage.

Q: Were there any other issues that I may be missing? What was Canberra like for example? I always think of it like being trapped in a small town.

KELLEY: It is sort of like being trapped in a small town. It's an artificial city, much like Brasilia, which I never visited but I've heard a lot about, and shares a lot of the same problems. The major cities of the country are still much more attractive for business people, for bureaucrats they're where the economic and much of the domestic political action is. So Canberra spends a lot of time just trying to catch up and keep in touch with what's going on in those places. If you want to see the movers and shakers in the country you have to spend about half of your time in Canberra popping off to Sydney or Melbourne. It was a delightful place to live as long as you didn't mind a little cultural deprivation. It was coming along, there was plenty of local theater to get into. There was excellent access to the politicians, to the parliamentarians and to the Ministers in the government--provided you had the right access to start with, something to build upon, which fortunately I did. If you'd known these people before they became Ministers, you were able to maintain your access pretty well. It was marvelous for me, the Ministers were in town most of the time--I could get in to see the Defense Minister anytime I wanted to. As Political Counselor that is a pretty unusual situation to be in. I couldn't get in to see the Foreign Minister easily because I didn't know him before he got the job. But the Defense Minister was virtually my mentor in Australian politics before he got the job. We played poker together and I would go off to the Australian labor party conferences and pal around with the Defense Minister. It was a great situation and that was largely because of the informality of the environment in Canberra and the lack of pretentiousness on the part of the Australians in general.

PHILIP R. MAYHEW
Country Director for New Zealand & Australia

Philip R. Mayhew was born in California in 1934. He graduated from Princeton University in 1956 and served in the U.S. Marine Corps from 1957-1959. He entered the Foreign Service in 1961 and served in Laos, Congo, Vietnam, Thailand, Jordan, and Washington, DC. Mr. Mayhew was interviewed on May 26, 1995 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: Then what did you do?

MAYHEW: I was country director for New Zealand and Australia for a year. Dan O'Donohue, who had become ambassador to Thailand and whom I had worked with before, said that he would like me to take over the Thai desk if I could. So I was only on the Australia/New Zealand desk for a year.

Q: That would be '88 to '89.

MAYHEW: '88 to '89, then I took over the Thai desk. In ANZ it was a quiet period. A visit by Hawke to the US had taken place just before I took over.

Q: Hawke was the Prime Minister?

MAYHEW: Hawke was the Prime Minister of Australia. Relations with New Zealand were as relations with New Zealand have been for a long time, friendly, but on a security level still rather acerbic.

Q: Prickly.

MAYHEW: Prickly, yes. At that time the New Zealanders had not really been forgiven, particularly by the American military, for their anti-nuclear policy. It was one of those cases where the New Zealanders had been such close friends that their subsequent attitudes were really taken as a betrayal by many people. And, of course, you had the situation where people in the USG thought that they had been lied to by Mr. Lange, which is yet another complication. You still had people in the US government then that had been involved in negotiations with Lange.

Q: Lange was Labor?

MAYHEW: Lange was the Labor Prime Minister.

Some people involved thought that Lange was not only a rather nasty piece of work, but a man who did and would lie to them. I don't know the truth of this because I wasn't around for it. It was before my time, but I do know people who felt very strongly. I think probably external circumstances have now made New Zealand's nuclear attitude less important.
Of course the real importance of New Zealand attitudes was the possible influence on attitudes in Australia. The Australians were more concerned about what we might do vis-a-vis New Zealand than anyone else.

EDWARD GIBSOON LANPHER
Deputy Chief of Mission
Canberra (1989-1991)

Ambassador Edward Gibson Lanpher was born in 1942 in Richmond Virginia. He earned his undergraduate degree in 1966 from Brown University and was sworn into the Foreign Service later that same year. His first post was as a Rotation Officer in Tel Aviv, Israel but later his Foreign Service career took him to such posts as Gabon, England, Zimbabwe, and Australia before he was appointed Ambassador to Zimbabwe. He was interviewed in June 2002 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: Today is September 16, 2002. Gib, you were in Australia from ‘89 to when?
LANPHER: It was July ‘89 until the end of June 1991, two years.

Q: Who was the ambassador?
LANPHER: The ambassador was a fellow named Mel Sembler, a large campaign contributor to President Bush. He was a Florida real estate developer, a very wealthy man. He was one of those fellows - this was in 1989 - whose confirmation was held up by Senator Sarbanes, the accusation being that he bought the job. This was a subject of a long series of Doonesbury cartoons. Mel, who was a very nice, very wealthy man, resented this. He said to me once afterwards, “What do they mean? I only gave George Bush $126,000 and helped him raise $30 million for the inauguration, but that’s chump change.” I actually arrived in Australia in July 1989 and took over as chargé because Sembler was held up until October or November.

Q: What was the status of American-Australian relations at that time and what were the issues?
LANPHER: U.S.-Australian relations, I quickly learned, even though I had never served in that part of the world before, were exceedingly close. A lot of this goes back to the fact that we are perceived, and rightly so, to having saved Australia in the second world war. Northern Australia was being bombed by the Japanese; The Battle of the Coral Sea stopped the Japanese advance southward. They still commemorate Coral Sea week every May all over the country and we participate heavily in that. We’re feted. Our navy comes in to Australian ports. They love us. They get irritated with us now and then, as all our old friends do. But it was very interesting to go to a country where we were so universally liked and where we had such a dependable ally. We did have irritants in the relationship, which was unfortunate. One of the things I quickly realized,
having gone out to Australia as DCM/chargé, was how Australia and New Zealand were sort of the orphans of the East Asia Bureau. They spoke English. They weren’t really Asian. So, it was quite hard sometimes getting the East Asia Bureau’s attention back in Washington. Fortunately, Australia is the apple of the eye of the Defense Department and especially our Pacific Command in Honolulu. In fact, the Pacific Command, when they heard I was coming out to Australia, insisted that I stop by in Honolulu for three days of consultations, meeting all the top brass, lunches, dinners, briefings, you name it. The basic message was, “You’re going out to our favorite country in the world. Don’t screw it up, young man.” I understood that. Before I left Washington, I had also had an invitation to lunch from the director of the National Security Agency. This message was, “Australia is my crown jewel. Take good care of it.” So, that was the nature of the relationship when I went out there.

What was interesting was, when I arrived in Australia, the former political appointee ambassador had just left about a month before I arrived, and I found a very demoralized embassy and mission staff. I had not only the embassy but I had four consulates in Australia. I also had the overriding responsibility, although not day to day management, of a collection of U.S. bases and intelligence facilities in Australia. It was a big management job. I should say that this former ambassador, also a very wealthy man, had been a cheapskate, to put it bluntly, and somewhat of a tyrant. He was abusive of staff. He also used almost all the travel and representation money for himself, which meant nobody in the embassy was entertaining or traveling. When I discovered this after I had been there a couple of weeks and thought about it, I gave Sembler a call back in Washington. I said, “You’re going to have your work cut out for you when you get out here. I’ll lay the groundwork, but here is the situation.” Sembler, to his credit, said, “You’re my CEO. I want you to take care of this problem. Do what you think is right. If you think people have been deprived of representation or travel money, you allocate the money as you see fit. Allocate some to me, some to you, spread it around. When I run out of my money for travel, representation, whatever it is, I’ll pay the rest out of my own pocket.” I said, “Fine.” And he did. He ran out of his travel and representation money after one month at post and he paid for everything else out of his own pocket. When he finally arrived and we met him at the airport with his official car, an Australian-made Ford, right hand drive, we took him to his residence. Our agreement when he recruited me for the job was that he would consult me on everything, I’d give him straight advice, I’d keep him out of trouble and pointed right. He came into my office the second or third day and said, “Gib, there’s something that’s bothering me.” I said, “What’s that, Mr. Ambassador?” He said, “This official car of mine.” I said, “Is something wrong with it?” He said, “No, it’s a fine car. But I haven’t driven in a Ford in 30 years and I just don’t like driving in a Ford. Can I get another car?” I said, “Well, that’s what’s been assigned to the post.” He said, “Well, what happens if I buy an official car for myself, pay for it myself.” I said, “As far as I’m concerned, that’s fine. We can put a security radio in it if you like that.” He said, “Fine. What kind of car can I get?” I said, “What do you want to get?” He said, “I’ve always wanted to have a Rolls Royce.” I said, “Mr. Ambassador, there is only one Rolls Royce in Canberra and it belongs to the Governor General of Australia and I think it might not look good if you got a Rolls Royce.” He said, “Oh, I understand. What about a Jaguar?” I said, “The British ambassador has a Jaguar.” He said, “Oh, I don’t want to upset him by getting a Jaguar.” Then he brightened and said, “What about a Mercedes?” I said, “Look, there will be certain people who will be critical of you for driving a
foreign car, but as far as I’m concerned, that heat is very little, it’s your own money. Fine. A Mercedes is okay.” He said, “Can I get one here in town?” I said, “I think so. I’ll get my administrative counselor to take you out this afternoon.” He said, “Great.” My administrative counselor came back that afternoon after he had been to the Mercedes dealer and he said, “Gib, you wouldn’t believe what the ambassador just did. He bought himself a Mercedes 560 or 640, the biggest damned Mercedes you’ve ever seen. But that’s not all. He bought his wife a Mercedes station wagon and his political appointee special assistant a little Mercedes.” I said, “Three Mercedesa.” My administrative counselor, who was a very good guy, said, “Yes. And he sat there and wrote a check. He couldn’t get it duty free, so he had to pay the duty and everything else.” I said, “Well, how big was the check?” He said, “$450,000.” That’s the kind of fellow Mel Sembler was. He was a terribly nice guy and always consulted me on everything, let me run the embassy in terms of substance and management. He did a lot of entertaining, a lot of travel. We kept him supplied with speeches. He was an outreach kind of guy. But he was a splendid political appointee, not long on the substance, but long on graciousness, entertained well. Essentially, he was an excellent manager - giving good guidance and knowing when to delegate when others could do it better than he.

