

BRCKO
READER
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ANN B. SIDES
Chief of Visa Section
Belgrade, Yugoslavia (1991-1992)

Ann B. Sides joined the Foreign Service in 1983. Coinciding with her work in Yugoslavia, she served in Niger, Algeria, Senegal, and Ireland. This interview was conducted on October 8, 2010.

Q: Srebrenica and all that.

SIDES: Yes, that's the idea. But Srebrenica came later, in 1995. The Serb forces started with the towns along Bosnian border, like Brcko, Foca, and Visegrad in '92. They'd round up the military-age Muslim or Croat men and kill them or put them in concentration camps improvised from schools or factories. Helpless old people were driven out of their villages or murdered. Some of the worst stuff happened to women. They gathered up the women and put them into camps where they were raped systematically. Tom Mitnacht and John Zerolis, our political officers, did a lot of the reporting. I hope through this oral history project they'll tell their stories. Propaganda on all sides was pervasive. The Serbs were the aggressors, no doubt about that, but there were some very bad actors among the Bosnians and particularly the Croats. Zagreb was kind of a creepy place to be because of the government's relentless, hyper-nationalistic propaganda. Actually it did have rather a Fascist tinge to it.

Franjo Tudjman was the president of Croatia at the time. Although he should have known better, he revived and encouraged the use of language and symbols associated with the Fascist "Ustasha" government; the Nazi puppet regime. In the summer of 1992 the front line was about 30 miles outside of Zagreb. It was terribly sad to see these villages destroyed, houses wrecked and abandoned that people had scrimped and saved to build. You'd see people's clothes still folded on the shelves, kids' dresses all ironed. The school books, pictures, things people had gathered through life, who then had to leave it all in a few minutes. The visa work was very stressful. There were a lot of Bosnian visa applicants at that time who had been driven out of their home towns and had fled to Croatia at the time when Croatia was fighting the Serbs.

Although some of the refugees from Bosnia were ethnic Croats, most were Bosniaks, which was the Muslim ethnic group. By late '92, the war had evolved into a three-way conflict between the Croats and the Bosniaks, the Serbs and the Bosniaks, and the Serb-Croat conflict. The Croatians were trying to establish power in the areas they dominated, and unite them with Croatia. The Bosniaks went from being allied with the Croats against the Serbs, to fighting each of them. The Bosniak refugees in Croatia therefore found themselves in a very vulnerable situation. They began showing up at the visa window, applying for visitor visas. The vice consul and I tried to apply the law impartially, but the law requires that the applicant demonstrate ties, like a home, job and so forth, that would compel departure from the USA after a visit. These poor souls weren't going to America to see Disneyland or attend an academic conference and go back to Bosnia.

We refused most of them. We felt we had no choice. It was awful. I remember one old lady in a headscarf with bright blue eyes; she looked like my grandmother. I reached my hand under the window to get her passport and documents, and she seized my fingers and kissed them. I had to leave the window for a while. We were afraid the people we refused would soon be sent back by the Croats to Bosnia, perhaps to their deaths. One day Rick Holtzapple, the vice consul on his first Foreign Service tour, said "I don't think I can do this anymore. I feel like those consular officers who refused visas to Jews and sent them to their deaths in WWII." We used to keep a bottle of whiskey in the bottom of the filing cabinet. As I recall it now, we were sipping whiskey out of some nice porcelain teacups I kept in my office. I said, "There has got to be a way to solve this."

By then, Washington had seen quite a lot of reporting about what was going on in Bosnia in these camps. I asked Ron Neitzke's advice, and we sent a cable to Washington laying out the situation with the Bosnians and the danger of their "refoulement" from Croatia back to Bosnia. We must have gotten somebody's attention, because within about two weeks, Terry Rusch, a refugee programs officer from the PRM Bureau, that's Population, Refugees and Migration, and some people from the Immigration and Naturalization Service showed up in Zagreb and said, "We are here to start a refugee program." I suppose it helped that Ambassador Zimmerman was at that time the head of the PRM Bureau. Anyway, Terry and her team and I went to Karlovac, where an old barracks from the Austro Hungarian times was being used as a refugee Facility.

As I recall, I got up on a bench and said in Serbo-Croatian, "Come here if you want to go to America as a refugee." People gathered around, but many said, "Oh I don't know, it is so far away. We are hoping the war will be over and we can go back to our homes." They were real refugees, not the phony kind. All they wanted to do was go home, but eventually many accepted the refugee visas. Terry's people set up the program. They got non-governmental organizations to interview people, and to set up places in America to receive the refugees. I felt that Rick and I were in a much better position morally to refuse visitor visas when we knew there was a legal alternative for people who were fleeing the war.

Q: Ron Neitzke made a great point when I interviewed him, very emotional about the fact that "Washington" was trying to pursue the policy of equivalency. That the Bosnians and Croats were as bad as the Serbs. Well I mean both of us know if you are in Serbia you get a history of what the Croats did during WWII and they were really very nasty. But the point was in the era you are talking about probably because they didn't have a chance because they were on the defensive, the Serbs were absolutely beastly, and I use the term in probably its correct form, because of the mass rapes the massacres and the whole thing. But anyway Ron said that he was under pressure to report nastiness on the Croatian Bosnian side to sort of balance of what was happening on the Serbian side. As a matter of fact it wasn't. He said it came out to about one in ten. Did you feel this?

SIDES: That they were morally equivalent? Initially, yes, I did. There were a couple of reasons for that. For one thing, all sides practiced propaganda, tried intensely to capture

public opinion in the West. The Serbs weren't the only ones who lied and exaggerated. As a result, the claims made by the other parties to the conflict, the Bosniaks and the Croats, often lacked credibility. Of course, we didn't want to believe them. I mean rape camps, who would want to believe that? It was true about the camps, but because so many of the things they said weren't true and were demonstrably not true, we were skeptical of many atrocity claims that, when investigated, turned out to be true or partly true. It's also true that clientitis is the occupational disease of the Foreign Service. We all suffer from it, and the fact that we knew we were being propagandized and lied to didn't necessarily immunize us from the feelings of sympathy or understanding for the position of the people that surrounded us. I was as vulnerable to this as anybody.

As I said, I have an MA in communications, and knew how propaganda works, but it didn't mean it didn't have an effect on me. Early in the conflict, we didn't always know what was happening, or the tendency of all sides to lie made the fog of war even thicker. It became clearer as time went on, but this was the period of 1992-'93. Accusations were made that were very difficult to verify. Let me give you an example. In, I think it was autumn of '92, when things were pretty nasty, a man came to the consular service window. He was an American named Harry Bader. He introduced himself as a professor at the University of Alaska. He was also kind of a free lance journalist who wrote on human rights for a law publication. He told me he needed to speak to an American official privately. Consular officers are always available, and I invited him to my office.

Harry told me he had been trying to visit Brcko, a town in northeast Bosnia, just on the border with Croatia. There were rumors of atrocities there. He made it as far as Slavonski Brod, on the Croatian side of the Sava River, but Brcko was held by Serbian forces and he was not able to get into the town. Bosnian refugees on the Croatian side told him that on the other side of the river there was a large meat processing factory, and that people were being killed there and their bodies rendered. You know what I mean when I say "rendered." In meat processing they grind up the leftovers, the fat and stuff, and use them for whatever, or dump it. Harry said he tried to get over there and confirm the story but he was not successful in getting close to the place.

He got statements on tape from the refugees, but he couldn't verify this very inflammatory story and, although he believed it, he felt he could not publish it. He said the story haunted him, and he thought he should tell somebody. So he told me. I went up to Ron Neitzke and said, "Ron, I am about to ruin your lunch. Let me tell you what I just heard." He said, "Well write it down; do a cable and get it out now." I drafted up the cable, choosing my words very carefully because it was not verified and very evocative of the Holocaust. I found out later that Washington did get it and thus became aware of the allegations about the meat factory in Brcko. I suppose it was just another horror story among many.

Later on, when I was assigned to Dublin, I happened to be watching a documentary on Irish television and it was about these thousands of missing people from Brcko and that nobody knows what happened to them. I started to cry. In 2009 some Serb policemen were tried for war crimes in the Brcko area, but I don't know if the "rendering" allegation was substantiated. A lot of what happened in the early days of the Yugo wars—the atrocities and so forth—which I

just accepted at the time as part of the day's news, snuck up emotionally on me later, when I had moved on.

My colleague Dubravka Maric, a Foreign Service officer whose mother tongue was Croatian, was assigned to interview women who were in the rape camps. Awful stuff; I don't know how Dubravka slept at night after listening to the stories of those poor women. You should talk to her for this oral history. Some of the atrocities happened under circumstances that made it difficult to determine who the perpetrator was. The opposing sides accused each other of fabricating incidents to secure international attention and sympathy. Even that was possible. You may remember the mortar shell that landed in the marketplace, it was called "Markale," in downtown Sarajevo and killed about a dozen shoppers. The Serbs said that was one of the Bosnians' own shells that landed there. Some of the press repeated this claim. A long time later the UN did a trajectory study and apparently it did come from the Serbs.

There was a strange incident just before I arrived in Zagreb where there was an explosion at the Presidential Palace in Zagreb. The Croats said the JNA air force dropped a bomb on the palace trying to kill Tudjman and Ante Markovic, the former Yugoslav prime minister, who happened to be there at the time, meeting with Tudjman. Some of the military attaches in Zagreb at the time suspected it was an internal explosion. Nobody saw a plane. I don't know whether the truth has ever been conclusively established. Why would the Croats blow up their own building? Strange things happened all the time in those days.

JANET L. BOGUE
Desk Officer for Yugoslavia, Bureau of European Affairs
Washington, D.C. (1992-1993)

Janet Bogue joined the Foreign Service in 1982. Coinciding with her work with the former Yugoslav states, she served in Austria, Kazakhstan, Nepal, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom. This interview was conducted on May 18, 2007.

BOGUE: What is less known was there were at the time, five or six other cities or towns that were enduring the same sort of encirclement, that didn't have the stature. People knew about Sarajevo because of the Olympics. It had a functioning newspaper. It had journalists who were working there. It had things people could recognize. The journalists all stayed at a Holiday Inn hotel. It had things that people could relate to better. There were these other towns. Also, it had vowels in its name. Places like Brcko, no one could begin to pronounce or spell. So the scene I would set is that all of this was happening.

BOGUE: It is interesting. You may remember the City of Brcko. Brcko could not be settled in the Dayton agreements. So, a separate arrangement was made for Brcko. Brcko became almost an independent city in the way of the old independent cities like Danzig, the free cities of Europe that were independent entities. Brcko had an administrator from the West, who happened to be American. He ran Brcko. Brcko had all three ethnicities there.

What they did in Brcko was absolutely fascinating. First, the parents said, "All the kids have to go to separate schools: a Croatian school, a Serbian school and a Bosnian school. A kid will not go to any school but their own." The Serbian administrator said, "Fine. No problem." And then he built a fantastic school for children who were willing to go to an integrated school. The teachers were paid very well. They had modern textbooks. They had lab equipment. They had all this great stuff.

Essentially, what this administrator did was to say to parents, "What do you want for your kids? Do you want a good education? Or do you want that kid never to sit next to someone who isn't their ethnicity?"

Some parents voted for "I only want my kid to sit next to his or her own ethnicity if it means they get a terrible education."

But, wouldn't you know it? 90% of parents said, "What I really want is for my kid to get a good education."

In Brcko, over and over, people did things like when the City Council became deadlocked over ethnic issues, and then garbage wasn't collected. The administrator essentially said, "Do you want garbage collected? Or do you want this person to represent an ideological hard-line position?"

People said, "Well, what we want is garbage collected."

Over and over, Brcko moved ahead because people started putting people in place who would provide technocrats essentially, who would provide services instead of ideology. They started electing city council members who would pick up the trash, have good schools regardless of their ethnic backgrounds instead of ethnic zealots who would let the trash pile up rather than ever let a garbage man from the other ethnicity have a job.

So, you could see that carrots and sticks could work, but it was very hard to apply them countrywide. That was just a very difficult thing to do and it was a very slow process.

Bosnia may still come out of this but it is not clear how that is going to happen.

Q: What about the problem of corruption?

BOGUE: Again, it was a very big problem. It was a problem in communist times, as you know from your time there. All the communist economies have gone through spasms of corruption as they have converted to western economies. Added to that was the vacuum

created during the war when criminal gangs were able to get tremendous footholds because they had guns. But they also were doing things that people needed. You know, when Sarajevo was strangled, criminal gangs were able to get food through, and things like that. They were able to get rich because they were actually providing a service that people needed. It has been difficult to dislodge them from their positions. Of course there are groups of people who profit from these kinds of circumstances and they hate it when the war ends, because their position of power and influence and wealth is jeopardized. They do everything they can to hang onto that.

Q: Did you have a problem with various types of oversight saying "oh these people are a bunch of crooks and we can't do this." Or "there are lots of investigations" that would stop progress.

BOGUE: ... No, we actually would have welcomed a little more of that interest, particularly locally. We would have welcomed a little more press activism on investigative journalism. That's a scary thing for people. If you are investigating criminal gangs, you might wind up in a gutter yourself. Look what has happened to journalists in Russia and other places who have done that. It's never a situation where sitting in safety in the United States you say, "You go out there and put yourself in danger." That is exactly the kind of thing these societies need. They need to develop those kinds of institutions. They need crusading journalists. They need Ralph Naders to say, "Hey! These cars aren't safe!" They need all the gadflies and the consumer advocates. They need Mothers Against Drunk Driving. They need the kind of things that we lump under the term, "civil society." They need citizens' groups. They need watchdog groups. They need all that stuff.

That did not exist under Communism. That is a long, hard, slow process to develop in people who are accustomed to being fearful of their government. They are accustomed to being way too busy just trying to get by and make a living, to have the kind of time they need to devote to that.

Things in the United States run on volunteers and that requires a certain level of prosperity to be able to do that.

Q: You go to a country such as France and the volunteer situation is still pretty weak. It's a centralized government. As you say, things are breaking down in Europe into localities where volunteers can flourish. Our oral history program is done essentially through volunteers and getting money from individuals rather than government support. It is hard to get something like that going in most European countries.

Q: Were there indicators in Bosnia that things were beginning to break down? If these people under 30 are saying, "Screw this ethnic stuff," which is pretty primitive. Did you see this beginning to break down the system or not?

BOGUE: I saw more of that in Serbia, interestingly enough. A lot of young people who had left during Milosevic's time came back. A lot of them came back with excellent

educations and experience that they had gotten outside the country. Also, there were some leaders coming up, not that all of them were perfect or perfectly pure themselves. Many of them had had to make their deals with the devil.

For instance, Zoran Djindjic, who had become the Prime Minister, was assassinated while I was working there. I went to his funeral. I was at ground level with the funeral party, so I couldn't see it, but when I saw on the news later the aerial photographs, they thought there were a million people on the streets of Belgrade following the funeral procession. This was a kind of Kennedy-esque figure. He was young, dynamic, charismatic, and terribly good-looking. He had a young wife and two very young children, a boy and a girl, who were there at the gravesite.

This was the moment when he was killed by the old Red Berets, the most extreme nationalist part of the army that had served Milosevic. He was probably killed because he had agreed to turn over some of the Serbian wanted war criminals to The Hague. He was shot to death.

His funeral became one of those moments when people said, "Enough of this. Here is finally a leader, for all his faults, he has been focused on the future. He has been holding out the idea of a European future for us, instead of just talking about how the Serbs are being oppressed and instead of being an ardent Serbian nationalist about past injuries. He is actually looking to the future."

I think you did see in times like that, people actively saying, "It is time for us to turn that corner."

Serbia has not done that all the way, still. You still have the problem of the war criminals. You still have a problem with people electing very radical, sort of nationalist, people. Kosovo has become a flashpoint now that the negotiations are underway.

You did see some potential for more positive leadership in the future. I met some very dynamic young Bosnians. I met very dynamic young people in all parts of that. The question was just whether in fact they would be able to carry forward with these policies.

Q: Looking at the time, this is a good place to stop now.

BOGUE: The universities are ethnically completely segregated. These kinds of things could work. You will remember the town of Brcko. Brcko was one of the areas that couldn't resolve at Dayton. There was huge disagreement over which side Brcko should belong to. So there was an agreement at Dayton that there would be a separate arrangement for Brcko.

BOGUE: There was a special arbitration panel that set up Brcko as a kind of independent city-state, the way Danzig used to be in Europe, before the war. There used to be these kinds of

free cities, independent cities, that weren't really under a country's government. Brcko became like that, administered by an American. In Brcko, what started to happen was that all the parents were sending their children to single ethnic schools. All the Croat kids go here; all the Serb kids go here; all the Bosniak Muslim kids go here. There were no joint schools. So the American administrator said, "Fine, no problem. You can send your children to segregated schools. We don't have a problem with that. We are going to build one really nice school that is going to have really nice lab equipment and modern textbooks. It is going to teach English, which for European Union purposes, everyone wants to know now. It is going to have computers and computer labs, and all that great stuff. Anybody who wants to send their kids here can, but they have to understand that kids from the other ethnicities will also be here. It will be a mixed school. So each parent can make their own choice. They can send their child to a terrible school with only kids from the same ethnic group; or they can send their child to a really good school that has numbers of different ethnicities there."

And guess what parents decided? They voted with their children for a good education. They started bringing their children. Except for some parents, who said they really didn't care if their children had a bad education, as long as they never had to mingle with any other group. Most parents, by far, wanted a better future for their children. They knew that getting a good education was part of that. So they started coming to the mixed school.

In places, you can break this down with incentives and so on. Bosnia is sort of trapped in this. At some point, I think Dayton is going to have to be revisited and reopened because what was meant to be a floor to ensure everybody having a voice has become a ceiling. You cannot get out of it. You cannot get beyond that. Their economic problems are very severe, but part of the reason is that people don't see any way out of this very inflexible Situation.

RAZVIGOR BAZALA

**USIA, Eastern Europe Division,
Office of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and
Romania, Desk Officer (1992-1994)**

**Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina
USIA, Public Affairs Officer (1995-1996)**

Razvigor Bazala joined the Foreign Service in 1970. Coinciding with his work in Bosnia, he served in Poland, Jamaica, Vietnam, and Hungary. This interview was conducted on July 19, 2011.

BAZALA: After the fall of Yugoslavia, I changed that to Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian impressively increasing my language skills without a moment's effort. In truth, while each language subsequently became internationally recognized as unique, they are very similar to each other and no speaker of any of the three needs an interpreter to communicate with a speaker of either of the others.

Our tours in Belgrade were just the first of several encounters with the country and its remnants after the death of Yugoslavia. I returned to Washington from Belgrade to become the country affairs officer at USIA for the Balkan nations in 1982 and 1983, and later served in the State Department as country affairs officer for Yugoslavia between 1985 and 1987. During the Balkan wars I served again as USIA's Balkan country affairs officer (1992–1994). During that assignment I replaced the PAO in Skopje, Macedonia for four months. At the end of the war in Bosnia I served as embassy PAO in Sarajevo in 1995 and 1996 and was spokesperson and media advisor to the deputy high representative in Brcko, Bosnia in 1997. In 1998, I was named to the new position of regional PAO to be available to fill in at any of the Balkan and former Soviet Union countries staffed with only one USIA officer. In that capacity I served in Moldova, Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Slovenia, and Kosovo. Sylvia also served in Bosnia as deputy chief of mission at the embassy in Sarajevo from 1998 to 2000. It seems as if we could not get the Balkans out of our systems.

The key event during our first tours in Belgrade was the death of the founder of Yugoslavia, Marshal Josip Broz Tito in May 1980. The U.S. government issued the first in a series of "After Tito What?" intelligence analyses in 1952. Tito had proposed the establishment of a broader Yugoslavia when he came to power at the end of World War II without Soviet assistance that would have included Albania and parts of Greek Macedonia and Bulgaria, territories over which he had ambitions, asserting that the area would be united by "a" model of socialist government, not "the" (Stalinist) model. The idea, which included the notion of workers self-management, was an anathema to the Soviet dictator. The Yugoslav model was a "leftist deviation" for which Stalin expelled Yugoslavia from the Cominform [Communist Information Bureau] that the Soviet Union founded in 1947 as the official postwar forum of the international communist movement. For the next thirty-three years Soviet attitudes toward and probable involvement with Yugoslavia remained an issue of concern to America's foreign policy makers.

The Cold War had already begun, and Tito won immediate support from non-communist European governments and the U.S. after his expulsion from Cominform. This support enabled him to stay in power despite being banished by Stalin. Yugoslavia thus was able to avoid being folded into the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet defense alliance composed of 60 nations that the Soviets dominated after World War II, the antithesis of the U.S.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO].

While Tito successfully avoided having Yugoslavia engulfed within the Warsaw Pact, the Soviets continually attempted to rein him in as closely as possible. By the 1960s, however, the Non-Aligned Movement (Tito was a founder) provided Yugoslavia and third world nations across the globe some wiggle room to withstand the Cold War foreign policy maneuverings of East and West. It also provided a rationale for Tito to strut around the world for years espousing non-alignment long after the movement became increasingly insignificant in the third world. The

headlines his travels garnered served little more than to boost his ego in his last years as domestic problems in Yugoslavia mounted.

The U.S. took great interest in Yugoslavia's overt desire to remain independent of the Warsaw Pact, which kept intelligence analysts and policy makers busy for almost four decades monitoring the slightest shifts in the conduct of its relations with the Soviet Union. The other nations of Europe shared that interest and implemented policies that treated Yugoslavia favorably and demonstrated respect for Tito. While the Cold War established limits to restructuring the scope and nature in the relationship between the U.S. and Yugoslavia, there remained some flexibility for adjustments at the margins.

As the years went by, the country became a relatively open society, certainly in comparison to the other Warsaw Pact member states. In hosting the 1984 Winter Olympics, Yugoslavia appeared to have enormous potential for adopting aspects of western European modernism. It came to be regarded as the acceptable face of communism as the Yugoslav tourism industry rapidly expanded to draw in hordes of hard-currency spending middle class Europeans looking for low-cost holidays along the nation's gorgeous Adriatic coastline. Tito had some rather clever ways of reducing domestic political and economic stresses and tensions that increased the appeal of Yugoslavia in the non-communist world. At a time of stagnant economic development in the early 1960s, for example, he made passports available to virtually all citizens on demand, a policy that no other communist nation ever considered implementing. In so doing, he was able to export domestic unemployment and reduce doubts about the effectiveness of his economic policies. Tens of thousands of Yugoslavs looking for work resettled in West Europe and easily found jobs amid labor shortages there which made it possible for them to send home remittances to family members left behind. That eased internal tensions and pressures on the government dramatically into the early 1980s.

Less than a year after being named IIP team chief, my work there and my involvement with AFSA ended when the European division sought me out to become PAO in Bosnia. The administration was anticipating negotiations to end four years of conflict, the worst Europe had experienced since World War II. Even though a venue for the negotiations had not yet been found and the talks not yet scheduled, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, who spearheaded the effort to launch them, requested that USIA have someone on the ground in Sarajevo as soon as possible. He wanted efforts to be made to increase public receptivity to democratic governance under the rule of law and promote tolerance, freedom of movement, and the development of market economics. In his view, a peace accord acceptable to the U.S. would require Bosnia's postwar leaders to take actions necessary to implement those objectives. The UN, with more than thirty thousand peacekeepers deployed in Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia, was unable to end the Balkans conflict after four years of open hostilities during which more than a hundred thousand people perished and several hundred thousand refugees fled to Western Europe, the U.S., and elsewhere.

By mid-1995, however, following the massacre in Srebrenica where forces of Serb General Ratko Mladic killed eight thousand men and boys overnight, all parties on the ground had had enough.

Holbrooke stepped forward at that juncture and organized the U.S. effort to bring the conflict to an end. He succeeded by arranging for the warring parties and an array of U.S. government agencies and interested international organizations to gather for peace negotiations. The talks took place at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio over a three-week period during which the parties cobbled together an agreement that all sides ultimately accepted. The site of the negotiations was the Hope Center, named not for a desire accompanied by the expectation of fulfillment, but for the internationally known comedian Bob. It housed innumerable objects related to his career, mostly captioned photos. Prior to my departure for Sarajevo I traveled to Dayton for the opening of discussions with U.S. Ambassador to Bosnia John Menzies, one of the few FSIOs elevated to that distinguished rank. The eight-hour drive from Washington to Dayton in Menzies' car with him behind the wheel for the entire trip gave us all the time we needed to consider the changes the administration anticipated would follow in Bosnia after the talks and how USIA programs could contribute to achieving them.

