

CYPRUS

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Victor Wolf, Jr.	1957-1959	Consular Officer, Istanbul, Turkey
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Willard Ames De Pree	1958-1960	Vice Consul, Nicosia
Parker T. Hart	1958-1961	Bureau of Near East Affairs, Washington, DC
Alfred Leroy Atherton, Jr.	1959-1962	Near Eastern Affairs, Iraq, Jordan, Cyprus, Washington DC
William N. Dale	1960-1964	Counselor, Mutual Security Affairs, Ankara, Turkey
Fraser Wilkins	1960-1964	Ambassador, Cyprus
Charles W. McCaskill	1960-1964 1964-1967	Economic/Commercial Officer, Nicosia Cyprus Desk, Washington, DC
Victor L. Stier	1960-1965	Information Officer, USIS, Athens, Greece

Carleton S. Coon, Jr.	1961-1963	Greek, Turkish, Cypriot, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near East Affairs, Washington, DC
Herbert Daniel Brewster	1961-1965	Political Officer, Athens, Greece
Raymond A. Hare	1961-1965	Ambassador, Ankara, Turkey
George Albert McFarland, Jr.	1963 1963-1965	Cyprus Desk Officer, Washington, DC Consular/Political Officer, Nicosia
Charles T. Cross	1964-1966	Deputy Chief of Mission, Nicosia
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John A. Baker, Jr.	1964-1967	Political Officer, Cyprus Affairs, United Nations, New York
Barrington King	1964-1967	Political Officer, Nicosia
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Victor L. Stier	1965-1968	Greek/Turkish/Iran/Cyprus Desk, USIA, Washington DC
Cyrus R. Vance	1965-1969	Special Emissary, Ankara, Turkey and Nicosia
Stuart W. Rockwell	1965-1970	Greek, Turkish, Cypriot, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near East Affairs, Washington, DC
Robert V. Keeley	1966-1970	Political Officer, Athens, Greece
Lucius D. Battle	1967-1968	Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near East Affairs, Washington, DC
George Albert McFarland, Jr.	1967-1968	Cyprus Desk Officer, Washington, DC
Thomas D. Boyatt	1967-1970	Political Officer, Nicosia

William C. Burdett	1967-1970	Minister Counselor and Chargé d’Affaires, Ankara, Turkey
Archer K. Blood	1968-1970	Political Officer, Athens, Greece
William R. Crawford, Jr.	1968-1972	Deputy Chief of Mission, Nicosia
Robert F. Ellsworth	1969-1971	Ambassador, American Mission to North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Brussels, Belgium
Bradshaw Langmaid	1970’s	USAID, Washington, DC
G. Jonathon Greenwald	1969	Office of Assistant Legal Advisor, UN Affairs, Washington DC
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Robert J. Wozniak	1970-1974	Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Nicosia
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Wells Stabler	1973-1975	Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European Affairs, Washington, DC
James Alan Williams	1973-1975	Political Officer, Nicosia
Arthur A. Hartman	1973-1977	Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European Affairs, Washington, DC
William B. Macomber, Jr.	1973-1977	Ambassador, Ankara, Turkey
Frank Athanason	1974	Liaison Officer, NATO Headquarters, Athens, Greece
Robert S. Dillon	1974	Director, Greek, Turkish, Cypriot, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near East Affairs, Washington, DC

Walter J. Silva	1974	Near Eastern Affairs, Cyprus Task Force, Washington, DC
Frederick Z. Brown	1974-1976	Deputy Chief of Mission, Nicosia
Paul F. Gardner	1974-1976	Mutual Security Affairs Counselor, Ankara, Turkey
C. William Kontos	1974-1976	Director, Cyprus Task Force, Policy Planning Staff, Washington, DC
L. Bruce Laingen	1974-1976	Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European Affairs, Washington, DC
Jack B. Kubisch	1974-1977	Ambassador, Athens, Greece
James G. Lowenstein	1974-1977	Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European Affairs, Washington, DC
William R. Crawford, Jr.	1974-1978	Ambassador, Cyprus
Edward L. Lee II	1975-1977	Regional Security Officer, Nicosia
Robert J. Wozniak	1975-1976	USIA Headquarters, Greece-Turkey-Cyprus Desk Officer, Washington, DC
James H. Morton	1975-1976 1976-1978	Cyprus Desk Officer, Washington, DC Director, Greek Affairs, Washington, DC
George M. Barbis	1975-1979	Political Officer, Athens, Greece
Carl Edward Dillery	1976-1978 1978-1982	Deputy Chief of Mission, Nicosia Deputy Director, Southern European Affairs, Washington, DC
Raymond C. Ewing	1976-1979	Deputy Director, Southern European Affairs, Washington, DC
Geoffrey W. Chapman	1977-1979	Cyprus Desk Officer, Washington, DC
Robert S. Dillon	1977-1980	Deputy Chief of Mission, Ankara, Turkey
Ronald I. Spiers	1977-1980	Ambassador, Ankara, Turkey

George S. Vest	1977-1981	Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European Affairs, Washington, DC
Richard E. Thompson	1977-1982	Diplomatic Courier, Frankfurt, Germany
Galen L. Stone	1978-1981	Ambassador, Cyprus
James Alan Williams	1979	Cyprus Desk Officer, Washington, DC
David T. Jones	1980-1982	Cyprus Desk Officer, Washington, DC
John Nix	1981-1983	Political Officer, Nicosia
Raymond C. Ewing	1981-1984	Ambassador, Cyprus
James L. Tull	1981-1984	Deputy Chief of Mission, Nicosia
Christian A. Chapman	1982-1983	Special Assistant to Secretary of State on Cyprus, Washington, DC
Richard W. Boehm	1984-1987	Ambassador, Cyprus
Robert V. Keeley	1985-1989	Ambassador, Athens, Greece
John Nix	1987-1990	Deputy Chief of Mission, Nicosia
Nelson C. Ledsky	1989-1992	Ambassador, Cyprus Coordinator, Washington, DC
Alfred H. Moses	1997-2000	Special Presidential Envoy for the Cyprus Conflict
Thomas G. Weston	1999-2004	Special Coordinator for Cyprus, Washington, DC

BEN FRANKLIN DIXON
Greek Desk Officer, Bureau of Near East Affairs
Washington, DC (1948-1951)

Ben Franklin Dixon was born in North Carolina in 1918. His Foreign Service career included positions in Morocco, Thailand, Pakistan, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990 and 1991.

Q: How did we view Turkey? I mean, you were on the Greek desk and there's always the Cyprus issue. How did we view Turkey in those days?

DIXON: Well, Turkey didn't get involved in the Cyprus issue very much. It was the British versus us. And we had lots of hard sessions with the British, telling them to get off their ass and have some elections there and get some local government going on. They didn't have to rule the island, but have cities have their own mayors and do anything. The British picked out a labor leader they thought would attract attention, and he turned out to be a weak willy. Their efforts in trying to get their own party started there, these things were so good. We said: What difference does it make, you know, if you just give them some measure of self-government and let them do certain things? Which they were not. The British kept picking them up and interning them and this sort of thing. And we felt that they were being pretty stupid about it. And there's a long series of things in the, you know,...what are those things we put out every year about foreign affairs?

Q: Foreign relations series.

DIXON: ...of memos I wrote about these meetings, that I think give a pretty good insight to what we were trying to do there.

Q: You worked with George McGee quite a bit, didn't you? He at that time was the assistant secretary for Near Eastern Affairs. What was your impression? How did he feel about the situation that you were dealing with? What was his style of operation and how effective was he within the department, would you say?

DIXON: George McGee is a very able guy. He has a new idea about every five minutes -- ninety percent of them no good, but ten percent of them pretty good. But he's got objectives that he's got in the back of his mind. You know, he parlayed himself into this position. He went to Oxford. He was a geologist and he wrote on a potential oil-bearing shale in Algeria. The French government, I think he saw that they got a copy of his paper on this. They sent him down to Algeria, and they brought in oil. And they gave George some money. George's idea was to make a million dollars by the time he was twenty-five. He came back, and he knew Will Clayton, he got himself a job in the State Department, and then he got this job as assistant secretary for NEA. But, in the meantime, he'd brought his money back from England, bought some property in Texas, and made I don't think a million but three million by the time he was twenty-four and half, or something like this. And then he came in the State Department. He had a very agile mind and was quite capable, though he was very voluble, said too much, pushed too much on the ideas that were not really good. They had a lot of trouble talking him out of things. But I think the overall effect of his reign in NEA was very positive and very good.

Well, I was very much impressed. There was this guy named, I think, Suderose, who was sent over by the rightists in Greece, who wanted to go ahead and set up a certain kind of government, which, in effect, obviously, they could control. And they felt that the reaction against the Andottis was such that the Greek population as a whole would have voted for this in their current mood. McGee perceived this right off, and he said, "Look, I realize that you feel you can get a friendly vote for this kind of government, which is a bit too strong, it seems to me, by taking the

vote right away." But he said, "I'd like to see really a more measured time, when people would look at both sides of the question before we go into this." And I thought he showed great perception. He just said this, and McGee, in responding to it, that was his off-the-hat response. And I think it was very wise.

They did put off elections until things had calmed down some and they didn't have soldiers at everybody's village and that sort of thing. When that didn't go off, they wanted to put off elections for a good while. And finally they did hold elections. And Papagos, who was a general who had been nonpolitical, was elected. In Papagos, we got a government that was fairly moderate. They had effective people in the thing. The old cabinets had been primarily political alliances between the Venizélos and the Tsaldaris parties. Papandreou, who was a very able guy, had this...

Q: This was not...

DIXON: This was the father of the one now.

Q: Andreas is the son.

DIXON: Yes, Andreas's father was prime minister for a short period. And he was a pretty good, level-headed fellow. He was an eccentric. I'll never forget, when I went down to the Peloponnisos, we came past this village and he was making a speech. And I had been to see him. The embassy said, "We haven't had much time to pay attention, it would be nice if you went down and talked to him." So I did go in and talk to him. We got to this village, and he was making a speech in the village square. So I walked in to sort of see what the reaction was and so forth. He saw me there, and he was very pleased that I'd come to hear his speech. It was only accidental. But he gave me a book that he had written, which he signed. He lived about a block and a half from the embassy, and I saw him a couple of times after that. He was very pleased that I had taken the trouble to go down to hear his speech.

But, generally speaking, the main political people were the Tsaldaris and Venizélos. They went out. The Greek government, for the first time, began to finance itself in about '52 or '53, and to start paying on their debts, which they had not paid since 1824 when the bishop raised the flag over the fortress in Patras.

We felt that things were going really well. Then Greece and Turkey joined NATO, and we began a more serious effort to help them with their forces. With a different objective -- not fighting the Andottis, but to be able to defend that part of Greece.

Q: Well, at that time (again, we're trying to go back), everything was not predicated on Greece versus Turkey. I mean, this was not the focus of balancing these two antagonists.

DIXON: That happened much later on. Greece and Turkey both were being helped. We were advising both of them to take it easy with the other. The thing that brought this on, there was a soccer game between the Italians and the Turks in the stadium in Athens. The Greeks all cheered for the Italians, and the Turks were about to break off diplomatic relations with them. We

worked hard on trying to keep the peace between Turkey and Greece.

When they both came into NATO, they were of course allies. Things got even more difficult, because some of the Greek islands, you know, are right on the Turkish coast. And I remember one day the Turkish ambassador came in and said that they were very much concerned that you could hear a cock crow from one of the Greek islands off the southern part of Turkey, and that the Greeks were putting soldiers there, and they were, in effect, putting soldiers onto all those islands. Where they had been all along -- well, some of them. There wasn't much Andotti fighting in the islands, but there had been soldiers there. Well, all of a sudden, they became very sensitive to it, and we had a hell of a time trying to placate the Turks and the Greeks and keep them working in the NATO saddle, so to speak.

The thing that really got this off on a bad footing was Cyprus. I remember, when I left the Greek desk doing work for George Allen, who was assistant secretary after McGee, we had Archbishop Makarios come almost every year to the U.N. and ask that Cyprus be joined to Greece. Senator McCarran, from Nevada, had a big Greek constituency there and he was very beholden to Makarios. Before Jack Purifoy went to Greece, McCarran came with Makarios to call on Purifoy, to say, in effect, that the Senate would not vote on any appropriation for the State Department unless we allowed Cyprus to join Greece. This made a big impression on everybody in the State Department. It didn't work out that way, but, you know, the warning was clearly there, and McCarran was still pretty strong in the Senate. We had followed a policy of trying to get the British to behave better, to get the Cypriots, through our consulate, through Bill Porter there, to calm down, to take it easy and not do anything rash. We tried to explain to the Turks what we were doing and not to get excited. And we were able to keep the lid on the Cypriot thing.

When I left the desk, they were getting ready for the... Every year, we had this, when the General Assembly came open, because it came up before that, and Makarios would show up, and McCarran and so forth. They said they thought we ought to take a new look at our policy, that maybe we should stand for elections for self-government and so forth and so on. Rather than just tell the British they ought to do it, they wanted to come out.

And I said, you know, here we've tried this for a number of years. And the thing that seems to work best is to keep the wraps on this thing until we can get the British to turn it around. We think, in due course, they may do something. And we think that's the best way to unlock this situation, rather than trying to get it open and try to stand for elections or talks on different things publicly, what we were trying to do with the British.

They didn't take my advice, and they started on a different track. And exactly what I said would happen if they did this did happen. My name was mud in GTI, you know, for being right.

Q: Oh, there's nothing worse. Nothing worse.

ARCHER K. BLOOD

**Biographic and Protocol Officer
Athens, Greece (1950-1952)**

Archer Blood was born in Illinois in 1923. His Foreign Service career included positions in Greece, Germany, Algeria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed in 1989 by Henry Precht.

Q: Well, tell us something about your political work in Athens.

BLOOD: Yes. Well, the job actually developed somewhat differently. I continued to do biographic work, and I enjoyed that thoroughly. In fact, I drafted some very long biographic reports. I was very much taken by the New Yorker profiles and tried to emulate them. I was doing a bit of psychological profiling also in examining Greek political figures. But I was also asked by Ambassador Peurifoy to become the protocol officer of the embassy which I did. That took a great deal of my time. It also meant that I had to look particularly after congressional visits. I also was a liaison with the palace. Any Americans who sought audiences with the king or queen of Greece would have to come to me, and I would intervene on their behalf or discourage them, as the case might be.

Q: What kind of relations did we have with the palace at that time? How would you characterize them?

BLOOD: Very, very close, very good relationship. The United States ambassador, of course, at that time was really sort of a viceroy in Greece. He sat in on the meetings of the war council. The war with the guerrillas had just concluded, but the United States still was providing massive economic aid, and we were very intimately involved in the political developments in Greece.

Charlie Yost was the deputy chief of mission at the time. A splendid, splendid officer. I remember one of my delights of that tour was reading his analysis of that labyrinth and very complicated Greek political situation.

Q: What was the strength of nationalism among the people that we dealt with in the government, the king and his ministers? Were they uncomfortable with the kind of viceroy role that we exercised?

BLOOD: No, I don't think most of them were. I think they accepted it as a benefit to Greece. After all, it was U.S. help which had enabled Greece to defeat the communist threat to the government. Oh, sure, there must have been some who objected to the heavy U.S. role, but it certainly didn't come from the palace nor do I think from the leading political groups.

Q: Intellectuals and journalists were --

BLOOD: Oh, some of them, yes.

Q: Okay. Anything you would like to recall from that period, any incident?

BLOOD: No. It was a very, very busy two years. And also my family increased from one to three in that two years.

Q: *Was Cyprus a problem at that stage?*

BLOOD: It was just beginning to be. I remember with another officer from the political section going downtown to watch a demonstration by Greeks concerning Cyprus and sort of getting pushed around by the police as a result of our being on the fringes of the crowd. It was just beginning.

Q: *Just beginning.*

BLOOD: Yes.

Q: *All right. Then after Greece, you were off to Algiers.*

STEPHEN E. PALMER, JR.
Consular Reporting Officer
Nicosia (1951-1953)

Stephen E. Palmer, Jr. was born in Superior, Wisconsin on July 31, 1923. He received a bachelor's degree from Princeton University and served in the U.S. Marine Corps. His Foreign Service career included positions in Nicosia, Belgrade, Sarajevo, Tel Aviv, London, Islamabad, Madras, Geneva, and Washington, DC. Mr. Palmer was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on June 31, 1995.

Q: *How long did the training last?*

PALMER: It was in that old red brick building on C Street, and I didn't have any language training because I was assigned to Nicosia. It was something like four months, I believe. About all I remember from the instruction was the lady whose husband had been an ambassador, or a minister, somewhere and taught us etiquette, including how to lay a table, which corners of cards to turn -- a whole language of which corners of card to turn, which I never did use.

Q: *Your first assignment was Nicosia.*

PALMER: Yes, there from '51 to '53. It was a very small post, not including the big FBIS station which was only remotely connected with the Consulate. In the Consulate itself there were only three State officers, the third one being an administrative officer. We had one American secretary which meant that I was blessed with having to do the -- I've forgotten what the coding thing was...

Q: *One-time pad.*

PALMER: Yes, a one-time pad and those strip things. That's when I first developed an aversion to useless instructions, or broadcast instructions, which were not pertinent to all posts. That was very interesting, it was a satisfying assignment. I did some political reporting, and economic reporting, as well as consular work. I was sort of our delegate to Archbishop Makarios because he was being handled with kid gloves, given the British aversion to recognition of him as the political leader. I remember how upset my British friends were when I went to the church office of the Archbishop to give him his visa to the United States rather than requiring him to come to our place.

Q: What was your impression of Makarios?

PALMER: I was reminded of him by Castro, though I never knew Castro. Very compelling eyes, very strong grizzly chap. I found him rational in our discussions, and not extreme.

Q: In the first place, what was the situation on Cyprus in this '51 to '53 period?

PALMER: There was no violence as I recall it, and the two communities were all mixed up and getting along okay, and there was quite a bit of intermarriage. I belonged to a club, it was called the Bachelor's Club. You had to be a married man to be a member, the Deputy High Commissioner and a few other top Brits, and Turkish and Greece Cypriot community leaders, lawyers and one thing and another. I was the only American invited to belong, and we had a lot of very congenial times. The man who technically replaced me doing consular work, was from another agency. He was inadvertently assassinated when presumably a Greek Cypriot terrorist threw a grenade through a street window in the basement taverna where he and some British friends were having some drinks. I've forgotten his name, his brother runs an insurance company which caters to the Foreign Service. So it was shortly after we left that violence did start.

Q: Did you ever run across Colonel Grevas?

PALMER: No.

Q: Did the Greeks have army troops on the island at that time?

PALMER: No.

Q: Well, of course, they wouldn't have had, it was strictly British...

PALMER: Right, and they had very few troops. It wasn't viewed as a military situation.

Q: Who was the consul general?

PALMER: His name was Joseph Wagner. He had a very charming wife, Camille. Joe died fairly early in life.

Q: Were you married at this time?

PALMER: Yes, and that was the reason I was assigned to Nicosia. I was originally assigned to Izmir and the lady in personnel who looked over these things, when she found my wife was pregnant said, "Oh, you can't go to Izmir, you've got to go to a more civilized place." So she thought Cyprus would be nice.

Q: How did you find dealing with the British at that time there?

PALMER: There were in essence two sets of Brits there. One of the old school, including the Governor General who thought they should be and would be there forever. And some of the younger officers thought that a degree of independence perhaps on commonwealth status, or something like that, was the sensible way to go.

Q: Were we pushing anything at that time?

PALMER: Not really, not to my recollection. I think we were sort of way out in left field, or off the radar screen as they say today.

Q: The cold war was just beginning to crank up, we'd just gotten involved in Korea. Was Cyprus considered at that point...had it even gotten into the cold war business as far as we were concerned?

PALMER: No, I think not. I don't recall even semi-strategic consideration being given.

Q: What about Israel? The state of Israel started in '48.

PALMER: Yes, that was interesting because we had a very active Israeli consul. Perhaps the Egyptians put a post there too. Anyway there was a lot of sort of Arab-Israel stuff going on and that was very interesting to try to follow although it was almost all clandestine. Yes, I remember the Israeli consul whose name was Yaron; very urbane.

Q: You're saying really the Arabs and the Israelis were talking to each other.

PALMER: Well, no, they were jockeying...I think the Israelis even then were using Cyprus as a transit point for various arms and things, and the Arabs were trying to find out about that. It was all sub rosa, which in my job I was not called to pay much attention.

Q: Your job was basically consular work?

PALMER: Consular and then I had the Makarios bit, and a lot of economic and agricultural reporting which was required and most of which was nonsensical.

Q: You'd go out and count grape vines, or something?

PALMER: Well, almost as silly. The only way to submit the annual report on sage production was to go to the open market in two or three cities and count the bags of sage that was picked

and brought in by little old women.

Q: As a consular officer, were there many Cypriot Greek Americans?

PALMER: Yes, there was quite a Greek Cypriot community already in the United States and quite a bit of back and forth, relatively small numbers. But that had been going on a long time. We had very able foreign nationals working with us in consular work. I enjoyed the consular work mainly because its all with people.

Q: During this two year period, your initial tour, I take it there weren't any great events. It was a rather tranquil island at that time.

PALMER: Yes, very much so.

Q: Was there any feeling at our Consulate about what if these Turks and Greeks might lay into each other?

PALMER: I must admit we did not foresee how bad it might get.

Q: So you left there in '53, and I have you going to Serbian training.

RAYMOND F. COURTNEY
Consul General
Nicosia (1954-1957)

Raymond Courtney was born in Tulsa, Oklahoma in 1908. He attended Harvard College and Harvard Business School and later served in the U.S. Navy during World War II. His Foreign Service career included positions in Bulgaria, The United Kingdom, Cyprus, Canada, and Washington, DC. Mr. Courtney was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on March 4, 1992.

Q: You left London in 1954 and then you went to Nicosia where you served from 1954- 57. What was the situation on Cyprus when you went there?

COURTNEY: The British were just in the process of moving their Middle East military command from Egypt to Cyprus. The Governor General, who had been there some time, Armitage, was winding down. In conjunction with this military move the new Governor General, John Harding, former CIGS...

Q: That is Chairman of the Imperial General Staff.

COURTNEY: Yes. I guess Armitage left shortly after I arrived. There was a good reason to believe that political foment was brewing, but it had not quite surfaced at the time I arrived.

Q: That was the EOKA and all that.

COURTNEY: Yes. I got there in September and so far as I was aware, everything was quite quiet. In January, 1955, they apprehended a schooner running guns in. Then on Easter came the first violent action and that was the blowup of a number of electrical power lines and installations, accompanied by public declarations by the EOKA people that the revolt was on. It was soon after that that it was definitely learned that Colonel George Grivas was on the island and beginning to direct guerrilla and terrorist operations. From that point on, of course, the violence developed and the British tried to counter it with troops. By the time I left in 1957 they had substantial forces there trying to restore order.

Q: What did we have on the island? What were we up to?

COURTNEY: We, the United States Foreign Service, were not very well prepared for what was there, and I was certainly completely unprepared. My post had been vacant for about three months because the man who was there had to leave and I was delayed, to the annoyance of the Department. I was delayed in trying to wind up a job I was doing in London, a tripartite British, French, American exchange agreement. Anyway, I knew nothing about the situation and on arrival found myself in a pleasant surrounding with a very comfortable house and a good office and staff.

Q: You were what?

COURTNEY: I was the Consul, it was a small post. I was beginning to learn what I could from scratch. There was also an NSA monitoring station on the island.

Q: NSA being National Security Agency.

COURTNEY: It was also handling a certain amount of official traffic through the area and that was its ostensible reason for being there. It was ostensibly under the Consulate, although the cover was pretty thin.

Our official interest there had been limited to having a representative in that area to observe and look after a very few consular needs. There was not much business association, except for the Cyprus Mines Corporation which was a very profitable copper mining enterprise there. This was owned by the Mudd family in California who had succeeded in discovering the old Roman copper mines and developing them very successfully and shipping out substantial amounts of copper. There were some asbestos enterprises, but I don't think there was any American interests in those. They were European, I think. There was not much else in the way of commercial interests on the part of the United States.

As the situation developed, of course, it became more useful that we had a better equipped observation post there to try to know what was developing. In the course of my three years there we added substantially to our staff and communication facilities.

Q: Let's talk a bit about relations with Makarios, who at that point was the Greek Cypriot leader

and with the Turkish minority. And were there any contacts with representatives of EOKA when you were there? Were people coming to you as a counter force to the Brits?

COURTNEY: No. I did not have any contact with any representative of EOKA. I enjoyed and found my contact with Makarios very interesting. For the most part I was just there to exchange chitchat really. Without any instructions I tried not to mislead him into thinking I was making any official representation of the United States government. But, of course, I think it was right, and I think the Department agreed, that it was good that I could have an open relationship with him and talk about the problems. I took it upon myself to ask him why he didn't free himself from the dictation of Grivas and declare for full independence rather than enosis, union with Greece. The old Greek Cypriots had gotten along fairly happily together under first the Turkish rule and then the British colonial rule. It wasn't really necessary that they divide so violently. If he could sponsor a movement for independence with the British colonial regime ending, which was obvious and the British knew it and would accept a new status. Maybe this was rather naive and presumptuous on my part to talk like this, but he seemed to be interested in listening. Also he was not a free man by that time, he was not able to disassociate himself from the military and political support that was coming from Athens. He had to stand for enosis without due consideration for the Turkish interests there.

Q: Did you have much contact at that point with the Turkish minority?

COURTNEY: A little bit, yes. Denktash was very active then and I got to know him a bit, although not so much as the Greeks.

Q: What about the British? It was not a happy time as their empire was dissolving around them. I know in other parts of the world you met up with the local British officials being rather unhappy because they felt the United States was standing around to pick up the pieces in one way or another. Did you feel this when you were on Cyprus from the local British civil authorities?

COURTNEY: No, I honestly don't think so. I certainly wasn't aware of it and don't think it was there. Prime Minister Anthony Eden mentioned us favorably in talking to Parliament one day, which, of course, was reflecting an official view, but I think it was genuine. I did not sense any of that kind of resentment on the part of the Britishers who I knew.

Q: You were there at a very difficult time for American and British relations...the Suez crisis in October 1956 in which Cyprus was the main staging point. Could you explain what you were doing then and what the situation was from your vantage point as this thing built up?

COURTNEY: All I could do was observe the buildup and report that. I know by then that CIA was reporting the buildup quite independently of anything I was reporting. But your question was?

Q: Well, one of the things that happened, particularly in London, was that all of a sudden the wires went dead. Here you are in a local place but in many ways a critical spot because this was where the British launched their attack on the canal. Did you find all of a sudden nobody was

answering your calls or you couldn't get on the base, or anything like that?

COURTNEY: No. Not at all. I am sure that my contact with the Governor General was just as free as it had been. And also with the military officers.

Q: What about afterwards? At a certain point Eisenhower said that he was not with the British. This was a major...

COURTNEY: Dulles gave the British Ambassador a dreadful dressing down.

Q: Yes. And you know military men are not overly subtle on these things. Were you getting anything to the effect that we felt the British were letting the side down?

COURTNEY: No, I don't think we did.

Q: That is very interesting. What was your impression of our Embassy in Athens at that time? Were they overly promoting the Greek Cypriot enosis cause?

COURTNEY: That is hard for me to say. Possibly some more degree of sympathy to the enosis cause might have come through in some of the communications that I was acquainted with. But other than that I would hesitate to try to make any judgment.

Q: Sometimes it comes through that an Embassy takes the local cause, but it wasn't hitting you very hard on that?

COURTNEY: No. During my time I didn't observe anything like that.

Q: When you left in 1957, where did you see the situation on the island was going at that time?

COURTNEY: Well, it was beginning to be quite clear, I thought, that first, there was a bad split between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots and that was going to be a difficult situation. And secondly, that the Cypriots were going to get their way. In other words, they were going to get independence at least. Enosis looked like a possibility, but maybe not so great a possibility as the likelihood, by then, of independence, but the British colonial rule was coming to an end.

Q: What about the State Department while you were out there. You said that you really didn't get many instructions. Did you feel we had much of a policy there or was it just a waiting period?

COURTNEY: The latter I think.

Q: That is what I gathered. Later when we got into it we couldn't get out of it. Then you left Nicosia and went back to the State Department. I have you serving as an advisor regarding nuclear weapons at the State Department from 1957-61. What was that?

WILBUR P. CHASE
Political Officer
Ankara, Turkey (1955-1959)

Wilbur P. Chase was born in Washington, DC in 1919. His Foreign Service career included positions in Canada, Germany, Turkey, Iraq, Israel, The Philippines, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on July 24, 1990.

Q: We've now reached the point where we can move from Haifa to your next position, which was in Ankara. I have you being there from 1955 to '59. Does this make you a Middle East hand or something?

CHASE: I have a lot of affection for the Middle East, but I never became a linguist. I think I would have continued further in the Middle East except that one of my children had school problems and I felt it was best that we stick to places where I could get better schooling, or at least hopefully better schools. Like a lot of these things, your career doesn't always evolve quite the way you'd think you would like it, but it turned out well.

I liked Ankara. When I first got there, I arrived on, I think it was the 4th of July, and Webb Balance, the administrative officer, came down to the hotel and said, "Well, how do you like going down to Izmir?" This took me by surprise. I suddenly found out that the consul down in Izmir was leaving, and the new one wasn't going to come for quite some time, and that he wanted me to be down there to run the office. So I went on down and I had a good time in Izmir, I enjoyed it.

It was interesting to me that, when I had been living in Israel, Cyprus was a place that we used to visit from time to time, and the problem with EOKA, the Greek community of Cyprus that wanted to join Greece. First of all, the British were resisting, and then it became the Turks who were resisting, since a very sizable portion of the population is Turk. I became aware of these tensions over in Cyprus, from visits when I was in Israel, and when I was en route from Haifa to Ankara, I had stopped off there while the boat had stopped there, and all these notices about EOKA dangers.

Well, I ended up and went down to Izmir. My first job in Ankara, I'd been sent there to be one of the political officers. The Izmir trade fair was coming up. That is a big international trade fair, and there was going to be an American building there for us to show off our wares. We wanted to know what was happening there, we also wanted to see a great deal what the Soviets were doing, what were the Eastern Europeans doing.

I'd been intrigued with Turkey for quite some time, even going back to Basra days. I can recall a John Van Ness, who was a missionary out there, and his daughter then married Bill Brewer, who was in the Foreign Service and became Ambassador Brewer. And John Van Ness was saying, "The Palestine situation, what we need are a few Turks to take care of that." And Turks do have, I think rather successfully, a managerial sense. They know what it is to run things. You can argue

whether it's done well or not, but being an administrator, be it a governmental administrator or a business administrator, being an administrator or director is an admired profession in Turkey. The government pays fairly low salaries, and families would subsidize one of their members if they would go into the government. So they're used to it.

Well, in Izmir, it is definitely Middle Eastern, with a heavy overlay of remembrances of things Greek.

Q: It used to be Smyrna.

CHASE: I know that the Greek consuls general would call it somehow Smyrna, but not I.

Speaking of a colonial atmosphere, this was a Levantine sort of an atmosphere: tobacco growers, agriculturalists, a foreign community of missionaries, business people, educators who had been living there, some of them for generations. They weren't Turks, they were French, they were British, they were what have you; it was a colorful sort of an environment.

They came up to celebrating the occupation of Smyrna, the beginning of Izmir, and I was the only foreign consul who went down for these celebrations of the Turkish National Day. The people invited me, but it was not a formal sort of a thing, and I found out that the foreign consular people were aloof to it. It wasn't that they weren't welcome, they just didn't become involved. I went down, and the Turks very much noticed that an American was there. And they appreciated it.

The commanding general took me off and said, "You notice that." Down at the dock where the main formalities were taking place, the ships were in the Mediterranean moorings, with the stern to the dock. And here, right there in front of the reviewing stand, was a Greek ship with a Greek flag. And the general said, "Past things are past." Nothing was said against Greeks, it was all completely neutral. This was a day that we had occupied Izmir -- not occupied it from whom -- but occupied it. And I was quite intrigued with the way that they were phrasing it and trying to say we are in NATO with Greece and Britain.

However, a few days later I was down at this big international fair. I'd been in one exhibit and when I came out of it I noticed there was some fire and a certain excitement around. All of a sudden I realized that it was the Greek pavilion that had been torched. This was relating very much to the Cyprus issue. The Turks had been fairly quiet, but, for reasons that are still under debate, anti-Greek riots took place in Istanbul, and in Izmir they torched the Greek pavilion.

I got into my car with my wife and we started driving down to the Greek consul general's home, to warn him and tell him what was happening. We got there, and as we came up, the first head people of the mob had outrun our car. They had gotten there first and they had torched the house. The Greek consul general, his wife, and a child were there, but they were able to escape through the back door. Nobody was injured. But about three o'clock in the morning, I was awakened by the Greek consul general calling me and saying he wanted to come and seek asylum at the American Consulate. So we gave him asylum. His wife and child, oh, everything they had had been destroyed; it was quite a sad event.

For the next four and a half years that I was in Turkey, my occupation was Cyprus and the Greek-Turkish...

Q: How did you get involved?

CHASE: I was a political officer in the embassy. Now that was the thing I was working on.

Q: This is very interesting because we have had quite a few interviews with people who, mostly later on, but who were involved, but almost always from the Cypriot point of view.

CHASE: Toby Belcher among others.

Q: Yes, well, I mean they just happened to be there on this. Every time you talk about Cyprus, you have to talk about a specific time, but really it doesn't change a bit, I guess, the feelings. This was '55 to '59, what was, let's say, the official Turkish attitude at that time, as opposed to maybe the street attitude, towards Greece and Cyprus?

CHASE: I think, in talking to the Turks I met when I was on Cyprus: shopkeepers, fellows with me out sailing, Turks, and the Greeks, it's like a number of these areas where you have a minority, that if a Turk went in to get a job on Cyprus in a bank, he would maybe be hired to be the janitor, but he would never dream of becoming a clerk. He hit an economic ceiling that he couldn't penetrate. And, seeing what was happening to the Arabs in Israel, again you hit your ceiling, you become very, very much constrained.

The Turks would tell me on Cyprus about, "Look, if there's an earthquake over there in Turkey, the spring that I get my water from here in Cyprus turns muddy." So there are connections.

But when I arrived in Turkey, the first few weeks I was there, I was aware that people were very conscious of things Greek, and that some of this was completely unrelated to the Cyprus issue. There is enough other history of the Turks and the Greeks having problems.

I was asked to go down to Istanbul and talk to the various members of the community. The ambassador didn't like what the consul general in Istanbul was sending in, but he liked the things I was reporting, so he asked me to go and look around in Istanbul -- which the consul general in Istanbul didn't particularly appreciate.

Q: The ambassador was Fletcher Warren at that time?

CHASE: No, that was Avra Warren.

Q: What was the Istanbul man sending in that the Ankara man didn't care for from the consul general in Istanbul? Do you know?

CHASE: Oh, it was in part this issue of how deep-seated, how much animosity is there between the Turks and the Greeks; how much was this a definite governmental-directed, government-managed riot that took place; how much was it that maybe the government encouraged or suggested that it be done, and then the dam of self-control was removed and the natural desire for

anger at the Greeks took over. And so, as I believe, the ambassador was disturbed that the Istanbul consul general was sending in too much: This is a government-directed, -run, -managed plot. And he wanted to find out a little bit more of comments from people who would say that this is a thing that the Turkish people are deeply concerned about. And from my reporting in Izmir, he had liked the things I was sending in from there. So when I was returned to Ankara and took up my assigned position as political officer, he then asked me to look into this thing and see what I could find out.

Q: After you looked into this, how did you see the official Turkish attitude towards the Cyprus problem and Greeks? Again, we're talking about the Fifties.

CHASE: At that time, the Turkish government began to feel that Greece was trying to put a stranglehold around them: taking up all the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea, going through Rhodes and Cyprus, that this would be encircling them. There are a whole lot of other things that kind of filtered into this and fed it along the way. But at the time, in '55 when I arrived in Turkey, the Turks were not particularly concerned about Cyprus, in that they were convinced that the British were going to stay on forever.

Q: When did the British leave?

CHASE: Just when I left, in '59. It was the Geneva Accord, when Menderes and (I can't think of the name of the fellow in Greece) finally met and signed an accord which established the dual Greek-Turkish government of Cyprus. But at the same time that I was arriving, the British had given signs that they were going to pull out and turn the island over. So from '55 to '59, the Turks were adamant that Britain will not leave Cyprus under conditions which will allow Cyprus to be joined to Greece. At the beginning (and to an extent I still think there is a lot to it), the Turks didn't have any really latent, deep anger with Greece. But they did react, and I think it was popular, they reacted, saying that Greece is fine, it's over there, but they will not come and dominate us.

Q: It's funny. I served, as you know, some years later in Greece, and I had the feeling in Greece that the Greeks used the Turks as the bogeyman all the time. Anything that happened, they were concentrated on Turkey. Whereas the Turks, from my distant observation, really weren't that interested in the Greeks per se. I mean, they were more concerned about the Soviets and others, and that the Greeks were an annoyance but not a major preoccupation -- unless they started messing around in Cyprus with the minority there.

CHASE: I would agree with that. The Turks didn't have an obsession with things Greek. Generally, they couldn't care less about what the Greeks were doing. They felt rather superior to the Greeks. They were very much concerned about the Soviets. They were concerned about the Kurds in eastern Turkey. They were concerned about Syria and Iraq and Iran, their neighbors there. They share water and population and transportation problems. At one time, we had tried very much to get the Turks to become involved with the Arab-Israeli thing. The Turks weren't particularly willing to be brought into that squabble.

Q: When you were there, this was the Menderes government. What was your observation of the

role of the Turkish military at that time?

CHASE: Whenever you start talking about Turkey, modern Turkey, I think that it's important to start out almost with a little summary of Ataturk and his six principles. Ataturk instilled in the Turks a terrific sense of nationalism and self-confidence, an attitude on the relationship of people to the government, government to the people, and the importance of democracy. Even though Ataturk was a dictator, he was devoted to the concept of real democracy. And the spirit of democracy was such that the military have never felt that they can do anything other than support Ataturk and his devotion to democracy. The military was in the background, solely as a defense of the homeland, not for interfering with politics. And they got, I think, reluctantly dragged into the political fray with the Menderes government and then several other subsequent governments not being able to govern properly. And so the military took on the mantle of governmental rule most reluctantly.

Q: Did you have the feeling in your dealings at that time that the civilian government was sort of taking a more pragmatic stand on the Cyprus issue, and that at least the leaders of the military really wanted to have at the Greeks, at least on Cyprus?

CHASE: The military didn't want to become involved with Cyprus. They looked at Cyprus as being something that wasn't their bag, because they were concerned with the Soviets and Eastern Europe, and somewhat with the Arab frontier, but that was more of a peacekeeping thing. See, at that time the Baghdad Pact was alive, and the Turks were very much key supporters of the Baghdad Pact. These were the areas that they were thinking about, and Greece wasn't a threat to them. In a military thing, they'd see Cyprus as something that was going to be handled through negotiation and through diplomacy.

Q: How about in our embassy? You have the Cyprus thing, and these negotiations were going on. Were we playing any role, from your vantage point, during the gradual breaking away by the British from responsibility in Cyprus?

CHASE: Oh, we played a very active role in the Cyprus dispute. We didn't ever become a party at the negotiating table, but we were constantly in the background, arguing with the Brits, the Greeks, and the Turks about let's keep this thing as a diplomatic tug of war, not a military tug of war. In fact, none of us even really thought of that as being a realistic concern. This did not come out, really, in the conversations, about the threat of a military intervention.

But we were constantly trying to assess what were the minimum conditions that the Turks would accept, what were the minimum conditions that the Brits would accept, and what were the minimum that the Greeks would accept. I think that we did fairly early come out with the thought that Cyprus should not become a part of Greece, enosis should not be fomented.

We toyed with trying to push the British to continue on to rule there. But the British were broke and they were getting their soldiers killed, so they thought they had to pull out.

We talked to Makarios, in trying to get Makarios to be rational. Maybe coming from the Turkish background, I think Makarios was a dirty old scoundrel. Toby Belcher, I know, liked him. I think

Toby also realized...

Q: Toby Belcher was our ambassador...

CHASE: He was our consul general. We of course had in Cyprus at that time some very major installations: USIA, the CIA, and our radio transmitters. So we had an interest, and to a large extent I think it's still there.

Q: Actually, it was a place where a lot of our interests intertwined. We had bases we considered very important at that period in Greece, in Turkey, and in Cyprus. So there was no feeling that we should just duck it and let everybody else play a hand?

CHASE: No, no, we were an active participant even though we shied away from acknowledging that we were a part of the negotiation.

Q: What was the reaction in the embassy and with yourself to the agreement that was signed in Geneva, the Geneva Accords on Cyprus in '59?

CHASE: [A sigh of relief] At last. We knew it was tricky and it might not succeed, but we were just so relieved that we thought "thank goodness". I arrived in Turkey with the almost breakdown of Greek-Turkish relations, and when I left, here the two governments had signed an accord. It was the answer to the maiden's prayer. With good will, we had a feeling that this is a viable solution. That if the Greeks and the Turks on the island would really try to make this succeed, it could succeed. That each side's basic interests were protected. There was enough opportunity for them to make a successful marriage.

L. BRUCE LAINGEN
Greek Desk Officer, Bureau of Near East Affairs
Washington, DC (1955-1960)

Ambassador L. Bruce Laingen was born in 1922. His Foreign Service career included positions in Iran, and Washington, DC, and an ambassadorship to Malta. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on January 9, 1993.

Q: You left Tehran in 1956 and came back to the State Department where you served for four years. What were you doing when you came back?

LAINGEN: I was assigned to the Greek Desk. Three relatively junior officers were assigned at that time to what was called GTI...Greece, Turkey and Iran. I was assigned to the Greek Desk. Another friend was assigned to the Turkish Desk and another to the Iranian Desk. Reflecting the arbitrary nature of assignments at that point, none of us had ever seen or worked in the countries to which we were assigned. I had never been to Greece. I overflowed it once. I had no competence at all in Greece. I was the assistant Greek officer; assistant to an officer named Ben Wood, Charles Benedict Wood, who died this past fall. I was exceedingly fortunate to work with him

because of his own competence, style and personality. He was a great guy. I was assistant Greek Desk officer for two years and then after Wood left served as the Desk officer for Greece for the final two years of a four year stint in the Department at that time.

At that point Cyprus did not have a separate Desk. Cyprus was not that much of an issue. It did become one, however, in that time to the point where for the last two years I had an assistant who was the Cyprus Desk officer.

I was assigned back to Washington in 1955 and took the midcareer course for the last months of that year and began my Greek Desk tour in 1956. I was assigned back about the same time that the Minister of the Embassy in Tehran at the time, Bill Rountree, whom I referred to earlier, was assigned as the Assistant Secretary for NEA. At that point, NEA, as you recall, extended everywhere from East Pakistan to Cape Town. There was no separate African Bureau yet.

Q: And it included Greece, Turkey and Iran.

LAINGEN: Yes. I mention him, as I did earlier, because I respected him and appreciated serving under him. I have been fortunate in the Foreign Service to serve with some very capable people as my chiefs. I was fortunate in a personal sense at the time because Bill Rountree as Assistant Secretary said to me one day, "Why don't you come out and meet the girl next door?" So I went out for a dinner party and met the girl next door, whom I later married.

Q: That was Penne.

LAINGEN: Yes, Penne.

Q: In this period of 1956-60, what were our interests in Greece, as you saw them as Desk Officer?

LAINGEN: We had a large AID program. It was the aftermath of the difficult period involving the post-war Greek civil war. It was a time of growing American military presence and the evolving Cyprus problem. We were heavily preoccupied with the Cyprus issue during that time. My assistant for the last two years then became in effect the Cyprus Desk Officer, Archer Blood.

I like to joke that he and I resolved the Cyprus issue in 1960 in the Zurich Agreement. The Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey went off to Zurich, Switzerland and resolved the Cyprus issue by setting up an independent Cyprus with agreement between the two states.

Then I left in 1960 to go to Pakistan and Arch Blood left to go to East Pakistan. We like to joke that as soon as we left the Desk in 1960, things began to fall apart. The Cyprus agreement that had been reached began to fray at the edges and fell apart in the sixties.

Q: During this period both Greece and Turkey were already in NATO. What sort of feeling did you have towards the role of Greece...I come at it from a different period in the next decade, 1970-74, and the Greeks were so occupied with hating the Turks in the Cyprus situation that their NATO role was mainly to make sure they got whatever the Turks got militarily. Did you

find yourself having to sit down with the Turkish Desk Officer and compare notes to make sure that the balance was equitable?

LAINGEN: No, it was not a large factor. We didn't focus much on it.

Q: Also it was a period of profound Greek-American preoccupation with....

LAINGEN: I don't think there was any particular serious problem of any kind. There was always friction because of the Turkish and Cyprus issue. We saw a lot of Greek-Americans. The problem is that we don't have many Turkish-Americans in this country, but a lot of Greek-Americans. I don't think there are any Turks in Congress, but there are Greeks. I came off that assignment with respect for the Turks as solid partners, but I had more enjoyment with the Greeks because they are fun.

Q: What about Makarios and Grivas and the search for independence and Enosis? Did this mean that you were having to consult with people handling British affairs? Was this a problem?

LAINGEN: Yes, it was a problem, but not a serious one. We and the British consulted a lot, saw each other a lot. But I, frankly, looking back on that tour on the Greek Desk, don't recall many major issues that confronted us at the time. It was a remarkably calm time -- other than the way the Cyprus problem grew and eventually led to the Zurich Agreement and was resolved. We nurtured that with them, but we were not large players in that agreement. They went off and did it themselves. I often point to that as an example of how sometimes when we step back from things these countries can do it better themselves. I put that in context in a later time in Indian-Pakistani relations when they went off after the tragedy of 1971 and came up with a similar agreement which they worked out themselves.

I have never served in Greece. I traveled in Greece as Desk Officer a couple of times and came to know then a gentleman again whom I look back on with great respect and interest named Philip W. Ireland, who died just a couple of weeks ago. He served as Consul General in Thessaloniki, Salonika, at the time I was on the Desk. He was a very strong presence, as he always was, to the point that we sometimes referred to that sector of Greece as Northern Ireland.

By the way I recall seeing a great deal of another American private presence that has been such a positive factor in relationship with that country, and that is the American farm school in Salonika. It was run then by the Landales, founded by a gentleman named House. It is still there today. I think it is a presence that has done as much for us in terms of long term respect for the United States as anything we have ever done in Greece.

Q: Same way with the American University of Beirut, Cairo and Istanbul.

LAINGEN: That is right. All over the place. Beirut particularly, of course. I recall that in one of the first speeches that Terry Sutherland made recently after coming back as a Beirut hostage, he said that the best way to punish these bastards who held him hostage was not to seek them out and kill them, but to rebuild the American University of Beirut. And I agree with that.

I saw something of Cyprus at the time...visiting and meeting with Makarios and coming away with enormous respect for the personal stature, power of that individual. Not someone who one could penetrate or influence very easily.

Q: I heard somebody say that a Secretary of State told you that the problem with Makarios was that Cyprus was just too small for him.

LAINGEN: Oh, exactly. That is a very good point. We had an American business interest in Cyprus that preoccupied our time then occasionally. That was a copper mining complex in the western part of Cyprus. We would spend a lot of time about supporting its interests, particularly as we began to worry more and more about the Turkish/Greek divide in Cyprus.

Q: One of the things that is often thrown at any capitalist country, particularly the United States, is that American industry overseas dominates us. We are out there just for further trade or the exploitation. You have a copper interest on Cyprus. Cyprus is going through a difficult period and you say you spent a lot of time on it. What would you do?

LAINGEN: There is a limit to what you can do, obviously. That interest has to function under the laws and practices of that sovereign country. But what we did and what you can do is to meet with these interests. The Desk Officer has to have an open door in my view in Washington for American business interests who want to come in. They are not all convinced that there is that much help they can get from a Desk. I think on the whole we see less of American business interests than we should. I think that certainly has been true historically over time as far as American diplomacy overseas. I think that is changing. An American embassy is expected to be a lot more active in terms of supporting American business overseas than it was before, unless you get into a real crunch as we did in Tehran in terms of American oil interests.

But we met with these company people when they came to town and counseled with them about our appreciation and awareness of the way British policy was affecting Cyprus at the time and the way in which the place was either going to pull itself together or wasn't. Of course it did in the large sense in that Zurich Agreement.

Q: Our role in the Zurich Agreement was....

LAINGEN: Bystanders. We didn't have a role in it. They went off and did it themselves. There was a lot of saying, "For God's sake you have to resolve this problem." And we have been saying that to the Greeks and the Turks ever since, with less success, now. It was Karamanlis for the Greeks and who was the Turk? It has slipped my mind.

Q: You were in the GTI in NEA, which in those days covered Africa. You represented one corner and Africa represented the other corner but things were pretty well focused on what we would call today the Middle East...we were just coming out of the Suez Canal situation. Did you feel that you were kind of on your own?

LAINGEN: Oh sure. We were a side play. And Africa was too. Who thought much about Africa in those days? Looking back on it I can't imagine how an assistant secretary could conceivably

have coped with the bureau that large, except that there weren't that many crises in Africa in those days, I guess.

Q: Just one thing and we might call it quits. What does a Desk Officer in those days do? It sounds very impressive. You have Greece and you are the Greek Desk Officer. You never served there before and all of a sudden you have the cradle of civilization. What do you do with it?

LAINGEN: At that time for a junior officer, a Desk Officer assignment was a great one. I still think it is a great one.

Q: It is called a Country Director now.

LAINGEN: A Country Director usually extends to more than one country. That is another story. The Country Director position never evolved exactly the way it was supposed to and we had hoped it would in the early seventies. We then got into this regrettable trend of more and more Deputy Assistant Secretaries. The power that the Country Director was supposed to have was diminished because of this other strata, layer, up there that regrettably is still there in such numbers. A country desk, however, in many respects I suppose even today, still is the core, the repository of whatever intelligence and knowledge we have about a given country. It is assumed, at least, that that is where the expertise is -- where people who think most about both big and particularly small issues are. That is why the person assigned there, I think, should not be someone who never served there but someone who has served there and knows the language to some degree. It is the place where...and again it depends on the country...the Desk Officer for Togo, for example, I suppose is a country that is not going to loom very large ever in American interests. But he can be consequential because he is the only one who ever thinks about Togo. On the French Desk there are a number of officers and the real expertise is divided among them. But it is an important position. Certainly an important training position, I think. In terms of the evolution of a senior officer, in political terms at least, he ought to have a desk officer assignment. I was happy to have had one at that point.

I was also very fortunate, I think, as an officer in the Foreign Service, to have had a lot of in and out assignments. I didn't stay long in the field, ever. The only extended period were the two assignments in Germany and Iran to begin with, marking a total of 4 years. Otherwise my assignments have always been in and out giving me the satisfaction of developing family connections, preserving them back here and strengthening my roots in terms of understanding my own country, which I think sometimes can be weakened if you don't have frequent assignments back in Washington. Of course, by law today the Foreign Service is expected to be on that kind of rotation. It didn't used to be.

Q: You got Greece. It is a complicated country. The politics is complicated, the people are complicated. How do you develop expertise? Did you read your way in?

LAINGEN: Never studied Greek. Certainly didn't do all of that.

Q: Did you have files that you could read? Did people talk to you?

LAINGEN: Yes, there were files I could read. Looking back on it I guess I read a lot of them in the first year or so I was assigned there. I was fortunate to have a Desk Officer supervisor...I was the assistant to a Desk Officer named Ben Wood who knew and felt, and I think understood the Greek psyche very well, having both traveled and served there. I learned a great deal from him. I had very good relations with the Greek Embassy as a Desk Officer surely should have. That's the slot with respect to a country in the Department in Washington that must work the hardest to insure that the relationship between the Department of State and that embassy in this city is good. That is his job, more than anybody else -- to make sure that he has contacts there and that there is good relationship in terms of access for that ambassador to senior levels in the Department of State. Not to the point of becoming a victim of clientitis, but being mindful of the fact that that embassy, depending on the country, can be a very important player in how you carry out your job.

Sometimes they can be supporting actors in the process, and usually are. And big players, sometimes, depending on the country. Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, for example, was a powerful player in Washington.

Anyway, I saw a good deal of the Greek Embassy at the time. The Greeks are not only political animals, but they are social animals and like to talk and party. There was a great deal of contact that I had at that time. I still look back on that experience as probably the best in terms of relationships with foreign diplomats from another country that I have ever had in this town. Because of what they are and the intensity then of the growing American-Greek relationship, a good relationship at the time. We hadn't gotten into the Colonels period, we were in an upswing in the Cyprus period, if you will. It was a good time.

I did my best to read, as a Desk Officer has to do, I think, about Greece, including, not least, classical Greece. I remember that Edith Hamilton was still alive at that time, approaching her nineties.

Q: "The Greek Way."

LAINGEN: Yes. I called on her in her apartment here on Massachusetts Avenue. She was a big figure in terms of how we talked about Greece at that time. We had a very active Greek Ambassador at the time. George Melas. He liked to throw his weight around town both socially and politically. The Greeks can in this town, of course, because there are so many Greeks in positions of consequence. Not only in the Greek Orthodox Church, but also in terms of American business interests and in the Congress. Anyway, Melas was a great guy. I got married during my stint on the Greek desk and there was a gift from the Greek Ambassador which I still value.

MURAT WILLIAMS
Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs
Washington, DC (1956-1959)

Ambassador Williams was born and raised in Virginia and was educated at the

University of Virginia and Oxford University. After serving in the US Navy in World War II, he joined the State Department, serving in Washington, DC, where he worked with the Refugee Relief Program, and abroad. His foreign posts include San Salvador, Bucharest, Salonika, Bern and Tel Aviv. Mr. Williams served as U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador from 1961 to 1964. He died in 1994.

WILLIAMS: I went to the Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs. I was sent there mainly because I had had considerable dealing with the problems of Cyprus when I was Consul General in Salonika. I knew pretty well what problems Greece faced. Some people questioned whether our relations with these three countries should have been brought together. It didn't seem that the problems of Greece had anything to do with the problems of Iran, although ancient Greece and ancient Persia had a great deal to do with each other. Somehow those three ex-empires, Greece, Turkey and Iran were engaged in affairs which were of particular interest to us and were different than the affairs of the Arab world. They were neighbors of the Arabs but, themselves, were not Arab. I think Iran had a fair number of Arabs; the Turks had a small number of Arabs, but their problems were really different.

At the time that I was in that Office...

Q: Which is 1956 until 1959?

WILLIAMS: Yes. At the time that I was in that Office more than half of our time, I believe, was devoted to the question of Cyprus because Cyprus was keeping the Greeks and Turks at odds with each other and interfering with their participation in NATO. I, with my colleagues Ben Wood, Bruce Laingen, who were working mostly on Greek matters, developed a proposal for the independence of Cyprus. We pushed it quite a lot. We had colleagues in the European Bureau who thought that might be the best idea. The Greeks, themselves, wanted all of Cyprus; the Turks wanted Cyprus too. They, the Turks, had a large minority of Turks residing in Cyprus. But we were able to take initiatives which later developed, with the help of some of our friends in the European Bureau, into the final solution. I remember very well the Assistant Secretary for the Near East at that time, Bill Rountree, telling us that we should go ahead and work on it, but he didn't believe the question of Cyprus would be solved until a lot of blood had been shed. In the long run we know that there was a good deal of violence and even in recent years there has been trouble in Cyprus. From the standpoint of NATO it was better to put this at least to the side so that it wouldn't interfere with what Greece and Turkey did in their NATO roles.

VICTOR WOLF, JR.
Consular Officer
Istanbul, Turkey (1957-1959)

Victor Wolf, Jr. was born in New York in 1927. His Foreign Service career included positions in Iraq, Iran, Turkey, The Philippines, Denmark, Germany, Poland, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on July 31, 1986.

Q: Were you getting much pressure from the United States?

WOLF: Well, a little bit in Armenian cases, but rather more in Greek cases. The Greek situation was, again, different. The Greek situation stemmed from the fact that relations between Greece and Turkey had never been all that good, of course. There was the memory of the Greek adventure in Asia Minor in the early 1920s.

Q: The burning of Smyrna.

WOLF: The burning of Smyrna and all of that, the massive invasion by the Greek Army into Asia Minor. But the real problem came over Cyprus. The curiosity about Cyprus was that in those days the Turks had a sense that for once they were on the right side of a minority issue. The Turks have had a certain reputation in the world as being very bad in their treatment of minorities. In Cyprus, it is the Turkish community that is in the minority, and the Turkish Cypriots were frightened that if there was a union with Greece, which is what many in the majority Greek Cypriot community wanted, they would be discriminated against and persecuted by the Greek majority in a province of a Greek state. So they appealed to their brothers on the Turkish mainland to protect them, and the Turks were very glad, for once being on the right side of a minority issue, as it were.

The problem culminated in 1956, when Greeks in Salonika burned the birthplace of Ataturk in Salonika as an anti-Turkish protest. The result was almost immediately widespread anti-Greek manifestations principally in Istanbul. Now, there are all sorts of stories about how many Greeks were killed, whether Greek women were raped, and all that sort of business, in Istanbul. The fact of the matter is that there was no real recorded case of killing or raping. There was a lot of burning, there was a lot of looting, and there was a fair amount of disorder, and there is some evidence that the then-Turkish Government was behind some of these anti-Greek manifestations.

Q: Was the burning of Ataturk's place, was the Greek Government involved in that, do you think?

WOLF: I don't know the answer to that question, but I wouldn't be surprised. I wouldn't be at all surprised, because my impression is that neither of the two governments were beyond staging things that would be useful for their particular purposes, whatever those purposes.

Q: Given these riots and all, what happened to the consulate?

WOLF: Then the Greeks wanted to get out.

Q: How many are we talking about, the ones who wanted to get out?

WOLF: It's difficult to tell. The whole Greek community probably was between 50,000 and 100,000.

Q: So it was a sizable community.

WOLF: That was approximately the size of the community. I could be wrong, but my impression was 50,000 to 100,000. And a significant number of those Greek Turks, meaning citizens of Greek extraction, were also registered for immigration, and we had the same kind of problem that we had with Armenians, that they wanted non-immigrant visas, we weren't able to give them non-immigrant visas if they were registered, unless they showed that they really were not intending to stay behind in the United States on that trip in a permanent way.

We had much more pressure from the state because there were a number of states or constituencies, districts within the United States where there was a large Greek community, and the Greek lobby, the Greek community, was very well organized in the United States, in many respects much more organized, at least at that time than the Armenian community. You have a Greek-American organization called AHEPA, I believe. I don't know what that stands for.

Q: *I think it's American Hellenic . . .*

WOLF: Ethnic Protective Association?

Q: *Something like that.*

WOLF: At any rate, AHEPA. They were very interested in seeing that as many visa applications of Greek ethnics in Istanbul were approved, and we got a fair amount of attention from AHEPA. The congressman who were very interested in this was John Brademas, a Democrat of Indiana.

Q: *Who is of Greek extraction.*

WOLF: Who is of Greek extraction. There were also some districts in Massachusetts where there was a lot of interest. In Maryland there was a lot of interest, in Delaware.

Q: *We're really talking about places where there was a large American-Greek community.*

WOLF: Yes. This was the kind of pressure that went on, and there was a fair amount of that. I would say those were the movement of peoples issues that I had to deal with.

Q: *How did you resolve the Greek problem?*

WOLF: You didn't resolve the Greek problem. All that you could do was deal with it on a case-by-case basis. I always took the position if there was any possible explanation, if in an individual case one could plausibly assert that a person was coming back, I tended to issue the visa, simply because why look for trouble? It's going to come anyhow on cases where you can't, really can't issue the visa. So if there was any possible justification in coming to the conclusion that the person would come back from a non-immigrant trip, I would issue the visa.

I have to say, in fairness, that a significant number of Greek ethnics to whom I did issue non-immigrant visas did, in fact return, and many of them would call me up at the consulate general or come to see me at the consulate general and say, "See? You weren't sure whether I would return. Here I am. I want to prove to you that I was an honorable man." Because I would always

ask them to swear the oath, the oath that the statements they made on their visa application were true.

Q: *Which you included the statement that they were returning.*

WOLF: Which you would include a statement that they were returning or the period that they were going to be there or the purpose of the visit. My own impression, frankly, is that one of the reasons why a number of these people did come back was that they were very impressed in those days by the concept of an oath before God.

ARCHER K. BLOOD
Cyprus Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1958)

Archer Blood was born in Illinois in 1923. His Foreign Service career included positions in Greece, Germany, Algeria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed in 1989 by Henry Precht.

BLOOD: I spent two years in the secretariat. Then I went to NEA. Probably my favorite job of all in the Foreign Service. I became the first Cyprus desk officer.

Q: *This is 19 --*

BLOOD: This would have been 1958. Cyprus, of course, didn't achieve independence until 1960. It was still a British colony. There was an insurrection going on in Cyprus of the EOKA (PHONETIC), the Greek Cypriots trying to achieve union of Cyprus and Greece. Many negotiations with Greece, with Turkey, and the British. It was coming up in the U.N. brought by the Greeks every year.