Q: If we had a difficult thing to put forward, which you always have, something comes from Washington, would he do that?

LANPHER: He would go, but he always took me with him to assist in the heavy argumentation. Sometimes when the Australians had something that they really wanted to complain about, they didn’t like to offend him because he was a good guy and they didn’t want to put him on the spot. They’d sometimes wait until he was out of town on a speaking trip and I’d be invited over quietly to come and have a chat with the Prime Minister. “Sorry your boss is out of town, but this was so important we thought we’d better raise it right away.”

Q: You were the designated hitter.

LANPHER: Well, I worked well with the Australians and they worked well with me and felt that they could talk straight.

Q: What was your take on the Australian government?

LANPHER: The prime minister was Bob Hawk for all the time I was in Australia. He was overthrown in an internal coup in his party about six months after I left Australia. I knew it was coming because I had been tipped off. But he was the prime minister and a real character. A decent, straight fellow. He had flaws in his character, as he would admit, but he was a down to earth guy and had a very good staff. He also had, for the most part, good ministers in his government. It was kind of an open and raucous affair. It was a parliamentary system. They had question time in parliament, which is a couple of hundreds of yards from our office. I used to go over and be entertained for an hour in the afternoon listening to question time. It’s outrageous the sort of questions and responses. I remember once going over... The finance minister was a guy named Paul Keating. He got a question from the opposition one day that was sort of snarky. His
response was, “That’s exactly the kind of question I’d expect from a dirtbag like you.” So, there was an openness and it was kind of refreshing.

Q: Where was this government coming from? Was it labor, liberal, conservative...

LANPHER: It was a labor government, but it was one that had gotten over its socialism to a large extent. It was quite a pragmatic government. They valued their relationship with us. For a country of 18 million people and a land mass about the size of the continental United States, 10 times as many sheep as people, they wanted to pull their weight in the world. They wanted to have a voice. And they worked with us. We had our differences on things like chemical weapons and we had some difficult issues with the Australians in terms of trade. For all our talk about market economies, we drove the Australians crazy on our protectionist trade issues and our subsidies in agriculture, a problem that continues to this day. Australia didn’t subsidize its agriculture. Because we did, we hurt them badly, particularly in two or three commodities. One was wheat. We undercut their markets by dumping our subsidized wheat on the world market. The same in sugar. Australia is a very efficient, low cost producer of sugar. Of course, our sugar quotas kept them out of our market, which hurt them. Also, we had quotas on beef. Australia is a big producer of beef. We had a quota which I thought was pretty high. But the Australians wanted more. Australia produced a lot of commercial grade beef in their northern territories, beef that you couldn’t cut with an ax but our fast food hamburger outfits liked to import it because then they’d blend it with our high fat content beef. If you go to Wendy’s or McDonald’s, you’re probably eating a percentage of Australian beef. These were contentious issues. The Australians felt, given the amount of cooperation they gave us in the political, security and diplomatic areas, that we treated them badly on these trade issues. I spent an awful lot of time on those, going out and talking and trying to explain our policies in farmers meetings.

Q: This brings up an issue. We talk out of two sides of our mouth on this. We’re talking about free trade and all that and yet we have this if not closed, limited market which is very protectionist. How did you explain this?

LANPHER: I tried to explain it as honestly as I could. I labored on speeches on our Export Enhancement Program, which was kind of code word for “screwing the Australian wheat industry.” Of course, the Europeans were bigger offenders than we were. I tried to lay a little off. But I never gave a dishonest speech. I’d lay it out, “This is the way it is. I’d like to do something about it.” We would argue as an embassy with Washington, but we were up against the farm lobby and Congress and politics in the United States. Everybody wanted the sugar money out of Florida and Louisiana and the beet sugar industry and you name it.

Q: Did the ambassador have any clout in Washington?

LANPHER: He had the contacts with the President and he could see the President when he came back and always got a picture taken with the President.

Q: This was George Bush Senior.
LANPHER: Yes. But in terms of having any impact on substance on these difficult trade issues, for instance, no. We were pissing in the wind.

Q: That’s a good diplomatic definition. With a labor government, particularly in New Zealand, coming out of England, there were some really dedicated left-wing labor types, the kind that sit around and sing “The Red Flag Forever.”

LANPHER: I never met any of those guys in Australia.

Q: They had been eliminated?

LANPHER: Yes. And the Labor party was dominated while I was there by some really bright and tough minded people - the “New South Wales Mafia.” These guys were tough and pragmatic and they weren’t misty eyed English style labourites. If you really wanted to get punched out, you’d suggest that they had some affinity with the British Labor Party.

Q: Did you have any problems with these big monitoring stations? We have some pretty big stuff out in northern Australia.

LANPHER: Not really. We had quite a few installations. They had been a contentious issue at times in the ’80s. It became an issue of sovereignty and the Australian left raised a lot of hell about these. But the labor government in about 1986/’87/’88, before I went to Australia, came to Washington and said, “We’ve got to manage this better. We understand that these installations are in both our interests, but we’re getting a lot of heat politically on this and we have to manage this better.” Our agencies, the National Security Agency and the CIA, were not very happy with the Australian proposals, but slowly, slowly, they came around to the Australian view. And the Australian view was that these needed to be “joint facilities,” not unilateral U.S. facilities, and that they could sell that to the Australian people. This effort on the part of the Australians was led by their defense minister, a fellow named Kim Beasley, a great friend of the United States, a man of considerable intelligence and, by the way, a U.S. Civil War freak, and an awfully good fellow. He sorted this out. By the time I got there in 1989, we had no problems and in these installations which I visited, they were manned jointly by the Australians and the Americans sitting side by side at computer consoles and whatever. To this day, I can’t tell you what all these facilities do for reasons of classification. But they are very important to the United States, incredibly important, and they played a very significant role later in my tour during the Gulf War.

Q: You were there during the Gulf War, weren’t you?

LANPHER: Yes.

Q: How did that play out? Or should we talk about other things before we get to that?

LANPHER: Why don’t we jump to that? Then I’ve got a couple of topics that I think ought to go
Our consultations were intensely close. The Australians immediately sent a couple of destroyers to the Persian Gulf. They were with us, worked very closely with us diplomatically and on the ground throughout the Gulf War. We kept the Australians extremely well informed. My wife recalled to me last night when I told her I’d be talking about Australia today and I asked her, “What were some of your memories?” She said, “I’ll never forget the dinner at the ambassador’s residence the night before the air war in the Gulf War began.” The equivalent of the Australian Joint Chiefs of Staff were there, the head of the army, the chairman of the Joint Staff, the head of the air force, navy, were all there. The minister of defense was there and there were six other senior Australian military and diplomatic officials. It was a dinner for about 20 people and their wives. My wife said, “It was quite incredible. Everybody in that room knew the war was going to start the next morning and nobody said a thing about it.” We were as one. Everybody knew what was going to happen and everybody kept their mouths shut, everybody was discreet, and everybody had a hell of a good evening at Ambassador Sembler’s house. She said it was quite surreal that we all had such an evening. I remember being in the embassy the following morning. A friend in the prime minister’s office called and said, “Turn on your CNN in about 10 minutes because that’s when the first Cruise missiles are going to hit.” We were that tight with the Australians.