I volunteered to drive, but he insisted on remaining at the wheel for the entire trip saying he needed a break from his life in a clamshell at the embassy where he slept on a cot next to his desk and was surrounded by four automatic weapons-bearing security guards who accompanied him whenever he left the building. Soon after we arrived in Dayton, I learned there was no plan for a formal opening of the talks. Organizers scrambled to find an announcer to introduce the participants in the negotiations. They turned to me under their assumption that my language ability would have the names of Slobodan Milosevic, Alija Izetbegovic, Franjo Tudjman, and Wolfgang Ischinger, among others, roll trippingly off my tongue. CNN and other international media were on site to cover the event, and the following day after I flew back to Washington, colleagues and friends told me they were impressed when they heard my voice introducing participants as they walked into the room and took their places at the negotiation table. That event may have constituted the fifteen minutes of the fame Andy Warhol said everybody would have at some point during their lives.

I played no further role in Dayton. I left for Sarajevo a few days later having had brief opportunities to meet all of the key administration participants in Dayton. Dropping into Sarajevo in November 1995 was like stepping into a hell hole. A very charming nineteenth-century city that prospered after the Austro-Hungarian Empire drove out the Ottomans in 1878, it was almost totally devastated. Water was largely unavailable and entire neighborhoods were without electricity for months at a time. With the approach of winter, there was only enough gas to heat half the city every other night. The effects of the war were visible everywhere.

A few days after I arrived in Sarajevo, I went to Mostar with the ambassador for a meeting with Croatian authorities to assess their thoughts on the still ongoing Dayton peace talks. Mostar, with a population that exceeded a hundred thousand, was the Croatian population center of Bosnia, and it was even more destroyed than Sarajevo. The famous pedestrian bridge across the Neretva River constructed by the Ottomans in the mid-seventeenth century crashed into the river following explosions at both ends set off, according to the New York Times, by Croatian militia. Disturbing images of the event were broadcast on TV around the world. The UN replaced it with a temporary bridge, but it did not reduce the divide between the Bosniak and Croatian communities. I found

that quite disheartening and wondered how things would work out on the ground even if the Dayton peace talks concluded successfully.

We learned on November 21 that agreement was reached among the negotiating parties. The Dayton Accords were to be formally signed in Paris several weeks later, and in my first weeks in country, I spent much time trying to convince media and leaders in civil society that full implementation of the provisions of the accords would bring permanent peace to Bosnia.

The USIS staff when I arrived consisted of two absolutely wonderful women who worked for the embassy while enduring numerous personal hardships throughout the war, but that did not prevent them from keeping their fingers on the pulse of Bosnian society. They knew personally many of the people who had been or would emerge as key players in Bosnia's media and political, cultural, and academic life. Their coolly rational and balanced assessments of developments around them provided me with invaluable guidance in developing ideas about programs that I hoped would change views and attitudes of people who were considered potential leaders of civil society. Their perceptions of on-the-ground reality helped me prioritize the program activities USIS would implement in post-war Bosnia.

The director of USIA's public opinion research office flew into Sarajevo with me after Thanksgiving. She was armed with an interagency-designed questionnaire that would be used to provide a snapshot survey of public attitudes toward the Dayton Agreement. It was intended to give the State Department and the administration some idea about current attitudes toward interethnic relations and public receptivity to changes in governance that the terms of the Dayton Peace Accords would mandate.

Despite war-torn conditions across the country, we located an adequate number of university-educated public opinion researchers to help us. They had worked throughout the war providing public opinion data to international non-governmental organizations. We were able to contract with them for a quick door-to-door, face-to-face series of interviews with several hundred Muslims (also called Bosniaks), Serbs, and Croats (the term Bosnian referred to the population of the country as a whole). We focused on people in key Bosnian cities, with a number large enough to constitute a credible statistical sample of the entire population.

With damaged roads, bombed-out bridges, uncertain telephone service, snowy winter weather, and less-than-certain personal security for pollsters, gathering, obtaining, and collating all the information was a major undertaking requiring long, circuitous drives into Sarajevo from outlying areas at all hours of the day.

The effort paid off nicely, however. The results of the poll were issued just a day or two before the signing in Paris of the Dayton Accords on December 14, 1995. I understand that they provided Ambassador Holbrooke and others in the Clinton Administration with an increased sense of confidence about the deployment to Bosnia of an international force of as many as sixty thousand military personnel. The poll indicated foreign soldiers would not encounter significant resistance

anywhere in the country. That dramatically increased the prospect for the peaceful implementation of the reforms required by the Dayton agreement.

Participants who fought inconclusively for almost four years had had enough and laid down their arms. As soon as the international force, composed of NATO-members' and other nations' militaries, began deployment to Bosnia the day after Christmas, not a single shot was fired against them on Bosnian soil. Enough was enough. All involved were fed up with the war and its horrible consequences. People had literally burned park benches and the books off their shelves to keep warm in winter. Public parks became vegetable gardens. People went out with canteens to get water from central pumps because there was none flowing in their homes. I remember one of my staff members telling me how she came home one day and was very saddened to find a bullet hole in a container she was carrying on her back. Moments later she realized the sniper's bullet was meant for her. In effect, then, to some extent all Bosnians were prepared to buy into the Dayton Peace Accords.

On Christmas Eve, I attended midnight mass in Sarajevo's relatively modest Roman Catholic cathedral conducted by a Croatian bishop. His message encouraged tolerance, engagement in rebuilding, and acceptance of the fact that, as elsewhere around the world, there are different views and different religions in Bosnian society. He concluded that the resolution of conflicts among citizens should not be sought through violence. Leaders of the key religions in Bosnia echoed that message over the following days, but not all their adherents were convinced.

In the interim I served in USIA's Equal Employment Opportunity [EEO] Office as a member of a panel reviewing a complaint by African-American male candidates who claimed that they were denied entry into the Foreign Service as FSIOs on the basis of their race. A class action suit was going to come to trial at some yet undetermined date. Perhaps because of my earlier experiences with AFSA, I became the Foreign Service member of the team to review it. I considered the complaint to be unfounded and the work did not interest me much. When in early 1997 the European division requested my release to serve temporarily on an inter-agency team to consider support for the development of a private radio network in Serbia, I was not sad to leave EEO office behind.

The proposed network was centered on Belgrade's independent radio station B92 that became a responsible and internationally respected opposition voice during the war with Bosnia; Serbian government supported media was rabidly nationalistic. Pending the availability of funds, B92 was prepared to become the hub of a network of twelve to fifteen local stations previously part of the Yugoslav government's network of local radio stations spread around the Republic of Serbia. Interested stations hoped to acquire state of the art broadcast and transmission equipment in return for participating in the network.

Local radio stations created under Tito's communist government no longer had links to centralized government media after Yugoslavia fell apart. While funding for their continued operation was uncertain, they remained genuinely committed to offering listeners more information about developments elsewhere in the country, the Balkans, and the world but lacked access to resources. Their participation in the proposed B92 network would resolve that problem.

I traveled to Belgrade as the USIA member of an interagency team headed by USAID to review the B92 radio network proposal. We were ready to back it with SEED funds if our assessment indicated the expense was warranted. We visited all of the cities and towns with radio stations interested in joining the network and discovered that several were in the hands of level-headed, clear-thinking professionals not driven by myths of nationalist supremacy and did not see Serbia as a nation victimized by a world that hated it. All wanted very much to have state of the art broadcast equipment including transmission towers and access to international and domestic news unavailable to them in Serbia's fragmented media environment.

A provision of the agreement to fund the network was that member stations would rebroadcast both Serbian language VOA and RFE news feeds. Our efforts culminated in the formation of Serbia's Association of Independent Electronic Media [ANEM] under B92's leadership. ANEM served to expand the reach of independent broadcasting in Serbia at a critical time between the launch of NATO airstrikes to counter Serbian aggression against Kosovo in March 1998 and the transfer of Slobodan Milosevic to the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague in 2001. As many as thirty broadcasters have been members of the Association, which still existed in 2014.

While I was in Belgrade working on the radio network gig, I received a phone call from Ambassador Robert William (Bill) Farrand late on a dark, cold, dreary, and rainy afternoon in February 1997. Bill was an old colleague from the days of my first tour as a country affairs officer fifteen years earlier. At that time, he was director of the State Department's East European Affairs office and chaired a weekly interagency regional meeting that I attended regularly. He was calling from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia where he was head of the inspector-general team reviewing operations of the embassy there.

Bill told me he had just been designated by the Office of the High Representative [OHR] for Bosnia as deputy high representative and supervisor for Brcko and would assume those responsibilities in April, less than two months later. As he was an old Soviet and East European hand, that designation made good sense. Because of my own recent experiences in Bosnia he turned to me to help him with his public affairs and media outreach strategy. I said I was interested but had another assignment I would return to upon getting back to Washington. He responded by saying, "Let me see what can be done about that." By the time I got home, my assignment to the equal opportunity office was curtailed and I traveled to Brcko late in April 1997 just a few weeks after he arrived there.

The most frequently asked questions about Brcko are: one, how do you pronounce it, and, two, why did it matter? The first question is easy to answer; Brcko is pronounced BERCH-ko. The second requires some elaboration. The Peace Implementation Council [PIC] composed of nations and international organizations that participated in the peace negotiations at Dayton, or subsequently supported the peace process in Bosnia, established an ad hoc international institution, the OHR, to oversee the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Dayton Peace Accords. The objective of the OHR is to ensure that Bosnia and Herzegovina evolves into a peaceful and viable democracy on course for integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. The PIC authorized the OHR to adopt binding decisions when local parties seem unable or unwilling to act and to remove from office political officials who violate legal agreements of the Dayton Peace Accords. The High Representative is appointed by the PIC with the approval of the UN Security Council; he is responsible only to the PIC and is the final civil authority in Bosnia.

The PIC regarded the sole unresolved matter of the peace negotiations in Dayton, the location of the Inter-Entity Boundary Line [IEBL] in the Brcko district, an issue that could undermine the ability of the OHR to implement other civilian provisions of the accords if not addressed in a manner perceived as equitable and unbiased by the nation's Serbian, Croatian, and Bosniak ethnicities. One of the preconditions set by the international community prior to the start of the talks was insistence that Bosnia would consist of only two political entities. That required bending arms to get Bosniak and Croats to agree to jointly govern one (the Federation) with Serbs governing the other (Republika Srpska or RS). The Serbs insisted, however, they would not enter talks unless they were guaranteed 49 percent of Bosnia's territory, which was a considerably larger portion than their share of the nation's total population. The international community, however, agreed to the 51/49 percent territorial split to get the Serbs to the table.

Several earlier proposals involved divisions of Bosnia's territory into nine or ten regional enclaves, an idea quickly rejected because their boundaries would immediately become sources of discontent and tension that could undermine implementation of a peace agreement. To eliminate any further consideration of enclaves, the international community laid down another condition at the start of peace negotiations. Only a single line, not to be referred to as a border, would delineate the division of territory between the Federation and the RS. A computer program had been developed to divide Bosnia's territory into any number of 51/49 divisions delineated by a single line; it could not, of course, determine the exact placement of that line. Those around the negotiation table in Dayton could not either. And there was the rub.

The Brcko municipality on the north-east border of Bosnia was an area about twenty-five miles long stretching along the Sava River border with Croatia and hardly three miles wide at its narrowest point. The Serbs were deeply concerned about where the IEBL would run across Brcko knowing its narrow strip of territory would be the only link connecting the two so-called saddlebags of RS territory together. When the location of the IEBL in Brcko threatened to upset negotiations in Dayton, in order to conclude the talks with a settlement, it was decided to delay further consideration of the Brcko question for a year and then deal with it through an arbitration process.

That postponement exceeded a year because the man designated as the principal arbitrator for Brcko, American judge Roberts Owen, said in 1997 he lacked information about the extent to which Dayton provisions were being implemented by both entities in the Brcko municipality. He therefore requested OHR to name a supervisor for Brcko who would have a year, until March 1998, to encourage both entities to fully implement the provisions of the Dayton Accords in Brcko municipality. At that time a report prepared by the supervisor assessing the progress made toward that end would provide the arbiter with enough information on the basis of which he could recommend where the IEBL in the Brcko municipality should be located. The supervisor would be responsible for implementing the arbiter's decision.

I understood well the difficulties Farrand would face in the role of OHR supervisor for Brcko. I witnessed the evacuation of Serbs from Sarajevo in March 1996. The Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic who represented the RS in Dayton, could not insist that a section of the city of Sarajevo be maintained as a Serb district or neighborhood. To do so would have violated the Dayton Accords provision that the IEBL be a single line. I found it amazing that the entire Serb

population of the city literally just packed up and moved out over a one week period in a series of seemingly endless convoys of heavily-laden cars, buses, and trucks headed off in the snow.

One day, just out of curiosity, my two FSIO colleagues and I drove across the Miljacka River into what had been Serb Sarajevo in the war to observe the process. It was truly bizarre to witness Serbs rip out the entire infrastructure of the apartments they were now abandoning, including light switches, light fixtures such as sconces, ceiling lamps, and bulbs, electric power plugs, all kitchen and bathroom plumbing fixtures, and even the rubber or vinyl baseboards along the floor. The same process was repeated floor by floor, building by building across the neighborhood. Perhaps somewhat undiplomatically, I smiled, waved, and wished several evacuating grim-faced Serbs the equivalent of bon voyage in their language. My colleagues later said I was lucky not to have been assaulted by one or more of them, but the whole episode struck me as utterly surreal.

We did not know at the time how significant the Serb evacuation would be. As it turned out, most of them were headed for Brcko where they occupied abandoned, partially destroyed Bosniak and Croatian homes at the border and southward as a way to strengthen the RS claim to as wide a corridor as possible through Brcko in the arbitration process. To keep a lid on the stress and strains that such a mass relocation could generate, the U.S. component of IFOR established a base, Camp McGovern, that straddled the IEBL just a few miles outside of Brcko with a force of several hundred soldiers armed with tanks and heavy artillery.

Farrand was going to have a hard time in Brcko. Most Serbs in the municipality were people who had exiled or expelled themselves from Sarajevo. They were politically alert and had a very strong sense of themselves and their rights and privileges. Cheek by jowl with them were many Croats whose homeland, Croatia, lay just across the bordering Sava River. Much of the Bosniak population that was driven out during the war was intent upon returning to the municipality. The supervisor had to get local leaders and authorities to accommodate each other's views and perspectives if there was to be any hope of implementing democratic norms and restoring stability in the community. Farrand's approach to the job was to walk the walk, get out and around, and personally size up the situation on the ground by meeting with local leaders in their neighborhoods and make himself a known quantity they could approach freely.

There were two major problems in Brcko that the supervisor had to address immediately. First, areas of the municipality that were densely populated before the war had been extensively mined during hostilities which posed a major barrier to the resettlement of areas abandoned by Bosniak and Croat families. Second, freedom of movement had to be restored. The supervisor presided over a large-scale de-mining effort to ensure that the reconstruction of several thousand single family homes could be undertaken without people being maimed or killed in the process. Because there would be questions about who would wind up occupying them there was much tension throughout the municipality over the fate of their small pieces of Bosnian real estate.

Adding to that tension was limited freedom of movement across the IEBL, which was demonstrated early in my stay in Brcko. Just a few weeks after I arrived, a group of Bosniaks from Sarajevo, several of whom I had met previously, decided to test freedom of movement by chartering buses and driving up to Brcko to look at homes they occupied before the war. I saw firsthand the ugly tensions between ethnic groups in Bosnia. The Bosniaks had let authorities in Brcko know their plans and word got out rapidly to the Serb community.

Thuggish Serbs gathered at key intersections along the likely path the buses from Sarajevo would take through the municipality. At each was a pile of cobblestone-sized rocks to toss at the buses to let passengers know just how they felt about their intrusion onto what they considered their turf. Farrand's deputies and I along with another group of OHR staffers walked out to see what would happen as the buses passed by. At some locations, our presence was enough to get Serb thugs back off, but we could not monitor the entire route the buses would take.

I could not believe what I saw as the buses approached. Unarmed passengers sitting calmly in their seats and looking out the windows were barraged with stones and bricks as if they constituted a force of hostile enemies. Every window was smashed. Thank God no firearms were involved. I joined up with the buses as they approached the Brcko municipal center and boarded one as soon as it arrived. Almost every passenger had suffered some injury, fortunately none of them serious. If repeated, such episodes would prevent the full implementation of Dayton provisions regarding freedom of movement in Bosnia. Needless to say, no members of the predominantly Serb police force were anywhere in sight.

And that was problem number three. The attack on the buses hammered home the point that civil society and tolerance would not prevail in Brcko if the police force was dominated by Serbs. Farrand was fortunate to have an effective American as leader of the International Police Training Force [IPTF] in Brcko who was able over time to make enormous strides to convert Brcko's police into a multi-ethnic force.

IFOR soldiers initially deployed early in 1996 had already torn down dozens of roadblocks all over Bosnia that were thrown up during the war and IFOR patrolled the IEHL regularly to prevent roadblocks being set up anywhere along its path. Unfortunately that did not ensure that Bosnian citizens could move freely through what previously were 121 ethnic strongholds, and this put a real crimp in refugee returns that could have undermined further commitment to the implementation of other Dayton provisions. What could have proven to be a major setback proved to be very easy to resolve, however.

During the war, Serbs, Bosniak, and Croats added small insignia to their auto license tags to indicate their ethnicity, which in the post-war period worked against building a unified nation. An international organization official proposed creating a single national license tag by using letters common to both the Cyrillic and Latin alphabets (such as A, K, M, and T that represented the same sounds in Serbian, Croatians, and Bosniak, and B, C, H, and P that represented one sound in Serbian but another in Croatian). Put any single one of those letters between two groups of three numerals colored black on a plain white background and you had tags with no indication of ethnicity. Just after I left Brcko, those license tags were introduced and almost immediately made it possible for anyone to travel anywhere in the country without facing hostile reactions on the road. Serbs benefited greatly. They no longer had to take circuitous routes to get from one saddle bag of the RS to the other; they could cut, more or less, straight across.

Within days of arriving in Brcko, I found a very pleasant apartment in a two-story house on a dead-end street lined with rather large homes. It was about fifteen-minutes walking distance to the office and close to the Brcko railroad station and a small bus depot I passed en route; neither had operated over the past five or six years. Cows ate the grass that grew between railroad ties and empty freight cars stood like sentinels on tracks in the freight yard. While close to a residential

neighborhood, the rail area seemed desolate and forlorn, underscoring how far things had to go before they could be said to be normal in Brcko. The street I walked down leading directly to the OHR building had three or four decent eateries that prospered nicely after the supervisor and staff moved in. They all served marvelous crepes, called palachinki in the Balkans that some colleagues consumed more than once daily gaining unwanted pounds in the process. But that could not be helped. Everybody was looking for something good out of the Brcko experience and there wasn't much else besides beer and cevapcici (grilled dish of minced meat).

I walked through the open-air Brcko market that offered the first ripened fruits of spring including strawberries and cherries just after moving into my apartment. As I approached it I heard a recording from a speaker nearby of "Don't Speak," a song by the American rock group No Doubt, a big hit in the U.S. just a few months earlier. To this day, the song immediately awakens memories whenever I hear it of that rather mundane experience on a pleasant day in an environment otherwise fraught with ethnic tensions.

Only a few OHR staffers in Brcko had private cars. As at the embassy in Sarajevo there was a pegboard in the OHR garage with car keys. When I needed transportation there was generally one available. OHR cars could also be used for private travel on weekends and a German colleague and I drove to Belgrade, less than two hours away, several times to spend weekends there staying at the recently constructed Hyatt hotel in New Belgrade, an area of town that was becoming increasingly prosperous. For about a year in 2000 one floor of the hotel served as the U.S. embassy. There was even a McDonald's within walking distance. I spoiled myself with ninety-minute massages in the hotel's gym, a marvelous way to relieve Brcko-induced stress. We attended a concert by American blues guitarist B.B. King at the Sava Center, a two thousand seat auditorium built more than thirty years earlier in the last years of the Tito era. It remained an impressive modern structure at the turn of the century and offered a sharp contrast to structures in Brcko whose dated architecture was undistinguished.

Farrand and I stayed one weekend in what had earlier been the residence of the U.S. ambassador to Belgrade. Richard Miles, a friend of his and an acquaintance of mine, was serving as chief of the U.S. mission there; it was not an embassy at the time. Bill was trying to get a better grasp of the motives behind the political behavior of Serbs in Brcko and anticipated Miles could shed some light on that. We were invited to spend a weekend with him for that purpose. I attended a number of receptions at the residence when it was the home of Ambassador Larry Eagleburger during our tour in Belgrade more than fifteen years earlier, but neither I nor any of the other officers in the embassy had any reason to venture to the private area of the home above the ground floor. Yet here I was sleeping in a bed Henry Kissinger may have occupied when he was the ambassador's guest in 1981. Or maybe it was an entirely different bed slept in only by lesser luminaries or mere family members. It did not matter. I just wished there were others besides Sylvia to reveal this to, but she said probably no one else would care.

It was my objective to get the messages Farrand communicated in local gatherings to the population as a whole. Doubts and skepticism about the role of the supervisor made that difficult at first. Brcko city did not have a television station; also broadcasts from Sarajevo could not be seen in Brcko but TV Belgrade came through loud and clear. Several marginal radio and television stations with small broadcast footprints had been established elsewhere in the municipality, however, since Dayton implementation. There was a small Bosniak television studio

in a barn that had holes in the roof; someone held an umbrella over its sole camera to prevent water damage when it rained.

I ventured forth to identify and locate all existing local media outlets and in the early days I had to negotiate their acceptance of an appearance by Farrand. The Serb community was particularly hostile to him initially. Later on he regularly received invitations to appear for interviews about his work and objectives. My efforts to make him familiar to Brcko's residents through media appearances were successful and made his job less difficult. He rapidly became a known quantity, almost a household name, which was what he wanted. That made his agenda widely known and the public perceived him as playing a balanced role in his dealings with Bosniak, Croatian, and Serbian authorities.

To provide Farrand a regular opportunity to address media, I arranged biweekly press conferences at the OHR Brcko building, which drew local, national, and sometimes even international reporters from Stars and Stripes, a U.S. Defense Department authorized independent newspaper for the U.S. military community, and VOA for example. Those events provided him a wide stage on which he could get his messages out. I also briefed local press on numerous occasions about OHR activities.

My moment in the spotlight was participation in a half-hour weekly interview on Radio Mir (Peace), the U.S. Army station set up at Camp McGovern. What made it more work than I needed was that I had to script the questions the army interviewer posed to me. He had no experience as a journalist and was without a clue about events beyond the base perimeter. Maybe I should just have been grateful that prevented him from tossing me any curveball questions that might have left me speechless, not that it would have mattered all that much because I doubt that more than a handful of people ever heard the interviews. Driving on roads near the base I could never pick up Radio Mir's signal as I scrolled back and forth across the am dial on the dashboard radio. So it seems that the spotlight may not have been all that bright. At least the scripts I prepared provided good talking points for upcoming press briefings so it was not a total waste of time.

On the plus side Camp McGovern had a little PX with consumer items such as Jif peanut butter, Right Guard deodorant, Crest toothpaste, and Wrigley chewing gum to name a few that were unavailable locally except at the open air Arizona Market. An American army officer at Camp McGovern came up with the idea to develop an open-air private market north of the IEBL where anybody could open a stall. With making money being at the top of everybody's priorities, he believed that concerns about ethnicity would be at the bottom and such a market therefore would contribute to the breakdown of ethnic tension in Brcko municipality. It was no surprise that he was proven right. Anybody who wanted to buy or sell just about anything was welcome. In a few short months one could find among other things tin cups, pirated CDs and DVDs, Turkish clothing, imported packaged foods, toiletries, plumbing supplies, games, and toys in vast array, not to mention internationally known brand name items such as those available at the PX.

My office also monitored local media output for accuracy in reporting about OHR and the activities of the supervisor. On several occasions, I had to remind editors and producers, sometimes in a less than cordial manner, that they could not publish or broadcast lies about the

activities or functions of the supervisor. In fact, I threatened the Serb municipal radio station in Brcko with closure if it continued broadcasting hostile and inflammatory commentary about the supervisor claiming he was biased against the Serbian community. The Dayton Accords specified that OHR decisions are binding and they all got the message.