The great part about it -- I was a class four officer then -- was that I was the only person I think in Washington who was solely concerned with Cyprus. There were, of course, many people above me who were partially concerned with it. But all the policy papers and virtually everything, I drafted. It could be changed, as they often were, but it was a feeling of responsibility, sort of a focused responsibility. It was such a challenging job. I was dealing with the British, Greek, Turkish embassies. It was a great job.

GTI -- that was the office of Greek-Turkish-Iranian Affairs in NEA which has now been subsequently transferred to European Affairs. And that was a great office. Tremendous people in it.

Q: *Who was in charge?*

BLOOD: Owen T. Jones was the director, and Mennen Williams was deputy director. Bruce Laing, he and I shared an office. I was the Cyprus officer; he was the Greek desk officer.

Then, of course, when he was away or on vacation, I also handled Greece. And when I was away, he handled Cyprus. And then Roy Atherton subsequently became, when I left the job, the Cyprus desk officer.

Q: *Was the Secretary seized of the Cyprus problem at that time period?*

BLOOD: No, he was not. The people we did work with primarily were Bill Rountree --

Q: *Who was the assistant Secretary?*

BLOOD: Assistant secretary for NEA. Bill Dale who was then director of British affairs in EUR. Bob Murphy who was --

Q: *The Under Secretary.*

BLOOD: The Under Secretary for Political Affairs. And he was the one that the Greeks and the Turks would come to, particularly the Greek ambassador would see him. The Secretary and the Under Secretary rarely got involved in Cyprus. I think, as I recall, Bob Murphy was really the senior most person with whom I dealt on Cyprus.

Q: *Now, what was the U.S. trying to accomplish at that time?*

BLOOD: Well, we were trying to, of course, bring about a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem that would secure our military concerns in the area and not upset Turkey too much. We were trying to block, the time I was there, the Greek efforts to use United Nations General Assembly to sort of try to force some action with respect to Cyprus.

Q: *We favored an independent Cyprus eventually.*

BLOOD: Eventually we did, but we didn't start off that way. I remember drawing up a plan myself that called for enosis of Cyprus with Greece with Turkish bases on the island.

Q: *But was that --*

BLOOD: That didn't get very far either. I've always thought that the Greeks misplayed the Cyprus -- Makarios particularly, the Greek Cypriot leader misplayed the Cyprus issue. If they had -- and this is my own theory -- if they had accepted the early British offers for limited self-government and had not --

Q: *Under British sovereignty.*

BLOOD: Well, yes, initially under British sovereignty, but the British were doing this throughout the world, and everywhere it was leading to independence. At this time, the guerrilla, the EOKA guerrilla movement, had not begun. The Turk Cypriots were sort of quiescent and relaxed. And I think if they had done that, accepted the British offers, that eventually and gradually just like in many places of the world, and without Turkish resistance, Cyprus would

have become part of Greece. But the resistance sort of --

Q: We were talking about Cyprus. Would you continue where I interrupted you?

BLOOD: All right. The Greek Cypriot resistance worried and antagonized the Turkish Cypriots and then the Turkish government. When the Turkish government became intimately involved, the problem became much more intractable. The chance for *enosis*; that is, union of Cyprus with Greece, which I always had favored myself, disappeared.

The key event, in my own analysis, in the move toward independence was the defeat of the Greek effort at the United Nations in November of 1959. The Greeks had made the mistake of allowing Krishna Menon of India to stage manage their effort.

Q: What was our position?

BLOOD: Our position was against the Greek initiative. We were getting many telegrams from Greek-Americans throughout the country urging us to support Greece in the United Nations. The queen of Greece, Queen Frederika, had a very long-standing letter writing relationship with George Marshall, who was, of course, retired by then. But she was pressing him to intervene on the behalf of Greece. And the queen and the palace, particularly the queen, was also approaching White House and other people trying to get the United States to change position.

Q: The Greek position being move enosis and our union with Cyprus. Am I incorrect on that?

BLOOD: Well, that was the Greeks' ultimate goal, yes. I forget exactly the technical nature of their proposal in the General Assembly. It wasn't that bold, but it was leading in that direction.

I also recall it was Bob Murphy who held the line in a rather key decision not to go along with the Greeks even though Henry Cabot Lodge, who was our ambassador to the U.N., was urging that we accept the Greek position. Our feeling was that if the Greeks realized that they couldn't get anywhere in the U.N., then they would be forced into negotiations with the Turks and the British. And we wanted to stop, once and for all, the U.N. effort which had been conducted on a yearly basis. We wanted to make it clear to the Greeks that they better give up this U.N. route and resign themselves to negotiations. After the failure of their --

Q: Was this a position that the British wanted and we accepted the British argument, or was it something that we independently arrived at?

BLOOD: I think we independently arrived at it. We had, at that time -- our primary contacts were with the Greeks. They were in constantly berating us. The Turks came to see us much less frequently. And the contacts with the British were not as frequent as with the Greeks and the Turks.

Q: But you don't think at a senior level, there was consultations with the British?

BLOOD: Oh, there was. Of course, we had an excellent consul general in Nicosia. At that time,

of course, it was a consulate general, Toby Belcher, who was superb and had a wonderful relationship with Sir N. Harding who later became Lord Carradon. But in Washington, no, I don't think so. And I know that if there had been, I would have known about it because whenever the Secretary and Under Secretary were not involved in Cyprus, Mr. Murphy was. When anybody ever came in to talk Cyprus to him, I was there as the note taker.

Q: What about the Turkish position? They were just too preoccupied with their own internal affairs, or why didn't they take a more active role? Why did the Turks leave the problem alone at this stage?

BLOOD: Well, the Turks were playing to their strength. They had won our gratitude in Korea. They were, in terms of military significance to NATO, more important than Greece, and they knew it. And they, I think, sensed that we were probably not going to accede to Greek wishes. They weren't importuning to us to do anything. They were really concerned that we not adopt the Greek point of view; and they knew we weren't, so they were rather relaxed.

Q: You indicated earlier that they might have been prepared to accept union with Greece.

BLOOD: Before the troubles began, yes. And if the Greek Cypriots had not come into active hostility with the British. If the offers of limited self-government had been accepted, it could have played out gradually over a period of years without strife or violence. Yes, I think they would have accepted that.

Q: How significant was Greek pressure, Greek-American pressure, on the State Department at this time?

BLOOD: Not very significant, really. They were always behind the curve in the sense that the cables which we would receive asking us to vote for the Greek resolutions in the General Assembly would usually arrive at the State Department after the vote had been taken. And we were, therefore, able to send off a standard reply, "Well, thank you, but, you know, this is already after the fact."

Q: What about through the Congress? There was no organized effort --

BLOOD: At that time, the Greek lobby was not that as sufficient as it later came to be. There were a few congressmen -- I remember John Brademas of Indiana, who is now president of NYU -- who was interested. But even then, he was very sympathetic to all the other considerations and not blindly in support of Greece. In fact, we discounted the Greek-American pressure and could afford to do so.

Q: Greek money wasn't important politically? There were no wealthy Greeks who had a --

BLOOD: Oh, you had people like Tom Pappas who was a wealthy Greek-American from Boston close to President Eisenhower, but their lobbying efforts weren't really well focused.

Q: So how long did you have this job?

BLOOD: I had it for two and a half years, and then I left to go out to Dacca in the summer of '62.

Q: That was a big change jumping from the Mediterranean to Pakistan.

BLOOD: Yes, but remember that NEA Bureau ran from Greece to Dacca. So I was still within my bureau, I was just in a different area of it.

WILLARD AMES DE PREE
Vice Consul
Nicosia (1958-1960)

Ambassador Willard De Pree was born in Michigan in 1928. He received a B.A. from Harvard University and an M.A. from the University of Michigan in 1952. He served overseas in the U.S. Army from 1944-1946. His Foreign Service career began in 1956 and included positions in Cairo, Nicosia, Accra and Freetown with ambassadorships to Mozambique and Bangladesh. Ambassador De Pree was interviewed in 1998 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

DE PREE: No, I wasn't. I was still interested in Africa. I told the Department when I entered the Service that I was interested in Africa. The Department had originally assigned me to Elisabethville in the Congo, but for medical reasons I had been reassigned to Cairo. In my annual April Fool's bid list, I continued to ask for an assignment in sub-Saharan Africa. But then, in 1958, when I was about due for reassignment from Cairo our vice consul in Cyprus in Nicosia was mistaken for a Britisher and was shot, and the Department needed somebody in Nicosia quickly. Since I had just about completed my two year assignment in Cairo, I was picked. I packed off the wife, and the kids, (at that time we had two kids), to my wife's parents in Sweden while I went off to Nicosia. Once again an African assignment had to wait.

Q: You mentioned the vice consul who got shot, was he killed?

DE PREE: No, he was not. Basil Wentworth was his name. He returned to the States. I really don't know what happened to him afterwards. I never met him.

Q: To go into some place where someone has been shot as a Foreign Service officer wasn't in those days an expected hazard of the business. How did your wife feel about you going off to something like that?

DE PREE: She wasn't all that happy, but took it in stride. I was more disappointed that my family wasn't able to accompany me than I was concerned about going into Cyprus. I had talked to Toby Belcher who was consul general in Nicosia at the time. He reassured me that the Greek Cypriot resistance movement was not targeting Americans. Of course, I realized that I might be mistaken for a Britisher, as had been Basil Wentworth, but it didn't really bother me.

Q: What was the situation, you were in Nicosia from 1958-60, on Cyprus at that time?

DE PREE: When I arrived the struggle of the Greek Cypriots for Enosis, or union with Greece, was still raging. General Grivas was the leader of the Greek Cypriote resistance, EOKA. They were engaged in guerrilla activity against the British forces on the island. Sir Hugh Foote was governor at the time. There had been talk of a truce but at the time I arrived they still hadn't reached an agreement. So we had to be very careful where we went. I can recall being invited to a reception at Government House, where we had to be escorted in by military convoy. But there was an air of expectation that agreement on the transition to independence would soon be reached. In fact, it did take place within a few months. With the agreement came a cease-fire.

My years in Cyprus, 1958-1960 were a promising time to be in Cyprus. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were talking and mixing together. The Consulate General was often the site for these meetings. The Consul General, Toby Belcher, was particularly active in bringing Greek and Turkish Cypriots together. Alas, it didn't last very long.

Q: What was the feeling towards Enosis, union with Greece, at that time?

DE PREE: Many of the Greek Cypriots preferred union with Greece to independence, but they began to realize that this probably was not achievable. Therefore, the next best option was independence. The issue then became how much power would be in the hands of the Greek Cypriots who were the majority and what rights would the Turkish Cypriots have. These were sensitive subjects. Neither trusted the other. You could tell the Island was headed for trouble, when the only flags you saw around the island were either the Greek or Turkish flags, not the newly-designed Cypriote flag. I left before independence.

Q: Did you get much of a feeling for the role of the Turks? Were they pretty much a peasantry as opposed to the more commercially minded Greeks?

DE PREE: Most Cypriots, Greek or Turkish, were peasants. Some Turkish Cypriots had commercial interests, but the big mines and most commercial trade were largely in the hands of Greek Cypriots. The big banks were controlled by the Greek Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots didn't like it, but that was the situation on the island.

We had a problem in the consulate general. No American officer on the consulate staff spoke Turkish. Toby Belcher tried hard to treat the two communities equally, but because he spoke Greek there was a perception among some of the Turkish Cypriots that he favored the Greek Cypriots. I gather now the US tries to have at least one Turkish speaker on the staff.

Q: How was Toby Belcher as a principal officer?

DE PREE: I thought he was first rate, one of the best officers I worked for. He was good with people, an excellent reporting officer, adept in negotiations, and highly respected by everybody on the island. He didn't stay on to become the first ambassador, but was brought back a couple of years later after fighting broke out again because of the high regard in which he was held by the Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the island.

Nicosia at the time was a very small part. There was Toby Belcher, myself, a CIA officer, and a rather large administrative support section because of the radio relay station and FBIS station. There was no AID staff, no defense attaché, nor anyone from USIA. That was it. As the vice consul, I doubled as reporting officer and the public affairs officer. It was a great learning experience.

Q: As public affairs officer, did you have any contact with the local press?

DE PREE: We had contact with both Greek and Turkish press. Toby Belcher largely handled these contacts. I did know one or two of the editors. I kept busy with our small exchange program. I also worked to found the Cypriote/American alumni association, which was made up of graduates of American universities, both Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

Q: Did you feel the hand of the American embassy in Athens at all? Were they taking an interest in what was going on?

DE PREE: Yes, we did. But the embassy was letting Toby Belcher call the shots in Cyprus. It did not try to treat the Consulate as a constituent post. Actually we had more to do with London, since Cyprus was still a British colony.

Q: How did this play?

DE PREE: The Greeks on the mainland in a sense looked down on the Greek Cypriots. Cypriots were country cousins. But there is a kinship of Greek speakers and the mainland Greeks were supportive and tried to make sure that Greek-Cypriote interests were not shortchanged during the transition to independence. The feeling in Greece was that the Greek Cypriots should have power corresponding to their numerical numbers. They had about 80 percent of the population, and the Turkish Cypriots about 18 percent, as I recall. In this respect the Greek-Cypriots may have been short changed by the London accord.

Q: Did Grivas appear at all during the time that you were there?

DE PREE: Yes, he came out of hiding. But he wasn't that conspicuous on the local scene. It was Archbishop Makarios, who returned from exile, who captured most of the attention. He was the acknowledged Greek Cypriot leader, not Grivas.

Q: What about the British part of the equation? The Brits were going through a very difficult period all over the world with decolonization. The United States is just sitting back. We had been a colony and basically were opposed to colonialism, etc. Did the British officials that you dealt with kind of resent "you Yanks?"

DE PREE: I sensed that there was some of that. A year or two before I arrived on Cyprus, or maybe just shortly before, the British combined the Colonial and Commonwealth Services into a single Service. Cyprus began to get a number of people out of the Colonial Service to serve in the British administration of the island. They had a different mind set. I had the impression that

they were more resistant to change than the people in the Commonwealth or diplomatic services. There was a discernible difference. But the differences were largely muted on Cyprus because of the dominant position played by Sir Hugh Foote, who by virtue of his strong personality, was determined that there was going to be a transition to independence and that it was going to take place under his leadership. He was highly respected on the island by all elements.

Q: Except those who were trying to kill him.

DE PREE: That reminds me of a delightful story. It involves the governor immediately preceding Sir Hugh Foote, Harding was his name, a general. One of the Greek-Cypriots working at Government House planted a bomb in the bedroom of Governor and Lady Harding, and it went off. No one was in the bedroom at the time so no one was injured. After placing the bomb, the Greek-Cypriote suspect, of course disappeared, joining his colleagues in EOKA. A few weeks after the settlement was reached and the EOKA people came out of hiding, this ex-employee got on a bicycle and peddled off to Government House to request his back pay. Apparently he thought there would be no question, even though he acknowledged that he had been the one who had planted the bomb in Governor and Lady Harding's room.

Q: What were American interests in Cyprus?

DE PREE: Our interest largely was to support the transition to independence. We had very few economic interests. There was a pyrites mine which was owned by the American/Cyprus Mining Corporation, but trade was minimal.

We had a military interest in the two bases, the British Army base at Dhekelia and the British air base at Akrotiri. Even after independence these bases were to be considered to be part of the UK. Given Cyprus' location on NATO's southern flank, we had an interest in this continued British military presence. Perhaps our major interest was to work to ensure that Cyprus not exacerbate the already fragile relationship between our NATO allies, Greece and Turkey.

Q: At that particular time, did you feel that the problems of Israel and the Middle East intruded?

DE PREE: They didn't seem to intrude on our work in Cyprus. We had people transiting through Cyprus on their way from Israel to the Middle East, so we had to handle the passport work, otherwise...

Q: This was because they couldn't go directly?

DE PREE: Yes, that is right. We were following developments in the Middle East, but it wasn't a major element of the work done in the consulate general. Cypriots were preoccupied with developments in Cyprus.

Q: Was your family able to join you?

DE PREE: Yes, as soon as there was an agreement on independence the family joined me.

PARKER T. HART
Bureau of Near East Affairs
Washington, DC (1958-1961)

Ambassador Parker T. Hart was born in 1910. His Foreign Service career included positions in Brazil, Yemen, Kuwait, Egypt, Syria, and Washington, DC, and ambassadorships to Saudi Arabia and Turkey. He was interviewed by William R. Crawford on January 27, 1989.

HART: That brings us to the summer of 1959. In that year, 1959, there was a meeting between Karamanlis and Adnan Menderes [Phonetic], which was very significant for the future of Greek-Turkish relations and Cyprus matters in particular, because their initial meeting -- and I've forgotten the exact date -- in 1959 had led to the Zurich agreement in principle on an independent republic of Cyprus ruling out enosis and partition. This was a change in the position of both sides. It was an act of statesmanship which gave us great relief in the State Department because it meant that the heat was off for a while between Greece and Turkey and reduced the threat the Cyprus question presented to the unity of NATO. It led, of course, in 1960 to the London meetings so that the London-Zurich body of agreements emerged into very elaborate arrangements with respect not only to the sovereign base areas that Britain would retain on the island but a great number of smaller sites which they would lease from the government of Cyprus for an indefinite period for purposes of military communications, surveillance and training.

About this time Dulles became desperately ill with cancer. I can't remember the date when he went to Walter Reed for his last stay. His place was taken by Christian Herter. We had what I remember as a period in which the Foreign Service really came into its own. Herter had the respect for the Foreign Service and believed in using it to the full and I think he had the utmost confidence in Loy Henderson as did the whole administration, especially Eisenhower. I found myself attending meetings when Bill was absent or in the interim between Bill Rountree's departure for Pakistan and Louis Jones' entry as assistant secretary. Loy Henderson was usually at meetings held by the Secretary to discuss the Foreign Service and the Department's organization, but he was frequently called upon, also, to express his opinions on substantive matters, especially including the USSR. Sometimes we'd have some very interesting exchanges on the subject of Soviet intentions and policies.

Herter was sworn in after Dulles' death as I remember it. Eisenhower wanted him and a number of us met him on his return from the Senate where he had been approved right away. He served as Secretary of State for about a year.

ALFRED LEROY ATHERTON JR.
Near Eastern Affairs, Iraq, Jordan, Cyprus
Washington DC (1959-1962)

Ambassador Alfred Leroy Atherton, Jr. was born in Pennsylvania in 1921. He received a A.B. and an M.A. from Harvard University. He entered the Foreign Service in 1946. In addition to Egypt, Ambassador Atherton's Foreign Service career included tours in Germany and India, and many positions in Washington, DC involving Middle East affairs. Ambassador Atherton was interviewed by Dayton Mak in the summer of 1990.

Q: It was certainly not a matter of national concern politically or...

ATHERTON: In any case, my time on the Jordan Desk was shorter than I had anticipated it would be. I went back the very end of 1958, and my recollection was that about a year and a few months later, sometime in early or perhaps mid-1960, there were some personnel changes in the Office of Near Eastern Affairs. I was not an Arabist, I was not one of the group who had committed themselves to the Middle East by learning the language, partly because nobody had ever suggested I take time off to learn it--although, to be honest if I had been asked, I'm not sure what I would have said. I guess I still wanted to keep the European option open.

I was informed one day that the Bureau was going to make a few internal changes. They had an officer coming back whom they wanted to get into the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, and the job they wanted to get him into was the job I was in. I was going to be moved over and assigned to a different office within the Bureau: GTI, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, which, in those days, was part of NEA, part of the Bureau. And, specifically, I was to be assigned as the new Officer in Charge of Cyprus Affairs. My first reaction was to be a bit put out. I felt that I had committed the last four and a half years to learning about the Arab-Israeli problem, and I had just begun to feel that I really knew enough about it to be productive. I knew nothing at all about the Cyprus problem. But I learned quickly, and the move was made.

About the middle of 1960, I suddenly found myself with a different front office. I was then working for the Director and Deputy Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, Iranian, and Cyprus Affairs. The Director was Bob Miner, and his Deputy in those days was Ollie Marcy. I worked with colleagues who dealt with a totally different world from the world I'd been dealing with.

It was a very interesting time to do this, actually, because it was the time when the British were in the process of letting go of Cyprus as a colony. It was the period after the London-Zurich agreements had been negotiated, and Cyprus was moving from the status of a colony to becoming an independent republic with a very complicated constitution which was supposed to balance the minority Turkish and the majority Greek communities, in order to protect the Turkish political rights while recognizing that the island was more Greek than Turkish.

It was a period when a serious effort was made by all concerned, and some of the leaders of the two communities tried to make the united Greek-Turkish Cypriot constitutional system work. There were those who didn't want to see it work, and they are the ones that we remember now in history, such as Archbishop Makarios on the Greek side and Denktash (who I guess is still a factor in Cyprus; even then he was) on the Turkish side. But there were people like Glafkos

Clarides, who was one of the more moderate people on the Greek side, and his Turkish counterparts.

I can remember, in particular, one of the highlights of the attempt to make this rather complex and delicately balanced new constitutional system work was an invitation from our government to bring to this country, together, the new Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Justices of the united Supreme Court. They were delightful people who also happened to be personal friends. There weren't too many friendships between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. And their wives got along; they played bridge together. There was a third Justice who was appointed, a German I think, who was a third-country national. But the two, the Greek and Turk, came together, en famille, as what I guess we would call IVs these days, Important Visitors, invited as guests of the State Department. And my job, as Officer in Charge, was to be the control officer of this visit. So we got to know them quite well, actually.

It was also a period when I was able to do a certain amount of traveling to the area to witness this moment of history.

I remember my first visit to Cyprus was when there was still a British Governor, Sir Hugh Foote, who later became Lord Caradon. And I remember meeting him when he was still Governor and was presiding over the transfer of colonial authority and the beginning of the Republic of Cyprus, with its reserved rights for the British to keep bases on the island, which still exist today. But it was the honeymoon period of the first year of Cypriot independence, when many people were, I think, trying to make the system work. It was the best time to deal with Cyprus affairs.

In retrospect, I was not unhappy about the transfer. At the time, I thought I was being moved out of my natural home, which by then had become NE, Near Eastern Affairs. But it didn't take long before I shifted my perspectives. I enjoyed the job and enjoyed dealing with a new set of problems, which also had their economic as well as their political aspects.

In fact, it was dealing with attempts to analyze and figure out ways to inject some capital and some new dynamism into the Cypriot economy, to try to make a single economy out of what had been recently two separate economies, that got me thinking that I probably didn't know as much about economics as a Foreign Service Officer should in the world I was working in.

WILLIAM N. DALE
Counselor, Mutual Security Affairs
Ankara, Turkey (1960-1964)

Ambassador William N. Dale was born in Washington, DC in February 1919. He entered the Foreign Service in June 1946. His career included positions in Turkey, Israel, and Washington, DC, and an ambassadorship to The Central African Republic. Ambassador Dale was interviewed by Dr. Henry E. Mattox on September 19, 1988.

DALE: I think I should mention one thing, the work of the Status of Forces Agreement. I haven't mentioned that. The Turks are a very patriotic people, and the Turkish flag is to them a very sacred object. American soldiers, when they came into Turkey, were told that, but they didn't always remember it. We had difficulty, a great deal of difficulty with a soldier who, when he first came to Turkey, had been warned to be careful about the flag, he went to a house of ill repute one night, got very drunk. When he came out, he went downstairs. The ladies were standing around in a balcony, which ran on three sides of the building. He saw a Turkish flag and, like laughing in church, he couldn't help but pull it down and threw it in the garbage pail, where upon the ladies, who were interested in love most of the time, became very patriotic, piled on him, brought in the police, and he was arrested. His defense was very unique. He said, "I saw the flag was falling (because he was pulling it) and I wanted to keep it from touching the grounds, so I let it go into the nearest receptacle there was, which happened to be a garbage pail."

So he had a long jail sentence as a result of this, and we thought that was unfair. The Turks, however, are very sensitive on this point, so we had a good deal of political difficulty at first over questions pertaining to the Status of Forces Agreement and Americans' behavior relative to the Turkish flag, relative to the Black Market, and cases of that nature.

Later on, a genuine issue did come up, and that was over Cyprus. The Americans were trying to keep the Turks from invading Cyprus, and in the end, Ambassador Hare, one of the real feats I've ever seen, the best feats of diplomacy, did manage to talk Prime Minister İnönü out of invading the island of Cyprus. This was in 1964, when the ships were loaded with troops, landing craft were ready. He went into a Cabinet meeting, couldn't get into the room, sat outside, managed to persuade the prime minister not to invade, a real tremendous feat of diplomatic initiative.

Q: How?

DALE: How did he do it? He managed to persuade them that if they did, they would have no support, that it would endanger their tie with NATO, which was very important to Turkey at that time. I guess it still is, but it was extremely important. He told them that it would certainly make it difficult for the United States to continue and on the scale it was and the aid which Turkey needed to develop. Lastly, he said it wouldn't solve the problem at all, because it would tend to isolate Turkey, and they would find they couldn't hold onto whatever they had won, because they would be so isolated from the West. Turkey has a strong desire to be associated with the West, because they need to balance it against the Soviet Union, which for centuries they've looked on as the major threat.

Q: Who did he talk with?

DALE: Prime Minister İnönü. That issue overwhelmed all the other issues by that time. The Status of Forces Agreement, the problem of what the military was up to paled in significance when the Cyprus issue came up.

Q: In this particular diplomatic feat that you're talking about, was Hare operating on instructions, or exactly how did he take this initiative?

DALE: He was operating on instructions, but the instructions were general. He used the instructions to support the pitch he had already determined. I was waiting for him in the embassy, and he was down at the foreign ministry. We were giving a dinner party. I knew the dinner party started. I could almost tell by my watch what course was being served. I got back in time for dessert. By that time, we'd reported back to Washington that our naval attaché, who was stationed in Eskenderun, where the troops were loading, could see the troops filing off the ships, back to their barracks, and we knew that the crisis was over.

Q: That was quite a coup.

DALE: That was quite a coup. That man was good.

Q: When was Cyprus eventually partitioned?

DALE: 1974, ten years later. Later on came other events, such as the famous Johnson letter to the Turks, which was very unfortunate. But this was before that.

Q: You left in 1964.

DALE: Yes.

FRASER WILKINS
Ambassador
Cyprus (1960-1964)

Ambassador Wilkins was born and raised in Nebraska and educated at Yale University. He entered the Foreign Service in 1940, where he became a specialist in Middle East Affairs. His overseas posts include Halifax, Baghdad, Tangier, New Delhi and Teheran, where he served as Minister/Counselor. In his several assignments in the Department of State in Washington, Mr. Wilkins dealt with Middle East matters. He also served on the Policy Planning Staff and as Inspector General of the Department. In 1960 he was appointed Ambassador to Cyprus, where he served until 1964. Ambassador Wilkins was interviewed by Peter Jessup in 1988.

Q: How did you suddenly switch, after two years, from Tehran to Cyprus?

WILKINS: Well, I mentioned earlier that Mr. Henderson had spoken to me on occasion about going to Saudi Arabia; and I declined. Well, there I was in Iran, and my wife and children had gone home ahead of me. I guess it was a coincidence that the Cyprus thing came to a head at that point. They were looking for someone to be ambassador there, and I was selected; primarily because of Loy Henderson, who by that time had returned to the Department as deputy, to under secretary of administration.

I can't think of any other reason why they would have taken me. I didn't speak Greek, but I studied Greek when I got back here, for six months. The independence of Cyprus was delayed from the spring of 1959 until August of 1960, because of the conference in London; between the British, the Greeks, and the Turks. They couldn't reach an agreement about the shape of the government in the new island, and the way in which the British governed the island.

So I had time on my hands. I used to spend the morning in the Department reading cables and doing necessary things. Then I'd go over in the afternoon, to the Foreign Service Institute, and study Greek. Incidentally, I got up to a 3 on a scale of 5. I continued to study Greek while there, but I've forgotten most of it now. I could say a few words they were always putting guns in my car, and so on. I said, "That's my flag," and so forth.

But the first three years at Cyprus were keystone. That's all explained in the talk I made in 1971, at the Naval War College, when I was advisor to the president of the Naval War College. I used my experience in Cyprus – being a small country, career officer-in-charge – as an example of how an American embassy operates. And that talk, which was transcribed and fortunately I found among my papers, I've now had typed up and am sending to the historical division of the State Department, for inclusion in the file.

Q: Makarios spoke English, didn't he?

WILKINS: Yes. Although, sometimes in involved conversation it was difficult. I never attempted to speak Greek with him. We'd call him, "Your beatitude." I've forgotten the words for it in Greek. He was a Byzantine character, as I explain in this transcript, and a very difficult man. Like Nasser in '56, Makarios was really on his last legs in '64. And was saved by the fact that the British forces in Cyprus, under Duncan Sandys, moved out and restored order on the island.

You might recall here, that it was during this period in February of 1964, that they attacked the American embassy. There were two bombs. I was in my apartment upstairs, and they blew up my exchange, made my office a shambles. I had to evacuate 1,200 of the 2,000 Americans on the island. We had an unusually large embassy there, totally something like 500 people, of which 35 were embassy proper. The rest were all secret communications under NSA, and F.B.I.S, and so on.

We'd inherited the British radio stations on the island, as they gradually withdrew in '59-'60.

Q: Didn't you have an air base, also?

WILKINS: No, we didn't have an air base, but the British continued to have an air base in Akrotiri, and they had an army base in Armington. They more or less gave up the army base, while I was there. They continued to maintain operations in Akrotiri, because the British considered Cyprus a stepping stone for them – to other areas of the Middle East. And they'd always looked on Cyprus as a relay point for telecommunications, during the Second World War. They withdrew from the Middle East, beginning with India, and Pakistan, and Burma, and Ceylon, in '47 under Atlee.

Then later they withdrew from everywhere. They withdrew from Palestine, and as the French did, from Syria and Lebanon. They ran out of money and could no longer maintain troops in any of those countries.

Q: Now who set off these bombs?

WILKINS: Greek separatists, no doubt. Because they considered the Americans very pro-Turkish.

Q: Would Makarios have been aware of this extremism?

WILKINS: I always thought so, and I asked him on many an occasion to knock it off. But he never did anything about it. He was always evading the issue, in a Byzantine way.

Q: And did you have any dealings with Denktash?

WILKINS: Oh yes, I knew him very well. He rented me all the furniture in my house. As a matter of fact, he never charged me any rent for it, which is probably contrary to Foreign Service regulations. When the war broke out, nobody bothered about those things. The house was burnt out, so who cares.

I rented a small house up on the north coast, just as a weekend retreat. Because the embassy proper was in Nicosia – some 50 miles away. I might add here, that I became a 3rd class scuba diver while there. I was more active in those days than I am now!

CHARLES W. MCCASKILL
Economic/Commercial Officer
Nicosia (1960-1964)

Cyprus Desk
Washington, DC (1964-1967)

Charles W. McCaskill was born in South Carolina on February 21, 1923. His career in the Foreign Service included positions in Germany, Greece, Cyprus, Iran, India, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed on July 7, 1993 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: You were in Cyprus from 1960 to 1964. In the first place, what was your job when you went out to Cyprus?

MCCASKILL: I arrived in Cyprus almost exactly one month before independence, which occurred on August 16, 1960. I went as Economic/Commercial Officer but found after I got there that I would also be doing the consular work because the Department had taken a budget cut, and

we had lost the consular officer position. The position was restored in about a year, but until then I did the consular work in addition to my duties as Economic/Commercial Officer.

Q: Can you describe Cyprus at the time you arrived, what the political/economic situation was?

MCCASKILL: The London-Zurich Agreements establishing the new Republic of Cyprus had been signed in February, 1960, and there was some relief (obviously premature) among all parties concerned (except the Greek Cypriots) that the Cyprus Problem was "settled". Athens was truly anxious to put the Cyprus Problem to rest, to get on with solving some of Greece's problems. It should be kept in mind that Greece was at war longer than any other single European country -- from October 28, 1940 to the end of the Bandit War in 1949 -- and the Greek Government wanted to get on with rebuilding the country. The Greeks had been completely preoccupied with Cyprus from the early 1950s and time and energy that should have gone into reconstruction of Greece were devoted to Cyprus. The international community was fed up with Cyprus, which had been at the center of the world stage for some years. So the feeling in Greece, at least in Thessaloniki, was one of relief that the problem was settled. It was our perception that the Greeks were relieved.

When I arrived in Cyprus I was surprised to find a general feeling among the Greek Cypriot community -- which was 80% of the population -- that the London-Zurich Agreements would not work, that the safeguards written into the agreements for the Turkish Cypriots were extreme, that the agreements were "not fair", and on and on.

In truth, the agreements were an extremely complicated set of agreements which did, in my opinion, give the Turkish Cypriots too many safeguards. Former Under Secretary of State George Ball described the Agreements as an "impressive diplomatic tour de force" which were "too complex to be workable". Most objectionable to the Greek Cypriots, Turkey could, under the Treaty of Guarantee, intervene in Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot community's vetoes, legislative and executive, could bring the government to a standstill; the Turkish Cypriots, 20% of the population, were given 30% of the civil service and the legislature. The Greek Cypriots vigorously opposed the concept that the two communities on the island were equal partners, that there was no majority community and no minority community, that they were both equal participants in the government.

The Greek Cypriots, including Makarios, felt that the agreements had been imposed on Cyprus by circumstances, that Makarios had been "forced" to sign ; no Greek Cypriot was present when the Greeks and the Turks reached agreement. Makarios stated later that he signed because the British threatened to partition the island if he did not agree to the agreements, and he feared that intercommunal fighting like that of 1958 would begin again. Moreover, Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis rebuked Makarios rather strenuously at the first meeting in London and threatened to withdraw Greek support if Makarios refused to sign the agreements.

Makarios had indicated in 1958 that he could accept a solution of an independent Cyprus rather than insisting on union with Greece. Great Britain by 1958 had reviewed its security position and had decided that bases on the island would satisfy its security requirements and that it did not need to hold the entire island. All of this led to the conference in Zurich and later in London.

I've gone beyond the political/economic situation on the island when I got there but this does give a little flavor of what we were hearing when I arrived. I might add that I have thought about the London-Zurich Agreements over the years, and I have concluded that it was probably impossible for a small group of Greek and Turkish diplomats to work out, even in outline, such complicated agreements, and I have wondered if the agreements were drafted in London and slipped to the Turks who then put them on the table in Zurich. You may recall that they met in Zurich for less than a week and drew up an outline of the agreement; they then met in London a few days later to sign them. Many of the provisions had been contained in previous British proposals -- most recently the MacMillan Plan -- but one still has to wonder if the Greeks and Turks had the diplomatic expertise for such an undertaking.

Speaking of the pressures on Makarios, Ambassador Nikos Kranidiotis, the Cyprus Ambassador in Athens for many years, in his book entitled Difficult Years says that Makarios anguished all night over whether or not to sign. He received calls from Queen Frederika in Athens, from former Governor of Cyprus Hugh Foot, and from the leader of the British Labor Party, all urging him to sign. As a footnote, I asked Frederika, whom I came to know fairly well when I was Consul General in Madras, if the story were true and she said her husband spoke to Makarios. The King only called, she said, because they were afraid that the Karamanlis government would fall if Makarios refused to sign. She indicated that fear that the government would fall justified what otherwise could have been termed "intervention" in Greek internal affairs. I believe Kranidiotis' version, and have always felt, that for whatever reason, Frederika was dissembling with me.

Cyprus was dubbed by some over the years as "The Reluctant Republic", since it was felt that the solution really desired by the majority Greek Cypriots was union with Greece rather than independence, and that independence was "forced" on Makarios.

Those very early days were very interesting and exciting and even humorous as we approached independence. There was a story on the island that Makarios, by then the President-elect, and Turkish Cypriot Vice President-elect Fazil Kucuk realized rather late that they had not even thought of a flag. After all, every country had to have a flag on independence day, and they agreed on a temporary flag which was a sort of yellowish-clayish outline of the island on a white background with olive branches underneath. That was to be temporary, and they were to design a more appropriate flag later with their help of time. Nobody has yet designed another flag of Cyprus and that one is still used as the official flag.

I rode around Nicosia, the capital, a good bit on independence day, and I saw Greek flags in the Greek quarter and Turkish flags in the Turkish quarter. This is what a former governor referred to as "the flag nuisance" in Cyprus. Under the British occupation, the Greek Cypriots traditionally brought out the Greek flag on holidays, rather than the Union Jack. This tended to grate on British nerves but they never found a way to counter it.

Q: What was the feeling when you arrived in Cyprus, from your colleagues at the Embassy and in Washington, about where Cyprus was going. What was the feeling at the time?

MCCASKILL: There was actually widespread interest in Cyprus when it became independent. It was one of the first newly-independent small republics. With a population of 600,000 it was considered a very small country in those days, and there was considerable interest in seeing that it worked. Because of the long fight against the British and the fact that the problem was debated at such length in the UN, everybody knew where and what Cyprus was.

Our own interests were several: (1) to deny the Soviets access to the Mediterranean through Cyprus. There was a well organized Communist Party of 10,000 members on Cyprus and in 1960, this was of considerable concern to us. (2) to insure the continued function of US facilities -- our Federal Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS) facility, our relay facility, etc. -- on the island; (3) to insure the continued functioning of the British Sovereign Bases (SBAs) on the island; (4) to work to prevent Cyprus from disrupting the southeastern flank of NATO by becoming an issue between our NATO allies Greece and Turkey.

These are given in no particular order, though there was some preoccupation with the "communist threat" in Cyprus, and even President Kennedy was said to be taken with the island and the problem in the early days.

Q: FBIS is not a covert intelligence operation. We would monitor broadcasts, translate them, and then pass them out to anyone.

MCCASKILL: It is an overt monitoring service, and that particular location was highly effective for monitoring internal domestic broadcasts in the Soviet Union. It was said to be one of our most effective FBIS stations. Secondly, we had a tremendous radio relay station, only a relay point. Communication facilities were not as sophisticated as they are today. The relay station had direct lines to Washington. Messages would go, for example, from Beirut to Cyprus, off of one wire onto another for direct transmission to Washington. And then there was another facility referred to just as a station. I suppose it was an NSA facility.

Q: National Security Agency.

MCCASKILL: It was staffed when I was there by US Navy personnel because during the Greek Cypriot terrorist campaign against the British life became so tense that the Department had problems getting civilians to go there. We had a rather large complex of facilities and a very real interest in the island. We wanted to protect our interests and keep Cyprus from falling under Soviet influence. Remember that the Soviet fleet was active in the Mediterranean at the time, and our interests in Cyprus were real.

To show our interest we wanted to get off to a quick start. One possibility we had was a PL 480 program which we were able to justify on the basis of a drought of several years. It took some doing -- we did not even have a copy of PL 480 in the Embassy when we started talking about it with the Cypriots. A couple of AID types came over from Amman to help us out, and we drew up a program for 50,000 tons of wheat and barley. We gave it to Cyprus under Title II of PL 480. It was worth several million dollars and the Cypriots appreciated the gesture. The British had given Cyprus a golden handshake, really in return for the sovereign bases, and ours was the first assistance of any kind outside the British. We also began an Exchange Program and other USIS activities. And significantly, Makarios paid an official visit to Washington, and Vice President

Johnson paid a return visit to Cyprus. Two visits in the first couple of years of Cyprus's independence were proof of out interest in the island.

The Soviets had a tremendous diplomatic establishment in Nicosia, and we concluded that it was a regional Soviet base. They had an excellent Turkish language officer in their Embassy, and one or more Greek speakers.

Our Embassy was relatively small. The Ambassador, the DCM, a Political Officer, an Economic/Commercial Officer, and a rather large administrative section because we gave administrative support to FBIS, the relay base, etc. The station was composed of three officers and two clerical staff. But, as I said, the Embassy proper was very small.

Q: The Ambassador the whole time you were there was Fraser Wilkins, wasn't it?

MCCASKILL: All but about six months.

Q: One, how did he operate; and two, what was your impression about how he felt about Cyprus?

MCCASKILL: Ambassador Wilkins arrived in Nicosia in September, 1960. I do not know for sure, but looking back I believe his only instructions were to encourage the Cypriots to make London-Zurich work. I have recently read some declassified materials that would seem to indicate that Wilkins did not believe the Agency's reporting and did not seem convinced that trouble was on the horizon. I had heard this from some of the Agency people some time ago, but only recently have seen a few things indicating that it was indeed the case.

As I mentioned previously, it was suggested that we might use PL 480 as one of our instruments, but I am relatively sure nobody was looking at the possibility that London-Zurich would not work, nobody was doing any contingency thinking, let alone contingency planning. I think those were the Ambassador's instructions and I think he hewed to that line.

Q: When you were on your economic/commercial side, what were your main tasks?

MCCASKILL: Interestingly there was a fair amount of commercial work, inquiries, etc. Even in a population of 600,000, merchants were looking for new products to sell. And American firms were looking for business in Cyprus, which let it be known that it needed a new power plant and a small refinery. Remember that Cyprus was oriented toward the UK; on independence, people began to look elsewhere. The economy of Cyprus was not doing badly at independence. The income from the British bases was a significant factor in the economy; the "Golden Handshake" was a boost. I have forgotten the figures but the per capita income of Cyprus was much higher than that of Greece or Turkey. And there was great interest in the economy. Just before independence, it was announced that the UN would send a team out, under an eminent American economist, Dr. Willard Thorp, to draw up a five-year plan for Cyprus. The UN delegation consisted of several good economists so I drew on their expertise to some degree.

But there was not all that much pure economic work in a post that small, especially with the UN

team and our own AID mission, when they came in about a year, so I sort of gradually slipped over into political-type work, talking to people, getting out around the island, etc. Cyprus was a wonderful place to work, and access was easy. I still remember those days very warmly as among my best in the Service.

Q: What about your contacts with the Turkish side?

MCCASKILL: I had fairly good contacts on the Turkish side, but in truth the Greek Cypriots were the dominant business/commercial/banking forces in the island. To give you an example: I gave a party in the port city of Limassol, a sort of get-acquainted party. Limassol was the business capital of Cyprus, and instead of asking 50 or 60 people to drive to Nicosia, I gave the party in Limassol. Even in the business capital of the island it was difficult to find Turkish Cypriot businessmen of any significance. One of my best friends in Nicosia was a Turkish Cypriot who ran a well-known bookshop, but he was relative small scale then.

Q: You were saying there was a ten thousand-strong dedicated Communist Party which is really a very potent weapon. Ten thousand disciplined Communists in any place can be a problem. Did we have much contact, or feeling for what they were doing?

MCCASKILL: Yes, we had contact with them. The Political Officer had contact with them, and we would see them at parties occasionally. Makarios never considered them a danger. He was in many ways relatively naive politically. He considered them members of his Greek Cypriot flock, no danger to him. He actually made a deal with them in the first election. Makarios was not unopposed in the first election held just before independence, and he gave the Communists five seats in the first Parliament in return for their pledge not to oppose him. He felt in the final analysis that he could control them, that he really did not have to worry about them. I guess you could say that he actually was proven right. He seemed to think we overplayed "the threat". We were very conscious of them and their very strong labor union. To counter the communist union, we worked closely with the non-communist union and did what we could to strengthen them through grants, exchanges, etc.

Q: As the new republic began to take shape, what was CIA up to, what were they doing? Or was that beyond your camp?

MCCASKILL: You may remember that Agency reporting was distributed on a need-to-know basis, and since most of their reporting was political, I was not on distribution for their material. However, I knew the Agency people very well -- we were good friends in fact -- and while I did not see their reporting, I knew what they were talking about. The Chief of Station was also a good friend of mine. So while I was out of the loop officially, I was nonetheless privy to the substance of what they were sending to Washington.

One of the things that has haunted me about Cyprus, and continues to haunt me to this day, is that the Agency apparently was reporting that the island was going to blow up, that the two communities were arming themselves to the teeth, and that a blow-up was inevitable. In fact, in early 1963, the Chief of Station indicated his strong belief that the situation would blow before the end of the year. What haunts me is that if they were reporting this back to Washington,

wasn't anybody reading it? And why did we not do something to head off the crisis? In their book entitled Facing the Brink, reportedly based on Mr. Ball's papers, Edward Weintal and Charles Bartlett said something to the effect that it was "inconceivable" but true that no advance planning was done for the "predictable" Cyprus crisis. Mr. Ball says in his own book that the effort to maintain a balance between the two communities "was bound to fail".

So, based on all of this -- recognition that the Cyprus "experiment" was bound to fail, good CIA reporting, etc -- why did we do nothing to head it off? We admitted in retrospect that Cyprus was a very strategic piece of real estate between two NATO allies which alone should have pushed us to try to head off the "predictable" crisis. And of course this was on top of the fact that we had failed to recognize the problem for what it was in the 1950s, that is, simply another problem of a colonial people wanting self-determination. It was complicated by the fact that self-determination for the Greek Cypriots meant union with Greece. And the fact that 20% of the population was Turkish Cypriot made it even more difficult. However, we handled it poorly all along, and that is something else which has haunted me all these years. It is of more than passing interest to me, in looking at the problems in the area overall, that the Turkish Kurds constitute 20% of the population of Turkey, as the Turkish Cypriots were 20% of the population of Cyprus.

Q: Did you have any feeling about what the CIA -- I'm not trying to drag out dirty secrets- -but any feeling how the CIA types were getting their information? What were they seeing that you weren't seeing?

MCCASKILL: I have reason to believe that they had a very good source, very close to the government. Everybody knew everybody else in Cyprus, and after I became Cyprus Desk Officer and did read their reporting, I tried to figure out who the source was. I finally decided that it was A, B or C. I tried this on one of my old Agency friends from Cyprus, telling him that I never could figure out who that source was. "Who do you think it was?" he asked. I replied that I thought it was A, B or C. He replied laughingly that those were good guesses but that he could not tell me more than that. I now think I know who it was and it was indeed a very good source close to the center of things in Nicosia.

Q: What were you getting, both from Ambassador Wilkins and the rest of the Embassy who were dealing with it, and you yourself, about Makarios at the time, how effective he was, for example? What was your impression of how he was handling the situation?

MCCASKILL: I say with hindsight that the person most responsible for the failure of the London-Zurich Agreements was Makarios. While we recognized that he was determined to amend or revise the agreements, I am not sure we really knew how far he was prepared to go, and in truth Nancy Crawshaw, the British writer and authority on Cyprus, says that Makarios was taken aback by the reaction to his suggestions for constitutional amendment. The government was a presidential system, with, constitutionally, a president who was always Greek Cypriot and a Vice President who was always Turkish Cypriot. Of the ten cabinet ministers, 7 were Greek, 3 were Turkish. (Of course, Makarios gave the Turkish Cypriots the less important ministries, he thought, though it did not work out that way entirely.)

It bears mention that certainly in 1963, and maybe even earlier, Makarios thought he had UK support for constitutional reform. I myself accept that the Brits did indicate some support for

reform, and must perforce accept some of the blame for the blow-up. As a footnote, this is documented in Clerides's book.

With Makarios, one never knew where the line between president and priest came, since he continued to exercise such priestly duties as performing marriages, presiding at engagement ceremonies, baptizing children, etc.

Another thing that has bothered me in retrospect is that I think we never realized that, under his clerical robes, there was a Cyprus peasant priest. He was very shrewd, you might say cunning, but underneath he was a Paphos peasant who wanted to put the Turkish Cypriots in their places. He was determined from the very beginning to revise the constitution, even though the London-Zurich Agreements did not allow revision. The popular perception of Makarios was that he was a wise, intelligent, world figure who could hold his own on the world stage. I believe, as I said above, that he was a very shrewd village priest skilled in the way of the Byzantines, always pushing his adversary to the brink, but always with his eye on the prize, which was a Cyprus dominated and governed by the Greek Cypriot majority with adequate safeguards for the Turkish Cypriot minority,

Q: Was his determination to revise the constitution supported by most of the Greek community that you talked to? Were there real problems, or were there perceived problems with the Turkish minority?

MCCASKILL: While some Greek Cypriots may have been more moderate than others, all, deep in their hearts, felt that the Agreements were unfair and that the constitution needed revision. For all of its shortcomings, the London-Zurich Agreements could have worked with a modicum of good faith on both sides. I think, for example, if Makarios had given freely the 30% of the civil service to the Turkish Cypriots, if he had been more generous with the Turkish Cypriot community, it might have worked. The Turkish Cypriots were simply not up to partnership with the Greek Cypriots, and they would have been overwhelmed by the Greek Cypriots in time. I am speaking here of the long term. But in that regard we must remember that Cyprus became independent in 1960, 33 years ago. Who knows what might have evolved, peacefully, by now. I personally feel, as I may have said previously, that Cyprus would be a unitary state dominated by the majority Greek Cypriots.

The Turks were very aware of what London-Zurich had given them, and they would have opposed each Greek encroachment strenuously. But I still feel, that over time, the Greek Cypriots would have had things their way.

Q: I gather that it was a fairly submissive, not overly educated community. In other words, it did not have strong leadership?

MCCASKILL: The Turkish Cypriot community had one real leader, Rauf Denktash, very bright, very fast on his feet, and heads and shoulders above anybody else in the community. Fazil Kucuk was the nominal leader, but in truth Denktash had pushed Kucuk aside. I believe that, after the troubles started, no solution but partition was acceptable to Rauf Denktash, and the Greek Cypriots played right into his hands. In the late 1950s, the Turkish Cypriots had countered the

Greek demands for union with demands for partition. In fact, the Turkish Cypriots had traditionally taken that tack. So partition was not a new concept.

As I indicted previously, Denktash was very, very bright. He had been a Queen's Counsel, in Cyprus, and had tried some very delicate Greek Cypriot cases during the EOKA period, I think maybe the first cases of Greek Cypriots sentenced to hang. It is not beyond the realm of reason to assume that the British pushed him to the fore in the Turkish Cypriot community. It is the kind of thing the UK did throughout the former colonies.

Q: Did you have the feeling that the Greek Government in Athens was meddling in Cyprus's affairs?

MCCASKILL: On the contrary, Athens was carefully trying to distance itself from Cyprus in those early days after independence. The two Greek Ambassadors during that four years were highly able career men who were apparently under instructions to try to make London-Zurich work. At least one of them, to my knowledge, would become very irritated with Makarios's headstrong ways, and I personally heard him talking about Makarios in very uncomplimentary terms at a cocktail party. I thought, in fact, that his remarks on that occasion bordered on indiscretion. When Makarios was hellbent on constitutional reform, then Greek Foreign Minister Evangelos Averoff wrote him a rather strong letter advising against such a move. Averoff himself told me once in Athens when I was last stationed there that those first three years of Cyprus's independence were "a real honeymoon" between Greece and Turkey. Averoff blamed Makarios for the blow-up, and made no effort to hide his resentment concerning the way things had gone. In that regard, the London-Zurich Agreements were concluded when Averoff was Foreign Minister, so he had a personal stake in seeing them work.

Q: What about Grivas and the other EOKA people? Where were they?

MCCASKILL: Grivas had left the island by that time. I can't remember just when but he left after the Agreements were signed. He went to Athens where he formed a political party, I believe, and fell flat on his face. He did not go back to the island until 1964, after the troubles had started again. Many of the original EOKA fighters had been taken into Makarios's government, many of them as members of the Parliament.

Q: How did the blow-up happen? How did you and other in the Embassy see this thing? Give us some personal accounts.

MCCASKILL: We had good information from the Agency that both sides were arming, were forming paramilitary units to oppose the expected attacks of the other. That both communities were arming has been confirmed by Glafcos Clerides, the present President of Cyprus, in his book entitled My Deposition. The Greeks had even begun patrols around the Turkish quarter of Nicosia, under the leadership of the Minister of Interior, a former EOKA fighter and real gunman. Apparently the Greek Cypriots had information that the Turks had received several shipments of rifles that they were going to distribute. Each side knew the other was arming and tension was escalating between them.

On the night of December 22, 1963, a Turkish Cypriot car with four Turkish Cypriots in it was returning to the Turkish quarter. They were actually in the red light district of Nicosia, a sort of no man's land between the two quarters, though in thinking about it I guess the red light district could not, per se, be a "no-man's land". Anyway, the Turks were stopped by a group of Greek Cypriot policemen and ordered out of the car. Shooting ensued -- who knows who fired the first shot -- two or three Turkish Cypriots were killed and a Greek Cypriot policeman was killed. That started it. An incident like that started it.

We were having a party that night; it was the day before our wedding anniversary and we were having some friends from the Embassy in for dinner. We went ahead with the party despite the fact that the tension all over town was unlike anything I had ever experienced, an almost warlike-atmosphere all over town. Houses were shuttered up, traffic was at a minimum, there was a feeling that people were preparing for something.

A Turkish Cypriot Embassy driver who helped at parties was to work at our house that night. He stopped by about 5:00 p.m. to say he could not work: he may have been exaggerating, but he told me that if he were not shot coming out of the Turkish quarter, he would be shot going back in. He was obviously terrified. He got back into the Turkish quarter all right and I did not see him for three or four months. He could not come to work, and I made arrangements to go into the Turkish quarter one day three or four months later and see him.

We made it through the party and our guests got home safely. The next day, a Sunday, December 23, dawned clear and tense. I will never forget the tension throughout town. Nobody moved. People were obviously hunkered down. A firefright broke out in the early evening about a mile as the crow flies from my house. You could smell the gunsmoke in my yard. The whole staff headed over to the Embassy, though I can't remember what we did except to try to get a handle on the situation and report it to Washington. Everybody on the staff seemed to realize that that was the beginning of what would be a very bad period.

I can't remember the details, but I know that we went on to a sort of war-time footing, certainly an emergency footing. We set up an Operations Room (I think that's what we called it) which followed events closely and began regular sitreps to the Department. Our DCM was on home leave at the time, so we were missing one of our substantive staff. This threw some burden on the rest of us. As I recall, the Political Officer, the Consular Officer and I manned the Control Room; the Consular Officer and I did a good part of it. It is my recollection that I actually drafted many, if not most, of the SitReps. We were working long, hard hours, with almost no time out even for Christmas dinner. For a time, we were working around the clock.

An interesting note: we had, to my knowledge, three overflights of two planes each by the Turkish Air Force in the period right around Christmas. In a Security Council meeting of December 26 or thereabouts, the Turks denied all but one of the overflights, and I believe the Turkish Ambassador in Washington denied the reports when he was called in by Assistant Secretary Phil Talbot. The Department instructed us to be very careful in reporting overflights, but there was no doubt in the minds of many of us that overflights had occurred. Who else would be breaking the sound barrier over Nicosia in fighter planes with red markings?

Ambassador Wilkins and the Acting British High Commissioner, Cyril Pickard, were very active in trying to dampen things down and work out a cease fire. (The British High Commissioner was in England when the trouble broke, for reasons I cannot recall.) The city had rapidly become divided, as the Turkish Cypriots withdrew into what was obviously a preconceived position in the northern part of Nicosia in the direction of the small port of Kyrenia on the north coast. Information available to us indicated that their emergency planning called for them to take the Kyrenia road as far as the pass in the Kyrenia mountains, since Turkish relief for the Turkish Cypriots would come through the north and into Nicosia through the Kyrenia pass. That is in fact what happened in 1974 when the Turks invaded. The northern coast of Cyprus was only 40 miles from the Turkish mainland and that was the logical route for an invasion force.

But right away the city became divided, a sort of miniature Berlin. Sir Duncan Sandys, I believe Commonwealth Secretary at the time, came out to try to help keep the situation under control and cobble together a cease fire. The Green Line, the line dividing the two communities, came into being when a British army officer engaged in the peace efforts drew a line on the map with a green crayon. The Green Line stands to this day, though it has undergone some changes in the 30 years since it was drawn.

One time, Ambassador Wilkins was returning from the Turkish quarter where he had gone on official business, and he was stopped at a checkpoint and some young punk, a member of one of the paramilitary groups roaming the city, pointed a gun at the Ambassador's head. Ambassador Wilkins never confirmed that story to me, but I have always believed it. It gives a little of the atmosphere in the city at the time.

Q: You were saying you all were working around the clock . What were you, as an Embassy, doing?

MCCASKILL: As I said, we were manning the Operations Center, reporting developments on the island in as great detail as we could. Remember that the possibility of war between Greece and Turkey seemed very possible and we were doing anything, everything we could to dampen down the situation to avoid Turkish action. We wanted the Department and Athens and Ankara to be as fully informed as possible since they were working as hard as we to avoid any further tragic developments. All Embassy staff reported everything they heard to us for reporting and we reported up everything we got.

Q: Other than reporting were we playing any role?

MCCASKILL: Of course. Ambassador Wilkins was in touch with the government all along. For example, there was a reported sighting of a Turkish flotilla off the northern coast of Cyprus. This was the sort of thing that could have provoked a reaction from the Greeks; it terrorized the people on the north coast, including some of our FBIS people. It was assumed of course that the Turks were headed toward Cyprus. The Embassy checked this out with Washington, which checked it with Ankara, and we were able to tell the Greeks and Greek Cypriots that it was only a "Turkish exercise". Of course, it was gunboat diplomacy, a show of force, but we played a key role in reassuring the Greeks and Greek Cypriots that they were not under immediate threat from the Turks.

When we received that word, the Ambassador went to the Presidential Palace to inform Makarios. He could not find Makarios so delivered the message to some of his people there. When the Ambassador twitted Makarios about this later, the Archbishop said he figured that if the Turks were determined to invade, there was nothing he could do to stop it so he said his prayers and went to bed.

But that was the kind of thing we could do: act as middle man between the Turks and Greeks, and try to put out the fires as best we could.

Q: Were you getting much from out embassies in Athens and Ankara? Did they appear to have "gone local", as some of our embassies have been accused of doing? Or did you find reporting from there pretty professional?

MCCASKILL: I think we found them very professional. They were advising caution and restraint, certainly in Ankara. In Ankara Ambassador Hare was advising the Turks not to do anything precipitously because we did have reports from Ankara that the Turkish military was very steamed up about how Turkish Cypriots were getting killed. There was one awful incident that understandably aroused the Turks: a Turkish army officer's wife -- remember that there was a Turkish army contingent on the island in conformity with the Treaty of Alliance -- and three children took refuge in the bathtub, where they were found by some Greek Cypriot paramilitary forces and killed right where they had tried to hide. Pictures of the bodies were circulated in Cyprus and on the mainland, and according to reports, really got the Turkish military steamed up. So the Turkish government needed to be cautioned to exercise restraint. The reporting from Ambassador Hare was, as would be expected, very professional and very helpful. There were three very real invasion scares in the space of several months. One was the last week of December; one on Friday, March 13, 1964; (I remember well because I was the Embassy duty officer; Ambassador Hare really thought they were coming then); and one was in June. when the so-called Johnson-Inonou letter was sent to Ankara calling off the Turks in very blunt terms.

Q: When did you leave Cyprus?

MCCASKILL: I didn't leave until July, so I was there for seven months of the emergency.

Q: During that seven months, what were the main things you were doing and experiencing?

MCCASKILL: Well, we were reporting on what was going on, as I have mentioned. I did not do a lot of economic reporting during the seven months after the troubles started, since it was difficult to focus on it when the island was threatening to go up in smoke. I was doing more political work, getting out and talking to people.

It was interesting how the violence spread from town to town. I have forgotten the precise sequence, but it started in Nicosia, and went from there to Limassol; from there it hopped over to Paphos; then to Famagusta, and finally to Larnaca.

The United Nations PeaceKeeping Force in Cyprus, known popularly by its acronym UNFICYP,

came in March, and we followed its progress as it settled in. In addition to the peacekeeping force, two high ranking UN officials came to the island about the same time: the UN Mediator, Former Finnish Prime Minister Sakari Tuomioja, and the Secretary General's Special Representative on the island, former Ecuadoran President, Mr. Galo Plaza. There was also a UN police contingent. We kept in touch with all of these organizations and people, exchanging information and views in order to broaden our understanding of the situation.

Q: While you were there, was it true that the Greek military was beginning to get involved again?

MCCASKILL: Yes. This became known to us in the summer of 1960. Before I left the Greeks had started putting troops on the island surreptitiously because they felt that if the Turks took action, Greece would be at a marked disadvantage. The Greeks were, in effect, trying to get a jump on the situation. I would have to check the numbers, but they stayed until the confrontation of 1967 when Athens agreed to withdraw them. It is interesting that they went in in 1964, when George Papandreou was in office.

Q: Were you hearing about it?

MCCASKILL: Yes, the Agency was getting reports on it, but the troops were pretty well hidden up in the hills, in restricted areas. The Greeks and Greek Cypriots did a good job keeping it quiet, bringing the troops in at night, drawing the curtains on the buses, etc.

Q: By the time you left, what was your feeling, and that of the rest of the Embassy, about whither Cyprus?

MCCASKILL: When I left the island I think the general feeling in the Embassy was that the situation could not go on for long. The Turkish Cypriots were suffering some privation. Fresh vegetables and seafood were limited in the Turkish quarter because of travel restrictions on the community; a friend of mine who had been a ranking officer in the Ministry of Agriculture told me that they received only two gallons of gasoline a week. This same friend said that he felt "terribly hemmed in", with no place to go.