Q: Was there any problem with people in Australia - it’s an immigrant nation to a certain extent - did the Gulf War cause any problems?

LANPHER: We had intelligence information and the Australians did. We had a very sharing intelligence relationship across the board with the Australians. There were threats of Iraqi terrorism on a worldwide basis. We had several close calls, including one in Zimbabwe, but another one in Indonesia, the Philippines, Greece... There were threats in Australia. There was intelligence information suggesting that there might be a threat, that there might be a sleeper Iraqi cell somewhere in Australia. So, for about six months, the Australians insisted on putting a policeman on my property at my house and he basically lived in my garage for six months on around the clock basis, which really impressed my little boys. He went through a lot of coffee and cookies that we kept him supplied with. I was never personally concerned. But the Australians went out of their way to provide protection to me. The ambassador lived in a secure compound, the embassy compound, but I lived off the compound. But nothing happened.

Q: Working out of Canberra, I would think that there would be a problem in that it’s somewhat isolated and the real political life would be taking place in Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane, Perth, and elsewhere. Did you find that you had to rely on your consulates to supply you with the real meat of what was going on in Australia?

LANPHER: Not really. Canberra has this image among Australians and outsiders of being a sheep station. In 1960, the population of Canberra was 59,000 people. By the time I got there in 1989, there was about 300,000. Government had gotten a lot bigger. Canberra was a very pleasant place to live. It had achieved by that time a critical mass. There were business
representatives, there were lobbyists, there were politicians from all over Australia that basically lived almost full-time in Canberra and would go home on weekends. I found I could stay pretty well plugged in. I had some very good contacts. I had some very good reporting and development of contacts done by our consulates, particularly in Melbourne and Sydney. But I thought we were pretty well informed. We had a relationship with the government both with the governing party and the opposition. I think we were sufficiently well plugged in even though Canberra was a small town away from the coasts. The ambassador traveled quite a lot. When I wasn’t minding the store in Canberra, I traveled quite a bit as well. I would have liked to have traveled more, but he traveled a lot and somebody had to mind the store in Canberra. But I got to Brisbane, to Perth three or four times, to Darwin, Hobart, Adelaide, Melbourne, Sydney, all these places more than once for most of them. Adelaide only once and Hobart only once. I think we stayed pretty well plugged in. Australians like to talk and they liked Americans. There weren’t very many secrets down there that they didn’t share with us. I got a heads up from within the labor party that “We’re going to roll Bob Hawk.” Just before I left, they tried it for the first time. But I had had a month’s warning and I was able to tell Washington ahead of time that, “Our good friend Bob Hawk is in trouble and there are elements within his own party that are out to dump him.”

Q: What was your reading on how Hawk was as a political leader?

LANPHER: I thought he was good. I think he was well liked and he was a popular figure. You could go to the racetrack in Canberra and he was a man of the people. He would be up there at the betting window along with everybody else with a pint of beer in one hand and putting down his bets. I think the real reason he was eventually dumped in favor of Paul Keating, the finance minister, was that there were a number of people within his party that were younger who felt that Hawk had had his eight years and it was time for somebody else. That’s sort of the head kicking nature of democracy in Australia.

Q: There were several things you wanted to talk about.

LANPHER: I already mentioned the spirit of the Coral Sea. That impressed me.

Q: That’s a battle that few Americans even think about.

LANPHER: Yes. But we as a government pay attention to it because it’s important. We always send a senior delegation out for Coral Sea Week. We’ve sent Vice Presidents and everything else out because it’s so important to the Australians and important to the relationship. But I never realized it myself until I went out there just how important we were. At times during the second world war, there were more American servicemen in Australia, up to a million at one time, than there were Australian men at home because the Australian men had all gone off to fight in North Africa and Europe. Then you go up and down the west coast of Australia. These little fishing villages were all home ports to American submarines who were the most effective force against the Japanese, sank more than anywhere else in the world. You find the intermarriages and the descendants of these World War II submariners all up and down the west coast of Australia. I once had a phone call from the governor general of Australia who said to me, “Gib, all my
friends, fellow politicians and everything, have been invited out to visit a U.S. carrier battle group and I’ve never been invited.” I said, “Well, I’ve got a battle group coming in in 10 days time out to Perth.” This was the Carl Vinson carrier battle group, 10,000 men and 10 ships. I said, “I can fix it up that you can go out and land on the carrier, be blasted off by catapult.” He said, “Can you really do that?” I said, “Yes.” I got a hold of my naval attaché and said, “We will do it, won’t we?” Of course, the Navy loves to do this sort of thing. So, the governor general and his wife and my wife and I, as chargé at the time, flew out to Perth. The Navy met us in Perth and took us out to this carrier and we landed and the tailhook caught the wire. We had a day on the carrier. We were royally treated. We watched air exercises. We had lunch with the admiral and the captain. Then they blasted us off and sent us back. The Governor General was absolutely thrilled. And the Navy did just a first-class job. Then the next day, the carrier battle group steamed into Fremantle, the port of Perth. Ten thousand sailors came ashore and were royally greeted by the Australians. They had a “dial a sailor” thing set up right in the harbor. Sailors called and got dates. My wife was just taken aback by the reception our guys got. And that helps. For the U.S. Navy, Australia is the port of call. It doesn’t matter which port. It’s their favorite country. It’s an intangible, but it’s quite important.

Another event I recall... Again, I was charge. My defense and air attaché came to me and said that the head of the Australian air force (a fellow I knew well) had come to him and said, “Look, one of our units that fought alongside your guys up in Darwin against the Japanese during the second world war was awarded a Presidential Unit Citation by President Roosevelt for their valor and heroism back in 1942. The citation was never delivered. All these guys in this unit, the few that are left, are getting old and wouldn’t it be a nice thing if we resurrected this thing and had a ceremony up in Darwin?” I said to my attaché, “That’s a great idea. See what you can get out of the Pentagon.” We got the citation and whatnot. The head of the Australian air force flew everybody, all the survivors from all over Australia, up to Darwin, including my wife because, for dumb reasons, my wife was not allowed to fly on our attaché aircraft. She went up on a 707 or something like that. We went up and it was the most lovely ceremony at dusk on the tarmac at Darwin where all these planes had taken off from during the second world war with these guys coming by on crutches and canes. I gave a little speech and the head of the air force gave a little speech and we had F18s streaking by in the sunset. It was quite a moving ceremony to see these old guys out there. It speaks to the history of our cooperation and why we have such reliable allies. They still care.

As I was saying, this relationship with CINCPAC and Australia is intense. Everybody from CINCPAC comes down to Australia at least twice a year. We do joint exercises with the Australians. Shortly after I arrived, I went up and participated with the number two in CINCPAC in a joint exercise. We had 24,000 Americans down in the Northern Territories swatting flies and doing the bush and whatever you do in joint exercises. But I must say, any time I had a problem with the State Department in Washington, all I had to do was call CINCPAC and outline the problem and they’d say, “Gib, we’ll take care of it.”

Q: Did you get any reflection of the relationship with New Zealand? We had had distant relations with New Zealand because of their government saying, “You can’t bring nuclear ships
LANPHER: Yes. This was a chronic problem in the ANZUS relationship. It really got under the skin of people in Washington, not only the Defense Department but also many folks in the State Department. We had any number of conversations with the Australians about the New Zealand problem. Just for the record, we have annual AUSMIN talks where the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense in alternating years come out to Australia for three days of talks or the Australians come to Washington. This was always on the agenda in the two years I was there. But I would also get separate instructions to talk to the Australians about it. As an anecdote, I went in to talk one on one with the prime minister, Bob Hawke, about this one day on instructions from Washington. I was basically trying to get him to help us think how we could approach the New Zealanders once again. We talked for about half an hour and then finally he said, “Don’t take notes of this, but the fundamental problem here is the Kiwis have shit for brains.” I thought I would fall out of my chair. All I could do was chuckle. It was what I would call a hearty perennial. I think in retrospect this was sort of a declaration of independence by the New Zealanders. It was a question of principle and politics in New Zealand. I think we made too big a deal out of it ourselves because we didn’t really need access to their ports for our nuclear powered war armed vessels. We had Australia. We didn’t need New Zealand for that. But it’s one of those things that countries get into a snit over and don’t know how to get out of. We had far more important issues with New Zealand in the area of trade, I always thought. But be that as it may.

Q: What about relations between Australia and Indonesia?