My office was one of the larger rooms in the OHR building and soon two public affairs staffers, Serbian and English women who did not get along all that well together but got their jobs done, moved in. A Serbian OHR staff translator also spent much of her day working with my office. She shared an apartment in Brcko with another colleague and drove home to Belgrade on weekends. The Serbian press staffer was a hard-nosed, levelheaded energetic war correspondent during the conflict who had suffered abuse from all parties. Her presence on the staff increased the perception that Serbian interests were accurately represented in the OHR Brcko press office. She sometimes brought a Walkman cassette player to the office with her and introduced me to the sounds of Guns N' Roses, whose "Sweet Child of Mine" I found both melancholic and somehow lulling; it reminded me of just how far away I was from home.

In August, I took leave in the U.S. Sylvia and I spent a week in Pawleys Island, South Carolina before driving back to our home in McLean, Virginia, to find our lower floor under several inches of water. While at home we watched CNN on a TV set upstairs and learned that the English princess Diana had been killed in an auto accident in Paris. Her untimely death dominated headlines around the world for days afterwards and on returning to Brcko I found several staff members still mourning the tragic event.

Fall was approaching and my Serbian landlord, who kept beehives along the back wall of his house and harvested honey without using a mask or anything else to avoid being stung (he must have been immune), invited me to join him and some friends of his, "good ol' boys" of Brcko, to harvest plums that would be fermented into a Balkan specialty alcohol known as slivovitz (SHLEE-vo-vitz) widely fermented across all Slavic Europe. Father longed to have some for years after moving to the U.S. but found it unavailable anywhere. I must have been a teen when he finally acquired a bottle because he offered me a shot and I remember that I did not like the taste. Throughout my Foreign Service career, however, I raised shot glass after shot glass of the stuff in innumerable toasts across the Balkans, sometimes as early as eight in the morning. Every hour is happy hour in the Balkans.

My landlord and I drove out at dusk to an orchard of plum trees, gathered the fruit in large baskets, and as they boiled we rotated them through a grinder that removed their seeds and turned them into juice giving rise to a sweet perfume as dusk turned to darkness. Ribald tales, one after another, followed for several hours while we consumed plums fermented the year before and continued to grind and boil this year's batch. It was a once in a lifetime experience of fellowship with half a dozen local men I did not know and probably would have disliked under different circumstances just a few years earlier.

Once again I was becoming weary of being alone overseas and while I thoroughly enjoyed playing George Stephanopoulos to Bill, the job was really another sidetrack to my career, a good portion of which had been spent in non-USIA postings. I had wandered off the beaten track more often than I should have. Most significantly, Bill had media under his control by then. He knew where and how to gain camera time whenever he wanted. Junior staffers could grind out his press

releases and translate media reaction reports into English for his edification. By mid-November it was time to head back home.

At a small OHR farewell function, I received a painting by the father of the OHR translator that I had admired earlier in his apartment in Belgrade. It was a watercolor of the main gate to the Ottoman Kalemegdan fortress in Belgrade located at the mouth of the Sava and Danube rivers just half a mile from the American Center I served in fifteen years earlier. After a few hugs, handshakes, and kisses on the cheek, and, yes, toasts with shot glasses of slivovitz (just a few), I left for home. This ended an unusual experience that did much to expand my understanding of post-conflict recovery and reform.

The final arbitration award in 1999 made Brcko a federal district jointly governed by national and entity authorities. That deferred indefinitely the question of where the IEBC should be located in the municipality. If that arrangement holds, there may be no need for a demarcation line in the future.

PETER W. GALBRAITH
United Nations Transitional Administration to East Timor
Dili, East Timor (1991-2001)

Peter Galbraith joined the American Government in 1978. Coinciding with his work in Croatia, he served various roles in Capitol Hill through several administrations, including work on Iraq, Israel, Afghanistan, and East Timor. This interview was conducted on March 19th, 1999.

GALBRAITH: There was another thing that had happened, well, two other things, well, a number of other things I think that are worth mentioning in '94. At the last minute in I guess October, David Owen, who was the EU mediator and Thorvald Stoltenberg was the UN mediator, they came into the Z-4 process and sort of bumped into staff positions the Geert Ahrens, the EU rep and Kai Eide, the UN rep and were able to broker an economic and confidence building agreement. That agreement provided a number of things. It provided that the Croats would return some generating poles to a utility I think in Dinkovatz that the Serbs had. These were things that had been sent to be repaired and hadn't been sent back. They put in the agreement by the Serbs to open the gas pipeline that went from Rijeka to Zagreb in east, which ran through Serb-held territory. That included an agreement by the Serbs to open the autoput, the four-lane highway that went through part of Western Slavonia. David Owen was so keen on this that he actually went out of his way to sabotage parts of the Z-4 plan.

He tried to get the Russians to withdraw their backing of it. His basic argument was that Eastern Slavonia which under our plan because it was not a Serb majority area, but a Croat plurality area,

it was going to be returned to Croatia, that that area should not be considered part of the plan, it should be left separate. The reason that he was doing that was that he actually personally wanted to get territorial exchanges. He hoped that Croatia would be persuaded to give up the Baranja region to Serbia. This is the area in the east that is north of the Drava River and which had a significant Hungarian population. He also wanted Croatia to cede land to Bosnia north of the Sava by Brčko so that there would be a corridor so the Serbs could have a corridor through there and then Brčko could then be perhaps linked to the federation.

Frankly some of these ideas actually had appeal to Tuđman. I knew that they were completely unacceptable politically in Croatia. Tuđman might have had the illusion that he could agree to territorial swaps, but the Croatian parliament wasn't going to agree to that. The Croatian public wasn't going to accept that. Frankly I thought it was a very bad idea for the United States to accept that. The only solution had to be based on recognition of the, on the successor states of the former Yugoslavia having been internationally recognized and accepted as members of the UN, maintaining their territorial integrity because once you open the idea to any changes in borders, then you would be in a situation where basically those that wanted to divide up Bosnia, namely Serbia and Croatia might be able to do that. The way you stop that is to never open the door on that. So, I thought Owen's tactics were incredibly dangerous.

He went to Moscow and he tried to get the Russians to agree that Eastern Slavonia not be part of the Z-4 plan and to overrule their ambassador, Kerestetzhiyants, who was a very good partner of mine and a complete collaborator. The Russians wouldn't do it, which was very interesting. The notion that the Russian position was entirely pro-Serb. It may have been at the macro level, but it was still a sufficiently professional foreign ministry that they were going to listen to their ambassador and take his recommendations at heart. He was able to outmaneuver David Owen who wanted to take a more pro-Serb position than they were taking. Anyhow, Owen also got his. He, and Stoltenberg contributed, were able to delay the preparations of the Z-4 plan, so it wasn't presented until the 30th of January, '95. At the beginning of January '95 the Croats announced that they would not extend the UN mandate beyond the 31st of March which basically was a signal that the UN would have to leave Croatia, leave the occupied areas and then Croatia would presumably be prepared to take military action. This was something that was completely, you know, had everybody in Europe and in Washington up in arms and panic.

Q: At this point, Serbia occupied almost a third of Croatia in the Vukovar area and all that?

GALBRAITH: The Serb occupied territories were Baranja, which is north of Vukovar, Vukovar and the surrounding area of Eastern Slavonia. Territorially that was probably about 4 percent of Croatia. But they also held Western Slavonia which may have been another 4 percent and the Krajina which is this region in the west of Croatia west of Bosnia so if you will, north of Bihać and west of Bihać touching practically to the sea. That would be about 23 percent of Croatia's territory.

Q: So, you come out close to a third?

GALBRAITH: Yes.

Q: So, I mean was this sort of sitting and rankling all the time? I mean was this something like Alsace Lorraine with France, they were going to get back theirs?

GALBRAITH: Oh, yes, there was no question that Croatia intended to take this back. It was more than Alsace Lorraine in the sense that first this, I mean it was a larger percentage of Croatia's landmass. Second, the local, the Croatian population in these areas had been brutally expelled in '91. A number of people had been killed. The homes of the Croats had been burned and tank shells fired through them. They had been looted. There was this lobby of dispossessed people and it basically bisected the country. In fact when I arrived in Croatia, there was no land route between Zagreb and Split. It was between the capital and the second or third largest city in the country. With that whole region, all of Dalmatia was cut off by land from the rest of Croatia. So, this was not something that they were going to accept permanently. I don't think August 1995 was the point at which Tuđman planned to take it. He took advantage of Serbian actions and errors.

But, let me sort of make one point about the Z-4 process and I may come back to it later, but Owen's delays, David Owen's delays pushed the presentation of the plan from November-December to January and I think having to present it after the Croats had said they wouldn't renew the UN mandate really killed it as a meaningful, as a document that could have provided the basis for a meaningful political settlement.

Okay. The events that led to war. I tend to date this from what I call the first Bihać crisis, which was the 9th and 10th of November, 1994. In fact, I was down in Lovran which is near Opatija on the Istrian Peninsula when I got a call from the foreign minister, Granić, asking if I would come back to see him and Šušak immediately. I think they were going to send a helicopter, but the clouds between the coast and Zagreb were such that it couldn't fly so instead I raced back with a police escort making it in a couple of hours. I met with Granić and Šušak and I think the defense minister. Basically they said, we intend to take military action to relieve the siege of Bihać. Bihać was part of Bosnia. It had 160,000 people in the northwest of the country. It was completely surrounded on the south and east by Bosnian Serbs and on the north and west by Croatian Serbs, by the Republika Srpska Krajina. The military commander there was fifth corps, a guy named Dudaković, General Atif Dudaković, had in September of '94 launched a military offensive first against a breakaway Muslim leader named Fikret Abdić, who had allied himself with the Croatian Serbs driving Abdić quarters out of Bihać. They eventually took refuge between the Croatian frontline and the Serbian frontline in an utterly destroyed place called Trn. Then he had launched an attack south of outer Bihać, basically trying to break the siege against the Bosnian Serbs that had made some considerable headway.

In October the Bosnian Serbs had counter attacked and in November the Croatian Serbs had attacked, maybe even October, October or November, along with the Abdić supporters and had come around the 9th of November the Bihać pocket was much shrunk and there was a lot of concern that it might fall. Now, from Croatia's point of view that was completely unacceptable strategically because what it would mean is there would be a single western

Serb state from Brčko, from the Posavina corridor practically to the coast. A solid block as opposed to the current situation which in essence that the western Serb territory had this big donut hole of Bihać. Of course, if you eliminate the donut hole there are no internal lines, you are able to redeploy your forces against both the Bosnian government and against Croatia.

GALBRAITH: The second reason is that what took place in Bosnia was not the result of choice by the people of Bosnia, it was the result of ethnic cleansing and genocide. It was the product of horrific crimes. While I can accept a right of self-determination, I cannot accept the right that a group within a country or a group backed in this case by a foreign country, by Serbia, can come in and kill, expel the previous inhabitants and then declare that they have a right of self-determination. That's just morally reprehensible. I think that this judgment was shared by all of us who were working on this issue. One of the arguments that I had with David Owen in the year and a half previous when we were working on various peace initiatives, not always in parallel was that he constantly wanted to redraw the boundaries of these countries and I thought that set a very dangerous precedent. For example, I think he contributed significantly to the demise of the Z-4 plan, the Croatia peace plan, because he wanted, he didn't want Eastern Slavonia to be part of it because he hoped that he could engage in a territorial exchange relating to Eastern Slavonia.

He had ideas to solve the problem of Brčko in the northeast of Bosnia by granting the Serbs a corridor through Gornja, which is on the north side of the Sava in which Croatia would give up territory. At one point he actually was proposing that that territory not go to Bosnia or to the Bosnian Serbs, but to Serbia itself because the Bosnia Serbs were being uncooperative. I think our position, which was to insist on the existing borders, was much sounder. It provided the basis for a settlement that ultimately everybody was prepared to accept. If we had ever begun to open the question, reopen the question or open the question of borders, we would really have opened a Pandora's box. Incidentally, Tuđman was prepared to do territorial exchanges. He was actually I think prepared to give up Croatian territory.

Repeatedly he would tell me with regard to Prevlaka, which is the southern tip of Croatia that juts into Kotor Bay where Yugoslavia had its navy that he was prepared to, he wanted to know whether. He constantly was asking me whether NATO and the United States cared if Croatia held on to this territory. I think he wanted, kept wanting me to say that this was strategic valuable territory because it controlled the access to the bay where the Yugoslav navy was. I declined to do so. It was clear that he was also trying to, you know, he was considering whether he should trade this territory or give it up in some kind of deal with Serbia.

ROBERT M. BEECRO

**Special Envoy
Sarajevo, Bosnia Federation (1996-1997)**

Robert M. Beecroft joined the Foreign Service in 1971. Coinciding with his work in Bosnia, he served in Germany, France, Egypt, Jordan, Burkina Faso, and Belgium. This interview was conducted on September 17th, 2004.

Q: What about corruption? I recall some headlines about money going to the government in Bosnia and corrupt as all hell.

BEECROFT: Yes, it's still true. The international community been applying considerable pressure to deal with corruption. At the OSCE Mission, we had our own team of a half dozen auditors. They focused on publicly owned corporations such as the electric companies, which in many cases are socialist relics. Corruption is built into the system. It's very Mediterranean in that sense. The attitude is this: if you work for a public company, or for the government, you're entitled to skim some cream off the top. The war just made matters worse. There is political corruption, but the whole economy is also based on corruption. People claimed there were no jobs. The fact is that there were, but they belonged to the gray economy. It wasn't full employment, but it wasn't 40% or 50% unemployment either. People were working for somebody's brother or nephew or somebody in the family, and they weren't paying taxes. Have you ever heard of Arizona Market?

Q: Yes, but you might explain what it is.

BEECROFT: Okay. Brčko is a river port city across the Sava River from Croatia, way up north. The highway that leads south out of Brčko toward Tuzla was named Arizona Highway by SFOR. In 1996, south of Brčko, right on the boundary line between the two entities, an ad hoc market sprang up. It looked for all the world like a souk, a Middle Eastern bazaar. The three ethnic mafias cleaned out a minefield and installed wooden walkways and lean-to shacks. It was something you'd expect to see outside of Istanbul. You could buy anything at Arizona Market. You could buy a television. You could buy a nice young lady from Moldova. You could buy a Mercedes stolen off the streets of Berlin yesterday -- name your color. It was all there. Everybody profited. These guys all knew each other, all understood each other and they cut the pie very efficiently.

Q: It shows there is such a thing as real cooperation.

BEECROFT: You bet, as long as it's in everybody's interests.

Q: Did you get involved in the when you were there, at one point I think everybody depending on which entity you were in you had license plates of that entity.

BEECROFT: Not entity -- ethnicity.

Q: Were you there when they switched the license plates? Explain what the problem was.

BEECROFT: During and immediately after the war, the Bosniak, Croat and Serb authorities each issued their own license plates. Naturally, this discouraged people from leaving their own territories, because they were so easily identifiable. I have a Serb license plate at home. Someone gave it to me when I left in '04. It has SS on it -- it looks like CC because it's in Cyrillic -- which stood for "Serb Sarajevo." There was also a Bosniak license plate whose emblem was a fleur de lys, because that was the Bosniak symbol. And you had a Croat license plate, which featured a red and white checkerboard, the Croat symbol. Of course, these competing license plates carried ethnic and religious connotations. You didn't want to drive into the "wrong" territory, depending on the license plate you had. Very early on, we began to push for a single license plate and a single currency, because you also had three currencies. The politicians' interest was in exploiting and reinforcing everything possible to add to their power base, which meant exaggerating all differences. The high representative's office, Carl Bildt, began coming up with designs for license plates and designs for currency. Oh, and by the way, designs for a Bosnia and Herzegovina flag.

Q: Oh God.

BEECROFT: There was no state-level flag. There was a Republic of Srpska flag with a Serb crest on it and the slogan "SSSS" --in Cyrillic, CCCC—which is an abbreviation for "only unity saves the Serbs." There was no Federation flag, because the Croats and the Bosniaks couldn't agree on one. One of the first breakthroughs we achieved in the so-called Federation Forum was agreement on a Federation flag -- red vertical line down one side, green vertical side down the other side, a shield in the middle with the EU stars at the bottom, to show that the Federation is be part of Europe, and at the top of the crest a Bosniak fleur de lys alongside a Croat checkerboard.

BEECROFT: But at this point, 1996-'97, there was still no flag of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the same time, we were pressing for a single license plate and a single currency. This is not easy, because you are dealing with symbols, and if there is one thing that matters in the Balkans, it's symbolism. I have at a sample banknote at home that Krajišnik tabled one day at a presidents 'meeting; the Serbs had had it printed in Paris. It's high-quality work, really nice. It features a really nice picture of a Serbian Orthodox monastery. At this president's meeting, Izetbegović, the Bosniak president, looks over and says, "I know that monastery. Isn't it in Serbia?" Krajišnik, looking a bit like the kid caught with his hand in the cookie jar, replies, "Yes, but that shouldn't make any difference since it's a monastery, not a public building."

So Izetbegović gets a little smile on his face and says, "We don't care what's on the bills, as long as it's noncontroversial. I'd be perfectly happy with trees and birds and flowers." Eventually, the three sides agreed on a series of faces of academics and other non-political figures.

As for the license plates, Bildt and the British Ambassador, Charles Crawford, devised a totally anodyne plate consisting of three numbers, one letter and three numbers, with no national markings at all. His idea was that that would build confidence that anyone could drive anywhere without being identified as a Bosniak, Croat or Serb. He took it up to Pale and showed it to Krajišnik, who shakes his head and says, "Oh, this is unacceptable. You're going to be using letters that do not exist in the Cyrillic alphabet." So Bildt announces: "Mr. President, I have good news for you. We have chosen only the 12 letters that are common between the Latin and Cyrillic alphabets." According to Crawford, Krajišnik flushed bright red and said, "We will still never accept it." That was the kind of psychological trench warfare that was being waged. The symbols were used as tools to emphasize small differences and keep political control.

The same thing with the flag of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The flag was invented out of whole cloth – sorry – by Carl Bildt and his team. It consists of a blue field to suggest Europe, on which is a white triangle in the general shape of Bosnia and Herzegovina and a line of stars which have no particular significance.. It looks like something you could pull out of a cereal box.

Q: It really is an abomination.

BEECROFT: As I said, it was just something that OHR came up with. Bildt actually had a half dozen designs he was considering, This one was anodyne enough so that the Bosnians eventually accepted it. But if you go to Banja Luka, the seat of government of the Republika Srpska, today you will be hard pressed to find a Bosnian flag. There are plenty of RS flags on display, though. They have put the Bosnian flag in the RS parliament chamber, though, along with the RS flag. That surprised a lot of people, including me.

Q: Did you have problems with corruption creeping into the American presence there, the military and civilian?

BEECROFT: Virtually none. I'm deeply proud of what the United States has done there over the years, in terms of the level and seriousness of the commitment -- SFOR troops, staffers at OHR and OSCE, police in the International Police Task Force, people in various NGO's...I don't think we could have asked for more.

Q: How did you fine, not just American, but the NGO community, non-government organization community. What was their contribution and what was your impression of their work?

BEECROFT: They were especially active in five areas: health; humanitarian demining; housing rehabilitation; refugee return, which is related; and education. Bosnia and Herzegovina, after all, had been a constituent republic of Yugoslavia, with a very good standard of health care, excellent hospitals in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Mostar, Banja Luka, Gorazde, other cities. During the war, a lot of dedicated doctors, Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs, others stayed on, and many died. A lot of NGOs were active, such as CARE, who came in and helped to re-start the hospital system.

Then there was humanitarian demining. Estimates for land mines still in the ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina today vary between 500,000 and a million. The various militaries in Bosnia and Herzegovina had planted some of the minefields, so there were some records as to where some of them were, but others had been planted by peasant farmers who managed to get access to weapons storage sites. They wanted to discourage people from taking over their farms if they were forced off the land. So you had these random land mines scattered here and there. Today, animals, and sometimes children or adults, are still being killed by these incidental mines. No one had the money or the resources necessary to take all these mines out of the ground -- either the random mines or the minefields that had been planted by the military along the confrontation line.

A number of NGOs with expertise in demining came in and began getting to work, training locals to do it. Some war veterans who were looking for work anyway were hired on. It was a drop in the bucket, but it was a start. As for refugees, Save the Children, Red Cross, Red Crescent, UNHCR, lots of organizations focused on refugee issues. UNHCR is not an NGO, but they helped launch and organize the process. This ties directly to reconstruction, facilitating the return of people who want to come back and finding places for them to live. The U.S. Embassy in the early days, OSCE later on, really got involved along with UNHCR in creating circumstances for return. This has been one of the good news stories in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It will never be what it was before, but the advocates of “ethnic cleansing” never fully accomplished their mission either.

Q: You know, I was in is it Derventa.

BEECROFT: Derventa. When were you there?

Q: '94, I think it was the third election.

BEECROFT: Oh my God. So you saw it when it was really in bad shape.

Q: Yes. People would point out houses. These were Muslim houses essentially that had been blown up.

BEECROFT: Yes.

Q: Were you able to I mean were they getting Muslims back into places like that?

BEECROFT: Not a whole lot in Derventa, because Derventa is still terribly poor. A lot of it has to do with lack of jobs. People need to be able to come back and do something. The eastern part of Republika Srpska, along the Drina, had been overwhelmingly Muslim.

That is, after all, where Srebrenica is. The region was viciously “cleansed” of Muslims by the Serbs. If you go back today to places like Foča or Višegrad, the Muslims have come back in large numbers. Foča is a town right on the border with Montenegro, not too far from where Karadžić reputedly is holed up. The Mayor of Foča, a Serb, deserves a lot of credit. Mosques have been rebuilt. Muslims have come back. In the spring of '04, I was at a town called Janja, near Bijeljina, to visit a school there. Before the war, Janja had

been 48% Muslim and 52% Serb. By 1998, it was 99% Serb. Now many Muslims have returned, and the school was a wonder. Here were people of both nationalities on the ground, faculty, parents and students, and they were working together very smoothly. They had developed a curriculum that both be comfortable with. The lesson is if there's some sense of law and order, and if there is some sense of comfort with each other, you can begin the reconciliation process on your own.

Q: It sounds like in a way the reconciliation really does come down to on the ground rather than in the capital where the political leaders are still mouthing the same old crap.

BEECROFT: Absolutely right. There are bright lights all over Bosnia and Herzegovina and that to me is the great hope.

Q: What about Brčko is that a problem for you when you were there?

BEECROFT: In '96 and '97 it was awful. Brčko, a river port and market town up on the Sava River, was viciously ethnically cleansed of Bosniaks in 1992-3. Terrible things were done in those days. This was in the very first days of "ethnic cleansing." At Dayton, Brčko was so sensitive, both geographically and socially, that when the accords were agreed in November of '95, they couldn't agree on Brčko -- the reason being that it's located right at the narrowest place in the saddlebags that are the Republika Srpska. Brčko is at the top of the saddle. So, the RS was not about to give it up for strategic reasons, even though it had been mainly Bosniak.

On the other hand, the Federation wanted it because it was also where the north-south lines of communication go; rail and road bridges cross the Sava into Croatia and then on to Hungary. Both entities wanted it but neither could have it. After three years of prolonged negotiations, the Brčko District was established in 1998 under the authority of the High Representative -- like the District of Columbia, except it isn't the capital. Ever since, there have been Brčko Administrators, always Americans, who report directly to the High Rep. Ten years ago, it was a shambles, surrounded by minefields. It was largely rubble. Mosques and churches in the town had been flattened. There was no economy. The bridge across the Sava River to Croatia had been blown. There were no hotels; you couldn't stay there. We put in a series of senior FSOs as the Brčko Administrators.

Q: I interviewed one.

BEECROFT: Bill Farrand, probably.

Q: Bill Farrand, yes.

BEECROFT: Yes, Bill was the first. I can't tell you as much as he can, but he was magnificent, and so were his successors. They used their powers as the Deputy to the High Representative to reform the political and economic structure of Brčko. They turned the town into a laboratory. It was the first town in Bosnia and Herzegovina where the schools were integrated forcibly. It was the first place where they held elections that were

really elections, where the old hardline parties didn't just buy the process or try to dominate it. They created an effective police force.

Right at the edge of town was a major SFOR base, Camp McGovern, built right on the inter-entity boundary line. U.S. and NATO troops kept a close watch. Over time, Brčko, because of its strategic location and thanks to the process of putting enlightened local citizens in charge, has become a very most prosperous town, second only to Sarajevo. It irritates both the RS and the Federation, because Brčko is making money hand over the fist. Taxes are lower, import duties are lower, and neither entity can put its hand in the pot. They both covet it and they can't have it. Brčko has turned from a disaster into a success story.