Make no mistake about it: the Turkish Cypriots were under siege. They had only two telephone lines in and out of the Turkish quarter at one time. Their electricity and water were never cut, simply because cooler heads on the Greek side knew that such drastic action would bring Turkey in for sure and prevailed on the more radical elements.

When I told one good friend goodbye, the day before I left the island, I honestly felt that they could not hold out another six to eight months. And there, of course, was one of our basic mistakes. I think my view was held by many people, but we were obviously wrong. I see in retrospect that the Turkish Cypriots, with Turkey's support, were prepared to sit there until hell froze over. But I think many of us felt that the Turkish Cypriots would, within several months, probably fold up. One mistake we Americans make in diplomacy is to think in short terms; in the Middle East, a year is as a day, or something like that, and things move slowly, slowly.

Q: Was there a feeling that the Turkish Government could not stand by and watch them fold up?

MCCASKILL: When I say "fold up", I think we were thinking that they would come to terms with the Greek Cypriots, decide that anything was better than the way they were living, and just decide to live together again on the Greek Cypriots' terms, that is, with the Greek Cypriots as the majority, the Turkish Cypriots as the minority with certain safeguards.

One of the primary goals of the United States then was to avoid seeing Turkey humiliated. We simply would not stand by and see Turkey humiliated by a settlement. The Turks knew that, of course, and they exploited it for all it was worth. This has become institutionalized in the Department, I believe, and this attitude, perhaps modified over the years, continues until today.

In the spring of 1964, there was a rumor in the Turkish quarter that we were considering an exchange of populations settlement. I am sure this was kicked around in the Department but I do not know that it ever reached the Seventh Floor. Our reply to inquiries concerning solutions was that we would support any solution arrived at by the parties. We were obviously very much involved in the search for a solution -- i. e., the Acheson mission in the summer of 1964 -- though we would have denied that we would try to force a settlement on the parties.

I have wondered over the years if the Cyprus Problem were not a Muslim-Christian problem, and I am not sure that is not at the root of it. I could never satisfactorily explain why people who otherwise seemed normal would want to go out and wantonly kill their fellow islanders.

Q: Look at what is happening today, in 1993, in Yugoslavia particularly. Ethnicity is such a strong, strong force that it permeates everything. And this seems true of some of the Muslims, who carry the virus on many grounds. At least they make the ground fertile.

MCCASKILL: I just wanted to make one last point before we break, and that is that there seemed to be a sort of lemming instinct in Cyprus. Certainly the Greek Cypriots seemed hellbent on self-destruction. We used to talk about this in the Embassy and agreed that it was true.

Q: This is September 21, 1993. You said you wanted to add something about the Ball visit and how the system worked?

MCCASKILL: Under Secretary Ball came to Cyprus in mid-February (1964) with a peace plan, accompanied by Mr. Sisco, then Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, Ambassador Jack Jernegan, an old NEA/GTI hand who was then a Deputy Assistant Secretary for NEA, and I believe a Mr. Greenfield, who was Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs. Mr. Ball apparently decided during the trip that the problem required a change in Ambassadors, and after his return, Ambassador Wilkins was called home on consultation.

We learned soon after he left that then FSO-2 Taylor G. (Toby) Belcher who, you remember, had been Consul General in Nicosia from 1957 to 1960, was coming out to "cover" in Ambassador Wilkins' absence, a most unusual sort of move. The DCM, who had returned from home leave, was pushed aside and was understandably irate, since this didn't say much for the Department's confidence in him. Toby told us in a staff meeting that he would actually be the new Ambassador. But it was an embarrassing situation, for Wilkins, for Toby, and for the DCM. The

Department was late in getting Toby's orders to return to Washington to him, so he was still in Nicosia when Wilkins arrived back. We had, at one time, Ambassador Wilkins, "Ambassador-Designate" Belcher and a DCM, all there together. To say it was a bit awkward is putting it mildly, and the Department handled it very, very poorly.

On the action side, in early February a bomb exploded at the Embassy and Ambassador Wilkins rather quickly ordered the evacuation of all dependents. It was a controversial move, but he announced it on Cyprus television the evening after the bomb exploded and he could not back down. Whether we should have evacuated would probably still be argued among those of us who were there. Not all of the Embassy wives had left by the time Mr. Ball arrived and I heard that he was furious that some were still there and gave the remaining dependents just a few days to leave. My own wife and sons were among those who had not left and as I remember they had about two days to get packed and get a booking home. I felt then and still feel that evacuation was probably not called for at that time, but in truth there was a large American community -- communications dependents, etc. -- and I think Ambassador Wilkins felt personally responsible for them all.

Q: You came back to the Cyprus Desk where you served from 1964 to 1967?

MCCASKILL: Actually I was assigned to NE/E at first. In those days there were four offices in the old NEA Bureau: the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (NE); the Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs (GTI), where the Cyprus Desk was located; the Office of South Asian Affairs (SOA), which included India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka; and an Office of Regional Affairs. I was assigned to the economics section of NE and I worked on Arab/Israel economic affairs for about six months. Gordon King, the Cyprus Desk Officer and a friend of mine, wanted to make a change and left to go to the Peace Corps.

When I went to GTI, every Desk Officer in the office had served in the country for which he was responsible or otherwise had experience in the area: I had served in Cyprus for four years and my number two had served in Turkey; the Turkish Desk Officer and his assistant had both served in Turkey; both officers on the Greek Desk had served in Greece, and both of those on the Iranian Desk had served in Iran.

Q: A very strong office.

MCCASKILL: We thought so at the time. The Office Director herself had actually served in Greece, Turkey and Iran.

Q: Who was that?

MCCASKILL: Kay Bracken. I think she was an FSO-1 at the time. Her deputy, John Howison, had served in Iran and I believe Turkey. So we had a tremendous amount of area expertise in GTI. I think those two years in GTI may have been among my most enjoyable in my 35 years in the Service.

Q: While you were on the Cyprus Desk, what were the main issues you had to deal with?

MCCASKILL: The main issue, of course, was the Cyprus Problem and a solution for it. We had very knowledgeable people not only in GTI but in all of Washington. I felt at the time that there was probably as much Cyprus expertise in Washington as there was in any capital. We spent an inordinate amount of time "looking for a solution", trying to get a mix that we thought would fly. We were an ad hoc kind of group: we had coffee together, we had lunch together, we took a walk after lunch during the day, all the time bouncing ideas off each other.

A corollary was keeping the Greeks and Turks apart. The UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus was a relatively large force when it came into being in March, 1964, 6-7,000 men.

I might digress to tell you an interesting anecdote. Dr. Ralph Bunche, the Number Two in the UN, visited the island in March, 1964 to see the problem for himself and report to the Secretary General. At his departure statement he said that he was glad that he had come to Cyprus to see this "incoherent war" for himself, since one could not always understand it from New York. However, he went on, once in Cyprus, one could not always believe what one saw. I still have the clipping reporting his press conference and even started a paper one time entitled "The Incoherent War", giving Dr. Bunche the credit for the very apt description of the situation.

Cyprus was obviously getting top billing, with a Bunche visit, and the appointment of Mr. Tuomioja and Mr. Galo Plazo, both of whom I have mentioned.

To get back to my original point, another focus of our activity was keeping the Greeks and Turks apart with the help of the United Nations.

Q: There wasn't a real line was there? I mean there were Turkish villages and Greek villages all intermingled.

MCCASKILL: There was the line in Nicosia which I have mentioned known as "The Green Line". There were fairly clear dividing lines in all the five towns, where the Turkish Cypriots had withdrawn into the Turkish quarter for security reasons. But in the countryside, there were still some mixed villages. There was not much interchange between the two communities, and even the villages were divided to some extent, but not to the degree the towns were divided.

Q: You were saying you were sitting around with your colleagues trying to find a solution. Was there any consensus? I mean, what did you feel were some of your options, and what were the thoughts at the expert level?

MCCASKILL: It's hard to remember what some of those were. One of our first approaches was to try to find out precisely what Turkey wanted so that we could work with them from there. We had the problem of trying to find a solution that included ironclad safeguards for the Turkish community. I think we believed that the Turks could not hope to regain their "equal community" status they had gotten from London-Zurich.

I have wondered over the years where the "equal community" concept came from and have concluded that it was an outgrowth of the old Ottoman millet system, when the Ottomans

administered minority communities in the Ottoman Empire through the community heads. In Cyprus, for example, the head of the Greek Cypriot community was the Ethnarch, who happened to be the Archbishop of the Church of Cyprus at the time. All taxes, administrative decrees, etc., directed at his community, were administered through him.

Our task was to find some balance that would satisfy the Greeks and the Turks, with security the first consideration. We got some indication of the Turks' requirements out of the Ankara, four or five things that all meant the same thing: no domination of one community by the other, equal participation of both communities in the government, and that sort of thing. The Turks spoke about "not upsetting the balance of the Treaty of Lausanne in the area" but one hears little of that out of Ankara since Turkey itself upset the balance with its invasion in 1974.

We spent a lot of time working on this. We considered such things as territorial compensation for the Turks if the island were united with Greece. For example, former Secretary Acheson's mission in the summer of 1964 envisaged a permanent Turkish base on the island. This was unacceptable to the Greeks; when it was scaled down to a long-term lease base for the Turks, they rejected that. In looking back, it may have been impossible to find the right package at that time. And that itself is meaningful, that is, "the right package at the right time", since timing was extremely important.

Q: Was the general feeling that the Greeks would not treat the Turks kindly if they got control?

MCCASKILL: I'm not sure that feeling was prevalent. I think there was a feeling among the working level types that it should be a "Greek Cypriot solution". The Greeks were, after all, 80-82% of the population. I think that we all felt that it had to be a majority rule. The precedent in Greece led us to believe that the Greeks would not, could not, persecute the Turks without fear of intervention from Turkey. Still, the Greeks looked upon the Turks as the hewers of wood and drawers of water, and would not be happy until they were firmly relegated to that status. The Greek Cypriots, like all Greeks everywhere, felt themselves culturally superior to the Turks, and would find it difficult to accord the Turks anything but minority status.

Q: I've heard people come back and say, when all is said and done, that the Greeks really aren't very nice to the Turks.

MCCASKILL: Let me answer that with an anecdote. When I gave the party in Limassol I referred to previously, I was standing at the door of the restaurant greeting my guests. I was chatting with a Greek Cypriot businessman from a rather prominent family, when another guest approached. When the man was within earshot, the Greek Cypriot said to me "Oh, Mr. McCaskill, here comes Mr. So-and-So. He's a good Turk." I thought that if I had been that Turkish Cypriot I would have hated that Greek Cypriot's guts. Mind you, if the shoe had been on the other foot the same attitude might have prevailed.

Q: Did you think it could be solved?

MCCASKILL: I think I did then. I must have. I was told one time by a colleague, who was then Political Counselor in Ankara, that I never "gave up". So I must have thought so then. I've

become jaded over these 30 years. I've lost some of the enthusiasm I had then, but I can only believe that I must have thought so at the time.

Q: What was the thinking in the higher reaches of NEA, and even further up in the Department about Cyprus. Was this just a pain in the neck, fouling up NATO? Also how was Makarios viewed?

MCCASKILL: Cyprus had top level attention in the Department from late 1963 for several years. There was some commitment on the Seventh Floor, where our efforts were led by Mr. Ball, that Cyprus would not be allowed to destroy NATO. Mr. Ball himself tried to put a solution together, again determined not to let Cyprus ruin NATO. It is hard for me today to remember the amount of very high-level this problem, which seems small potatoes when compared to the Balkans, was getting.

I have mentioned our concern with the Communist menace. I don't think I mentioned that three of the five mayors in the island were Communists. I mentioned the large Soviet mission. Cyprus was disrupting NATO; the southeast flank was impaired by Cyprus. President Kennedy, before his death, felt we should do something, though I never saw what he wanted to do spelled out.

Makarios was looked upon back in Washington as a very unsavory, untrustworthy, unpredictable man, and, I might add, very uncooperative. That was in part because he had taken Cyprus into the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961, looking ahead to the time when he would need Non-Aligned support in the UN. Mr. Ball had a very bad impression of Makarios, regarding him as very slippery (though he referred to Makarios once as one of the most intelligent people he had ever dealt with.) Mr. Ball never really understood that Makarios was a genuine Byzantine. Andreas Papandreou referred to Makarios once as a "tribal chieftain." I don't remember where I got the impression, but to recall that President Kennedy and Makarios got along very well during the Archbishop's official visit to Washington. This is in fact another example of the attention being given to Cyprus. Kennedy told him, much to Makarios's chagrin, I assume, that he thought the London-Zurich Agreements were about the best he could get and that he should in effect grin and bear it.

People back here did mistrust Makarios a great deal. He was not yet, at that time, known as "the Red Priest" or "the Red Archbishop", or the Castro of the Mediterranean". This mistrust carried over to the Kissinger days.

Q: In an interview with Bill Crawford, regarding the meeting of Kissinger and Makarios in the elevator, Kissinger remarked that "In person, Your Beatitude, you're really very charming." Makarios looked at him and said, "It only lasts a little while."

MCCASKILL: Actually, a man who knew Makarios very well, Patroclos Stavrou, told me that Makarios was at heart a royalist. Peter Ramsbottam, the British High Commissioner in Cyprus back a number of years ago, said the same thing in an article he wrote. Stavrou told me that Makarios had pictures of the King and Queen in his bedroom, and that if Makarios were anything, he was a royalist. He was a Cypriot royalist, if we believe these two men who knew him well. He was on fairly good terms with Greek King Constantine, Greece's last king, though I

can't remember whether it was Stavrou who told me that or Ramsbottam who mentioned it in his article.

Q: From your vantage point, what were our priorities in that part of the world? Obviously we were concerned about the Soviets, and worried about the southeast flank of NATO. In the Greco-Turkish relationship, we always had to observe a kind of balance. I always had the feeling that Turkey really was the military leader, and we just had to sort of keep the Greeks happy for its real estate, but not much else. What was your feeling?

MCCASKILL: As I mentioned earlier, I think our tilt toward Turkey has become institutionalized over the years. I can well understand the military/security priority given to Turkey: its control of the Straits, its long land border with the then-Soviet Union, etc. You only have to go through the Straits as a tourist -- as I have -- to recognize their strategic value over the centuries. But the Turks have exploited their advantages, as I have said before, and this was always a matter of great chagrin to the Greeks.

The Greeks traditionally point to the fact that they fought with us in both world wars (while Turkey did not), that they have a big Greek-American community here, and on and on. But down deep, I think they have come to accept it. Karamanlis and Andreas Papandreu have both said publicly that "the road from Athens to Washington passes through Ankara" or something like that. A Greek Foreign Minister, addressing a group of American visitors some years ago, said that if, for the sake of discussion, we accorded Greek and Turkish membership in NATO a weight of 100, Turkey would be 65 of that and Greece would be 35. But, he said, if Greece should withdraw from NATO, Turkey by itself would not be able to carry the whole load, and would not be weighted at 65 by itself.

Over the years, Turkey has created the perception that it is the more dependable ally, due in large part to the influence of the American military. But I wonder if this would bear close scrutiny. For example, I have heard, but never confirmed, that Turkey would not permit us to use our bases in Turkey when we were mounting the effort to free our hostages in Iran. Secondly, Turkey would not allow us to use our bases for the re-supply of our people in Lebanon in 1982-83. And there have been three military governments in Turkey since 1960, though Washington Turkologists are quick to point out that Turkish military governments are "different" in that the Turkish military mounts coups to preserve democracy!! I cite all of these things because the Greeks are aware of them and it intensifies their chagrin at what they regard as Turkey's favored position in Washington.

The ratio in military assistance was set at 10 to 7, I believe in 1976, though I am not sure whether it is still in effect. As I remember it, in 1976, a multi-year agreement was negotiated with both Greece and Turkey, but never signed, giving Turkey 1 billion dollars worth of assistance, and 7 hundred million to Greece, an obvious ratio of 10-7. The Greeks grabbed on to this, since it enabled them to maintain some parity with Turkey, which had suffered somewhat from the arms embargo following the invasion of Cyprus in 1974. The Greeks felt that 10-7 was to their advantage, and fought to keep it in effect. As I noted, I do not know whether we still adhere to it, but I think that we do not.

Q: What about the Greek Lobby when you were on the Desk? How did they affect you at that time?

MCCASKILL: The Greek Lobby really was mobilized only after the invasion in 1974. They were not a political force when I was on the Desk, though AHEPA and the Archbishop were not averse to throwing their weight around if they thought it would be helpful.

Q: Were there certain Congressmen, particularly of Greek ancestry, sort of on you? Or was that a fairly benign period?

MCCASKILL: It was a benign period, as far as that was concerned. We had other worries, of course, that arose when Greece and Turkey almost went to war in 1967 and Secretary Vance went to the area to promote a settlement.

Q: I can't remember which happened first, Vance going out or the April 1967 coup? Which happened first?

MCCASKILL: The coup occurred first.

Q: Were you on the Desk at that time:

MCCASKILL: I was on the Desk when the coup took place.

Q: Could you talk about how that came? I'm sure you must have been involved and what were the reactions to it?

MCCASKILL: Much of this is hazy to me, because we Cyprus types were not directly involved. The Greek Country Directorate, as it had become in 1966, had primary responsibility under the direct supervision of the Assistant Secretary and the Deputy Assistant Secretary. The coup occurred on April 21, 1967. Greece had been terribly unstable politically since Karamanlis resigned in 1963. You may recall that he had some difficulties with the palace over an official visit of Queen Frederika and her daughter Sophia to Britain. The Greek constitution required that the royal family had to secure permission of the government before any member of the Royal Family could travel abroad. There was a rather famous old Greek Communist, Tony Ambatielos, who had been imprisoned by Greece during the war and who, after his release, was still involved in anti-government activity.

Ambatielos's wife Betty, who I believe was British, was quite active in Britain, particularly in anti-Greek demonstrations, etc. She threatened, with considerable support from communist/leftist groups, to demonstrate again Frederika and Sophia if they visited Britain. I've forgotten the details of the trip, but I believe the British Royal Family had invited Frederika, and I have forgotten why Frederika was so determined to go. But the Karamanlis Government refused to give her permission. She went anyway, there were demonstrations against her, and she and Sophia on one occasion had literally to run from a mob. Karamanlis resigned over the issue -- I believe in July of 1963. A caretaker government was formed, elections were held in November, 1963, and George Papandreou obtained a plurality. Since he did not have a working majority, he

took a chapter from John Diefenbaker's book and right away dissolved the Parliament and called new elections in February 1964. Papandreou and his liberal party won a good working. I've forgotten what they called the party by then but it was essentially the old Liberal Party.

George Papandreou governed until 1965 when the great "apostasia" occurred: enough of Papandreou's deputies were bought off -- and I mean that literally -- to bring his government down and from then until the coup in 1967 Greece was in a period of great political instability. There was a succession of weak governments until elections were finally called for May 1967.

It soon became clear that Papandreou was running very, very strong and would probably win. It was being bandied about that if Papandreou were indeed elected, a coup would take place. This centered for the most part on speculation concerning the so-called "palace coup" or "generals' coup", a coup by a group of high-ranking Greek officers with palace blessing. When the coup finally took place, on April 21, 1967, it was led by three colonels: Papadopoulos, who emerged later as the real brains of the group; Pattakos; and Makarezos. They were unknown in Washington. I called a contact in Langley the morning the coup occurred and asked who Papadopoulos was. My interlocutor professed not to know, though I think in retrospect that he was probably dissembling with me.

Q: Colonel Papadopoulos was on their payroll at one time but there are a lot of Papadopouloses.

MCCASKILL: But it is a fact that my contact told me, and as nearly as I can remember his words, "We don't know who he is." Let me repeat that we thought that if there were a coup, it would be a palace coup at least with palace blessing. And Embassy Athens was doing what it could to head off that possibility. When it came, it was a real shock here. I would like to say again that the Cyprus people were on the fringes of what was going on -- we worked closely with the Greek people, of course -- and some of my recollections of this period are hazy.

Q: What was our feeling? I mean once the word came, what were you all doing in NEA in your particular office?

MCCASKILL: I think, first, that we -- NEA -- were trying to figure out who these guys were and what we might expect from them. And, of course, recovering from the shock of a military coup in a NATO country. I learned later, from Merle Miller's biography entitled Lyndon that there was some concern in the American academic community that Andreas Papandreou, whom the junta had imprisoned, would be shot. At J. K. Galbraith's request, Johnson intervened and whether or not that was decisive, Papandreou was obviously not shot. When the exercise was over, Johnson sent a message to Galbraith through Nicholas Katzenbach that "I've told those Greek bastards to lay off that sonofabitch, whoever he is." Papandreou told this story himself sometime when I was last in the Embassy.

But what the Department was doing, as I recall, was trying to determine who was in charge, what had happened to the democratic process in Greece, whether our old friends in Greece were in any danger, whether people were being arrested and imprisoned, and so on.

Q: Was there concern about the NATO side of things at that time or was it felt that this was going to be pretty much an internal thing and this wasn't going to affect Greece internationally?

MCCASKILL: As I have indicated, I am a bit hazy on much of this. Certainly as I said before, we were concerned that a military coup had taken place in a NATO country. Andreas Papandreou has always said that the colonels used a NATO plan at the base of their own plans. It was considered a very efficient coup as coups go. It was boom-boom and all over and done pretty quickly. I can't remember when the question of recognition came up. The question of military shipments came up -- whether these would continue.

I think history has established that what triggered the coup was the fear of the election of George Papandreou and the role of Andreas in the Papandreou Government. You recall that Andreas had returned to Greece in 1959, and had immediately gotten into politics with his father. The Greek military had a deep-seated fear and mistrust of Andreas. It was the perception among the military that if George were elected -- and it was increasingly apparent that he would be -- Andreas would have a key role in the government. The military felt that that would be disastrous for Greece.

Let me give you an example of the influence he had on his father. You recall that Dean Acheson had been asked by George Ball to go to Switzerland in the summer of 1964 to help the parties work out a solution to the Cyprus Problem. He was in fact there for several weeks. This resulted in what has come to be known as the Acheson Plan for Cyprus, generally regarded as an enosis solution, with Cyprus going to Greece in return for the Turkish base I referred to earlier, first in perpetuity, secondly on a 99 year lease.

When I was last stationed in Athens from 1979 to 1983, I heard from two people who were in a position to know -- one of them in Papandreou's cabinet -- that Papandreou was prepared to accept the Acheson Plan. According to one version I heard, Papandreou actually informed the cabinet meeting one evening that he was prepared to accept. Then Makarios got to Andreas, Andreas got to his father, and the Prime Minister reversed his decision. There is little doubt that he did have considerable influence on his father. I believe that Christopher Woodhouse, in his little book The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, mentions that Andreas persuaded his father to back away for support for the Acheson Plan.

There was fear in the Greek military that Andreas was "leftist", "radical", etc. Papadopoulos and his cohorts were all rabidly anti-communist, actually more than a little unbalanced; they were men who had earned their bars fighting in the communist guerrilla war. I think it is true that a man of Andreas's stripe could have so aroused their fears and suspicions that they took the ultimate extreme of implementing a military coup against the legitimate government of Greece.

Q: What was the reaction from the Cyprus Desk? Here were some ultra nationalists, known to be super nationalists. You were sitting on a powder keg. What was your concern about Cyprus with this new crew in there?

MCCASKILL: We were concerned about how they would move, as indeed they did in 1974. Greek Army officers in general were always dedicated to enosis, the union of Cyprus with

Greece. They also had a deep mistrust of Makarios, whom they considered "red". There was a meeting in Alexandroupolis, near the Greek-Turkish border, to try to negotiate an enosis solution. There were other meetings with the Turks where they tried to negotiate an enosis solution, a rather serious effort in Madrid. Makarios was repulsed by the very idea of a military coup, and was as suspicious of the colonels as they were of him. He, Makarios, knew they would try to negotiate a settlement of the problem with the Turks and impose it on the island.

Q: Were the plans for enosis that they were talking to the Turks on of a practical nature did you feel? Was there any chance of anything"

MCCASKILL: I would have to go back and check the provisions of various negotiations. I have the recollection that the Greeks were surprised that the Turks did not accept the proposals. Toby Belcher always said that the greatest mistake we made with Makarios was in thinking we -- meaning Greece, Turkey, the UK, the US, NATO -- could impose a solution on the island. Toby felt, and history proved him right, that Makarios would find a way to scuttle any such efforts. The failure of London-Zurich is itself proof of this, since as I said before, it was Makarios who engineered the scuttling of the Agreements.

Q: What was our reaction as the Papadopoulos regime was beginning to settle in? It was obviously very anti-democratic and aroused an awful lot of opposition, certainly within the European intellectual community, and somewhat within the American academic world. How long were you dealing in NEA at that point?

MCCASKILL: Actually I left Cyprus Affairs in the summer of 1967, shortly after the coup occurred. I was assigned to Farsi training in September 1967, with an onward assignment a year later to the Political Section in Tehran. At that time, we were still feeling our way in Greece.

Q: This was not a regime that we (1) expected, or (2) were comfortable with. I served in Greece from 1970 to 1974, when Greeks pointed the finger at us saying "Oh, the CIA did this and this is your government."

MCCASKILL: I don't believe that for a minute and have always refused to accept it. I do think it was a surprise to us. I had a dear friend in Northern Greece who said the same thing to me. When I denied it, he told me that he believed me when I denied that I knew anything about a coup. But, he was always quick to add -- and we discussed this more than once -- I was too junior to be privy to that kind of information. You are right; it was a government that we had not expected and we were not comfortable with it. I think we grew more comfortable with it later. Greeks were always quick to point to the number of high level visitors to Greece, including Spiro Agnew. As you know, the Greeks must blame somebody for their problems, and this was a good example of that unfortunate trait.

Q: It is one of their traits. So what prompted you to go into Farsi training, and go to Iran where you served from 1968 to 1972? What got you going on that?

MCCASKILL: I felt I needed to get out of Greek-Turkish-Cyprus affairs, and the Number Two job in the Political Section in Tehran was opening up. I would ordinarily have gone out in the

summer of 1967, but the incumbent extended for a year, leaving me in limbo since I had given up my Cyprus job. The NEA Personnel Officer, then Orme Wilson, suggested that I go to Farsi training.

I ended up getting a 3-3 in Farsi, which delighted me since I was the oldest of the three students and the other two were really very good language students. The tutor told me later that they rated me second among the three, which pleased me no end. But then he might have told the other guy the same thing for all I know.

VICTOR L. STIER
Information Officer, USIS
Athens, Greece (1960-1965)

Victor L. Stier was born in 1919 in Michigan and raised in Oakland, California. His career in the Foreign Service included positions in Thailand, Greece, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Finland, The Netherlands, and Washington, DC. The interview was conducted by G. Lewis Schmidt in 1990.

STIER: The big problem when we were there, I guess they're still there, Cyprus was just -- there was no way to get anywhere with the Cyprus problem. Archbishop Makarios was very difficult for the United States, a very intelligent but a very vain man and you couldn't really -- American officials had a tough time dealing with him, but there was also the fact of Turkey as there still is a question of Turkey. I mean we had to maintain good relations with both countries, and it was hard slogging. For those five years that I was there the Cyprus problem made Greek-U.S. relations extremely difficult. In Turkey, too. If the U.S. pleased Turks, the Greeks were upset, and vice versa. Working in USIS in Greece was a very delicate, vexing, but also very exciting job.

CARLETON S. COON, JR.
Greek, Turkish, Cypriot, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near East Affairs
Washington, DC (1961-1963)

Carleton S. Coon, Jr. was born in France in 1927. His career in the Foreign Service included positions in Germany, Syria, India, Iran, Nepal, Morocco, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on October 26, 1989.

Q: Then shall we move on to...you then came back to Washington. You were in the Department from 1959 to '63. Was the whole time in Cyprus affairs?

COON: No, no. The Cold War had taken on an economic dimension in the '50s. The Russians

were extending aid to all these places, instead of just trying to undermine their governments. Congress didn't understand what was going on. A Congressional committee grilled Doug Dillon who was at that point Under Secretary, and said, "What are you going to do about this? This new and insidious form of the god-less communist threat." And Dillon, thinking fast, gave the standard bureaucratic response. He said, "We're just now setting up a staff to study it, sir." And I came back and I was recruited on to that staff. It was called U/CEA, Communist Economic Affairs. So for the first year and a half, a year and three-quarters after I was back, I was a member of this small illustrious think-tank-a bunch of mavericks who thought heretical thoughts about what the Soviets were doing. And Bob Terrill, the director, had this big map up of the world with different shades of red and pink on the various countries. African states were just then beginning to emerge, and most of them were fairly feverish at that point and we set up various mechanisms for compiling statistics. And I helped organize an annual report on economic relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc that was levied on each country to the woe of my peers. A lot of people have not admired me for my role in that. But it was a pretty good requirement when it started. It got corrupted by bureaucratic processes. I got one good field trip out of it. And then Roy Atherton took pity on me. Roy at that point was Cyprus desk officer, and he was leaving and he wanted a suitable successor. So he and I connived and I got myself into GTI. That would have been fairly early '61.

Q: GTI means Greece, Turkey and Iran?

COON: Yes. That was the third branch of NEA at that point. The first branch being the Arabs, and the second branch being the South Asians, and the third being GTI.

Q: What was the situation as we saw it on Cyprus when you were there? This would be around '61.

COON: '61-'62. It was fairly calm but lots of problems. I had a very bizarre situation in dealing with the Cypriot embassy because the Ambassador, Xerion Rossides, was in New York all the time. He was a Greek. And the Charge in Washington was a Turk and his subordinate was another Greek. And they were fighting a civil war even then. They were just fighting with words more than bullets. So I would have to have one set of responses for the Turk, and another set for Rossides when he would come down every now and then to contradict everything the Turk said. I really loved that assignment because it gave full scope to my propensity to argue heatedly about emotional issues, because there's nothing more emotional than the issue of Turks to the Greek Cypriots, or vice versa.

I think in small ways I contributed to a sensible policy, and things were going along very well until the fall of '62 when the Chinese attacked the Indians. The Indians crumbled and John Kenneth Galbraith decided it was time for us to set up a major arms program for India, and came back and decapitated several senior Foreign Service officers in the Office of South Asian Affairs. And the Bureau wanted somebody to honcho the arms sales program to India. So they looked around and decided, "Coon isn't doing anything. That Cyprus thing is quiet." So they told me to move across the hall and occupy a new position on the India desk. And I said, "I can't because Cyprus will blow up if I do." They said, "Oh, nonsense." So I moved across the hall, and Cyprus blew up -- Christmas of '62.

Q: What happened?

COON: What happened? They started fighting. No, I should consult the record before I make such a glib statement. Makarios did something that sort of deeply offended the Turks. In effect he declared that the Turks would be getting a bum deal in the future; the Greeks would be running the Turks, or whatever. Makarios was very slippery, very astute...he was one of the two or three great statesmen of the century, in my opinion, in terms of just sheer brain-power.

Q: A big leader for a small country.

COON: But anyway, he pulled a fast one and the Turks knew it was there. Nobody else did, and they started reacting the way Turks do and they got very, very dicey. So I went back without instructions, the desk being vacant, and just continued working as the Cyprus desk officer until the end of the year when they hauled me back because things were really heating up on the Indian arms sale business. So I was quite busy during that period. Then finally they got somebody else to replace me on the Cyprus desk, and things have been in bad shape ever since on Cyprus.

Q: Let me just go back. Were we playing much of a role in Cyprus?

COON: No. Fraser Wilkins was our Ambassador there, and no, we weren't.

Q: Could we have?

COON: Yes, we could have.

Q: Doing what?

COON: Talking, diplomacy. What diplomacy is supposed to be all about. Seeing an emergent problem, and taking steps to make its emergence less likely. Chipping away at the hard rocks on which the comity between the Greeks and Turks eventually floundered. But we weren't that concerned. We were a little concerned because Cy Sulzberger wrote an article about Cyprus when I first took over the desk that said it was heading for the rocks. And for a couple of minutes there, there was a flurry of White House interest. And in fact, there was a young staff assistant at the National Security Council, named Hal Saunders, who came around and talked to me for quite a while. Oh, I might add that my Cyprus incumbency overlapped the inauguration of John Kennedy. In the Eisenhower years the bureaucracy had been very, very straight laced and highly organized, and if Hal had strolled into my office and sat on the corner of my desk, and said, "How are things in Cyprus, Carl?" the whole structure would have quivered, and I would have immediately have had to do a practically verbatim memcon, which would have gone straight up, and been read up the line. Everybody would have been snuffling and snorting, and saying, "What's this interloper from outside the Department doing talking to one of our desk officers?" But as soon as Kennedy was inaugurated, in came Hal and said, "What's going on in Cyprus, Carl? Tell me what you really think." And I did.

Q: Was there much more of that...

COON: It was loose, and open. The old-timers didn't like it. I thought it was wonderful. It was a chance for me to explain what the real situation was, someplace where it mattered other than to my immediate superior who already knew but nobody beyond him cared, or had time to. I wouldn't say they didn't care, but they didn't have time to care. They were too damn busy even then with places like Lebanon.

But anyway that was an interesting permutation that took place during the Cyprus thing.

What was your question again?

Q: I was just wondering. You say diplomacy would have helped. I'm just wondering. Do you think diplomacy could have really done much in terms of...I mean, after all, the Greeks and the Turks have been going at each other since the time of Darius or something.

COON: Yes, I know, I know. Well, one never knows. It's a "what if" question, and not having separate time capsules to check these things out...let me just say, I was dissatisfied with the flaccidness of our policy and would have appreciated a more aggressive effort to isolate and erode some of these hard points in the relationship.

HERBERT DANIEL BREWSTER
Political Officer
Athens, Greece (1961-1965)

Herbert Daniel Brewster was born in Greece to American parents in 1917. His career in the Foreign Service included positions in Greece, Turkey, Lebanon, France, Germany, Italy, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed in 1991 and 1992 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: How did you see Turkish-Greek relations at that time, between '61 and '65?

BREWSTER: In 1963 and '64 they were tense. I remember there was a crisis on Christmas Day, because I was called into the office, but I would have to refresh my memory on just what the issues were at that time. The Cyprus problem has always been one for the Greek government whoever was in power. No one dared go against Makarios and it would take a great deal of courage for either of the parties at that time, whether ERE or Papandreou's party, to make concessions.

Q: ERE being...how do you spell that?

BREWSTER: Capital ERE, its the National Union Party of Karamanlis; by November '63 Karamanlis had left and Kanellopoulos was the Prime Minister. I remember in the summer of '64 it was the central issue; in June of '64 both the Turkish Prime Minister and the Greek Prime

Minister were invited to come to Washington to talk to our government about a solution for the Cyprus problem. The Turkish government, I believe, seemed to accept the thesis as a possible means of negotiating with the Greeks. When the Greeks came, Ambassador Labouisse was on board the special Presidential plane, I came along; George Papandreou brought his son along as well (that was Andreas Papandreou) and they turned the proposal down. I would have to check out on what the proposal was.

Q: We can always add this as we go. What was the impression at the Embassy, maybe the difference between Briggs and Labouisse but also within the political section, of Makarios and Cyprus?

BREWSTER: Archbishop Makarios, in the view of the political section certainly, very much the thorn in the side of the whole problem. He just was not ready to give in. And the Greeks were not ready to take a solution which Makarios did not agree to. And that is what happened in that instance, the Greek Prime Minister asked for a few days to think it over; they checked with Cyprus and it was Cyprus that turned it down.

Q: Was it our feeling that eventually Cyprus was going to be part of Greece? Or was our feeling that we liked it the way it was, with better relations but keeping Cyprus not a part of Greece?

BREWSTER: I think it was more the idea of finding some solution of federation in which there was an independent Cyprus. The double union, so called, the Enosis, was much more a posture of people like Grivas, who was a general with the armed forces in Cyprus. I think union with Greece by that time was fading; they were not insisting on that they just didn't like the solution that we proposed as to how to set up a federation. A great deal of time had been spent already during that period at talks in Geneva between the Greeks and the Turks on various aspects of the problem. We were not immediate parties to that but the mood was much better in the sense of progress toward a federated solution, one in which there was Cypriot independence but with all the necessary safety valves for the Turkish community within the Greek area.

Q: What was our impression of Grivas? Was Grivas well-connected within the Greek military? Were we concerned that he was an influential figure in the military, with the possibility of a coup?

BREWSTER: This may have been true with the military. He came to Greece only occasionally; we did not see him on those visits. He went to the Greek Pentagon and I think the relationships there were good. I think he was looked upon as a radical even by the Greeks. The Greeks have a great love feeling about Cyprus but they also were aware, I think, at the time, that union with Greece was a very long shot and not one that was essential.

Q: Before we move to your next phase is there anything I may have left out, or any major incident during that time that we may not have covered?

BREWSTER: On the Cyprus issue, although there were more details, the plan was that Cyprus would govern as a federation, and Turkey would have a base, similar to the British base, out on the Karpas point with about 80 square miles. That was going to be it. And that was not accepted

because Makarios wanted the whole piece of pie. He was doing it just as a way of showing that "nobody can walkover me." None of the Greeks, the Papandreou side and the other side, were looking long-range in terms of "do we think we can get anything better than this?" The easiest thing for a Greek to do is to say "No." It is less staff work than to work out whether this is a good deal or not a good deal. They don't always staff things out; two or three people make the decision of "no, we don't accept that."

Q: There isn't the feeling that you negotiate and get to a certain point and say, "well let's go back and we'll look at it," and everybody disappears and works out what they can do.

BREWSTER: Because we were working with the Archbishop at arm's length, as if he were the Patriarch and you don't touch him. It was a situation like that. And no Greek can go strongly against the Greek church or the ethnicity of Greece.

RAYMOND A. HARE
Ambassador
Ankara, Turkey (1961-1965)

Raymond A. Hare was born in 1901 and raised in Maine. His career in the Foreign Service included positions in Iran, The United Kingdom, and Washington, DC, and ambassadorships to Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Egypt, and Turkey. He was interviewed by Dayton Mak in the summer of 1987.

HARE: As you know, Cyprus is a small island off the southern coast of Turkey. It is actually visible from Turkey. Inonou once told me that they, the Turks, had made many concessions to the Greeks, and the only thing left in the South was Cyprus. There has been violence on Cyprus because of the fact the majority of the population there was of Greek origin with a smaller Turkish population. The Greeks had tried to push their policy of Enosis, which in effect would unite Cyprus with Greece. This had been accompanied by a terrorist campaign led by one Colonel Grivas. The British, who had been in charge in Cyprus, gave the country its independence and in a way washed their hands of the problem. The Archbishop Makarios, whom the British had deported for his troublemaking, returned to the island and was elected President. The old problem of the two ethnic elements rose again, and real violence erupted. We became particularly interested in the problem largely because it involved two of our NATO allies, Greece and Turkey. The Cyprus problem was typical of some situation where both parties can state their positions, but neither can go beyond a certain point without feeling that they are giving something away. This gets so crystallized, so stylized that, though you talk of negotiations and try to promote a reasonable solution, you aren't actually prepared to do so. For instance, in the case of Cyprus, if you talked about the country in terms of the "people" of Cyprus, that means that you were pro-Greek. If you talked about the country in terms of the "peoples" of Cyprus - in plural - that meant you were pro-Turk. Actually, the Turks never aspired to have the whole island. Their idea was to have full association in the government or a partition of the island.

This problem of Cyprus came to the boiling point while I was Ambassador to Turkey. The

situation reached a point where there was imminent danger of hostilities. We had established a sort of "watch committee "at the Embassy to keep tab of the situation, and each morning at our daily staff meeting we would go around the table reporting items of interest and views on what was going on. One day in the morning staff meeting after listening to the various reports, I said, "I feel there is something different about what you are telling me." They told me, "No, Mr. Ambassador, it's the same" I said, "I know it's the same, but it sounds different somehow. I just felt it." After you have worked with something long enough you sort of get a sixth sense in the way you feel about it. I said "prepare a telegram" (what I called an "amber" telegram), saying that this situation should be "watched."

Later in the day I got a small piece of information that fit exactly into my suspicions. I felt that something was in the wind as far as the Turks were concerned. I telephoned the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs and said, "Mr. Minister, I have a very urgent matter that I would like to discuss with you." He replied, "I'm sorry, I can't do it now. I'm going to see the Prime Minister in a few minutes". "This is really very urgent, I said. "Please!" He said, "Well, I have to see the Prime Minister in twenty minutes. Can you get here by then?" "Surely," I said. Getting there was made a bit easier by the fact that the Foreign Ministry was not far from our office, and the offices of the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister were on the same floor in the same building. I got there and told him, "We are both acutely aware of the situation in Cyprus. We both follow it, and somehow today I had the impression that perhaps something was different which might indicate an intention on your part to take military action." He looked at me funnily and said, "Well, perhaps you are not wrong. As a matter of fact the decision on the subject is going to be taken at eight o'clock tonight; and if the American Government has anything to say about it, they should say it by that time." This was about five o'clock or thereabouts in the afternoon. I got back to the office very fast and wrote a very urgent telegram. I got a reply right back, it was mostly boiler plate, all the obvious things. I was to tell the Turks, please don't do this; you could cause this, you could cause that and everybody would end up in a dangerous situation. I don't remember exactly what the telegram said, but I think it said in effect, "Use your own devices."

I went around to the Foreign Office; it was about 7:30 or so when I got there. Anyway, it was before the meeting time. The Foreign Minister suggested that we should go in to see Prime Minister Inonou, which we did. I started out my plea with him, which was nothing special, mainly boiler plate. Inonou said, "Well, it's quite true that we are thinking about a military movement into Cyprus." He explained that this was a move to protect the Turkish community there, the Turkish enclave. I had my instructions to dissuade them from military action and also, having been around in military situation a good part of my life, I felt that this was a very dangerous move for the Turks to take. First of all, I knew that they were not really set up for an amphibious operation of this kind. Such an operation takes time and it requires all sorts of special equipment. So, if the Turks were going to try a landing, that would be serious and things would probably get much worse. On the other hand, if they used their Air Force, that would be disastrous because their air force was very strong and the results would again be disaster. Either way they chose the prospect would be dangerous.

Inonou got up several times to leave, and each time I would say something to make him wait a little longer. Finally, he said, "Mr. Ambassador, all my people are waiting in the next room to discuss this matter; they are waiting for me, Mr. Ambassador, what do you want?" Well, I had no

instructions to say what we specifically wanted, but I had learned -it's the old thing when in doubt, play for time. So without hesitation I said "Twenty-four hours, sir." He said, "Well, I don't know. I will see what I can do. We are supposed to go at eight o'clock tomorrow morning." Well, they didn't go. The move had worked. Meanwhile back in Washington they had developed a letter to the Turks from President Johnson to Prime Minister Inonou. It was called the "Johnson Letter," but I've learned since that Dean Rusk and Joe Sisco had worked on it. I don't know if Johnson ever saw it or just gave perfunctory approval. It was a very tough letter, but it was reasonable in the sense that it was a warning. Here we were, joint members of NATO; we were friends of both Greece and Turkey, and if Turkey should make a movement whose end we couldn't see or predict it all might have wider and graver consequences. We could not guarantee what we would do, we couldn't guarantee our support in a situation of that kind. The letter was not well drafted, however, and there really was no necessity for its severity. After all, my play for time had worked, the move had not taken place. This was a time to act firmly but with diplomatic restraint.

I took this message to the Prime Minister and gave a copy to Erkin. When Erkin had read his copy of the letter he became really furious: "Mr. Ambassador, after this the relations between Turkey and the United States will never be the same," he said. Inonou on the other hand said, "Mr. Ambassador, I think I'll read the last paragraph first." The last paragraph was a very nice one asking him and his Greek counterpart to come to the United States to discuss the matter. It is very hard to understand how Inonou would think of something like that, that he could draw on such wisdom. He had had no time at all to study the message or to consider it. His reaction was instant and amazingly wise.

For a long time after the Turks were fairly boiling over this famous letter. It seemed to me, and to some of my Turkish friends as well, that although the letter was a difficult one, a tough one, it would have been better to have published it and let people see what it was and what it was not. Otherwise the Turkish public could imagine that just about anything was in the letter. The imagination can run wild in circumstances such as this. Well, the letter was indeed published eventually and the flap subsided to a certain extent. However, people sometimes like to keep tucked away in the drawer of their desk such sensitive issues and pull out and start all over again in certain circumstances regardless of the original problem. This letter is that kind of thing. People have been bringing up the Johnson letter ever since. The other day, in fact, a student or journalist - journalist it was, came to see me about it. He had been commissioned by his editor in Turkey -I think the paper was HURRIVET- to do a research on the Johnson letter. He had talked to George Ball, who had worked in it back on this side and now he was coming to see me. We talked about the thing for some time, and then I got, I must say, annoyed. I said, "Look here. This was something that happened a long time ago; it might have been done better, but it was done in good faith. What is it and why does your editor want to raise the Johnson letter again after all these years. What for? Frankly, I resent it, and I want you to know it! This is gratuitous provocation!" I don't usually get tough with people who are with the press, but that's the way I felt about it. It's like dragging a dead cat around and dropping it on your doorstep.

GEORGE ALBERT MCFARLAND, JR.

**Cyprus Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1963)**

**Consular/Political Officer
Nicosia (1963-1965)**

Mr. McFarland was born and raised in Texas and educated at Southern Methodist University and the Universities of Texas and Princeton. After a brief journalist career, he joined the Foreign Service and was assigned to the Passport office in Washington. His subsequent overseas assignments, primarily as Political Officer, were in San Jose, Nicosia, Istanbul, Lima, Ankara, Brasilia and Antigua, where he served as Deputy Chief of Mission and Chargé d'Affaires. He also served as Cyprus Desk Officer in Washington. Mr. McFarland was interviewed by Lewis Hoffacker in 1999.

Q: Well, Turkish limits you to Turkey, of course. You couldn't use it anywhere else.

MCFARLAND: Well, no, my first post was Cyprus.

Q: Well, that was before it was divided.

MCFARLAND: Yes. It was when it was divided.

Q: Oh, so you saw some of the fireworks.

MCFARLAND: Oh, I should say I did. I finished up the Turkish course in May or June of 1963, and went on the Cyprus Desk for three months waiting for a job to open up in Cyprus. It turned out to be the consular job, but it was only a sort of part-time consular work. There wasn't that much to do in consular affairs in Cyprus, and the rest was supposed to be political, and I was being sent there as the first Turkish-speaking officer in the Embassy. And it was otherwise and overwhelmingly a Greek-oriented embassy. All the other language officers were Greek language officers.

Q: Do you remember the ambassador at the time.

MCFARLAND: Well, that was Fraser Wilkins, when I arrived.

Q: Oh, yes. I know Fraser.

MCFARLAND: I arrived there in September - so many things in my life seem to happen in September - and had about three months to get my feet on the ground and meet the Turks and start taking Turkish lessons to keep my conversation going, because I had to live in the Greek Sector. It turned out I never found a house. We were looking all over the island and couldn't find a place that suited my wife. We stayed in the temporary apartments that were right across the street and a half block beyond the embassy, just a vacant lot between us. The embassy was in two joined apartment buildings or office buildings, with a slight break or dip between them. And

the night that it all broke loose, I was embassy duty officer, which was just, I think, three nights before Christmas. It think it was December 22nd of '63. It was at 11 or 12 o'clock at night I heard a tremendous siren go off, and I figured it was from the police stations. Other sirens, then BOOM! BOOM! Grenades and gunfire. It was pretty loud. I quickly jumped into my clothes and ran across the street to the embassy and notified the ambassador. He asked me to get the country team together - that was everybody - so I started calling them, and I was interrupted by a fellow from the Tourism Hotel. "What's going on here?" This was for me the definitive instance of the fog of battle. I didn't know what was going on, and I had to tell him so. I didn't know that this many years later we would still have a Cyprus problem. No one is quite sure yet what set off that incident that developed into full-scale fighting between the paramilitaries of the two sides.

Q: You don't know who fired the first shot?

MCFARLAND: No. Apparently a Greek police patrol was pressing the Turkish Cypriots. A Greek police patrol was in the Turkish Cypriot area of north Nicosia, and fighting broke out, but I don't know who fired the first shot or why. But the two sides had been getting visibly more tense for some time, since I had arrived there. And the Greek Cypriot police had been searching for hidden Turkish arms, trying to round up Turkish Cypriot paramilitary. Well, in the next couple of days, some 104 Turkish Cypriots were killed. Only five of them were from battles. And then the next three or four months, the Turkish Cypriots, who were then 18 per cent of the population, were driven back out of their villages into about five per cent of the Island's area, where they've stayed for the next 10 years. This, today, would be called, of course, "ethnic cleansing." In those days, we couldn't see it that way.

We had, of course, an element of adjusting to the initial shock, responding in a variety of ways. The British had forces on the island who did a very good job of moving in and interposing themselves and talking truce and getting the fighting to stop within about two days. But it wasn't sure how long the peace would hold. So that on Christmas Day, I organized a convoy to go into the Turkish Cypriot sector and bring out American and any other foreigners that were cut off there. We knew there were about 17 Americans that were cut off.

Q: So essentially, the island was divided.

MCFARLAND: Yes, it was.

Q: It was divided just almost overnight.

MCFARLAND: Exactly.

Q: That was before the Turkish forces arrived.

MCFARLAND: Yes, that was another thing here later, 10 years later.

Q: But it's the British that interposed, because there was no UN presence at that time.

MCFARLAND: The UN forces came in a few months later, and the Brits continued to be part of the UN force. They were the largest contingent, but there were Canadians, Norwegians. . . . It was a big operation. It was, I think, the first UN peacekeeping force. UNPECYP, it was called.

Q: You as a Turkish-speaking officer, were you suspect?

MCFARLAND: Yes, I was suspect, of course. They Greeks thought that I was pro-Turkish, and the Turks were quite pleased initially to have me as eighth man in the embassy, and then they began thinking, Hey, he lives in the Greek Sector. He's coming over here to spy on us and going back and telling the others. So I was suspected by both sides. And that corresponded with my own attitude, which was "a plague on both your houses" - get along, as you used to.

Q: You were there for the US national interests, nobody else. You weren't trying to be a partisan in the conflict. Just Uncle Sam's interest required you to be that way.

MCFARLAND: Exactly, that's right. But the Greeks, especially, whose initiative had set up the whole thing, were paranoid and bloodily paranoid. They were willing to kill. They had shot an American member of the embassy in the late '50's, when they were trying to get the Brits out. Somebody went to the man's door, and when he opened it, someone fired six or so shots from a revolver and it was only because he fell to one side he lived - I mean, he was badly hurt, but he survived. And we had repeated threats against us, because we were trying to keep the Greek Cypriots from going out and completing the job of wiping out the minority Turks. And the Turks, meanwhile, "We have the right of intervention under the 1958 agreement, and we could exercise it." "Oh, no," the United States Government said. Britain said, "you would set off a war with Greece." "Greece would fight Turkey?" Well, this became our policy - that we would avoid Turkish intervention. The Turks should not intervene; they should sit by and let their community sit and be squeezed, besieged, by the Greeks. The whole thing, of course, had started out of the desire of Greece, and especially the Greek Orthodox Church, to reunite all the regions where historically Greeks had been present and where actually there was a large Greek population. This was enosis of Greece, and in another term it might be called Greek territorial expansion, or territorial ambitions. I don't think we came out so strongly against Greece, but we had called a spade a spade, and it was their ambition, and not any ambition of Turkey's on Cyprus, that caused the problem. The Brits, as a historical footnote, had offered Cyprus to Greece in 1914, that Greece would join the allied side in World War II. Athens then had a lot of German influence, and Athens refused. It was a terrible mistake. After World War II, after the Italians had been forced out, Greece wanted to continue expanding, and they saw the successes of nationals elsewhere against the British Empire and got curious. They sent their young monk Makarios to Cyprus after training him in the US with the specific mission of uniting Cyprus for Greece. The Church was a direct inheritor of Byzantium. A great many people make the mistake of considering Greece to be the inheritors of Pericles. That's not Greece. So that Makarios did what he could to carry out his mission. He had accepted the London-Zurich Accords, not happily, but he had accepted them, dividing the government of the island, but keeping the island whole and integrated. He became the first president, and the Vice-President was a Turkish Cypriot, Dr. Küçük, a medical doctor. I don't know if you've found this. There are a great many medical doctors that rose to prominence in politics in very small countries.

Q: Did you have any feel for the Greek lobby in this country? Was it powerful?

MCFARLAND: Oh, terribly powerful.

Q: The Turks were separate.

MCFARLAND: I heard personally from it.

Q: And the Turks had no lobby, really.

MCFARLAND: No.

Q: And the Greek lobby is powerful on the hill. You felt that in the early days. It was always there pressuring the White House.

MCFARLAND: Yes. This, I suppose, was a basic reason for our taking such a pro - Greek stand on the issue. Another part, of course, was the threat of the Soviet Union. Greece could have been torn loose from its association with NATO, could have opened the door to their co-religionists in Moscow. That's possible. I'll concede that as a possibility. But at any rate, we were not concerned with righting injustices against minorities; we were just concerned to keep the lid on, don't explode.

Q: And it was Cold War time. Everything related to the Cold War. A Communist threat was always there. And for 25 years I dealt with the Communist threat, as you did. That was our main preoccupation.

MCFARLAND: Precisely. Everything was oriented toward basically our national survival and the contest, in any case, with the Soviets, the KGB, and all its many fronts.

Q: And they must have been pretty busy on the Island.

MCFARLAND: They had a Communist Party there and a Communist trade union which was quite powerful.

Q: Did they have an embassy also.

MCFARLAND: Oh, yes, there was a Russian embassy.

Q: So they ran a powerful operation.

MCFARLAND: Oh, yes.

Q: So you had two years in Cyprus.

MCFARLAND: I had two years in Cyprus. I should point out some of my adventures there. I was living, as I said, not far from the embassy, in clear view of the embassy. In early February

we got a warning that a small fanatic group of Greek Cypriots led by Makarios's personal physician, who had sworn to attack Americans - the British intelligence put this out and passed it on to the CIA, which passed it on to everyone. Everywhere around the world (the rest of my Foreign Service career I was getting at least one threat every six months, I think) - but this was specific and time-related, and it was confirmed by later events. The evening of the 4th or 5th of February I was standing out in front of the temporary apartments talking with a neighbor who was a communicator and saw this sand colored Land Rover with several people inside pull up to the side gate of the embassy, about 30 or 40 feet from the embassy itself. The gate, of course, was unlocked. There were no guards outside. These were the early days. Somebody got out, unloaded something from the back of the Land Rover, pushed the gate open, walked up to a permanently closed side door, entered - it was the wrong building - set down the package, struck a match, and lit the fuse, and at that moment converted himself into an enemy of my country. I got his description. He ran back to the Land Rover, which tore off. I couldn't see the license plate as I ran. I ran to the embassy and told the Marine guard to get everybody out of the building, and the bomb went off. And with the Marine behind me, I ran around the end of the building to check to damage, and someone, some person we had evacuated, called from behind to look out, there may be a second one in there. He saved my life. I ducked around the corner of the building, and - KABOOM! - the second one went off, knocked down the Marine, who miraculously was not hit by these flying fragments of pipe that had been put inside a threaded pipe so it would break up into shrapnel. One piece went through the side of a car, and another one cut down a small cypress tree. They were picked up all over the place. And just after the first one went off, just after I'd ducked around the side of the building, the ambassador, who lived on the top floor of an adjoining building, the penthouse, called down, "What's going on down there?" because I hadn't had time to notify him. And I said, "One small bomb, Sir." BOOM! - the second one went off. "Correction: two small bombs, Sir."

Q: Were you knocked on the ground by the second one?

MCFARLAND: No, I was around the corner from it. The Marine was knocked down, though, and I was okay. Nobody's hit me yet. A lot of people have tried, though. So the ambassador called a country team meeting and decreed evacuation. So I spent the rest of the night as consular officer organizing my share of the evacuation. We got all of the families off the next morning for Beirut.

Q: That's the evacuation of the embassy. What about the other Americans on Cyprus? Did they leave voluntarily?

MCFARLAND: There were not many other Americans. We had already had a cutting back of the official presence to essential personnel, so the Peace Corps left, most of the AID mission, and so on. The Americans who remained were in the station that I can't refer to in greater detail and the cadre of the embassy. And let's see, the UN force came in. I was the principal go-between with the Turkish Cypriots. I kept in constant touch with them. I had finished the Turkish course with an S4/R4, which at that time was a record, I think, and in fact led them to... There was a couple with an S4/R4 in Hindi that Tony Quainton achieved. Our success motivated FSI's hierarchy to proclaim that henceforth nobody would get S4 on the basis of 10 months of language training.

Q: Rather arbitrary, I would say.

MCFARLAND: But anyway, the linguists thought we were both deserving of it. At any rate -

Q: Your family had gone.

MCFARLAND: My family was gone.

Q: Where did you send them?

MCFARLAND: Beirut. And they stayed there until May. My wife had an operation and then went back to Texas to recover. The children were with her. I was all alone in Cyprus until December, when they returned. Things had settled down by that time, and there was no longer a threat to Americans. I finally found a house, where we stayed for seven months or so.

And let's see, what other stories can I... Oh, yes. Let me continue what I started, this critique of US policy. The Greeks made a flagrant attempt at annexing Cyprus in July of 1974, when the Greek junta was in power, which impelled the Turks this time to invade. And many casualties and considerable destruction. This could have been avoided if Turkey had been permitted to intervene in 1964 on the outbreak in December of '63, and the intervention would have been to restore the status quo ante, the London-Zurich Accords, that is, the combined government -

Q: So they had a right.

MCFARLAND: They had a right under those accords, which we prevented them from exercising, we and the Brits. And furthermore, this would have prevented the partitioning of Cyprus, that would have meant to the Greeks great advantage. And, yes, we couldn't do that. It was a major shortsightedness of policy.

Q: Whether the Greek lobby is to blame for this?

MCFARLAND: I'm not aware of it, but I simply say that it was a major failing, and I think it bears relation to the policy over Yugoslavia. This Greek-Turkish problem in Cyprus was, in fact, our first Balkan War of the second half of this century, and the same elements present in Yugoslavia were present there, especially the incitement of ethnic anger.

Q: Makes sense.

MCFARLAND: And the fight over holy land. Well, so much for our policy. I continued to carry it out as an embassy officer. I had to defend it at one point. I was invited by a Turkish Cypriot friend to visit his club one evening. I arrived on schedule and was shown into this conference hall where about 50 Turkish Cypriot men, obviously the educated type, were assembled, and I was shown to a seat at a table facing them. I thought I was there as a guest. It turned out I was there as an object of questions, and for an hour or an hour and a half I carried on in Turkish

defending the United States position. It was, I guess, the roughest time I ever encountered with people who were under siege as a result of United States policy.

Q: Were you allowed to write that up when you went back to the embassy?

MCFARLAND: I wrote it up.

Q: You wrote it up.

MCFARLAND: I believe I did. I think it's on the record. Although the people in the embassy were so pro-Greek, they thought they were bending over backwards. I was kind of like the token Negro. Although the ambassador did later make a point of meeting with the Turks every week. Fraser Wilkins lasted only until about March of '64. He began drinking rather heavily under pressure. George Ball came out on a peacemaking effort and was not well impressed and had him withdrawn. He never again had an ambassadorial job. He was inspector general later.

Q: Who replaced him?

MCFARLAND: He was replaced by Toby Belcher, Taylor G. Belcher -

Q: Oh, yes. I know Toby.

MCFARLAND: - a great guy. We were all friends, and he had this instinct for -

Q: Energetic.

MCFARLAND: - diplomacy, and particularly for a trouble spot or a hot spot. He knew where to send people and what to do, how to get things done. And I ran afoul of the Turks, in particular, one instance which I frustrated an effort by a Turk in their embassy to set off a Turkish air strike. He was the, I suppose, USIS equivalent. He sent off a false report to the Turkish radio station in Ankara to the effect that Greek Cypriots were attacking a Turkish village in the north of Cyprus. We picked this up on, what is it, the -

Q: FBIS?

MCFARLAND: - FBIS, yes, thank you, almost immediately. It came in as a flash message. I quickly checked with the UN. "Has there been any attack on this Turkish village West Akron?" Because he had reported artillery shelling. "No, it's all quiet there." "Are you sure?" "Yes." I reported, put in the ambassador's support, "Tell the Turks, don't react." They had sworn that they would send in fighter bombers next time a Turkish Cypriot village was attacked. We frustrated this. And I was pinned with the responsibility for this in the Turkish eyes, and this particular Turk sent off a message which I later heard about thanks to CIA saying that I was CIA. I was supposed to be an operative. It discredited me, but another Turkish Cypriot told me that this man had confided to him that "I have prepared a pilaf for Mr. McFarland, and he is going to have to eat it." Well, I didn't have too much difficulty eating that particular pilaf. But this must have been in May or so. In late July or early August, after working seven days a week for about

seven weeks straight, I took a few days off and went down to Tel Aviv to rest on the beach and see something of Israel, and the first morning I was there, I picked up the newspaper: "Turkish Jets Bomb Cyprus." Oh, God! Just when I was away! I tried frantically to get a flight back there. The embassy in Tel Aviv couldn't have cared less. I had to wait until my scheduled return. Meanwhile, other people had handled it.