LANPHER: The Australians were always concerned about Indonesia. It was a big country to the north, a huge number of people. The Australians devoted a lot of time and energy to it. A lot of their intelligence service was devoted to Indonesia. I think we talked with the Australians quite a lot about Indonesia and they talked to us more than we talked to them. I didn’t have much direct dealings on Indonesia. This was usually done by my political section and our intelligence communities working together.

Another thing I’d like to mention... I’ve said how close our defense relations were and how much that paid off. Things weren’t always so good on the diplomatic side when I was there. Their foreign ministry was a bit less pragmatic, a little bit more dogmatic, and left-wing politically correct with the Third World and the developing world than the military was. Plus, they had a foreign minister, Gareth Evans, who was very bright, very energetic, but very tempestuous and who made his name back in the ‘60s leading anti-American anti-Vietnam protestors in Melbourne when Australia was with us in Vietnam and had troops on the ground. I don’t think Evans had ever gotten over his anti-Americanism. He tried to cover it up as best he could, and he did for the most part. But I saw it on several occasions during these Australian-U.S. ministerial talks. One year, Dick Cheney, our Secretary of Defense, and Jim Baker, our Secretary of State, came out for these talks. The formal talks were in Sydney, but they also came to Canberra. But it was quite clear that there was an antipathy between Baker and Evans that was just quite incredible. Everybody liked Dick Cheney. Cheney and the Australian military got on very well.
But Baker just couldn’t stand Evans. Evans was pretty nasty to his own staff. When you get a ministry talking out of school about their foreign minister, as they used to to me, it was uncomfortable. The relationship survived that, but it was a strain, the fact that Baker didn’t like Evans and I think vice-versa.

Q: How did you find the Australian media?

LANPHER: Very often and for the most part pretty responsible. They had their tabloids, but we didn’t have any major problems with the media. In fact, some of my best contacts and sources were the national media, the national political and diplomatic correspondents. They were good.

Q: Were any island issues coming up? Australia and the U.S. overlap dealing with some of the South Pacific islands.

LANPHER: We didn’t have much of a problem. The Australian concern was Papua New Guinea. They had a lot of nationals, a lot of investment there, and the place was a real mess. We had a very small embassy there, but that was basically their sphere of influence. Whatever they wanted to do, we were generally supportive.

Q: How about China, Vietnam, and Japan?

LANPHER: Once again, there were trade issues. Actually, we were quite helpful to Australia in terms of muscling the Japanese and the Koreans into, for our own purposes, opening up their markets to our agricultural products. But Australia received quite a bit of benefit from the opening up that we forced on those people, so they were quite happy about that, although they were unhappy about our market being relatively closed.

Q: As an observer of Australia, my impression is that it’s still a very male dominated society. Were you seeing any changes on the female side, a women’s movement? Were they looking to the U.S.? We were putting quite a bit of emphasis in the United States in bringing women more into the body politic and other things, sports, etc.?

LANPHER: Not as much as I would have liked. Your observation that Australia had that image at least at that time, ‘89-’91, and I haven’t been back so I don’t know if it’s changed. I and my wife were quite taken aback by how much the sexist male dominated society. I think that was really quite true as a generalization. There were lots of exceptions. But I recall one conversation my wife had. This was out in Perth when we went out for that carrier battlegroup visit. As part of that, once the ships were in port, we were invited to the Officer’s First Night Party at the Hyatt Regency in Perth. The ladies of Perth have a group that sponsors these things. The ladies, as my wife learned, pay about $10 a year to be on the list of invitees. The American officers coming ashore from all these ships chip in $50-100 a piece for this party and they rent the grand ballroom. So, we showed up at this party. My wife hadn’t seen anything like this since a college mixer. She was in college in the ‘60s. My wife being a good journalist, at that point on a leave of absence from the “Wall Street Journal,” just couldn’t believe what she was seeing when we went
into this ballroom, so she separated from me and went over to a group of these ladies and had a conversation. The ladies were adamant that this was on the up and up, that there were no hookers, there were no transvestites, these were all proper ladies. My wife said, “Well, why do you do this? What do you see in our guys? I’m not against our Navy officers and I’m sure they’re nice enough fellows, but why do you do this?” One of the women said, “You don’t know our men.” My wife said, “What do you mean?” The woman said to my wife, “When an Australian man invites us out on a date, he’ll call up and say, ‘Meet me at the pub.’ He won’t come pick you up. You go to the pub. He says, ‘Hi’ and then he goes over and stands with his mates drinking beer until he can’t stand up and then you’re expected to put him in a cab and send him home.” My wife was astounded and said, “And our guys?” This woman said, “Your guys are perfect gentlemen. They say ‘please’ and ‘thank you.’ You don’t have to send them home in a cab. They behave themselves. They’re nice guys.” Out of every one of these carrier battlegroup visits, probably three or four marriages result.

Q: Back in ’69/’70 when I was consul general in Saigon, our military men used to get R&R. The ones who went to Australia were just delighted. They’d come back and say, “Here are these beautiful, wonderful ladies, and these stupid Australian men don’t understand what they’ve got. This is paradise.” They enjoyed the company of women.

LANPFER: Yes.

Q: And we’re all trained to be kind of nice to women and it’s a good deal.

LANPFER: Exactly what my wife found. But leaving that aside, the Australians are a very welcoming people. They’re a tremendous ally and lots of fun. I’m a trout fisherman and I soon found some friends in Canberra who had properties up in the hills outside of Canberra where I could go trout fishing. When Cheney and Baker came out, I got a backchannel phone call from the Pentagon saying, “Cheney really likes trout fishing. Is there any way on that Sunday that they’re going to be in Canberra that Cheney and Baker could get a morning of trout fishing in?” I said, “I think I can arrange it” and quietly arranged it with a retired navy captain friend of mine, an Australian. It was kind of a hoot. The captain said later, “I took them up there, but they brought all these security people up who were scaring the sheep and everything else. But you know, that Cheney is a world class fly fisherman. Baker’s got a lot of learning to do.”

Q: Any other issues?

LANPFER: One of the things that people don’t appreciate always is how burdensome management can be. I’d been a DCM before, but being a DCM in Australia with a huge mission spread over a huge country was kind of a challenge. It took up a lot more of my time than I suppose I would have preferred. It was my job, so I did it and I did it faithfully. But there were so many substantive issues that I would have liked to have gotten more immersed in. I got into the agricultural and military security issues. But management took up an awful lot of time. When you have four consulates and a big mission, you spend a hell of a lot of time doing things like efficiency reports. Because my ambassador was not a writer, I had to write all of his. So, I did all
the consuls general. I did all the review statements. I did all the section chiefs and service chiefs and everything else. It took a while. On top of that, I had the unfortunate experience of having to send a consul general packing for loss of confidence. As a lot of people in the service know, to do such a thing, you really have to spend a lot of time documenting it.

Q: Without going into names, how would this problem manifest itself?

LANPHER: I started and some of my section chiefs in Canberra started to get phone calls from the consulate in question about the competence and erratic behavior of the consul general. This sort of built up. I had met the consul general, who had been directly assigned without consultation with the post by the Director General. It built up and I finally decided, one, that I had to start documenting what I was hearing, which I did. Finally, I went out and did a personal three day inspection of the post in question, talking to everybody from the American officers to the local staff down to the drivers and also to people in the local community who interacted with the consul general. I came away after three days saying this person had to go. I told the person this. I was threatened with lawsuits, but I said, “That’s the way it is.” I went back and wrote a seven page cable and had notes to document every conversation. The Director General was a little bit unhappy because he had personally assigned this person out there, but in the end, this person was pulled.

Q: Was it a personality problem or was it alcohol?

LANPHER: It was personality. Sadly, and it’s a sad commentary on our service, the problems that this person showed at this post had been problems that had been manifest before and nobody had ever had the guts or the will or the time to take it on frontally and do the right thing. I did. I never had more thanks in all the time I was in the service. I had personal notes from people in the consulate afterwards about, “Gib, thank you very much. You showed real guts in doing it.”

Q: Did you see any other things? By having all these people at these different posts, were you seeing any signs of new trends or things that were happening within the Foreign Service?