Q: How about Mostar when you were the first time?

BEECROFT: Actually, the first time was as a tourist in 1974, with my wife Mette and then six-year-old son Christopher. To come back and see what had happened to it was shocking. There's a grand avenue, called the Bulevar, that parallels the river on the west side of town. The buildings along it looked like Swiss cheese. You had the Croats on the west side of the street and the Bosniaks on the east side, firing at point blank range for the better part of three years, every caliber of weapon. It looked like pictures of Stalingrad in 1943. The bridge of course was gone, the famous Turkish bridge over the river. The shelling had been such that even when you were a few blocks away from the boulevard, the buildings were pretty badly beaten up. No one was talking to anybody.

You would go to east Mostar, the Muslim side of town, and you'd talk to the Bosniak mayor. Then you'd go to west Mostar and you'd talk to the Croat mayor. You had, in effect, two estranged halves of a single city. Mostar has recovered from that only very slowly. No one could solve it quickly. The international community threw a series of special envoys at Mostar, and they've all come a-cropper. One of them, the former mayor of Bremen, Hans Koschnick came close to being ridden out of town on a rail. As he left town in his car – fled would be the better word -- he was pelted with bricks and rocks. Finally, Paddy Ashdown last year threw in the gauntlet and said "I've had enough." He imposed a solution on Mostar. At the end of the war, what you had was a central district, which was a political no man's land. Then you had three Bosniak communities on the east side of the Neretva River and three Croat communities on the west side. There were two universities, two police forces, two mafias, two religious organizations -- the Islamic community on the east side and the Catholic community on the west side, which was in turn divided between Franciscans and non-Franciscans. A lot of competition there, in a very small place.

Q: I know in World War II the Franciscans were as close to being a fascist organization as you can have. I mean the little brothers of St. Francis were taking Serbs, putting them in churches and setting them on fire.

WILLIAM FARRAND
Brcko, Bosnia (1997-2000)

William Farrand joined the Foreign Service in 1964. Coinciding with his work in Bosnia, he served in Malaysia, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Papua New Guinea. This interview was conducted on March 28th, 2001.

Q: Well, after the inspection, I'm just looking at the time here, after the inspection what did you do?

FARRAND: I had inspected oh, I don't know, maybe eight or nine or ten overseas posts and maybe three bureaus in the Department of State, when I received a telephone call. I was in Saudi Arabia already about two weeks into an inspection there, just after, not just after, but shortly after the bombing at Dhahran of the Khobar Towers and I received a telephone call from Washington asking me to go to Bosnia and take on a job in a contested city in the northeastern part of the country to take on, in fact to take on the city, to run the city.

Q: What city is this?

FARRAND: It's a vowel-challenged city, a little city of about 80,000 people, a vowel challenge. It's Brcko

Q: Today is December 11, 2001. Bill, you were in Bosnia from 1997 to when?

FARRAND: The 31st of May, 2000.

Q: Well, tell me how the assignment came about.

FARRAND: I was on an inspection team and we had landed a couple of weeks earlier, or ten days maybe in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and we were setting up to inspect the embassy in Riyadh, the consulate in Jeddah and in Dhahran in the aftermath, well, it was probably a year after the bombing that had taken place in Dhahran at the Khobar Towers. I was sitting one evening watching a film and I got a tap on my shoulder, it was the marine guard saying that Washington wanted to speak to me right way.

I got on the line with Washington, I guess it was close to midnight in Riyadh so I guess that would have made it about 6:00 in Washington or maybe 5:00 and it was Bill Montgomery, who was an

old acquaintance. He said, he was calling from the European Bureau and he said, "We'd like you to go and take on a big assignment, a big one in Bosnia." I said, "What's it about?"

He told me and I said, "Give me overnight to think about it." I told him that I was in a middle of starting off on a very serious inspection in an important country that we had spent several months getting ready to be there because that's how it works. He said, "That's not important, don't worry about that. Just tell me whether you'll do it or you won't. We want you to go to a town called Brcko." Sure, it's vowel challenged, I'll repeat that, it's vowel challenged. Brcko. So many people say Berko or Brickle or something of that nature, but in linguistics, the 'r' is rolled, so a rolled r becomes a vowel. The 'c' has a little hat on it so it's Brcko. You can say it like a birch tree, with a 'ko' on the end, Brcko, but you put the emphasis on the first. Anyway, what I did, it had then the major sticking point at the Dayton Peace Talks out in Bright Patterson Air Force Base in November, December of '95 that it was the one issue that could not be resolved.

There were other tough issues, as in all negotiations like that, leading them to some tough peace accord between three warring factions, there were things that were simply papered over. This one they couldn't, nobody would give in, it was a town of 90,000 people, 85,000 people up on the border with Croatia on the Sava River up in the corner next to Yugoslavia, of Bosnia.

So, I didn't know anything about it. I mean, I had been doing other things. I followed the Bosnian War generally, but it was all too confusing for me, the Bosnian War. You had when you went to read articles on it, you would read about the Croats and then about the Bosnian Croats and then about the Serbians and then about the Bosnian Serbs and then the Bosniacs, which means Bosnian Muslims as opposed to Muslims elsewhere. It became very difficult to follow, all the factions, and all of the ins and outs and I had plenty on my plate out in the South Pacific when I was ambassador out there. So, I followed it generally, but I didn't follow it closely. Well, would I take this on? He would give me overnight. So, I went to bed, got up in the morning and I'd been thinking about it and I said, "Yes, I think so. I want to get back into the active screen."

I had been in the Inspection Corps for about fifteen months, maybe sixteen and I had found it very rewarding, but I was a passive observer. I wanted to be active. So, I told him yes, I hadn't even called my wife. He said, "Leave it to us." I must say within six hours I received in the middle of the day I received call from the Inspector General. She said to me, "Bill we just have been called. The seventh floor wants you to come back. Is this in accordance with what you want to do?"

I said, I explained to her and I was in a funny position, but I said, "Look, if it's serious I'll do it." I would like to think with some reluctance, maybe not, maybe she was happy to see my backside. Within two or three days I was back in Washington and then within three or four days of that I was sitting at a huge table in Vienna where all the foreign ministers of the various countries that were helping to implement the Dayton Peace Accord. They are called, it's a new term and it's unique only to the Balkans, unique only to Bosnia. They were called, these fifty-five nations, the Peace Implementation Council. That's what they were called, the Peace Implementation Council.

This particular issue, Brcko, there were only two entities in Bosnia, it's like having two states in the United States, and they're shaped like an amoeba and at one point the amoeba for the Serbs comes down to 5,000 meters and is right at this city called Brcko. That's why they felt they had to have it because they had stolen it fair and square during the war and they are going to keep it. I'm paraphrasing what?

Q: Teddy Roosevelt?

FARRAND: It was a Senator Hiawatha from San Francisco. He was a semanticist when we were going to give back the Panama Canal. He said, "We stole it fair and square." I think it was Hiawatha, I think so.

Q: Well, anyway, it referred to the Panama Canal.

FARRAND: Anyway, and to a small extent, this little thing of Brcko, is not unlike the Panama Canal. It was this little strip of land about twenty kilometers long and it was only at its widest point about ten kilometers and that was where the road, the major east west highway went through. That's how the Serbs felt they had to. On either side of it there were half a million Serbs and I for the reader or the listener I depict it the following way. The two, first of all Bosnia and Herzegovina is the size of West Virginia. It had about 4.2, 4.3 million people before the war. West Virginia doesn't have that I don't think.

(End of tape)

Q: Yes, you had gone on after the other tape had run out so you'll have to do a bit of back tracking. Bill, maybe you could start you were telling about Brcko as being between betwixt and between the pommel of the saddle between the Serbs on one side and the Serbs on the other side.

FARRAND: I'll try to recreate and I hope I don't double over, but anyway, the quick description without having a white board of Bosnia as I've already indicated the size of the territory, but it was broken down at the Dayton Peace Accords because there was a hammered out agreement that the Serbs would have forty-nine percent of the territory and the Bosnians and the Croats, Bosniacs, which are the Muslims and the Croats would have fifty-one. Now, this was a, as you can imagine, a terrific problem of allocating real estate around the country between these two entities. It meant in the case of the Serbs that the Serb entity ended up looking like an amoeba. It was the what's the word we use in American politics when you.

Q: The gerrymander.

FARRAND: It was the gerrymander from hell. A quick description would be like this. The Croat Muslim federation if you would visualize them in your mind as a mule standing facing roughly north south, maybe a little bit northeast, southwest, orientation, a mule and then over that mule would be thrown a saddle and two saddlebags. One saddlebag goes down the right-hand side, the eastern side, the other saddlebag goes down

the western side to the left as you look at it. Each saddlebag was half of the Serb population, roughly half a million people in each saddlebag.

The saddlebags came together at the top of the mule with a saddle and the saddle was the narrow corridor and the pommel of the saddle was Brcko, the little city of about 85,000 people before the war that had been unremarkable for most of its history. Five hundred year old town with the banks on the Sava River which had been an internal river in Yugoslavia so it was no big deal. It had been an unremarkable town for maybe one hundred years or seventy-five years it had been under Austro-Hungarian rule control. It had marks of Austro-Hungary in the village you could see that.

Only because of the accident of war, Brcko assumed enormous importance because it was the second serious city that Milosevic's Serbian forces out of Serbia hit on the night of late April 3, 1992. They swept into the town, blew up both of the bridges, this is element of the Yugoslavian national army, Yugoslavs and these terror groups, militias that were under such people as Archon and Shashell and Captain Dragan and all of these other unfavored characters. Archon has gone to his rest, which I hope is not a rest. There was a city between Brcko and the border of Yugoslavia called Yillia. It was hit first and then Brcko was hit. In the succeeding two weeks, or maybe a month they became, these towns just became horrible places.

As these thugs came through with their AK47s driving little old ladies, little old men out of their houses, stealing their televisions, stealing their washing machines. Anybody who wasn't a Serb was driven out and the house was destroyed. There was a huge amount of destruction. At the point where the saddle, at the top, the Sava River is right there and on the other side is Croatia. That doesn't help Bosnia having Croatia across the river doesn't help Bosnia.

Having Yugoslavia just maybe forty kilometers from Brcko on the Dreena River, that doesn't help. The destabilization because there were hard lined forces both in Croatia and in Serbia and they all came together with an intensity here in this little town because the Serbs felt, there was an east west highway through there. I'm talking of Bosnian Serbs now, the Bosnian Serbs. They had to keep that east west highway. As I said, they had stolen, raped and pillaged Brcko fair and square and they were going to keep it. Now, the Muslims and the Croats who together had made up about seventy percent of the population of Brcko before the war felt that for reasons of equity and simple justice they should have access to that town again because it was most of the real estate. By the way, you're talking about a little town, that's true, but this wasn't primitive. This was a nice little town, with little houses and nice houses.

Q: Nice town, not a bunch of mud huts.

FARRAND: Absolutely not. Yes. They had a library before the war; they had two nice hotels. They had twenty-six or twenty-seven factories. Brcko it worked out had produced for Yugoslavia much of the vegetable oil, which is pressed out of seeds like sunflower and rapeseed and other stuff like that. They had a big huge plant that produced much of the vegetable oil for all of Yugoslavia. Just works that way. They had a big shoe factory and the shoe factory employed 1,200 people and you figure 1,200 times four, because the

average family would be four. That would be 4,800 people, close to 5,000 people living directly on the shoe factory, well it was the ripple effect. That was destroyed utterly during the war. Housing, I mean. I'm laying out for you why it's important here.

Now, there was a ceasefire line which I think I've mentioned, there's a ceasefire line in the Brcko area, the corridor, this long narrow corridor which is so strategically important for the Serbs and for the others to keep the two sides of the saddlebags together. The two saddlebags together. The ceasefire was a real line; the trenches, the minefields and everything were established in this area. They were real; they were as a result of heavy fierce fighting during the war. They were not drawn politically as Dayton felt, they were real.

Right in the middle the United States Army carved out a place for a camp right on the line and demined it, demined it with huge machines that came in and blew up mines and then they put themselves in, about nine months prior to my arrival. So, the army was running it when I arrived. There was a lieutenant colonel in charge of eight hundred troops, but he was basically doing the things that needed to be done to keep the warring factions apart and to start setting the stage for a return of refugees and internal displaced persons to go home which is the primary right under the Dayton Accord. People have a right to return to their homes freely and without fear. That was my number two job.

The number one job when I got there was to restore freedom of movement because before the war the Brcko Municipality which it was called. Brcko was the seat of we would call a county, like Fairfax. It would like drawing a line right through the middle of Fairfax and up to the north would live all of the I don't know what, and in the south would live all of the others. Then they would be divided.

In the southern portion and right in a horseshoe shape around the city of Brcko everything was leveled, leveled. I never, I read about Dresden in World War Two. I'm sure it wasn't as bad as Dresden, but that's what struck my mind when my helicopter landed there on April 11, no April 10, 1997. Now, but to go back, so the whole peace agreement that was hammered out in Dayton in three weeks almost fell apart because of Brcko. It almost fell apart. Neither side would budge at all. It was going to become, people were concerned, it would become Kaiser's belief again.

A trigger for more fighting from the partisan groups, things of this nature. So, they agreed at Dayton, this was before my time, I had no knowledge of this, I was out doing other things, inspecting posts in Africa, they agreed at Dayton, I think it was Christopher who came forward and said, "Look, we can't resolve this issue. We're going to have to figure out what to do. What if we did this? What if" lawyers probably do this, "what if we put this under arbitration, finding arbitration for one year? What about that?" In other words, we close this discussion down, this three week discussion down and we leave this one issue out here hanging, breathing, but we put it under binding arbitration and all three of you, will put a tribunal. We'll have a Serb and we'll have a representative of the Federation and a representative of the Republic of Serbska. They'll both be legal minds and the two of them together will get together and select a third member to be the presiding arbitrator under UN rule under the United Nations rules. This doesn't mean it's

the United Nations, but they used those rules.

So, reluctantly, Milosevic said yes because he is a snake. Tudjman said yes, and Ambagavich was very unhappy. Ambagavich was very unhappy. He said, this is an unfair, unjust way of going about this, but I'll go about it because we need peace. It was agreed. In world court, these two people were assigned. The Serbs named their man and the Bosniacs named their man. The Croats were not represented. But, those were very weak, they were professors of law, they were very weak. They had no mandate, they were just figureheads, they could do nothing.

So, when it came time for them to select they couldn't do it. So, the world court stepped in and with consultations with the United States and named an American who had been the legal advisor for Cyrus Vance, secretary of state and then the key legal guy on Holbrook's team, a guy named Robert Sopoan from Covington. Named him to be the providing arbitrator. He then took over the tribunal and for one year struggled to do something about Brcko.

Q: This was before your time?

FARRAND: Before my time, for one year they struggled to do something about Brcko. They could not resolve it, nothing changed, nothing. In fact, if anything they became more firmly entrenched. We must have it, we must have it. I think it was the presiding arbitrator, but it could have been somebody else, but I think it was he who said, "What we're probably going to have to do here after a year is up, we're going to put this under international supervision. We're going to put it under direct supervision. We're going to put a supervisor right on a plane in there."

People agreed and I got my phone call and I accepted and the next thing I know I'm in front of the Peace Implementation Council in Vienna, a massive room, glittering chandeliers all the way around and I'm sitting at the front table right next to the high representative. The high representative was the ex-prime minister of Sweden, a young, brilliant man by the name of Carl Bildt and Bildt, Bildt, I'm not sure, well, yes, I am sure. I think that Bildt's relationship with Holbrook and Holbrook's relationship with Bildt was less than harmonious. They couldn't have an American; they did not want an American in charge.

The principal deputy high representative was an American. In fact, that's wrong. In fact, that is also wrong. They put a German in as the principal deputy high representative. Then they had three deputy high representatives around the country. One in Mustar in the southwest, one up in the north, so I had two titles. I was the deputy high representative in the north and I was the supervisor of Brcko.

All of this was codified in a document known as the award. Again, and I learned that when an arbitrator arbitrates between two parties or three, whatever, the decision that comes down is an award. So, the first award came down in Rome, it was signed in Rome, Italy in February of 1997. It established this supervisory regime for Brcko. It all had to do with Brcko. It was forty pages long. Buried in there it states that there will be a deputy high representative named by the high representative and then he would have two hats, that person and it would be a he, believe me. I'm

in front of this huge room and they introduce me and I'm sitting here saying to myself, "What in God's name have you gotten yourself into?"

I had no idea. I want to make this point now, if I don't I'll make it probably at the end, but I want to make this point now. Apart from life experience, apart from all that goes into what that makes up a reasonably educated person in this world, I had no prior training or no prior preparation. My Foreign Service career did not prepare me for what was about to come and fall on me. We are taught in the Foreign Service as diplomats, and this is the point, if there is a point out of this, if there is one. We're trained to be close observers of host country governments. We are trained to analyze, to observe, to analyze and to report on what we see and to suggest policy options and if the policy options are accepted back here in the metropol, and then they come back out and say yes this is what we shall do, then we become part of the implementation of that policy, but the policy is carefully controlled afar or by the ambassador.

It is coordinated and when we implement it our implementation does not go to interfering in the affairs of the other country. In fact, that's one of the other things we're never supposed to do. You must not interfere in the affairs. Well, of course, we do it all the time, but we're not supposed to do it. We become nudgers of policy. Don't you think you should do this? We try to through exhortation and other things persuade oral argument to persuade the others to do what we wish to have done. We do not take over, but in this job as supervisor I was given the task of going in and running this town. I was very close to people would say proconsul and I used the word, so I'm tied to it now, I rarely do; for sake of shorthand, so there you are.

Q: What did you find when you got to Brcko?

FARRAND: From the time that they called me on February 27, I think it was out in Riyadh and I was back at this big meeting in Vienna on the sixth of March. I then went to Sarajevo where the high representative had his office in a big bombed out old building. I was given; it was catchers catch can, but I was given as much as they could give me by way of briefings. I was introduced to the military side, I was introduced at the non-governmental organization side, I was introduced to those international organizations, such as the special representative of the secretary general, who at that time was a Norwegian ambassador; a representative to the Red Cross to the International Rescue Committee, to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE, which was there primarily to monitor and hold the technical aspects of elections and all of these things were supposed to get me ready to go up there.

In addition, there was this basic document called the award. In the award, it stated, and I'm going to quote this, there's other things that it says, but I'm going to quote this, it stated that, "As the supervisors, such orders and regulations as the supervisor may deem fit to issue will prevail as against any existing law. Such orders and regulations as the supervisor may deem fit to issue shall prevail as against any, any law."

Q: This is known as carte blanche.

FARRAND: Any. In my little microcosm, my little postage stamp I want to explain this

because I think it didn't get on here. The city of Brcko before the war, there were probably throughout the entire province of Bosnia and Herzegovina because it was a province of Yugoslavia at one time. There are probably something on the order of thirty or forty, thirty-five counties. They called them *obschenas*. Thirty counties. This was one county. Brcko was the seat of that county. The county itself was probably something on the order of five hundred and fifty square kilometers. So, you can drop that down to, what would that be three hundred and fifty square miles? Something like that? Not big, but not small.

The war cut it right in half and at the end of the war to the north with the Serbs who were living in all the Bosniac houses and before the war the municipality, that is the county of Brcko, as I said had about 85,000 people in it, but the plurality, the vast plurality were Muslims and they were in the towns, but they were the entrepreneurs. They had the houses. The Serbs were mostly country people. The hard scrabble farmers, but then they moved into the town and took over these houses and in the heart of the town this was planned by Karagee and company. They were stuck that town with Serbs so that it could never go back and that's what they did. They destroyed 10,000 homes so if you figure a family and then times four, that's 40,000 people out of a population of 80,000 that were left homeless and driven out. The tension and the pressure was enormous.

Now, your question goes to what did I find when I arrived? I wanted to tell you about my authority which was something again that I had never touched in the Foreign Service and with thirty years in the Foreign Service, I had never had, I mean sure sometimes I would run a section and you know how it is in the Foreign Service. You think management, you run a junior officer and a half of a secretary and that goes for management?

Now, suddenly I've got a staff, an international staff of about twenty people. I'll just quickly go through. I had Brits, Germans, Danes, Swedes, I had an Australian believe it or not. I had one Canadian later on, then two Canadians. I had an Italian later on; I had a Swiss later on, a Swiss Italian. I had for a couple of years I had a Spanish woman, a newspaper reporter from Madrid who came on my staff to run my press. It was just a polyglot and then we had to hire local people because we were given an office in the downtown which was an old communist trading house full of plate glass windows; plate glass windows on the ground floor, big windows on every floor, I mean, my God. No setback, it was just on the street, no setback at all. The military lived four thousand meters away, which is roughly three miles away. They were in battle rattle. Do you know what that means?

Q: Yes, flack jackets, helmets?

FARRAND: Flack jackets, keblars, they call them today, helmets. Every time they went out they bristled and they had Bradley fighting machines when I first arrived rumbling through the town. They even had a huge tank, big tank; big massive thing because it had to block the river access, had to block the access to the bridge. They had jury-rigged a couple of baileys because the bridge had been dropped. Two spans had been dropped out of seven spans, two were dropped. We spanned those spans with old World War Two Baileys.

Q: Bailey being a type of bridge?

FARRAND: Yes, kind of a temporary bridge. Then the bridge could then be used, but only by the army going back and forth, that would be our army because we had a massive camp up in Hungary. So, they would go across, go through Croatia, into Hungary. Croatia was at its fattest point there, but its fattest point is only a couple of hundred miles, a hundred and fifty miles something like that. The town was and they were all waiting for this supervisor to come. Finally, the day comes, Bildt who was one of my minor heroes I really think the world of Carl Bildt. He has something, he taught me a lot and one of the things he taught me was the way a politician looks at problems like this.

I'm afraid that people in our profession have a tendency to immediately in a circumstance like that immerse themselves in either the written or the oral word; start issuing reports. Now, I have never considered myself, I'm going to say this because I'm retired now, I've never considered myself a typical Foreign Service officer. I did not go to an Ivy League school, quite the contrary and I learned what I learned on the run. My masters degree was in economics, it was not in diplomacy, law and diplomacy. So, I learned what I learned on the run. I never really in fact, it was, when I came in there was no course over here at the Foreign Service Institute on how to be a political officer or an economic officer.

I had to take it from my bosses and from criticisms that come back. I always kind of approached some of this probably a little too tentatively at first and it took me time to catch my wind in the Foreign Service. I can look back now and say that some of that, where I don't consider myself cut from a mold of the Foreign Service. It may have been good for me up there in Brcko because I have a naturally, I just have a naturally outgoing personality, it's just the way I am. I tend to talk more than I should and that is not bad when you don't want somebody who is terrible introverted in a job where you've got all these people that are seething with anger and distrust and they're looking at you. I'm just going to give you this anecdote, I know I shouldn't lard this up with anecdotes.

Q: No, anecdotes are fine.

FARRAND: This was big day, the supervisor was finally coming. Two or three helicopters, escort helicopters took off from the base in Sarajevo, Bildt was sitting next to me. I had never been to Brcko before. It was only a forty-minute ride over these low mountains, I mean I've got to tell you. Bosnia could be a very beautiful place if it didn't have the troubles that it has. We went up there, we had the head of the United Nations, the special representative, SRSG they called it, the head of OSCE, the head of the United Nations International Police Task Force who was a Dane, a policeman, we had the American ambassador and that was wise, there was no American ambassador at the time. There was a charge and he came. There was a bevy of people that came from the press and this helicopter has lifted off and then forty minutes later we start settling down over what once was a soccer field and probably is today, in Brcko. Heavy, armed guards around and out I come.

Now, I am not a physically imposing person, I'm five foot eight, maybe five foot seven now that age has battered me down. I step off the plane and I've got Carl Bildt beside me and he's six foot five. He's a Viking, a Viking and we start across, and I'm introduced to the town fathers such as they were. There were no town fathers, but there was a mayor that had been appointed a Serb. They wait and wait and wait and wait and finally they put me into a cavalcade. I ride into town in this bullet proof vehicle, bullet proof and in front there are these HUMVs and in back there are HUMVs and the things rumble, rumble into town. Again, I'm asking myself, "What in God's name have you gotten yourself into. You damned fool." At the same time, you're excited by this prospect you say, Jesus this is a huge.