Q: People were hurt.

MCFARLAND: People were hurt, and then the Greek Cypriot armed forces got hurt. They had attacked Turkish Cypriots and tried to extend their . . . and the Turks responded.

Q: By air. So you were due to leave. You were there more than two years?

MCFARLAND: I was there not quite two years. I arrived in September and left in July.

CHARLES T. CROSS
Deputy Chief of Mission
Nicosia (1964-1966)

Ambassador Charles T. Cross was born in China in 1922. He attended Carleton College and Yale University, and served as a lieutenant overseas in the U.S. Marine Corps from 1942-1946. His assignments abroad included Taipei, Jakarta, Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur, Alexandria, Nicosia, London and Danang, with an ambassadorship to Singapore. Ambassador Cross was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

Q: Then you went to Cyprus as DCM and served there from 1964-66.

CROSS: I was the last person to receive his assignment in that War College class. I was supposed to go to Singapore to be the consul general, replacing Sam Gilstrap who was to go to some African post as ambassador. He was an administrative officer who was from Texas and a buddy of Lyndon Johnson. On the next to last day of the course, I was told that FE could not hold on to me any longer, waiting for the Gilstrap assignment to go through. Therefore they had released my name for assignment to NEA. I was told that I would go to Cyprus as the DCM. I found that intriguing because this was the time when Cyprus was attracting considerable attention. The UN was just beginning to mount up its mediation efforts between the Turks and the Greeks. Greek Cypriot terrorists had placed a bomb in our chancery and partly destroyed it (No one was killed, but the embassy had many security scares while we were in Cyprus. A few years later, our ambassador was killed by sniper fire.)

Toby Belcher, who was our new ambassador, was anxious for some leave. He was an expert on Greek affairs and had been the consul general before the post was upgraded to an embassy. As a newly arrived ambassador, he wanted his own choice as his DCM. So I was delighted to go to Cyprus for two years. They were very exciting years for a DCM.

I should mention that the day after I graduated from the War College, I went to the office responsible for Greek, Turkish and Iran affairs in the Department. That office was headed by Kay Bracken, who had served in both Iran and Greece. When I went to see her, I was told that she didn't have time to talk to me nor to give me any work. She suggested that I go to the Operations Center which apparently had a vacancy, and while I was working there I could read all of the telegraphic traffic which mentioned Cyprus. So I did that only to find that there was no one in the Operations Center. There wasn't anyone who was reading the cables about Cyprus. So I sat down and started to read the files when along came someone from the Secretariat. He had a messenger with him; he asked me to read a draft cable, put in appropriate paragraphing, check the spelling, but not to change the message in any way. I started; it was exciting since I had been in the Ops Center just a few minutes and in an area strange to me and here I was working on obviously a very important message. It was a message from President Johnson to President Inonu of Turkey. It turned out to be a very important message for U.S.-Turkish relations. It was in my eyes a very crude message; it was just phrased wrong. It asked how the Turks could expect the U.S. to protect them when they took unilateral actions. I thought that this was not the way I would approach the Turks. But I didn't change anything and gave the cable to the messenger. Soon after that, Kay came to see me and asked how things were going. So I told her about the message, which surprised her since she had never heard of it. I had not even finished my sentence when she flew out the door, very distressed. It was obvious she had been left out of the loop. The draft had come from Rusk's office which was trying to prevent an intra-NATO war. This was after George Ball, the undersecretary, had visited Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia without success.

Q: What was the situation in Cyprus when you arrived in 1964?

CROSS: The UN peace-keeping force (United Nations Peacekeeping Forces in Cyprus - UNPKC) was just getting started. The commanding general was an Indian, General Thimayya, a wonderful guy. The British brigade, which had been stationed in Cyprus for many years, was assigned to the UN command. Then the command also had regular battalions from Canada and Ireland and forces from such countries as Sweden and Denmark, seasoned "peacekeepers," plus a medical team from Austria.

But this command was just getting organized when I arrived. Its main goal was to stop incidents between Greeks and Turks before they could spread. For example, there were allegations that some Greeks were mistreating Turkish farmers. So the UN command set up a check-point to end that harassment, and with the visible presence of the UN forces, the violence did end. The command submitted regular reports to UN headquarters in NY that were published and distributed around the world. There is no question that the UN presence reduced the number of incidents, but it never was able to eliminate them entirely.

About two or three weeks after my arrival, the Turkish air force bombed the island. That obviously raised tensions between the two communities.

Q: Was the embassy staff relatively small?

CROSS: Yes. We had a political officer - Robert Sharp. Barry King was there. George McFarland, a Turkish language officer, was assigned to the embassy. You have to remember that we in fact had a dual workload. Whatever we did with the Greeks, we had to do with the Turks and vice-versa. We could not afford to be seen as giving one side greater weight than the other. On my first day in Cyprus, I was taken to dinner in Greek territory. I heard all about their positions. Then after dinner, I went to the Turkish side to have a brandy with Turkish leaders who told me their positions. As far as I can remember, when I left two years later, both sides still had the same positions they aired that first night.

Q: Archbishop Makarios was the president of Cyprus at the time. What was your impression of him?

CROSS: I had no background on Greek, Turkish or Cypriot affairs. I found him a remarkable person. He had a noticeable steeliness and stubbornness to him - which was not a rare phenomenon among the Cypriot Greeks. There was no question that Makarios' main - and perhaps sole - goal was to achieve independence for Cyprus. He was not interested in annexing the island to Greece. In the early years of Cyprus - somewhere around the 6th Century - a princess from Christian Turkey came to the island and was healed from some malady that she had. From then on, the archbishop of Cyprus became an independent power, an Autocephalous Church. For example, he was allowed to wear a blue robe rather than a black one as did other members of the Greek Orthodox Church and use a special purplish-colored ink to sign documents.

So for centuries, the church on Cyprus was an independent entity and no archbishop would have considered really turning the island over to either the Greeks or the Turks. So Makarios just followed the lead of his predecessors. The Greeks, in the person of Colonel Grivas, were still a major force on the island; later this group tried to mount a coup against Makarios. I met Grivas several times; I found him to be a "barbershop" kind of hood - that is, talkative, boastful. His actions set Cyprus back a good many years and gave the Turks a very good reason to invade the island in 1974.

Q: Was Denktash the Turkish leader at this time?

CROSS: The same people were leaders then as they are today (except for Makarios.) We used to have dinner with Clerides quite often. Glafkos Clerides at the time was a policy advisor; the foreign minister was Kyprianou. At the time he was very young - about 30 years old. We got along with the government pretty well - they thought we were on their side. Toby spoke excellent Greek and I think did in fact sympathize with the Greek Cypriots because he was concerned that the Turks would invade and occupy the whole island.

Q: What was our view at the time of the treatment that the Turks were receiving?

CROSS: They were essentially badly treated. The Greeks kept them down, despite the warnings from Turkey that such treatment would call for a response. The Greeks operated in gangs, driving the Turks out of their native villages. It was very cruel. The UN tried to put a stop to this barbarism, and I must say that during my time, there weren't many incidents.

Q: Did the Turkish Cypriots take any action?

CROSS: They were arming themselves and eventually were able to defend themselves against the Greek gangs. According to the 1961 agreements that made Cyprus an independent country, a battalion of the Turkish army and a battalion of the Greek army could remain on the island. In fact, they were stationed relatively close to each other near Nicosia. When matters seemed to get out of hand, the UN advised the Greek army that further escalation might force the Turkish battalion to take action. That stimulated the commander of the Greek battalion to call the Greek Cypriot leaders to encourage them to calm things down. That helped quiet the waters.

Q: I think that in the 1960s we saw the growth of the Greek-American lobby which painted an unbalanced picture of Cyprus. The Turkish story was really not told in the U.S.

CROSS: I think that is right. I think the Department was under considerable political pressure from the Greek-American lobby to support Greek Cypriot claims. I should mention again that during my tour, there was in Cyprus a representative UN secretary general. This official kept looking for a solution; first it was Galo Plaza, the former president of Ecuador. He was very skillful, but he was not able to get the sides together. He was replaced by Carlos Fernandez, a prominent Brazilian diplomat. Fernandez ran into the same problems as his predecessor.

We worked with these UN representatives most of the time. They would talk to us and the British about their efforts and possible solutions. The dialogue was almost always the same because there weren't any solutions acceptable to both sides. Furthermore, these Latin American diplomats were limited in what they could propose. They had to be careful not to push either side to the edge because then failure was certain and mediation would have to cease.

A few months before I left, Ambassador Toby Belcher and I began to see that the whole situation was ridiculous. Our embassy in Athens was supporting the Greek Cypriots, and our embassy in Ankara was supporting the Turkish Cypriot cause. They were just showing "clientitis." Only we in Nicosia had any ideas on how the issues might be resolved. I was certain that if there were no interference from either the Greek or the Turkish governments, a solution could be found by the parties living in Cyprus. So I suggested that the embassy in Nicosia develop some general outlines of a solution based on our knowledge of what would work in Cyprus. We would then approach the Greek and Turkish governments with our plan. We would put it to these governments that we were sick and tired of the stalemate and that this plan would be our last effort. If they accepted the plan, we would pursue it on Cyprus with the Greek and Turkish leaders there; if they didn't accept it, we would announce we had lost interest in Cyprus and would be unresponsive in the future to the pleas of either government. We would declare that the Cyprus crisis had nothing to do with NATO and that we would have no further interest in the matter.

We sent this proposal to Washington where it was met with considerable fear. But the Department did agree that the idea could be floated in Athens and Ankara without it being designated as an official U.S. proposal. I went to our embassy in Athens which agreed to most of our suggestions. I then went to Ankara where Ray Hare was the ambassador with Ed Martin as DCM.

Hare said simply that one doesn't present the Turks with ultimatums. In any case, they didn't buy our proposal. Soon after that "shuttle" diplomacy, I left Cyprus and was never again engaged in this issue. I went to London on a direct transfer, but went through Washington for consultations and saw Ray Hare, who at that time had become the assistant secretary for NEA. He told me that he thought the plan had lots of merit, but that if we were to approach the Turks on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, it wouldn't work.

I should explain that the plan called for the same Turkish political status that was in the Cypriot constitution. But the issue was that the Greeks were seeking a unitary state under one president, not a confederation that the Turks sought. We tried various formulas which would satisfy both positions, and I think we finally found one that we thought might have met the political needs of each side.

Q: How was it to deal with the Cypriot Turks?

CROSS: Toby dealt with Denktash. It was easy to deal with them because the leadership was well educated and even the shepherds spoke English. So language was not a problem, but they did have their share of "hotheads" who pushed the leaders. I think it is fair to say that neither the Greek nor Turkish leaders could have remained in power - or even perhaps alive - if they had not heeded the pressures from the "hot heads." I must say that since my service in Cyprus, I smile whenever I read about the periodic surges of optimism that the community problems on Cyprus were about to be resolved through the appointment of a new negotiator who would bring the two sides to Geneva and settle the whole thing - probably by sitting in some good restaurant where he would say the same things that had been said *ad nauseam* many times before.

Q: I went to a meeting in Washington a couple of years ago, mourning 25 years of tyranny on Cyprus - obviously sponsored by the Greek-American lobby. This tyranny allegedly started with the Turkish invasion of 1974 - which was a response to a Greek coup. All the speakers attributed the Cyprus "problem" to this invasion. There was never any reference to the Greek atrocities perpetrated on the Turks. I think one could not have left that conference without having a feeling that the Cyprus problem stems from irrationality - on both sides.

CROSS: Of course, it doesn't help that the Greeks and the Turks have been enemies for centuries. It seems to me that there is really no possible negotiated solution to the Cyprus problem. I think the world might be able to impose a settlement if enough pressure were brought to bear on both countries. At the moment, the Turks have the better of the situation because they occupy a much larger portion of the island than their population would seem to merit.

Q: From 1970-74, I was consul general in Athens. I liked the individual Greeks, but I found their political behavior very hard to take. They blamed us for everything, and they kept poking sticks at the Turkish tiger who could eat them up without lifting his paws. The Greeks never seemed to quite grasp the reality of the situation.

CROSS: I agree. The Turks put the Greeks on notice many times that unless they stopped harassing the Turkish Cypriots, they would bomb the island. And finally, when the Greeks did not change behavior, they did bomb. The world was shocked, even though it had heard the

warnings.

Q: The oral history collection has many stories about the vicissitudes of trying to deal with the Cyprus problem. In today's terms, it is somewhat akin to dealing with the Yugoslavia. The history of these conflicts goes back centuries. We still have in the Department an ambassador named to deal with the Cyprus matter. Talking about sinecures!

CROSS: Holbrooke had the job for a while. I felt like writing to him to tell him that the best way to handle the Cyprus problem is to tell the warring parties that the U.S. had the solution and not to accept any arguments.

NORBERT L. ANSCHUTZ
Deputy Chief of Mission
Athens, Greece (1964-1967)

Norbert L. Anschutz was born in Kansas in 1915. His career in the Foreign Service included positions in Greece, Thailand, Egypt, France, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed July 13, 1992 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: Well, then you went to Athens in 1964. Henry Labouisse had asked for you to be his Deputy Chief of Mission. You served there during a very interesting period, 1964-68. What was the situation when you arrived in Athens?

ANSCHUTZ: I think the political situation had been deteriorating for several years in a modest sort of way. George Papandreou and the so-called Center Union had just won a very impressive political victory. Karamanlis had left. The American position in the Karamanlis days had strongly supported Karamanlis, rather openly, to the dismay of some of the elements in the Greek party politic. So there was a change in position.

There were tensions within the so-called Center Union, Papandreou's party and at one point there a significant number of the members of the Center Union abandoned the Center Union party. This led to a very delicate situation in Athens, in the political cosmos, as it was called.

About this time George Papandreou's son, Andreas, returned from the United States with his American wife and began to be active politically in away that caused tensions within the Center Union. So elements of the Center Union, who had been playing the politics of the situation for a number of years, were very much dismayed to find Andreas coming in with rather obvious intent of seizing the leadership role when his father stepped aside.

As a result of all this, a group of the Center Union, including the current Prime Minister, Constantine Mitsotakis, and others, withdrew their support of the Center Union and in effect entered into a sort of unspoken collaboration with the conservative party, ERE it was called.

At this time there were allegedly certain plots within the military, both in Greece and later down

in Cyprus. These issues became extremely delicate politically. There was something called the Aspeda trial which was supposed to have involved certain officers down in Cyprus who were allegedly working with Grivas, who had been one of the leaders of the Greek Cypriot...

Q: Grivas was a colonel.

ANSCHUTZ: Yes, he was.

The issue of enosis, the union of Cyprus and Greece, was one of the political problems which was being bandied about in those days. What that would have involved would have been the incorporation of Cyprus into Greece with the attendant collision that would have imposed with the Turks. One of the key figures in all of this, of course, was Archbishop Makarios, who was the senior political personality in Cyprus. It was believed by some of us that Makarios, himself, had visions of not only enosis, but as a result of enosis of perhaps achieving political control in Greece.

Q: I have heard people who knew him say that he was too big a political leader to be stuck on that little island.

ANSCHUTZ: Well, that was his view, I am sure.

Makarios and Andreas apparently had reasonably good relationships. This was a cause of tension.

Then there was allegedly another officers organization which was known as Pericles, which again was allegedly sponsoring leftist, liberal whatever activities. And there were trials of these officers conducted. As a result of these trials the issues of the control of the armed forces became very important in the political context. The Palace had always tried to maintain very close and direct relations with the armed forces.

Q: This was King Constantine and his mother, Queen Fredericka.

ANSCHUTZ: That is right.

These issues all tended to complicate the situation and at one point as a result of all these issues the question arose as to whether or not the Prime Minister could or would discharge the Minister of Defense. This was much opposed by the Palace and the relationships between the conservatives and the Palace on the one hand and the Center Union on the other hand became quite venomous.

I am not getting the sequence of this in a very orderly fashion, I regret to say.

Q: With all of this going on...we had bases there and this was certainly a time of real confrontation with the Soviet Union, we had the Berlin Wall, Khrushchev was talking very tough, the missile crisis, all these things were going on...it was a period of high cold war. Greece was considered to be a key element. What were we doing in the Embassy while all this was going on?

Where did we feel our interests were? Were we making our wishes known? Was the CIA messing around?

ANSCHUTZ: As you are well aware, because of our post World War II active interest in Greece and the considerable volume of aid that had been provided to Greece as a result of the Truman Doctrine, the American position in Greece was extremely important and strong. We, in the Embassy, tried very hard to prevent ruptures within the parliamentary system. Some of us had reservations as to whether it was wise to push on the part of the conservative ERE party and the Palace to push too hard on the military. At the same time, the left wing of the Center Union, which was controlled by Andreas, was campaigning very hard against the Palace and against certain elements of the military, so that the tensions built up very considerably.

Our view was, in the Embassy, that the talk of a coup should be discouraged, because we felt that that type of a solution was not tenable over a longer period. Plus the fact, for all the reasons you mentioned, we weren't eager to see this type of ferment in Greece.

At one point, a modus vivendi was developed between George Papandreou and the Palace, and to a certain extent the so called conservative opposition. This was not accepted by Andreas, who with his more leftist associates was campaigning very hard on an anti-Palace and, to a degree, anti-American thesis.

At one point, as a result of the compromise, a caretaker government was established...a compromise between Papandreou and the Palace and ERE...and one of the Center Union politicians, a man by the name of Stephanopolis was put in as the Prime Minister. He governed with the support of part of the Center Union, which had pulled away from George Papandreou and the Center Union, itself, and another small party called the Progressives which was led by a politician by the name of Markazeni.

At one point another caretaker government was put in led by Kanalopolis, who was an ERE minister, which was established with the support of the moderate group of the Center Union and his own party, ERE, on the premise that elections would be held in May, 1967. As this date approached it is fair to say that the Center Union of not only George Papandreou, but taken with the faction led by his son, Andreas, would probably win those elections. Andreas was campaigning against the Palace and against the Americans, in a very vigorous and brutal way. This produced tensions, not only in the country where tensions ran very high, but also anxieties in the military forces, and therefore in the Palace. There had been talk of a military coup led by certain senior generals who were well regarded by the Palace. The position of the Embassy was that a coup was not the proper solution to the problem. Nevertheless, on April 22, 1967, a coup did take place. It was led by three relatively junior officers. In other words it was a coup which anticipated a coup which might have taken place by the senior officers. These were Papadopoulos, Pattakos, and Makarezos.

Q: Before we move into the coup period, what was our analysis and efforts to try to do something with Andreas Papandreou to try to tone him down?

ANSCHUTZ: We had, I think it is fair to say, numerous contacts with Andreas. I think the

ambassador saw him from time to time.

Q: The ambassador was by this time...?

ANSCHUTZ: By the time of the coup it was Phillips Talbot. I had seen him over the years on a more or less continuing basis.

Q: Was Bob Keeley a friend of his at that time?

ANSCHUTZ: He may have been. Bob came later and was very sympathetic to Andreas, I think. Wait a minute, I take that back. I don't know that Bob was sympathetic to him. I don't remember that he saw him, he may have, but I don't remember that. John Owens knew him and Bob McCoy, who was the economic counselor, saw him. Andreas was at one time the so-called Minister of Coordination and therefore had frequent contacts with the Embassy in the economics sphere.

Andreas was not an easy man to deal with. There were occasions when there was, at least on my part and maybe on others, rather blunt talk with Andreas. One of the things that I tried to do was to try to build bridges or a bridge between Andreas and the Palace, but I was unsuccessful.

Q: What were you thinking of when you say a bridge

ANSCHUTZ: My thesis was that a coup was not in the interests of Greece or the United States, and if there could be a dialogue on a personal basis between the King and Andreas there might be some hope of reducing tensions. Neither party was eager to be compromised by seeing the other. Each felt it would be a loss of face. So my efforts in those regards were unsuccessful.

Q: Was the CIA...Greece in that period and sometime after was known as kind of a CIA country. Certainly the time I was there, 1970-74, the CIA was in bed with the Colonels. Did you have the feeling that things were going on with the CIA that you weren't completely aware of?

ANSCHUTZ: Yes. Strangely enough I had during my career a very good relationship with the CIA and their representatives. But I was fully aware that the dynamics of the situation I could not always accurately assess. It is also true that on the basis of a long historical connection, the Palace and particularly Queen Fredericka, had always felt that while relationships with the Embassy were quite good, that the real route to the Oval Office was through the CIA. So these connections were very assiduously cultivated. It was much less easy for the Embassy to have a continuing dialogue with the Palace, in my opinion.

Now, I was not the ambassador. I was the DCM and Charge. But I think it is fair to say that our relations with the Palace, although they were quite cordial, were not as close as the relations with the CIA. I don't know to this day how much the CIA knew about the Colonels' coup. I do know, as everyone else knows, that Papadopoulos had worked as an intelligence officer of some kind and had long and continuing contacts with the CIA. And in many cases the situation was such that if you wanted to deliver a message you delivered it through the CIA. I am not saying that they didn't accurately and faithfully transmit the message, but there was a feeling that their

contacts were frequently better than ours were.

Q: This was my impression when I was there in the post coup period. This was during the Lyndon Johnson administration. Were you getting much interest in the State Department and White House on developments that led up to the coup, or was Vietnam pushing it to the back?

ANSCHUTZ: Yes, there was interest. One of the factors in this, not so much the State Department...but because Andreas had connections, associations, with some of the senior economic personalities in Washington, we frequently had reactions which were transmitted through those channels. Because Andreas and Margaret, his wife, had lived a long time in the United States, they had a number of sources and connections which they used for political purposes in the United States. The Embassy, as such, was taken completely by surprise and perhaps the Agency was taken by surprise too, except that they had had ongoing relationships with some of the members of the coup, particularly Papadopoulos. And, of course, as in every large mission where you have a large economic mission, a large military mission, a large Agency mission, etc., everybody gets into the act. So we have intelligence reports which would emanate down at the airfield and come through the Air Attaché, or maybe the air section of the military aid mission. All of these various sources recording part of the political tremors in the period before the coup and each one of the various sources have his own solution as to what a course of action should be.

In any event, the Embassy proper was certainly taken by surprise. We were looking at some of the senior generals but we were not looking closely at the colonels at that time.

I think the reaction of the Embassy was that we didn't want to completely upset the domestic situation, so the reaction was one of great reserve and the expression of hope that the constitutional government would be promptly restored. I think Jack Morey, when he heard about the coup, was alleged to have put on his reserve officer uniform and gone down to the Embassy. One could conclude from that that he didn't really expect this at that time.

Q: Who was Jack Morey?

ANSCHUTZ: He was the Chief of Station at the time.

Q: How did you find out about the coup? I assume the Embassy assembled and tried to figure out what to do.

ANSCHUTZ: It was not as orderly as that. If I remember correctly, Kanalopolis, the leader of the ERE party, was, I believe, arrested. Some how or other the word got to Phil Talbot, the ambassador, and he saw Kanalopolis. I don't remember whether he went...Kanalopolis lived not too far from the Residence...over there or whether Kanalopolis came to the Residence. But that was the first intimation that we had, as far as I am aware. I think Phil Talbot telephoned Washington. Dan Brewster, who had been the political counselor in Athens was then on the Desk in Washington. I first heard about it when he called me. There was a blackout of communications and the way that he was able to reach me was to go through the airfield at Ellinikon for telephone service and they in turn were able to get up to me. I dutifully jumped into my track shoes and

went down to the Embassy. There was a curfew and all transit was forbidden, but I managed to go by back streets...

Q: You walked over?

ANSCHUTZ: No, I went by car. There were only a few people who managed to penetrate the curfew. I think soon thereafter Phil Talbot saw the King and told him that we felt a military coup was not the solution. The King said, "Well, this wasn't our solution." I think it was pretty clear that they had been talking with some of the senior military officers about the possibility. But they were pre-empted by the Colonels who took the ball away from them.

There was obviously a great hue and cry at the time and the position, I think, taken by Washington and the Embassy that this was not the proper solution and that every effort should be made to restore constitutional government as soon as possible. By the same token, we had to be restrained because we didn't want to take a series of action that would catapult Andreas and the left into power by permitting them to play on American displeasure and concern.

If I remember correctly the King went up to northern Greece shortly thereafter where there were several of these more senior loyalist officers. The King had, I think, gone to the Greek military headquarters the night of the coup and tried to discourage these activities.

Q: I know later there was the King's attempted coup which came somewhat later. He went up to Larisa. But that was later. The main thing is in the Embassy did we have any feel for these guys...Papadopoulos, Petekos, and Makarezos?

ANSCHUTZ: Well, we got feels quickly. As I say, Papadopoulos had been known to the Agency for a period of time. I think some of the people in the military aid mission knew Padikous.

Q: I think Pete Peterson was a friend of his too. He was the chief of the consular section.

ANSCHUTZ: Yes, that is correct. I have forgotten who knew Makarezos. Anyway, early on, one of the first reactions was to stop providing military assistance. At one point consistent with the policy of very, cool, reserve to the new government, Talbot and his family went on leave. He went back to the United States. This also afforded him an opportunity for consultation.

I was called on at my residence by all three, if I remember correctly. I regurgitated the Embassy/State Department position that we had to get back to a constitutional government at the earliest possible moment. I remember one of them saying, "I know, but the constitution has to be revised. We can't use it in this form." I said, "Well, if the constitution has to be revised, let's get about it. You ought to be able to do that in a week or two." "Oh, no, this is going to take months in order for us to do that." Well I was not very sympathetic to that because I felt that whatever changes had to be made in their view could very promptly be made. So my lack of sympathy for that was very clear.

Then they insisted that I join them for dinner. I did and it was very pleasant, polite and civil, but the gap in the positions was very wide. Of course nothing occurs in Greece that isn't known all

through the country within a few hours, as you are well aware. So the fact that I had met with these people was interpreted by their...they chose to interpret that as a sign of implicit endorsement, or something of the sort.

Q: What was your impression of these men? From accounts that one hears, they belonged to a group which really wasn't very sophisticated. They had been regular officers and had dealt very little with anything beyond the horizon of a serving officer and saw things in rather simplistic terms.

ANSCHUTZ: I think that is very true. I think they were sincerely concerned about the consequences if Andreas and the leftists took over in Greece, both economically and particularly to the military. I have little doubt that within their framework they thought they were acting at least patriotically.

It was ironic...my own antipathy to the group was quickly deciphered and as a result of that I was invited by the Mayor of Athens down to his headquarters and I had an honorary citizenship of Athens conferred upon me, which was, of course, intended to be a kick in the teeth to the junta. I don't think it would have happened under other circumstances.

Q: The coup happened. We obviously had our instructions that you don't recognize until a decision is made at the top. I assume this is part of them coming to your house, the coup leaders.

ANSCHUTZ: Part of it. I think the initial position had been stated by Talbot and ratified by the State Department shortly after the coup and before his departure on leave. So the broad outlines of the American position were promptly established. Of course the meat on those bones were very slow in presenting themselves.

Q: The position was what essentially?

ANSCHUTZ: That this was undesirable and that prompt, firm steps should be taken to restore constitutional, parliamentary government. Obviously it was not happening and the confusion continued. At a later time...was it December when the King actually went up to Larisa?

Q: I think it was around then when the King made an attempt to rally the army.

ANSCHUTZ: Well, it was not well done. In a sense it was perhaps too late. My own view was that...there was talk among some people including a few people in the Embassy, that we should bring in the Marines and the Sixth Fleet, etc...which I thought would be folly. But I did think that if the King had at that time gone up to northern Greece and put himself aside the established loyalist senior commanders up there, a negotiation could have taken a much different and more favorable turn. But that didn't happen until almost six months later.

Q: After they had already consolidated themselves.

ANSCHUTZ: Then the reports began to come in, particularly from our military, since all the junta was military. They would say, "We know old Pattakos is really very pro-American," And

then you get the same thing about Makarezos. Everybody has his three cents to throw in. I have to say that I didn't feel that the military assessment about some of these things was particularly helpful.

Q: My impression, I am talking about a slightly later period, was that our military was heavily loaded with Greek-American officers there, for one thing, who were very happy, many of whom settled down later on to stay. But the point being that they were an extremely conservative bunch and felt at home there. They were not really representing what I would say were main line American interests. Did you have any of that feeling?

ANSCHUTZ: I think there may be some of that. Yes, there were a number of Greek-Americans, both in the military and in the Agency. Like most of us they were willing to be persuaded that what their friends and acquaintances were doing was in the common good.

We had an amusing incident. There was a Greek journalist who has lived in Washington for many years since the coup, by the name of Ellos Demetrakopoulos. He at one time had been very close to Andreas and took a very liberal view. He arranged, somehow, for one of the senators from Indiana and a prominent economic journalist to visit. Now, visits to Greece during this period by Americans were discouraged and particularly by prominent or distinguished men. Ellos and the senator came to call in my office. They said they wanted to call on Papadopoulos, who was the acting Prime Minister, and they wanted me to escort them. I said that I don't think it was appropriate and didn't see any reason for the senator to call on Mr. Papadopoulos. At any rate, they insisted. I went over to the Hilton Hotel and the senator and Ellos were there coming down the stairs. We all piled into my car. All the time I was arguing against this call, which in my view was completely inappropriate. Our policy at that time was trying not give status to this group. You may remember that you come out of the Hilton and had to turn right and there was a divider between the highway and you turned right and went down towards the Palace. I argued all the way down in the elevator, in the car, etc. I was making no headway at all. So when the car stopped to make a U turn to turn down Queen Sofia, I just got out of the car and said, "I am sorry, if you feel that you have to make this call it will have to be your privilege, but I will not escort you." I walked off.

I just sent a very brief message to the department and said that I had declined to escort the Senator. It was as though I had dropped a rock in the water. There was no reply from Washington. So they made the call.

Q: I am a little surprised at Makarios, because he was such a foe of the regime, being on Andreas' side. Why was he trying to screw up this?

ANSCHUTZ: Well, it was only afterward that he became anti-Andreas and particularly in later years.

Q: He was a real thorn in the side of the Embassy for many years being opposed to the junta and going after our policy all the time, and had quite a following here in Washington.

ANSCHUTZ: Oh yes. He is a very good publicist. He is really completely devoted to his work.

He has worked ceaselessly in his PR activities.

Q: Why was he trying to establish contact with that group at that time?

ANSCHUTZ: What they wanted to do was to embarrass the government. The senator was going to presumably be critical of the action they had taken. This was a pro-Andreas call. That didn't give it any particular luster in my eyes either.

Q: What about Andreas? Right after the coup he was in prison and it looked like he was going to be shot, or something. What did the Embassy do? Here was a guy who had been an American citizen and served in the American Navy and had been a professor at Stanford and a few other places and had been spending most of his time out on the hustings attacking the United States so he obviously wasn't over popular. Yet his life was being threatened.

ANSCHUTZ: Of course as an American citizen we were opposed to any summarily action against Andreas. There was also an organized effort in the United States to free Andreas, led by a very good economist from Minnesota who was, I think, the head of the Council of Economic Advisors, Walter Heller, I think. His name escapes me too. So this had wide international publicity. I think it is fair to say that we may well have saved Andreas' life. I think he might have been executed.

Q: Were we making representations?

ANSCHUTZ: Oh, yes. I think by that time Phil Talbot was back and I think he made representations too, pointing out that any such action on the part of the government would certainly compromise the already delicate relations we had with the government. Our relations with the government was a very brittle, tenuous thing. But we did in effect have relations of a sort. So Andreas may well have owed his life to American intervention.

Q: During this period...you left when?

ANSCHUTZ: I left in June, 1967.

Q: So at the time you left...it was only April to June...we were being very distant?

ANSCHUTZ: Yes, we were.

Q: Did you retire shortly thereafter?

**JOHN A. BAKER, JR.
Political Officer, Cyprus Affairs, United Nations
New York (1964-1967)**

John A. Baker, Jr. was born in Connecticut in 1927. His career in the Foreign

Service included positions in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, Moscow, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in September 1992.

BAKER: I took an assignment to the UN Mission in New York. Adlai Stevenson was still in charge there. I started out as one of six or seven officers in the political section in the Mission. The head of the political section was Richard Pedersen, who had been around the Mission for many years and was quite well versed in UN affairs. He assigned issues to the political officers and I was assigned the Cyprus issue, which within a few months suddenly broke into flames in Nicosia because the Greek Cypriots were challenging the regime of the Treaties of Nicosia that had been set in place before the British withdrew.

Q: Archbishop Makarios was there?

BAKER: Yes. So there was violence in Nicosia and fighting between the Greeks and the Turks. This finally came to the Security Council in the winter of 1963-64. We had a series of meetings the result of which was the creation of the peacekeeping force on Cyprus which is there to this day. That was an interesting process because I think it was the first occasion on which the Security Council turned to the non-permanent members to take a lead in negotiating a solution which would be put before the Council. The British couldn't get into it because they were the former colonial power...but we perceived that the more we got into it as the central broker, the more we would tend to East-Westernize the problem, which didn't seem to be very helpful in the sense that it wasn't an East-West problem anyway, it was a Greek-Turk problem.

Q: East-West, this was between the Soviet Union and the US?

BAKER: Yes. So if the proposal that came forward in the Council looked like an American proposal, it would probably be a good way to invite Soviet opposition and maybe even veto. So the Norwegian and Brazilian members of the Council, both of whom had rather competent ambassadors, took the lead on that. Charlie Yost, who was Adlai Stevenson's deputy, rather adroitly encouraged them along the way. I served as sort of a go-between trying to keep up the process and putting messages and ideas into the process and, of course, reporting voluminously to the Department about the procedure.

So, as a result of that I became quite well acquainted with all the players in that drama. Not Makarios, himself, because he stayed in Cyprus, but his Foreign Minister, Kyprianou; his ambassador in New York, who was an odd old fellow named Rossides; Rossides' young, activist assistant, Andrew Jakovdes, who is now the Cypriot Ambassador in the United Nations, the Cypriot players, Clarides of the Greek-Cypriots, Denktash, who is still the leader of the Turkish-Cypriots, the Turkish and Greek Ambassadors, Erelp and Bitsios, and the Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Bayulken, who took an active interest in the matter. So I have a very vivid memory of all those players and their interactions and their rather high degree of emotion over this whole process.

Q: Was the Greek lobby in the United States a problem?

BAKER: To the degree that the Greek lobby weighed in...they were accustomed to weighing in

in Washington. The Greek lobby was not all over us in New York. I didn't really sense from the kind of instructions we got that we were particularly leaning towards the Greek point of view on this. The Greek government was pretty careful in that period. They were not 100% behind what Makarios was doing. They were concerned that the people who were calling for Enosis, which was the union of Cyprus to Greece, would create a real nasty situation between them and the Turks and they weren't sure they were really up for that. So they tended to regard Makarios with a little bit of hesitation, not as a 100% ally, but somebody who was looking out for Makarios.

Q: With solid reason. What was your impression of Adlai Stevenson as the head of your delegation?

BAKER: I arrived there the fall of 1963 and I worked for the Mission under his leadership until he died July, 1965. But I was one of a number of officers in the political section. I didn't work regularly in direct contact with Stevenson. When the Cyprus issue or other issues that I handled were in the Security Council, I worked for him and wrote drafts of his speeches and was always impressed on how he could turn a rather pedestrian draft into a work of considerable artistry. It was rather humbling to even try to write a first draft for somebody like Stevenson. I was always impressed by the amount of effort he put in to what I might have regarded a fairly routine presentation in the Council. But for him there wasn't any such thing as a routine presentation and he would want it to be a quality presentation, and it was. He knew how to make a silk purse out of a sow's ear.

So I really respected that capability and I respected and enjoyed his sense of humor when he chaired meetings and when he entertained visiting chiefs of state. He had dinners for them at his apartment at the Waldorf. I was present at some of those and he was remarkably gracious and witty on those occasions. I particularly remember one he had for King Hussein of Jordan at which I was present. He really did those things with great style.

He wasn't engaged as heavily in the sort of nitty-gritty negotiation of issues as the rest of us were, it seemed to me. And certainly nowhere near the degree that his successor, Arthur Goldberg, was. I think he relied heavily on Charlie Yost and Francis Plimpton, who was another one of the deputies there, to craft those positions and direct the strategy and manage the work of the Mission with respect to the work across the street. He would be the spokes man for it. But I didn't feel that he was always personally engaged in the diplomacy. Maybe that was because of the time of life it was for him, or also of the things that he felt he could do best, I don't know.

Q: How did you feel about dealing with the other delegations? Did we make a difference as far as our approaches or were these delegations for the most part responding to instructions from home on important issues?

BAKER: That is a complicated issue. Often what you needed to do is to find out where key delegations might be inclining and if you felt that they didn't have much latitude, in terms of their own instructions, then you would have to ask the State Department, if you thought it was important enough, to weigh in in their capitals to see if we could get their instructions changed. The major governments tended to work on instructions from their own countries.

The growing number of third world countries there often didn't have instructions from capitals and their tendency was to follow the lead of the leading non-aligned countries there. That became even more marked in the seventies when the non-aligned movement became even larger and more organized and more active, but it was already apparent in the mid-sixties.

It was apparent, for example, when the Cypriots, who figured that out, brought the Cypriot issue into the General Assembly in 1965. What the Cypriots were getting in the Security Council was more or less a recognition of an effort to work their way out of the Treaty of Nicosia, which had established a certain Greek-Turk balance on the whole thing. What they really wanted to do, what Makarios wanted to do, was to change that regime, to say that that was a colonial imposition, that the Cypriots had signed the Treaty of Nicosia as a colony, not as an independent nation, and that, therefore, just as the rest of the formerly colonial world they had to take the steps towards the rest of their independence. They wanted the General Assembly to recognize their concept of what self-determination was for Cyprus. So they appealed to the third world to support them in a General Assembly resolution which would try to overturn in effect the Treaty of Nicosia.

That was the subject of a considerable amount of lobbying and campaigning in the General Assembly in 1965, the result of which was a some what equivocal one for the Cypriots. I think they won their resolution, but not with sufficient margin to really make it very operational.

BARRINGTON KING
Political Officer
Nicosia (1964-1967)

Ambassador Barrington King was born in Tennessee in 1930. His career in the Foreign Service included positions in Egypt, Tanzania, Cyprus, Greece, Tunisia, Pakistan, and an ambassadorship to Brunei. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

Q: You took a year of Greek training, and then you were sent to Cyprus, was that it?

KING: That's right.

Q: You were there from 1964 to '67. There were really only three places--Athens, Salonika and Cyprus.

KING: That's right.

Q: What was the situation on Cyprus when you arrived?

KING: Bad. I was supposed to be there on a certain date in August, and my wife was delivering our first child, which was a week or so late. So I got an extension of several days so I could be here when the child was born. I was supposed to leave two days later. Well, I found out I

couldn't leave because no airlines were flying to Cyprus because the Turks were bombing Cyprus, and so I was delayed several more days before going there. When I arrived, without my wife -- not because of the child, although that would have delayed her a few weeks -- but because once again we found ourselves in a situation where no dependents were allowed. So when our daughter was six weeks old, my wife flew to Beirut. Now it's sort of ironic, the situation is reversed, because now you might use Cyprus as a safe haven for Beirut, but not the other way around. But Beirut was very peaceful in those days, and she stayed there for a couple of months, and then once again the order on dependents was lifted, and she came to Cyprus. But all during the time there the political situation was tense, there was a lot of violence, and if you were an American you didn't feel safe at all. And as later events proved it was a dangerous place for us. In fact, the Ambassador to Cyprus was shot down right in front of my office door.

Q: Rodger Davies.

KING: That's right -- after I was gone.

Q: Could you explain the political situation, and politico- military, the whole situation on Cyprus at that time?

KING: As far as the United States was concerned, it was a no-win situation because -- I guess this is sort of common to islands -- a very self-centered view of the world. And you were either for the Greek side, or you were for the Turkish. But it was almost impossible to be for both, and since United States policy was trying to be even-handed we had a lot of Cypriots, both Greek and Turks, who disliked us for opposite reasons. It was very threatening. The island about eight months before had been divided in two by fighting, and the green line ran across the island, and ran through the center of the capitol, Nicosia.

Q: When did Cyprus become independent?

KING: Let's see, I got there in '64, in '63. And almost immediately law and order broke down. Vicious fighting, like most civil wars, in which a lot of civilians were murdered. The Turks all retreated to Turkish areas. The Greeks, they had been mixed before a good bit, retreated to Greek areas, and the north of the island became entirely Turkish, and the rest of the island became entirely Greek. You couldn't travel between those points if you were a Greek or Turk, you'd be killed, that's all there was to it; but you could, if you were a diplomat, but it was risky business and several times when I was driving in both the Greek and the Turkish parts of the islands, you'd be stopped by some 15-year old kid with an automatic weapon poked in your face. There were violent incidents all the time. Nevertheless, we had a house on the north coast and we went there on the weekends. It was a short drive of an hour or so. It belonged to an English woman, and they had all fled when the fighting broke out. She could get absolutely nothing for it because at the end of the street was a Turkish machine gun post. So we lived there anyway, it was close to the water, and we paid 10 pounds a month rent for it. That's what we offered and they'd take anything you offered.

Greeks could go there to Kyrenia, which was a sort of a resort area, but they had to be accompanied by a United Nations armored convoy that left every morning, and came back in the

afternoon. No sane Greek would have traveled any other way. We successfully did business with both sides, and as a matter of policy we had a Greek language officer who really never did any business with the Turks. And we had a Turkish language officer also, who never had anything to do with the Greeks. And that is the way it was, and that's about the only way you could operate. I was the Greek language officer.

Q: Who was the Turkish?

KING: George McFarland. He spent all of his time on the other side of the green line. I would go there occasionally but everybody considered me pro-Greek. For some reason people think if you speak their language, you're their friend, which doesn't prove a thing. Why were we training all these people in Chinese, and Russian in those days? Anyway, it was a very interesting tour because there were a lot of attempts to bring about a solution in which we were actively involved. My job, however, as economic officer but being the Greek language officer in the Embassy, I got involved in the political situation a lot. So that was fun. I did spend a lot of time on the economic side of things. One of the most powerful people in the country was the head of the cooperative movement, and he was seen as a potential successor to Archbishop Makarios, as President. It did not turn out that way, but I spent a good deal of time with him. Then I spent a good bit of time with the Cyprus balance of payments, because Cyprus was spending a lot of money on weapons...

Q: You're saying Cyprus. You're talking about the Greeks?

KING: Yes, and what was the legitimate government; you had to accept that. We questioned how well they were going to be able to survive with these large outlays for weapons. As it turned out they did very well. The Greek Cypriots are very industrious, and clever, and despite the fact that the island was divided, over the years they have become more and more prosperous, instead of going down the drain as some people thought they would.

Q: Where was their economic strength?

KING: Tourism, agriculture, mining, shipping. They had a lot of things for such a small country.

Q: Did you have much to do with Archbishop Makarios?

KING: Personally, no.

Q: What is the reflection of this man that you were getting from the Ambassador?

KING: Sort of respect for his uncanny skill in getting things done the way he wanted, and not so much respect for his motives and what he was up to. I think we tended to regard Archbishop Makarios a little bit like we did Nasser; that he was a potentially bad influence on some of his neighbors, and in the non-aligned movement we regarded him very much as an opportunist. And also we had the same problem, that is that he was getting weapons from the Soviet Union, and had various other arrangements with them, and tolerated, and encouraged the Communist Party, always making sure it didn't get an election majority.

Q: How did we see the Soviet Communist menace there? Did we see it as a real factor?

KING: Well, again, I think the professionals on the ground probably took it less seriously than Washington did. We were concerned. I guess probably the greatest concern was that it was provocative, and that Makarios was going to carry things so far that one day the Turks were going to invade. And, of course, that is eventually what happened.

Q: Did you get any feel that if the chips were down...we obviously wanted to keep these two allies from fighting each other, but if the chips were down where we were going to be standing?

KING: Oh, I think, as you say, we would try to keep some good relations with both. I don't think good relations with Cyprus would have been very important to us, but with mainland Greece, yes. But I think in the end Turkey was more important to us than Greece.

Q: Who was it -- Toby Belcher was the Ambassador?

KING: Yes.

Q: How did he operate? What sort of a person was he?

KING: I think Toby was about what you wanted for Cyprus; very easy going, gregarious fellow. He made a lot of friends, and managed to do it on both sides. About the only person who was really successful at that. He had a lot of good Turkish contacts, and of course, everybody who was anybody in the Greek community, and managed to convince them both that he thought highly of them. He worked very hard at it, and I think was emotionally involved in preventing a disaster happening in Cyprus. And he thought, I believe, that an armed conflict was the thing we must do our best to prevent. The rest of it would take care of itself if we were patient, and manipulated things, and waited. He worked towards that end all the time he was there. Of course, things really went sour after he was gone.

Q: How did we view enosis, the idea of unity between Greece and the community there, Colonel Grivas, and all that?

KING: I think everybody thought Colonel Grivas was a menace of the first order, and that he was deliberately trying to create a conflict in which there would be a war. And I think that's correct. I think we thought enosis was a fantasy. Nothing like that was ever going to happen. The British offered Cyprus to Greece in the first World War, and they refused it; mainly because the King of Greece was married to the Kaiser's sister, and didn't want to get involved, and forever afterwards regretted that, but from then on it was too late. But no Greek politician could ever say it, you know these facts very well. When finally the Papadopoulos government got itself involved, and then after Papadopoulos was overthrown, they really did something provocative, and all of that. Well, what happened is exactly what you'd expect would happen. I think we had it figured out all along.

Q: So you didn't feel that there was a thirst on the part of the Greek Cypriot population?

KING: That's a funny one. If you asked them, they would say yes; and if you said, "You don't really want it," they would become extremely angry. But, in fact, I'm not sure they did want it because they knew the Greeks looked down on them. Of course, all these Greeks who were there in civilian clothes were Army officers, and they did mingle with the Cypriots, and they had a very low opinion of each other. It's interesting what they called each other in slang. The Greeks called Cypriots, gaidhouria, donkeys. And the Cypriots called Greeks, kalmaradhes, which means people always scribbling with a pen.

Q: Well, you were moving over to the scribblers with a pen. You didn't really move out of the firing line, at least it was certainly an active time. You went to Athens in 1967.

KING: '67.

Q: Before or after April 22, '67, the time of the colonels attempted coup?

KING: After.

Q: Could you describe the situation in Greece at the time you went there? This is 1967.

KING: I think a polarization of opinion both in...well, within the Embassy for one thing, and also I think you had it in the U.S. government. The usual kind of polarization you have. One side seeing a great threat in Andreas Papandreou in the left; and the other side, quite naturally being very much opposed to this imposed dictatorship of the right. And as you know, through the five years that I was there, there was some internal division within the Embassy about what American policy should be.

Q: I wonder if you could describe, when you first arrived there, Phillips Talbot was the Ambassador, and how the Embassy viewed things? You were doing what there?

KING: I was in the economic section.

Q: How did you see the Embassy's internal view of this situation?

KING: I think Phil Talbot was basically quite unhappy with the situation that he had to deal with. But I think that he felt that he had to work with what was there, as best he could, and try to move the situation back to a more democratic regime. I don't think, in fact, there was an awful lot that we were going to be able to do about it until it just played itself out. In fact, that's pretty much the way it was.

Q: Did we have fairly open relations with people? Did you feel we were holding back as an Embassy, being somewhat standoffish?

KING: To whom?

Q: To the Greek government.

KING: A bit standoffish, yes. There was a factor then that was soon out of the picture, and that was the King. And I think we tried to make use of this third factor, to try to bring about a better situation. But once the King made his attempt, and that failed and he was exiled, and eventually, of course, the royal family was finished in Greece, then you had a polarization in Greek politics between the left and the right. The regime tried to make it very difficult for us to have anything to do with the left. They had some success with the U.S. government. I think in particular the best support they were getting was from Spiro Agnew.

Q: The Nixon administration came in in '69, and we had a new Ambassador there, Henry Tasca, who is a controversial figure. How did you see him? When you were there you saw both sides of two different Ambassadors.

KING: I think there was a definite change, and I think there was much closer contact with the regime than there had been under Phil Talbot. I think relations with the opposition were a good bit inhibited under Tasca. Tasca saw a lot of Papandreou, and his chief lieutenants. I occasionally served as an interpreter and went with him to dinner parties at Papandreou's house, and this kind of thing. So I saw a good bit of that, although I was not in the political section at that time. Eventually I did switch over to the political section. I was in Greece, as I said, for five years which was awfully long.

Q: Long, long. Particularly coming out of the Cyprus pressure cooker.

KING: As far as I know, I've probably had a longer continuous tour in the Greek-speaking world than anybody in the U.S. Foreign Service in our time.

Q: I would imagine so, yes. What was your impression of Tasca's operating style? I mean how did this Papandreou- Tasca chemistry work?

KING: I think Tasca was a more secretive kind of person. He was more inclined to concentrate on what he could do personally, without letting other people know too much about what was going on; as compared with Talbot who I think was more open, and led more of a team effort. I don't think people felt very much under Tasca that they were part of a team in which they could influence his views on things. I think a lot of people felt his mind had been made up before he ever got there.

Q: How did you feel...the potpourri, and the influences...I'm thinking of three different areas that I think were important: one would be our political section, then there would be the CIA, and then there would be the American military; all of whom had a role. Could you describe how you felt about these people coming out, and what they were doing in our Embassy? We're talking about the Tasca period.

KING: I would say we were being pretty supportive with the exception of some people in the political section of the Embassy. I think we were being pretty supportive.

Q: I was Consul General there for four years at this time, and my impression was that the CIA,

for its own reasons, was playing almost a pernicious role. Again, I was coming as a political reporter, but they seemed to discount country team meetings. Sort of a nasty business was going on in the Papandreou regime.

KING: That's right. I share that opinion.

Q: And I also felt that our military had too many Greek Americans in it, because of the language and they wanted to come back, it tended to be 110 percent super patriot, and thought this was fine, which was not a very good mix at this time.

KING: That's true, and on top of that, whereas the other parts of the mission that were interested in the politics of Greece, whatever you may think of their opinions, were competent and knew what they were doing. It was my opinion that the American military never really understood what was going on. They had emotional reactions to things.

Q: It was not, obviously, where we were sending our top grade people.

KING: But that's generally true. The Defense Attaché assignment is a dead end. I mean it's well known it's very rare for anyone who goes as a colonel as a Defense Attaché to ever get anything else much after that. No, they don't send their best people. You know you get ahead by commanding troops in the U.S. military, and that's not commanding troops. And they've got this long standing prejudice, so you're not going to get very good quality with personnel policies like that.

Q: Was there sort of an unrest would you say within the Embassy because of at least on the part of the Ambassador, and the CIA, and to a certain extent, at least a tacit, acceptance by the military of our increasingly close relations with the colonels?

KING: Yes. I think there was, and I think at times it got rather bitter.

Q: Can you think of any times?

KING: All the time. There were ups and downs. It depended on what was happening. Something would happen that some people in the Embassy would see as an outrage, and others would, as you said, try to excuse. This happened all the time.

Q: How about from Washington? Were we getting any particular direction?

KING: You see, even though by then I was beginning to get up in rank a little, and even though I was the number two person in the political section, that doesn't mean by any means I was being cut in on a lot of what was going on; particularly since my sympathy for some of it was suspect. I guess my feeling was that Henry Kissinger, whose main concern was that we do nothing to alienate Turkey -- wanted stability in Greece, which we allegedly had under the colonels. It proved to be not as stable as people thought it was. And also, Andreas Papandreou turned out to be not as big a threat as many thought. He finally did get into power, which was seen as just a terrible thing to happen; and now he's got himself out of power again by his own corrupt

behavior.

Q: At the time though he was considered to be a very dangerous person.

KING: Oh, a tool of the Soviets, and all of that, and without passing judgement on that, he just didn't prove equal to doing anything to a drastic degree.

Q: Greek politics, as usual.

KING: As far as I can see. Of course, I was gone by then.

Q: Were we feeling at all the pressure of the Greek- American lobby? Did you feel that in the political section?

KING: Yes, I guess so. We felt it in both directions though. We got a lot of people whose families felt they were being persecuted by the colonels, who were talking to their Congressmen. And you also had some who would support any Greek government as long as it was Greek, and therefore we mustn't do anything to it.

Q: Granted, Tasca particularly was sort of cutting people out, but did you get any feel about how we were sharing and working as American policy toward this volatile area with our Embassy in Ankara? Or were we just doing our thing, and they were doing their thing?

KING: I think Tasca had a sort of antagonistic view towards the Turks, and our Embassy in Turkey, just from a purely personal point of view. If he'd been in Ankara, he would have had the same feeling towards the Greeks.

Q: So you left there in 1972, and things really blew up in '74.

KING: Yes.

NICHOLAS G. ANDREWS
Political Officer
Ankara, Turkey (1965-1968)

Nicholas Andrews was born in Romania in 1924. His career in the Foreign Service included positions in Germany, Australia, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Poland, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on April 12, 1990.

Q: This is an interview with Nicholas Andrews. I apologize. We have to repeat a little, but you were sent to Ankara in 1965 to '68. Could you explain what you were doing there?

ANDREWS: Yes. I was the second man in the Political Section dealing with Turkey's foreign

relations, because I was not a Turkish language expert. And as such I found that Turkish foreign relations I was particularly concerned about were Turkey's relations with Greece, and with Cyprus, because there was not that much going on between Turkey and the Soviet Union, although much concern was expressed, there was not much in reality going on. Turkish relations with the Balkans were rather slim. Turkish relations with the Arab world were similarly rather slim, nothing of great interest. So Greece and Cyprus dominated the topic. And in 1967 there was a threat of Turkish military intervention on Cyprus. Turk Cypriots on Cyprus were being molested and their rights were being trampled on, allegedly by the Greek Cypriots, and at some point the Turkish government had had enough, and we were within a few hours of military intervention when President Johnson sent Cyrus Vance as his emissary to try to resolve the issue.

That was in itself an interesting period when Vance tried to deal with the Turks, and varied proposals and counter-proposals between Athens and Turks, and sent flash messages back and forth. And everybody stayed up, and didn't sleep during about a two to three day period. So the threat of military intervention was set aside, but Turkish feelings toward the United States were not improved thereby. The Turks feeling that we had interfered when they had a perfect right to help their Turkish Cypriot comrades on the island, and President Johnson had been very harsh in his threat to suspend assistance to Turkey if it took action in Cyprus. Turkey feeling that the threat from Russia was one thing, the problem of Cyprus was another, and we were linking the two and saying, "If you do this and such on behalf of your Turkey Cypriot friends then you're on your own vis-a-vis the Soviet Union." So that was, I suppose, a kind of a high point, although it was so quick it didn't last long.

I got more interested in the Turkish domestic scene just because there was not that much to do on the foreign scene. But it was a quiet period without the threat of Turkish military doing anything within Turkey. It was a period of civilian government.

Q: I'd like to go back to the Cyprus thing. What was your impression of what we were reporting from Ankara, what was being reported from Athens, and what was being reported from Nicosia? I'm thinking about our own. Were there bad cases of looking back on it, or at the time of what you would call localities, everybody seeing the issue in terms of their post rather than U.S. interests?

ANDREWS: I think there's no doubt that there was localities. I guess my feeling was also a form of localities. My feeling, I think, has always been, Turkey is a much larger state than Greece, has a much larger military force than Greece. Therefore, if it comes to war, the Greeks will never win. Therefore, the Greeks should not posture as if they're going to use military force, and as if they could beat the Turks, because that just doesn't fit with common sense.

On the other hand apparently during some of this period, at least the early part, the Greeks did seem to think that they could match the Turks in a war. How exactly they were going to do this, I don't really know. But I think it is that feeling of not being inferior, in the military sense, which tended to fuel the Greek politician's views that that they would defend the Greek Cypriots to the end, and that they would win out eventually. Maybe it was really the feeling that, if push came to shove, we, or others, would help the Greeks and prevent them from being decimated by the Turks, and eventually, because we were on their side, they would win. But my view was that, if

we said "a plague on both your houses," we're not going to help either one of you. We don't want to have anything to do with either one of you; maybe that would bring some sense into the views of both sides. Maybe it wouldn't. Maybe the Turks would take advantage of their superiority.

Q: Did you notice a cooling off of relations with the Turks? I mean as far as were sort of entrees being shut down?

ANDREWS: Not quite, but I think there were some hard feelings. I think there were one or two appointments that I couldn't get afterwards because they didn't want to bother to talk to me. I think there were some hard feelings on the military side of the equation where there was some reconsideration as to how soon they should get certain military equipment, and that made things worse. But the point is that over the long stretch of time with some Greek Ambassadors in Ankara who were very friendly to the Turks, who were very genuinely respectful of the Turks, and some good Turkish Ambassadors in Greece, it still hasn't worked out. In other words, relations have improved up to a certain point, and not beyond it. And then, as soon as something came up, the entire package of cards, building a somewhat better relationship, just collapsed again. Whether it had to do with the territorial sea boundaries, or whether it had to do with other things in the Aegean, or whether it dealt with Cyprus.

Q: I served four years in Greece, from 1970 to '74, and I never could side myself...during the time of the colonels and generals, so I was not that simpatico with the regime then. But we're talking about things that started with mother's milk as far as Greece is concerned, that these are animosities that are so deep that anything can spark them. And there's a certain point in common sense, and rationale, that diplomacy no longer has anything to do with it, which I'm afraid is true of much of the Eastern European area, and particularly the Balkan area. I mean there are these things that have been built in for so long.

ANDREWS: But realism does require, it seems, some kind of common sense in your foreign policy, and I don't see the common sense in Greece, given its size and population and military standing, being able to take on the Turks on the question of Cyprus or anything else. Just as I don't see the Hungarians being able to take on the Romanians. They may have everything on their side. They've got to achieve their objectives by diplomatic and political means, but not by military means. So waving that sort of threat, or having generals speak out on your foreign policy, is a mistake. Keep it political, keep it internationalized by all means, but don't get into the military end of things.

Q: I couldn't agree more.

ANDREWS: And the net result is, in fact, that the Turks are now on Cyprus, at least the northern part of it. And I don't know how we're ever going to get them out. In fact, I don't think its feasible really.

PARKER T. HART
Ambassador

Ankara, Turkey (1965-1968)

Ambassador Parker T. Hart was born in 1910. His career in the Foreign Service included positions in Brazil, Yemen, Kuwait, Egypt, Syria, and Washington, DC, and ambassadorships to Saudi Arabia and Turkey. He was interviewed by William R. Crawford on January 27, 1989.

HART: There were other problems, too, particularly the problem of Cyprus. As I mentioned in the manuscript which you've just read, in 1964 when things were going very badly for the Turk Cypriots on the island, the Turks made up their mind that they were going to land forces on the island to protect their own community. Getting wind of this, Raymond Hare, my predecessor, asked for 24 hours to consult Washington because he knew this might involve hostilities between Greece and Turkey. Greece had placed on the island, above the treaty limits of the London-Zurich Accords, quite a few thousand regular Army Greek officers and men to bolster the national guard. They were there presumably to deter the Turkish intervention. In any case, President Johnson signed off on a letter prepared for him in the State Department which was a very tough letter, indeed. One phrase in that letter caused us a great deal of trouble which was, "you will have to realize, Mr. Prime Minister, [that is Inonu], that your allies would not have had the time to determine whether they have to come to your aid in the case of a Soviet intervention."

This really was saying in so many words, "You may not be able to count on us if the Soviets come in and try to break up this fight."

It was a great mistake, in my opinion, to have introduced that phraseology. In any event, it hung like a cloud in the background of people's minds. We had had demonstrations, as my deputy told me when I arrived, the previous year against the United States for the very first time. It had never had happened before.

The combination of the Turkish Labor Party efforts to defame the relationship and to spoil it in any way possible, plus some actual things that had happened which I have described in my book "Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War," did cast a cloud over our relations. When I came in by way of Istanbul, I was prepared that people were likely to question me on the state of our relations. Sure enough, one Turkish correspondent got to me during the period when the plane refueled before going on to Ankara. He asked me if I would comment on the state of Turkish-American relations which he said were not so good. I told him, "I think they are fundamentally sound and good. I intend to pursue every effort to make them better."

He didn't push it any further as an American correspondent might have.

This is a rather long-winded way of describing some of the major issues that we had to face which kept us very busy. I have not discussed Cyprus because I wrote a book on it (Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War -- Cyprus A First-Hand Account of Crisis Management, 1965-68," Duke University Press, 1990.) and felt it was rather useless to go into that in great detail here. But that was the major crisis of my time. If you want to deal with it briefly, I could.

Q: I think it is pretty well covered by your book. Any other reflections, however, would be welcome in terms of what you think 1974 showed about underlying Turkish attitudes or where they expect the problem to go now. Are they there to stay?

HART: Shortly after the Turkish military intervention occurred in 1974, a high-ranking Turkish political figure came to Washington. He was an old friend of mine. I referred to the Cyprus problem, and he said, "Pete, there's no problem any more. It is settled."

Well, I knew what he meant, but it is still a problem. It is a problem for Turkey because of public opinion which is constantly being whipped up by Greek and Greek Cypriot political leaders who believe the only method of trying to pressure Turkey is through the United States. They are very active in pressuring our Congress to penalize Turkey for keeping troops on the island of Cyprus.