LANPHER: It’s difficult to make a generalization without sounding like an old fart. And maybe I am an old fart. But I thought I was seeing starting in Australia sort of a bit of a breakdown of the sort of discipline that I had been accustomed to when I came into the Foreign Service back in the 60s. And it manifested itself in small ways. When I came into the Foreign Service, I was told, “If you’re invited to a reception at the ambassador’s or the DCM’s house, one, you go; and, two, you get there 10 minutes ahead of time so you’re there to help out with the guests and you mingle with the invitees, not your fellow Americans.” I saw quite a bit of a breakdown in Australia on that score, people declining invitations, not RSVPing an invitation, not showing up on time. I saw that later when I was ambassador in Zimbabwe to a certain extent. My wife, who was late joining me in the Foreign Service, my second wife, noticed this as well to the point where in Zimbabwe later, she said, “We will not invite that officer to our home again.” But again, I’d rather not sound like an old fart.
On the other hand, I think, certainly reflecting on the last 10 years in the service, the management of the State Department got to be pretty bad and was not as supportive of the troops as it should have been. This led to a certain malaise in the Foreign Service. I know I came back in 1995 from Zimbabwe after essentially six years away from Washington. I’d go in on a Saturday morning as I had always done. I was a Deputy Assistant Secretary. But I’d be virtually alone in the State Department, where it used to be a bustling place on a Saturday morning. There was nobody there. I used to counsel junior officers. I detected much less of a sense of a career commitment. “If I like it, I’m going to stay, but there are other things to do and I’m not wedded to a career in the Foreign Service.”

J. RICHARD BOCK
Consul General
Melbourne (1989-1992)

Richard Bock was born in Philadelphia and raised in Shelton, Washington. He attended the University of Washington and Princeton University and entered the Foreign Service in 1955. His career included posts in Germany, Vietnam, Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, and Australia. He was interviewed in 2002 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: Today is August 21, 2002. You went to Melbourne. You were there from when to when?


Q: How had Melbourne been treated by the system? Had the political process snuck in there?

BOCK: No, not that I’m aware of. We had had political ambassadors off and on in Canberra, but not in the principal officer positions, even in Sydney as far as I know.

Q: Who was the ambassador while you were there?

BOCK: He went out just about the same time I did. It was Mel Sembler, who was a political appointee, had been one of President Bush’s campaign officials and was also active in the Nancy Reagan anti-drug campaign.

Q: Before you went out to Australia, when you talked to the desk and others, were there any simmering problems dealing with Melbourne that you felt you had to concentrate on?

BOCK: I suppose the major Melbourne-specific problem revolved around [naval] ship visits. There was a somewhat left-wing government in Melbourne which had an anti-nuclear position and had raised difficulties for various sorts of ship visits in the state. Of course, ship visits were basically a federal issue in Australia, but there was this local component to it.
Q: Can you talk a little about how you saw Melbourne, where it fit in the Australian composition?

BOCK: Melbourne was sort of the less flashy counterpart to Sydney. It’s not quite as large a city. It used to be the seat of government. It was and still is the major manufacturing city in Australia. It was a magnet for very large scale immigration in the ‘60s and ‘70s and continuing on and was a very strong labor union center. This meant that the Labor party was heavily tied in with the labor unions and was certainly influenced by them. In national politics, it was kind of a mixed bag. Victoria was the second largest state, so a lot of people from the state of Victoria were active in national politics. But it didn’t have the clout that the Sydney area had.

Q: I assume that because of manufacturing, it was more of a blue collar city.

BOCK: It was a mix. It was heavily blue collar but also a lot of old money. Sydney is kind of brash, sort of the Los Angeles of Australia. Melbourne might be the Boston. I wouldn’t carry that too far... So that you had this kind of old line pro-British upper crust combined with this blue collar mostly non-British, considerably Irish, but also a lot of continental European and increasingly Asian blue collar workforce.

Q: What was your principal work there?

BOCK: The principal work outside of managing the consulate was really representational. It was getting out and around and trying to explain U.S. policies, trying to build support for them. This was right at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union. It included the period of the Gulf War. The role of the United States was changing and attitudes all over the world were undergoing reappraisal as to what the role of the U.S. should be and what the role of their own country vis a vis the U.S. should be. So, I took on a lot of speaking engagements as well as more private conversations to try to deal with what it was we were trying to do.

Q: Obviously, things were changing all over. Our prime concern had been the Soviet Union and all of a sudden, whammo, the Soviet Union had gone. Then you had the invasion of Kuwait and our response to it. Being in a place like Melbourne, did you find that you got good guidance or did you kind of do it on your own?

BOCK: There was a good deal of information available through the wireless file and other sources from Washington that I could draw on, but, yes, I put together things pretty much on my own based on whatever I could get out of Washington.

Q: What were groups you talked to particularly interested in?

BOCK: I think they were interested in... This was a time when this “new world order” was being bandied around. Bush used the term once or twice and that sort of became a grand plan that, in
fact, nobody had. But it was dealing with that kind of question - where are we going now in the world? I should mention that there were more parochial things that would come up. We were pushing for what’s now termed “globalization” - I’m not sure that term was being used then – in the economic sphere. Well, the Australians had all sorts of quibbles about our agricultural policy, for instance. There were a lot of other economic issues that cropped up as well. But in the overview, it was, now that the Cold War is over, where does the Australian-U.S. alliance fit in to the big picture?

Q: What did the Australian-American alliance mean?

BOCK: Well, it’s an interesting question. It wasn’t an easy one to answer because the original Australian-American alliance was anti-Japanese. Then it became anti-communist and depending on the point of view either anti-Soviet or anti-Chinese. By this time, very few Australians wanted an anti-Chinese alliance and we weren’t pushing that either. But then looming over the Australian horizon was Indonesia with some people seeing it as an opportunity and some seeing it as a threat. In population terms, it just totally overwhelms Australia. So, one of the perspectives you could bring up was that our role in the Pacific was a way of integrating these various countries in a way which would be of mutual benefit. That included what was at the time our increasingly closer relations with ASEAN, including Indonesia. That drew a positive response from a lot of Australians.

Q: When you were getting out there and talking, did you push the ASEAN side of things? In other words, it’s not just us, but we’re all in this together?

BOCK: To some extent. I wouldn’t say I pushed ASEAN per se, but yes, the idea that these relationships in East Asia were cooperative and were working was the sort of thing you did.

Q: I always think of the Battle of the Coral Sea, which in American terms is not a skirmish but is not major. Was this something that was passed out?

BOCK: There was a deliberate effort to perpetuate it. There was an annual Coral Sea celebration in which the U.S. sent a presidential envoy and we would plan various events around that. It certainly is true that the old veterans and their contemporaries were the ones that really felt this. But it was a useful vehicle for having various events which would celebrate Australian-American ties. A lot of younger people got involved in this, too.

Q: You mentioned agricultural policy. What was the perspective there about our agricultural policy versus the Australian one?

BOCK: Their perspective was that we were subsidizing our exports, period, particularly wheat. Beef was also an issue. Our perspective was that we were in competition with a heavily subsidizing European Union and that we were using only targeted subsidies to recipient countries where Australia was not a competitor. I didn’t get too deeply involved in this because I didn’t have the expertise. We had an agricultural counselor up in Canberra. But I was not convinced.
There were times during those three years when Australian agriculture was in trouble. They rely on exports and to the extent that we were underpricing our exports, it was a real problem.

Q: Did you find that the European immigrant population there was getting involved in European politics? Particularly I think of Yugoslavia. When I was consul in Belgrade back in the '60s, a hell of a lot of Yugoslavs were either going to the United States or to Australia. How did that play out?

BOCK: That was certainly the case. The two largest continental European immigrant groups in Melbourne were Italians and Greeks. With the occasional exception of a Greek-Turkish thing, there wasn’t that much home politics that they would reflect there. But there were substantial populations of Yugoslavs which in the period after '89 we suddenly began to identify as Serbs and Croats and Albanians. Yes, they got quite active and we had a whole series of demonstrations at the consulate, not against anything we were doing, but they had grievances on what was happening back home and they wanted the United States to do something about that. It started off with Albanians. Then with the breakup of Yugoslavia, it became more general.

Q: What did you do?

BOCK: Well, if they had a petition they wanted to hand in, we’d take their petition and we made sure with the police that things were orderly. We had one or two demonstrations which threatened to get out of hand. I couldn’t tell you now which groups they were, but over the three year period, it wasn’t a serious problem.

Q: I interviewed Tex Harris. Was he in Sydney or Melbourne?

BOCK: He was in Melbourne some years after I was.

Q: He was saying that they got pretty nasty then because that was when we were actively intervening. Particularly the Serbs would go there with slingshots with big ball bearings.

BOCK: Yes. We didn’t have that.

Q: We hadn’t gotten that involved.

BOCK: Yes, that’s true. We were still before that.

Q: What was your impression of how Australia was integrating its people? I always think there is the melting pot theory in the United States and Canada has the stew theory, separate chunks but they all mix.