As we settle down, I look at the devastation around that town, my heart sank. I said, "Well, we're supposed to get this built back again?" By the way I should say here, when they asked me to do the job, they said, "Look you're going to have," are you ready for this? "You're going to have two million dollars in walking around money in your pocket and you're going to see something and you're going to say get that fixed. So, you can make a quick impact on the people, if the international community is here it's going to make a quick impact on your life and it's going to start making things better. It's going to lower the temperature because people have had nothing and we're going to give you something and when you have something you have something to lose. So, I was told not to worry. Two million. Three years later after much haranguing and jawboning on my part and coming back, three years later I received the first installment on that which was \$235,000. Three years later.

Now, I go back and I ask myself, I'm jumbling in and out, what should I have done differently? Should I have said I'd like that in writing? I'm talking to an old friend who says, "Don't worry you're going to have it." Should I say I want that in writing, Bill? Then I'm calling into question his veracity and we do things by word, don't we? Yes, well. I land, we come into town and I'm going to tell you this anecdote. There was a huge crowd around this building. When I say huge crowd, I'm going to say three hundred people, that's not huge, but it seemed huge. Upstairs I go, we all go into this office that has been arranged for me later with a big, big thing of bulletproof glass between my desk and the window. It was installed later. It kind of made me feel good having that bulletproof glass right there. We go out to the front and they say, "You're going to give a speech now. You're going to give a speech and say you're here."

We had worked on a speech together, but it had largely been written for me and I had added my thing to this and that. As we walk out to the front, I've got Bildt who is the higher rep on my staff and others. As we walk out I'm going to do the Foreign Service thing, just stand there and be you know, with my little shined shoes. Vince grabbed me by the arm and says, "Come on." I said, "Where is this?" He says, "Bill, come on." He took me by the arm down the stairs and into the crowd and it drove the security people nuts. I had a security detail of six guys. Had them for all the time I was there. Great cost. Anyway, down we went. Now, I don't speak the language, a little bit. He doesn't speak the language a little bit, but we both have interpreters. So, Bildt has got me right in the middle and the people surround us. Serbs all, all Serbs. I remember one man who had about three teeth in his head and he had a huge bushy mustache, with a black flat hat on and he is very angry and he's looking at Bildt and he's saying, "I'll never live with the bastards again. I'll never let them back. We'll never let them back."

Bildt is saying to him and this was the anecdote, Bildt is saying to him, "Who do you hate?" "I hate them; I hate them, the Turks. We'll never let them back." He said, "Well, what happened?" He said, "They burned my house and they took my sister away and they beat up my boy, these are people who live right down the street." Bildt says, "The people lived right down the street, is that correct?" He said, "Yes." He said, "Do you know who they are?" He said, "Yes, I do know who they are." Bildt said, "Then hate them, don't hate them all, and hate the people that did it to you. Don't hate everyone. Hate the two or three that did it. Take out your anger on them." That was a very good lesson for me to learn because I used that line many times after when I would be in similar circumstances and people shouting. There is standoffishness in our profession that is inappropriate for a situation like that. Can you understand what I'm saying?

Q: Oh, absolutely. In other words you're saying in this case, I mean you really have to be the politician. The acumus politician to get up and get into the —

FARRAND: You have to be the politician. You have to be, that's right. When I was at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, I don't want to hammer this. I know I sound like Johnny One Note, but when I was at the Industrial College as deputy commandant, so called, there was two years running a, they took the student body and put them through a test called the Meyers Briggs personality. It was how you like to receive information, how you like to relate to the world. The doctor the Ph.D. that did it lives over here in northern Virginia and I'll think of his name. He would come into my office before he went off to make his presentation and we got talking. I said to him, "How is this, is this really a valuable thing?" He'd say, "Yes, it's very valuable. It's been going on for many years. It's based on union psychiatry."

It basically, there is a strong indicator if people prefer to be quiet or introverted or prefer to be extroverted. He said, "Let me tell you something about your branch of government, the Foreign Service. I've done this at the Foreign Service Institute. At this stage we have millions of validations of this test. The American people are roughly two-thirds extroverted and a third introverted. It's just the reverse in the Foreign Service." Now, you can believe that or not or it's a broad statistic. There does need to be, this is not the time to be owlsh and academic, hiding behind the door, issuing reports and orders. So, I took this very much to heart what Bildt had said and others and I became, I let that side of me open up more. There were times when you had to be a play actor and times when you had to be stern, but there were other times when what you really needed to do was listen to people, just get out there and let them natter at you, let people natter at you. I had five children I know there's times when what they really do is just air their grievances. I'll stop there.

Q: What were the issues, I mean, how did it progress?

FARRAND: I had four objectives laid on me by the award. I was given one year to restore freedom of movement in this small little Gaza Strip. They called it the Porsavina Corridor because the Sava River is the root word, Porsavina and it's the corridor. Nothing could move in this 225 square kilometer spit of land if it wasn't Serb. Anything other than Serb, automobile, person, would be in trouble. Same to the south. The Serbs could

not go to the south of the line and the line was actually very reasonably defined because there are the mine fields on either side and nobody had kept good records during the war. It's still a problem today, a huge problem.

First thing was to get restored. So, you had the mine fields, you had freedom of movement, no automobiles traveled north south, they all traveled east west and trucks and other things there could be no crossing of the line. That was the first thing because in order because the second thing which was crucially important was to set up a procedure to enable under the Dayton Peace Accord people to return to their homes of origin. As I've already told you before the ward Brcko and the Brcko Corridor were seventy percent non-Serb. Because of the war it was ninety-seven percent Serb when I arrived, packed in there by Coragic and the hardliners to frustrate me.

We called them biological blockers. Now, as Bosnia had lost during the war thirty percent of its housing nationwide, thirty percent. That meant, and of course, there were many people who left the country and went off to northern Europe, Germany, Switzerland, places like that, Austria and some to the United States. We have 100,000 Bosnians in the United States, most of them Bosniacs, most of them Muslims as a result of that war, but they had left. That took out some pressure on the housing, but still you were down thirty percent of your housing. People were packed into houses, two and three families. It was our job to make it possible for those people to come back north of the line because the Muslims and the Croats were south of the line, but to the north of the line come back and take over their houses. The strategy on that had to be all worked out and it was a very delicate thing.

The third thing I had to do and that I had to do within a year, I had to get the people back within a year. I set myself a target not knowing it, but I set myself a target of trying to have 7,000 people back by the end of the year. I was told by people that that was considered quite remarkable, but I had no judge. They asked me, "How many are you going to have back at the end of the year?" I said, "Well, 7,000." They said, "Well, they'll bless you if you do." Then the third thing was to hold free and fair elections in that year with the organization for security and cooperation. The fourth thing was to restart the economy. The first three things we were able to get done mostly. We were able to get a good heavy start on it. It was all a process but we couldn't get the economy restarted. That was just too premature. Those are the four objectives.

Q: Let's take a look. The traffic one I would think would be with the military force that would be almost the simplest one to do or not? Maybe it wasn't?

FARRAND: I'm just going to try to say a few words and be brief on the role of the military in Bosnia. There were twelve annexes to the Dayton Peace Agreement. The Dayton Peace Agreement had a framework up front and then there were twelve annexes. The first annex was responsible, eleven or twelve. The first annex was the military annex and there was annex A and annex B and they took up together about twelve pages of the whole award. That was the military's obligation and that was negotiated at Dayton and it was negotiated between the Pentagon and State Department and all others, too. The basic thrust of the United States Pentagon and the thrust of the military in negotiating their instructions under this peace agreement was to keep out of it as much as possible. Hands off. Be a presence; separate the warring factions around the ceasefire line, which became

known as the interentity boundary line.

The interentity boundary line, IEBL, was about one thousand kilometers long. Two kilometers to the north of it and two kilometers to the south of it, the military, that would be S4, I4 in the beginning, then S4 was to keep all military activity of any kind out of that area. That became that ribbon of four kilometers, a thousand kilometers long, four kilometers wide all across the country was divided into two entities became S4 country. Nothing went on in there. There could not be movements of Serb forces toward the line or movements from the north or from the south, nothing. By the time S4 got there, I4 got there and then S4, NATO, by the time they got there the two sides had virtually exhausted themselves. So, this job while complex was not, you say, freedom of movement would have been relatively not difficult. This was relatively not difficult.

The military took great pride in the fact and still do that they were able to get in and get their job done. Their job was to separate the warring factions and to ensure that they not start again. Pick up arms. Administer military bases to insure that nothing moves inside unless it was approved, etc. Now, when it came to intervening in the affairs of the country, particularly on the security side, the military wanted no part of that, unless, there was a clear danger to life, clear danger to life. Then the U.S. military and the others could move in to help rectify the situation to their delight, but not property. They would not go in to protect property. So, if some Serbs were blowing up buildings, these guys didn't go into to protect the building. They might rumble through town, rumble, rumble, rumble around and suppress things just by their very presence, but getting out and mixing it up, no, that was left to the police. What police? What police? Who were the police? The police were the thugs who were running the God damned war. I know we're not supposed to swear.

Q: Yes, you can. This is all history, you're allowed.

FARRAND: What do I have to rely upon when it comes to restoring freedom of movement? Can I ask the army, the U.S. army to come up and rumble through town and say, "Okay, Mr. Muslim, you follow me, here's my Bradley fighting machine, and you follow me with your little Hugo car and we'll take you up to the middle of town and you can do what you want and when you're ready we'll drive you back down." That's restoring freedom of movement. First, some freedom and some movement. No, there was a contingent, an international contingent of twenty-nine countries sent a total of 258 police to Brcko unarmed to become the International Police Task Force whose responsibility was to monitor and train or train and monitor the local police. The local police at that time were all Serbs and they were wearing purple onion suits, they wore purple camouflage suits which came right out of the war and which were anathema to the Muslims and the Croats when they saw those suits. They wore slouch hats, which were purple. The police had no badge, no identifying documents of any kind, no number, nothing. They had weapons, which they did not display stuffed inside their balloon pants pockets and they were swaggerers. Essentially, their role was to protect the Serb power structure and there were upwards of five hundred of them. We didn't know who they were.

I had another marvelous man who was a police commander, a chief of police from the city of Santa Fe, New Mexico, an American. His age, his looks belied his age. He probably was, he could have been ten years older than he looked. He was in absolute top physical condition, a Ph.D. from the University of Michigan in something related to public administration, thoroughly dedicated, stood six foot three, athletic build, an American black by the name of Don Grady. He came in and we sat down and I'd say, "Don, we've got to get the police in shape." He said, "I know. What do you want?" I said, "Well, what do I want?" He said, "Yes, sir you're the boss. You tell me what you want." I said, "I think I want a better police force." "Yes, but specifically what do you want?" "Well, hum." He said, "Why don't I come back to you with a plan and we'll look at it?" I said, "Do that, do that." He did.

I had a Russian; oh I didn't tell you I had a Russian on my staff of ambassador rank, my deputy. I had two deputies, a retired brigadier general from the British Royal Parachutes and a retired ambassador from the Soviet Union. They were my two deputies. So, we had a triumvirate, me, a Brit and so we called ourselves, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin. We even took a photograph, they did it, and they cut out the faces and they put our faces in, it's a sketch. With everybody talking and we would talk these things through in endless discussion, how to do everything because there was no template. There was no book; I couldn't turn to anything. As a matter of fact, nothing has ever been written, I am writing it now.

Q: Excellent.

FARRAND: I am, but because I'm spending a lot of time blarneying with you and others I don't get much going on that, but anyway, the thing is that we had to get a police force and it was the civilian contingent of the international community, this task force, IPTF, International Police Task Force, under the United Nations that helped to get the police set up properly so that we could then have a multiethnic police force on the streets; so that the people from the south at least feel that they weren't going to be picked up by cops who were instantly going to beat them up. We had all the patrols on the streets, there would never be two and two.

The police had worked together before the war. We got rid of half of the five hundred thugs. We sent them through a psychological testing and attesting on what they knew about police. Half of them didn't know anything about police; they were just brought on. We put training courses in place. It was not easy and people who listen to this say how could you assess cross culturally psychological aspects of a person? Well, it's hard and I'm not sure that we did it right in every case. We surely didn't, but we cut half of them out and we sent them off to other parts of the Republic of Serbska to join police forces elsewhere, whatever, just get them out of town. We cut it down to about 230 officers and then we, by that time, we were going to hold elections then on the basis of the election results those ratios were used to put the multiethnic police together. There were several things moving in parallel all at once all the time.

Now, freedom of movement. First priority. I got to Brcko on the 10th of April. Three weeks later, it's May 1, now May 1st in the communist world is May Day. This is going to be a big day. The Muslims came to me and said, "We want to bring two busloads of our citizens up to visit you in

the heart of Brcko on May Day. We always celebrated May Day and so we want to do it now.” They told me this, I don’t know what day May Day was, but say May Day was a Monday. They tell me this about on a Saturday, we’re coming north with these two buses and a long string of cars and we want to come in and you are our protector, you are our little godfather. You will protect us, throw your mantle of protection over us as we move north on this bomb, mortar pocked road that is just a disaster. You could only crawl on it because of the potholes and the mortar rounds. You couldn’t go out there because of mines. We’re going to come up and we’re going to do it at 11:00 in the morning on May 1st. Well, this is my decision, so I get my people together and we debate back and forth, back and forth. If we get the police, can we do it? I go down and see the local police commander. I physically go down and see the local police commander.

Drive over, drop into his office. He’s a guy, he sits behind his desk like this and his name is Velosovich. I said, “Commander Velosovich, chief, can you deal with this? Can your police force deal with this because they’re asking to come up, two busloads, four kilometers up the road to visit me in my office and turn around and go on back? No big deal, but can you deal with it?” He kept his face straight. I said, “It’s important that you do this. You know this is one of my functions here.” He shrugs his shoulders and looks unhappy. I said, and this was a big mistake on my part because I had been told by people that had been dealing with him. If you can get a Serb in a position of authority to say, “Yes, I will do it”, if you can get them to say that to you, then you can rely upon that, but if they don’t, then you don’t have anything. You can walk away from that meeting and you think, well he didn’t say no. You can’t take the lack of a no for a yes, which I chose to do.

The military, the United States military started getting on the line, they were very nervous. This was my first test of me and the base was right on the road and actually it straddled the road. These two buses would have to go through this military base and then come out the other side and go right up the road. I had a two star general fly in and say, “What are you going to do?” I had a one star general come up to me and say, “Mr. Ambassador, do you know what’s happening, or do you know what you’re going to do here?” I remembered him and I said, “General Abasak, let me ask you a question.” He had all these troops outside rumbling. I said, “Let me ask you a question. You read this, it says that my job is to get freedom of movement going. Now, this is my first opportunity to test whether how bad that is. What am I going to do? Am I going to wait on you because what I’m sensing here is that you guys wish this wouldn’t happen? You don’t want the commotion.

Yes? This instruction doesn’t speak to you, it speaks to me.” I remember saying that to him. He just went and looked at me. Anyway, I stepped off the diving board with that. I said, two buses can come, no cars, no trailers, two buses can come up, they’ll come to my office, I’ll meet the delegation head and then he goes back down and they all get on the bus and leave. The day comes, everybody is tense and they start rolling forward. I start getting reports. I’m just sitting in my office, but I’m getting reports, we had walkie talkies. They’re coming up through, they’re moving now. What happened, just before these two buses were to go through the camp and head north the three or four kilometers to my office, two other buses loaded with U.S. servicemen going out to Hungary across the damaged bridge for R&R headed out. This wasn’t very

well coordinated. This was if you want to think about it, a mistake that I never knew. The military never told me they had two. These two buses which are of Hungarian make, start coming up that road and the thugs who had all been preplanned by the local hardline Serbs with the rocks as these buses came up, the thugs came out from behind the bombed out basements and sheds and things, they all came out throwing rocks at these two buses. With one driver who was a Hungarian was hit, the rock came through the windshield, hit him and glazed off of him. These two buses came under the attack. Well, they keep on going, they get to Brcko, they keep on going they keep on going because now they can't turn around and go back down, they don't want to get hit again and the servicemen and, remember, force protection is the crucial thing.

Force protection is number one, nobody can get hurt. So, they got to keep on going, they get to the town, they get to the bridge, the tank pulls back and these two buses get across and once it closes, once in Croatia, everything is all right. They've patched themselves up. This one guy got hurt, they took him to the hospital up there and the military was crazy now.

Then the two buses loaded with the Bosniacs start up the road. The thugs, not being very well organized, with their sneakers and their leather jackets, they've dispersed. The buses make it all the way up to my office, quite nice. It's a warm day, the sun is shining and it's hot and there's no air conditioning. The two buses pull in front of my office. I send word down to have all the people come off and serve them soft drinks. We had that set up. They all went inside. We had a large gathering room. I said to send the top delegation up, let the top delegation come up, the guy that had headed the delegation into Bosniac. He is now their Prime Minister of Bosnia right now. His name is Labugia. They come into my office, he speaks English, studied in America and I said, "Now, this is a tense moment and you're only going to stay here for about five minutes." There are eight of them around the table. I said, "You can stay for five minutes. I'm happy that you got this far, this thing isn't over yet. I'm doing this because you requested to come, but my responsibility is not to instigate a bow up here in this town again."

Just as I'm starting to say that, in comes my lieutenant saying, "Sir, there's a crowd gathering around the two buses out in the street and they're beginning to sound real ugly." I said, "Where are the police?" He said, "Well, the police are there, but they've let the crowd get through." The IPTF commander, this man came in to see me and said, "What do you want me to do?" I said, "Can you get out there?" He said, "Yes." He went down, he waded right into them. Now, he's six foot three, just like Bildt. He waded right into, talking to all of them, talking to the people. Now, let's not have any trouble here. He looked at the Serb police and they're in the road, but they're doing nothing because Yalovich, the guy that I said had never given me the high sign so he said, "It's getting ugly." I said to everybody sitting around my table, "I think now it's time to reboard the buses. It's good that you came. Reboard the buses now, we'll get your people" there were forty people on one bus and forty on another, "get your people back on the buses now."

Now the way the buses had pulled up to the building was such that if the building is this way and the bus pulls up this way and this was the entrance to the building to get back out, but this is where the driver sits, the entrances are here. So, the people who come back out have to go around

and negotiate the crowd to get back into the buses. Probably 250 to 300 people were now gathering and there was a harridan, a woman screaming in the midst with big black hair, screaming about the Turks and how evil everything was. They get back aboard the buses and they finally get back just before the first rock hit. We get our people out and I said, "I don't want them going back down that road, I want them to go through town over to the Arizona road and down through the Arizona market and out. Get them out of the town and out into the countryside and down. I want them not to go back because the thugs will have reloaded and be ready for them."

It was so many pockmarks they would have been sitting ducks. They left the town, they started out and went through the town and they start out to the countryside over about eight kilometers and then head south by about six kilometers and be back south of the interentity boundary line, about fourteen kilometers. Now, you asked me whether these things are easy or not and you asked me with the military there isn't this the easiest thing? As they pulled out, the thugs had been repositioned. The organizers of the opposition had prepositioned them. As they pulled out on the first street and they got through two of these massive apartment buildings, out from the alleyways came phalanxes of thugs throwing rocks and they busted most of the windows. Everybody by this time is ducking way down below that metal, you know how the metal comes up and then there's windows? So, they were going through town, they got out the edge of town, the U.S. military is activated by now, but they are not in anyway intervening in no way. Helicopters above the buses while the buses are being attacked the helicopters are above.

You would have thought that would have intimidated somebody. No, not at all. By the time these buses got back to what we call the Arizona market, where they could then be back in safe territory, they were just. We had three people hurt, including the guy that was the leader. He got a little scratch. In fact, I think he loved it. Nobody got killed and I was the luckiest guy on earth. I had four star generals visiting me. I had people on the phone, the Pentagon was concerned, but I established wittingly or not, what my line was. My line was, it's pretty bad. I couldn't rely upon the military; I had to have a police force. This took time. Long answer to a short question.

Q: Let's talk about the police force, how did this work out? Were you able to get a police chief who cooperated, were you able to get a police force that would do something?

FARRAND: This was one of the most delicate tasks of all and this became a serious flashpoint between Radervonkovadgidg.

Q: Who is a Serb nationalist leader in Bosnia. Also, an unapprehended as of today, war criminal?

FARRAND: It's one of the greatest blights on our whole policy toward Bosnia that he hasn't been picked up. We're going after Osama Bin Laden, but we can't go after... He's responsible for just as much killing. A woman by the name of Vienna Plotsige, who was also a nationalist Serb, but somewhat more moderate and somewhat, and she lived in the western saddlebag, he lived in the eastern saddlebag, which is by far the more orthodox hardline. The whole question became who controls Brcko and in their calculus who controls the police force of Brcko. It came down to a big struggle for the control of the

police force of Brcko with us in the middle and they could play all kinds of games around us because of course, they know the territory, they know the terrain, the language, the people, the history and we are meddling outsiders who are struggling to catch up to these power plays. It all culminated in an enormous eruption of violence on the 28th of August, 1997 starting at about 3:00 in the morning and ending probably not the next morning at 3:00, but maybe at noon the following day.

The police of Brcko, this guy Velosovich that I was telling you about, tried to throw his lot in with Plasige to the west, the more moderate. The people in Poly, Karagig forces wanted that to happen not at all. A great struggle took place that broke out into open conflict over the police station and the U.S. military in this instance did get involved. They did get involved. They actually got down there and tried to ring off the police station with barbed wire and to protect its incumbents. The extreme nationalists under Karagig brought in thugs from out of town and there were plenty of thugs in town, but they brought in thugs from out of town and they had a pitch battle at the bridge. Bradleys were brought in, a couple of soldiers got badly hurt and Molotov cocktails were thrown. The whole city was under siege by the people that were raveled out into all of this. All of the vehicles, most of the vehicles that the International Police Task Force had, they had about forty or fifty small vehicles, most of them were destroyed.

Most of the vehicles around my compound were destroyed that were left on the street and it was a great big compulsive affair that ended with calm being restored with the help of the U.S. military. That may or may not have been the high point of the hardliners efforts to frustrate what we were doing there, what we were sent out to do. He still remains at large. This is one of the great mistakes of our policy in Bosnia is not to go after that man. If we did go after him, just like Osama Bin Laden, we would take losses.

Q: How did the military restore order or who helped restore, how was order restored?

FARRAND: In the military way. They just blanketed the town with patrols and everybody again went into a battle mode. All vehicles had fifty caliber guns on the swivels. The people that had been used went back to their homes. All the people were out. What we had to do was get rid of the thugs. So, we did. One of the great lessons I learned from that experience was a gun; a gun pointed at somebody can pacify that person, but only so far. What really pacifies them, what really gets them dodging for cover is a video camera? The army had video cameras and all you need to do is see somebody up there doing this. Before you know it, they'd be jumping, pulling things over, dodging and trying to get out of there. It's marvelous, marvelous.

One of the things I asked for as a result of that, I wanted the international community to cough up money for about twenty-five or thirty video cameras that I could give to police patrols. Just bring that up and oh boy, they don't want that. This could be used in lots of places. I don't know why, but surely. It was nip and tuck for some time, we did restore order. We didn't know what had hit us for a while, but we kept on moving with our program. Underlying everything one of the things I've learned from all of this is the hardliners, whoever they may be, wherever they may be, Al Qaida, they do not have a positive program for the people. They don't have a positive program;

they have a program of mayhem and destruction and defense and destruction and obstruction, all those words. They don't have a program for the people.

What about medical care or social welfare or food or anything of this nature. They're taking care of themselves, the big boys and then they're having their lieutenants who are fanatics out there do all of this mayhem. They don't have a program. The people are threatened, so they are not going to come forward and give you their allegiance, that being the international community. They're not going to come forward and say, "We're happy to have you here." Or any spontaneity of any type. You're not going to get that from them because they're calculating, where do we go, where do we go? Because if they get too far out, they're going to get chopped off by the guys, the hardliners, going to get chopped off or killed. They stay and they shudder and stay in and watch. Then if you, the international community in this case, can restore something like a moniker of normality, something like so that a little store could open that sells milk, little store could open that sells potatoes. People aren't getting hit on the street and they come back out slowly, slowly and start going about their affairs. If you can maintain that and get your police going properly, then you are beginning to achieve something, something, but you've got to keep the peace.

Q: Did you find that the police became an effective force?