It all goes back, of course, to the basic syndrome between Turkey and Greece. You all know that. I don't need to go into it. There has been an effort in this recent period to try to break the crust of that syndrome and see what the realities really are. There is no reason, in my opinion, for continued hostility between Greece and Turkey.

During the period that I was in Turkey, however, the Greek effort was directed toward Enosis, union with "Mother Greece" by all Greek-speaking communities. The biggest community is really the only one of importance and it is Cyprus. Their effort there, as I learned even before I left Washington from the Greek ambassador, was to have it generally accepted that the London-Zurich Treaties of 1960 were a dead letter. They wanted to start all over again on the basis of Enosis. They felt that they had the Greek Cypriots with them. They knew they didn't have the Turk Cypriots with them, but they felt they could ride that one out. Greeks had massive superiority on the island in terms of numbers and military force.

The problem was with us in the embassy in Ankara as it was in our embassy in Nicosia and in Athens to try to see what we could do to avoid ahead-on collision. It was a problem that hung like a cloud over our international relationships. We knew that it was dangerous. We didn't know how it would develop, but we could see some flash points turning amber toward red. Sure enough, in 1967 it came within a whisker of war between Greece and Turkey. It was very close. Anybody that says that that was not a close shave, is wrong in my opinion because even in 1974 it wasn't as close as in 1967.

In 1974 you had the breakdown of the Greek government in the face of the Turkish invasion. In any case, you had a discreditation of the military regime in Athens with its own people and even with the Greek Cypriots. In 1967 it was different. The military regime had a different leadership. It was a Papadopoulos-led regime in Athens. They hadn't yet given up entirely on the relations with the Greek public. The Greek public, however it may have felt about the regime at that particular juncture, was pretty well under control. The press could not function freely. There were no demonstrations possible in the streets. There was no parliament functioning. King Constantine was still there. Papadopoulos had been plugging for Enosis but it was proven by the crisis of 1967 that, as a soldier, he was not willingly going to go to war with Turkey. He knew Greece couldn't win and that it would be a disaster. What was needed was a face-saving way of getting out of the fix. The confrontation was unraveled by Cyrus Vance because both sides really

needed him. Both sides really wanted his help. Public opinion was a bigger problem in Turkey than we had in Greece, whereas normally it would be the other way around. Greece was the place where there were notoriously volatile party politics and street demonstrations. These were absent, but they were not absent at all in Turkey. So we had a problem with public opinion, but the willingness of the Turkish government to conduct secret diplomacy with Cyrus Vance as the mediator was demonstrated over and over again in his visit which lasted from November 23 to December 3, as described fully in the book. Only about seven days during this time were actually spent shuttling between Athens and Ankara.

The Turkish leaders made it easier for him because they, themselves, kept the journalists from invading their premises. They couldn't keep them away from the door, but they could keep them outside. They could call a number of meetings at times when the journalists didn't expect it and didn't know where it would be. They called them deliberately in a place where the journalists would be caught absent. It worked. It permitted a calming of the atmosphere and further discussions to proceed on the issue of war or peace, even though the fundamental problems, the problems of governance of Cyprus, were not resolved. They still haven't been resolved successfully because you have got, in effect, two working democracies now on the island which have not yet found the key to a federation.

Federation was outlawed in the mind of Makarios when I was there. He wouldn't go for federation at all. He still thought that he was going to be able, somehow or other, to be the single master of Cyprus by what seemed to us to be a policy of making life discouraging for the Turk-Cypriot youth. If they went abroad, he made it hard for them to come back. Yet, since there was so little opportunity for them on the island of Cyprus under the circumstances, the Turk-Cypriot youth had every reason to try to find work abroad. The economy was about 100 years behind that of the Greek Cypriots. I think Makarios hoped that, eventually, Turk Cypriots would just simply migrate away so that the residue would be a lot of old people staying on with no influence and unable to do anything. The young people would be gone. I believe that was his policy at the time leading up to 1967.

Also, he had tremendous influence over the government that preceded the military government in Athens. In fact, he seemed to have more influence than George Papandreou. He probably had more influence than most of the top Greek politicians of that time.

We had a very close relationship between the three area ambassadors -- Phil Talbot in Athens whom I had known when I was working in Saudi Arabia and he was assistant secretary; and "Toby" Belcher in Cyprus whom I had known since 1959 when I had first visited the island. We three got together as best we could to try to see what we could do before the situation got out of hand. When it did begin to get out of hand, we were very close in our evaluations, and we trusted each other's judgements. Neither of us went off at too great a tangent on his own particular track. We tried to keep the main problem in focus. When Cyrus Vance came along, I'm sure he felt that he had good support from all three embassies, and certainly magnificent support in New York.

This was a very intense part of our three missions, working on this problem. It interrupted everything else that we might have been concerned with. I believe that I came to the conclusion that was better expressed by Elie Ledpiero in one of his writings. He said that rule by the

majority -- a sort of sacred principle in our part of the world -- works only if the composition of that majority and its outlook can shift and change with issues and with people's feelings freely expressed, so that the majority and the minority not be permanent. Permanence invites fear of oppression by the minority. Where the majority is hardened because it is ethnic and because it is looking out for its own interests first and foremost all the time, the situation threatens the minority of a different ethnicity. Then you've got the makings of real trouble. Until that problem is resolved, the rule of the majority over the minority simply doesn't work. It is the stuff out of which revolutions or civil war are made.

CHRISTOPHER VAN HOLLEN
Political Counselor
Ankara, Turkey (1965-1968)

Ambassador Christopher Van Hollen was born in Maryland in 1922. His career in the Foreign Service included positions in India, Pakistan, Turkey, and Washington, DC, and an ambassadorship to Sri Lanka. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on January 23, 1990.

Q: You went to the War College from 1964 to 1965 and then you were assigned to Ankara, Turkey as Political Counselor from 1965 to 1968. What were the main issues that you addressed in Turkey during this period?

VAN HOLLEN: The key international problem for Turkey then and now was its relationship with Greece; the contentious issue then and now was Cyprus. The task for American diplomacy was to maintain reasonably satisfactory relations with both Turkey and Greece since both were members of NATO and we believed that it was very important to keep a degree of cohesion in the southeastern flank of NATO at a time when these countries were on the verge of war. It was almost a replay of the India-Pakistan situation. It was obviously different, but there were similar elements.

There was a crisis over Cyprus in 1967. Cyrus Vance, later Secretary of State, was involved in it. The main task for American diplomacy was to assure the Turks of continued U.S. support while at the same time we were seeking to maintain satisfactory relationships with Greece. The domestic political equation on the Greek-Turkey question is that there are many more Greek-Americans than there are Turkish-Americans. That created domestic pressures favoring the Greeks. At the same time, Turkey was considered as very important in the NATO context because of its border with the Soviet Union. This was at a time of the Cold War so that there was strong emphasis on supporting Turkey as a NATO partner which was protecting the Eastern flank of NATO and which was threatened by the Soviet Union. This factor was constantly mentioned when the question of military aid arose.

Q: As Political Counselor, you talked to the Turkish Foreign Ministry and others. Were the Turks more concerned about the USSR than the Greeks, whose exclusive focus was Turkey?

VAN HOLLEN: The Turks were very much concerned about the Greek role in Cyprus. They were concerned about the impact of mainland Greek activities on the island vis-a- vis the Turkish minority, which comprised about 20 percent of the Cyprus population. They were very, very sensitive to any efforts by Greece to put into effect ENOSIS which was the union of Greece and Cyprus. While the Turks had the military power and the population advantage to prevail in a military confrontation with Greece, they were less certain on Cyprus, partly because of the geography of Cyprus, partly because of the concern about the international impact of a Turkish invasion of Cyprus. When Turkey did invade the Island, this caused a suspension of U.S. aid -- this occurred after my tour. Incidentally, for those who are interested in this period, Parker Hart, the former Ambassador, has just written a book on his experiences in Turkey, including the Cyprus crisis of 1967.

Q: How were the Turks to deal with? Were they greatly different from the South Asians?

VAN HOLLEN: A lot of people felt that they had difficulty dealing with the Indians because of the perceived "Indian arrogance" and India's alleged disdain for America. That was very much overstated. I did not have any difficulty in dealing with the Indians or the Pakistanis, either. The Turks were quite easy to deal with. By and large U.S.-Turkey relationships were fairly good and that may have helped matters. The aid levels were holding up reasonably well. Turkey had a pretty good reputation in the United States. Some of that went back to Turkish support for the U.S. effort in Korea when the Turks sent troops. They also had a very good top level Foreign Ministry careerist by the name of Ilter Turkoman, who later became Ambassador to France and the U.N. I had a very good relationship with him. Over all, the relationship was good. On the other hand, at the Ambassadorial level, Ambassador Hart took a lot of knocks from the Turkish press on the Cyprus question.

Q: How did the Turks view the Soviets?

VAN HOLLEN: It is hard to judge motivation, but the answer is that they felt threatened because of Soviet pressures after World War II in Eastern Turkey and in the Bosphorus waterways. At the same time, there probably were elements in the picture similar to those prevailing in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. While the Turks were concerned about the Soviet threat, they were also interested in U.S. military assistance in the context of maintaining their military superiority over Greece. In relative terms, the Turks saw a more direct threat from the USSR than did Pakistan, which at the time had the advantage of having Afghanistan as a separation between it and the Soviet Union. There was a bit of ambivalence on the Turkish side as well in the sense that they recognized that emphasis on the Soviet threat enhanced their prospects for U.S. military assistance for themselves.

VICTOR L. STIER
Greek/Turkish/Iran/Cyprus Desk, USIA
Washington DC (1965-1968)

Victor L. Stier was born in 1919 in Michigan and raised in Oakland, California.

His career in the Foreign Service included positions in Thailand, Greece, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Finland, The Netherlands, and Washington, DC. The interview was conducted by G. Lewis Schmidt in 1990.

STIER: The big problem when we were there, I guess they're still there, Cyprus was just--there was no way to get anywhere with the Cyprus problem. Archbishop Makarios was very difficult for the United States, a very intelligent but a very vain man and you couldn't really--American officials had a tough time dealing with him, but there was also the fact of Turkey as there still is a question of Turkey. I mean we had to maintain good relations with both countries, and it was hard slogging. For those five years that I was there the Cyprus problem made Greek-U.S. relations extremely difficult. In Turkey, too. If the U.S. pleased Turks, the Greeks were upset, and vice versa. Working in USIS in Greece was a very delicate, vexing, but also very exciting job.

Q: After Greece, where did you go?

STIER: Well, I was supposed to go to the Army War College, but the day before I was to leave Athens, all our good-byes were said, Bill Miller the European Area Director came through. I was sitting out in front of Floka's with a couple of Greek journalists, saying goodbye, when Bill walked up and joined us. I introduced Bill to them and when they left I said, I'm looking forward to the War College. He said, Vic old boy, but you're not going there. Arnold Hanson had been the Desk Officer in IAN for Greece, Turkey, Iran and Cyprus and he had just been given an assignment elsewhere, and I was sent to take his place in Washington. But before that I was given a wonderful opportunity, a tour of my area. I knew Greece and I knew Turkey, but I didn't know--well, I knew Cyprus, but I didn't know Iran, and I went to every post we had in Iran. I think there were five of them out- side of Tehran.

Q: Four or five, yes.

STIER: Iran was just a splendidly beautiful country and, of course, fascinating politically. Anyway, I spent three years in IAN as a Desk Officer. The first half, miserably, on the inside of the building, the interior wall so to speak, without a window on Pennsylvania Avenue, just going absolutely bananas. Occasion- ally I'd walk over and ask the indulgence of luckier colleagues to let me look out their window once in a while. It was a terrible claustrophobic feeling, at least for me. But finally, I worked up enough seniority in IAN to get myself a desk with a window. Big deal. I enjoyed that very much, working in Washington. It's the only tour I ever had in Washington and I never felt a Washington man. I was always a little bit of a rebel about that, but I learned a lot there, and it was fun watching the Washington government work.

Q: You said you learned a lot; what was it you thought you learned while you were in Washington?

STIER: This indeed was where I learned the Agency's principal task was assisting in the formulation of United States foreign policy, and what our role ought to be in trying to get along with the rest of the world and to effectively convince them of the rectitude of our views.

Q: Let's see. When you went back to Washington that must have been 1965?

STIER: 1965, July.

Q: Who was the director of the Agency? Was it Carl Rowen?

STIER: No, I think he'd left. It must have been Leonard Marks.

I was three years there in Washington and I'd been almost five years in Greece, so I ended up eight years of Iranian, Greek, Cyprus and Turkish affairs there. Much of that time was spent on Cyprus and NATO affairs. An increasing amount of time was spent on Iran.

CYRUS R. VANCE
Special Emissary
Ankara, Turkey and Nicosia (1965- 1969)

Secretary Cyrus R. Vance was born in Clarksburg, West Virginia on March 27, 1917. He received a bachelor's degree in 1939 and a law degree in 1942 from Yale University. He served as Secretary of the Army (1962-1963); Deputy Secretary of Defense (1964-1967); special representative of President Johnson in the Cyprus crisis (1967); U.S. negotiator at the Paris Peace Conference on Vietnam (1968-1969); Secretary of State (1977-1980); personal envoy to United Nations Secretary General on the Yugoslavia crisis (1991-1992); personal envoy to United Nations Secretary General on South Africa and Nagorno-Karabakh (1992); co-chairman to the United Nations-European Community International Commission on the former Yugoslavia (1992-1993); and special envoy to the United Nations Secretary General on Greece-FYROM negotiations (1993). Secretary Vance was interviewed by Paige E. Mulhollan on November 3, 1969.

Q: Regarding Cyprus first, I've been told in the course of this project, I think I can say without violating any confidence, that you're one of the few men in the world who can tell his grandchildren that he actually prevented a war -- in the case of the Cyprus controversy. How did that mission arise, and what were the circumstances that sent you there?

VANCE: I first heard about the possibility of being sent to Cyprus the day before Thanksgiving. I was sitting in this office, and at about eleven-thirty I received a call from Nick Katzenbach in the State Department. Nick asked me how I would like to go to Ankara. I thought he was joking and asked him what he really called about. He said, "I'm not joking." He said, "I'm serious. You may have seen that the Cyprus situation has heated up again, and there is a possibility that we may want to send you to Cyprus with the first stop being Ankara."

I said, "If you're really serious, I don't see how I can possibly do it. I'm terribly busy at this point. What sort of time pressure is there?"

He said, "The time pressure is immense, and if it's decided that you should go, you'll be going this afternoon."

Q: This was middle morning.

VANCE: Eleven-thirty in the morning. I asked him further about the situation, and he filled me in as to the events, which had somehow not caught the public attention. I had recalled seeing something on page ten of the New York Times that morning -- nothing on the front page -- so that I was really quite surprised to hear from Nick that the situation was as serious as it appeared to be.

As we talked further he indicated to me that the most recent analysis indicated that there was a strong possibility that the Turks might be going to invade Cyprus the following day. He said that they were checking their information further, and that if this checked out then the situation was indeed a desperate one.

I told Nick that I would be, under the circumstances, willing to go if the President felt that I could do the job, and said I would first, however, have to check with my partners and let them know what was in the offing.

Q: Almost tell them goodbye at that point.

VANCE: I got off the phone about five minutes till twelve and it being the day before Thanksgiving, a great many of my partners were not around so I found it hard to find some of my partners to talk with them. But I did indeed talk to a couple of them, and they fully agreed that if the President wanted me to go and with the situation being as grave as it appeared to be, that I should go. Accordingly at about twelve-fifteen I called Nick back and told him that I had checked with my partners and if the President decided that he did want me to go, then I would be prepared to do so.

I went out to lunch over at Dillon, Read and got a call at lunch from Nick saying that Secretary Rusk and the President had met further, and that they did want me to go to Cyprus, and that a cable was being sent to the capitals involved requesting permission for me to come as the personal emissary of the President. Nick also indicated that U Thant was going to send a personal representative; Mr. [Jose] Rolz-Bennett was to be that individual, and that he would be leaving some time later in the day as well.

Q: From here?

VANCE: From here. Rolz-Bennett was going to go to Nicosia, whereas it was proposed that I would go to Ankara and Athens, and then subsequently to Nicosia. I asked Nick what the time schedule was, and he said that I should be out at Kennedy by no later than four o'clock; that they were going to have a plane there; that Luke Battle would be flying up to fill me in on the latest information; and that I would have a small staff consisting of John Walsh, who was the Deputy to Ben Read in the Secretariat, and one Turkish expert and one Greek expert, plus a secretary. I told Nick that size staff sounded ideal, that I didn't want any larger staff and that I would look

forward to seeing Luke later in the afternoon.

I then called my wife, who was packing my suitcase to go down and visit one of my daughters at school for the Thanksgiving holiday. I told her that I would meet her at LaGuardia Airport to pick up my bag, but that I was not going down to Washington and Virginia to see our daughter, but on the other hand was going to the Eastern Mediterranean. After a considerable silence she finally accepted the fact that I was not joking and that indeed I was going to the Eastern Mediterranean some time that afternoon.

I drove out to LaGuardia and picked up my bag from my wife and went on out to Kennedy. I waited at Kennedy for an hour-and-a-half or so because the plane had trouble taking off from Andrews and was late arriving. It got into Kennedy some time after five, and I then got on the plane and talked to Luke Battle for about an hour or so.

Q: That was the only briefing you got, right there?

VANCE: That was the only briefing I got from Luke. Subsequently on the way over on the plane I read all of the cables to bring me up to date and discussed the situation in detail throughout the entire flight to Ankara with John Walsh and the two other staff members who were among our group. While we were waiting at Kennedy for an okay from Ankara that they would receive me, Luke checked in to find out what was happening at the U.N. and we received confirmation of the fact that Rolz-Bennett had already departed for Nicosia. The okay from Athens had come in and from Nicosia, but the okay from Ankara was long overdue. Finally at about six as I recall it, or six-thirty, we got word that Ankara had said that they would receive me. That meant it was about one o'clock in the morning Ankara time. I think there is about seven hours difference between the two.

The information that Luke gave me indicated that what Nick had said earlier appeared to be true, and that the best information which the United States government had is that the Turks plan to launch an invasion.

Q: Which would be that same day.

VANCE: Which would have been that morning at daybreak. Apparently the delay in giving the okay for me to come to Ankara was in some way related to the various activities which may have been underway at that time.

We flew nonstop from Kennedy to Ankara and upon arrival were routed into a fighter airstrip. The Turkish government indicated that they did not believe it would be safe for an American representative to land at the regular airport because of the intense feelings which existed in Turkey at the time. People had recollections, according to the Turks, of the 1964 crisis at which time the United States took a strong position which caused some severe repercussions.

Q: You were not associated with that personally though, were you?

VANCE: No, I was not associated with that personally.

We landed about first light at the fighter strip outside of Ankara, and the pilot incidentally did a superb job. He had never been into this airfield before, it was a cold winter's day with snow all around. He brought it in and landed on a fighter strip, and it was an absolutely superb job. Incidentally, it would have been absolutely impossible to carry out the mission with the recurring trips back and forth between the various capitals at all hours of the night and day without the superb help of the two crews which were flying the KC 135 which we used throughout the mission. They did an absolutely superb job. That plus the communications which were available were both absolutely essential ingredients of a successful mission, or a reasonably successful mission.

Q: What was your communications hookup? Was it to the White House, or was it to the NEA Bureau at State, or -- ?

VANCE: Through the command center to the State Department.

Q: You were getting your instructions through Battle's bureau?

VANCE: The only instructions that I had when I left were from the President, and they were to do everything within my power to try and prevent a war. They said that there would be further instructions arriving later, but there was really only one essential instruction and that was to use my best efforts to see that a war was averted.

On the way to Ankara we discussed the strategy to be used and concluded that with the limited time available to us, that it was absolutely essential to find if possible an agreement between the Greeks and the Turks as the two principal protagonists and then try to get the Cypriots to agree to the basic understanding which might be reached between Greece and Turkey. It was simply impossible within the limited time available to get all three people on board at the same time.

Inasmuch as the people whose troops would be used were the Greeks and the Turks, we decided that this is where we should concentrate our efforts. We further decided that what we should attempt to do was to find out what the essential position of each of the two countries was and then see if there was common ground which might provide the basis for an understanding. We further decided that we would not attempt to mediate until we reached the conclusion that there was not a basis for common ground in their stated positions. Accordingly, we then went through several days of shuttling back and forth between the two capitals trying to communicate the position of each to the other in an effort to find a common ground which might provide the basis for a settlement.

Q: Did you discover that the Turks had, in fact, been prepared to invade that morning and had stopped because of your mission, or had our information been not correct in that regard?

VANCE: I was never able to really tie it down to my satisfaction. My feeling is, however, that it probably was correct that they were about to invade that morning.

After two trips back and forth to the two capitals, Ankara and Athens, I concluded that it would

be impossible to get either country to agree to the other's position, and therefore decided that we should take the mediator's role and propose a four-point settlement which appeared to me to give each its essential needs and at the same time provide a face-saving device which would permit both countries to climb back from the limbs which they had gotten themselves on.

Q: You devised this four-point program yourself, on the scene?

VANCE: Yes. Together with the assistance and advice of our Ambassadors in Ankara and in Athens, they were Phil [Phillips] Talbot [in Greece] and Pete [Parker T.] Hart [in Turkey]. Incidentally they and Toby [Taylor G.] Belcher [Arab. to Cyprus] as well as all the members of the various missions performed superbly.

We took the proposal back to Ankara, and presented it to the Turkish government. Their initial reaction was favorable. They said they would have to consult with their Cabinet and with the opposition leaders and would be back in touch with us. That was early in the morning when they said that. The day dragged on. We heard that the meetings were being held with the opposition leaders, but we received no call from the Foreign Minister [Ihsan S.] Caglayangil or others in the Turkish government that they were prepared to pick up the conversations again. This dragged on into the evening and it was not until a little after midnight that we heard from the Foreign Minister. It had become apparent because of the delay that they had run into some kind of trouble, and this became crystal clear when we arrived at the Foreign Minister's office some time after one o'clock in the morning.

We sat in one room, John Walsh and I and Pete Hart, together with Caglayangil and his very able assistant [Turkoman] who incidentally now is the Turkish Ambassador to Greece, and negotiated with the Turkish Cabinet which was sitting in the next room. It was one of the most agonizing negotiations I have ever had anything to do with because we were negotiating with twenty-some individuals, each of whom had apparently strong convictions, and it made it awfully difficult to accomplish anything.

Q: You were also doing it secondhand, which didn't help anything, either.

VANCE: Right. We would receive suggestions for modifications of the basic four-point document, and we would then discuss them with the Foreign Minister and either accept them or make suggestions for their change, and these would then be taken in by either the Foreign Minister or Turkoman and discussed with the Cabinet. Then they would come back and report to us what the result had been.

Q: This still hadn't been presented to the Greeks at this point?

VANCE: No, it had not been presented to the Greeks. [To] each suggestion that was made by the Turks I responded in terms of what I thought was feasible and fair, keeping in mind what the Greek reaction would be as I saw it, having talked with them over a period of days back and forth -- because what I was trying to do was to find a middle ground that would be acceptable to both.

At one point during the night we came to a sticking point on the time the Turks were demanding for the withdrawal of all the Greek forces above the treaty minimum from the island of Cyprus, and the Turks were seeking what to me was an unrealistic and unreasonable time period. So I asked specifically to meet with the Prime Minister [Suleyman] Demirel, and we had a very difficult session which culminated in his going back to his Cabinet and coming back with a modification in the time which seemed to me possible to reach agreement on.

We concluded our session at about seven o'clock that morning, having worked throughout the night, and left with a somewhat mutilated and hardly articulate document to take back to Athens. We went back to the residence and picked up our shaving stuff and took off immediately for Athens.

When we arrived back in Athens we met promptly with Foreign Minister [Panayiotis] Pipinelis who took the document for his perusal and for consultation with the Greek Cabinet and the King. As you know, agreement was reached with one or two minor modifications on the document which I brought back from Ankara, and this formed the basis for the ultimate settlement.

The problem then arose as to how we were going to get [Archbishop] Makarios [III] on board, and we discussed that among ourselves at some length, and then our group took off for Nicosia.

Incidentally, I might say that throughout all of this John Walsh was a tower of strength. He was the one who was the basic draftsman of our cables reporting to Washington. He would do the first draft on the aircraft flying back and forth between the capitals so that we would have it typed and in final form when we arrived and thus were able to keep Washington fairly well clued in on a current basis.

Q: Were you having to get approval from Washington at each step of the way?

VANCE: No. We merely reported what we were doing, and assumed that if they felt that we were not proceeding in a satisfactory fashion they would let us know. But time was so much of the essence that there simply was not the time to report back and wait for instructions.

Q: The new Greek government -- the coup had already taken place --

VANCE: Yes, the coup had taken place before that, and the government was a government basically being run by the current Greek leadership. It had a civilian Prime Minister at that time, but the real power lay in the hands of the military.

Q: Was their desire to gain the continued approval of the United States a factor in making them amenable to the agreement that you had worked out with the Turks?

VANCE: They did not mention that at any time. I'm sure it's probably a factor that operated in their evaluation and their thinking about the problem. I think they became convinced that they were faced with the prospect of war between Turkey and Greece, with all the dreadful consequences that that would mean for their country, for NATO, and for the peace of the Eastern Mediterranean. So that the factor which you have referred to was only, in my judgement, one of

the many factors that was weighed in their conclusion that they should try and find a way to settle the matter and pull back from the brink of war.

Q: What were the other peace makers who were around doing during all of this time? The U.N. representative, and wasn't there a NATO representative [Manlio] Brosio there?

VANCE: Yes, Mr. Brosio was there. We reached an agreement that inasmuch as we -- the United States -- had been first in Ankara and Athens that we should take the laboring oar, and that the others would assist in every way which was necessary. I must say that the cooperation between Rolz Bennett, Mr. Brosio, and all of the others could not have been better. I look back with great interest and pleasure in seeing that it was possible to have a mediation and negotiation involving three different organizations, each having a part to play, and involving three different countries, and it was possible to integrate all of them and for each to contribute to the common end. I think that's the most satisfying part of the whole operation.

Q: Was there a Russian presence in the middle of it that was either positive or negative?

VANCE: The Russians did not play an important part. They only appeared at one time on the scene. They made a statement to the effect that should war come about that they would give support, and by that I believe they meant logistic support, to the Turks. But other than one meeting which took place in Ankara between the Russian Ambassador and the Turkish government, they did not appear to be playing an important role in the controversy.

Q: Did the participants think that the United States was genuinely impartial as between the two of them?

VANCE: I think that they did. At first, I don't believe that they felt that. I think that the Turks were very suspicious at the outset. They thought that we were coming to slap their wrists and to interfere in what they considered to be their internal problems, but I think as time went on they became convinced that the United States was seeking the common desire of all, namely to preserve the peace of the Eastern Mediterranean, and to prevent our good friends, the Turks and the Greeks as well as the Cypriots, from becoming embroiled in a conflict that could mean nothing but misery and hardship for all concerned.

Q: Did you talk to Mr. Johnson about all of this when you came back?

VANCE: Yes.

Q: You did see him then?

VANCE: Oh, I did indeed, and reported at length to him when I came back. He was superb all the way through this. One of the things that made it possible to accomplish what was accomplished -- and I think that people give us more credit than we deserve -- I think that really basically both countries found themselves in a situation where they had gone too far and both were looking for a way to withdraw, and we were merely able to act as the agent or intermediary which facilitated this process. But President Johnson was absolutely superb. He never tried to

dictate in any way the details of what was going on, but gave full support to our activities. His encouragement was invaluable during many bleak periods when it looked as though everything were going to fall apart and no settlement would be possible.

Q: You were in touch while you were in Ankara or Athens with the White House ?

VANCE: Not personally, but word would come through from the State Department speaking on behalf of the Secretary and the President. This was helpful to us.

Q: This sounds like a remarkable freedom for a negotiator in the field.

VANCE: It really was extraordinary, just extraordinary. And the fact that the President was willing to give that much authority to a negotiator in the field is to me perfectly extraordinary.

STUART W. ROCKWELL
Greek, Turkish, Cypriot, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near East Affairs
Washington, DC (1965-1970)

Ambassador Stuart W. Rockwell was born in 1917. His Foreign Service career included positions in Panama, Turkey, Israel, and Washington, DC, and an ambassadorship to Morocco. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on October 5, 1988.

Q: Then we move from 1965. You came back to Washington and you served in NEA as the Deputy Assistant Secretary in NEA, which stands for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. What were your responsibilities?

ROCKWELL: Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, and Iran.

Q: So you moved away from the Palestinian side of things.

ROCKWELL: Yes.

Q: Greece and Turkey later were moved into European affairs. How was the situation at the time? This is under the Johnson Administration for part of this period, and then into the early Nixon period, too. What was our interest in Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus at that time, '65 to '70?

ROCKWELL: Greece and Turkey were NATO members. We all know the strategic position of Turkey and the Straits, the Greek connection with air bases. Also, the Greek-American community is an influential one here. Turkey has one of the largest, if not the largest, number of people under arms in NATO. Turkey had taken part very honorably in the Korean War. I think that our interests were the traditional ones in that strategic part of the world.

Q: If I recall now, this is the time of the Cyprus problem. Was that at a particular boil during

this time? It goes up and down from time to time.

ROCKWELL: I'm sort of unclear about the exact timing. Of course, when I was there in that position, the Greek Government tried to overthrow Makarios and to bring about enosis between Cyprus and Greece.

Q: Enosis is the word for "union."

ROCKWELL: Yes. So that was a big crisis, and that resulted in the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. So that was a boiling point.

Q: The Turkish invasion came in '74, didn't it?

ROCKWELL: I don't remember the exact date.

Q: Cyprus is always a problem. Did you have much of a lobbying effort on the part, say, of the Greek-American lobby?

ROCKWELL: Yes, there were a great many people who were opposed to the Greek colonels, and there were people like Tom Pappas, who were very favorable to the Greek colonels.

Q: Tom Pappas was a Greek-American citizen who was head of Esso Petroleum, I think.

ROCKWELL: Yes, he was a businessman and he was, as I recall it, very much in favor of the colonels.

Q: Also, he was very influential in Republican politics. I know because as an aftermath of the Watergate business, I had to serve a subpoena on him because he was on the Republican Finance Committee and was part of the investigation. I had to subpoena him when he was in Athens, when I was consul general there.

What was the attitude of the Johnson and then the Nixon Administration toward Greece and Turkey, sort of a plague on both your houses? Did they try to leave it to the professionals, or did they get very much involved?

ROCKWELL: I think they left it more to the professionals. There was a general feeling that the Greeks and the Turks were constantly asking for too much money, and that we should give them what was needed in order to achieve our interests there, but that we'd been helping there for many, many years and that it was time to taper off. I think there was not a tremendous amount of interest, especially in Turkey, more in Greece than in Turkey.

Q: And in Greece it was really more because it was an unpopular regime.

ROCKWELL: Yes. However, the Nixon Administration, especially under Henry Kissinger, didn't feel very uncomfortable with the Greek regime.

Q: Just for the record, there was an overthrow of a democratic government in 1967 in Greece led by Colonel Papadopoulos, and that regime lasted until 1974.

The National Security Council was run by Henry Kissinger during part of that time when you were there, from '69 to '70. Did you feel the National Security Council was very interested in the area, or was Vietnam absorbing most of their efforts?

ROCKWELL: What period are you talking about?

Q: You were in from 1965 to '70. You were the deputy assistant secretary for NEA. Nixon came in in 1969. So you would have had 1969 and part of 1970 before you went to Rabat.

ROCKWELL: Yes. I don't recall that the NSC got very much involved.

Q: That really answers the question. There were other things to do done.

ROCKWELL: We used to have to go over there and explain what we wanted to do. Henry Kissinger would sit there and listen, but he didn't intervene. He didn't seem to be particularly concerned about it.

Q: It was only, I think, that he got rather involved later in the '75-'76 period.

ROBERT V. KEELEY
Political Officer
Athens, Greece (1966-1970)

Robert V. Keeley was born in 1929 in Lebanon of American parents, his father was a Foreign Service officer. As a Foreign Service officer he was posted to Jordan, Mali, Greece, Uganda, Cambodia, and was ambassador to Mauritius, Zimbabwe and Greece. The interview was done by Thomas Stern in 1991.

Q: That brings us to mid-66. You were then assigned to Athens. I think you mentioned earlier that Athens was on your list of "desired posts." So undoubtedly by mistake they assigned you to a post which was on your list of preferences.

KEELEY: It wasn't by mistake. It was the result, as often is the case, of good luck. The officer in Personnel responsible for my onward assignment was Robert Houghton, the late husband of my current executive assistant at the Middle East Institute, Lois Houghton. Bob Houghton had worked for my father in Damascus. My father had had a very fine staff there, made up mostly of younger officers; his DCM was Rodger Davies (later assassinated in Cyprus); others were Harry Symmes, Deane Hinton, Jim Leonard, Bob Houghton, etc. All went on to have distinguished careers, mostly in the Arab world. His CIA station chief was Miles Copeland.

So I knew Bob, though not well; at the time of my assignment availability, he was looking for a

candidate for a political officer position in Athens. The incumbent was an officer who had been there for five years, following two years in Salonika -- seven years in a row in Greece. Orme Wilson, who had served in Athens, was the Greek desk officer. Both he and Bob thought it would be a good idea to inject a little new blood into the Embassy. There had built up a "clique" of Greek-language officers who had studied the language, mostly at FSI, who all seemed to think alike, who all knew each other. A "revolving door" had in effect been established with the same people moving in and out of the Athens Embassy. I did not fit that mold, but when the files were searched for a Greek-speaking officer, my name came up. In those days, you had to fill out a form periodically in which you mentioned any languages that you had ever spoken and stated to what degree of fluency. I had not studied Greek, nor had I been in Greece for twenty years, since 1946, although I guess I had visited briefly on a couple of occasions. In any case, Bob called me and asked me how my Greek was. I said that it was somewhat rusty, but that it used to be very good when I was younger. He asked whether I would have any trouble brushing up on it on my own. I said that I didn't think so. I then inquired whether there was an opening in Greece, since I had wanted to be assigned there for years. Houghton said: "Oh, you've asked for Greece?" I asked whether he had looked at my April Fool card. He said he hadn't and that his interest had only been stimulated by my Greek language knowledge. He then asked whether I would be interested in Athens. I said I could be on my way the following day or as soon as the orders had been cut. Of course I still had several months to go at Stanford, which gave me time to hire a Greek tutor and improve my spoken Greek. And so that is how I got to Athens, as a member of the Political Section of the Embassy in Athens.

That section had five officers. The Ambassador was Phillips Talbot, formerly Assistant Secretary for the Near East and South Asia. His DCM was Norbert Anschutz; the Political Counselor was Katherine (Kay) Bracken, formerly Director of the Greece, Turkey, Iran Affairs Office (GTI); the next ranking officer in the Political Section was Malcolm Thompson, a Turkish specialist who was doing an out-of-country tour in Greece (he did the politico-military work); and he was replaced by George Warren in 1967; we had a labor officer by the name of August (Gus) Velletri, who was an expert in Italian affairs; and then there were two other Greek-speaking political officers, one-John Owens -- working on domestic Greek affairs, whom I replaced, and John Day, who was working on Greek external affairs, i.e., Cyprus, Greek-Turkish relations, NATO, Balkans -- everything but domestic political affairs. As I said, I was to replace Owens, but when I arrived at the Embassy, I found a rather unfortunate situation: Day had been switched to the internal affairs desk and I was assigned to the external affairs one. I didn't think that this was particularly to my benefit since it meant becoming almost exclusively involved in the Cyprus problem. I was a bit disappointed because my interest was far greater in the Greek political scene. On the other hand, I thought that since I knew very little about Greek domestic politics or Cyprus, it was probably wise to spend a year learning. After that year of apprenticeship I would be better able to fill either position and I certainly hoped to get a crack at the more important one, namely the internal affairs one. However, Day extended his tour, which was the custom of Greek language officers in those days and which was one of the reasons that Owens had been left in Greece for seven years. So John Day stayed two years longer; since I had a four year tour, I spent the first two on external matters and the last two on internal affairs. Actually I ended up as the acting Political Counselor because there was an extended vacancy. Bracken was replaced by Arch Blood, who stayed only briefly because he was assigned to Dacca, East Pakistan, as Consul General. So in the last six months of my tour, under Ambassador

Tasca, I was the acting Political Counselor, and sort of his right hand man, because by that time I was the only officer in the Embassy whom he had known from previous assignments, from when he had worked in the Bureau of African Affairs.

As I have said, during the first two years in Athens, I was not responsible for internal affairs. I injected myself into them because I didn't like the policies we were following at the time, during and after the coup of 1967. I argued that, while we were not responsible for the coup, it could have been averted and should have been averted. When it did occur, we should not have accepted it; that is, we should have tried to overturn it or reverse it. I felt that we could have done that successfully, although that was never tested. Had we done so, the situation would have been quite different and would have changed our relations with Greece from that day forward. We had a difficult policy issue to face -- the 1967 coup, its beginnings and its aftermath -- in which different elements of the Embassy took differing positions. There developed at least three camps, maybe more; in the end, it was probably more like one and a half when you sorted out all the differing aspects. There were those who, although not welcoming the coup, found it a more favorable development than any other alternative that they could conceive. There were those who were disappointed that it had taken place; didn't welcome it, but thought that the best course was to accept the coup and make the best of it. That group wanted to recognize the government and work with it and hoped to change its means and manner of governing to a more constitutional and democratic process which would protect human rights. And then there were a few of us -- two and half people, really (Mac Thompson, myself, and one other partly) -- who thought we should reject the coup and refuse to accept it and try to reverse it.

I said that I thought that the coup could have been averted. Briefly -- and it is a very complex story leading up to the coup -- there was first a Generals' coup developing (in contrast to the Colonels' coup that did take place). We were quite aware of the Generals' plot down to its last detail -- its code names, its means of operation, who was in charge, its purposes, etc. The Generals were intent on preventing an upcoming election, which was to be held on May 28, or if unable to achieve that end, to overturn the results. The election had become in effect a plebiscite on the monarchy, namely a fight between King Constantine and George Papandreou, the head of the Center Union party. Papandreou had been driven from office in the summer of 1965 in a dispute over his son Andreas and over who could appoint the Defense Minister. There had also been defections from his party; it is a well known, but complex story. His departure from office didn't resolve the political conflict. Papandreou was replaced by what was known as an "apostate" government made up of defectors from his Center Union party which lasted until the beginning of 1967. There were about 45 "apostate" Ministers supported by the Conservative ERE party in Parliament; it was a government of ex-centrists existing on the support of conservatives.

The political situation was obviously very unstable and complex. It could only be resolved by elections. Such an election, if won by Papandreou, would have challenged not only the power, but even the existence of the monarchy, because the 1965 crisis and aftermath had placed the King and Papandreou in direct conflict with each other. The Generals were very pro-monarchy, as the military had always been in the post World War II years, although in earlier years a split had developed between the Royalists and the Venizelists in the military.

In any case, the Embassy was fully aware of the Generals' purposes and activities. The King had asked Ambassador Talbot how the United States would react to a coup. The Greeks tend to use euphemisms in their politics; in this case, the possible action was described as an "extra-parliamentary" or an "extra-constitutional" solution—a coup by other names. The government would consist of the Generals with the King's blessing. Talbot responded, even though he had no instructions (he didn't receive any real guidance even after the conversation with the King), that "it would depend on the circumstances."

That is what set me off. When I read the cable, I began to consider what "circumstances" might justify a coup. My analysis was that such an event would only be a temporary solution; a coup couldn't last and would probably make matters worse, because eventually the Greek population would insist on democracy in one way or another and the end result would be even more damaging to the monarchy, the military, and the Greek relationship to the U.S. and NATO. So we had an opportunity to tell the King that a coup would not be an acceptable outcome. I think the Generals would not have proceeded if we had said "No." They were after all operating on behalf of the King and in his name; he may not have known all the details, but he knew all about the Generals' strategy and objectives. I can't guarantee that the King would not have proceeded against our wishes, but since he asked for our views, as did the Generals in a less direct fashion, one can make an argument that he would not have proceeded.

After all, we played such a prominent role in Greece that our advice did not need to be sought so directly; we were in constant contact with the King, the government, the military, etc., so that our views could have been conveyed in many different ways. They would have listened; whether they would have accepted our advice, I cannot of course say. I should add that I am not saying that Talbot could have given a negative answer on his own; that would have required Washington instructions. But what upset me was that the answer given was so vague that I don't think the King understood it or that it was at all helpful to him. It just left him in a quandary. Partly as a consequence of this murkiness that we created, the Generals' coup never took place. It was preempted by a group of Colonels acting secretly. They stopped communicating with anybody -- our intelligence service and anyone else. They went underground as of January, 1967. But they also went into action that resulted in their coup of April 21, 1967.

In retrospect, when you look back on the sequence of events, as I did, it is very interesting. Everything was cut off. My guess, which I couldn't prove without access to intelligence archives, is that the Colonels went into an "operational" mode and cut all contacts. They stopped talking to people, particularly those who might thwart them. They were after all not only plotting a coup; they were also preempting a coup that had royal approval, that was being conceived by their own superior officers, and that was apparently not opposed by the Americans. The Colonels were running tremendous risks; if they had been caught, they would have been in serious trouble. They probably would have been tried for treason, as they of course eventually were.

I didn't see the Colonels' coup coming. I saw the Generals' coup developing. My feeling was that this effort would not solve the political problem in Greece; in fact, it would exacerbate it. I thought that we owed it to the King, for whom I did not have any particular attachment, to give him appropriate advice as clearly and as straight-forwardly as possible. We, in fact, "copped out." To say "it depends on the circumstances" was not very helpful to anyone. The

circumstances in Greece at the time were dire. The forthcoming election had developed into a referendum on the monarchy and the whole constitutional system. We were caught in the middle because we had become, from the point of view of the center, the allies of the conservative party. The Center Union had begun to boycott us. Its members wouldn't attend our receptions; they would not deal with us. It was even very difficult to find anyone who would talk to us. I knew some personally, through family and other connections, but even I had difficulty and I was not the officer in the Embassy responsible for internal political issues. During this period, Ambassador Talbot had exactly two meetings with George Papandreou, who was the head of one of the two democratic parties in Greece. He was the probable winner of the upcoming elections; he would be the future Prime Minister, and we saw him just twice in a period of five or six months. That is a clear indication that something was amiss in our relationships with the Greek political spectrum. The American Embassy was being identified with the likely electoral losers and with those who were plotting with the King and the military leadership to prevent the election.

I think that Talbot may have tried to see Papandreou more often, but he and we were not welcomed by the center group because Papandreou really blamed us for what had happened in 1965. He thought that his demise at that time was a CIA operation and that we had bought off the parliamentary deputies who voted him out of office. When a government is created out of defectors-apostates" from one party who gain power with the support of another party -- tensions are severely increased and relationships tend to become nasty. It was much nastier than even if a rigged election were held. The shifts of allegiances are matters that impinge on personal relationships and create all sorts of accusations of bad faith. Greece has a very personalized political system in any case. The members of a party are viewed as "my members;" the deputies are chosen personally by the head of the party; they are elected together, so that defections are felt as personal betrayals far beyond just political or ideological shifts. They are "traitors and turncoats." The emotional level was extremely heated during this period in Greece.

I really had no portfolio to become involved in these issues. I was responsible for external matters such as Cyprus, which I was covering, although in general external problems were pretty much under control. When I read about the Ambassador's exchange with the King, I thought I should do something about that. I consulted a close friend, Bruce Lansdale, with whom I had grown up in Salonika, who had lived most of his life in Greece and understood the Greek mentality. He was the Director of the American Farm School in Salonika at this time. He happened to be in Athens for a day; he didn't have much time for a discussion because he had a lot of appointments with government officials. But he did come to the Embassy and I offered to drive him to the airport so that I could talk to him. I would also have a few minutes while he waited for his flight. I told him point blank that I thought there would be a military coup and that it would happen sooner than anyone was expecting. He said that he had the same feeling. Then we pursued the idea and I found that his views and mine were so close that I was amazed. He was not working in the Embassy. He was sitting in Northern Greece with students and peasants and farmers, but, as I said, he had a great understanding of the Greek mentality.

So after this discussion, I went back to my office and wrote a long memorandum to my boss. It was about twelve double spaced typed pages which was entitled something like "Our current dilemma" or "The present political situation." I started out by saying that I thought there would

be a coup sooner than anticipated. Then I discussed a) the probability of a coup by some Generals, which I thought was not only possible but probable; b) the timing -- and here I thought I was making a contribution, because although there was noticeable tension in the air, people were also relaxed because no one thought that something unexpected would occur prior to the scheduled election. But the logic of the situation, i.e., the reason for the coup, was to avoid the election. It didn't make any sense to assume that the coup might happen after the election, although that was the existing conventional wisdom. I didn't think that the Generals would permit the election of Papandreou and then have to step in to remove him. That scenario didn't make much sense to me; if the Generals didn't want a particular electoral outcome, they would prevent the election from taking place. Therefore, I predicted that the coup would take place well before May 28. I suggested that we would wake up one morning three weeks hence, say, and find a military government in power. And I discussed the possible consequences of a coup.

If Ambassador Talbot had read my memorandum immediately -- it didn't get to him for several days -- he would have been very annoyed because I criticized the view that the U.S. attitude toward a coup would "depend on the circumstances." We knew what the circumstances were; we knew who was involved and why. That brought me to the question of the consequences, and I thought it would make matters worse rather than better. I finished this memorandum at around 8 p.m. on April 20. I then locked it in my safe and went home to pick up my wife to go to a ship owner's apartment in Kolonaki Square for a cocktail party. At the function there was the usual talk about Andreas Papandreou and how awful he was. He had just given a speech in which it was reported he had said that Greece didn't need a King to swear in a government and that if his party won the election, they would swear themselves in; he was accused of challenging the entire constitutional system; he had in effect made the King the enemy in his electoral campaign and had the Center Union running against the King and not the conservative party. He had described all of the opposition as "one kettle of fish" and used his usual diatribes, according to the talk at the cocktail party.

My wife and I then went out to eat in a restaurant called "Vladimiros" run by a Greek named Elias, who was probably an intelligence operative, or some service's agent. He pretended to be an ex-communist guerrilla who had fought in the mountains in the Civil War. He was a funny guy, but he was very well connected with the left wing party -- what we used to call the crypto-communist party -- the EDA, which stands for the United Democratic Left. I wanted to find out from this restaurant owner, who was probably my best source from that part of the Greek political spectrum, what the Left intended to do. It was critical to know whether the Left would support Andreas Papandreou and his slate of deputies in order to try to defeat the Right and the King, or whether the Left would support its own candidates. This was known as the "subsidy" factor for the upcoming elections. I did not get a very good answer that night; Elias claimed that the Left would support its own candidates. We went home about 1 a.m., went to bed, and the Colonels' coup happened that night. When I woke up in the morning, the tanks were in the streets. My son told me that I didn't have to go to work because the buses were not running and schools were closed. That was a clear indication that something terrible had occurred.

Colonel George Papadopoulos and his gang took advantage of the situation and all of the turmoil and the planning for the Generals' coup by simply preempting it. These Colonels had been plotting for years and years in the Army. They were fascists; they fitted the classic definition of

fascism, as represented by Mussolini in the 1920s: a corporate state, uniting industry and unions, no parliament, trains running on time, heavy discipline and censorship, extreme nationalism, xenophobia, religion, regimentation; everyone was organized in some kind of group -- youth, professional association, syndicates. There was no particular anti-Semitic component, because Jews were not a factor in Greece. In other words, it was not what we associate with Nazism; the national socialism part was adopted essentially from Mussolini's original program, not from Hitler -- it was almost a classic fascist ideal.

Several weeks later, to the annoyance of some people, I sent around a memo with a short encyclopedia definition of fascism, pointing out that it was practically *verbatim* the program of the new government. I am talking about real original "fascism," not the kind that developed historically in Italy or Spain or Germany, for example. The Colonels were students of General Metaxas, who had led a pro-German dictatorship from 1936 to 1940. It disappeared with the Italian invasion and he died shortly thereafter. That is the model that the Colonels, who were young men in the late 1930s, just in or recently graduated from the military academy, were trying to emulate. They were true believers.

I thought that the coup could be over-turned. The King was very unhappy with it; it was not led by *his* Generals; he didn't know any of the Colonels. They had monitored his movements; they had beaten up his military aide, Major Arnaoutis, which was humiliating to him, and they had in effect presented him with a *fait accompli* and had told him that "This is it. Take it or leave." The King didn't have much choice. We couldn't help him; it was the majority view that there wasn't much we could do. I thought that we could have worked with the King and with the Generals and reversed the situation. We didn't try; my advice wasn't accepted and was not even welcomed; it was probably considered much too radical and dangerous. I did give my April 20 memorandum to Kay Bracken the morning of the coup, but she probably didn't look at it for several days. I told her, when I gave it to her, that my thoughts had been overtaken by events, but that I thought the analysis still had relevance to the then current situation. It was obviously not the Generals' coup, but an entirely different one, but it was a coup nevertheless, which the United States had to confront. The King was asking for advice and help; he didn't know what to do. Mrs. Bracken returned my April 20 memo to me with a notation at the top that she had "noted" it. That was quite a put-down, as it meant that she thought it was entirely irrelevant.

The coup took place on a Friday. On the following Wednesday, John Day had been sent to Washington to try to find out what U.S. policy was or was going to be. We were not getting any inkling whatsoever; we had a lot of questions and no answers. It was one of those very difficult situations with no useful communications coming out of Washington, which seemed paralyzed by unexpected events. We in the field felt at the end of a very long cable line -- kind of helpless. The Embassy was feeding Washington all the information it could; we were working over-time trying to figure out who the Colonels were; no one knew them. We had no bio-data on them; they didn't speak English; they were not part of our military circles. Only one had been trained in the United States-Brigadier General Pattakos -- he even spoke some English. The other coup leaders had not been in the U.S.

I argued, as I mentioned, that we could reverse the coup. There is no evidence whether I was correct; we never tried, but I did have some evidence that some counter-action on our part might

have succeeded. It was my view that we could turn events around because the Colonels were so shaky, but we would have had to work with the King. There would probably not have been much opposition and the reversal might have been bloodless. But who knows? There were no guarantees. I'll explain what I based my argument on.

I went with Ambassador Talbot to see the new Prime Minister. I was the note-taker because John Day, who would normally have filled that role, was in Washington. The Colonels had installed a civilian, a Supreme Court judge named Kollias, as the front man. All the decisions were being made by Papadopoulos and his military colleagues, but they wanted a civilian *facade*; the King might have more or less insisted on it. He had agreed, two or three days after the coup, to swear them in as a new cabinet. The principal Colonels held the key positions and while the King didn't exactly bless the new government, he did have his picture taken with them. That was published in the newspapers and therefore at that point almost everyone had given up and had decided that they would have to live with this new regime.

Talbot's meeting with Kollias was the first official American contact with the new government. Talbot was concerned with the usual issues: safety of U.S. citizens and security of our military facilities, which were important to us. He was not of course really overly concerned with these issues because as far as we could tell, the Colonels were not anti-American. They appeared to be pro-NATO and pro-American, violently anti-communist. They were not really a concern in terms of our East-West confrontation; to the contrary, the problem was really whether they could manage the situation. I went to the Ambassador's meeting with Kollias as the note-taker because I knew Greek, although there was an official interpreter present as well as our own, who was not used at all. The Prime Minister started out by saying: "Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much for calling on me. I wonder whether you could do something for me? There is a rumor circulating in town that the Sixth Fleet is on its way to Phaleron Bay [this is where it used to anchor near Piraeus] and when it arrives, it will demand the resignation of my government. Have you heard that rumor?" Talbot, an experienced diplomat, thought quickly and said that he had not heard it and that it sounded rather preposterous to him. Kollias said that he was happy to hear that, and he then requested that the Embassy issue a statement refuting the rumor. Talbot very quickly and shrewdly responded: "No, Mr. Prime Minister. There are a lot of rumors floating around this city and especially at the moment. I have heard some, but surely not all. If I start denying one rumor, then the one that I haven't heard and therefore haven't denied will gain credence. Heaven only knows what that might lead to. So I think denying one rumor is a losing proposition."

The Prime Minister said he understood Talbot's position, but he said that crowds were gathering at Phaleron Bay with binoculars waiting to welcome the Fleet ashore and to show the Marines which way to advance. I could barely suppress laughter at this juncture; the P.M.s' hands were literally shaking. So then the Prime Minister asked whether *he* could put out a statement, to which Talbot responded: "It is not up to me to tell you what you may or may not say, but you should not quote me." So the government did put out some kind of statement without reference to Talbot or the American Embassy. Of course, as is always the case, when a rumor is denied, people tend to think it is true and you get the opposite effect from what was intended. So word went around Athens that the Sixth Fleet was on its way to replace the Colonels with the Generals because we wanted the Generals and not the Colonels.

This conversation with Kollias led me to write another memorandum, or rather a whole series of memos, which in essence became the basis for a memoir that I wrote later on covering this period. In the memo I said to the Ambassador that the Prime Minister's performance (which we described in detail to Washington in a cable and which should have shocked the Department because it suggested that Greece had a very unstable government), which was so lacking in confidence and so worried, indicated to me that the coup could be reversed with "a flick of the finger" (as I put it none too graciously) if we just told the government that it was not acceptable to us. My note so energized the Ambassador that he called me in to ask me where I got that idea from. His secretary, whom I knew well, and who like all good secretaries read all the papers that went to the Ambassador and therefore knew what was going on, told the Ambassador that there was a certain amount of dissent within the Embassy and that there were people who disagreed with current policy, which was essentially a "hands-off, let's see what happens" position. These staff members, she told the Ambassador, were in favor of a much more activist policy which would have called on the U.S. to do something. So the Ambassador called me in and asked for a further elaboration of my views; he asked for all of my recent memoranda, which he took home over the weekend; he read them and then sent them back to me without comment a week later, by which time the coup was a permanent fact.

Q: This was the first time you encountered a policy issue which divided the Embassy. What comments might you offer on the perception of the local people to a divided Embassy?

KEELEY: You are assuming that the Greeks were getting mixed signals from the Embassy. I don't think that was the case. That had something to do with Foreign Service discipline. Foreign Service people, if under good discipline, generally do not take policy differences outside the compound. The differences are confined to internal discussions. Although I had a lot of friends in the Greek political world, particularly in what became known as "the opposition" for the next three years, and undoubtedly some may have had a general feeling that I had some doubts about existing policy, they didn't have any great details and not right at the beginning. As far as I know, none of the U.S. government employees, including the military, discussed the intra-Embassy debate with Greeks. If you are looking for hints and signs, maybe one could have concluded something when the U.S. Armed Forces Radio Network began to broadcast "rock and roll" music exclusively -- no news, no talk shows. That was viewed as a precaution; under the circumstances, all officialdom tends to go into a shell and to stay out of things. If a bulletin is read over the radio, people are afraid that it will be misinterpreted that the U.S. was up to this or that. I don't think that even the Embassy's local employees were conscious of the internal debates; there is a tendency to keep one consistent public face while vigorous debate may be going on inside the Embassy walls.

In any case, the dissent was limited to very few people who were trying to influence their superiors; we were not trying to influence the Greeks, or any element thereof, to behave in a different way. Eventually, undoubtedly some of the debate seeped out and it became known that different Embassy officers had different attitudes. It depends in part on whom you see and whom you talk to and the kinds of discussion you have. You would be careful not to criticize your superiors or the policy, but you can't help expressing an attitude or point of view; that is just part of normal behavior. My wife and I tried to help a number of families whom we knew who had relatives and friends in prison. They were political prisoners and our actions certainly showed

some sympathy for their point of view; the Embassy's and the U.S. government's attitude was entirely "hands off" -- it was an internal matter. We didn't in those days -- the mid '60s -- have a major investment in a human rights policy as we have now and have had more recently.

In any case, our government's policy was clear; whatever differences there were, were on an individual basis. Some of this dissent has come out over the years because after all I have been dealing with Greece for many years and by now there are a good many people who know.

Q: Did you reach any conclusions about our intelligence capabilities in light of the surprises that arose in Greece during your tour?

KEELEY: That is an interesting question. I tried to analyze that problem in the memoir I wrote just as a point of interest. First of all, successful coups are often the ones that are not predicted. The unsuccessful ones obviously are the ones that become exposed and are therefore thwarted. So stealth is certainly a key ingredient in a successful coup and that is what happened in Greece. CIA has been blamed for engineering that 1967 coup or for fomenting it or for supporting it or for organizing it. I don't believe that for a minute. I have tried to examine it from a logical point of view. I know that the "station chief" and his deputy were not knowledgeable; they had run into the same military road-block as I had the morning of the coup as we were all trying to get to the Embassy. They were completely unaware of the coup and when we met at the Embassy, they had nothing to tell us; as I said, neither CIA nor we -- nor our military attachés! -- knew who these Colonels were. I have to believe that Washington headquarters was also in the dark. There is a possibility that one or more lower level people, particularly some Greek-Americans who worked in the intelligence services, both military and civilian, knew about it in advance, because they were very sympathetic to the Colonels and their approach. These staffers were very conservative, very anti-communist, fearful of the Papandreous regaining power; one might say even anti-democratic in some respects. It is possible that they knew about the Colonels' plot and failed to report it either because they were cut off from their sources or because they colluded with the Colonels by not passing on information which would have enabled us to predict the coup.

On the other hand, careers in intelligence services are often made by being the sole source of very important information and developments. You can become a hero by being the person who predicted an event when no one else had. In the Greek case, someone could have made a real career-enhancing move by predicting the Colonels' coup when everyone else was watching the Generals. That would have been particularly true if the agent or case officer could also have added that he knew the plotters and all their plans. So an intelligence agent would be motivated to tell all in the kind of situation we had in Athens. The question then becomes whether some of the agents were more strongly motivated by their own political leanings or by their career ambitions. I don't have the answer and I don't think it could be answered one way or another without access to their reporting, that is, to CIA's archives. Even then one couldn't tell if someone had deliberately not reported what he knew.

I believe that I do know that the reporting stopped in January of that year; there had been reports on these Colonels for many years, but they stopped in January, 1967. The State Department's intelligence analyst for Greece-Charilaos Lagoudakis -- noticed that fact; he was very skillful and was the Department's institutional memory on Greek affairs. He was the kind of person the

Department should have for each country in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research; he or she would be the one whose experience would go back so many years that everything would be known and remembered. When you have turn-over in those analysts' positions, it is an absolute waste and it creates an absolute bureaucratic nightmare. He or she would be the single person who would notice such events as the stoppage of reports because they had been coming in for years and all of a sudden, in January, there is nothing. That stoppage would be accentuated by the knowledge that rumors of and even reports on a Generals' coup were rife. The analyst would then have to ask why he was not seeing reports any longer on the Colonels. What are they up to? Are they part of the Generals' coup?

In early 1967, the INR analyst (Lagoudakis) did make some inquiries; he didn't get any answers and the coup took place. Then he had some big questions; they also were never answered. Did reporting exist which wasn't disseminated? My guess is that there was no reporting on the Colonels after January, but I don't know why. I don't know whether anyone has ever investigated that set of circumstances. I would have thought that someone might have wished to pursue this apparent coincidence. The reports on the Colonels had been intermittent; it could well have been that four months could have passed without contact, but because of the timing, my guess is that Papadopoulos and his group, which was about twelve to fifteen people -- small enough to keep good security -- went into an operational mode and cut off communications with all outsiders. Then they put the final touches on their plans and waited for the "go" signal from Papadopoulos. In the meantime, the Colonels were instructed to go about their business as usual. Most, if not all, of the Colonels were part of the Greek intelligence service, all of which was part of the military -- their CIA, for example, was a military organization. They were not troop commanders, which was one of the reasons that we didn't know much about them. They had been principally in staff positions in personnel and intelligence; that was deliberate. They got themselves assigned to those areas because they provided the best base for plotting.

They did a very clever thing. General Spandidakis, who was the Chief of the General Staff -- the senior military officer under the Commander in Chief, the King -- called a meeting in Athens on Wednesday -- two days before the coup. This I found out by doing some research on the events of that week because it interested me. He had all of his senior commanders present; most came from the North because that was where most of the Army was located -- according to NATO plans that called for massing on the Albanian and Yugoslav and Bulgarian borders (and to some extent, the Turkish border). This meeting was a regular session that occurred every couple of months. There was an important promotion list coming up, so they had a number of issues to discuss. My guess is that Spandidakis also told his commanders that everything was in place for the Generals' coup, but that the time to pull it off had not yet been reached.

On Thursday, the Generals returned to their units. The following day, Friday, they receive orders to execute their coup. The field commanders obviously concluded that the Chief of the General Staff had changed his mind since Wednesday; something had happened -- the King had given his approval or the Americans or someone had said "Go." Also, George Papandreou was going to Salonika on Saturday to launch his electoral campaign. There would be a tremendous crowd; the atmosphere would be politically super-charged; there would be demonstrations and possibly riots. So some of the field commanders undoubtedly assumed that the leaders of the Generals' coup wanted to pre-empt the Salonika event; in any case there were a number of plausible

explanations for the Friday order. So they executed it. They didn't know of course who had signed it in Athens; they didn't know it was a Colonel (Papadopoulos). So it was extremely cleverly done and I guess that is what the Colonels were planning to do all along. The Colonels may also have been even a little premature; they probably were waiting for the Chief of the General Staff to call for the coup and then they would pre-empt it. So they may have moved a little sooner than they may have originally planned, but they certainly did pre-empt the Generals, using the latter's plans. The Generals were caught flat-footed.