BOCK: I would say there were two issues, much as there are in Canada. One was the immigrant population. There were political differences with the more conservative parties holding on to a kind of British oriented Australia and the Labor Party being much more engaged in integrating
and not just integrating but recognizing the heritage of these other groups. It never took on a particularly acute form while I was there. It was a sort of underlying debate that was going on. Then, of course, there was the aborigine population, which in numbers is quite small, but in terms of individual problems, it’s much, much greater than a question of integrating Greeks or even Vietnamese. The Australians were wrestling with this problem throughout. They still are. Land rights are involved. Native culture is involved. And they’ve made a lot of strides over the past several decades toward dealing with the problem, but they certainly haven’t solved it. Their aborigine problem struck me as combining the worst elements of our white-black race relations and Native American problem.

Q: In your position as consul general, did you find you were going after two groups, the old money and then the Labor type group? How did you spread yourself around and how did you find these groups?

BOCK: You dealt with what groups you could find. There were business groups of various sorts. For instance, both the kind of Rotary Club small business people and the equivalent of the Business Roundtable. I tried to keep good contact with both. I had various conversations with labor leaders, but the labor people were difficult to deal with. I could deal with the Labor Party. But not the unions by and large. Some of the unions were approachable and some were basically not. There were some real left-wingers there who had this - part of their ideological makeup was that the American government was bad.

Q: I’m told that in Australia you had some people who came over from the old British labor system, the type of guys who would gather together once a year and sing the Red Flag Forever.

BOCK: Yes. I think it was very much the same strain.

Q: Combining both a close communist tinge plus the left-wing intellectual despises the United States.

BOCK: Yes. The head of the labor movement in Melbourne when I arrived was a guy named John Halfpenny. He had the reputation of being able to pretty much manipulate the Victoria state government and I was able to talk to him on a few occasions but he really wasn’t interested in talking to Americans and had this view that our policy was all wrong, if not evil.

Q: How did the Gulf War play?

BOCK: We were the subject of some demonstrations, not violent, by people who were basically anti-war. It wasn’t that they thought Saddam Hussein was a good guy. The general population was quite supportive. We took on very tight security precautions at that time. This was decided at the embassy in Canberra. I had personal protection for about four months as well as heightened protection on the consulate. That was largely based on the fact that there was a significant Arab population in Australian made up of all sorts of people and there was a fear that there could be some terrorists among them.
Q: There were reports going out that Saddam Hussein had sent agents abroad.

BOCK: Yes, and I think Australia was included in it, but I don’t think there was ever any solid evidence of that.

Q: But I remember those stories and Australia and the Philippines were particularly noted for that.

BOCK: Yes.

Q: What was your impression of the absorption of and the Asiatic influence? It was really quite new.

BOCK: It was mostly new. There was an old line Chinese population in Melbourne that had come over in the gold rush, but the vast majority of Asians in Melbourne tended to be Chinese and Vietnamese, although you had a sprinkling of Indonesians as well. Clearly, integration was much slower there, but it was happening. I should describe the setup there. Melbourne is a city of three million but the mayor of Melbourne only has control over the downtown business district and then you’ve got all these separate suburbs that have their own town councils. We were starting to see Vietnamese being elected to these small town councils. So, they were gradually finding their way into the political system, but it was slow.

Q: Were we making any effort to show what we were doing regarding this in the U.S.? Or did we find ourselves just observers?

BOCK: I wouldn’t say there was any kind of a push to do this. The subject would come up. I and others would take the opportunity to say, “This here is what we’ve been able to do.” But having served earlier in Germany, there really was a difference. Australia was a self-defined country of immigration. So, they recognized they had an obligation to do something about this. It was just a question of what was going to work as opposed to Germany, which at the time I was there was still in denial and saying, “We’re not a country of immigration. We’re a country of Germans.”

Q: Australia being so far away, did you get many Americans coming over who got in trouble?

BOCK: Oh, yes. There is quite a tourist industry, including Americans. And we had rare bird smugglers and you name it.

Q: What did your consular district include?

BOCK: The Melbourne consular district was and I think still is about half of Australia. It included not only the state of Victoria but the state of South Australia, Tasmania, and the Northern Territory. So, it had the entire central swath and then the southeast corner.
Q: What about Tasmania? Was this kind of fun to visit?

BOCK: Yes. I tried to get to both Tasmania and South Australia quarterly if possible. In Tasmania, it was often the occasion- (end of tape)

The Tasmania government was very welcoming of U.S. Navy visits. Plus, they could handle much larger ships, the aircraft carriers would come to Tasmania, which even if the political situation allowed could not get into Melbourne.

Q: I would think that an aircraft carrier with 3,000 men or something like that in Tasmania…

BOCK: They would love to have come into a bigger city. Hobart is a city of a little over 100,000. So, you’d get down there for that. Tasmania politics were interesting as well. They had a Green Party which was much further along in popular acceptance than it was anywhere else. But the ultimate significance of Tasmania was pretty low.

Q: We’ve had this thing for the last few decades with New Zealand about nuclear ships. I don’t know where it stands today, but it certainly brought relations there to practically a halt. Was there any residue of this?

BOCK: There was in Victoria state, yes, but not with the federal government, which was perfectly supportive of nuclear powered ship visits. The nuclear weapons issue was a little more difficult for them. It seems to me there was some change in our declaratory policy, but I’m not sure now when it was. At any rate, we basically had the support of the federal government in Canberra for ship visits, nuclear powered, and nobody was going to raise a question of whether there were any nuclear arms there. But getting the government of Victoria to support that was a problem and until they would support it, the federal government wouldn’t force a visit and neither would we. We actually got some ship visits during the latter part of my tenure there. But that was after a couple of different state premiers had come and gone. It wasn’t easy.

Q: Was this again because of the leftist labor side?

BOCK: Yes. And there was a very strong anti-nuclear feeling in Australia which had almost but not quite stopped their shipments of raw uranium but which had actually prevented them from doing any uranium processing. So, they were shipping only the ore.

Q: Did you get involved with our listening stations up in the north?

BOCK: No. We had some consular issues occasionally involving them, but our consular people handled that. I did not get involved at all in anything else.

Q: Was there much of a flow of Australians to the United States other than as tourists?
BOCK: Yes.

Q: Let’s talk about flow either as tourists or as immigrants.

BOCK: We had a practical problem in that after the institution of the visa waiver program for European countries and various others, we wanted Australia to be on board as well, but it required reciprocity and the Australians wouldn’t, for reasons of their own, grant reciprocity, visa free entry to Americans. So, at the time, the Melbourne consulate was the third largest visa issuing post in the world. We had over 100,000 visas a year. It was a terrible burden and we had some real public relations problems because there was just a massive flow and we had two officers.

Q: What did you do? I assume they’d come in bushel baskets.

BOCK: Yes, a lot of it was done through travel agencies, the same sort of thing which is now being criticized in Saudi Arabia but which worked quite well in Australia. But even so, managing that flow was quite a problem. As far as immigrants or workers, there was some of that but it was a tourist problem mostly.

Q: I would think there would be for bright Australians, particularly in the newer fields of electronics, of computers, and so on, they would tend towards the States as a place where they could show what they could do.

BOCK: Yes. Certainly a number of them did. I mean, you had a good number of students going in there and a number presumably staying, as students tend to do. I don’t remember anybody complaining about a brain drain. I don’t think it was considered a problem.

Q: I assume there were some universities in your area.

BOCK: There were three major universities in Melbourne and then there were also some in the other states. I can’t say that I had all that much to do with them on a regular basis. We had a public affairs officer at the time and he took as one of his major tasks cultivating the university crowd and I left that to him by and large.

Q: How did the writ of the embassy run?

BOCK: It don’t think there were any major issues. We were kept on a fairly short leash administratively, but that didn’t bother me too much. We had quarterly meetings in Canberra with all the principal officers. People from the embassy were always coming down for one reason or another. The ambassador loved to come to Melbourne. He always regarded Melbourne as his favorite city, so we were getting lots and lots of ambassadorial visits. It was all pretty cooperative. I don’t remember any major issues.
Ms. Meyers was born in Virginia and obtained degrees from Southwestern University and Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. A Japanese and Burmese language officer, she served tours in Tokyo, Yokohama and Fukuoka in Japan and as Principal Officer (Chargé d’Affaires) in Rangoon. Other assignments include Johannesburg, Canberra and Washington, where she dealt primarily with economic matters. Ms. Meyers was interviewed by Thomas Dunnigan in 2005.