FARRAND: Yes, they did. They did, surprisingly, but you couldn't put too much weight on them. You had to keep the International Police Task Force monitoring the patrols, going around with patrols. They have twenty-nine countries, the police, in addition to the United States and the United Kingdom and Germany who would send police, not troops and Spain and Argentina and a few others. You also had countries like Jordan, Egypt, Sierra Leone, and Morocco. It's a tough thing, what's going on, tough thing.

Q: What about people coming. By the time you left could you get people in and out of the area?

FARRAND: Yes, yes, by the time I left they were moving freely north and south, by the time I left. Actually by the end of the first year, people were coming slowly back into town, slowly, slowly. The big problem that we had was how to get Serbs out of houses.

Q: What had, I mean what had stopped the bullyboys from coming in? Were they on call?

FARRAND: Yes, yes. That was a combination of factors of messages being put out. I think that the involvement of the U.S. army on that fateful day back on August 28th, they realized that they had pushed a button one too far because they had picked up. You remember when I told you about the buses coming in and how the helicopters flew overhead while the buses were being destroyed. The helicopters had troops on them and nobody was raising a finger from stopping those buses from being destroyed. Nobody was getting involved. The military was not backing me up on that. People like Karagig, just like Osama Bin Laden built a school. Osama Bin Laden went to school on President Reagan's reaction to the bombing of the marine barracks in Lebanon. You remember what happened? Just simply pulled everybody out and we left. Just pulled them all out and went away with our tails between our legs. Huh? Osama Bin Laden saw that, Osama Bin

Laden took a look at what happened in the aftermath of the Cole. Nothing.

Q: A destroyer that was bombed by his people.

FARRAND: A destroyer. Nothing. We went to school on all of these things. The people who are against you are watching you and that happened in Bosnia.

Q: Okay, they saw that our military was ineffective as a protector. So what happened? Why didn't they keep it up?

FARRAND: When the military reacted on August 28th and actually engaged in combat.

Q: I mean there was enough, they didn't send the bullyboys in again after the August time?

FARRAND: There were threats, but they never did it. General Shinsecky was the four star who was in charge of escort at the time. He is now the chief of staff of the army over here at the Pentagon. He came out about a year later and we were standing at the bridge talking, he and I and he said, "You know, Bill, I think they shot, they threw their best shot at us that day and when they failed, they realized that all they could do from then on was fluster and go underground and do other types of intimidation, but don't come up and do it head on again because we stopped them."

That was only because the military actually did, did stop them. Now, you see if the military had chosen on the day when the buses were coming through, I didn't say this when I was recounting this. From the time that the buses departed from my office and started back out to go back down south to the interentity boundary line, the IEBL, by another route, army helicopters were above those buses all the way and the thugs by some miracle were transported down the road. There would seem to be an inexhaustible source of rock throwers and you know. The U.S. military helicopters did not set down, deploy and put these guys in irons, no, did not. So, they were being, it was like we could do whatever we wanted and it's nice to have them up there because it's a hot day and they're fanning us. I think they miscalculated.

Q: In your relations with the American military, I would think. I want, you know, after the non-intervention of our support of the S4, during the bus incident, this must have caused a certain amount of tension between you and your staff and the American military because I mean, you know, they didn't do a bloody thing and there must have been a certain amount of embarrassment on their part, too? I mean, how did that work out?

FARRAND: Based on the amount of visits I had from ranking military officers in the aftermath of the main first bus incident, I would say that that incident did more to ring the bell of. You see these things go all the way up to the top to the Pentagon. I can tell you, my name suddenly, at least around those categories, about people involved in that, I'm a name. Farrand. I'm sure they were saying, "What the hell is Farrand doing today?" I am sure as I sit here that at the tank, they said, "What the f--- is Farrand doing out there?" I have no doubt in my mind. Of course, I wasn't there and I've never been in those corridors and all of that, but I just. What I needed. Well, you're going to ask about my

relations.

Relations between the military and the civilian side were always touch and go. Even in that situation. I look at the Afghanistan situation with a whole different set of eyes perhaps from not wholly different, but in significant respects different from the way you look at it because I am seeing what's going to have to be done coming down the line now when this all settles down. All of these things have lessons. Some large and some small. I'll suppress those comments; however, it's against the background of what I saw in Brcko and what I viewed over time as a microcosm. I had all three ethnic groups in this town. In the thousands that was a microcosm of the macrocosm of Bosnia and, I would argue of the larger regional area, too. Few other communities had all three warring factions in one place. None, that I can think of, not Sarajevo, not Mustar. Now Brcko, the military, the last thing a military commander wants is anything to happen to any one of his soldiers. Minor injuries are acceptable, but a major injury a life threatening injury and heaven forefend, a death of a soldier is that is at the end of the stone because if you are a lieutenant colonel hoping to make full bird in one day. Full bird being full colonel, and you had something like that happen, this is a very unforgiving atmosphere in Washington today in the army, the Pentagon and in the civilian side. Somebody is always to blame in litigious America.

If I fall on the sidewalk somebody is to blame, not me, who owns this sidewalk, I sue them. That what happens in the military so that force protection is the very first thing. Everything is gauged on keeping the forces out of danger which puts a tremendous burden on young commanders and these are young commanders, lieutenant commander is in his late thirties or early forties. It puts a tremendous burden on these boys and they're all boys thus far. The need to avoid exposing your forces to danger runs directly counter to what I had to achieve. Now, I didn't want their people to get hurt, but at the same time I'm not going to go anywhere until I test the waters until I find out what the limits are here. Now to the credit of the army and to the credit of the commander, I'm going from May 1st now to August 28th, that would be May, June, July, August, four months later. When the police struggle erupted in the middle of the night in downtown Brcko our military was there and in the course of the day they put themselves in harm's way. By putting themselves in harm's way, they sent a very clear message back up the line.

Brcko was not where the decisions were being made. Decisions were being made in the mountain vastness where Karagig was sitting with his counsel and that's what, how it was being done. That message went back up the line that we were not paper tigers, that we were able to go out there. One kid, I think got hurt. Molotov cocktail being thrown at you, I don't care. They escorted some people out of danger. The police chief that I was telling you about from Santa Fe, the International Police Task Force, you know, one of the things that really drives me crazy in giving an interview like this, I cannot use freely.

(End of tape)

Q: You were saying that the international police force was...

FARRAND: Yes, he found himself barricaded during these riots at the police office downtown and we couldn't get at him. The mob was swirling about and we just could not extricate him, well we finally did find a way of getting another vehicle in there and were able to get him out, but and that was with the active collaboration of the U.S. military in this case. Where their instructions were coming from, they did not answer to me, they had to take into account what I was doing, but they didn't answer to me. I could not call upon them for security or anything. They were getting their instructions from the headquarters of the multinational division north which was in Tuzla with instructions from the S4 commander, that would be General Shinsefey in Sarajevo who was probably hearing from the commander of the U.S. forces in Belgium who was probably hearing from the Pentagon. Everybody just was on tenderhooks. Now, I am on and I am not privy to these communications, only privy to what happened, not to what to the. Because I had no secure communications.

Q: Was anybody from the State Department saying to go to it or don't, or were they sort of saying, well, you're on your own, fellow?

FARRAND: One of the great dissidents, dysfunctionalities in Washington in the relations between State Department desk operators and the Pentagon in the time of a crisis of this nature. Now, the crisis that I'm talking about here would not be a crisis if it were not where it happened. I mean, I have a little riot in a town where a few people get roughed up and some Soviets get hurt. This is not, good God, this happens in Northern Ireland everyday, what happened there was a quiet evening in Northern Ireland. It happened to be, however, right in the focus of everybody's' attention. This happened to be the most sensitive area at the time I was there. Today it is not such a sensitive area. It's quite a story about what happened there and I'm not sure I'm going to have the time to stretch it all out and I don't want to say it over here because I want to put it in my book. So, why should I give it to you for free when I want to write it in my book? I should probably start lying and not tell the truth until my book.

The facts are that the military had put itself into a very difficult time. After Somalia, right after Vietnam, Somalia for sure where eighteen Rangers were lost, it just kind of made the majors, captains, very uncomfortable and very uneasy. They want to do some more things, but they can't. People lose promotions over it. This is serious. If I'm a one star general and I'm in charge of this particular area and something happens, a couple of soldiers get killed, I'm never going to see two stars. I would just kiss it goodbye. You think, oh sure, you think, oh things can't be that base. Oh, yes, they can.

Q: Back to this, particularly after the May Day thing, did you find that relations between you and the military and your staff cold?

FARRAND: The Brit, my deputy supervisor, who was a brigadier retired, Royal Parachutes, knew the military more than that he knew the American military because he had as an active duty officer in the British army, had come to Ft. Bragg and was made a deputy company commander for one of those exchange programs. So, he knew our people. He took it upon himself to keep a closer tab and a closer watch and I urged him to do so. The difficulty was the lieutenant colonel at the time, don't need to deal with

personalities, did not particularly cotton to this British brigadier. So, it didn't become as easy a flow as it should have been.

Now, the fact that S4, the stabilization force had been in position in Brcko for about eight to nine months prior to my arrival, prior to the arrival of a supervisor, civilian supervisor, meant that those lieutenant colonels, there was one prior to me and then this fellow, these lieutenant colonels, they had a civilian responsibility for monitoring the government of that sensitive little area. They became, they had to do things right, worry about what the mayor was doing. They had to do things like be concerned about electricity supply, things that a government of a city would normally do. When I came on the scene, it was after this fellow had been in place for about two months; he was already in the saddle and feeling his oats a little bit. He didn't necessarily I suppose, I never talked to him about him, but could tell by his actions, didn't necessarily feel that this civilian, gray haired, balding, who took a different approach to solving problems indeed was very threatening.

Another anecdote that will bring out the point here perhaps you're looking at. When I arrived on April 10, 1997, two weeks before the bus incident, I received a regular stream of delegations of military officers coming up to visit me. A bewildering array, people who were the chief of staff, people who were the deputy adjutant, people who were, you know, decomp ops, or G3, or, or G2, G5, G7, coming up to see me and say, "Bill, Mr. Ambassador, we're going to give you all the support you need. You just let us know what you need. Tell me what you need and we will give you that support. Tell me what you need." I would say, "Well, I certainly will and I thank you very much for your offer of assistance. I can't tell you how much it's appreciated. General, I just need a little time to find my footing here because I'm not sure I know what I really need. I don't know what to ask you yet."

Well, the U.S. military, before they deploy on any mission outside of their home base wherever that may be here in America, if they deploy and they're going to be under canvas, they take their command components of those contingents who are going over and they bring them together and they subject them to chalkboard instruction, power point instruction, cable cot exercises and they go down to Ft. Poko, Louisiana and they go into the field and they recreate a village just very much like it and they put signs on old blown houses and homes and things, and you move in and you actually run a live exercise. You do it in as close to the conditions as possible and they spend big time on this, I mean big time. When they arrive on the scene, because they've located for six months, they've got a huge job, they have and by the way they train their people for worst case scenarios. So, that when they arrive on the scene, they are most everybody is familiar with the terminology and everybody is familiar roughly with certainly the strategic situation and the tactical situation, tactical more than strategic. Now, here they're faced with a supervisor who was plucked out not more than two weeks earlier from a totally different function in another part of the world, raced around Washington, raced through some quick briefings down in Sarajevo and plopped on the scene who had had no previous experience with police work, supervising police forces, no previous experience running cities and towns, the infrastructure, mains, water mains, sewer mains, buildings, lights, no previous experience. No hands on experience of running a city and no previous experience except for my time in the military which was navy, not army, working directly with military commanders. This commander can't take that onboard. How could it be?

Well, it could be because the organization that you work for for most of your adult career and mine is truly averse. The Department of State does not train or educate maybe to have this, but they don't train you up for operational duties. They assume you can pick it up because we're all so bright. We are so terribly, terribly, intelligent. We can do that without any extra care and we don't have enough people in our business to have surge capacity or the flow capacity to take people off line, keep our positions filled and train. So, we are an enigma to the U.S. military, we are an enigma to the Pentagon. The Pentagon doesn't understand how we can operate this way. Neither do I. They're not wrong.

Q: Oh, I agree. Well, Bill, I'm going to stop at this point and I'll put at the end. I think we've got one more session to go. We'll come back to Brcko. We've already talked about your relations with the military; we've talked about the incidents of May and August of 1997 and how that helped the back, the August time, of some of the police side and so, but we will move on and what I would like to talk about your staff which is an international one and then talk about the other things; getting people to come back to Brcko and running the place and your relations with not only just the military, but with your group of foreign ministers who supposedly were supervisor and the State Department. So, we'll do that

Q: Today is the 18th of December, 2001. Bill, I'd like to add one note. I've been thinking about what we were talking about last night and you were talking about how unprepared you were and the State Department doesn't train its people and that you were thrown into this. At the same time, your diplomatic background and your understanding of the situation, the May Day situation when the people came, it was a messy situation where, the buses were being stoned, but if you hadn't let them come, it would have sent a very powerful signal that the Muslims are really, couldn't depend on you. I'm not sure that any training, particularly military training which is usually designed to avoid risk under the rules of the game and all, would have helped. So, I mean, whatever it was that you had picked up over the years or internalized, worked. I must say I was interviewing shortly thereafter, Bob Barry, who was I think heading OSCE in Sarajevo at the time and he said, "Well, you know Brcko had far more success in resettlement and other things and getting things done than other places. It was the most critical spot." I mean, whatever the background was, whatever it took, you did the right thing. So, let's go on. Your staff, you had this international staff, what were they doing and how effective were they?

FARRAND: In all of my diplomatic career, I have served in places where I think I'm accurate in saying this, only an American staff, either in an American embassy or back here in Washington, I never served at the United Nations, I didn't serve in multilateral organizations and therefore, this was the first time that I found myself in charge of a staff which I suppose at its outside was twenty-five professionals from, and I suppose, I counted them once, as many as eighteen countries. I'm not going to try to list them.

The challenge of that, of course, after you've bumped around as long as I have, you have Stuart, you're right. There is a certain coming in to your experience a certain version a

life's experience, of course, which is the primary thing. No amount of training could overcome someone who was not able to interact and work with people without and in keeping them on the side without these life skills, what you talk about. So, the multilateral staff was made up largely of, well, I had a senior military brigadier from the Royal Parachutes from the British army who was retired who was my senior deputy. He had an equivalent deputy who was a Russian ambassador actually; they do it that way. This man was of ambassadorial rank. I told you I think why I think that they both were assigned and we made jokes about it later because there was a concern on the part of Russia, particularly, that an American would come in and do harm in some way to the Bosnia Serbs that were occupying the town. So, I don't know where I'm going with this reply. Could you sharpen it a bit?

Q: Oh, yes. What types of things, were these people coming in not just to watch you, but did they have their own jobs? Were they bringing expertise such as sewage education, electricity, I mean, what have you?

FARRAND: Right. I don't want to tell you they were only there to watch me. They were there for sure to give a balance to the administration of this highly combustible community where it was teetering on the edge. It had come out of a chaotic situation in the war and the feelings were raw. The ethnic and enmity between the three groups. That would be the Bosnian Croats, the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Serbs was at top pitch. There is no question about that. They brought balance, they brought solidity, they helped me to explore other ways of doing things that I would not have thought of, they served occasionally as a break on my enthusiasm if I felt that yes, we ought to do this, they would say, "May we close the door and talk for a minute?"

We would and we would go through it very carefully. I think one of the things I want to ease up on the State Department here. One of the things the Department did for me that I didn't realize until later. There was a course actually here at the Foreign Service Institute and I think the course was conducted up in the hills of West Virginia. I believe it had to do with supervisory management, and I believe I took it just before I became a deputy chief of mission. In fact, I think it's called the DCM course. That course was invaluable, not so much for what it did, not so much for the substance, but for the attitudinal approach.

The way that the instructors who were down from Cambridge. They were contracting organizations, but they were from Cambridge and they said, they brought out you don't have to be the most brilliant person on your staff. You don't have to be the most accomplished person on your staff. You don't have to be the bravest person on your staff. You do have to, however, understand where those strengths and build on the strengths. If a person has a weakness, don't go crazy about that person's weakness if it can be gotten around when you are pushing forward on a complex mandate, a complex program as this was. That was an excellent. It changed my thinking. It really did because I probably was always a bit concerned that how can I deal with somebody who had steeped themselves in history of the Balkans, who has his Ph.D. on the Balkans? How can I deal with that? I know something about the Balkans, but certainly nothing like this. Yet, I had such people and we were able to build on those strengths.

I guess I would have to say to you that I conducted an open shop, an open front office. I probably drove my people a little nuts by calling them in. I'm talking a German, a Swede, a Brit, a Russian, a Canadian, a Spaniard and English, by the way, was the language. I probably occasionally want to have a meeting tomorrow on the question that we have just discussed here at this staff meeting this morning. I don't want to conduct it right here because I have things to do today. I want to think about it and I want to get together with you, you, you, you and please come to my office and I would turn to my administrative assistant and say, "Please set this meeting up." They would come and we would sit and I would try to follow as best I could the reason for this meeting is the following or here's what I would like to come out of this meeting.

I didn't always do it that way, but I tried to hone to that and I think, am I going where you want me to go? I think the, for me, the best result, the best outcome was a couple of times when a senior fellow on my staff and that's what would happen in the international community by the way, one has to be ready for this if one is going to get engaged in these type of hybrid operations than don't fit within the bilateral diplomatic paragon. If you're going to get involved in this, you've got to recognize that these people may not come into this with the same enthusiasm that you have for getting the job done. They may, they may, but they look at it slightly differently because there is out there, which I hadn't known, I really hadn't known, but there is out there, kind of a professional international community, I won't say worker, but a person who kind of goes from the crisis in Bosnia to the crisis in East Timor to the crisis in the Sudan or if there is one down in Namibia, they keep their ear tuned. There is a vast network of nongovernmental organizations that are tied to the governments, international organizations which are tied to governments and then, of course, the governments themselves. They're always looking for people and there is a whole cadre, cohort of people, if you will, out there ready to go different places depending on a number of factors, family, because lots of times they are more comfortable traveling away from their places for long periods of time.

I had a number of British officers, by that I mean professionals, that were working with me that would go home and see their family every two and a half months and it was understood. It was accepted I think over there. The Brits have done that perhaps more than we. Anyway, because of their empire. The thing that I learned was that these folks, you can get working with them and then all of a sudden, they come and say to you, "By the way, boss I have an offer." I would say, "What is the offer?" They'd say, "Well, you know the problem in East Timor; you know the problems in Kosovo?" I'd say, "Yes?" "Well, I think I'm going off there."

You can't say no, you can fluster a little bit, but you can't really say no. When they did, I had two people come back to me and say in one way I'm sorry I left because I've come into a, that's the person that left, is saying, I, the person that left, am in a situation now where the international community shuts down all internal communications because the person at the top has a closed way of operating. You did not. You did not. That they said to me and I felt good about that. It was part of the reason why we could make such progress there in Brcko. Over here in Mitushain or Kristina, there is no cross organization between agencies. I felt good about that. I had another person called me, too from Macedonia. He's working at that time for Catholic Relief Services, but now he's got a job with the international crisis group. He did this about four months ago. He

lives in town and he called and said that he just wanted me to know that that style of management was an enormous assist to the program to the mission.

Q: Let's talk about first as you mentioned the Russian ambassador there was there more or less to see that you were working with the Serbs? Was there a problem? You're trying to put this together, yet it's the Serbs who are being the bullyboys. You know, in a lot of cases they weren't being the bullyboys, they were just Serbs. Did you find that you had to watch yourself and your team not to be beastly to the Serbs as opposed to the Croats and Muslims?

FARRAND: You know, there might be something to be said for bringing somebody like me onto the scene who had not been immersed in it and had not been there during the war and had not seen some of the atrocious acts and I'm going to say by the Serbs against the non-Serbs, however, once the thing got rolling of course, then there is going to be some tit for tat. Well, the tit for tat, this particular round of the never ending round of Balkan conflicts that seems to go back for some time. This one you've got to lay in the hands of the Serbs, you've got to, Milosevic.

The Serbians, I'm not going to say the Bosnian Serbs, I'm going to say the Serbians. Look, the situation was such that the municipality, they called it, the town had 85,000 people before the war. Well, probably, I don't know how many, 1,000 were killed, just killed. They were non-Serbs, non-Bosnian Serbs and were driven away, some driven out of the country, some driven into the country, but the place was all Serb when I got there. Now, what am I going to do? Poke a sharp stick in the eye of everybody I talk to and just say I want you all to know that I find you all morally repugnant. As far as I am concerned you should be categorized with animals, we ought to treat you like that.

No, you can't do that; you can't do that because they're pretty punch drunk, too at this point. Punch drunk from the war, punch drunk from all the pressures they're getting internally and not well.

Q: How did you go about the resettlement process? What did you see as your objective and what did you do?

FARRAND: Yes. The people back here in Washington that I had to go around and see in a blur of one on one meetings with people, over at NSC, certainly at many offices at State, out to the agency, out to the Pentagon, all wanted to know the answer to that question. What do you see as your goal? How many people you going to get back? Well, I never was on the ground. I hadn't followed in any great detail the war. I was learning fast about what happened, but I was behind the curve all the way. I, therefore, could not say look I think it's going to be possible to bring back within a year x number of people. Although with one man I did, his name was, he was a special representative over at the White House sitting in the State Department. His name is Sklaar. He said, "How many do you think?" I said, "7,000."

He looked at me and his jaw dropped. He said, "Well, if you can do that, you'll be a hero." So, I figured I just took the number out of the air, 7,000 people, not families, families would be times

four, would be 28,000. No, no, no. Just 7,000 I said. So, I tested the waters. I plucked that out of the air, but I remembered it. When I reached 7,000 when the numbers got up to 7,000 I don't think it was done in a year. Surely it was not, but I think by the end of the second year I was hitting in those numbers and then it began. It was a tumble down effect. You had to, the fear was palpable, the hostility was palpable and you had to devise a plan which was laid on me to do although I had a great deal of help in this from the high representative himself personally, Carl Bildt and from the head of the United Nations high commission for refugees that sat in Geneva, came all the way in to number two. Not Ogata, Madame Ogata, but her number two came in. Lawyers and others came in and we sat around and jawboned for a couple of days, three days, coming up with a plan to bring people back which was the primary right under the Dayton Peace Accord, the primary right under the Dayton Peace Accord, stated, "All persons shall have the right freely to return to their homes of origin."

Freely to return to their homes of origins. Now, of course, it was laid on the parties, not on the international treaty, on the parties to make that work. Well, we went about it very carefully in the beginning because there was going to be no receptivity to any of it at all, none, no receptivity. Serbs would say that. We'll never have them back. They use a pejorative. The pejorative that the Bosnian Serbs used to describe the Bosnian Muslims was Turk. That was the lowest word you could use. We'll never have the Turks back. You had to chew away at that. Of course, the Bosnian Muslims were saying, "Okay, you big man, you have all the powers. It states right in the final award that all rules or orders and regulations laid down by the supervisor shall prevail as against any conflicting law, any conflicting law."

The seeds of that statement were built a sure fire problem with the office of the high representative; you can see that can't you? That began to grow as the initial period of enthusiasm. As we began to make some progress, then that power which was pretty broad began to come up against the power of the high representative, that was the problem.

Q: How do you convince, how did you sort of get the trickle going?

FARRAND: Right, right. What we did, I think I said in an earlier session, that the ceasefire line which was a real battle line, it was not politically drawn through the Brcko municipality. The word for cognoscenti is opstina. That line, all around the country, was about a thousand kilometers long, plus or minus a couple of kilometers, I don't know. Under the Dayton Agreement, two kilometers north of it and two kilometers south of it. Well, two kilometers either side of it was the area in which the stabilization force, S4 was given total authority to keep out all, any kind of military activity of any sort. It went through the Brcko area, about forty kilometers east west and S4 controlled, because we had a major battalion there, three hundred troops; S4 controlled that strip of land. Four kilometers wide, forty kilometers long. Now, that kind of real estate is going to have within it some villages and indeed, right near where we were there were about three, two for sure, Muslim villages that had been destroyed and emptied out by the Serbs. It worked out that those villages fell within this four kilometer strip centered on the interentity boundary line, which was the ceasefire line, the IEBL. Right on that line, so that what we did, we started to put out feelers that people could come back to those villages and they

bought it, why not? Because S4 controlled it. They were going to come under the mantle of S4's protection. Now, S4 was not a police force, but so long as S4 had total control over that strip, then the people would come back in. So, we started very delicately, sensitively bringing a few back in there. Then we started working off the line. Marginal.