The worst episode from an intelligence failure point of view happened on December 13, 1967. The King tried to throw out the Colonels. That is known as the King's coup. All of this has been covered in other writings, so I will just be brief. Having failed in my efforts to motivate people to reverse the Colonels' coup, I returned to my regular duties, except that some ex-politicians kept contacting me, some directly and some through mutual friends. At one point, in mid-November, I was asked whether I was willing to meet with George Mavros, who had inherited the leadership of the Center Union party -- George Papandreou having been jailed, as was his son (father under house arrest and son actually in prison). The government had threatened to try the son, but not the father. George Mavros was free and the nominal head of the party, although as a stand-in for George Papandreou. I said I would be glad to meet with him. I had always assumed that my responsibilities included reporting on what the ex-politicians were up to. They were no longer active -- couldn't be. We should have been interested in what they were doing and thinking.

When I met with Mavros, a meeting arranged by mutual friends, he laid out a plan for the King's coup and actually gave me the date (December 13); it was an extraordinary meeting. He said the plan had been discussed with George Papandreou, and with Kanellopoulos, the head of the conservative party, who had both agreed and in fact had encouraged the King to proceed. The King said that he would appoint a kind of "service" government, which would be partly military and partly civilian. It would run the country for a year or eighteen months and try to calm the political waters. It would have been along the Turkish model, where the military usually steps in to restore democracy when the civilians get out of hand and become undemocratic and tyrannical and behave in anti-Ataturk ways. It is an entirely different approach from that of the Greek Colonels; the Turkish military are the protectors of the Constitution, the Ataturk revolution and democracy. When the situation is stabilized and the Constitution has been amended and fair elections have been held, the military retreat to their barracks. That is what the Greeks wanted to do with the King's coup; the King and the leading politicians had all agreed. A new Constitution was being drafted. The King would fly to Salonika with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; he would accept the resignation of the Colonels' government; declare amnesty and so on. The Generals -- loyal to the King -- were still in many commanding positions. It was all planned.

I went back to the Embassy and immediately wrote my report and sent it to the Ambassador through the hierarchy. They duly noted it and filed it; they paid absolutely no attention to it. It was truly amazing. But I must add that I had some doubts about the reliability of Mavros' comments because if this plan had been approved by all of the politicians and was a matter of common discussion and knowledge -- after all, I had been informed -- how was it that the Colonels, as professional intelligence officers who must have tapped everybody's phones, could not possibly know about these plans? It appeared to all of us as "pie in the sky." I can't blame anyone else for not taking it more seriously than I did, although, as I said, I thought that the King

needed some help, some sound advice.

On the night of December 12, our Ambassador saw the King at some public function. They couldn't really talk, but the King took him aside and asked the Ambassador to come to see him in the morning; the phrase was "early morning." In response to the Ambassador's question as to the meaning of "early," the King said: "How about 6:30?" When asked where, the King suggested his palace out at Tatoi, which was north of Athens. There was an airstrip there which was the original Athens airport. Talbot said that he would be there. He arrived the next morning at the palace at 6:30. He was met by the King, who announced that he was flying to Salonika with Mr. Kollias and a new Constitution. He said that he would accept the forced resignation of Colonel Papadopoulos and his entire government, proclaim the new Constitution and appoint a new cabinet -- it was exactly the same scenario that had been reported to me by George Mavros the month before. Then the King gave Talbot a tape that he requested be played on the Voice of America, and then he handed over another tape that he hoped would be played on the BBC. These tapes carried an address from the King to his Greek subjects about what was transpiring.

The Ambassador wished the King good luck, got back into his car and drove back to the Embassy. The King's coup was launched. I found out about it when I arrived for work. We had a big staff meeting. All internal Greek communications were cut. The King landed somewhere in Larissa where the First Army was headquartered. He tried to broadcast from there, but the station was so weak that no one heard it. It was a total fiasco. Our biggest problem was trying to find out what was going on. We couldn't get through to our Consul General in Salonika, even over voice radio. There were rumors that the King was in Kavala. We sat around all day long, way into the evening. We had a military officer in the attaché office who was close to the King -- he played squash with him often. We thought of sending him out to try to find the King, but the majority opinion was that he was so well known, that he wouldn't ever get out of Athens. I volunteered to go. I had an old Volkswagen beetle without diplomatic license plates; it was very useful for meeting with people under the conditions of surveillance then existing. It also enabled me to park on sidewalks, which, although a violation, was customary in Athens.

So I went home to get some sleep; I was going to start early in the morning heading north. The next morning I stopped at the Embassy first, only to find out that the coup was all over. The King had flown off to Rome with his family -- the Queen was pregnant, so that her obstetrician went along. The King's mother and twenty-light trunks were also aboard. The Royal Family went into exile and the coup was a flop. I saw Ambassador Talbot later in the day and he asked whether I remembered the memo I had sent him a month earlier on the King's coup. He noted that the date of December 13 had been precisely correct; so it was obvious that the plotters -- that is, the Colonels -- knew exactly when all these events would transpire. I said: "Of course. Mavros was undoubtedly involved in the planning. If he knew the date, and told it to us, then many others must have known as well, and that is why the coup failed. Everybody must have known the date!" We agreed that the coup was bound to fail.

The next day or so, Ambassador Talbot had a very embarrassing moment. He was called down to see Colonel Papadopoulos. And there was no way he could avoid going. The Colonel wanted to know what the American Ambassador was doing at the Royal Palace at 6:30 in the morning. Talbot said that the King had asked to see him to tell him what he intended to do. You can

imagine what the rest of the conversation was like. In fact, the Colonels had had the King taped - his phone had been tapped; they may well have bugged some of the rooms. The Colonels were willing to play their tapes, which they did, trying to paint the King as a terrible plotter, which seemed very silly to me since it was the "pot calling the kettle black."

Q: We had nothing to do with the King's escape?

KEELEY: No. The whole coup was a surprise to us. We had a lot of advance information on it, as I've explained, but the first we knew that he was actually going to do that was on the morning of December 13.

Q: But he must have known earlier that at least he should be prepared for that eventuality. Otherwise he would not have been so well prepared.

KEELEY: That is right, although I can't say that for sure. I think his intention, since he had control over military aircraft of various types with loyal pilots, was probably to be ready to send his family out because he might have been afraid that there could have been some bloodshed. There could have been some fighting; there were troops that were loyal to the Colonels. There could have been some conflict, so that he might well have been prepared to send his family to safety, particularly his wife, who as I said was pregnant and close to delivery time. No one could tell how the day's events would unfold. But the King was supremely confident. Many of the Generals who had been involved in their own coup planning were still in command positions; some had been retired, but not all by any means. Not all could be retired; there weren't enough senior officers to take their places. Papadopoulos was extremely clever; his people were clever. When the King launched his coup, his Generals' first mission was to arrest the Colonels' representatives in each military unit. The Colonels had placed at least one of their own men in each major unit as a watch dog to keep an eye on things. It was typical of that kind of military establishment. I am sure it is true today in Iraq, Libya, Syria -- any place that has a military or quasi-military regime. They all have a system of human watchdogs. The King's Generals didn't impress us with their acumen. They immediately arrested the Colonels' men; these officers immediately professed loyalty to the King and the Army leadership and to all that the King was doing, whereupon they were all released. They returned to their barracks, collected a few officers and troops and proceeded to arrest the Generals. That was the end of the King's coup. All the Generals, except one perhaps, were immobilized within hours and were not functioning soon after the King's announcement.

These four years in Athens were the most difficult assignment for me personally in my career. I had a lot of troubles. I mentioned the memoir that I wrote about that period, that experience. It is a very sensitive document, although I read from it from time to time if I have to speak about Greek affairs. It deals in part with the personalities in the Embassy, not always in a kind or generous manner because we had serious policy disagreements. I don't like to personalize issues, but often people take things personally. I have outlined my views here and assume that some day my whole paper will be available for public perusal. I have only let about five or six people read it in total, mostly relatives of mine, because of the personal nature of some of my observations. When I lecture on Greek matters, I might just read certain portions, concentrating on the less sensitive parts. I don't consider it classified in the usual sense of the word although others might

characterize it that way. I did not use official files, but used my own files. Much of the paper is based on internal memoranda, which were never sent to Washington, and by this time have probably been destroyed. I have referred in a very few places to official messages, but I was working from memory when I wrote about them. The paper has never been cleared with the State Department because I didn't use official material; I haven't tried to publish it nor do I have any intention to do so for the present. Eventually, I hope it will become public when some of its sensitivity has abated. I didn't write it to criticize or attack people; I tried to describe events as honestly as I could.

If the memoir were published today and translated into Greek, it would surprise many people who had no idea that there was a debate within the Embassy. They tend to view the U.S. government, embassies and other instrumentalities, as monolithic. That is their bias and they would be amazed. Some of them would think that my writings are fiction; that it was all made up to make an interesting story or that it is an attempt by the Americans to show that they are not monolithic and that they do have different views of the Greeks and Greece.

At the end of my tour in Athens in 1970, I had another sabbatical which I spent at Princeton. I was supposed to go to the Naval War College at Newport, R.I. I wasn't really attracted by that idea; had it been the National War College in Washington, followed by a Washington assignment, I would have been happier because my kids would not have had to change schools so often. Furthermore, I would have welcomed a Washington assignment. But as projected, we would have had to move from Athens to Newport for a year and then either to Washington or to another overseas assignment. We had already gone through so many moves -- by the end we had moved in and out of our Washington house nine times in ten years. So I called a friend -- George Lambrakis -- in the Department, which is the way things are done, unfortunately. I had gone to Princeton with him. He used to give me poetry to be published in a literary magazine of which I was more or less the publisher at the time. George was responsible for training assignments. He said that he had arranged the Newport assignment. I told him that it involved just too many moves and asked whether he didn't have any other opportunities in the Washington area. He said that he didn't and didn't see any possibilities of any openings.

In any case, I told him that I didn't want to spend my next nine months arguing about the Vietnam war with my military colleagues; I asked whether he didn't have an opening at a university because I still felt deprived in my education; there were more things I needed to learn about. He said that he had two slots at Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School -- we sent two mid-career officers there every year. They had not yet been chosen. He asked whether I would be interested in that. I jumped at the opportunity because I could return to Princeton to study all the things I hadn't studied as an undergraduate, but should have to be a proficient Foreign Service officer. George said he would propose my name. He did so and called me to say that the selection committee thought I was nuts since I already had had a year at a university, and I was refusing a military college assignment which was supposed to be prestigious. He said he had told the committee that I was forty years old and if I didn't by that time know what I was doing, I never would, and that I should be given the benefit of the doubt. Furthermore, he told them that I had some specific things wanted to study; so they approved the assignment.

It was a very unusual situation. Not many officers have two opportunities for academic training,

particularly so close together, as I did. The assignment to Stanford was won in a competition so that it was not really a State Department assignment, although it paid my salary. It had no other expenses for my year at Stanford -- my travel, the transportation of my effects, was all paid by NIPA. So my year at Princeton was really the first fully State-supported academic assignment.

One of the courses that Foreign Service officers traditionally took at Princeton was Dick Ullman's course in "American Foreign Policy -- Post World War II." It was a graduate seminar for students working for their MBAs. Ullman considered the Foreign Service officers a resource; that is, people who had some experience in diplomacy. He asked each FSO to teach one seminar session; he wanted one specific foreign policy issue thoroughly examined, principally from the point of view that Graham Allison and his Harvard colleagues were using. Allison had written a book in which he argued that foreign policy is what emerges from the interaction of bureaucratic competition among State, CIA, Defense, AID, USIA, the NSC and all the other agencies involved, and of course other institutions. In addition, policy also came out of the interplay between the Executive and Legislative Branches. He also acknowledged labor and business and other groups' pressures. What emerged from this interaction, competition, pulling and hauling was U.S. foreign policy.

Looking back on my service in Athens, I thought that this was a perfect case study of Allison's thesis. I have already described some of the intra-Embassy disputes. Our policy emerged from the bureaucratic battle among the Embassy's sections. I wrote my perception of that history as a paper for Ullman's seminar. I delivered it at one of the sessions. Ullman was impressed by it and suggested that it be expanded into a book-length study because he thought it was a very interesting examination of how foreign policy is made in the field. Allison had focused on Washington -- at the large picture of the whole government. I had described the policy-making mechanism at the level of an Embassy. Of course, the Embassy's conclusions are then used to try to influence Washington, where another maelstrom is in play. Ullman thought that someone who had gone through such an experience personally and who had some documentary support -- memoranda back and forth -- should develop an analysis and have it published as a book.

When I went to Uganda, I had a little free time the first year and I used it to expand my Princeton paper to book length -- it's about 350 pages double spaced, but there are a lot of appendices -- memoranda and other papers which I didn't quote in their entirety in the text.

Q: Let me ask you a couple of more questions about your Athens experiences. Do you have any recollection about the feeling in the Embassy during your tour when the staff was divided on a policy issue, when it was lacking guidance from Washington, and when it was somewhat under siege from certain parts of the Greek political spectrum? How was the morale; how did the people in the Embassy feel under those circumstances?

KEELEY: My sense in retrospect, and remembering that this was over twenty years ago, is that morale dropped. For some reason, morale has never been very good in Athens during all the years that I have known that post. I don't fully understand it; it may well be part of the general syndrome in the Foreign Service in which morale tends to be much better in smaller posts under extreme hardship conditions especially those that are going through turmoil and difficulties. People rally around each other; they also know that they have to get along with each other; they

have to cooperate and work as a team, whereas in the more "lush gardens" of the world, morale tends to be lower because that sense of necessary solidarity or the "us" against "them" is absent, and people have greater opportunities to gripe and bicker with each other. Greece, in the pre-anti-American terrorism days, was considered a "garden spot." That was one of the reasons the post was so large, because it had so many regional installations -- communications, security, immigration and naturalization, etc. These staffs were located in Athens because it had good living conditions, good schools, good climate, a friendly population -- at least in theory.

But the 1967 events, as I recall it, had a much more significant impact on the relationships between the Americans and the Embassy's Greek employees. The latter were, by and large, very unhappy with what had happened to their country and its politics, and like many other Greeks blamed us -- our policies, our lack of policies, our lack of intervention. I know that Ambassador Talbot sensed that, because he took a fairly unusual step. Some weeks after the coup, he called a general meeting of all our local employees -- there were hundreds of them. He gave them an explanation of what had happened and our policy; in general, his theme was that events were not our fault, we had not caused them, and that we were working with them in the best way we could. In effect, he said: "Don't blame us for what has happened in Greece!" Although he was not very explicit, he certainly implied that we were not overjoyed with the situation; we were certainly not cheering, but trying to cope with it as best we could. He in effect expressed some regrets for the difficulties that every one was experiencing. He was trying to cope with the morale problem.

Q: You had an opportunity both starting with your tour in Athens and later on to become acquainted with the Papandreous. What was your relationship with them, how you perceived them and their role in U.S.-Greek relationships?

KEELEY: I covered much of that in my memoir, which I hope will some day be published. Briefly, my wife and I did not know the Papandreous at all when we arrived in Athens in 1966. It was quite unlikely that we would have become acquainted in any serious way because of the mutual hostility between the Embassy and the Center Union party, particularly the Papandreous and especially the son. But through a mutual friend, Margie Shachter, whom we had met through other mutual friends -- she was a close friend of Margaret Papandreou, the wife of Andreas Papandreou. Margaret was an American citizen and may still be -- she may be a dual citizen. She and Andreas had four children who were born in the States -- George, Nick, Sophia and Andreas, Jr. (called Andrikos). Mrs. Shachter one day explained to me that the Embassy had not been very kind to Mrs. Papandreou although she was an American citizen, and regardless of the politics she should have been treated better -- according to Mrs. Shachter, who was also an American. Furthermore, the Papandreous had four American children. She gave me some of the details, most of which concerned Mrs. Papandreou's view that she was being harassed by the Greek government -- this was after the Colonels' coup and the arrest of her husband, who was first kept in a hotel in Pikermi and later in the Averoff prison.

I don't know exactly what Margaret expected of the American Embassy, but she did complain that her phone had been cut off, which she thought was improper and wanted Embassy assistance to get service restored. She had been getting a lot of calls from friends in the United States who wanted to know how she and Andreas were. Most of the callers were economists and professors,

although there were actually some U.S. government officials who called -- these were members of the Johnson Administration who had been faculty colleagues of Andreas' at various institutions -- people like Galbraith, Walter Heller, etc. They had taken up Andreas' case in Washington. Some of these people were sending mail, which was being intercepted; so they began to send messages to the Papandreous through the State Department and the diplomatic pouch, but that mail was not being delivered to Margaret since it was an improper use of the pouch, the Embassy thought. I am sure that there were explanations for all of Margaret's complaints, but I felt that her treatment both by the Greek government and by the American Embassy was not correct. I was concerned about the image of the Embassy and the State Department and the Foreign Service in general. I assumed that the criticism of Margaret's treatment would get back to people in the United States sooner or later if it had not already reached our shores. I thought that we should make what efforts we could on her behalf; we did. We got her phone service restored, but had not solved the mail problem yet when Mrs. Papandreou asked through Mrs. Shachter whether she could see me.

I went to see her and talked to her and listened to her grievances. I reported all of this to Kay Bracken, who was interested in how Andreas Papandreou was being treated, what his prospects were, and how he viewed the current situation. So I was partly collecting political information for the Embassy on a major issue. We had some questions at the time about Andreas: would he be tried and if so, would he be convicted and if so, would he be executed? There were a number of possible scenarios of interest to the Embassy. Some people were enthusiastic about such prospects; some were very concerned about the effect of any harsh treatment on American public opinion, on attitudes toward our government and the Greek government. To some degree, therefore, I was encouraged to maintain contacts with Margaret, at least at the beginning, but most of the relationship was developed by my wife, who would see Margaret from time to time and try to help her. That had an unfortunate consequence (which I cover at greater length in the memoir) because the Greek police were keeping Margaret under surveillance. They noticed my wife's visits; she went to see Mrs. Papandreou at her home in Psychiko, driving our Citroen car which had American Embassy license plates. The police reports were forwarded to the Embassy during the routine sharing of information between the Greek and American intelligence services. The next thing I knew I was called in to explain why my wife's car was parked outside the Papandreou's residence. I told whoever asked (it was probably Kay Bracken) that my wife visited Mrs. Papandreou from time to time to see how she was coming along. Undoubtedly, the police thought that since the car had U.S. Embassy diplomatic license plates, there was some deeper significance. At that point, the Embassy's attitude changed and I was told that my wife's visits were not a very good idea; her actions might reduce my usefulness because obviously we had become targets of Greek surveillance; it was most likely that the Greek intelligence services interpreted my wife's visits as some kind of U.S. machinations with the Papandreous, who were the government's enemy.

As I mentioned, this report changed the Embassy's attitude towards what my wife and I were doing. I thought it was legitimate for my wife to befriend Margaret Papandreou, but the car belonged to both of us -- the license plates were issued to me, so that the police may well have reported that I was the one who was doing the visiting, although I am not sure that it made much difference. Andreas was in solitary confinement at the time; he was a man with a very active mind and an intellectual. He was deprived of any serious books to read as well as anyone to talk

to. That treatment was repeated for our hostages in Lebanon; they were in captivity for many years, many without anything to read. Andreas was in "captivity" for about eight months. Nevertheless, it is instructive to learn what the hostages did to keep their minds active because idleness can be very destructive to a thinking person. The Papandreous had run out of books for Andreas to read; all the material that was being sent to him was being censored; the Greek police wouldn't let him read any economics material, which was his major interest, or anything involving politics or current events. So Margaret had exhausted their library. I then lent her some books that she had picked out from our library -- books that would pass censorship. Andreas was very grateful when he found out about what we had done, although she didn't tell him while he was under arrest for fear of further endangering some of the books, however, may have had our names in them.

And that is how we began our connection with the Papandreous, which did not begin with Andreas, whom we were not to meet until many months later. When Andreas was released, just before Christmas, 1967, under a general amnesty decree which, however, was very much focused on him because of the intense interest in the U.S. -- partly stimulated by his prominent friends in the field of economics and government -- we were in Austria on a skiing vacation (I don't ski, but I went along with other people who did). We were watching the Austrian television news on Christmas Eve and on came a report from Athens indicating that Andreas had been released. It showed him arriving back at his house, being greeted by his wife and children. This was of particular interest to us because one of the things my wife did before we left for Austria was to buy a big fat American turkey from the PX at the American air base in Hellinikon for the Papandreous which she delivered as a present, so that the Papandreou mother and kids could have a very American Christmas dinner. When she bought it, we had no idea that Andreas would have been released. So while watching the TV report in Austria, we wondered whether he had been released in time to share in the turkey. In fact, he did and was very appreciative.

I should add a note to the history of this period. When we returned to Athens from Austria, Margaret called and invited us for dinner. Both she and Andreas wanted to thank us for what we had done to help her during the period he was in prison. She had never told him of her complaints and what the Embassy had done or not done and what role we might have played until he had been released. That was partly for security reasons, because she assumed that all her conversations with him would be monitored and recorded. She also didn't want to depress him or agitate him or anger him, but after his release, she told him and he was very appreciative. So my wife and I went to the Papandreous for dinner and spent a very warm evening there. He thanked us for what we had done; we said that that was the minimum an American citizen could expect from his or her Embassy; after all, one of the responsibilities of an embassy is to help its citizens in times of stress and distress. We had a long evening with Margaret and Andreas; I was fascinated, because it was my opportunity first of all to meet him and then to hear his version of his recent political history going back to his return to Greece: why he came back, how he got involved in politics, his relations with his father, the overthrow of the Center Union government in 1965, and what he perceived the Embassy's role to have been at that time, and then his views on events since then, including his time in prison.

He and Margaret also called on Ambassador Talbot and his wife to thank them for what the Embassy had done. I read the report on that meeting later and it was a bit strange because from

my point of view, at least, we had been discouraged from assisting the Papandreous. I interpreted the Papandreous' motive in asking for that meeting in an entirely different way than Ambassador Talbot did -- in his report. The Papandreous wanted to leave Greece and go into exile; they were offered that opportunity by the Colonels, but the Colonels also wanted assurance that Andreas would "behave," i.e., that he wouldn't mount an opposition movement or make a lot of anti-regime comments. The Colonels were fearful that Papandreou would have a ready audience, since he was already well known in North America and Europe and had been a political prisoner. So Brigadier Pattakos, in various conversations, tried to get assurances from Andreas that he would "behave." I have heard various versions. Andreas said that he would be true to himself, according to his version, which should not have been very encouraging to the Colonels. But I think he also convinced Pattakos that his main purpose was to return to his teaching and to the support of his family. So the Colonels took a chance and allowed the Papandreous to leave.

The call on Ambassador and Mrs. Talbot, as I interpreted it and I believe that this is accurate, was to assure that the Americans thought that it would be a good idea for them to leave Greece and that we wouldn't stand in their way or that we would thwart that in any way. From my perspective, I would have thought that that assurance would not even have been needed to be sought; it should have been assumed, since if we did anything to embarrass Papandreou, it would have caused major problems for the Embassy and the U.S. Government. I thought that we would be thrilled to see Andreas go into exile; we would certainly not have been an obstacle. But from his perspective and his attitude toward some Americans and the Embassy, he might have been concerned that somehow or other we would tell the Colonels "don't let him go." So I think the purpose of their call was to make sure that the Ambassador, if asked by the Greek government, would say that the Papandreou's departure from Greece was a great idea -- it was the best thing that could happen for everybody concerned. As it turned out, I don't think Ambassador Talbot was ever consulted by anyone in the Greek government, but I think the Papandreous were just making a precautionary move.

Everybody knows what happened. The Papandreous got their passports--he got his Greek one, and she and the children already had their American ones. They took off for Paris, where, upon arriving, Andreas gave a press conference and in effect announced that he was going to lead an opposition movement to the current Greek government. He was very nasty about Ambassador Talbot; he called him a "Gauleiter," which was about the worst thing you can call someone, since it conjures up all the specters of the Nazi regime. Talbot became really irate and it just confirmed his negative view of Andreas Papandreou. In his report to Washington he recalled that only a few evenings before, Papandreou had been in his sitting room telling him how he intended to find a teaching job and how he would mind his own business. Then he went off and gave a press conference, denouncing the Greek government, the U.S. Government for alleged support of the Colonels, and the American Ambassador, whom he insulted. I think both Talbot and Papandreou confirmed their negative views of each other. So that was the only contact I had with Andreas Papandreou until, while serving in Zimbabwe, we went through Athens in the early 1980s. My wife called up Margaret just to find out how she was doing. Margaret invited us out to their house in Kastri for lunch, primarily because Andreas had gotten interested in Mugabe. They had met at a Socialist International session or something like that. Andreas had taken an interest in him and he wanted to learn something about Southern Africa. Andreas was by this time Prime Minister of Greece. We had lunch together; I did my share of the talking, briefing Andreas about

what was going on in Zimbabwe and South Africa and about my impressions of Mugabe. It was an interesting and pleasant conversation, but I didn't hear much about Greece from Papandreou. So those were the only two meetings of any kind I had with Andreas Papandreou. When I was appointed as Ambassador to Greece in 1985, the Greek press declared that I was "a close friend of Andreas Papandreou." I had to deal with that and live with that throughout my tour in Athens. One dinner and one lunch over a period of twenty years a "close friendship" do not make, even with a Greek.

In answer to your question, I have never heard of any good biographies of Andreas Papandreou. There are some in Greek, but they are essentially campaign material and would not be at all objective. There are two books worth reading about that period -- the coup, the imprisonment, and the exile -- written by the Papandreous. The first, *Nightmare in Athens*, was written by Margaret and describes what it is like to be the wife of a political prisoner; she describes some of the events I have mentioned, but obviously in much greater detail and many more of them. Andreas wrote *Democracy at Gun Point*, which was in effect his denunciation of the coup and his commentary on the events that led up to it. So both their points of view are well expressed and available; I assume that there have been things written on the other side. I don't think anyone would call their books particularly objective, but that doesn't make them less valuable; they expressed their perceptions of events.

Q: Let me ask one final question about your mid-1960s tour in Athens. You mentioned Cyprus and suggested that it was a quiescent period. What are your recollections on that thorny issue?

KEELEY: It was entirely quiescent, with one important exception -- the crisis between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus in late 1967. As I have mentioned, I dealt with Greece's external affairs during my first two years in Athens. I went to Cyprus once before the coup of April, 1967 (in March) to become familiar with it. I spent quite a bit of time there, maybe a week; traveled throughout the island, which is relatively small, so any part can be reached in a day trip -- from and back to Nicosia. I talked to a lot of people. When I came back, I wrote a memorandum to Kay Bracken in which I concluded that the real problem in Cyprus was the presence of General Grivas. He was a trouble-maker. In my view, the solution was to get the General off the island -- this was when he had created the EOKA B (EOKA II) liberation movement, which was harassing the Turks and causing a great deal of trouble. As usual, that was like most of the recommendations I made, in that it was allegedly way off base. Mrs. Bracken pointed out to me something that I was not aware of and had never been briefed on, namely, that in some way or another we were complicitous in Grivas' return to Cyprus because we had seen him as a counterweight to Makarios, who at that time was being described by the State Department as the "Castro of the Mediterranean," who was playing "footsie" with the communists. The Archbishop had the support of the Communist Party in Cyprus, the AKEL, which had about a third of the electorate. He had been buying arms from the Czechs and other Eastern Europeans. He was viewed as the "red priest" and therefore a very dangerous character. Grivas on the other hand was a strong anti-communist, a conservative, a right winger, as well as an ultra-nationalist; I thought that he was an extremely dangerous man. Bracken's point to me was that this was hardly the time to pull the General off the island when, if we did not arrange it ourselves, we at least had tacitly approved his return. That was my contribution to the Cyprus problem!

As I said, there was a crisis during the period I was covering Cyprus. It happened in the late Fall of 1967, probably in November, just before the King's coup of December 13. There was a flare-up of fighting; I am sure that Grivas had a hand in it. A couple of Turkish Cypriot villages were attacked; people were killed. The Turks in Ankara threatened to invade the island. These events have been written up by Pete Hart, who was then our Ambassador in Turkey. His book covers the perceptions and the points of view of both the Greeks and the Turks, as well as the Cypriots. I have not yet read the book, but I am sure it gives a full coverage of the events.

The person who was called on to defuse the crisis was Cyrus Vance, later Secretary of State and now the U.N.'s special envoy for all the crises in Yugoslavia, and South Africa. Vance was not in the government at the time; he had held high positions in the Defense Department, but was at the time back at this law firm in New York. Lyndon Johnson called him and said he was sending a plane to take him to Ankara, Athens and Nicosia. Some knowledgeable official -- I think it was John Howison, who was the Turkish specialist in GTI, maybe the Country Officer for Turkey -- would be on the plane to brief Vance. Luke Battle, the NEA Assistant Secretary, went up to New York with the Presidential plane to brief Vance before take-off. John Patrick Walsh, then in the Secretariat, also was along, as may have been one or two others. There was no time, according to the President, for Vance to come to Washington. So off he went in one of the President's planes to Ankara and then Athens and Nicosia. He did a "shuttle diplomacy" tour for a couple of weeks and defused the crisis.

I recall that when he arrived in Athens, we had a general meeting with the Ambassador and other senior officers. I was there as the guy who covered Cyprus and I was all prepared to give a briefing. I never had the opportunity because as soon as the meeting began, Vance said he didn't want to hear anything about the Cyprus problem; he was not in Athens to solve the Cyprus problem. He said that too many people, better qualified than he, had tried to do that over a period of years and had failed and he would, if he tried it, also fail. He added that he didn't even have time to understand it. He had just one mission from the President and that was to prevent war between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus. He thought he could not achieve his very limited objective if the Cyprus problem had to be solved first, but he thought there was a good chance of avoiding an outbreak of hostilities between two NATO allies, which would be a disaster for all concerned, including the U.S. Vance had no intention of trying to solve the Cyprus problem; all he wanted was advice on how he could get the Turks and the Greeks to cancel their military alerts and to compromise somehow the immediate issues which had given rise to the current crisis.

So the meeting turned to that issue, after which Vance took off for Nicosia. He then traveled around to the three capitals, mostly at night because the days were consumed by exhausting meetings with cabinet officials of one country or another. We didn't accompany him on his flights; we waited until he had returned to our posts. Eventually he solved the immediate problem and war was averted. He did achieve a compromise, but most of the "give" was on the Greek side. The Colonels had to agree to remove most or all of their illegal forces from Cyprus -- forces that had been beefed up from the mainland way beyond what was permitted under the London/Zurich accords which allowed for 600 Turkish soldiers and 900 Greek soldiers to be stationed in Cyprus. The Greeks had built up the Greek Cypriot National Guard, assigned Greek Army officers to it, and had added thousands of mainland Greeks to their Cyprus force. The

Turks claimed that this unbalanced the military situation on the island and posed a threat to the Turkish Cypriot community. In fact, the National Guard had been established and strengthened to balance a threat Greece and Makarios perceived as coming from mainland Turkey. So the Greeks had to diminish their presence and had to agree to comply. The Turks finally accepted the compromise since the alternative was war.

Makarios was extremely unhappy with the agreement and Vance had a difficult time presenting it to the Archbishop in a favorable light. It reduced military forces which presumably were there to defend the Greek Cypriots. Vance decided to ignore Makarios' protestations and declared a solution had been agreed upon. He accomplished the mission President Johnson had assigned him.

At our final session with Vance in Athens after he had defused the crisis, the future Secretary of State made a profound and accurate prediction which stuck in my mind ever afterward. He said that by making the Greeks stand down from their military build-up on the island he had been able to talk the Turks out of invading the island. "But watch out the next time," Vance said. "The next time the Greeks provoke the Turks over Cyprus there will be no stopping them. They'll invade Cyprus and nothing we or anyone else can do will stop them." This forecast became one hundred per cent true in 1974 when the Colonels in Athens ousted Makarios, the Turks invaded, and we're still living with the consequences.

LUCIUS D. BATTLE
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near East Affairs
Washington, DC (1967-1968)

Ambassador Lucius Battle was born in Georgia in 1918. His career in the Foreign Service included positions in Denmark, France, and Washington, DC, and an ambassadorship to Egypt. This interview was conducted by Dayton Mak.

BATTLE: Let me turn now to the Cyprus crisis. Pete Hart has just written a book, to which I wrote the preface. That preface covers almost everything that I would like to say about the Cyprus crisis. There were some amusing aspects and some horrible ones. The press was so focused on the Vietnam war that no one was paying much attention to events in Cyprus, where the old conflicts between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots were once again active. It was a complex and delicate situation. I thought that we should send a special envoy as quickly as possible. The President did not want anymore special envoys; he did not want the U.S. involved in any more world crises. We had an intercepted message that clearly said that the Turks, weather permitting, would invade Cyprus the following morning. When I got the message, I went to see all the people who had an interest, including Nick Katzenbach, who was a tower of strength in this crisis. I saw Rusk briefly about sending a special envoy. As I said, the President did not favor it. He didn't want to get bogged down in another mess. Nick and I talked to him and told him that he either had to send a special envoy or troops would be moving into Cyprus, thereby initiating a war with which we would have to deal. The question was which was the preferable situation. The President then asked whom we would suggest. Katzenbach and I had

reviewed a list of names and our first choice was Cy Vance. Cy had not had much diplomatic involvement, although he had participated in a task force chaired by Gene Rostow which had dealt with a number of Middle East issues such as the freedom of the seas and the naval fleet. That is when I first really worked with Vance and I was greatly impressed. I was anxious that he take the Cyprus assignment. I told the President that it had to be done quickly; that the envoy had to be on his way that day. We agreed that I would take a briefing book and all the material we had on the Cyprus issue up to New York. Vance agreed to take on the job, although he suffered terribly from a bad back. We crafted a letter to the Turks; the last letter written to them on the subject of Cyprus was in 1964 had been so insulting that they had never forgotten about it. That 1964 letter had threatened them with great retribution if they invaded Cyprus at that time. So our new letter had to be tactful. Had we asked the Turks whether they would consider the despatch of a special envoy, the answer would have been negative. So we had to get Vance into the air the moment we announced his trip. I took a military plane to New York and sat on it with Vance, briefing him while we were parked at a hangar. He asked me what his instructions were. I said: "They are very simple, Cy. Stop the war". He said he didn't know much about the issue, but I told him that he would by the time he got to Cyprus and had an opportunity to read all the material I had brought him. John Walsh from the Secretariat was along and he did noble work. Interestingly enough, the press did not notice our actions. I don't remember exactly the day Cy went, but there was a Sunday night supper hosted by Polly and Joe Kraft. Betty and I were invited but I had to work at the office. So Betty went alone and when asked where I was said that I was working "as usual". Everybody groaned and assumed that it was the Arab-Israeli problem that was keeping me occupied. No one had noticed that we had a Cyprus crisis.

One other interesting aspect was that the Greek coup, which had occurred just a short time before, had eliminated all the free press. The Greek press was ordered to leave the situation alone. If the Greek press had been as inflamed as the Turkish one, we would never have reached a settlement.

Cy Vance pulled off one of the great negotiation coups in history. I talked to him by phone daily. Very little of what transpired was ever recorded in writing. Dean Rusk was preoccupied with Vietnam but I briefed him on the situation from time to time; Gene Rostow, for some reason, was uninvolved, which was just as well because his involvement would have been a disaster; Nick Katzenbach left me pretty much alone although I reported to him daily. Essentially, the Bureau handled the crisis. If it had not worked we would have taken the blame; fortunately, it was successful and everybody thought that was pretty good. Several years later, while I was at COMSAT, I got a call from State Department, saying they wanted to reconstruct the events of that weekend, which was Thanksgiving weekend, 1967. So the Department got all of us together: Arthur Goldberg, who had been our representative at the U.N., the three Ambassadors -- Toby Belcher (Cyprus), Pete Hart (Turkey) and Phil Talbot (Greece) -- John Walsh, Vance and myself. We spent a whole weekend at Airlie House reconstructing the Cyprus crisis of 1967. I don't know what happened to the voluminous book that came out of that Airlie House conference, but it included a lot of material that might have helped the next Cyprus crisis, which did result in a Turkish invasion of the island and a worse situation than we had before and the death of my dear friend, Rodger Davies, who had been one of my deputies in NEA. But the story does not quite end there. In 1973, I was invited to go to Rome to participate in a meeting between Clerides (Greek Cypriot) and Denktash (Turkish Cypriot), who wanted to meet with an international

group who would listen to them and advise them on how progress toward peace might be made. This was before the 1974 invasion. Cy Vance, Pete Hart, Phil Talbot and I were invited along with others. We met for several days in Rome and listened to Clerides and Denktash. They were a remarkable pair. They had known each other for many years; they had fought each other and had saved each other on many occasions; each recognized that they needed each other, but they argued most vigorously. A man by the name of Villemi, from Yugoslavia, chaired the sessions. There were representatives of the Greek government there, some of whom became Cabinet members later; Michael Stewart of the U.K. was there. The pattern was that one of the international group would present a topic to be discussed. I was given "The external influences on the Cyprus problem". I made a presentation which suggested that the Cypriots must not look to any outside forces to resolve their differences. They could not count on any other nation. I told them that I had had a terrible time persuading the President of the United States to become involved in 1967 and I was confident that it would be equally difficult task if not worst to try to get the U.S. involved in 1973 or any time on the future. The Cypriots should not count on the United States. After the commentary of the international participant, Clerides and Denktash would take over and scream at each other for the rest of the day. At 5 p.m. we would adjourn and the two of them would go to the bar as if they were the closest of friends and never uttered a cross word. That was without a doubt one of the most interesting non-diplomatic experiences of my life. I left Rome with some optimism, having thought that some progress had been made. But it all collapsed. I didn't agree with the way our government handled the issue subsequently. We should have injected ourselves quickly; we should have sent another envoy, perhaps Vance again. But we didn't and the whole situation became a disaster. Oddly enough, after that disaster and after the death of Rodger Davies (U.S. ambassador to Cyprus), I got a telegram asking me whether I would return to Rome to meet with the two Cypriots again. I am sure they asked the same group of international participants who had attended the 1973 conference. I replied that I would be glad to do so, but I never heard another word. I don't know what happened. In any case, in 1973, we had some very good and vigorous exchanges with the two key Cypriots. When I was involved directly in 1967, the Greeks made very difficult political concessions, which went unnoticed because they were not permitted to appear in the controlled Greek press. But in Turkey, the issue was widely debated because there the press there was freer and raised the political temperature. I recommend that anyone who works on Cyprus read Peter Hart's book, just recently published.

Q: In discussing these various crises and your various assignments, you have run across and dealt with some very important people. You dealt with some very tough issues. What is the most influential factor in a crisis situation in either causing it or solving it? Is it individuals, diplomats or is it history or social problems that exist? What do individuals contribute to a crisis and its solution?

BATTLE: The important ingredient in the resolution of these problems is have someone who knows something about them -- someone involved. In our government, it is the lowly desk officer in the State Department who knows all of the details. But when there is a change in the country and the that change may turn out to be an East-West issue, it becomes the largest issue in town. The tendency is for the senior officials to grab the ball, elevate the issue to the White House and the NSC -- in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict one of our main problems was Gene Rostow. The three people who got deeply involved in that problem were Leonard Meeker, the

Department's Legal Advisor, Joe Sisco, the Assistant Secretary for International Organizations and me, as Assistant Secretary for NEA. The three of us got along well; the problem was the intervention created by the requirement to clear messages with a lot of others. The Cyprus crisis, on the other hand, was the best managed crisis in which I have been involved. It was handled essentially by phone between Vance and me and was not dealt with at the Presidential level. There were no levels that interfered and slowed the process down. Now I think you have to keep the President and the Secretary informed, but in the main, the management of the problem should be left to those who have a background in it. I didn't know enough about Cyprus, but I had people on my staff who did. I would brief a congressional subcommittee without particular effort because the crisis had not become a public issue. It became one in the last two or three days, but until then it passed unnoticed. The fact that it broke over a Thanksgiving holiday period also helped in keeping it under control.

GEORGE ALBERT MCFARLAND, JR.
Cyprus Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1967-1968)

Mr. McFarland was born and raised in Texas and educated at Southern Methodist University and the Universities of Texas and Princeton. After a brief journalist career, he joined the Foreign Service and was assigned to the Passport office in Washington. His subsequent overseas assignments, primarily as Political Officer, were in San Jose, Nicosia, Istanbul, Lima, Ankara, Brasilia and Antigua, where he served as Deputy Chief of Mission and Chargé d'Affaires. He also served as Cyprus Desk Officer in Washington. Mr. McFarland was interviewed by Lewis Hoffacker in 1999.

Q: Oh, yes. I wouldn't want to live there, not at all. So you had two years.

MCFARLAND: I had two years in Istanbul and then was sent to the Cyprus Desk in Washington. Well, Jack Horner was the one who asked me.

Q: Oh, yes, Jack Horner.

MCFARLAND: To go there, but he retired after I had been there only about a month or so, and Bob Folsom, then, who had been consul general in Salonika, was brought in as the country directory.

Q: Well, this is still GTI, isn't it?

MCFARLAND: Sir?

Q: Was it GTI? Greece, Turkey, and Iran?

MCFARLAND: At this point they had broken up GTI. It had been GTI when I was on the Cyprus Desk before, but then they had reorganized with these country directors with the idea of eliminating one layer so that in effect the deputy assistant secretary became the office director with the Turkish country director and the Cyprus country director and the Iran country director underneath him. Stuart Rockwell was the supervisor.

Q: Oh, yes. I remember him.

MCFARLAND: And I again arrived just in time for a crisis. This was a crisis engineered by a General George Grevis, formerly of the Greek army, who decided to take some armored cars into a Turkish village and start shooting things up. This determined the Turks to intervene. This was, I think, in late November or early December of '67. And that was when Cyrus Vance was sent as mediator. I was handling the whole crisis and almost lost control to the Rostow brother, not Eugene, but there was a Walter?

Q: Walter, Walt. The one who was here in UT.

MCFARLAND: Oh, maybe it was Eugene. I'm sorry, but one of them was in State.

Q: Yes, Walter is the economist, I think. Well, they were both in State, I guess, at one time.

MCFARLAND: Anyway, he was moving to take over this crisis when there was a crisis in pound sterling, and he moved to that instead, so the pros handled it and did all the work, and it went very well. So twice in a row we were able to keep the Turks from intervening. But the first time - I should have mentioned this while I was still on Cyprus - there was the Johnson letter (this was, I think, in June or July of '64), which I believe George Ball said was "the crudest piece of diplomatic writing ever developed." It was written by a woman that made me a great favorite of hers. Formerly she was the head of GTI, Kay Bratman.

Q: I remember Kay.

MCFARLAND: I looked it up in the files later, and found that she was the drafting officer.

Q: For LBJ?

MCFARLAND: And LBJ signed. Indeed, it was from Lyndon to Inonu.

Q: "Crude," you say.

MCFARLAND: Oh, it threatened that if the Soviet Union intervened against Turkey because of Turkey's actions against Cyprus, we would feel under no obligation to come to Turkey's support. That was its principal proviso. And to Inonu, who was frankly - founded his relationship as Atatürk's chief lieutenant - was frankly like Mohamed, a sacred figure in the cult of Atatürkism.

Q: What was his response?

MCFARLAND: It was a terrible thing to do.

Q: What was the response? The Turks did not invade.

MCFARLAND: Well, the Turks did not invade. They did not intervene.

Q: But they resented it deeply.

MCFARLAND: But they resented it deeply.

Q: Did you consider Johnson pro-Greek? I know he spent time in Greece.

MCFARLAND: I don't know. I don't know if he was or not.

Q: Well, anyway, you would have known if you were on the Desk. I know he visited Greece at least once. I know that he never was in Turkey.

MCFARLAND: Well, there wasn't - and he didn't do anything particular for Greece at the time I was on the Desk.

Q: But he was President then. I think he went to Greece before, when he was Vice-President.

MCFARLAND: We used to send over these snippets for the President's evening reading but had little hope that they would ever be read.

Q: Vietnam was there anyway.

MCFARLAND: There's only so much presidential time available during the day. Anyway, we got past that second crisis, so we stopped the Turks from intervening twice. Now once by threat and once by mediation. To advance a little on my story, in July of 1974 - I was by then acting political counselor in Ankara - the Greek junta tried to depose Makarios and set up a Cyprus for Greece. I cannot understand the prime minister in Greece in those days, Ioannidis. He had spent his life as a neighbor of the Turks. Their prime intelligence target must have been Turkey, and surely should have understood how the Turks would react. And yet he thought that "our great, good friends, the Americans, who had stopped them twice will stop them a third time, and it is their duty and responsibility to do so." (Of course we couldn't.)

Q: The Turks marched.

MCFARLAND: They had a division earmarked for Cyprus. It did a miserable job of command and control, but it got ashore. Then there had to be a second invasion. But Makarios survived. He escaped their attempt to arrest him and fled to the Brits, and the junta wound up being deposed themselves. They paid heavily for their mistake, just like the Argentine junta.

Q: What did they do on the Island? A new line was drawn by the Turkish troops?

MCFARLAND: Yes, they came in the first time, they saved the airfield and a small area around Farinya and then around Alistim. It wasn't a large enough holding, so the Turks reorganized, sent in more forces, and reopened the battle a few weeks later. And it was that second intervention which brought international opprobrium on them, and the first one was considered to be within their rights under the London-Zurich treaty. But the second one just seemed to be gratuitous, and it was on that basis that the United States, in its wisdom, cut off all further supplies of arms to a NATO ally, Turkey. And that was what I suffered under in Ankara. I spent a good deal of time defending that.

Q: Explaining that.

MCFARLAND: Defending the US and explaining its policy, and fighting with people in Washington. I think I must have had to spend as much time arguing in Washington as I did talking to Turks. But anyway, my only contribution to the Cyprus Desk, really, apart from day-to-day forecasting and handling that event - must say, I made accurate forecasts; I only missed once - I developed a proposal for standby mediation, based on the success of the Vance mission. The US would have a mediator briefed and ready to step in, and this proposal was accepted by the ambassadors in all three countries involved, and we took it to Joe Sisco, who at that time was assistant secretary for the UN. Joe Sisco vetoed it. No, Cyprus is a UN concern now. We cannot take this down the road. Better let the UN handle it. And Stu Rockwell okayed my idea, which essentially has come out now with a special coordinator for Cyprus affairs. Well, but nonetheless, this would have been further along the lines of policy that I have seen now as mistaken, the idea of keeping Cyprus as an undivided whole, undivided except for the Greek lines around the Turks, and subject to future trouble.

I don't know if I spelled out my position adequately to begin with, but the problem is that the core of the Cyprus problem is Greece's desire for Enosis, opposed by Turkey's concern that Greece will then control its entire coastline. All the approaches from the Mediterranean and Aegean will have to pass close to Greek Islands. This is anathema to Turkish security planners. Atatürk felt that Turkey must be a secure territory, with no expansion, just secure territory. Turkey, apparently, has no real ambitions for territory in Cyprus. The reason for the partitioning of Cyprus is to prevent Enosis, as I see it, not to breed a terrible financial burden and drain on Turkey of having a separate Turkish Cypriot state which can't support itself.

Q: So there are Turkish troops there, and it's a republic.

MCFARLAND: Yes, recognized only by Turkey. The rest of us seem to want to have a unitary Cyprus once more. Now a unitary Cyprus would simply be another target for the Greeks to try to capture, which would set off more conflict. The best long-term solution for Cyprus is what we've got now, the division, the partition, which is resented by Washington and, of course, most of all by Athens, because it makes Enosis impossible. It's better to make Enosis impossible, and then let's get on about the business of living.

Q: But the UN has a substantial force there.

MCFARLAND: Yes it does.

Q: To avoid conflict.

MCFARLAND: Yes, I doubt that there would be any conflict if the UN force left. There might be some shooting by hotheads. It would depend very much on the leadership of both sides. I read in the newspaper that fighting was going to start again. I doubt that very much. That depends very much on the mainland countries. The problem with Greece's attitude toward Turkey is that as a small country it does not have the power to overcome Turkey, so it keeps sticking its finger into the big guy's eye, provoking Turkey without a rational hope of accomplishing any good end.

Q: Pure nationalism.

MCFARLAND: Yes, and bravura. I understand it in the Greek psyche and the Latin psyche, but it's just not rational, and we should not let ourselves be captured by it as we have let ourselves be captured by it. We went into Yugoslavia, I think, initially with the idea that there should be no partitioning and found that good fences do make good neighbors, or at least neighbors that are some sort of peace. And I'm afraid that that's the only solution for Cyprus.

Q: Greece is part of the Balkans.

MCFARLAND: Greece is part of the Balkans. And Turkey is. Turkey was the Balkan power. But this is another Balkan war that's best settled by partition - which we've got in place. There's not been any fighting since partition was established in 1974. Before that there was fighting periodically. They could live on their own without Uncle Sam I'm quite sure. I would hope that Greece and Turkey would little by little withdraw their own forces.

Q: Well, Greece doesn't have any forces there.

MCFARLAND: Oh, yes, they do. They have 10,000 or 12,000 troops, and Turkey has more than that. I think they have most of a division. And they've even established a university around Famagusta.

Q: A Greek university?

MCFARLAND: No, a Turkish Cypriot university.

Q: Oh, I see what you mean.

MCFARLAND: A friend of mine in Ankara has gone there to teach. He retired from teaching at Ankara University and moved down there.

Q: Well, is there a Greek Cypriot army or police force?

MCFARLAND: Yes, I'm not sure what their arrangements are now. They had a police force, which rapidly was converted into infantry at the time of the fighting. And there was a small army, but they depended mainly on the Greek army contingent. Under the London-Zurich

agreement, both the mainland countries were permitted to position contingents. And they fought. One of the last incidents of the time when the Turkish invasion occurred. Turkey's difficulty was in communications and maintaining command and control. In Ankara we were contacted by the Turkish General Staff who said, "Our aircraft has reported a Greek destroyer to the north of Cyprus steaming toward Cyprus. This is within an area that we consider unacceptable. Please inform Athens to turn that ship around, or we're going to sink it." We quickly got off a Niact, Flash, whatever it was forwarding a message to Athens. They contacted the Greeks and came back with the response "that's not our ship. We have no destroyers in the area. If you think it ought to be sunk, go ahead and sink it." Well, the Turkish Air Force was unable to contact the destroyer. It was of course flying a Turkish flag on its stern, but of course those perfidious Greeks would do that. And using their US training they peeled off and put bombs onto it. It sank. About a week or so later, crew members on a lifeboat were picked up by a passing freighter, and the truth came out. The Turks had bombed their own ship. They didn't have common frequency between ship and air.

Q: That's inexcusable.

MCFARLAND: Lack of information, lack of communications, planning, and discipline. It was the Turks' first time in combat since Korea, and Korea was sort of an exception. They were fighting under our command, and it was just a brigade. It was not all branches. The Turkish Air Force had never been in combat.

Q: Well, how did things go on the Cyprus Desk in general?

MCFARLAND: The thing is, once that December crisis cooled off and I'd tried to get my paper accepted, things became very, very dull, and I began running out of things to do, and I thought about getting on another desk and thought there was a chance here to write a paper. I asked for a year of independent study. It was run by FSI, and I went to the Library of Congress and then to the State Department library. This was during Vietnam times, and I wrote on the subject of consulting the electorate in making foreign policy.

THOMAS D. BOYATT
Political Officer
Nicosia (1967-1970)

Ambassador Thomas D. Boyatt was born in Cincinnati, Ohio in 1933. His Foreign Service career included positions in Chile, Luxembourg, Cyprus, and Washington, DC, and ambassadorships to Upper Volta and Colombia. Ambassador Boyatt was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

BOYATT: Then I went off to Cyprus. But those that stayed behind did, in fact, take it over. I can't recall exactly the timing but at some point while I was out in Cyprus, Lannon was elected president. I know I formed the chapter in Nicosia and supported him.

Q: How did you get assigned to Cyprus? Was this by choice?

BOYATT: What happened was that Ambassador Harris wanted me out of Luxembourg, and I volunteered for Greek language training. I wanted out, and I thought it would be nice to learn Greek, and go to Cyprus and Greece.

Q: You were in Cyprus from '67 to '70.

BOYATT: That's right.

Q: What was the situation in Cyprus when you got there, as you saw it?

BOYATT: The situation on Cyprus was that the country had become independent in 1960, under a constitutional regime that compromised the interest of the 80 percent Greek Cypriot Orthodox Christian majority, and the 20 percent Turk Cypriot Muslim minority. There were, kind of like Lebanon and other places where you have this problem, all sorts of constitutional guarantees, and checks and balances, built into the system. This regime was guaranteed by Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey. Cyprus had been a British Crown Colony before that for some 80 years.

The United States, while not having an active role, had a very big interest because the two contending parties at the end of the day were Greeks and Turks. They were both in NATO, and any friction between the two unhinged the eastern flank of NATO. Archbishop Makarios, the elected president of Cyprus -- a Greek Cypriot obviously -- had in 1964 tried to unilaterally impose some changes in the constitution. This was stoutly resisted by the Turk Cypriots. Mainland Greek army units, and mainland Turk army units infiltrated Cyprus to aid their specific communities. There was severe fighting, a crisis. The US Sixth Fleet steamed between the two warring navies, and U.S. pressure - especially on the Turks - resulted in an uneasy truce. UN troops were interposed between the Greek Cypriots and the Turk Cypriots scattered all over the island. There was no single dividing border, rather there were Turk Cypriot enclaves all over an essentially Greek Cypriot island. And each one of those enclaves was armed, and manned by Turk Cypriots, often supported by mainland Turks, and surrounded and contained by Greek Cypriots supported by mainland Greeks.

So when I got there in '67, I was the political officer, and the Greek language officer. The political section was composed of myself and one other fellow, and he was the Turk language officer. Our job was to find out what was going on in the two communities, and to report that and then try to influence the two communities and the two mainlands through their ambassadors to keep the lid on the situation.

Q: Here you were a Greek language officer, and the Greeks being Christian and more western, did you find that you had a hard time looking at the situation in a balanced view? Or were there built in biases because of the Greek-Turkish situation? And not only for you, but for others who came in, because I assume [overlap comment] to the Greeks than to the Turks.

BOYATT: Well, not really, Stuart. The fact of the matter is that everybody spoke English in the leadership groups. You only really needed languages out in the countryside. Business,

diplomacy, and politics were conducted in English.

Q: Of course, the British had been there for so long.

BOYATT: The British had been there for 80 years, and the leaders on both sides were by-and-large British barristers. And the Turk Cypriots are very westernized. In fact, somebody once did a study of blood types and found that the blood types of the Greek Cypriots and the Turk Cypriots were much more like each other, than they were like either mainland. Anyway, we are what we think we are, not what our blood types state. The fragile peace broke down in the fall of '67, and there was a major clash.

Q: You were there at that time?

BOYATT: Yes.

Q: How did you observe it, and what did we do?

BOYATT: We didn't exactly see it coming, but we saw it coming in the sense that the situation was so tense that this sort of thing could happen at any time. What happened was that a Greek Cypriot general, General Grivas, overran two Turkish Cypriot villages and killed a lot of Turk Cypriots. At the same time that that was happening, Ralph Denktash, who was the current leader of the Turk Cypriots, had been in exile in Turkey since '64, and he came back into the island clandestinely, and the Greeks apprehended him. And the minute that the two villages were overrun, mainland Turkey mobilized and threatened invasion, and mainland Greece mobilized and threatened to send troops to defend against the Turkish invasion. We, the United States, were very much in the middle because we feared that our two NATO allies were going to clash, as they did later, with US supplied weapons. There were several days during which the crisis got worse, and we were expecting a Turkish invasion at any moment. Meanwhile, there was frenzied diplomatic activity in all the capitals essentially trying to avert a Turkish invasion.

And our job on the island was to a) find out what was going on in both communities, and b) to try to find out what sort of elements could be fed into a negotiated solution, as opposed to a military solution. And the Turks kept turning up the pressure, doing all sorts of cute things like they sent their military attaché over to be, "Please give us the map coordinates of every house where there is an American." They did the same thing with the Brits, "because we're planning air attacks at any minute." That sort of stuff.

Anyway it got bad enough so that we evacuated all the women and children, and non essentials, and got down to the very core group. At that point, myself and the Turkish language officer, were going back and forth between the lines, and that was very dangerous. You know, as always, there were teenage kids manning guard posts with automatic weapons on both sides, nervous as hell. It was very tricky. In the end, Cyrus Vance was sent out by Johnson to negotiate a compromise.

Just as a sidelight, our families were evacuated to Beirut which in those days was a sea of tranquility, in an ocean of chaos.

Anyway, at the end of the day, Turkey agreed to a solution that involved the withdrawal of all mainland Greeks back to Greece.

Q: By the way, at that time weren't there Greek officers with the Greek Cypriots?

BOYATT: Right, and Turkish officers with the Turk Cypriots.

Q: Legally, I mean this wasn't...

BOYATT: No, this was illegal on both sides. If I'm not mistaken, it had been legal up to a certain point under the old constitution regime (900 mainland Greeks - 600 mainland Turks), but when that fell apart in '64 both sides flooded the island with officers, and troops, from the mainland. The solution was that all mainland Greeks would go back to Greece; that the mainland Turks would go back to Turkey; that the villagers whose villages were overrun would be able to go back to their villages; full restoration; and that there would be local talks between the two sides. We convinced the Greek Cypriots to let Denktash go, to release him into the hands of the Turk Cypriots so that he could be the person to negotiate in these local talks with Clerides on the Greek Cypriot side. The concept was that if Denktash had been shot while trying to escape, or held in jail, or whatever, there never would have been a negotiated solution. The Turk Cypriot side was divided, and here was a chance to release this guy so that he could become a strong voice for a negotiated solution.

Q: Who was doing this persuading?

BOYATT: Well, the ambassador, the DCM, and myself.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

BOYATT: Toby Belcher, and Glen Smith was the DCM. I was the political officer, and we were in a full court press. We were talking to everybody that would listen. Toby was talking to the Archbishop, and to the Foreign Minister, and to Clerides; and Glen Smith was talking to the Director General of the Foreign Ministry; and I was talking to everybody else.

Q: Did both sides feel that maybe they had painted themselves into some corners and were looking for us to come up with a solution and get them out of it?

BOYATT: I don't think so. The trouble was that we were basically dealing with the armies in Greece and Turkey. The colonels had taken over in Greece earlier in '67.

Q: April 22, 1967.

BOYATT: Right, this was November 4th, and they were in charge there, and I'm sure they were convinced that with the troops that they had on the island, they could have beaten the Turks. The Turks for their part, they all felt that the only real solution was for Turkey to occupy all, or part of, Cyprus and to move all the Turk Cypriots back into the partitioned sector. What the Greek

Greeks really wanted was the union of Cyprus with Greece, as in Crete, a la Crete, and to hell with the Turkish minority. And what the Turks wanted was the partition of the island, and what Makarios wanted was the continued independence of the island.

Q: Enosis, which was the union with Greece. At that time, how did the Greek Cypriots feel about it?

BOYATT: In a straight up vote, the vast majority of Greek Cypriots would have voted for Enosis, but you weren't going to have a straight up vote because at least the educated ones knew that such an action would bring the Turkish army in. So you sort of had the ideologues and the pragmatists, and the ideologues were for Enosis -- Union -- which means and only Enosis. The pragmatists were theoretically for Enosis, but wanted to be realistic, and what was realistic today was independence, and maybe there'll be union at some future date under terms and conditions which we can't see from here but right now the only viable solution is the continuation of an independent Cyprus.

Q: From your aspect, looking at it from Nicosia during this crisis, how did you feel that our embassies in Ankara and Athens were responding?

BOYATT: Of course, I thought they were totally spokesmen for the Greeks and the Turks. I didn't think they were being realistic at all. I'm sure they thought the same thing about us.

Q: To give an idea for somebody who is not too aware of looking at the diplomatic correspondence, the communications that go back and forth, where does something like this get resolved? We're talking about the Americans who were the professionals, so you're getting the Nicosian viewpoint of the situation, you're getting Ankara viewpoint, and you're getting the Greek viewpoint, all Americans reporting to influence our policy. How does this thing get sorted out?

BOYATT: In those days it got sorted out by George Ball. He was the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, or Deputy Secretary, one or the other. In any case, he was the seventh floor principal who dealt with Cyprus, so the conflicting viewpoints were dealt with by him essentially.

Q: Was there a certain amount of arm twisting? I'm talking about our three points of contact, our three embassies -- rather rough orders coming down; you do this, and you do that.

BOYATT: Yes. In all three capitals the ambassadors were delivering messages that essentially the host countries didn't want to hear. To Turkey the message was, don't invade and accept the compromise. In Greece, the message was, pull back your troops and accept the compromise which is not going to involve Enosis. And in Nicosia, the message was, give up on Enosis, and what's more give Denktash back to the Turk Cypriots so we can get some local negotiations started.