Q: In 1991, you went to Australia as DCM. Who was the ambassador then?

MEYERS: A gentleman named Mel Sembler, who was a Presidential appointee as Ambassador to Australia and Nauru, the island state just north of Australia.

Q: Was it a large embassy?

MEYERS: Yes. Not as big as Tokyo but it was a large embassy, with several agencies represented.

Q: Yes, and you had a number of consulates, too, didn’t you?

MEYERS: Yes, four. We had Perth, Melbourne, Sydney, the largest, and then Brisbane, which was still open then but has since been closed. We also had a consular agent in Adelaide.

Q: Did you get around to the consulates?

MEYERS: Yes, an orientation trip within a couple of months of getting there. After that I traveled sometimes for a specific event or to represent the ambassador. And then, when I was chargé for about seven or eight months, I got around quite a bit.

Q: What problems did you have as DCM there?

MEYERS: Basically the relationship is very sound and goes back for years. We had fought together in World War II and in Vietnam. The Aussies were also right there during the Gulf War, Operation Desert Storm. Our greatest friction was in the economic trade area. We were heavily subsidizing our agricultural exports, particularly then, to try to force the Europeans, who were subsidizing even more than we were, to come to the negotiating table. Our euphemism for this was the Export Enhancement Program (EEP). And the Australians were very unhappy about this because we were selling below their cost into their export markets. They didn’t have sufficient budget to subsidize their wheat farmers. So we were knocking them out of markets where, had
there been no subsidies, they could have done quite well. And they were upset about this and understandably so. The agricultural and economic counselors dealt with this problem frequently but the Aussies also raised it with the ambassador. The best we could do to assuage them was to try to tell them a bit ahead of time if a big EEP sale was about to take place. But we couldn’t tell them too far ahead lest the information affect the actual grain trading on the Chicago market. I remember in particular receiving cabled instructions once to go tell the Prime Minister at such and such time in Washington -- not a minute sooner -- that we were about to announce a large wheat sale. It turned out to be 10:30 p.m. in Canberra! So, yes, I did go to the PM’s office as instructed but I didn’t see Paul Keating. I saw two of his aides who said he would not be pleased at the news. So EEP was our major headache.

Q: How were our relations with the Australian Labour government in those days?

MEYERS: They were quite good. Prime Minister Bob Hawke had brought the Australian government a lot closer to us on defense issues. As I mentioned before, Hawke had sent a couple naval ships to join us in the Gulf War and he became a very good friend of President Bush. So the big event that took place while I was there was the state visit of President George H. W. Bush, the first since Lyndon Johnson had come in 1967. The Australians were delighted that President Bush came. The government wasn’t so happy with the timing, because it fell right over New Year’s and fouled up everyone’s holiday plans. And, of course, everyone in the Embassy also had their holiday leave cancelled and I, as the DCM, got to tell them!

Q: Did the President get into these agricultural problems or was it mainly a good will visit?

MEYERS: It was primarily a good will visit to underline the soundness of the overall relationship, despite our EEP difficulties. And the President did have the courage to mention the EEP program and to say that we would try to take Australia's sensitivities into account. But he didn’t say we would back off it because, of course, we wouldn’t.

Q: We didn’t have any military problems then, with our bases or anything else, while you were there?

MEYERS: No. As you know we do not have any troops stationed in Australia, and our intelligence cooperation went smoothly.

Q: It sounds like an interesting tour. Any speechmaking there?

MEYERS: Yes. All DCMs get involved in public diplomacy, and sometimes I would represent the Ambassador if he couldn’t go. Then, of course, I was also chargé for eight months. One of the most memorable events I attended was in a small town called Albany in Western Australia. It was around our Memorial Day. During the Second World War a lot of U.S. submarines were based there. The town holds a beautiful commemorative service each year called “Still on Patrol.” Some subs, of course, never came back. They have a bell there that was taken off a sub. And everyone stands at attention as the ambassador or chargé or whoever’s representing the
embassy reads the list of the submarines that are “still on patrol.” And then they toll the bell once for each sub. And it is so moving. Ambassador Sembler had left by May 1993 so I, as chargé, went to Albany and participated in the service. I still get misty just thinking about it.

Q: Well, any final thoughts on your tour in Australia?

MEYERS: It was wonderful. Not only was I working with a country and people whom I greatly admired and have a great deal of affection for, many of whom became good friends, but I had the opportunity to work under two different ambassadors, one a political appointee, the other career. Both of them brought different strengths to their job. Political ambassadors are often trashed for general incompetence and insensitivity, but that certainly was not my experience. Mel Sembler had a genuine interest in the relationship and he certainly had a wonderful appreciation of what his professional staff could do for him. He never felt threatened by us. He put his business acumen and people skills to good use; we complimented each other nicely. Then I had a chance to be chargé and run the Embassy and that was a growing experience too.

MARK E. MOHR
Consul

Mr. Mohr was born in New York and raised in New York and New Jersey. He was educated at the University of Rochester and Harvard University, where he studied the Chinese language. After service in Korea with the Peace Corps, he joined the Foreign Service in 1969, and served abroad in Taipei, Taichung, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Beijing and Brisbane. In his service at the State Department in Washington, Mr. Mohr dealt primarily with Far East Affairs. After his retirement he worked at the Department of Energy on Nuclear energy matters. In 1997 he was recalled to the State Department, where he worked as Korean desk officer. Mr. Mohr was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2009.

Q: Today is 27 January 2010 with Mark Mohr. Mark we are off to Australia. What are the dates you served there in Australia?

MOHR: Let’s see, from the summer of 1992 to the summer of 1995. It was a three-year tour. There was very little not to like. I was the boss for the first time in my professional life. When I wanted something done, it got done. No waiting. I decided on what I wanted to report, wrote it up, edited it, approved it, and sent it out. Again, no waiting. I had a fabulous residence, with a huge lawn and a swimming pool. There were even outdoor bathrooms, so if I gave a party, the guests never had to enter the house.

Q: Was Australia and New Zealand, were these considered to be outside the real game in East Asia?
MOHR: Oh, most definitely. They certainly weren’t considered career-enhancing assignments. I knew full well when I went to Brisbane that I would not get promoted into the senior foreign service. I was offered a job in 1992 as East Asian advisor in the office of the undersecretary for political affairs. This probably would have gotten me promoted into the senior foreign service. But again, in that job, you worked until 8 or 9 p.m. every night. I turned that down too. I truly needed a rest. My thinking was: better to go to Brisbane and not get promoted than to have a nervous breakdown. I just knew I wouldn’t do well as a patient at St. Elizabeth’s, D.C.’s local mental hospital.

Q: Well let’s talk about Brisbane.

MOHR: OK. I had been dealing with the Chinese communists, both in Beijing and Washington, for four years. It was quite stressful. It was an adversarial relationship. We were not friends. So going to Australia, to an allied nation, was like entering a different world. It took me months to adjust to the fact, much like Sally Fields accepting the academy award, that the people I met “really liked me. They really liked me.” More accurately, they genuinely liked Americans. And even though it was the early 1990s, they had received a big psychic shock during World War II. The Japanese had successfully occupied Papua New Guinea. They were very close to invading Australia. Imagine how we would have felt if the Japanese had conquered British Columbia, in Canada. There was the real possibility that Australia, a continent, would be invaded by the Japanese. In the event, the Australians felt that America was responsible for saving them, and unlike the French, they were more than willing to say thank you. And since I was the only official U.S. representative in Queensland, the province of which Brisbane is the capital, the people there felt obligated to be nice to me to show their gratitude. It was wonderful.

Q: What was working at the consulate like?

MOHR: It was small, a consulate, not a consulate-general. I was the only American, and I had five foreign service nationals (FSNs) working for me. Three did consular work, one was my administrative assistant, and one was the receptionist/chauffeur. That was Norman. He was a British immigrant. So I had a British chauffeur, very classy. The other FSNs were all female. They all were competent, and supported each other. It was the first time I had an office with no personnel problems. I was fortunate in that regard. Moreover at the time Brisbane, and the entire province of Queensland as well, was booming economically. As Australia is relatively close to Indonesia and Singapore, American companies were moving to Brisbane as their southeast Asian headquarters. It was safer, the educational system was better, and everyone spoke English. So my reporting was mostly on economic and commercial matters, although I did the occasional political piece. Reporting was not too stressful. I averaged one cable per week. I was not under any illusion that Washington was waiting with baited breath for my reports.

Q: OK, let’s talk about the city of Brisbane a bit.