Q: How did S4 feel about these people coming in?

FARRAND: Well, S4, that's a good question. They felt good about it, but they didn't want to be responsible for it. In other words, if there was going to be a fight breaking out between the two factions if it happened, they didn't want to have to be in a position to protect those people's lives, oh property, sorry, property. Lives yes, but not property. Well, when you're reestablishing a village, when you're building up a village, you're talking about property. You're talking about restoring property to its previous owners. So, S4 was under technically speaking, this was not S4's job, but S4 was very interested in getting out of Bosnia and one way of getting out of Bosnia is to get the people back to their homes and get life back to the way it is which is the standard intelligent way to go about things. That wasn't what was written into the mandate, not quite the same way. S4 always did state that after its first mission, which was to protect its soldiers, force protection, that's the first mission. The second mission was to get people back to their Homes.

Q: What about houses and property either side of the line because you're saying this is a Serb dominated area? In the first place, who were these people? Were they Croatians or Muslims or both was it preponderates of one of those groups coming?

FARRAND: The preponderates were the Muslims returning. Before the war the Muslims had been up forty-five to fifty percent of the population and after the war, and the Serbs only twenty percent. The Croats were in there with twenty-five percent. So, you had Muslim Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Muslims, which made up something on the order of seventy percent of the population of Brcko. After the war, the city had been ethnically cleansed and it's loaded with Serbs. So, this was, these Serbs were internally displaced from all over Bosnia, all over Bosnia, the far south, all over the place, they were jammed in there by Karagig and his henchmen.

Q: When you started moving away from the neutral zone, what happened? I know from my experience of just hearing about it when I was in Derventa and I went over to Vanaluka and I know that every time they would try and build something, some jolly boys would show up and dynamite and blow it up again. This was about the same time you were doing this I think.

FARRAND: Probably.

Q: So, what was happening with you all?

FARRAND: Well, I had this British retired brigadier. His name was Ian McCloud. He was a great fellow. He had a lot of experience in Northern Ireland, which is a great benefit to us, actually. Sometimes he would say when we would be having some trouble; "This is

a quiet night in Belfast.” He would also say, he had one saying that I wrote down, “You only have setbacks. You’re never defeated until you quit. Setbacks, yes, you get setbacks, but you’re never defeated.” So no matter what we did, we would encourage the people, that would be the Muslims if they were coming back to get up, brush themselves off and start again and then we for our part would start again. We never got set back. Set back, yes, but not. We weren’t going to take these things as the final word because of course, that’s what they wanted?

Q: What did you do about the bullyboys with the dynamite?

FARRAND: For one thing, they were all cowards. They only do these things at night. They didn’t have dynamite per se; they would have grenades or LPGs. There was no electricity; there were no lights in the city. We had lights. There were lights in the city and there was some electricity, but it was about a third of what you had had before the war. Now, out in the regions around the town, three and four kilometers out were all this reconstruction we were trying to get going. This is where the mischief would happen. There were no lights out there. So, you had this problem that would take place mostly at night. These people did not have generators, these portable generators. No. So, we had to get electricity going. What you had to do was to shine light on the issue, you had to shine light on the issue. We fooled around on a couple of ideas.

One idea, which didn’t go anywhere, it did go somewhere, but it wasn’t a good idea. Yet, I agreed with it. The idea was to get some towers and to bring towers in that would be a hundred feet in the air, if you could get a little higher that would be better and put policemen up there with heat seeking lights, infrared type optical things. Big lights. Actually we got along, people were willing to do it, they found a couple of towers, they brought them up by helicopter, we implanted them, but then the police, that would be the western police, the International Police Task Force didn’t want to be up there. You can see why.

Q: They’d be targets

FARRAND: They’d be sitting ducks. Had we thought of that? No. They didn’t want to go up there. So, it didn’t work. We left them there for a couple of months and eventually we took them away. That was something that didn’t work. One thing that did work, however, I think in time it worked. I went out to see the base commander, the lieutenant commander, the lieutenant colonel, I’m sorry, I’m an ex-navy man, lieutenant colonel. I said to him, “Look, I know your mandate, I know you’re not supposed to protect people, but one of the things.” I’m sorry, you do protect people when their lives are in danger, but you don’t protect property. So, let me correct what I just said. I said to him, “Your mandate is that you are not paid to protect property.” He said, “That’s correct.” I said, “Well, look, on the way up from your base to the heart of town and you start right on the IEBL, and it’s only about four kilometers up to town, you go through some rugged territory. You go basically through one road, one pockmarked, potholed, mess of a joke of a road and as you come up that road, that is your patrol. Then you get into town and you patrol on the streets and then you go back, put your people to bed and another patrol comes out and you do this around the clock, right?” “Right.” I said, “But you know, some

of the regions in which we are reconstructing is off to the side of that main road, maybe a kilometer over here, maybe a kilometer over here.” This is in the beginning stages, we’re just probing, but I said, “They’re having this difficulty at night. Would there be any chance with your people, as they come up the road that they could take a side tour? In other words, they’re headed from the camp to the town to start their patrols, could they start out ten minutes early, rumble up the road, rumble off to the side, rumble down into some of these little areas, rumble around, rumble around, come back out on the main road and then come on up and do that on a irregular basis, on a random basis?” He thought about it, “We can do that,” he said. I said, “I’m not asking you to get out, I’m not asking you to put troops around the particular houses that had their roofs destroyed, or anything of that nature. I’m just asking you to rumble by, just rumble by. You don’t have to do anymore than that.”

He was amenable to that. We never asked Washington because if you had they would have said no, the Pentagon. Without any fuss he did it and it had a salutary effect of suppressing some of this arbitrary random violence just because the troops were rumbling around. Of course, they had lights on their machines; they could see where they were going. It was quite evident there’s guys up there still going around with their fifty caliber.

Q: Did the international police and eventually the Brcko local police begin to control the sort of hoodlum element and the bullyboy element?

You never knew. In the early days there, I’m talking the first I’m going to say the first seven or eight months, you never knew whether the police or the bullyboys were different. You never knew. The police were virtually all Serb and, as I said, our estimate was, we would try to get a number fixed on them, but we couldn’t get a real fix, but our estimate was after we had our IPTF, we had two hundred fifty IPTF guys there from about twenty countries. They had this marvelous commander from Santa Fe, New Mexico and he did a careful look at it. He said, “I think there’s about five hundred of them.” But they’re not trained as policemen; some of them are nothing but paramilitary fighters during the war, just paramilitary. All they did was put on a uniform, and it’s not even a uniform, it’s a combat type uniform. They slouched around town. They drank coffee and basically protected the party, protected the Serb Orthodox party. When I say Orthodox, I mean hard line. That was their particular function.

We had to get rid of them and we did. By the end of the year, after we had had elections. Once we had elections, which took place in September of ‘97; I got there in April and in September of ‘97, once we’d had elections we could then once the elections took place we could then get ratios. This was anathema back here in the United States, but that’s what we had to do. We took ratios. How many Bosnian Serbs were elected? How many Bosnian Croats and how many Bosnian Muslims were elected? We took ratios. On the basis of that ratio, that’s how we formed our police force. That’s how we formed our police force on that ratio. We got rid of roughly half of the police so-called police; got rid of half of them. The other half we had them all take tests and we opened it up to others who wished to come in and those who didn’t pass the tests were dumped and then those who did pass the test were put through training, even, are you ready for this? Human rights, lectures and we impressed

upon them that they were to be a professional police force and that's what they were to do.

We made our patrols dual ethnic. It worked out that the number was two hundred thirty, that's what we cut them down to, two thirty. It worked out that the ratios left us with the following out of the two hundred thirty, one hundred twenty were Serbs, Bosnian Serbs, ninety were Bosniacs or Bosnian Muslims, and twenty only were Croat, Bosnian Croats. That was our police force. You saw the ninety and the twenty is one hundred and ten, it doesn't really match the one hundred twenty here, but it was such that we could have no Serb out on patrol unless he had somebody that was not a Serb with him on patrol. You would have thought that there was going and there was in the beginning, when we put this in place on the first of January 1988 and I addressed them all. I addressed them all. I called them over to the office.

We had a great big room and I addressed them and I was kind of impressed that I didn't see on their face this look of surliness that I expected. It might have been in their hearts, but I didn't see it on their faces. I was kind of really pessimistic that this was going to work, but because of the way that the IPTF went about it and because we stayed with it and wouldn't let it go, and we had one or two officers on my staff, one of them was a Brit, a young man, very bright, who had served in the Cold Stream Guards, was a young man. He went out and he took a special interest in this. We had civilian and the UN staff, too. This was kind of a complex interweaving and if I could put in a plug again, this would be where I would see State getting serious about introducing persons that the State Department wished to send into situations like this. I know a little bit about the perplexity of the international structure. Your own structure, that would be good and then they don't do that very well. You pick it up. They expect you to pick it up.

Q: Did you find that as you introduced these bipolar patrols or whatever you want to call them, did you find that they were beginning to get professional and stop you know, people from messing around at night and all that?

FARRAND: The quick answer is yes, the quick answer is yes. It didn't mean that there weren't significant, there wasn't a significant amount of trouble along the way. The professionalization of the police would be if I had to leave one thing for whoever looks at this down the road wherever, would be the professionalization of the police and the multiethnicization is probably one of the very first things you need to do if you ever, ever expect to get out of that community. I think that's going to have to happen in the Middle East. I won't get off on that. I think they're going to certainly have to do it in Afghanistan. It's going to be hard, but you've got to do it and you have to take time and think it all through. The devil is in the details. But, yes, they did start acting professionally.

Q: Particularly the Bosniacs who were coming back, one thinks of these flattened houses, what did they come back to and how did they settle in?

FARRAND: Sure. Okay. The United States army has a, what is it called, call it a regiment. It's probably not a regiment, but it's a large organization of persons who are civil affairs officers. Now what does that mean? That means that you can bring back in time of crisis from the civilian world, reservists, reservists put them into uniform and

depending on their expertise and private life, utilize them as advisors and assist in many, many different ways in a conflict zone. The U.S. army in the course of my three and a quarter years there provided me with at least eleven or maybe twelve of these people. They came with me for ten months. One of them in the very opening days was a Ph.D. in systems analysis out of Florida. Someday I'll look up his name. It's Jim, but I can't remember his last name. A man of quiet competence and I said to him, "Jim, we and I don't know how to do, I don't know how to do it, I don't what to do, but we need because my people are advising me that we need it, we need a systems approach to all of these destroyed houses. We need to know, we need somehow to find a way of marking all of these destroyed houses because they're all sitting on pieces of property. Now, it's all a jumble and a blur."

One thing the Serbs did before they left was to take all the street signs and the road signs and take them all, take them all away. They wanted nobody back ever, this was meant to be the final thing; you will never come back. This is all destroyed; you will never come back. You won't even know where you are when you do come back because all the street signs have been moved away, all of the road signs, anything that would identify. "So, would it be possible, Jim?" He said, "Got you covered?" You don't need to. He went down to the bowels of this building of mine, ours and he sat with another highly competent civil affairs officer who, let's see, am I getting this? Well, anyway, he worked out a system so that he went out into using the Cadastre records. Do you know the word Cadastre?

Q: Yes, the town records.

FARRAND: Yes, the town records. They're using the Cadastre records, which curiously enough, the Serbs had not destroyed. They're were a bit like the Germans in the Second World War, they kept all their records because they were compulsive and obsessive about record keeping. Well, the Serbs had not destroyed this and even if they had, there was a juadetic survey in Sarajevo, which had a microfilm of all property records throughout Bosnia. We could have always backed that up if we had to. So, what we did is, we went downtown. I'm sorry, yes; we went downtown, worked with the Cadastre records and then using a relatively simple marketing system. I forget how it went, but I think it was, let's say it was red paint with a number, red paint. That meant Bosniac or green paint meant Bosniac, red paint meant Serb and blue meant Croat.

The numbers were put on. We had this huge grid and I also asked, he asked me and I arranged with the general to go up in the helicopter and spend about an hour and a half and I did. They had, they brought their best cameras down and we took overhead cameras, click, click, click, and put them in grids. By the time we were done, we had a pretty decent way of telling Mohammed and his wife, Admirer and their five children, that piece of rubble is yours, if Mohammed wished to tell where he was before the war. So, it was painstaking and it always is, but that's how we did it. I don't know if that's responsive to your question.

Q: Where did you get building materials?

FARRAND: The House of Saud.

Q: All right, Saudi Arabia.

FARRAND: The House of Saud.

Q: This is obviously for the Bosniacs?

FARRAND: Right. They were the ones, they ere the ones that were in the plurality before the war.

Q: Were there problems with Serb families that had been displaced somewhere else moving in and taking over a Croatian or Muslim house?

FARRAND: Sure, sure, all over the place. Sure. That was the problem. So, then the question is, you see because the combustibility of the situation was. What we decided, Stu, essentially was we're first going to establish the principle that people can come back. They're going to come back to destroyed and unoccupied homes first. Then we're going to run that out as long as we can. Before we take on the real tough nut of having to start coming into areas where Serbs are living in non-Serb homes. We had to play. We were playing, what's the word? I was playing a short game, not a long game. The short game that I was playing I was getting ready for the long game.

You had to first establish these people coming back. They are coming back. You could do this or you could do that, you Serbs, but they're coming. Now, the Serbs did not view their return as a humanitarian or a legal issues. The Serbs viewed their return in strategic military delight. If you've ever seen a military map of how a battle envelops and these big arrows, these big flat headed arrows, coming here and here; that's how they saw it. We had to be aware; those of us, you always had to pull your head up. You always had to remind, I certainly did, that this is not a technical issue, only to mark hole houses only so you can bring Mohammad and his wife, Admira, and his six children back to a house. Yes, that's the goal, but getting all of that in place means that you've got to have some basic things there.

You're going to have to have, he's going to have to have a small stove of some sort, he's going to have to have some plastics for the windows so the winds don't blow in while he's trying to rebuild the walls and put the roof on again, all this other stuff. But, you can get lost in that and as Ian McCloud used to say, "You can get up so close to the cold face that you don't see the scene." You've got to pull back and say the Serbs are doing all of this. Uh, oh, here comes, here, here. They're putting all together in their minds in this vast conspiracy theory which wasn't very clever as a conspiracy theory that it was all a threat to them. They realized that as it happened in some future point, their ability to stay in the homes that were not theirs was going to be challenged.

You kept working, working with them, talking, talking, being as open and transparent as possible. I had stated on the very first day you will recall the last time when I said my first speech on the steps of the Brcko's supervisor's office. Carl Bildt was there and he and his people had drafted the speech and then I changed the speech a little bit to suit my own style. One of the things that was

in the speech was this statement to the Serbs because that's who I'm talking to in the downtown area on the opening day. "You will not be thrown out on the street if you have nowhere else to go." That was my fundamental contract. Wasn't even a contract, it was a one-sided assurance to them. We had thought this thing through because what was their sensitivity about my coming? Their sensitivity is "what's going to happen to us?" Are they going to have bayonets coming at us in the middle of the night? We had to calm them down and that did more, that one statement, did more to establish a certain basis at least some basis to go forward. Without that, I would have been deep kim chi and I must have repeated that over the course of the next year or two. Perhaps oh I don't know probably two dozen times in public statements.

Q: Where did you find the alternate housing?

FARRAND: There really wasn't any. I tried hard to persuade the international community, the givers, that would be the European Commission, the European Union and some bilateral governments as well that I needed buffer housing, buffer housing that would permit me to have a series of housing units that would be used as pass through units. For example, if Mohammed to the south of the line is coming back to take over, I'm going to try and think of a good Serb name. Anyway, Petar's house. Petar and his wife and two children are living in Mohammad's house in the heart of Brcko town. Mohammad wants to come back, but Petar has no place to go so if I had some housing units, maybe sixty, maybe a hundred. I could move Petar to those housing units under an agreement with Petar that as soon as we were to find permanent ongoing housing for him that he would leave these quarters. That would put a time limit on it, too. Then Mohammad could come back up and go into his home which is Petar is now living in the buffer quarters. Then, when you get about the business of trying to find a community in the south where Petar had lived before to see whether his house down there couldn't be vacated.

Now, to vacate his house of course, down there, you're going to put a Bosniac out because that's what was happening in Sarajevo. Bosniacs were living in Serb houses and if you were over in Mostar, which was the Croat area, you had that other combination going. It was constipated. It was absolutely constipated. How to administer a little tablespoon of mineral oil to start the ball rolling very, very. This was the challenge that we faced all the time.

Q: Did you find as you were beginning to put this together, was entrepreneurship beginning to develop? I'm thinking about you know, housing, masons and people who could build a little and the shops and things like that. Were you finding a community developing?

FARRAND: It came very slowly, but the people of the Balkans, most men are adept, are adept at things which a lot of people in this country are not anymore.

Q: They can build.

FARRAND: They can build. They can build. The construction of their houses, they do

not use wood. They only use masonry and it's a particular type of masonry. So, you learn how to stack, stack, stack, mortar stack, stack, and you leave space for windows and almost all the houses are identical. Once you learn how to build one, you can build another. There are people that are good at putting on roofs, tile roofs, there are people among that group that can do that better, so there was a division of labor and there was a certain flowering of the comparative advantage, a little bit. What we were trying to do in the beginning was to bring the families, we didn't want to flood the area, you couldn't flood the area. If we flooded the area we were going to trigger a violent response.

We tried to bring them back and I urged everybody when they were thinking about this and I didn't micromanage to bring them back in groups of twenty or twenty-five families. Twenty families. Bring them back to the same section, the same section and let them all come back to the same section. Because there's twenty families they can provide a modicum of security for each other if they are in the same rough area. A modicum. They can't do it, but they can provide a modicum. Some of the people always said, "Well, what if somebody tries to steal somebody else's property?" Well, I mean, the records aren't so great. The only thing that he has to show from before the war is a utility bill, an electricity bill that's torn on the top. His name is there and the address and it shows that for the month of I don't know, July 1984, that he paid the electricity bill at that piece of property. They stripped him of his ID cards. That's the one beautiful thing that the Serbs did, they did it in Kosovo you saw it. They took away everything, they stripped a person of every single piece of identity. They stripped them of all their legal documents. This was, well, forget about that. When that Muslim comes up in front of the board, which we established, he had to show that he could get, that he as closely as he could that he owned that piece of land. A lot of doubts rose up. What happens if they get there and he's an imposter and he's taking somebody else's land because the records aren't so hot? Well, we thought that one through pretty thoroughly and we determined that if we brought them back in clumps, of a couple of dozen families here and a couple dozen over there.

These people are not like Americans. There is no real estate market in Bosnia, no effective real estate market, Century 21, none of that. People are born on a piece of land and they live on that land. The father and their grandfather lived there before. Yes, maybe they could work out a transfer, but it would probably be a crude transfer, one on one worked out between them. It's not a sophisticated real estate market. So, there's a great deal of stability in the neighborhoods or was until the war. Now, that means if you put twenty-four families in and there's one ringer in they're trying to take somebody else's property, he's going to stand out like a sore thumb. Everybody's going to say, "Hey, we've never seen you before, who are you?" At that point it never happened. Never did I have any trouble with that, maybe once.

Q: Well, now what did these families, all the families including the Serbs that were there, what were they doing in order to reestablish a normal life regarding work and generating money and all that?

FARRAND: Well that, of course, is the \$64,000 question. You can bring people back, but if they don't have jobs or if they don't have a way of making a living, what in God's name is going to happen to them and what is going to happen to you and your program?

Well, we couldn't solve every problem all at once, but I can assure you that my eye was never far off the economic scene. Because to draw back just a little bit, there was no template for how to do this, there was no book I could go to. There was no, in fact, maybe that's what I'm writing now, what I'm trying to write now, some practical thoughts on all of this. It's complex because we were moving on all fronts at once. I didn't have the luxury of only dealing with returned people and then later dealing with the economy and then later dealing with reestablishing the court of law and the police, first the police, and then getting the freedom of movement going and then, you know, I didn't have the luxury. I had to move on several tracks at once and the tracks were not totally separate, they were in fact interwoven. Jobs, education, schools, the churches, the mosques, getting the market downtown up.

Q: Electricity, water, and sewage.

FARRAND: Water, sewage, electricity and emergency services. In Mosloff's Hierarchy of Need, you're right down there at the bottom. Food, shelter, water and clothing. This is not the time to bring in the Hamburg Symphony Orchestra to make them feel good at night. I mean, maybe they weren't feeling good, but you don't want to put your efforts on that, let's get them fed and clothed first. So, but there was a considerable reliance in my mind on the concept that if people could be gotten back to their homes they would calm down, their anxieties would be reduced and their energies would be totally taken up with clearing the rubble and starting again. Then go to bed at night tired. Not so anxious to go downtown and mix it up with the Malamute Saloon, something like that.

Q: How much support were you getting from this, I don't know what you call it, consortium of all these European nations?

FARRAND: Peace Implementation Council?

Q: Yes, they baited you and talked you into this. What were you getting from them?

FARRAND: Not very much. The problem of Brcko, because it was in the north, northern sector which was the American sector and because it was an outgrowth of the peace talks at Dayton, Ohio, Wright Patterson Air Force Base, and because they had placed Brcko under an arbitral tribunal and the person named to be the presiding arbitrator was an American and because when the time came for him to say we can't do it without on scene supervision, they selected an American. The Europeans were quite anxious. They were not willing to take on too much at Brcko. This was an American problem, the Americans want it, the Americans have got it. Well, the Americans didn't want it in that way, the Americans were anxious to set up a proper structure so that we could resolve this issue if it was resolvable. The Europeans, you had a problem there. There was no particular separate line item in the Peace Implementation Council's budget for Brcko and that was a problem I had to fight all the way.

Q: Until you can establish commerce and all, there must, I mean you need, how were you feeding the people, how were you getting supplies?

FARRAND: When I got there, before I got there USAID had been very forthcoming with cooking oil, baking flour, and sugar, raw sugar. I think that's right, but certainly cooking oil. There were huge tin cans piled inside of old gutted buildings. The whole dang thing would be piled up with USAID hand clasps and then these things had been opened and they'd poured out the oil and I guess they mixed it with the flour and they made bread or they made something. I don't know what you do. I'm not a cook, so I don't know how much cooking oil, but there was great evidence that that had been distributed. Who else? I can't really point to any particular country besides us that was coming in with food.

Q: How about Serbia itself, were they cranking anything in?

FARRAND: Only small items, which I cannot identify that would be totally unhelpful to the peace process to prop up or keep in place the Karagig part, which is the Serb democratic party which was founded by Karagig.

Q: This is a Poly group?

FARRAND: Yes, Poly which is outside of Sarajevo up in the mountains in the Republic of Serbska. The party was known as the Serb Democratic Party, which in the Serb language is SDS. So, if I refer to SDS, it's the tough guys. They're still in power over there. They're still driving people nuts.

Q: Around the time you ere there and when I was in Germany and I guess it was the September election out of Derventa.

FARRAND: Were you there in '97 September?

Q: Yes.

FARRAND: Yes, that was the election.

Q: But I was rather surprised seeing how things, commerce was coming back, the farms looked pretty good, better than the Soviets blown up buildings. Things were moving and just outside they had some very large fish farms which was sort of an innovation which I'd never seen before when I had been in Yugoslavia thirty years before. Was any of this sort of showing itself in Brcko?

FARRAND: No, not at this time. What you had mostly in Brcko, between Derventa and Brcko, closer to Brcko, than Derventa, was a colony a little enclave, two enclaves really of Croats up on the boarder on the Sava River which was the border with Croatia which you were up another sixty kilometers up to the east. I'm sorry to the west, to the northwest; you were up, up, further. If you had come up to these enclaves and there was a bridge had been taken out, but they had a big ferry. That ferry was in operation connecting up a road called by the American soldiers, the Arizona Highway. Down where the Arizona Highway connected with the interentity boundary line, roughly interentity

boundary line goes east west and the Arizona Highway runs from the Sava River down to Sarajevo north south where they intersect at the interentity boundary line.

A colonel in the U.S. army, Fantouno and his lieutenant colonel who was in charge of the battalion that was right there near Brcko, Camp McGovern, a fellow by the name of Tony Cuckulo. Fantouno and Cuckulo decided that it would be a good idea to establish a little place where people could exchange goods, not money, because they had different currencies. They could exchange goods across and maybe that would be a way of getting them to start to talk to each other. So, they did and they set it up under U.S. army auspices and they had it protected by a tank right on that road and they just lent them their own little stalls. Little wooden stalls. That became known, that worked. In fact it was one of those ideas which was a good idea at the time, but it didn't have any program beyond that. It began to grow and grow and grow and grow and became a huge cancer of smuggled goods and black market and warehouses and no administration. That was going to be a problem for me and it was a problem for me and it became a sore point.