Q: Looking back on this, was this the best way to go about this do you think?

BOYATT: Yes, I do. I think it was an excellent example of successful crisis diplomacy. The

problem was, that almost the minute the crisis was over, that is to say the minute that this three or four point compromise had been established, then our colleagues in Athens and Ankara wanted to go back to business as usual. Their imperative was, for Christ's sake let's get Cyprus back on the back burner, the local talks will do that, they're negotiating under the auspices of the UN, and let's get on with the really important stuff which is negotiating our base rights in Ankara, and trying to live with the colonels, or whatever, in Greece.

Q: Tom, what was your impression of Archbishop Makarios?

BOYATT: I thought Archbishop Makarios was a masterful combination of Greek Cypriot peasant cleverness, and by that I don't mean to call him a peasant, but there's kind of a native moxie. In our culture, we say someone is street smart. Well, in that culture the guy that is smart is the guy that manages to stay free and prosperous as a peasant...he just had all of that native cunning combined with all of the grandeur and the majesty, and learning, of a 1500 year old independent church. The Autocephalous Church of Cyprus is as old as the church of Rome, and as independent.

Q: Let's say for translator, Autocephalous means...

BOYATT: Self governing, from two Greek words. "Auto" meaning "him" or "self", and "cephalous" meaning head.

Q: How about dealing with him?

BOYATT: I haven't finished the answer. The third thing, of course, that he had was an excellent modern education, and a real feeling for modern politics. Dealing with him was a great pleasure because he was very charming, and very amusing, and he had a twinkle in his eye. He had a spark. He was probably the most masterful politician diplomat I've ever seen at playing off all of the elements in a situation, and playing for time on the theory that if you play long enough, something is going to break your way. In other words, a small country surrounded by larger countries, and then part of the east-west conflict, he had to make the most of what he had. And what he really had was agility. He was just terrific at playing off all sides against each other, and playing off the problem, playing off the problem until something changed which put him in less danger, or brought him closer to his goal.

Q: How about another character in this? Did you have any dealings, or was it completely underground at that time, Colonel Grivas?

BOYATT: I had no dealings with Grivas. Grivas was totally underground in our era.

Q: Here you were trying to reach a compromise -- I mean the United States -- which obviously could only mean non-Enosis.

BOYATT: Right.

Q: And there was no other way.

BOYATT: That is absolutely correct.

Q: So the United States, I would think, to the EAOKA which was the terrorist underground...

BOYATT: ...or freedom fighter, depending on your point of view.

Q: Or whatever you want to call it, so just the fact that you were trying to do this must have been an absolute threat to what they were fighting for. How did they act toward you? They were pretty good at assassinations, and why didn't they go after the Americans?

BOYATT: In the 50s and 60s, as you know, they had assassinated a lot of British colonial officers, and policemen, and innocents, including an American vice consul at one point. The EAOKA fighters, I think, made a conscious decision not to attack the United States on the theory that could do some harm, and no good, and that they would keep pushing for an Enosis type solution. I think that what their goal was (and subsequent events proved this out) Enosis, and only Enosis. To achieve this required a take over of the government of Cyprus to make the government the entity that wanted Enosis. They thought their job in the '60s when I was there was to keep alive the flame, the purity of the ideology to increase their numbers, and to increase their strength until they got to the point where they could take over the government of Cyprus. But at any step along that process to alienate the United States would have in their judgment, and it was the right judgment, would have been a big mistake. They eventually killed an American ambassador, but we'll get to that.

Q: How did you read Makarios's feelings towards the Greek colonels, Papadopoulos and company who had taken over Greece in early '67?

BOYATT: I don't think he was ideological about it, but I don't think he liked them. I think he thought they were narrow, and above all I think he thought they were dangerous, that they might overthrow him, Makarios, which in the end they tried to do. And that they might do something reckless and stupid where Turkey was concerned, which in the end they did. So his relationship with them was one of...he was very suspicious of them. I mean, periodically Makarios, or the Foreign Minister, would go to Greece and have a round of meetings, and come back and say there was a complete identity of views between u mitera partida, which means the motherly fatherland -- it's hard to translate -- which, of course, we all knew wasn't true.

Q: How about Denktash? How did you find him

BOYATT: Well, we helped save his life. Initially, in the early stages of course, he was very accessible, and very prepared to discuss the Cypriot problem, and open to us, as he was to everybody. But as time went on -- and I'm talking about years now -- those relationships deteriorated. He's a one-man band. I mean there is no other political element -- I shouldn't really say "is" because I'm not that close to Cyprus now -- but in those days there was no one who even touched him in political stature.

Q: On the Turkish side.

BOYATT: On the Turkish side, yes. He was in a class by himself.

Q: *Clerides?*

BOYATT: Clerides on the Greek side, who was his counterpart, but was not his equal because Clerides, and I just saw him last summer by the way for the first time in a long time, didn't have the political power. Makarios had the political power. Clerides had the constitutional power because he was the appointed negotiator in the talks, appointed by the freely elected Makarios, but Denktash was himself a power.

Q: *There were two ambassadors there, one was Belcher, and the other was David Popper, maybe you want to divide it into two, but when the embassy officers, you as political counselor, and the DCM, and our ambassador, would sit down, in your hearts of hearts how did you see the situation on Cyprus working out sometime into the future?*

BOYATT: Well, in '68 we all thought that a return to the status quo, with some mutually agreed adjustments, in the 1960 constitution, was very possible. There was a lot of momentum after the resolution of the '67 crisis, and the beginning of the local talks in January-February of '68. There was a lot of optimism. People thought, "Well, this will lead to a conclusion." And we in the embassy were trying to play an activist role in finding the elements of a solution. In Athens and Ankara they couldn't have cared less.

Q: *Because we had other fish to fry.*

BOYATT: That's right. They just wanted Cyprus off the screen, and the problem with that was that whereas Makarios could deliver the Greek Cypriot side, the only people who could deliver the Turkish Cypriots were the mainland Turks. So we were constantly battling with embassy Ankara because we wanted our embassy to put pressure on Denktash to compromise, and in essence they never did.

Q: *Who was the ambassador in Ankara?*

BOYATT: I think initially it was Bob Komer, if I'm not mistaken, and then it was Pete Hart [trans. note: Parker T. Hart, Robt. W. Komer, Wm. J. Handley]. The answer to your question, Stuart, yes, we had a vision of how this problem could be solved. The reality was that we couldn't, as it were, impose our vision on the parties.

Q: *In '69 there was a change of administration between the Johnson administration and the Nixon administration. So we're only talking up to the '70s, later we'll come to the continuation of this. But while you were there, did you, and the embassy in Nicosia, see any initial change in how one felt about this coming from Washington?*

BOYATT: With the change in administrations?

Q: *Yes. It was probably too early anyway.*

BOYATT: But even so, the people who were in control were the Atlanticists, and they were in control, interestingly enough, when Jimmy Carter came in. Of all people who talked a good pro-Greek Cypriot line, but when he won the election didn't do a damn thing. In fact, later wound up on the Turkish side like everyone else had been. There's a real problem here in this whole thing, and that is that the merits of the case are on the Greek Cypriot side. They are an 80 percent majority. How would we feel if somebody came in here and wanted to make the blacks and Hispanics a separate nation as it were, and were prepared to support them externally. We'd have a lot of trouble with that, and the Greek Cypriots had the same trouble. So in a sense, the justice was on the Greek Cypriot side, but the geopolitical realities were on the Turkish Cypriot side, and the two sort of balanced out. And as a result the solution never went anywhere. I am mortally convinced...I mean every damn problem that one lived with in those days, is today much closer to solution, except this one. You know, Czechoslovakia is free; and there's an Egypt-Israeli peace agreement, things are changing everywhere but the Cypriot problem goes on hopelessly without progress, and those same local talks that we established in 1968 -- that same vehicle is still puffing away 30 years later.

Q: Did you feel next to the Jewish lobby, the other great lobby in the United States which rears its head from time to time, the Greek-American lobby, was that very noticeable at the time you were on Cyprus?

BOYATT: No, it was not. The thing that made the Greek lobby was '74. We made that lobby. I told Kissinger that.

[Note: The following is the portion of Ambassador Boyatt's presentation on the subject of "Advocacy and Dissent within the System" made to incoming classes of Foreign Service officers that deals with Cyprus and his difficulties with the Secretary of State.]

Ambassador Boyatt's presentation at FSI Sept. 30, 1992
Introduction by Ambassador Edward Peck

Ambassador Peck: Ambassador Boyatt will be leading the second part of our presentation today. Ambassador Boyatt was born in Cincinnati, Ohio. After receiving his BA from Princeton University and MA from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, he served in the United States Air Force and reached the rank of First Lieutenant. He entered the Foreign Service in 1959, and has served as vice consul in Antofagasta, Chile from '60 to '62, assistant to the Under Secretary of the Treasury until '64; second secretary at the American embassy in Luxembourg until '66; and first secretary at the US embassy in Nicosia, Cyprus from 1967 until 1970. He returned to Washington in 1970 as special assistant to Joseph Sisco who was Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East; and he was director of the Cyprus Bureau from 1971 to 1974, and named a member of the Senior Seminar in foreign policy the following year. In 1975 Mr. Boyatt became Minister-Counselor at the US embassy in Santiago, Chile. Mr. Boyatt was chosen to be ambassador to Upper Volta in 1978, and in 1980 he was nominated and confirmed as the ambassador to Colombia. In 1983 Ambassador Boyatt was promoted to the rank of Career

Minister of the Foreign Service.

Ambassador Boyatt has also received many awards in the course of his career. In 1969 he received the State Department meritorious honor award for courageous behavior during the 1969 hijacking of the TWA plane by Palestinian guerrillas. Later he received the William R. Rivkin award for intellectual courage, disciplined dissent in taking bureaucratic and physical risks in the cause of peace on Cyprus from '67 to 1970. In 1979 Ambassador Boyatt was given the Christian A. Herter award for extraordinary contributions to the practice of diplomacy. He has also been decorated by several foreign governments. In 1971 Mr. Boyatt was elected vice president of the American Foreign Service Association, and he was elected president of AFSA in 1973 and served until he was transferred to Santiago.

In 1984 Ambassador Boyatt was elected a member of the Board of Trustees of Princeton University. He serves on the Advisory Boards and Advisory Councils of several other institutions including the Woodrow Wilson School, and the Peru Private Sector Management Project. In 1984 Mr. Boyatt was brought to the Sears World Trade as vice president for Latin America by Frank Carlucci. And currently Mr. Boyatt is a partner in the IRC group, and president of US Defense Systems. Please join me in welcoming Mr. Boyatt.

BOYATT: Thank you very much Ed for that introduction which would have amused my father, and my mother would have believed.

Just as an aside, how many of you know the book, and the author from which the quote about “urine etching glass” comes from? All right, listen carefully. Generation of Vipers by Philip Wiley. You're already one up on the cultural affairs officer at any post where you serve.

I've known Ed Peck for 25 years, and during those 25 years we probably spent 15 or 20 of them together...well, more like 15 in Washington. When we've been in Washington together we see each other every day, and on every one of those days Ed Peck has made me laugh. He is a truly humorous person, and you all have had the benefit of that this morning. In addition to that, I've been playing poker with him once a month during those 15 years as well. So he has made a contribution of another sort to the well being of my family. And I want to take this occasion to thank Ambassador Peck for his contributions to Tommy, and Kit, and Jessica, Alexander, and Catherine, and to their educations. I mean, how can you not love a guy who donates \$100 a month to your cause?

But having heard Ed you've heard the good copy, and the funny cop. And now you're going to hear from the tough cop, with a story that is not funny at all.

What I want to do is to take you through, step by step, in real world, real time, Foreign Service case wherein in 1974, during the Cyprus crisis of that year, the Foreign Service system about which Ambassador Peck was talking, efficiency reports, and grievance systems, and the dissent channel, and hierarchies, and the corridor reputation, and the network, where all of these elements of the system were brought into play under tremendous pressure. Because the only time you can really find out about a system is when it's under pressure. And it's under pressure when the best interests of the United States are in play, when the reputations of senior officers are at

risk, and when you as a more junior person, have a different view as to how the government should be proceeding, than your bosses do. And that's when it really counts because everybody is playing for keeps. And what I intend to do this morning is to give you a quick history of Cyprus, to tell you where the various national and bureaucratic players were in 1974, and then to step by step take you through a situation which I lived, which demonstrates, I think graphically, all of these elements.

First, a capsule history of Cyprus. Cyprus is an island in the northeast corner of the Mediterranean. It sits there like an aircraft carrier and dominates both east, west, and north-south movement. Every empire from the Egyptians to the British which has sought to dominate the Middle East has had to control Cyprus, and they all have. The Egyptians did, the Mycenaean Greeks did, the Achaean Greeks did, the Persians did, the Alexandrian Greeks did, the Romans did, the Byzantines did, the Crusaders did, and the Ottoman Turks did, and eventually the British did. Every one of those empires controlled Cyprus for anywhere from 80 years to several centuries. And every one of those empires left an impact on Cyprus.

In the ebb and flow of culture across the island, two stuck. The first, and the majority, is the Greek. The Mycenaean Greeks arrived in Cyprus in 1200 B.C., and there has been a Greek presence there ever since. In modern times the Greek portions of the island constituted about 80% majority which speak Greek, believes in the orthodox form of Christianity, and has essentially a European culture. Unfortunately in the ebb and flow of history with all of its mistakes, the Ottoman Turks, who controlled the island from 1570 until the British came in 1870, for about 300 years, also left on the island a 20% minority spread throughout the island in kind of a measles-like pattern in enclaves, which was and is, Turkish, Muslim, and partaking of what is essentially an eastern or middle eastern culture.

The way Cyprus flowed into the interests of the United States, and in the latter half of this century, was through the decolonialization of the island. When it began to become clear that Great Britain was no longer going to be able to control the island as they had from 1870 until the late 1950s, the two groups on the island rose up in various ways in an effort to control what Cyprus was going to be after the Brits left. The Greek Cypriot majority of 80% wanted enosis, which is the Greek word for union. They wanted to unite Cyprus to the Greek motherland just as other chunks of Greece had been united to Greece -- Crete as an example, Epiros is another example, Macedonia is another example. Historically what was to happen was that after those provinces would win their freedom from the Turks, they would accede and become part of the Greek nation. And the Greeks on Cyprus wanted the same thing to happen with the island.

The Turkish minority, as you might understand, had absolutely no interest in being a minority in a Greek nation including Cyprus. So as the Greek Cypriots were fighting for union with Greece against the British in the '50s, the Turk Cypriot minority began to fight and to agitate for "taksim", or partition of the island with part of it being Greek Cypriot, and part of it being Turk Cypriot, and an exchange of populations to achieve that.

In '58 and '59 and '60 the British were in their typical decolonialization situation between two sides. They were being shot at by both sides. It was a mess. They were trying to negotiate some kind of a constitutional modus vivendi, and in 1960 they were successful with the establishment

of the London-Zurich Treaties and Accords. And under London-Zurich what happened was that instead of Cyprus becoming unified with Greece, or partitioned between Greece and Turkey, it was declared an independent nation wherein there would be a Greek Cypriot majority which would have the presidency and most of the cabinet posts, and a reserved power-sharing majority in the parliament; but where the Turk Cypriots would have the vice president, a certain number of cabinet posts, and total control over the local affairs -- land, water, family, religion, all of that sort of thing. Not unlike the situation that was established in Beirut earlier. Great Britain became the guarantor power, along with Mainland Greece, and Mainland Turkey, of this constitutional regime.

They stumbled along from '60 until 1963 in a very uncomfortable situation characterized by two communities, an uncomfortable situation. Eventually Archbishop Makarios, who was elected president of Cyprus in a free election, and who was also head of the Orthodox Christian Church of Cyprus, tried to change the constitutional regime to give more power to the central government, which the Greek Cypriots controlled. The Turk Cypriots appealed to Turkey, the Greek Cypriots appealed to Greece. Greece and Turkey both sent troops onto the island, and a crisis ensued.

The British were in that part of the world, as they were in other parts of the world, trying to shift their imperial responsibilities to the United States. Just as in Iraq, and the Gulf, and the Middle East, we found ourselves taking over the great power, third power adjudicator, referee, enforcer role. We found ourselves increasingly thrust into that role in Cyprus. Why? Because the United States could not afford to have its Greek and Turkish allies at each other's throats with armies, armed and trained by us, over Cyprus. So suddenly Cyprus became a major problem for the United States wherein it had in the past, like Palestine, and like Kashmir, and India-Pakistan, like Ireland, been a British problem, it suddenly became an American problem.

The differences were patched over in 1963. There was another crisis in 1967 wherein the parties almost came to war, but didn't. And Cyrus Vance, incidentally, was President Johnson's negotiator in that crisis and managed to avert a war, and indeed he managed to get a mechanism for negotiations established which exists to this day. It must be the longest on-going negotiation in the history of the world, still unsuccessful. In any case, the situation on the island deteriorated, and deteriorated, and deteriorated, and the position of the United States came more and more and more to the forefront, and the British withdrew. And if they could have they would have washed their hands of it. They had a treaty obligation. They couldn't get out of it, but they very clearly weren't going to play a major role, and they very clearly encouraged us to do so. And we, for our own reasons, we felt that imperative, and we played that major mediatory role.

So, that's where we were in 1974. I hope you'll understand this capsulized history. What it did was, it projected two warring ethnic groups, both of whom were connected to metropolises which were our allies in NATO, and whom we could not afford to see in conflict because of what it would do to the NATO alliance, and because of the advantages it would give to the Soviets to fish in these troubled waters.

In 1974 the situation on the island was as follows: the Greek Cypriot community was itself divided between those who supported independence, and those who were disappointed with

independence, and in fact wanted to go back to enosis. And this latter group, more radical, the rejectionist front, went into clandestine guerrilla warfare against its own government. And they began robbing banks, the usual pattern. They began robbing banks to collect money, and they began using the money to buy arms. They began raiding the stores of the Greek armies, and the Cypriot armies to get arms, and publishing inflammatory leaflets, and organizing, and doing the sort of guerrilla warfare things, both urban and rural, that one always does when one is in charge of a rejectionist front.

The government of Makarios remained in favor of a solution on the basis of independence. The Turkish Cypriots continued to rearm because they saw trouble coming, and because they increasingly heard the voices in favor of enosis. And both Greece and Turkey, of course, supported their co-religionists on the island.

The situation in Greece was that Greece was run by a military junta, led initially by a gentleman named Papadopoulos, a colonel, and eventually by another gentleman named Ioannidis, who was a general. These Greek military men in effect ran the country. They had a civilian face organization. They had a prime minister, and a defense minister, and a foreign minister, all of whom were appointed. But these people were puppets, and they didn't have any power, and they did what the Greek army generals told them to do.

In Turkey, in 1974, Bulent Ecevit, had been elected the prime minister, and was the first prime minister from the left side of the political spectrum, and the first democratic leader in the country in several years. The country had been run by the army. His situation was fragile, and the Turkish army allowed him varying parameters depending on what the issue was. On economic issues he had fairly wide borders within which he could operate. On nationalist issues, of which Cyprus was the key, he had a very narrow parameter within which he could operate.

In 1974 the situation in Great Britain was that the discredited Wilson government was on its last legs. Sunny Jim Callaghan was the foreign minister, he wanted to succeed Wilson. He had absolutely no interest in the Cyprus problem. And he had no interest in having to have responsibility for the Cyprus problem because it would draw down his energy, and his resources, alienate the several hundred thousand Greek Cypriots who lived, and still live, in London. And generally the British were in a "wash my hands of it" mode.

The United States, if you'll remember, the first six months of 1974, we were without a government. Nixon was in the final phase of Watergate, and it was clear that he was without power, virtually without portfolio. But what power he did have left, and what time he had left, was devoted to saving Nixon. So in large measure one could say that the United States was without a government. And into that vacuum stepped Henry the K. Henry Kissinger became in effect president for foreign policy. Both during the final stages of Nixon, because Nixon was without power, and during the Ford administration because Ford really didn't have any capabilities in that area, Kissinger truly "ran" foreign affairs.

But in any case, the point here is that the United States government was not functioning in any way with any degree of efficiency. The normal channels of government had become clogged. The concern with Watergate was overwhelming. Washington was a very strange place in the first

six months of 1974.

From a bureaucratic perspective there were a couple of wild cards. The first wild card was, that the defense establishment in the United States was very pro the Greek military government. Why? Well, the main reason was because Admiral Zumwalt wanted to home port the Sixth Fleet in Piraeus, the port of Athens, and in order to home port the Sixth Fleet in Athens he had to have the agreement of the Greek government. And since the Greek government was three or four generals and colonels, he had to have their agreement. So nobody in the defense establishment wanted to see any activity involving Greece which would alienate the military government in any way.

To complicate matters further, the CIA had a special relationship with General Ioannidis and Colonel Papadopoulos. Why? Well, the reason is historical. in the '40s and '50s when there was a communist guerrilla movement in Greece, and at that time, at least in the late '40s, we weren't sure whether Greece was going to go communist or not. We poured huge amounts of aid, and bureaucratic attention, into Greece. And among that bureaucratic attention was a huge intelligence establishment. And that intelligence establishment, as it always does in a liaison way, got in touch with the Greek military, and the Greek CIA. And it turns out that almost 30 years later, both General Ioannidis and Colonel Papadopoulos had been very friendly with the CIA in the '40s and '50s, and the CIA, in fact, had a very close relationship with both of them, particularly with Ioannidis. So, from the CIA's bureaucratic point of view they had a major asset in Athens. They had a relationship with the guy who ran the country, and they didn't want it disturbed. And they certainly didn't want it disturbed by the Cyprus problem.

From the point of view of the US embassy in Ankara they had all sorts of things they were worried about in terms of the bilateral relationship, and they didn't want to see Cyprus impinge upon those relationships because from the Turkish point of view almost everything the United States did, or could do with respect to Cyprus, was anathema to any Turkish government. And particularly this Turkish government which was being observed very carefully by the Turkish army.

That was the world situation with respect to Cyprus into which one FSO-3 -- you would say O-1 today, I think -- stumbled as director of Cypriot affairs. I was doing my job as the sort of super desk officer for the Cyprus problem, monitoring the situation, when over a period of time in late '73 and early '74 I began to receive increasing evidence that the government of Greece, the Greek CIA, and the Greek military, were backing the radical rejectionist front on Cyprus which wanted to overthrow Makarios and declare Cyprus part of Greece. Now I knew, I'm a Greek language officer, I'd spent a lot of time out there, I knew that were the Greeks, broadly defined, successful in establishing a government in Nicosia which was responsive to Athens, much less which became part of Greece, that Turkey would invade Cyprus. I knew that. And I knew that if Turkey invaded Cyprus we'd have two NATO armies fighting each other, illegally, with American supplied weapons and on the basis of American training, and that it would damage our position in the eastern Mediterranean for a generation and provided -- who knew at the time -- what opportunities for the Soviets.

The situation on the ground kept getting worse and worse and worse and the signals, at least to

me, were clearer and clearer and clearer that the bloody Greek government was playing games with the pro enosis extremists on the right wing of the Greek Cypriot political spectrum. The gail appeared to be to get rid of Makarios and install a government which would be totally responsive to Athens.

So what do you do? You're the initially responsible person. I took what I thought was the most responsible action. I drafted an instructional cable to the ambassador in Athens which said, in effect, go in to General Ioannidis, not to the prime minister, not to the defense minister, not to the foreign minister, to Ioannidis himself, and tell him in words of one syllable that even he will understand, that the United States being the only government in the developed world which is still on friendly terms with the government of Greece, that the United States strongly opposes any efforts by any element of the Greek government, overt or clandestine, to mess around in the Cyprus situation. And that we particularly oppose any efforts to overthrow Makarios and install a pro-Athens government. Because if that happens the Turks are going to invade, and that's not good for any of us. And I also drafted backup supporting cables for actions for our ambassador in Nicosia and our ambassador in Ankara to take.

The cable got as far as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the bureau and he called me in, and he said, "We can't do that." And I said, "We have to do that." He said, "Nobody in this town wants to alienate the Greek government." And I said, "You would prefer a war?" Anyway, we argued back and forth, he refused to clear the cable. So I went back and I redrafted it, and I toned it down but with essentially the same message, and I came back with another try. This time he said, "Okay." So we went to the Assistant Secretary, and the Assistant Secretary said, "We can't do that. Nobody in this town wants to hear this sort of thing." And I said, "We have to do it. As responsible people we just have to." Well, this battle went back and forth, and up and down, and finally along about April -- I had started this in February, so two months had passed -- I finally got in to see the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, who was Joe Sisco, my friend and former boss in NEA had been promoted, and I said, "God damn it, Joe, we have to do something." And he said, "Look, this is very difficult. Nobody in Washington wants to do this, particularly they don't want to hear anything anti-Greek in the White House. Don't ask me why. I don't know why, but I know that's how they feel over there." So we had the same argument again.

Eventually in about June I managed to get a much watered down version of my instructional cable out of Washington with one version to our ambassador in Athens, and backup cables in Ankara and Nicosia. The ambassador in Athens instantly came back with a cable, which is his right, saying, "Those are terrible instructions that you've given me. I can't possibly do that. If I do that it's going to alienate the Greek government, and we won't have any influence with the Greek government. I reject these instructions. You've got to change them." So I had to fight the fight all over again, but with one more enemy. And by this time the CIA and the Defense Department had discovered what I was up to and they were both opposed to doing this for the reasons that I stated before. In the case of one, because of home porting; and the case of the other, because they had a relationship with Ioannidis.

So I went back for about the eighth time to the drawing board and finally got another instructional cable out to the embassy in Athens. By this time it's July 5th. The ambassador in Athens promptly went on leave. And the DCM, instead of himself carrying out the instruction,

gave it to the Political Counselor. And the Political Counselor, instead of going to General Ioannidis as instructed, went to a Greek Orthodox bishop who was reported to have close relations with the military, and gave the message of the United States government to this religious figure. All of this was reported back to Washington about the 12th of July. It became clear that the instructions had been carried out in a halfhearted manner at best by the embassy in Athens.

That same day we received a raw intelligence cable from the station in Athens which said, in effect, "We have been in touch with General Ioannidis, and we have been assured by General Ioannidis that the Greek government is not, and will not be involved in any clandestine activity designed to overthrow Archbishop Makarios, and to damage the situation in the eastern Mediterranean." That was a weekend, so all right, we'd had it from the horse's mouth. I went home. And about 3:00 a.m. on Monday morning, I got a call from the Ops Center at the State Department and the person said, "You better get in here. There's fighting in Nicosia, and something is going on and it doesn't look good."

So I went into the State Department, I went up to the Operations Center, and they said, "Here's what we've got." And he put two pieces of paper in front of me. On the left hand side was the Daily Intelligence Summary, which is done by the entire intelligence community for the President and the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the highest officers. And it said, in its lead item, "We have been assured by General Ioannidis that Greece will not move its forces on Cyprus against Makarios. To the right was a cable from Embassy Nicosia describing the fighting between Cypriots loyal to Makarios and Cypriots and Greeks trying to overthrow him. The presidential palace was in flames and the Cypriot force had been decimated. We don't know where Archbishop Makarios is. We presume he's dead. A government has been installed in Cyprus, and the new leader is Nikos Sampson." Nikos Sampson happened to be an individual who had killed a lot of British policemen during the '50s, and he'd killed a lot of Turk Cypriots during the '60s, and for them to make him the president of the new nation of Cyprus, was just unbelievable, and unthinkable. And, of course, instantly the Turkish army mobilized.

Now think about this. There we were sitting there with the entire intelligence establishment of the United States in all of its majesty, having been conned by a piss-ant Greek Brigadier General, on the one hand; and on the other hand the disaster which I had been trying to avert, and avoid, coming true like your worst nightmare. Well, it was in the fan, clearly. Several emergency meetings were held, and Kissinger decided to send Joe Sisco out on a shuttle diplomacy mission to solve the problem. And I had been around Washington long enough, and had become cynical enough, that I knew that the minute Kissinger sent Sisco, instead of going himself, it meant that he knew that there was no hope, and he didn't want to have a loser identified with himself. So he sacrificed Under Secretary Sisco, and his staff, of which I was one. I mean it's a clear bureaucratic signal that you're not going to win. And it didn't.

We flew first to Athens where an ashen-faced ambassador received us and said, "We've made arrangements for you to see the foreign minister." And Sisco said, "I'm not going to see the foreign minister. If I can't see General Ioannidis, I'm leaving." And we had about a morning's go-around over that, but we eventually got to see General Ioannidis, and Joe Sisco went in there and said, "If you don't do something we're going to have a war, and you're going to lose the war."

Now give me some elements of compromise that I can take to Ankara that we can work with." Whereupon, General Ioannidis launched into an emotional, weird, surreal, description of Byzantine history, and the struggle against the Osmanli Turks, and Constantinople, not Istanbul. We were clearly in real trouble because this guy had disconnected from the world, and he had all the power. And he didn't give us anything.

We went off to Ankara, and we met with Ecevit. We met with Ecevit just forever it seemed like, eight or ten hours. Talk, talk, talk, and Ecevit was just shaking his head, no, no, no. I'm not going to do anything. And finally our ambassador there, Bill Macomber, who is known to Ed, and Steve, and myself at least, and someone who had been Under Secretary for Management, with whom I had fought seriously as president of AFSA, but for whom I had a great deal of affection and respect, he sort of went like this, time out. And everybody stopped talking, and he turned to Ecevit, and said, "Mr. Prime Minister, you're a teacher and a poet. You're not a military man, and there are kids all over the world who are not going to forgive you if you let this happen." A tear rolled down Ecevit's cheek, and he said, "Mr. Ambassador, it's out of my hands."

The next morning the Turks hit the beach. They attacked northern Cyprus, they overwhelmed the Greek Cypriot forces in Kyrenia. They drove straight through to the Turkish sector of Nicosia and established a bridgehead on the island. We went back to Washington with a failed mission, and at that point I was, as you can imagine, self-righteous, and angry, and disappointed because American diplomacy had conducted itself in such a way as to bring damage, death, and destruction. The three Ds. It was, in my mind, unforgivable.

So, I wrote a dissent memorandum. And in that dissent memorandum I covered what I had tried to do, where I had been blocked, what the intelligence community had said and done, what the Defense Department had said and done, what had happened. And, yes, I had to say, "You see..." I was right, you know, a little bit of that. But then I said, "But Mr. Secretary," "...these dissent memoranda go straight to the Secretary..." "Mr. Secretary, you have to go to the Turks now, and keep them inside that bridgehead because if they break out and drive to both coasts, they will divide Cyprus in half, and Greece and Turkey will have another boundary over which they can fight until the end of time. And what's more, you will have them fighting with American supplied equipment which is contrary to their treaties with us, and our military supply relationships with both countries will have to be stopped...blah, blah, blah."

Clearly, Kissinger...I'm not sure he ever saw my memorandum. There's a requirement that they be answered within 30 days. In fact, my memorandum was not answered by Policy Planning for six months, and I'll get to that in a minute.

Meanwhile, on the island itself the Turkish tanks, two days later, drove out of the bridgehead, crashed across the island east and west in both directions, cut Cyprus in half, great slaughter of Greek Cypriots in the Turkish area, great slaughter of Turk Cypriots in the Greek area. A bloody mess. The government of the generals in Athens fell, and a democratic government took over but it was totally paralyzed. The only good thing was, it was clear that that democratic government was not going to get into a war with Turkey.

In Turkey, the Turkish army simply did whatever it decided to do and Bulent Ecevit had the

choice of ratifying it, or disappear, and he chose, however reluctantly, to ratify it.

On the island of Cyprus itself, everyone blamed the United States for what had happened. There was rioting, and there was a lot of shooting around the American embassy. And one particular morning the shooting was particularly bad, and as everybody ran for the safe room -- a room with steel casings around it -- one of our colleagues (long pause) was hit in the head, and her head was blown off. A Foreign Service national, and as the ambassador reached out to carry her, he took one right here, which tore his heart out, (pause) and he was dead before he hit the ground. A friend of mine, and Ed's and Steve's.

So, there you have it. We had alienated all three parties, the Greeks, and the Turks, and the Cypriots. We had caused severe death and destruction on the island. We had contributed to the death of friends, and in general made a mess of it. As you can see, it is difficult for me to this day. In any case, I got what I deserved. That is to say, I was simply fired. Kissinger said, "You are relieved of your job as director of Cypriot affairs." And I expected that. So I just went home, and stayed there.

The situation on the island went from bad to worse. Indeed, our relationships with Turkey and Greece were severely damaged, and remained damaged. They stayed damaged for a generation, and we had a lot of problems in achieving our policy goals in that part of the world.

Well, what are the lessons of all this? What does it tell you? In order to make that clear I have to provide a postscript. And the postscript is what happened to me. Well, what happened to me was that, unbelievably for me, the Director General of the era called me up, and said, "I'd like you to go to the Senior Seminar." I said, "Hey, you can't be serious. I'm damaged goods." And he said, "No, no. We want you to do that." And, of course, I did. It's an honor assignment, it's fun. It's a great year. It's the senior most training assignment that one can have, and I have to tell you that I was surprised, as well as delighted. That's what happened.

Half way through that year, I got a call from the intelligence committees on the Hill, the Church committee on the Senate side, and the Pike committee on the House side -- it was the Pike committee that called me -- and they said, "Mr. Boyatt, we have decided in analyzing US policy failures, we're going to do the three Cs, Chile, Cambodia, and Cyprus. And you had a lot to do with Cyprus, and we'd like you to testify." And I said, "You can't come to me directly, you have to go through the chain of command. If you want me to testify I'll have to call my superiors, and ask them." And they said, "That's fine. Do that." And mind you, I'm in a training assignment, all right? So I called Larry Eagleburger, who was the Under Secretary for Management, and who was very close to Henry, and I said, "Larry, the Pike committee wants me to testify." And he said, "You can't." I said, "Okay, I'll tell them that you said that." So he said, "Wait a minute." (Laughter) "Let me talk to the lawyer." So he went and talked to the lawyer, and called me back and he said, "You can't on the basis of executive privilege." I said, "Okay." I called up the Pike committee, and I said, "I can't testify. Under Secretary Eagleburger has said I can't testify on the basis of executive privilege." And the counsel for the committee said, "That's nonsense. Executive privilege flows from the President only to his immediate advisers, and not down to desk officers at the State Department. I'll call Eagleburger." So a big struggle ensued -- with constitutional overtones, by the way. A fight between the Executive Branch, and the Legislative

Branches, as to whether I could testify or not. And finally Kissinger said, "Okay. You can testify, but you can't say anything that's classified." So I saluted, and I went up to the hearing.

There were three or four Assistant Secretaries in the room, and Pike didn't call any of them. Instead he called me. So I went up, and was sworn, and he asked me a question. The first question he asked me involved a classified response, and I said, "Mr. Chairman, my instructions from the Secretary of State are that I can come, I can testify, but I can't divulge any classified information." "What!" And he went ballistic, and he cleared the room of all of the riffraff Assistant Secretaries, and the press, and everybody else, and the CIA's lawyer. And I'm sitting there all by myself, and they're all up there on this pedestal -- you know how they intimidate you -- and he went into executive session and he said, "Now you can testify." And I said, "Those aren't my..." Anyway, it went back and forth, and back and forth, and halfway through they discovered that there was a Boyatt dissent memorandum, about which I had heard nothing from the Foreign Service specifically. And they subpoenaed the dissent memorandum, and Henry, of course, resisted that mightily. This struggle went on and on, and eventually an agreement was reached under the terms of which I was allowed to testify in closed session, and answer questions up to secret but not beyond secret. And the Boyatt memorandum was cut into pieces, and those pieces were interspersed with other drivel made up by S/P designed to disguise what was the Boyatt memorandum because Dr. Kissinger was so concerned for protecting my anonymity. (Laughter) If you believe that, you will also believe anything.

Anyway, a constitutional compromise was reached. At the end of my year in the Senior Seminar I became the Deputy Chief of Mission in Santiago which is a great job. It's a career making job. I wound up being chargé there, and went on to two embassies, and retired when I was 50, and lived happily ever after.

What are the lessons? Well, there are a lot of lessons here. The first lesson is that you really test the system by how it performs under pressure. That's lesson number one. In my case, the system performed pretty well under pressure. While it is true that in a policy sense I was unsuccessful...maybe that's a fair way of putting it. I was unsuccessful in getting the United States government to do what it should have done, when it should have done it. And if I'd been successful, lives would have been saved and the best interest of this nation would have been much better served. But in the process of trying to do that, I spit in just about everybody's eye that you can spit into. I fought with the CIA at the highest levels, I fought with the Defense Department at the highest levels, I fought with two ambassadors at the highest levels, and I fought with everyone that was above me in the bureaucratic chain of command -- the Deputy Assistant Secretary, the Assistant Secretary, and the Under Secretary, and there was an implied fight the whole time with Kissinger. And he knew it, and I knew it. And yet, I survived. And not only did I survive, I prospered.

Why? How? What were the mechanisms that made this possible? Well, I guess three. One is the dissent channel. I used it, and I used it in the proper way. I used it in the appropriate way. Two, I fought but I kept my fight within the building. At any point in this struggle, I could have gone to the press, or the "Hill," (the Congress), and I could have generated a counter-fire against Henry Kissinger and made him fight out our Cyprus policy in public. In which case he would have had...the case for what I wanted to do was so overwhelming, that had it gotten into the public

domain, particularly the press domain, and the Congressional domain, that he would have been forced to do what I wanted him to do, but I did not do that. Now, I stayed within the system and a friend of mine was killed. But I did stay within the system. What did the system do for me?

Much to my surprise the first thing that happened was that I got a great efficiency report from the very Assistant Secretary I had been fighting. The Director General stepped in, and made sure that I got to the Senior Seminar. Somebody else stepped in and made sure I got a good onward assignment. In short, the old boy network, and it's still an old boy network, by the time you guys get up there it will be an old boy and old girl network, but in those days it was an old boy network, closed ranks, and everybody in that system did what they could to take care of me, and they did. And I lived to talk about it.

The questions? There are a lot of them, and the biggest one, of course, is did I do the right thing. Well, I don't know. Judgement is everything. Believe me, I would not have fought this fight over something that was unimportant. I wouldn't have fought this fight over an efficiency report, and I wouldn't have fought it over a travel allowance. But from my perspective the best interests of the United States were in play. So I fought. When your time comes, I hope you fight.

WILLIAM C. BURDETT
Minister Counselor and Chargé d'Affaires
Ankara, Turkey (1967-1970)

Ambassador William C. Burdett's Foreign Service career included positions in New Zealand, Iraq, and Washington, DC, and an ambassador to Malawi. He was interviewed by Richard Nethercut on December 16, 1988.

Q: After your service in London I see that you were in the State Department for another four years and then went to Ankara as Minister Counselor at the Embassy and during this period served as Charge for several lengths of time. Could you highlight some of the problems that you encountered in this assignment and what you consider to be some of the most important aspects you were involved in?

BURDETT: Cyprus was one of the most difficult problems in relations with Turkey. A major crisis developed soon after my arrival in Ankara in late 1967. The Turks made obvious preparations for a military invasion with troops boarded on transports. To avert a landing President Johnson assigned Cyrus Vance as Presidential Envoy to Turkey, Greece and Cyprus. "Frank" negotiations ensued. Turkish President Sunay postponed the landing to give Vance time to make one more effort with Makarios. Happily Makarios accepted, in effect, the Turkish terms and the invasion was called off. The next time the Turkish troops landed and we're still suffering the consequences. The Turks felt we let them down in failing to oblige Makarios to meet his commitments.

Q: In addition to the relations with Cyprus while you were in Turkey, were there other aspects of particular significance in our policy toward Turkey while you were there?

BURDETT: The bulk of our time on the operational side was taken up with matters involving the large U.S. military presence in Turkey to bolster NATO. There were negotiations on the status of forces requiring special attention to Turkish nationalist sensitivities, and arrangements for visits by the Sixth Fleet. Our A.I.D. program was extensive. We achieved remarkable success in introducing into Turkey a new type of wheat which enabled the farmers greatly to increase their yield. We also had a major Peace Corps program, but with the Peace Corps difficulties developed during the Vietnam period when volunteers sought to protest against U.S. policy toward Vietnam.

Q: That must have been interesting. How did the Turks react to this evident displeasure with U.S. policy by a portion of the Embassy?

BURDETT: These demonstrations did damage to our relations with Turkey. Unfortunately members of the A.I.D. mission and even a few Army officers took part. They culminated in picketing the Embassy. Under Turkish law picketing cannot be conducted without permission. To avoid arrest of the pickets and sensitive to the growing anti-Vietnam movement at home, the Ambassador permitted the demonstrations within the Embassy compound. I think this was a humiliating experience and brought mockery from the Turks who were amazed that such a thing could happen.

Q: During your assignment to Turkey you had three stints as Chargé d'Affaires and so during two of those times you then reverted to the position of Deputy Chief of Mission. Could you describe a bit of the transition process that you went through as two new Ambassadors came in the course of your assignment to Ankara?

BURDETT: Service as Charge is inherently difficult, but lots of fun. The uncertain time element weighs upon you. You are one man short at the top; members of the Country Team are "restless", although in Turkey most cooperative, when your term is short and your authority less clear cut than that of the Ambassador; you lack time for your own policy input and for developing your own tactics to execute policy.

The assignment of Robert Komer, prominently involved in the rural pacification program in Vietnam caused us difficulties. His name had appeared frequently in the Turkish press. At the time there was a growing leftist movement in Turkey and vocal opposition to our Vietnam policy, especially on the part of university students. A large demonstration greeted Komer's arrival, and we were obliged to stop his plane and unload far out on the airfield. It was, of course, a considerable embarrassment and irritating to Komer. A few days later in the official limousine with flags flying, he drove against staff advice to make calls on the university Rector. During this meeting Turkish students seized and burned the limousine. Both incidents made his mission more difficult. A lesson is the need to take into account the global repercussions of U.S. policies even in the assignment process.

Q: I see. Was this also true with respect to Ambassador Komer's replacement?

BURDETT: Ambassador Handley was an experienced career officer knowledgeable about the

Middle East and the transition went smoothly.

Q: In summing up your assignment to Ankara then, were there some principle impressions you gathered that influenced you in your subsequent assignment as Ambassador to Malawi?

BURDETT: There is a great gulf between Turkey and Malawi. Our policies toward each are completely different. To finish with Turkey, I developed a great respect for the Turks. They are strongly anti-Russian, not just anti-Communist, and I believe can be counted upon in terms of Western defense. They are a stubborn, proud people who respect the slogan, "An enemy of my friend, is my enemy." They have been disappointed in the United States because of our perceived bias on the question of Cyprus in favor of Greece. Their enmity with Greece is deep-seated. The Turks have major economic problems and have been grateful for U.S. aid in the economic field. They have made good use of our economic and military aid and contribute in a major way to NATO. Often overlooked is their assistance in the intelligence field.

Attachment

I encountered the Cyprus problem in 1964 while serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. EUR was drawn in because of the effects on NATO of the Greek-Turkish controversy and the involvement of British military bases on the island valuable to NATO. Turkey was staunchly anti-Russian, had faith in the US, and espoused the doctrine - the enemy of my friend is my enemy. The Turks, public and government, took for granted our backing in their quarrel with Cyprus and in particular Archbishop Makarios.

Makarios in espousing Enosis was seeking and receiving support from a growing communist movement as well as from Greece. Turkey was threatening military intervention to halt union with Greece and safeguard the Turkish minority. It appealed to the US. President Johnson approved a secret effort strongly endorsed by Under Secretary George Ball to organize an international force including US and non-NATO troops to establish security on the island and curtail Makarios' activities. This would forestall a Greek-Turkish military clash and communist threats to the bases. I was coordinator. Turkey welcomed our plan and other countries including Sweden agreed to provide troops. I received a telephone call from Ambassador Parsons in Stockholm asking if he could assure the Foreign Minister that the Secretary approved. I replied he could say the President approved and subsequently confirmed the answer with Ball.

Plans were completed for deploying troops down to identifying the US units and drawing up the rules of engagement. The British worked closely with us although not contributing troops beyond those already stationed at their bases. Suddenly Ball called a meeting, decided to cancel the project, and immediately obtained President Johnson's concurrence. Joseph Sisco representing IO led the opposition emphasizing the likely ruckus among third world countries at the UN. NEA demurred because of Greek reaction. I urged going ahead. The full reasons for Ball's decision are unclear. The negative factors cited were present all along. Probably developments in the Vietnam war, concern over public opposition to another US troop deployment and unwillingness to face an adverse domestic political reaction from the Greek lobby were significant, but unmentioned, factors.

The incident warrants recording because of the lasting negative effects on Turkish confidence in the US, and as a case of the US tendency to reach hasty decisions swayed by immediate expediencies without adequate evaluation of effects on our long term interests. Turkey felt suddenly deserted by a trusted ally on an issue of major emotional and national security importance. Trust was affected and our diplomacy bore the burden when again coping with Cyprus. Leaders of other countries, some of whom agreed to participate at US urging despite domestic political risk, were let down and bewildered. To what extent are we building a reputation for inconstancy and lack of stamina which will increasingly haunt our diplomacy? We seem especially vulnerable to domestic interest groups with narrow foreign objectives to which they give exclusive importance. Leading examples are the Israel and Greek lobbies.

I was assigned to Embassy Ankara from 1967-70 as Minister-Counselor and during the tour served as Charge for 9 months among 3 Ambassadors. Our Ambassador in 1967, Parker T. Hart, an outstanding Middle East veteran, had built solid personal relations with key Turkish officials which mitigated the new wariness toward the US. That year the Cyprus issue flared. The question again was Enosis and the perceived threat to the Turkish minority from the Greek majority. This time Turkey mobilized and troops boarded transports for invasion of the island. The government appeared obdurate. In a final effort to avert a landing President Johnson despatched a Presidential envoy, Cyrus Vance, to Turkey, Greece and Cyprus. It was a close call. As Hart and Vance were meeting with Turkish President Sunay Embassy Ankara received a "Flash" telegram from Nicosia citing reports invasion was imminent and saying the Embassy was considering an immediate evacuation of American citizens. The Turks had barred all access to the meeting with President Sunay and we judged an order to evacuate American citizens could trigger a Turkish landing even if not already underway. We sent a "Flash" back saying we did not believe a landing would occur that night. To our immense relief the Turks conceded Vance time for another shuttle to Nicosia where Makarios in effect met Turkish conditions.

The time required to convince Makarios he had no choice but to step back or face Turkish troops was bought in good measure with the personal trust built up by Pete Hart, reinforced by the negotiating tact of both Hart and Vance plus Turkish reluctance to break with the US. Unfortunately, the underlying souring of public opinion toward the US grew together with doubts within the military and government about US reliability. During the next round Turkish troops landed and we are still suffering the consequences.

ARCHER K. BLOOD
Political Officer
Athens, Greece (1968-1970)

Archer Blood was born in Illinois in 1923. His Foreign Service career included positions in Greece, Germany, Algeria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed in 1989 by Henry Precht.

BLOOD: Then came actually, I think, a critical point in my career. I said I was promoted to class

one, you know, February or so of 1968, and my tour was coming to an end in the summer. Of course, it was where would I want to go to next. And NEA came forth with some suggestions that didn't -- like political counselor in Ankara and Athens that didn't intrigue me too much.

Then Bill Hall, who had been the deputy chief of mission in Pakistan when I was in Dacca the first time, was assigned as ambassador to Ethiopia. And he wanted Chris Van Holland as his DCM, but Chris was in Turkey, I think, and they wouldn't let him go. And so he asked me if I wanted to go. And I said yes. I thought, "Gee, DCM in Addis is a chance to break into Africa, you know. I think if you want to get an embassy there, if you had been DCM in Addis, you might get an African embassy might be possible there." And I very much admired Bill Hall and Jane, his wife, and would love to work with them.

And then I suddenly got word that I had been transferred to Athens as political counselor. Subsequently, Bill Hall told me he thought I preferred Athens. And I said, "No, I never. If I'd had any choice, I would have jumped at Addis." Because the troubles that Mike Crosby -- I don't know if you remember Mike Crosby. He was serving as DCM in some African post. He had been in Greece when I had earlier. He was supposed to go as political counselor to Athens, but his ambassador was brought back as deputy secretary so he couldn't go. So the job was open. Since I was in NEA, they threw me into the breach. But if I had gone to Addis, I think it would have been a completely different career because one reason I went to Dacca is because I was very unhappy in Athens.

Q: You really didn't want to get back into the Greek region again?

BLOOD: No, I didn't. And they asked me to -- well, Phil Talbot was the ambassador. Phil Talbot had been assistant secretary in NEA after Rountree so I had worked with him and liked him. But when I got there, I realized in terms of rank, I would be about the fourth person in the embassy. I had been DCM and chargé in Afghanistan for a long period of time. Also, the junta was in charge. The CIA was very supportive of the junta. CIA people had very close contacts with the junta. The political section, we were anti-junta.

Q: Why were you anti-junta?

BLOOD: Well -

Q: Because of your democratic values?

BLOOD: In part. I think in part because most of us in the political section had served in Greece before. We had known the Greek politicians. The military would serve the king. We were very fond of them. We didn't accept the argument that these people were baddies. Everybody that we had known before were bitterly opposed to the junta because they were political people. I've never been in a post that was so divided.

Q: Well, what was the CIA rationale for support of the junta?

BLOOD: Well, a very good one really. Because the leadership of the junta had come out what

the Greeks call the CIA which was the Greek military intelligence. And so they had been the normal working contacts of the CIA before the coup. Suddenly the people that they knew, their working contacts, were now the rulers of the country. So this was obviously advantageous to them, and they like them and worked with them.

Q: But you said the embassy was quite divided?

BLOOD: Well divided, yes. Well, primarily the military -- and there were many, many Greek-Americans in the CIA and among the attachés. We had also a large MAG mission. They were without exception, the Greek-Americans, 200 per cent for the junta. The people who were opposed were in the political section. Bob Keeley was my deputy there for a while and bitterly opposed. And the USIA, I would say most of them were pretty unhappy with the junta. The economic section was sort of neutral.

Q: The DCM was McClelland?

BLOOD: DCM was Ross McClelland. Phil Talbot left in January after the election which brought in Mr. Nixon. And for the next year, over a year, there was no ambassador. And Ross was the DCM. I mean, Ross was the chargé.

Q: Why didn't we have an ambassador appointed?

BLOOD: Well, I think in part there was a feeling that you didn't want to show too much enthusiasm about the junta. I mean, there was many, many Greeks opposed to it. And they didn't get around to it until they appointed Henry Tasca, who didn't get there until, I think, January in 1970. And so most of my period was working with Ross as the DCM.

And he was in the very difficult position of running a divided embassy. It was really a bitterly fought struggle. The staff meetings were hostile. I've never been in a place where you couldn't, you know, as American officials speak frankly about the local government. But if you said anything mistaken as critical about members of the junta, the CIA would explode in anger.

Q: Would they relay it to the junta members?

BLOOD: I hope not. I doubt that. And then if they would, you know, started in staff meetings charges about political leaders that they were no damn good or can't be trusted, then I would rise to their defense. And there was much, much friction. And a lot of our military there felt that this regime was very popular. And our argument was "Well, if they are that popular, why don't they expose themselves to an election?"

"You don't need an election in a democracy, you know. They are popular. You can see that just by talking to people. That is our feeling."

I admit it must have been very difficult for Ross McClelland at that time. Because Greece is a country in which if you have ever served there, you do get emotionally involved. Most people there were emotionally involved in that issue.

Q: But Washington was surely aware of the problem in the embassy. Did Washington not give guidance or take --

BLOOD: No. I think perhaps they wanted both views coming out. And then I heard that Tasca was coming as ambassador. And, actually, a friend of mine in the Foreign Service, Bill Crawford, who had served as Tasca's DCM in Rabat, wrote to me and said that, "I know both of you. I know you and he will not get along." He didn't have a very high regard for Tasca. And I guessed that when Tasca came, he would opt for a particular position in support of the junta. And I was right in that.

Then the issue involved primarily then was the sale of military equipment to Greece: tanks, aircraft, artillery. The position that I took and the leader of the political section took was that, "Okay, we didn't mind selling it to the Greeks for NATO purposes but not on the justification that the rest of the CIA was using that this would bring them back to democracy. These people will never bring back Greece to democracy. And this is a lie. We will sell it to them only for purely security purposes and tell them that, but don't operate on the delusion that you are doing this as a way of encouraging democracy because that is just false." Anyhow, then when Tasca came, he did say let's give them . . .

So that's when they, NEA, knowing that I wanted out, said there is this opening in Dacca. And they knew I had served there before. Would I be interested in going?

Q: This is 19 --

BLOOD: '70. I guess the assignment was really firmed up at the end of -- no, about the end of '69, the first part of '70. I left Athens in March '70 to go to Dacca. Actually, I was chargé because Ross went on home leave for a couple months. When Taska arrived, I had been chargé for a month or so. It was I who greeted him when he came to Greece.

Q: When you left Athens in March --

BLOOD: This was direct transfer, yes.

Q: Direct. Did you have a feeling that the junta was there to stay indefinitely?

BLOOD: Oh, no.

Q: How do you think the issue between Greek opposition to the junta and its authoritarian policies were going to be resolved?

BLOOD: I didn't know. I didn't foresee that the junta would make such a stupid mistake over Cyprus that they would bring about their own downfall which was what happened. But I just felt that it was an anomaly that the Greeks wanted a democracy, that this was an abnormal situation, that sooner or later would fail. That was my feeling, but I didn't know when it would take place or how it would take place. I was rather pessimistic at the time seeing that they were in for a long haul, and Agnew had gone over right after I left to visit them. It looked like the United States was moving from a rather cool position to a warmer embrace of the junta.

Q: Did you think that whatever opposition there was the body politic would work against us in the future?

BLOOD: Oh, yes. Oh, yes, that's what we kept telling Washington that we are going to pay a price for supporting a non-popular government here, that the Greeks are going to remember this and hold it against us.

Q: But there was no reaction from Washington? Did you get any resonance from Washington to those arguments?

BLOOD: I think they -- no, no, I can't remember any. But Washington was divided too. I mean, there was no, you know, great enthusiasm for the junta certainly. And as I say, it took us well over a year before we moved into a warmer relationship with them. And even then, I think they were still uneasy about it because the rest of the NATO countries were damning them and were unhappy with them. It wasn't, you know, a close embrace ever.

Q: In this division of American official opinion over the junta, where did the White House figure? Where did they come down? The Johnson Administration at least.

BLOOD: Well, my feeling is that they took sort of hands off approach; wait and see what would happen. And it was actually during the Nixon Administration that we moved toward a closer position.

Q: I see. But they were not activists in one way or another trying to encourage any kind of evolution of --

BLOOD: Oh, yes, we were always talking about we encourage a return to democracy, yes. The question was did you trust the junta to bring it about.

Q: I see.

BLOOD: And I didn't, and all of us didn't. Or did you think that well maybe like some people thought we would have nice law and order in a country, remember, was solidly behind us in NATO, cooperating with us militarily and every way they could. Maybe, you know, why worry about it? That was the thing in the short run, but we were arguing the long run that we are going to pay for this because the Greek people are not happy.

Q: Did you personally have much contact with the junta leadership?

BLOOD: No, and they didn't like -- they liked their contacts with the people who were fully supportive, and they knew that we weren't.

Q: So if the State Department sent you an instruction to see someone at a high level, then you either had had to have somebody else do it from CIA or you went to see somebody else --

BLOOD: Well, I don't think I ever got an such instruction. I don't think Ross did. I think the pattern was the CIA did it. But we had a fellow named -- what was his name -- [Peter Peterson] he was the consul general, who was a Greek-American, and he was very close to Pattakos, who was number two in the junta. He often was used for this.

Q: All right. Any last minute thoughts on Athens before we move again?

BLOOD: No, except I think it was probably the most painful experience I had in the Foreign Service.

WILLIAM R. CRAWFORD, JR.
Deputy Chief of Mission
Nicosia (1968-1972)

Ambassador William R. Crawford, Jr. was born in Pennsylvania in 1928. His career in the Foreign Service included positions in Cyprus, Yemen, Romania, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by William Moss on March 12, 1991.

Q: From 1968 to 1972, you were the DCM, the deputy chief of mission, in Cyprus. The ambassador, to begin with, was Taylor Belcher until 1969, and then David Popper from 1969 to 1973. As DCM, responsibilities depend on who is the ambassador. What were your responsibilities, both under Belcher and Popper? Were they different or was it standard DCM-ships?

CRAWFORD: No, they were somewhat different. I agreed to go to Cyprus initially because I felt that the level of deputy chief of mission is at the stage at which Foreign Service officers should be learning management in the broadest sense. The embassy in Nicosia is itself a small post. But it is the hub of American activities in Cyprus conducted by five different agencies, which at that time had over 1,000 employees in Cyprus, and really it falls to the deputy chief of mission to coordinate the work of all of these several agencies through their respective chiefs. So it's a very good place to learn management, as well, of course, as a fascinating political problem.

On the political program, I could have had no better instructor than Toby Belcher, who at that point was approaching his ninth year on the island. First he had been consul general in the days before Cyprus independence for four or five years, then went back as ambassador for an equal period. So he was a voice of great experience. He really ushered me into the whole political problem.

David Popper was quite different. He did not have previous Cyprus experience or, indeed, Foreign Service experience. His career had been primarily as a civil servant in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. Very distinguished, but he did not know a great deal at that point, though an extremely intelligent man, about routine Foreign Service operations.

Q: As a political ambassador for somebody who knows the Foreign Service and how one deals

abroad.

CRAWFORD: Ambassador Popper had seen a great deal of the Foreign Service in his 25 or 30 years in IO [International Organization Affairs] so it was not like being deputy to a political appointee. But it was different from a normal ambassador-DCM relationship in the sense that Ambassador Popper was away from the post much of the time. Cyprus was fairly tranquil, and he was pulled out to head up international narcotic negotiations with some 70 different countries, successfully so. In his early time there, he was really off post a great deal, leaving me as chargé. It was at a very interesting period.

Q: Could you describe how you saw the situation at the time? We are speaking of 1968 through 1972.

CRAWFORD: By the time I got there, the second period of maximum tension, almost war, 1967 threat of a Turkish invasion, had passed. We were in an apparent lull as between Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. But the fascinating development of the years I was first in Cyprus was the do-or-die tension between the junta in Athens and Archbishop Makarios. It was this Greek-to-Greek thing that needed closest watching at that point.

Q: You are speaking of what is often referred to as the colonels, Papadopoulos and Pattakos and Ioannidis in Athens, who had seized power in April 1967, and their opposition to Archbishop Makarios, who was president at the time.

CRAWFORD: Elected president of Cyprus, as well as being head of the Cyprus church, very much in the ancient Greek tradition. An extremely canny politician and leader. At the time of his death, he was the longest surviving head of government and head of state in the commonwealth. It shows something about his sagacity. There again, it's a very complicated story, which is a subject of a book or several books all in its own right. Suffice it to say that an intense enmity had developed between the junta in Athens and Archbishop Makarios, with the junta fairly blaming Makarios for having aided a young man, a mainland Greek, who subsequently tried to assassinate the prime minister of Greece. Makarios had given him safe haven, the use of the Cyprus diplomatic pouch, and a fake passport to enable him to get back into Greece after a year of clandestine planning in Cyprus, where he subsequently tried to murder the prime minister of Greece.

Q: Threw a bomb on the road to Cape Sunion. His name was Panagoulis.

CRAWFORD: Yes. He was the man who had been given safe haven in Cyprus and subsequently tried to murder the prime minister. Well, in Greek terms, you don't forget that kind of thing, so the Greeks, with their very substantial assets in Cyprus, decided that Makarios had to go. They made several attempts on his life, cut the fuel lines in his helicopter, etc. Put in fictional terms, nobody would believe it, but the die was cast, and the colonels were determined to get rid of him. Watching these attempts build up was an absolutely fascinating detective story. The writing of it made me the 1970 or 1971 runner-up for the director general's reporting award.

Q: What was our role on Cyprus in this ongoing detective story?

CRAWFORD: It was a very complicated picture. Our relations were with the legitimate government of Cyprus and with Archbishop Makarios. Makarios presented himself to the world as a neutralist in the Cold War. At the same time, he depended heavily on substantial political support from the large Communist Party in Cyprus, which on a percentage of population basis is the largest Communist Party in any Western European state. At the same time, he quietly cooperated in many respects with the United States, in an anti-Communist sense. He was well aware that we had certain facilities in the British sovereign base areas in Cyprus, and he did not raise any objections or make a political issue of those. He had countenanced our cooperative, quiet relationship, in an anti-Communist sense, with his Minister of Interior, in various anti-Communist programs.

The issue becomes complicated in that ultimately it was that Minister of Interior, disaffected from Makarios for various reasons, who was the primary instrument that the junta used in its effort to unseat Makarios. So our role got a little fractured at that point. Let me just say that in a general sense, the Central Intelligence Agency felt that the officers of the junta in Greece were proven friends of the United States.