MOHR: The first thing you notice is the weather. It is close to perfect. Queensland is known in
Australia as the sunshine state. It says so on their license plates. About ten months of the year, the high is 85 and the low 65. Then in the summer months, January and February, it is a bit hotter. Weather has a direct effect on one’s disposition, so the attitude of most people was sunny as well. They are serious about their work, but also serious about their leisure time, be it planning for what to do on weekends, or how to spend their vacations. One funny thing is that on the unusual cloudy day, people start mumbling discontentedly. If there is a second cloudy day, they start grumbling. In the rare event of a third cloudy day, they are downright unhappy. It is as if they feel they had a constitutional right to wake up in the morning and see sunshine. For most of the year, they did. I soon acquired a girlfriend who was a former Australian model and a Miss Queensland. She was Italian-Australian, with blond hair and green eyes. She was also quite social and verbal. I was on the top of the society. I was the American consul representing the country who had saved them from the Japanese during WWII. I hobnobbed with the elites of Brisbane society. People kept trying to think of ways of doing things for me. As they say in the McDonalds’ commercials, I was “lovin’ it.”

Q: Well did the battle of the Coral Sea syndrome die down while you were there?

MOHR: No, not at all. They observed every battle. I was required to attend every celebration of every anniversary of every WWII battle. In the 1990s, most such anniversaries were the 50th year, so they were rather big and important. One advantage was I got to know the premier, Wayne Goss, fairly well. He was from the labor party, but was progressive labor. That is to say, he believed that the best the government could do for a worker was not to provide welfare, but a job. His chief of staff was Kevin Rudd, who later went on to be a prime minister of Australia. Kevin was my friend at the time, and we would have lunch once or twice a month. He was a former Australian foreign service officer, specializing in China, so we had a lot in common.

Q: What were our interests in Brisbane?

MOHR: It was mainly the growing American commercial presence, and also helping out the Americans who had settled in the province after WWII. I remember that an uncle of John Riggins, the Washington Redskins football star, was there. Unfortunately, the consulate closed down for budgetary reasons after I left. Consulate-General Sydney now covers Queensland. So I was the last U.S. consul there. An historical footnote.

The real story of the closing is an interesting one. I found it out from the DCM. The stated reason, as noted above, was for budgetary reasons. It was a time of cutbacks, but in reality Brisbane had escaped the list of post closings. State was going to close one or two consulates in East Asia. Each post was asked to submit a rationale for its remaining open. My rationale was that a consulate’s main function at that time was to provide service and opportunities to U.S. businesses. U.S. companies were increasing their presence in Brisbane. AT&T had just come in. I had recently helped secure a quarter of a billion dollar contract for a U.S. firm. There was a need for American citizen services, and most of the U.S. citizens residing in Queensland were elderly, so traveling to Sydney would be a real inconvenience for them. I found out from the DCM that my rationale was accepted, and Brisbane initially was not on the list to be cut.
However, the number one consulate on the list to be cut was Sapporo in Japan. The ambassador to Tokyo at the time was former vice president Walter Mondale. Mondale called his friend, then Vice President Al Gore, and complained. Gore called State, and told it that Sapporo was to remain open. In order to keep Sapporo open, which was very expensive, State had to cut two consulates in East Asia. So Brisbane and one consulate in Indonesia, Medan, was added to the list. The incoming consul to Medan was just finishing one year of Indonesian language training at the time. She was informed that her post was to be closed, and that she had to get another assignment. Because I did not have equal or greater political influence than a former vice president, my consulate was closed as well. Another example of life being unfair.

Q: Who was the consul general in Sydney?

MOHR: At the time, it was Greg Bujac. He was a bit unusual, in that he came out of the division of security affairs (SY). He was a great guy, with great people skills, and whenever I needed something from Sydney, he would provide it. I had no doubt that he would be capable of covering Queensland as well, but it hurt that we would be closed, and that five extremely loyal and hard-working employees would be out of work.

Q: Did you try to fight the decision?

MOHR: There was nothing I could do. To make matters worse, I was informed of the closing in the following manner. The administrative counselor called, pointedly noting that he was calling on behalf of the ambassador. He told me that the decision had been made to close Brisbane, two years in the future. However, on orders from the ambassador, I was not to tell my staff. I replied, “You can’t be serious.” He said, “No, I am perfectly serious. This is an order from the ambassador.” I said, “You can tell the ambassador that I will not be obeying this order. I felt it was unethical. “Correct me if I am wrong,” I said, “but what you want to do is keep these people in ignorance so they will work here. That is to say, it will be most convenient for you. No one will leave early, and you won’t be faced with the difficult situation of trying to get someone new to work at a post that will be closing soon. So keep the staff in the dark, tell them nothing, and you won’t be inconvenienced. Then at the last minute, when it will be really hard if not impossible for them to get another job, you will say, ‘Oops sorry you are fired.’ Well, I won’t be a party to this. I am going to tell my staff that the consulate is closing.”

The administrative counselor said, “You realize what the consequences may be.” I replied, “Yes, the ambassador could send me home. However, I don’t care. This is important to me. Throughout my career I have basically been treated decently by my superiors. However, there were times when I was not. I said to myself that when I am in a position of authority I am going to make sure the people who are working for me are treated fairly. Now was the time to act on those principles. He said, “I will talk to the ambassador.” The ambassador was Ed Perkins, who I knew and liked. I felt he was a decent person. In the event, I was correct in my judgment, as Perkins let me stay. It all worked out. I was right to tell the staff, and the administrative counselor was wrong in his desire to keep them in the dark. By telling the staff, I secured their loyalty. They were able to plan their futures, and the earliest any staff member left was one week before the
consulate closed. The department did do one nice thing: it offered jobs to two of my consular staff, in Sydney. One agreed, and one decided not to move.

Q: That is interesting because Ed Perkins essentially came out of the personnel field.

MOHR: Right.

Q: You would have thought he would have had a particular sympathy to the staff.

MOHR: Interesting point. Perhaps the whole idea not to tell the staff originated with the administrative counselor, and he just made up the stuff about the ambassador.

Q: It may have been the admin counselor trying to make things easier for himself. Good for you.

MOHR: Yes, I am very proud of that, and Perkins did support me. My staff was all Australian, and they were wonderful. They worked hard for me, and I owed it to them to support them as best I could.

Q: Well let’s talk a bit about your time there.

MOHR: As I said, I did mostly commercial reporting, with a bit of local politics thrown in. The representatives of the major political parties were thrilled that I was interested in their work, and always made time for me. My predecessor had been a career consular officer, and she was not interested in political matters. In addition, a big part of my responsibilities were representational. There was a lot of public speaking, not just limited to military anniversaries. I was asked to speak at many events. As I like to talk, this was not a problem.

Q: Well were there any military considerations, from the American military?

MOHR: Not in Brisbane. There were military anniversaries, and U.S. military representatives would attend. One time I had the commander in chief of Pacific forces (CINCPAC) visit for the 50th anniversary of the battle of the Coral Sea. In protocol terms, I outranked him. If neither the ambassador nor the DCM were present in Queensland, I was the representative of the president of the United States. Therefore, I outranked anyone in the military. This was very cool, as my personal rank was only equivalent to a colonel, but when CINCPAC, a four-star general (actually in this case an admiral), came to Queensland, I outranked him. In addition, we would have periodic visits from a U.S. nuclear submarine, which would come up the Brisbane River. Lunch with the commander and a tour of the submarine was a very coveted ticket. As I gave out the invitations, all of Brisbane’s top VIPs would lobby me to be invited. I also learned what the inside of a nuclear submarine looked like. It is surprisingly small. Clearly, weapons got priority over humans.

Q: Well did you have any problem sort of equivalent to the labor left wing being opposed to our bases, our listening bases?
MOHR: No, not at all. Queensland is one of the most conservative parts of Australia. There was some concern on the part of the Australian authorities about repercussions amongst the groups of the former Yugoslavia, fighting each other and protesting U.S. policy in that region. For instance, if we took an action against the Serbs in the former Yugoslavia, there was concern that the Serbian groups in Brisbane (who numbered over 30,000) might take some harmful action against me or the Consulate. The police visited my office to assure me that they were watching and protecting me.

Q: One person I think about having been involved in that region was Tex Harris; anyway it was during the troubles in Bosnia.

MOHR: But that was the late 1990s, wasn’t it?

Q: Well I think they were still having troubles then, and there was considerable migration to Australia.

MOHR: Yes, there were a lot of Serbs and Croats, even in Brisbane.

Q: Well did that play out at all...

MOHR: Not in front of the American consulate. I think they might have squabbled with each other, but it was never a concern of mine.

End of Reader