One of the major different points. I would differ with Bob Barry for example on what should have been done there and is being done. What I was going to do is being done now, but it took a year and we lost a lot of revenue. That is one of the economic impulses, it wasn't a totally healthy one, but it was an economic impulse. The difficulty, Brcko had about twenty-six factories before the war ranging from the production of vegetable oil to shoes to automobile batteries to, what was the other major one. Well, the processing of meat, big meat processing place, then several others that were of a smaller size. All of these factors had been largely gutted or damaged and not maintained and the machinery not maintained or stripped and taken to Belgrade by the Serbians. All that had to be gotten going again, but you can't get those things going on until you have your law on property in place, your law on contracts in place, your law on commerce, commercial code and all of that requires a multiethnic legislature and it was mostly Serb at the time and it's all interwoven.

Q: While you were doing this the three years you were there, was the Serbska Republica legislature putting together a working system, legal system that you know would help things develop?

FARRAND: No, no, no. They had no program. It took me time to realize this. Your question is a good one, but it took me time to realize that they had no program. Their basic strategy was to obstruct, delay, and frustrate the international community in every way so that it would be impossible to bring people back and to do whatever you could to undermine without being overly negative. I mean, you could smile at the supervisor and tell him one thing one night and change it the next after Poly had placed a telephone call to them or you would place a telephone call to Poly. So, no the answer is no. They were incapable of coming up with a coherent plan for the redevelopment of their community.

Q: You left there when?

FARRAND: 31st of May, 2000.

Q: When you left there, what had been done and what hadn't been done?

FARRAND: By the time I left we were evicting people, we were evicting the Serb families from the non-Serb houses they were occupying in the heart of town at the rate of two to three a week. We had set up a board to look over these applications very carefully. We had tackled the very first thing that we tackled, when we had to come down to hitting the hard nut of the town and we were going to do some evictions. The first thing we looked at was persons who-

(end of tape)

Q: You had said you were working to get the double occupiers out.

FARRAND: Okay, okay. It just follows along, that what you do it would seem to me in a circumstance like we were in, when I think back on it I was really following a strategy of bringing people back to homes to their properties, first destroyed and unoccupied and then destroyed and then partially occupied and then when we got up to the heart of town, we were always going for the low hanging one first. We would take what was easiest to get first. Gradually nibble it down. This never made the Bosniacs happy. In fact, at the end they were attacking me for doing nothing. They just wanted to make a smear campaign against me at the end. This was because of a particular decision I had made about the composition of the interim assembly. That would be the legislature. At the time I had made a decision that didn't please one man and then he launched a smear campaign.

We took first the people. For example, there would be a Serb because he was in a position of authority and influence. He would take over a very nice house and it was a very nice Bosniac, Muslim house. Then he would go down the street and see a nice Croat house and take over that and he'd live in both. He'd have his son, twenty-four year old son and their daughter in this house and he and his wife in this house. Plus, out in the country would be his Serb house toward Bevra. He had three houses. It worked out that all they would never say it, there were a lot of Serbs who were very unhappy with that circumstance and would be quite happy to see this man taken down a peg.

Now, they're not going to say it, but internally they're not going to give you any trouble. So, it was a win-win situation. We set up a board, it was a multiethnic board and we oversaw it and we brought these cases and they would be discussed in front of this board and then determination was great. Yes, you have three houses; well you can only have one house under the law; so many square feet per person. Therefore, you're going to have to divest yourself of a couple of houses and the choice is yours. It's going to be a matter of time.

What really happened, Stu, as this got going, this was a way of delaying the really hard problem of evicting that Serb who, this was the only house he had because there was nothing for him. If he lived before the war down in Sarajevo, if he had lived in another town, there was nothing for them there. He was huddling down, hunkering down and we were going to get to him eventually, but we're taking this. That's satisfying first of all, the numbers are getting better and gradually as we do these evictions and what happened the man that had three houses, many of these people, most

of these people are honorable people. They go home and they say this isn't right, I never felt right about anyway. So, we're going to have to give it up.

They would come in and hand the keys in without having the eviction forces to come. We got along a great way, that way. I would say that today the process has really opened up and its moving quite rapidly and families are coming back to their homes today. I just was over there about four weeks ago, six weeks and it seems to be going quite well. Now, so that was what we did there. Now, what other things did we do? Well, freedom of movement was restored within a year. By my first twelve months their people could pretty much come back up into town without having to get harassed. They didn't worry about it too much. Maybe the first fifteen months.

Q: They changed the license plates, too, didn't they?

FARRAND: They did and that was done down in Sarajevo at the idea of a fellow from New Zealand who had worked for the United Nations. He came up with this idea because we've got thirty-two characters in the Serb [alphabet] and you've got twenty-eight, twenty-six characters, in the Latanic and when you bring them together, there are ten of them, which are identical. O is identical, H, now H is "huh," in Latanic it's "umh," but it doesn't matter, it doesn't matter, it's still an H. You don't know what it is, so you put NH2345. Actually what they did is to put that letter in the middle, three numbers on the right, three numbers on the left and it gave you a huge array.

Q: Prior to that I mean in the old communist Yugoslavia, the license plates told you where somebody was from. I had, a BG meant it was Belgrade, SA was Sarajevo. This, of course, was an identifier for somebody who hated somebody from one of these places and so by making the numbers no longer correlate to place, it meant that people were no longer identified as being from the wrong area so they could move around.

FARRAND: That's very true, but in Brcko we had, that helped, but we had largely reestablished freedom of movement before this new license plate came in. The license plate was the cream on the cake, but we had largely reestablished it. The police were enforcing it. One thing that the communist police always did, the Soviet Union, all places, Czechoslovakia, Poland was they policed by the little popsicle sticks, the checkpoint. They would pull people over and stop them and "Let me see your papers, let me see your documents." Then check, check, check, check and then probably take a little money on the side if they found something. We attached that checkpoint policy and got rid of it. We made it to the point that they could not have checkpoints. They could only have a checkpoint if they went to the International Police Task Force and got the commander to say you can have one, but you can only have it for thirty minutes and you can only have it tomorrow night between the hours of 9:00 and 12:00 and no more. By getting rid of that you see, that starts the flow, even with the different license places. You're absolutely right, the guy who thought this up was really bright.

Q: We talked about the resettlement, the movement and by the time you left, the tasks that you'd been given which seemed almost impossible had taken hold?

FARRAND: We had the elections in cooperation with, Barry wasn't there at the time, his predecessor, Bob Frolick. We had elections on the basis of the elections we established a multiethnic police and assembly. We downsized the government just like Fiat; we set up a law revision commission to harmonize the laws. We set up a neutral district, demilitarized. This was because of the arbitrator. That was the way he was deciding things and were carrying it out on the ground. Brcko did go a long way.

Q: How about your relations with the State Department and with Sitban first and Sarajevo second? Were you more or less I mean did they bother you much, look over your shoulder?

FARRAND: State passed from a hands on group in the beginning in the first year, a hands on group that was very, very concerned. They told me when I go out, you get Brcko right and we'll have a chance for the Dayton Peace process in Bosnia. If you don't get Brcko right, the peace process in Bosnia is in real trouble. Brcko is the key. So, I operated under that presumption and nobody ever changed, but the people in Washington began to change. They changed and Kosovo happened. When Kosovo happened it was right near the presidential elections. They didn't want any bumping up of trouble in Kosovo so they brought a new envoy in after Gelpart.

Gelpart was always; he's a man that wants to be in charge of everything. He's very territorial, but he's smart as a whip and he understood the importance of Brcko. We had our differences he and I, but we got over them. I hope he got comfortable with me, I was reasonably comfortable with him and I could call on him for what I called top cover when I was getting heat because the Europeans never liked the Brcko concept, you see. We were moving faster, we were getting things done and the office of the high representative went from Bildt to a Spaniard to an Austrian. From Bildt, a Swedish prime minister to a Spaniard ex-foreign minister, to an Austrian ex-ambassador.

Q: They're going down?

FARRAND: In my judgment, but up in petty fogging and bureaucratism. So, at the end I will have to say that my relations with the high representative's office in Sarajevo were a big, total and I have my story to tell on that, they have their story to tell, too. I think I was that I wasn't dealt with straight. I didn't get any comfort from State because State goes off on other things. They're allowing little O-1 and O-2 officers to deal and that's no way to do it. I couldn't get any traction and then State wanted no to have any trouble with the high representative. Even though maybe I had a couple whisper to me, "You did a great job." They wouldn't stand up, you see? So, I was taken out and another fellow was put in, a friend of mine, a former friend of mine who went in and started to dismantle a number of things which you had to reestablish later because there's only one way to do it, but any way. I don't want to get into that.

Q: Okay, well, I think maybe this is a good place to stop. What do you think?

FARRAND: That's fine. If I could say one thing?

Q: Yes.

FARRAND: Beyond doubt it was the most, beyond doubt it was the most demanding and at the same time fulfilling job I ever had in thirty-five years, thirty-four years in the Foreign Service.

Q: Well, anybody who's aware of the complexities of trying to deal with this and get anywhere and trying to put it back after what had happened.

FARRAND: Well, I don't know, I don't know. Maybe my ignorance was playing because if you have a generally optimistic approach to life and you're not ready to hang up the cleats, this sort of thing is good. Nobody on the line, nobody in the middle of their careers like an OC officer or an MC officer would take this on because if they're still in the Service they have to make decisions. You're given primary authority and you have to make decisions. I've done it and sometimes they didn't go right. Most of the times they were okay, thank God. On that school bus incident, I made that decision. That could have been a life or death decision and I could have been wrong. If I'd been in the Service they'd been jumping all over me, you see?

So, I was in the Service, I was in the Service, but I was a year from retirement. They asked me to do this tough job and I did it. I took the decisions. If you're in the line it would be probably too much, you know, human nature being such. It was the greatest thing and I am, I can't let go of it. I think of it all the time and I'm writing a book on it. I've got to stop doing all of this so I can get my book done.

Q: All right, that's it then.

JOHN D. FINNEY, JR.
Political Advisor to Division North
Tuzla, Bosnia and Herzegovina, (1999-2000)

John Finney Jr. joined the Foreign Service in 1966. Coinciding with his work in Bosnia, he served in Peru, Thailand, Zambia, and Vietnam. This interview was conducted on December 21, 2004.

Q: I assume you were seeing the return of commerce? I mean commerce particularly since Croatia is the easiest place to get to and with Serbia too, and business opportunities opening up?

FINNEY: It was a trickle. You are picking out the hard areas for progress. Progress was very hesitant. Now a couple of things happened. A couple of positive signs of commerce. Number one: gas stations. Once you had freedom of movement, and once people were

stopped by SFOR security people from sniping at cars, and you could go visit. Even though you were a refugee in Tuzla you could drive down to Srebrenica and visit the graveyard at the appropriate time of the year and drive back without getting sniped or ambushed. So once that happened, the first thing we started to see was gas stations. Number two: the next thing you started seeing as the security improved was a brick factory for reconstruction and for the tile roofs. Then along with the brick factory you saw the sawmills. So again with the refugee return, the rebuilding of the houses, and then the cement. Then you saw little cement factories coming in. Then it was cell phones. The cell phones started to come in, and then that helped. But there were some huge obstacles.

Yugoslavia, even though it was regarded as a liberal regime, was still basically a state run economy. There is plenty of entrepreneurship out there at the local level, but it was still an idea that had to be fully developed. It was slow to develop. They expected Sarajevo, the central government, to build factories and do things for them. No, you have got to do it. This thing about privatization. In our AO (area of operations) I think there was something like 400-600 salt mines, chemical factories, detergent factories, battery factories, light bulb factories, coal mines. Mini light steel mill assembly plants. 400-600 of them which needed to be privatized. The Serbs and the Croats and the Bosniacs working through the process to determine who owned the factories because they were state owned. That was a huge tar baby.

Another factor was a commercial code. So that to bring in a McDonalds or to bring in a Deutsche Bank or bring in an Italian design firm or whatever, these investors had to be assured if they had a disagreement with their work force or with their Bosnian management, that they could go to court. So you had to put together a civilian code, a commercial code. You had to put together a banking system which was, believe me, hand to mouth. You had to develop a sense of entrepreneurship. You had to attract foreign investment. Another thing that drove us nuts was establishing a single commercial space. Under the Dayton Accords you had the Republic of Serbska, and then you had what was it, the federation. But you had several customs regimes. You had separate telephone systems. You had separate tax collection, and the railroad that ran from Brcko down to Sarajevo connected with Hungary and then down to Sarajevo, went through the Republic of Serbska and then through the federation, was not going through a single commercial space.

I was there from 1999, in effect to 2001, and we couldn't get the railroad going. And what was this, a 200 mile strip, a 300 mile trip from Brcko to Sarajevo. It drove you nuts because they had to change trains. So these were huge obstacles. The Croatian sector upon the Sava profited from the fact that in effect they became a Croatian economic zone.

Q: Croatia was much more keyed to the west...

FINNEY: Yes. And the Croats had that Adriatic coast, and the tourism by the time I got there was starting to come in. That worked for them. But on our Serb side, it was dealing with molasses. Also the politics of the situation. So much of the politics was still dominated by the old nationalist issues. We had a couple of elections from 1999 to 2001, and started electing women, and started electing sort of a new generation. That helped

shift the political agenda away from the old nationalist issues to school, transportation, public health, and investment in these economic issues. But it was hard work.

Q: Did you have much contact with, I guess they were, I am not sure whose auspices they were under but foreign service officers at Brcko and other places? What were they and how did they work?

FINNEY: They were doing a good job. We had up in Brcko an outstanding retired Foreign Service ambassador, Bill Farrand.

Q: Yeah, I have interviewed Bill.

FINNEY: Bill Farrand I think, is one of the heroes of our effort in Bosnia. As a result of the Dayton Accords Brcko was given the status of a condominium jointly administered by all three, but it was under American supervision. Ambassador Farrand had Douglas MacArthur-like powers in Brcko. He had a staff there, military people assigned there, foreign service officers there. We had NGO reps, UN reps. So Bill presided over an interagency headquarters. It was there for three years. It was a very difficult and tense situation. He did a superb job. The FSOs who were up there with him were very key to his efforts. Of course I was in regular contact. Every other week we went, my commander went up to Brcko to have lunch with Ambassador Farrand and his staff. The next time we invited them to come down to our headquarters.

So we had these meetings to exchange information and do coordination. The preparation for those meetings involved a lot of contact with his staff. In addition we had foreign service officers who were serving with the office of the high commissioner, who were serving with OSCE. We had one or two of them working in Tuzla. Of course they were very important to our effort to support the refugee return and civilian reconstruction. On almost a daily basis I was in touch with the Foreign Service officer who represented the office of the high commissioner in Tuzla and with the Foreign Service officer who was with OSCE. We had a very fine USAID officer there who was responsible for overseeing the reconstruction of all of these destroyed villages and roads and public health works and so forth. So we met with those folks at least once a week. Coordination was a key part of our whole effort there.

FINNEY: There was another area which I think we made definite progress. There was another area too that I should mention, and that was elections. We all know that elections are necessary for democracy, but certainly not sufficient. They are one element in the package. We had a series of elections both provincial and national during those times. We got reasonably good turnouts I think in the high 60 low 70 percentile rate of eligible voters. We were able to turn over some provincial and even national bodies, assemblies, parliaments and get new fresh leadership in. It was still a slog, but I think going through that election process was a definite plus.

We did make some breakthroughs in getting women and younger people more involved in the process and getting some new fresh blood. But I have to say it was still not enough, and much of the political debate was still along nationalist and sectarian lines. They couldn't escape fully from the dialogue of the past. That was linked to another area where I thought we made the least progress absolutely, and that was the economic revival. Because the economy was still prostrate, and because unemployment was still extremely high, we couldn't get the economic development going. When you can get economic development going you can change the terms of the political debate. So we couldn't get the national railroad going. We couldn't get one economic space declared. We had very slow going on the privatization process.

Q: Where you were, did your territory abut onto Croatia?

FINNEY: Yes it certainly did, the whole Sava River.

Q: How did that play in what you were up to?

FINNEY: The Sava River was our boundary line in the north, and we went west on the Sava River towards Croatia. The towns immediately west of Brcko, Croatian dominated towns actually developed a little bit of a boomlet because Croatia was getting its economy back in order faster than their Bosnian neighbors to the south. I think they have a strong entrepreneurial instinct is a polite way to put it. Others would say there is a lot of smuggling.

It seemed that life on the Croatian side, on the northern side of the Sava was distinctively, notably more active and prosperous in recovering than on the Bosnian side. This produced a lot of smuggling. The most famous example is what was called the "Arizona" market outside of Brcko that was dominated according to all informed observers by the Croatian mafia. There were all kinds of goods and products from refrigerators to fans to stoves to ovens, you name it. TVs, cars were rolling across the Sava River and not being paid duties on and showing up in the Arizona market. There people from Sarajevo and everybody else could come up to northeast Bosnia and buy these products. It was outrageous, but it was a form of economies that are recovering.

Q: Did we just sort of sit back and watch or...

FINNEY: Oh we had a big dog there. The constant wringing of hands about this. Because the whole Arizona Market area, in addition to the goods that were smuggled in there, consumer goods, unfortunately there was heavy trafficking in human beings, women for prostitution and young kids for all that terrible kind of, just outrageous.

Q: Were they local women and kids or was this just part of the major thing that was coming out of the Ukraine and Russia?

FINNEY: Belarus. We talked about the Russian brigade over in Ugljevik. They set up brothels in the Arizona market so that the Russians would come over from Ugljevik through Brcko and down to the Arizona market to patronize these brothels. Many of the women in the brothels were from the Ukraine, Belarus, and other eastern European

countries where things weren't going well. Yes there were some local girls, but we went over this at great length and mostly this was imported traffic. So the high commissioner, the senior international civilian representative in Sarajevo, was highly alarmed at the smuggling, at the prostitution, at the sex slaves and pedophilia, that this was an open sore. This had to be fixed. But he got involved in a big debate with our wonderful esteemed ambassador, Bill Farrand, who was our American administrator of Brcko, and within whose territory this Arizona market was.

They got into a big disagreement on how to resolve this problem. The people in Sarajevo wanted to line up 50 bull dozers side by side and simply bulldoze the Arizona market into oblivion. That was their basic approach. Ambassador Farrand's approach was quite different. He said, "Let's legitimize it. There is all this activity going on there. Of course we have got to get at the crime. We have got to stop the people smuggling, the arms smuggling and the prostitution. But let's find a way to legitimize the contraband and the smuggling and the sale of these consumer goods and tax it so that we can develop an economic base for Brcko."

These were two dramatically opposing views of how to handle the situation. It put a great stress on the relationship between the high commissioner and Ambassador Farrand. From the military perspective, we were most concerned about the arms smuggling, and the potential for harboring criminals and others who were hiding from us, war criminals and so forth. So there was an enormous amount of attention and effort and concern and meetings held on this. At the end of the day, Ambassador Farrand's approach, I think, won out.

We started doing very effective police raids, international police with local police. Reduced the prostitution etc. to a minimum, and then the Brcko council passed some laws. They broke up part of the Croatian mafia which reportedly was running the place. They built some new buildings, and they gradually legitimized that process. But it was a long struggle. Croats figured very importantly in it. There was some incredible devastation from Brcko west along the Sava River, through about 50 Catholic parishes. Most Croats were Roman Catholic, and so Croatian NGOs were coming in there with their parish priests who had fled to Croatia and were coming back reviving these towns. But as they came back into these towns, the hard line nationalist Croatian party, was coming in and trying to get their roots into these revived communities. The Croatian hard line nationalist party was very strong in the southwestern part of Bosnia, but they didn't have deep strength along the Sava River in the north. But they were making an effort to do so when we were there.

Q: Was there, I mean did you have lines into Croatia as far as to cooperate with our ambassador or did we have other observers or anybody there to moderate the Croatian hard liners?

FINNEY: Yes we did. Our ambassadors would come over several times to Bosnia. We would have a meeting up in Brcko and talk about these issues. We dedicated a bridge or two that the Army Corps of Engineers with international financing oversaw to build from the Bosnian side over to the Croatian side to promote movement of people and economic revival. So those were occasions where we could bring the Bosnian and Croatian officials together to try to deal with the crime factor, to try to work out sensible economic

arrangements so both sides could have sensible freedom of movement.

We also were very concerned about the hard line Croatian element, and there was a lot of dialogue between our embassy in Sarajevo and in the Croatian capital of Zagreb. But the election results frankly showed that the hard line Croatians still exerted strong influence in the south and west part of our sector where they had a couple of toe holds. Now we removed some Croatian politicians, some mayors and were influential in removing a Croatian governor, but it was a hard slog. Up in the north we did a little bit better. There were some moderate Croatians elected, and they sort of kept the hard line Croatians at bay. But it was a mixed picture. The bottom line is we were unable to cut into the hard line Croatian stronghold in the south and western part of our sector.

Q: What about Serbia at this point when you got there. It must have been sort of turning inward because of the devastation that the bombing did. I mean Belgrade was, you know a lot of the stuff had to be done, in a way was it almost removed from being much of a player or not?

FINNEY: They were turning inward. They were bitterly resentful because of the bombing, because of the civilian casualties they took, because of the fact that Kosovo was now being run by an international military and civilian force. But there were still elements in Serbia that were very much trying to help support and influence the Bosnian Serbs on the west side of the Drina. In the Serbian parliament, they were passing resolutions supportive of the Bosnian Serb position on a number of things. Serbian businessmen in Belgrade and elsewhere continued to channel funds to Mladic and Karadzic and other war criminals who were hiding and being supported by a network of people. You have got to have money to do that, and that money came from wealthy Serbian businessmen as far as we could determine.

The Serb-Bosnian leadership at the town and village level, where we were in northeast Bosnia on the west side of the Drina, was constantly going to Belgrade, taking weekend trips, sharing their experiences with the folks in Belgrade and coming back with renewed determination to hang tough and not to give up these towns on the west bank of the Drina to the returning Bosniac Muslims. And, most poisonous of all, they were telling the Serb refugees who were occupying Bosnian apartments and houses in these towns along the Drina, never to go back to central Bosnia where they came from because they would be mistreated. We were after war criminals and every once in awhile we would manage. And while I was there, the Serbian parliament was still paying troops and for training, and paying the salaries and making money available so they could get training inside Serbia. It was outrageous.

Q: Was there resentment and apprehensions of all of a sudden they come in and start digging up graves around the farms of people who live there all the time. Was there opposition? How did you deal with this?

Yes, there was opposition, particularly among the Serb land owners. The Bosnian Serb political authorities wanted to hide this. They didn't want the court to come in and be digging this information up. The local landowners were quite unhappy with this, and occasionally people

would take pot shots, and then we would set up a full time camp and keep our soldiers out in the field as long as it took to establish order so that these excavations could go forward. One time in the course of a major excavation south of Zvornik, the lawyers came down from The Hague and had a big briefing for us and told us that they had recovered some small arms rounds. They wanted to know whether these small arms rounds came from any of the weapons that were in the Bosnian Serb brigade which was about 10 miles away.

We went to that Bosnian Serb brigade. They had over 4,000 AK-47s. We took, over a period of two or three weeks, all 4,000 plus AK-47s. Fired them on the firing range, and did the ballistic analysis to support what these lawyers told us. That was just one example. Security was the big issue, assuring them that they would be secure. Then the other big issue was the interviews associated with these sites. Quite often they wanted to conduct interviews, but the people whom they wanted to talk to were afraid to come forward. So we facilitated a lot of that. We provided security details for these people so they would come forward and be available for interviews. Then we would help protect them afterwards. So we were deeply involved in this. While I was there, since Srebrenica was in our AO we had staff rides in which we organized opportunities for all the personnel assigned to this particular rotation to go down to Srebrenica, learn about what happened, and then to visit a grave site afterwards. So this was a major focus for us because we thought it was part of the effort to bring about justice. Now let me also hasten to add there were Bosniac atrocities against the Serbs in a couple of places west of Brcko. A number of Croatian concentration camps were set up that brutalized the Serbs. We went through the whole process up there as well.

End of Reader