Q: I speak with a certain amount of anguish, because I was consul general on the country team from 1970 to 1974 in Athens, and I know this positive attitude toward a bunch of thugs. (Laughs)

CRAWFORD: Then I'm preaching to the converted.

Q: But we're speaking for the record here.

CRAWFORD: At one point, when I went up to Athens with what I considered proof positive of the way the mainland Greeks were playing around in Cyprus and that they were going to pull the whole house of cards down if they continued their foolishness, I was told by our chief of station in Athens, Jim Potts, that that was just absolutely impossible. He couldn't agree with me: these people were friends with whom we'd worked for 30 years, and they would never conduct anything so foolish, and furthermore, we had absolute assurances that they weren't up to any of the kinds of things we were reporting from Nicosia. Well, this had been totally contradicted by a really dramatic conversation I had had, as chargé with the Greek ambassador, whose name was Panayotakos. He, although a career diplomat, was very close to the junta. About 7:00 or 7:30 one night, Panayotakos telephoned to ask me to come to his office.

I was ushered into his office. He was a fat man and was wearing a dark brown turtleneck jersey. There was no light except a hooded lamp on his desk, one of those things with the metal shade faced down toward the desk and not onto his face or illuminating any of the rest of the room. He said, "Mr. Crawford, I'm calling you in as the representative of a country with which Greece is allied. I want you to know of some important developments." (We were aware pretty well of what was going on, and Panayotakos was, in fact, just confirming information we had from many other sources.) He said, "We have today told Archbishop Makarios that he must leave Cyprus."

I said, "Mr. Ambassador, what if he chooses not to heed your advice?"

He said, "Then the people of Cyprus will know their duty." So I reported this.

Q: When was this, do you remember?

CRAWFORD: This would have been just before I left, probably the spring of 1972. So it was that kind of thing that I took up to our embassy in Athens.

Q: Makarios did not leave.

CRAWFORD: Makarios did not leave. He did not choose to heed their threats. But it was a direct antecedent to the events of two years later.

Q: The CIA station chief, whom I can understand, saw only his particular positive relationship, you might call it, with the intelligence agencies of the Greek. But how about our ambassador, Henry Tasca?

CRAWFORD: I had worked with Tasca in Morocco, and Tasca said, "You've got some pretty convincing information there, but why don't you talk it over with the chief of station who is the man in this embassy really closest to these people? Check it out with him."

The chief of station said, "I hear what you're saying, Mr. Crawford, but it's not plausible, credible, believable, or a fact. We have known these people for 30 years." I was bringing specific information that a particular colonel, Angelides, had come down to Cyprus to deliver the message to those Greek Cypriots who were regarded as totally subservient to mainland Greek wishes, to pull them together in an anti-Makarios effort. I said this was what Angelides was doing on that trip to Cyprus. He said, "It couldn't be. It's not credible. He's a fine man. I've asked him about this and he tells me there's no truth to it." (Laughs)

Q: I think Greece is probably one of the prime examples of what happens when a foreign intelligence service can almost co-opt ours because of cooperation and all. Israel may well be the other.

CRAWFORD: It was interesting that two years later, of course, when the Greeks made the last of their several unsuccessful efforts to kill Makarios, in July of 1974, once again the evidence in Cyprus was overwhelming that this was just about to happen. It was convincing enough to Washington to cable instructions out to Tasca saying, "Approach the Greeks and tell them this just won't wash. The information has now become conclusive." The agency was concurrently tasked, I believe, to go to a longstanding asset who was very close to General Ioannidis, who by that time had replaced Papadopoulos as prime minister.

Q: There had been a generals' coup over the colonels.

CRAWFORD: Ioannidis was actually in charge. We triggered this asset to try to find out what was up. He came back and said, "No, there's nothing to it, I can assure you." Of course, this was believed, because he, in turn, had worked so long and faithfully for the United States. But nobody ever considered the possibility that he might still be loyal to his boss and reporting to

him, Ioannidis, the whole time he was also working for the United States. So Ioannidis succeeded in throwing the U.S. off track in 1974.

Q: What were our relations with the Turks on the island? The time you were there, there was not the division, although they were separate communities. Cyprus was a mixed government and mixed community.

CRAWFORD: Not entirely. Starting in the early 1960's, the island had been, in fact, divided in quite a different way, in a pepper and salt configuration, in which the Turkish Cypriots, feeling exposed and dreadfully insecure in face of sharp hostility by the majority, 80% of the population that is Greek, had pulled into self-defended enclaves. Turks could still move out into Greek areas, but Greeks were not allowed into these tightly defended little Turkish enclaves in the northern sector of Nicosia and these several little secure enclaves dotted the country. The Turkish Cypriot leadership did not venture out of their own enclaves. But we had good personal relations with them and official relations at that point. There was no question of two governments. There was a nominal Turkish Cypriot vice president of Cyprus, but by 1968 he had really faded out of the picture even in the Turkish community. The *de facto* leader was Rauf Denktash. Over the years, we became very close personal friends, as did, indeed, his closest equivalent on the Greek Cypriot side, Glafkos Clarides.

This is important to subsequent developments, because, yes, we had a Turkish language officer in the embassy, we had a Greek language officer, but at the top, the ambassador and I had good relations with the Turkish Cypriot leadership, as with the leaders of the government who were all Greek. This served the U.S. very well after 1974.

Q: What were both the instructions and the official policy of the United States towards Cyprus at the time you were there as DCM?

CRAWFORD: "Do everything possible to try to support the efforts of the United Nations," which had a dual presence in Cyprus -- peacekeeping and peacemaking. Two different organizations. Peacekeeping was under the United Nations forces in Cyprus. The peacemaking presence was a special representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations. We felt the special representative should be out in front in the efforts to resolve the various constitutional issues between the two communities. So we were supporting his efforts: in Cyprus and as appropriate with Greece and Turkey.

The U.N. seemed to be doing a good job of that, slowly but surely trying to mend the constitutional fences. That was all swept aside, ultimately, by this Greek versus Greek feud which did, indeed, pull the whole house of cards down. So pre-1974 our policy was to stand behind and be as helpful as possible to the U.N. efforts to try to achieve a more stable relationship between the two communities.

Q: Having moved from Israeli affairs to another lobby which has the potential for being almost as difficult, and from time to time it crops up, the Greek American lobby, did you find this much of a problem on Greek affairs?

CRAWFORD: Not the first time I was in Cyprus, not from 1968 to 1972. The American Greek community had not at that point been aroused.

Q: It took the July 1974 Turkish invasion to do it.

CRAWFORD: Yes.

Q: We'll come back to that. During this period, it did not particularly invite your attention?

CRAWFORD: Nor was it trying to exercise much influence on Cyprus events. It was not in evidence as it was intensely later. We'll come to that in 1974 and afterwards.

Q: We'll be coming back to Cyprus in some detail. Let's talk about your assignment to the Yemen Arab Republic as ambassador. You might treat, at the same time, a little bit of changes you saw when you had been in Aden before, dealing with that area as a junior officer. How did you get the assignment of going to the Yemen Arab Republic?

ROBERT F. ELLSWORTH
Ambassador, American Mission to North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Brussels, Belgium (1969-1971)

Robert F. Ellsworth, a former member of Congress from Kansas, served as ambassador to The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and as Assistant Secretary of Defense. He was interviewed on June 4, 1991 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: How did you feel about the troublesome allies, the NATO ones -- I'm talking about Greece and Turkey?

ELLSWORTH: Oh, that was a horrible problem, and always a problem but that goes back 450 years. You can't solve that in 1969 or '70. Later on when I came back into the Defense Department, of course, they actually had a little war against each other with the provocation by the Greek thugs down in Cyprus, and the invasion of Northern Cyprus, and the occupation which continues to this day of Northern Cyprus by Turkey. But that's something that's hundreds of years...

Q: Did you look upon Greece as being a real partner in NATO at the time?

ELLSWORTH: They were -- of course, Greece and Turkey...I remember when Helmut Schmidt became Defense Minister of Germany. He came to his first Defense Ministers meeting, and there was a break around the table in the formal session, and he came around to Laird and me and started bitching at us -- that is the only word -- about why didn't Greece and Turkey contribute to the infrastructure fund of NATO, a big multibillion dollar fund that builds infrastructure for the NATO forces and every nation contributes to it in a percentage that's negotiated. And I said to him, because Laird didn't quite have the answer on the tip of his tongue, I said, "Mr. Minister,

Greece and Turkey don't contribute to NATO, they receive from NATO." And they were receiving a lot of money from us mainly, but also from other wealthier Europeans in terms of military aid. So, of course, they wouldn't contribute to the infrastructure fund because they didn't have the money. Greece and Turkey, you had to deal with them separately.

Q: Separately, but very equally.

ELLSWORTH: Separately, but very equally. Well, it wasn't really equal because they had different sized military, but in all they understood what the balance was, and what the conventions were for 40 to 60, or whatever the balance in a relationship was. And it wasn't easy. I mean, that couldn't be at the center of one's attention at NATO headquarters, although you had to handle it. And the Greeks and the Turks were always good at sending military people, and diplomats, to NATO headquarters who were very sophisticated, and sensible people, and grown-ups, and adults. The real nut cutting, if you will, on the Greek-Turkish conflict, came up down in the southern region and had to be handled by CINCSOUTH who is usually, if not always, an American admiral based in Naples, and it was he who had to work out how to actually have a NATO exercise over the Aegean region without erupting itself into a war.

BRADSHAW LANGMAID
USAID
Washington, DC 1970's)

Bradshaw Langmaid was born in Salem, Massachusetts, and graduated from Harvard in 1958. He spent five years in the Air Force, and then attended Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He joined USAID in 1963, and spent a large part of his career at the Near East Bureau in Washington, DC. He retired in 1993. Langmaid was interviewed by W. Haven North on July 14, 1998.

LANGMAID: In Cyprus, we funded a training program. The Cypriots had always sent their children to England. There were no colleges in Cyprus. When the British stopped paying for that, they wanted to come to the States, so we provided a fair amount of that training for the Cypriots. In later years, not when I was office director, but when I was DAA, we had several projects which were specifically designed to get the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots to work together on joint activities. The budget was about \$7 million in TA. It was a congressionally determined program. The Cypriots were doing very well economically.

Q: What was Congress' role, why were they...?

LANGMAID: Because of the Greek lobby. Throughout this period, the most active congressional committee was Congressman Hamilton's Near East and Europe Sub-Committee on the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The Senate was not organized in a geographic sense and the House regional committees were the most active. That sub-committee had a Greek lobby. This lobby was very strong. It knew it couldn't justify continued civilian economic programs in Greece, but they could in Cyprus, particularly as long as the Turks were occupying half of the

island. We finally realized we couldn't do very much about that, so we spent our \$7.5 million as sensibly as we could.

Q: What were we trying to accomplish?

LANGMAID: Not much, training.

Q: Just training, nothing political?

LANGMAID: We weren't in the political issue. The negotiations on Cyprus had no bearing on the overall program. Our program was just a token amount. It was just a sop to those in Congress who wanted to have us doing good things for the Cypriots.

Q: The State Department wasn't pressuring us to have a program?

LANGMAID: No, they did not want an AID presence or complicated program. They were not encouraging us to end the program, but they certainly weren't pressuring us to increase it. They knew full well that it would take money away from other things they wanted. I remember having a conversation with Mike Van Dusen, who was the chief sub-committee staffer for Congressman Hamilton. We knew full well that x million going to Cyprus was not going somewhere else. Mike said it was not worth my time, the politics being as they were. A couple of years, we went in for half the amount and the Congress earmarked it back up to the \$7.5 million. Finally, I gave up trying to get it cut and we decided to spend it as wisely as we could without costing a lot of staff time. We were not in an economic policy dialogue. They weren't interested and their economy was fine.

Greece was also phasing out. That covers the GTICC collection of countries. Later, the office name became NOAS and I picked up a few countries. I picked up Jordan well after the 1967 war, so we had a West Bank program and a Jordan program.

G. JONATHON GREENWALD
Office of Assistant Legal Advisor, UN Affairs
Washington DC (1969)

Legal Advisor, Near East South Asia
Washington DC (1970-1972)

Born and raised in Pennsylvania, Mr. Greenwald earned degrees for Princeton University and Harvard Law School. His first government assignment was General Counsel in the Department of the Air Force. He later transferred to the Department of State, where he served as legal advisor as well as Political Officer, both in Washington and in various assignments abroad. His foreign posts include Germany (East and West Berlin), Yugoslavia, Hungary and Belgium. He also had assignments concerning anti-terrorism.

Q: I guess the Navy has airplanes. There's no reason that the Air Force shouldn't have an interest in a boat on occasion. So when you came into the Department, that was 1969 after the new year. What sort of thing did you do? Again you were in the Legal Advisor's Office.

GREENWALD: Yes, there's a certain circularity to my career that you'll appreciate. I remember the very first set of telegrams I read the first day when I came in and they had said, "You're security clearance is now set, and you're starting work. Read these telegrams and come up to speed." I was in the office of the Assistant Legal Advisor for U.N. Affairs. It was a set of telegrams about the forthcoming set of talks between Denktash and Clerides.

Q: On Cyprus.

GREENWALD: On Cyprus. And when I left the State Department at the end of September this past year, by coincidence or not, the last telegrams I recall seeing were about the forthcoming talks between Denktash and Clerides. But in 1969 I was in the Office of the Assistant Legal Advisor for U.N. Affairs. We were a small office of about four. Primarily our job was to service the International Organization Bureau and the mission in New York. The great opportunity I had almost immediately upon joining was to go to New York and spend three months at the 24th General Assembly at the U.N. That happened because the person who would normally have done that became sick, and they simply needed a fill-in. So it was unusual for somebody just starting to have that chance which was great fun. It gave me a tremendous opportunity to see what the United Nations was like and to work on the Third Committee and the Sixth Committee, the Third Committee being the social and basically human rights committee and the Sixth Committee being the legal committee for the U.N.

Q: Were you involved with Cyprus at all other than visiting a couple times with Ambassador Popper, the head of your delegation?

GREENWALD: At various times people would say we have to spend a little bit more time trying to come up with new constitutional provisions and ideas and schemes, and there would be a bit of excitement, but it wasn't a period in which that was the most active issue. And so I read the telegram reports, and that was about it.

CHARLES STUART KENNEDY
Consul General
Athens, Greece (1970-1974)

Charles Stuart Kennedy was born in Illinois in 1928. His Foreign Service career included positions in Germany, Saudi Arabia, Yugoslavia, Vietnam, Greece, Korea, Italy, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by Victor Wolf, Jr. on July 24, 1986.

Q: Then from Saigon, you went to Athens, where you were consul general from 1970 to 1974. Of

course, this was right at the height of the colonels, the fairly repressive regime. I gather by the time you got there, the King had already fled. In what way did consular work and movement of peoples relate to the general problem of Greek-American relations at that time?

KENNEDY: Oddly enough, very little. We had a great deal of trouble with Americans, particularly Greek-Americans, who came back and would demonstrate against the colonel's regime, Papadopoulos and company. They had a referendum in which the King was deposed. But the Greeks left Greece for economic reasons, and these were almost always the poorer classes. Many of the wealthier Greeks had taken precautions over the years to be sure that they had a safe haven, and they still continue to do it. If they had any claim, they would get themselves a green card and go to the United States as an immigrant, but then often would return to Greece -- these are people with money -- to continue their business, but just in case trouble came, they could keep the resident alien card in their hip pocket and be able to leave in a hurry.

As far as any feeling that the Greeks were leaving the country because of political reasons, no. There might have been a few. Some of the better known exiles and all would leave for France or England, and some to the United States would stay as non-immigrants and carry on anti-colonel regime activities.

ROBERT J. WOZNIAK
Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Nicosia (1970-1974)

Mr. Wozniak was born in Michigan and educated at the University of Chicago, William College and the University of Indiana. After service in the U.S. Navy in WWII, he joined the United States Information Agency (USIA) in 1963. His service included several assignments at USIA Headquarters in Washington, D.C. as well postings abroad as Public Affairs Officer (or Deputy) in Athens, Nicosia, Damascus, and Rabat. Mr. Wozniak was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in 2001.

Q: So you went to Nicosia, to Cyprus in the summer of 1970 to be public affairs officer.

WOZNIAK: Yes, at the time, a quite fresh FSO-4, this is a grade two in this day and age. Is that, right?

Q: Yes.

WOZNIAK: I was a grade four when I went there.

Q: What sort of staff did you have? Were there other American officers or were you the only one?

WOZNIAK: Just prior to my arrival it had been a three officer post, believe it or not, with the departure of my predecessor it was trimmed back to two officers and an American administrative

assistant/secretary. Fifteen Foreign Service nationals (FSNs), and I must say it was the most talented group of FSNs that I had ever encountered in my entire USIA career. They were wonderful. We just had a ball. We had a vigorous cultural program. There wasn't a whole lot we could do on the media side because the Greek Cypriot press is not in any case a very professional one. Not in those days in any case. Cyprus was such a different country in the 1970s than it is today. I visited Cyprus last year or earlier this year. It is utterly transformed. It is cosmopolitan, very rich and booming economy and society. That is even to a degree true of the north (Turkish Cyprus), but not to the degree that it is in Greek Cyprus. But when I went there in 1970 it was a sleepy provincial old colonial capital, Nicosia, and the rest of the country was very much the same. The press was small, it didn't have a lot of focus on anything except the Cyprus problem as seen through a narrow editorial eye. There wasn't a whole lot of scope for media work, though we could do some extraordinary things on occasion.

Once for example, Frank Shakespeare who was director of USIA at the time, and liked to think of himself as a great strategist, wanted to come and take a look at the confrontation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the island. Unlike the kinds of travels that one has experienced since, Frank came alone with no security, no secretary, no support, no escort, and he stayed for four days. Well what do you do with the director of USIA for four days on a tiny little island? One of the things we did is we got him interviewed on Cypriot television, the director of which was an old friend, unfortunately now dead, a fine intellect and poet, interviewed for an hour on Greek Cypriot television. Imagine that in a society that didn't or hadn't paid a lot of attention to American policy positions listening to Frank Shakespeare talk for an hour about the Cold War, about the Greeks and Cyprus and every other issue that was current. It was a marvelous opportunity, but more often than not we were doing cultural stuff or policy related stuff in lecture and out the door formats.

Q: Where was USIS located in those days?

WOZNIAK: Right next door to the Cyprus museum. The USIA area director for NEA that I mentioned earlier, had ordered all USIA posts in his region to bring attention to themselves by super graphics, super-graphicing their office and all of their media output. So when I arrived in Cyprus, this wonderful old colonial building that USIS inherited was not painted in classic white but was painted in checkerboard and stripes, and the director of the museum, a big friend, made it clear to me that I could really ingratiate myself with him and with the Cypriot intelligentsia if I would tone down the garishness of the structure. So we returned it to its pristine white, and that is it, the start of a nice friendly relationship. It was a good location for USIS I said, and I think it has been there until very recently. It no longer exists, that old building.

Q: You mentioned that you had 15 Foreign Service national employees, Greek and Turkish Cypriot. Why don't you talk about the Turkish Cypriot audience that you had? Your background had been with Greek and served six years in Athens. Was that a problem for you at first?

WOZNIAK: I anticipated it might be a problem. It was certainly no secret to the Greek Cypriot community or the Turkish Cypriot community that I had spent all that time in Greece and was a Greek speaker. At that point I had never even set foot in Turkey. So one of the first things I did on arrival at post was arrange to visit my counterparts in Ankara and Istanbul. The reason was

two fold, one to send a signal to the Turkish Cypriots, but also to see what I could filch from their programs that would be useful in programmatic terms in Cyprus. It was not really a problem with the Turkish Cypriot community. In those days before the Greek coup d'état against Archbishop Makarios (July 15, 1974) and Turk incursions, they don't like the word invasion, into Cyprus in (July 20) 1974, prior to that the Turkish Cypriot community was hunkered down in enclaves, into which Greek Cypriots could not move. The Turkish Cypriots could move, and the Greek Cypriots welcomed it out of those enclaves and into the Greek held areas clearly. And so they were readily attended and did attend our cultural programs and visited our offices for other purposes. We had a good working relationship with the Turkish Cypriot community.

Q: Did you make any conscious effort to arrange programs that created a broadened understanding between the two communities?

WOZNIAK: Oh, sure. That was a major thrust as it continues to this day of course as a USIA activity. Unlike in Athens, in Cyprus I was PAO as well as ex-officio chairman of the Fulbright commission board. Both USIA programs and the Fulbright programs were very much oriented toward exactly that purpose of bringing the two communities together.

Q: The membership of the Fulbright commission was from both communities?

WOZNIAK: That's right. Some of it remains as it was in my day, still there. When I visited Nicosia this last June, I had a lovely time with the Mayor who has been mayor all these years, and a vital member of the commission who was very helpful in helping me reach consensus between the Greek and Turk members of the commission with an eye to exactly what we are saying, bringing the two communities together and assuring that they participated equitably in the offerings of the Fulbright program.

Q: And you also tried in the international visitor program and several other programs to make sure there were Turkish Cypriot as well as Greek Cypriot representation.

WOZNIAK: Indeed, of course. One of the first things I did when I got to Cyprus was agree to the recommendation of my most senior Turkish Cypriot at that time, to let our library which is on the first floor of a two story colonial building, be used as a venue for the exposition of the works of a Turkish Cypriot artist. We did that, I think much to the astonishment of a lot of Greek Cypriots, but we did it and it was again another signal to the Turk Cypriots that they didn't have to think they had someone running USIA information and cultural programs that had a bias.

Q: Who was the ambassador, chief of mission at the time?

WOZNIAK: David Popper. David Popper [editor: Presented credentials July 18, 1969; departed post May 31, 1973] and Bill Crawford was the deputy chief of mission and later our ambassador to Cyprus [August 1974-1978], one of your predecessors. It was a great team. You know, some of my best friendships were formed in that Cyprus crucible of Foreign Service officers. Some of us have gone on to illustrious careers as ambassadors, but all agree that the most satisfying assignment in their entire career was Cyprus. It was a vibrant embassy full of energy and talent and we just had a ball, a great time.

Q: Now did you spend a fair amount of your energy on things related to the Cyprus problem per se or not really?

WOZNIAK: Not directly. I guess the closest I got to confrontation with that problem would be in arguments with pro EOAK B [editor: Greek Cypriot paramilitary organization which supported union with Greece] journalists who were simply not persuaded that if they in fact realized their ambitions, they were going to bring down the wrath of the Turks on their heads and destroy the island's well-being. They didn't listen to such counsel, and it wasn't very hard to predict what would happen. But that is as close as I came to dealing with it directly, although I must say this is a very curious thing. I got to know reasonably well the notorious Nikos Sampson. The reason for that being my Greek Cypriot press aide was his sister-in-law. Her sister, a charming woman, Vera Sampson was married to Nikos and we found ourselves from time to time in social circumstances together. He was not an unattractive person personally, but he is not somebody you would want to run into on the street if you were on the wrong side of his political views.

Q: Was he pretty open about expressing them in this period of the early 70s?

WOZNIAK: You know in all candor I eschewed political conversation with Nikos other than those I was supposed to be portraying as a press officer. It was just too delicate of a circumstance to meet with him although he knew very well as did all of the EOKA B types that I knew. I don't think he was an EOKA B type, but he was swept into it by the putschists after the coup. But he certainly knew what U.S. positions were and what my position was on the Cyprus conflict. That is as far as it went.

Q: Was he a newspaper publisher?

WOZNIAK: Yes. He used to write a thing called Macchi which means battle, in a horse farm. He was a member of parliament at the time too. So he was a respected member of the community although he had a very checkered past and future.

Q: The checkered past went back to the previous EOKA...

WOZNIAK: That is right. When he was fingered by the British as being a gunman for assassinating any number of British soldiers on the streets of Nicosia.

Q: Did you have the feeling that there were a lot of journalists who favored or were sympathetic to EOKA B or were these people of a particular newspaper...

WOZNIAK: There had been a couple of newspapers. The South South, the New York Times of Cyprus, the Eleftheria, was the mainstay for those kinds of opinions but they were scattered around the rest of the journalistic community too. I think Greek Cypriots were much less sophisticated about the island and its problems and its place in world politics then than they are today. I am fairly confident that you would have a hard time getting a lot of support on the island for the notion of enosis today, but that wasn't the case in my time, although after this, the supporters of EOKA B or its ideology were few. I mean common sentiment on the island in the

70s would have been very tolerant of enosis if not a supporter. I don't think that is the case today.

Q: To what extent were the people that you are talking about, talking with in those days, who did support enosis, or union with Greece, was that primarily their focus, and to what extent was it anti-Makarios, or did the two kind of get mixed up together or was there a hope maybe that Makarios could be persuaded by pressure or political expression to adopt a more pro-enosis position?

WOZNIAK: That is a very difficult, very interesting question, and a very difficult one to answer, Ray. There were anti-Makarios sentiments of course, that you would readily find among the Greek Cypriot community. But he was a clever man, and I don't think that he could have been co-opted actively to pursue an enosis policy. I was called in once by the Turkish Cypriot chief of information, a very suave guy, perfect clipped British English, who said, "I would like you to listen to something." He played me a tape of a rally at the archbishopric where Makarios was haranguing the crowd, extolling the desirability and virtues of enosis, and the Turkish Cypriots thought they had a great propaganda coup by flaunting this tape. But that was Makarios' way of keeping the wolves at bay I think. Can you really believe that any more than Rauf Denktaş today would be president of a self proclaimed state, that Makarios really would have wanted to see his position as the prominent third world leader of an independent state removed by enosis with Greece? No, I don't think so. I don't think he ever was...

Q: Or if he was in the 50s maybe.

WOZNIAK: Yes, maybe earlier, but having tasted the perks of power such as they were, and the ovations that would be paid to him as a third world leader at these meetings of third world types.

Q: He was one of the leaders of the non-aligned movement going way back. Did you have any direct contact with him, other than seeing him at public events and so on?

WOZNIAK: No, Poptical Stadrou who was his chief of staff was a very good friend of my senior Greek Cypriot FSN who would inevitably almost every day come into my office and say, "Shall we go up and have a cup of coffee with Poptical?" Because what he really wanted to be able to do is be able to brush up against the archbishop's robes. But I think we did that once or twice. I called on Makarios any number of times with prominent visitors. The ambassador didn't have any problem with my doing that as long as we didn't get into any policy issues, and we never did on such occasions. I have a number of photographs signed by the archbishop in red ink, which was his prerogative given to him by the Byzantine emperor with dignitaries like Frank Shakespeare and cultural figures like Telly Savalas and others that would come under our program auspices. They were always just cultural events, courtesy calls.

Q: So you had a lot of visitors.

WOZNIAK: A lot.

Q: Mostly people that were coming under USIA auspices or programs or people that just

happened to come to Cyprus or were on the way somewhere else?

WOZNIAK: Most of them were brought there by us, although once in a while, we took up targets of opportunity. The most significant one that occurs to me is Buckminster Fuller who by chance was visiting a friend on the island. We got wind of it. He was leaving the next day. He agreed to lecture at the cultural center that night. We put out the word, there was no way of communicating about it except by radio. Cyprus radio could do that. We had the biggest crowd in the history of the cultural center that night on very short notice for a lecture and open session with Buckminster Fuller. That was I think one of the rare occasions at the time that what wasn't initiated by USIA. Most of the visitors came under our auspices.

Q: Have you pretty well covered the kinds of cultural programs that you did. There were exchanges, there were cultural presentations, visitors, lecturers. Not too much on the media side.

WOZNIAK: Yes because of the paucity of Greek Cypriot printed media. We worked much more closely with television and radio. We got a lot of programs through there I must say, but mostly soft stuff, the culture stuff.

Q: Television in those days was a Greek Cypriot broadcasting one channel, just in the evening.

WOZNIAK: That's right.

Q: Was there any kind of Turkish language television, Turkish Cypriot?

WOZNIAK: Not in my time, no.

Q: Why don't you talk a little bit more about what you particularly did with the Turkish Cypriot audience? Did you ever learn Turkish or have much contact with Denktash or other leading Turkish Cypriots?

WOZNIAK: No, I never had any contact with Denktash. He was at some cocktail parties, but I can't recall that there were very many instances where we did things, we intentionally eschewed doing things solely for one community or the other, so I can't say we did anything targeted at the Turkish Cypriot community exclusively. Nor did I have a lot of contact with its high level political leadership, although at the time, the president of the Cypriot community, the Turkish Cypriot community, was Fazil Kuchuk. Two things you asked. One did I make any effort to learn Turkish? Yes, I made an effort. One of my Foreign Service national staff had been a school teacher and we would have lessons. I learned maybe a hundred words. I found it just so much harder than any other language I had ever taken on, that I didn't make any effort to really become fluent in the language, but I learned enough to be courteous and make sure that I didn't get lost and things of that nature. But that is as far as it went. Contact on that side at "cosmic" levels, one of our Turkish Cypriot drivers was discovered to be stealing gasoline from our vehicles. I monitored this for a period of time and when I had conclusive evidence that he was doing that, I sacked him. Well he wrote letters of remonstrance to everybody he could think of from the White House on down to his own community leadership and of course, the Queen of England. I spent a lot of time in the next weeks and months answering letters from all of these

people. But I was also called in by Fazil Kuchuk one day to justify this. It was not an easy meeting. Employment in the Turkish Cypriot community at that time was limited and it was a vital question for them in economic terms to support families, to say nothing of the taint of having been sacked. Of course no one knew the reason he was sacked. I said I wouldn't discuss the reasons for it Mr. Vice President, but believe me I had cause. It was not an easy meeting, very awkward. He was looking to get the man reinstated or had some kind of justification for the action, and I was hamstrung at what I could tell him.

Q: Did you reinstate him?

WOZNIAK: No, no, I didn't. Can you imagine being called in by the head of the community, head of state today they would say, to...

Q: At that time, as you say he was vice president of a friendly republic.

WOZNIAK: He was indeed.

Q: Were most of your activities in this period in the capital city of Nicosia, or did you do other things around the island?

WOZNIAK: Mostly it was Nicosia, but we would get occasional programs to Famagusta and to Limassol. In the summer we had appropriate program offerings. We would take them to the ancient theater at Salamis which is a lot of fun. But most things did proceed in Nicosia on both sides of the green line.

Q: And you would do some things for them exclusively sometimes.

WOZNIAK: Sometimes, but most often they would if they were interested, they would come over the green line and attend our center or where ever they knew it was on the Greek Cypriot side. Sometimes we would take things over that would kind of surprise most people. Charley Wick came and said that Telly Savalas would be a great program opportunity for us. He was in fact in Cyprus. Telly came with six or seven others. Stayed a week. We had a Telly Savalas film festival. He wanted to go, I wanted him to go to the Turkish Cypriot side, and he did, and he was a major hit with the Turkish Cypriots. We have photographs of him in the press smoking with average Turkish Cypriots in the coffee shops of Nicosia. It was not common for us to do that kind of thing, to do things exclusively on the Turkish Cypriot side. Mostly it was on the Greek side of Nicosia.

Q: You said Charley Wick?

WOZNIAK: I think so. No it wasn't Charley Wick; it was Frank Shakespeare.

Q: Tell me a little bit about your interaction if any with UN peace keeping force, with United Nations representatives, with the other members of the diplomatic corps, international community?

WOZNIAK: You just reminded me of another Shakespeare story. In the early 70s, I can't say exactly when, in a State Department reorganization Cyprus was moved out of the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) into the European Bureau along with Greece and Turkey. The director of the USIA European area who had inherited Greece, Turkey and Cyprus operations knew nothing about them, came out to see us. His name was Jay Gildner, a wonderful guy. I laid out the red carpet for him which included a call on the UN special representative and the head of the UN peace keeping force on the island. A great Indian figure named Krunchan, had a great mustache and a regal bearing. And helicopter tours of the Greek line, of the Green line and the mountain outposts dividing the two sides. Gildner was very impressed. He went back and told Frank Shakespeare's staff about his experience. Frank the great strategist said, I have got to do that. So that is when he came out.

One of the things we did when Frank was there was to get to call on Osorio-Tafall, the secretary general's special representative. He had Prem Chand the head of the military force, the peace keeping force, in the meeting, and so there was Frank and I and Osorio and Prem Chand. Frank, being interested in the military questions directed all of his early questions and statements in the discussion to Prem Chand. After about 15 minutes of this, he turned to Osorio and said, "And what do you do here?" At which time of course, I sank to the floor. No, I didn't have a lot of dealings with those guys. I would see them in social events and rare occasions such as the one I just cited, but otherwise that was the ambassador's turf.

Q: I don't know if USIA made the reorganization at the same time as the State Department. The State Department I believe, moved Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus into the European Bureau in 1974, not too long before the coup in Cyprus and the Turkish intervention.

WOZNIAK: Oh really. So you are saying they anticipated that move.

Q: That is what I guess, I am asking. It is possible that these things happened, Gildner's visit and Shakespeare's visit were in early '74 not long before you left.

WOZNIAK: It may have been early '74, but I don't think so, Ray. I will tell you why. In addition to the reasons I have indicated earlier about why I changed my mind about making the Foreign Service a career, there was another inducement. Not only were the assignments wonderful, but the promotions were coming very fast. I made the old '3', which I guess is a career FSO-1 the year before I left Cyprus. I was always convinced that it was because Frank Shakespeare went to bat and said this is a good officer. In those days, the old boy network really worked, much more pointedly than it does today. I think directors of USIA could have had with that kind of influence, and I think that is pretty much what happened. I can't imagine why, otherwise I wouldn't have made that grade that quickly. Way before all of my other classmates in the USIA junior officer corps. So I think that USIA was moved into NEA earlier.

Q: Maybe a bit earlier, yes. Or they were perhaps anticipating the move.

WOZNIAK: That could be. A good deal of anticipating in advance of. That is very probable.

Q: To what extent in those days when you were there in the early 70s was Cyprus and Embassy

Nicosia involved with things in the Middle East? Certainly in the 80s when I was there, we were very involved in what was going on in Beirut and to some extent elsewhere in the Middle East. Do you remember getting engaged much in hosting meetings or otherwise having to deal with things that were related to Arab-Israeli or Lebanese things?

WOZNIAK: Not a whole lot Ray. We were all concerned about Palestinian terrorism of course. That was in our consciousness, but the only instance that I can recall that is all relevant to your question came when the then DCM, who I think, must have been acting as chargé at the time called me one night at home at 11:00. "Hey, Bob, can you come on over. I need a witness. I want someone here with me." I didn't know what he was talking about. So I went over to his house. We had a couple of scotches and waited for his visitor, who turned out to be his counterpart at the British high commission. Bill had just gotten an instruction cable telling him to do this, to meet with his British counterpart and arrange for a green light for the use of Akrotiri airfield to conduct U-2 flights over the Sinai. That is as close as I ever got to any involvement with any of these issues. I remember that evening very well because Bill and I probably had three scotches before the evening was over, maybe one or two before the guy arrived or while he was there. He handled that meeting beautifully, and as he and I were saying good night, the Brits having left, I said, "Bill that was very instructive." He said, "The only instruction, but it is an important one is, if you go in knowing what you want, and the other guy doesn't, you are going to get it."

Q: That was Bill Crawford.

WOZNIAK: Bill Crawford, right. His secretary told me when I first got there, watch out for this guy. We call him the silver fox. He was good.

Q: That was probably at some point after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the Kissinger shuttle diplomacy that led to the disengagement in the Sinai. One of the aspects of that as sort of a confidence building measure were the U-2 flights that went on for years and years from the British sovereign base in Cyprus. I am a little bit surprised at hearing you describe this that we were arranging that in Nicosia as opposed to directly with London. Because in a sense the embassy in Nicosia had nothing to do with those bases. They were sovereign British territory.

WOZNIAK: I don't remember all the details of it, especially of course it may have been some fine tuning I don't know,. Something that the local Brits had to be aware of and agree to. I just don't know. I don't recall.

Q: One other thing that occurs to me that in addition to a very different political situation was different from what it became in the summer of '74 was that for the embassy and USIA could use Nicosia International Airport for flights in and out. That would be about five minutes from where you were living?

WOZNIAK: Not more than ten. So that was like driving to Washington Reagan National Airport now if you live in Washington.

Q: And you would hear flights taking off over your house and so on.

WOZNIAK: Sure.

Q: Because when I was there it was Larnaca.

WOZNIAK: It still is and I guess it continues to be, although I take notice that just yesterday two community leaders met near Nicosia Airport. What an astonishing development that is.

Q: Is there anything else we should say about your time in Cyprus before we get to the events connected with your departure in '74 that we haven't covered yet?

WOZNIAK: Nothing comes to mind, Ray. I will do some homework.

Q: Okay. When did you leave?

WOZNIAK: Well, I was supposed to leave in the summer of 1974. Jay Gildner whose name I mentioned to you earlier asked me if I could accelerate that departure because the man I was replacing had to leave. I was going to work in Washington. The man I had to replace had to leave to prepare for his next assignment. So I wound up leaving in May, very reluctantly. My then wife and two children stayed behind, took a place in the village of Karmi, which was a charming village just below the Kyrenia ridge and over the beaches that were to be stormed by the Turkish forces in two months time. I was in Washington settling into my new routine when the flag went up in Cyprus on July 15 with a coup. I spent the next week or ten days at USIA in the daytime, and then I would go at night to the night shift at the task force at the State Department contributing what I could. Daily reports and one thing or another. But for a week I didn't know what had happened to my family because there was no communication with the Turkish north other than watching what the Greek side of our embassy could observe. On the seventh day they called me from London. They had been evacuated by the Brits with all the other foreigners who chose to leave on the third day when there was a cease fire.

Q: After the Turkish army came on to the island.

WOZNIAK: That is right. Oddly enough they survived it without too much emotional trauma and shock. But it was not a pretty time. It was very frustrating for me because the minor contribution I could make on the task force was not very satisfying. I thought I could do more for their interests and to help people if I had been on the island as I should have been when it happened.

Q: But the time you left in May, that was approximately two months before Sampson and others supported by the Greeks from Athens started the coup. Was this something you were anticipating as you left or thinking probably you had heard lots of talk, that it probably really wouldn't happen?

WOZNIAK: Yes, it was exactly that. The rumor mill had been such for such a long time that one tended to discount the likelihood of such insanity, because it was insanity, and it was foreseeable insanity. It was not difficult to know exactly what would happen, but you couldn't convince the putschists of this. Or the putschist supporters of it. They were impervious to logic.

Q: I take it though overall you very much enjoyed your time as PAO in Nicosia and kept an affection from there on.

WOZNIAK: I do. In fact the first year I spent there I was not a very happy camper because I kept comparing the then very provincial, very rustic Nicosia and the rest of the island with my Athens experience. Of course that was totally incorrect comparison to make. When I started to accept the island on its own terms, I fell in love with it as most people do. The Cypriots are wonderful people on both sides of the green line. And it is a little paradise, Aphrodite's island after all. It is one of my favorite trips and I do keep connection with the island as do you as members of the Cyprus American Archeological Research Institute.

Q: It is probably the same procedure at least initially when you were there it was a pretty sleepy backwater, but it was also in terms of the Cypriots' perception.

We were talking about the perception of the foreign ministry of Cyprus at the time you arrived. You were, I think, beginning to describe a map that you saw when you made your initial call.

WOZNIAK: I can't remember if it was in the office of the director general or if it was in the waiting room as you walked in to the foreign ministry, but in those days there was a huge map hanging on the wall of the world with Cyprus smack in the center of it. That is pretty much how the Greeks conceived of themselves and their importance. One reason why we couldn't do more effective work with the print media in the islands was they were concerned only with the Cyprus problem. Other issues got very little attention.

Q: Did you ever program somebody, a lecturer or otherwise to come to talk about something, cross cultural communication or whatever that was particularly focused on the problem of Cyprus between the two communities?

WOZNIAK: I don't think so. To the best of my memory, I don't think so.

Q: Later on occasionally we did, to talk about aspects of federalism or something with that in mind.

WOZNIAK: Oh yes, that kind of thing, yes I think we did. You know I don't know if it continued in your time there, but I inherited a function that was to be an annual thing. It wasn't much at the time, which was the foreign affairs workshop. You would bring in somebody as a centerpiece. One year it was I remember Lincoln Bloomfield. Another year I think it was the then editor of the International Herald Tribune. I can't remember now who I brought in the other two years of my four year tenure, but the only participants and attendees at this function were a few of us from the embassy and the foreign ministry. The foreign ministry would shut itself down for the day and we would spend the whole day, usually at the Cyprus Hilton Hotel over a discussion of relations, but that would involved discussions of Aegean questions etc. I have to go look at my files for that.

Q: Did that conference or workshop idea co-sponsored with the foreign ministry start in your

time?

WOZNIAK: No, I inherited that. They had it going before, and the ambassador made it very clear to me in our first meeting that this was something he valued very much and he wanted to see the program institutionalized and continued.

Q: Well, it was still going on when I was there. Whether it continued all three years that I was there in the 1980s, I am not sure. I had sort of mixed feelings about it because I just wasn't sure that it was something that could be repeated every year to basically the same audience each time. But it was certainly something that was going on in that period. Okay, what else about Cyprus. Anything else you want to remember or recall at this point. You can certainly add anything you want later on.

WOZNIAK: No.

DONALD C. BERGUS
Deputy Chief of Mission
Ankara (1972-1977)

Donald C. Bergus was born in Indiana in 1920. He graduated from the University of Chicago with an A.B. degree in 1942 and went directly into the Foreign Service. His career included posts in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, France, the United Arab Republic, Turkey, and Sudan. He was interviewed by Lillian Mullen in 1991.

Q: Did you understand Turkish?

BERGUS: I could, from Arabic, generally get the drift about what they were talking. Turkish is a lovely language. Anyway, when I was preparing to go out to Turkey all my briefings were based around the problem of "you have got to do something about this opium trade." As a matter of fact Bill Macomber was back on consultation just before I was to leave. What happened in Cyprus was that a group of Cypriot nationalists under the care and guidance of the military dictatorship in Greece pulled a coup and overthrew Archbishop Makarios. [July 1974] This got the Turks all upset because they were convinced, and not without reason, that this lot would do their best to harry the Turkish minority out of the land. They had to do something about it. So we arrived back days before the Turks began the invasion of Cyprus. That was a pretty busy summer. The Turks landed and in two waves of military operations they grabbed the northern third of the island, which they still hold-- forty percent of the island. There was a lot of to-do about that. You got into a lot of domestic politics. There is not much of a Turkish vote in this country, but there is a Greek vote and Greek-American legislators. I found this all very interesting because my father was born in Greece. He came to the United States and married my mother, who is of Pennsylvania Dutch stock, and there it was. So as crisis go it was a pretty good crisis that summer. We had the Cyprus problem on our hands and the constant threat from Congress, which they eventually made good, that unless the Turks got out of Cyprus they were

going to cut off aid, which in fact they did. Then we still had this opium problem.

The opium problem, oddly enough, we "solved" and I think rather well. Science came to our rescue, in that a farmer could raise the poppies and then instead of the process in which he took the opium from the poppy by bleeding the poppy at a certain stage of its development, he allowed the poppy head to die and sold the dry poppy head to the government at a good price and certain pharmaceutical factories were able to extract a narcotic from those dry poppy heads. One of the things that made it easy to enforce is that to take narcotic from a dry poppy head is a very complex manufacturing process which you can't conceal and there were only two or three factories in the world at that time capable of this process. While converting raw opium to heroin you can do in a garage. All the narcotics traffickers were able to do that very easily. So it was a very effective answer to the problem. The farmer got to raise his poppies, the legitimate narcotic trade had a source of supply and interestingly enough, one of the facts that came out of this, this was just about the time that MEDICARE was about to take hold in the United States and allow a lot of elderly people, who had not been able to afford to go to doctors, to go to doctors. As a result the demand for codeine and other legitimate opium products was going way up. So we were very happy to get this Turkish source of supply.

Anyway the opium problem was, as far as most diplomatic problems were concerned, solved within a matter of some months. But the Cyprus problem remained and it was still flourishing when I left Turkey in 1977.

Q: Didn't Congress offer to cut off aid to Turkey because of the Cyprus situation?

BERGUS: They did indeed. They did not only debate cutting it off, but they cut it off. This was during the Ford administration. Twice Ford vetoed the bills aimed at cutting off aid to Turkey and the second veto was overridden and aid was cut off. Therefore the Turks suspended operations on the network of bases we had had in Turkey, which in those days were very important. Now we only had one base, Incirlik, which we still have, and which by the way we have just received permission to use against Iraq. That was the only operating military base in Turkey, the rest were all listening posts. By listening posts I mean electronic listening posts. These facilities were very important to us because of them we were able to monitor the Soviet missile program.

When we suspended aid to Turkey, the Turks suspended operation of our bases and there was an awful lot of very good military intelligence we lost for a couple of months because of that. Relations got quite tense. There were always our day to day relations with the government and the Foreign Ministry which were very good. The Turks are a mature people. They have a small foreign office but professionally one of the best foreign offices in the world, and extremely capable. So we managed, but we had all sorts of housekeeping problems. They suspended some of the free entry privileges which our military enjoyed in Turkey and all that kind of day to day housekeeping problems. These were not exciting but time consuming and they meant an awful lot to a lot of people.

Q: Let us go back once again to the time of Markarios's ouster in 1974. Did you have a feeling that this was expected or anticipated either in the United States or in Turkey?

BERGUS: No, I don't think so. There certainly had been plenty of tension between the Greeks and Turks over Cyprus, there had been in the early '60s a threat that the Turks were going to take over the island because under Makarios the Turkish minority got more and more hemmed in, freedom of movement was denied them and they had a pretty rough life. The Turkish government just did not want to tolerate this behavior. That crisis was resolved, partially, and then there was the military coup in Greece, April 22, 1967. But this business of knocking off Makarios and trying to declare immediate union with Greece came as a surprise.

Q: Was Makarios against enosis?

BERGUS: He was against it because he was a big frog in a little puddle and he wanted to keep his puddle. The Turks, who detested Makarios, at least knew him. They did not rejoice when Makarios was thrown out of office, they got ready for war because they knew that these people on the mainland were working on *enosis* and they would not, as they said were hemmed in by these islands and their only outlook in the Mediterranean, was to the south, and you make Cyprus part of Greece, then we are really hemmed in. So they felt very strongly about it and they felt very strongly about the humiliation suffered by the Turkish minority on the island.

Q: The press was always talking at the time about our Greek bases and the junta was threatening to call for our withdrawal.

BERGUS: They were both playing it, the Greek bases, they were more interesting from a military operations and logistics thing, naval facilities in Crete and the airport in Athens while the Turkish bases had become much more interesting from the intelligence viewpoint.

Q: Couldn't we have moved the naval base to Izmir?

BERGUS: I don't think that ever came up. You know that once the military gets a base they will tell you that the whole world depends on it. There was never any question, they wanted those Greek bases, they had put a lot of money in them. As a matter of fact, as I recall, they had had a scheme whereby they were going to "home port" ships in Greece, which meant that you would have permanent military colonies around them, just like our base in the Philippines.

Q: There was a headline from that period in which it was claimed that the US backed Cypriot independence but did not appear to be displeased at the Makarios ouster.

BERGUS: Well I think that was the case because Makarios had been playing footsie with the Russians and he was not a very attractive person--at least from the point of view of our government. He was intriguing and that sort of thing.

Q: Of course Sampson who came in was...

BERGUS: He was just a thug, a pure thug.

Q: He did not last very long.

BERGUS: One thing in the decade before 1974, Turkey had exported a lot of laborers to Europe, particularly to Germany, and particularly to Berlin. These people, hard working, did a lot of the scut work that the Germans did not want to do, they got well paid and sent it back to Turkey. So you could go to a Turkish village and see two or three houses that had been fixed up and really looked well--you could say, "Ah, ha, there are German workers in those villages." As a result of this the Turks, probably for the first time in their history, had tremendous reserves of foreign exchange, which they had never had before. All this went along very well until the 1973 Middle East war and the increase in oil prices. This swallowed up the Turkish foreign exchange surpluses very fast and also slowed down the economies of Europe and the Turkish workers started to come home and tried to live off the economy. That was one of the sources of unrest. Then you had the students who, like students everywhere at that time, were against the established order. Remember Vietnam was just drawing to a bloody close, so you had great unrest there, then you had a pan-Islamic movement, which you still see in the Middle East, of conservatives who wanted to undo all the reforms that Ataturk had done--make Islam the state religion, reveal the women. This had a certain amount of power behind it, and you even had a pan-Turanian movement who wanted to reconstruct the glorious Turkey of history, which probably never existed, which extended through the southern Soviet Union, almost to Mongolia. So you had economic unrest, all these competing forces, you had constant unrest, particularly among the students and they played pretty seriously at it. I was shocked, you had high school demonstrations with high school students shooting at each other with real guns. It was a very frightening thing.

Q: Where did they get the guns?

BERGUS: Well, you can get anything. As this went on the question came, when is the army going to take over again? They won't put up with this for long. The Cyprus thing gave Ecevit a year's lease on life because of his action protecting Turkish interests in Cyprus by making sure that Cyprus did not become a threat to Turkey, was very popular. The Turkish army fulfilled its mission in a way that gratified the Turkish people, but as this began to wear thin all this other unrest developed. So it was a fairly insecure place.

Q: Didn't they have difficulty with their Iraqi border?

BERGUS: Well, they had a Kurdish problem, but in my day they solved the Kurdish problem by saying the Kurds did not exist, that the Kurds were mountain Turks, they were not separate.

Q: Wasn't there a Kurdish refugee problem along with an Armenian one?

BERGUS: Yes. The Armenian situation had pretty well been solved in 1915 when the Armenians were exported or massacred. But they had this Kurdish unrest on the border, so the country was relatively calm, but they had demonstrations and they had difficulties. And they had incredible inflation. I think--don't hold me to these numbers--that when I went there something like 700 Turkish lira to the dollar and when I left it was 3000, something incredible, an increase in inflation. So you had all sorts of basis of discontent within the country.

Q: Did Kissinger come over?

BERGUS: He came over twice while I was there. The first time he had some spare time, he was in the Middle East negotiations and there was a hiatus of three or four days while either the Egyptians or the Israelis were preparing answers, so he came to Turkey. He did not perform very brilliantly there and did not get anywhere, and then he came another time for a CENTO meeting. CENTO was the long-since deceased treaty we had--a defense arrangement between Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. That had been started by John Foster Dulles and never really got off the ground and Iraq was part of it but after the Iraqi revolution in 1958, that was really the end of that pact, but it was still there.

Q: Kissinger liked to talk on the telephone a lot. Didn't he call the Turkish government a lot?

BERGUS: Well he called them fairly often, and Kissinger basically was concerned about maintaining our defensive alliance with Turkey to the point where the Greeks thought he had gone completely pro-Turk. They had cartoons of him in the papers in Athens showing him wearing a Turkish fez--even though the Turks had abolished the fez fifty years before. So he made himself persona non grata with the Greeks but he did not do too well with Turks either, so he did not cover himself with any brilliance with the Cyprus dispute.

Q: He made some remarks about Makarios, that Makarios was dead politically.

BERGUS: That I don't recall.

Q: I saw that in a newspaper article, and Makarios threatened to return.

BERGUS: He did return and died in his bed in office.

Q: Were the Turks upset about his returning?

BERGUS: By that time they had in their hands what they wanted and they were going to keep it.

Q: How did the Turks feel about Demirel?

BERGUS: They elected him while I was there. He beat out Ecevit--he really didn't beat him out, but he was able to--by that time the Turkish left had broken into a million pieces so Denktash was able to put together a coalition of the center right and far rightist parties. He had the Muslim extremists and the pan-Turanian extremists in his government, some of whom were a pretty merry lot I can tell you. Anyway in my last months there we kept saying to each other, "When is the army going to step in?" which they did after I left. I was there into early 1977.

Q: In 1975 the Vietnam war came to a bloody end, did that affect the Department of State's or Government's attention to what was happening on Cyprus?

BERGUS: I think that did. I think pasting together the Middle East after the '73 war did. Greece and Turkey did not get the attention they'd gotten say a decade earlier.

Q: Is that while they were looking for more aid from Libya?

BERGUS: Well, the pan-Islamic people, who were basically anti-western in Turkey, were saying, "We should not mess around with these Americans who treat us so mean and are pro-Greek anyway underneath and if we would just get rid of the Americans, the Libyans, the Saudis and all those would come in and give us all we need if we become a good Moslem state." Which was baloney on its face and most Turks realized that was baloney because although they are Moslems they ruled the Arabs for many centuries.

Q: They are not Arabs?

BERGUS: No, Turkish is a completely different language. The idea of depending on Arabs for assistance was not very attractive for most Turks.

Q: Is there a memory in Turkey of their Ottoman empire?

BERGUS: Oh yes, they still have, for example, the foreign minister under Demirel, was an old Ottoman gentleman. He still wrote his Turkish in Arabic script which had been abolished forty or fifty years before. So you had people who remembered the Ottoman days.

Q: Was there an awareness that they were the last most important part of the Roman empire?

BERGUS: Yes, you have Roman ruins as far inland as Ankara, all over the place, Izmir and that whole area. They are very proud of their heritage. They have created a pretty impressive school of Turkish archeologists of those periods.

Q: In 1975 student unrest was exploding there, and the exported terrorism, I am thinking of the murder of the two Turkish ambassadors, one in Paris and one in Vienna. How did this effect your work?

BERGUS: That was Armenian irredentism and we worried a great deal about terrorism, Palestinian mostly because Turkey was close enough to the area and Istanbul is a place where people can come and go freely so Palestinians could come in. Shortly after I left Palestinians took over the Egyptian embassy and held it for three or four days until the Turks roused them out in Ankara. So we had enough of it around. And then you add Greek terrorism, our ambassador in Cyprus at the time, Rodger Davies, who was a very close friend of mine, was murdered and we are pretty sure now and when I was there that the evidence was that it was Greek terrorism. So we had enough of it around.

Q: In Davies case they arrested six Greek Cypriot policemen and they got off with some two weeks sentences or something.

BERGUS: If I knew it I had forgotten it.

LINDSEY GRANT
Deputy Chief of Mission
Nicosia (1972-1974)

Lindsey Grant was born in North Carolina in 1926. His Foreign Service career included positions in Hong Kong, Singapore, China, India, Cyprus, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on January 31, 1990.

Q: You went to Cyprus as deputy chief of mission in 1972.

GRANT: The end of '72, yes.

Q: How long were you there?

GRANT: Just under two years.

Q: Who was ambassador when you were there?

GRANT: Most of the time I was chargé. When I went, the people in the Department already knew that David Popper would be going. He did. He went home on leave, got his assignment, came back very briefly, and then went back to become the Assistant Secretary for International Organizations Affairs. Then I was chargé for a long time. There was one abortive appointment. The person refused it. No, I guess first Bob McCloskey was given the job, and then he was pulled back by Henry to resume his press contacts. So there Anne McCloskey was, and I had to escort two people, my wife and Anne to all the official functions. I was chargé. Then his appointment was terminated and I remained chargé until Rodger Davies' ill-fated appointment.

Q: What were our principal issues with Cyprus at that time?

GRANT: Aside from some small housekeeping things, we had some operations there, including our FBIS.

Q: We had a small Loran station.

GRANT: A little bit of stuff that we were running there as a matter of convenience. But the primary issue about Cyprus was -- still is -- the impact that it has on the connections between Turkey and Greece and, consequently, on the southern and eastern flank of NATO and our position in the region. There are competing claims over Cyprus. The Greek majority, of course, would love to be part of Greece, they say, though a lot of them wouldn't.

Q: I wonder how much they really want to.

GRANT: There are enough of them so that they manage to raise hell, and it's a tremendously complicated relationship. I'd better not try to get into it in great depth. But basically, the fear is

always that what did happen will happen. We lived through it, but it could have meant war between Turkey and Greece and a very difficult problem for NATO.

The problem can best be described by saying what happened. There was a military junta, and not a very bright one, in Athens. Archbishop Makarios despised them, but because of this funny relationship, you could not be against énosis, union with Greece. The Greek Greeks, from Greece itself, officered the National Guard, which was made up of young Cypriot lads, and tried to fill them full of énosis. Makarios, I suspect, would have been delighted for énosis to occur under him. He had a very broad view of his historical role. There was an earlier parallel a half century before in Crete, where the leader brought Crete into Greece and became the leader of Greece. Makarios could have done that, but things had gone otherwise, and we certainly didn't like to have his own National Guard officered by and being indoctrinated by Greek officers responsive to their junta. What worried us was always that somebody would get ham-handed enough to try to impose more direct control on Cyprus from Greece, and that the Turks wouldn't tolerate this and would invade, which, of course, is exactly what happened. It happened because Archbishop Makarios, being a man of cunning and reason himself, assumed too much reason and too little philetimo pride, on the part of the junta in Athens. He taunted them with their smallness and, in effect, said, "I am going to be the one who commissions new National Guard officers." The dictators -- the junta -- in Athens turned their officered National Guard loose to try to kill Makarios, and they missed him.

They put in command, as president, a person who I think was probably certifiably psychotic, who was known for his virulent hatred of the Turks and his willingness to kill them any time he could.

Q: Was that [Nikos Giorgiades] George Sampson?

GRANT: I think it was George.

Q: I think it was George, too. Absolutely, using a good Greek term, anathema to the Turks.

GRANT: Having made this error that was going to pose a real danger of bringing the Turks in, they compounded it by putting in charge the one person that was sure to bring the Turks in. The foreign minister was a guy who was very fond of Americans. He was always around, and he came by for advice. We didn't want to touch him, but finally, I went downstairs and remember talking to him. I said, "The only way you people have a chance is to persuade the Turks that you don't have any intention of touching their enclaves in Cyprus." And he went down to the edge of the Turkish sector and agreed to see Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader. He actually sat and waited. But Denktash wouldn't see him.

Q: You were in Cyprus at the time?

GRANT: That's right.

Q: We're talking about July 1974.

GRANT: Yes. We almost charged too fast into that. We didn't set the time.

Q: Because I had just left Athens. I had been consul general in Athens from 1970 to 1974. So this is July 1974, where this happened. When the officers went off to kill Makarios, what were you doing at the Embassy?

GRANT: What was I doing, myself?

Q: Yes.

GRANT: This was early in the morning. We were leaving. My wife had already left, because I knew this was coming. I was confident. As a matter of fact, I remember drafting a telegram saying, "We think they're going to try to kill Makarios." We said it in the summary of that telegram. The Ambassador, newly arrived, said, "We can't say that people are going to kill a foreign head of state just like that, in the summary." So we took it out of the summary, but left it in the body of the message. But anyway, it was that clear how fast this was moving. I had gotten my wife, since we were already planning to leave, out on a flight a few days before. I was, of all things, putting our cat on the early morning flight. That cat took the last flight that has left Nicosia airport from that day to this. I decided to go on down to the office to see what was happening, got there, and we could begin to hear some rumbling. One of the officers, the administrative officer, lived near the president's palace. He called and said, "There are tanks moving towards the palace." That's how it started.

The tanks came towards the front door. It wasn't a very wise maneuver, I thought, a very sophisticated one. Tanks came to the front door, and we learned later from a first-hand account of Makarios' assistant, that Makarios' military aide came through the French doors and said, "The tanks are approaching. Shall we go?" Makarios turned and said goodbye to this guy, walked out the French doors, down the lawn, into a car waiting in the back, and they took off, as we later learned, for the British military base. But even his whereabouts were not known for some time. Then the British told us privately. This, of course, brought the Turks in.

Q: To get an idea of how the embassy works, the ambassador was brand-new, I take it. That was Rodger Davies.

GRANT: That's right.

Q: What were we doing at our embassy? Here were the two allies.

GRANT: I'll tell you were what we were doing. During the spring before Rodger arrived, we were trying to persuade the Department to beat up on your boss.

Q: Henry Tasca.

GRANT: Tasca. With our embassy in Ankara saying, "Go, go, go," endorsing everything we said. "You've got to tell the Greeks that if they open this one up, that there's no way we can control it if the Turks decide they're going to move, and they may very well." Tasca never would

do it. It was, finally, the station chief who went in and made a pitch, but Tasca just wasn't about ready to do it.

There was another problem at that time. Cyprus had just been moved from the Near Eastern Bureau to the European Bureau in State, and European Bureau had other things to think about. It seemed like a very little country a long way away. We were worried about this. I remember we were asked to do contingency planning if things should happen, and we were the first one in the Bureau to get ours in, because we thought this was important. But nobody paid, of course, the slightest bit of attention to a theoretical plan. Washington tended to be concerned about the status of the negotiations which had been going on for years to resolve the division of Cyprus between small Turkish enclaves and the big Greek enclave. This had been going on and on, and actually it looked like it might have some hope of success. Tom Boyatt was the Office Director. Remembering that as the issue, he kept asking us questions about that, whereas the real issue had become this threat of a Greek move against Makarios. So as a government, we were woefully unprepared, with a new bureau trying to handle this.

Of course, Henry Kissinger turned up on the scene after the balloon went up. The Turks, of course, did come in. Henry had been running the Bowie seminar at Harvard when -- I guess it was Ecevit, the Turkish prime or foreign minister, I forget now, I think prime minister -- had been a student there. And Henry thought he could presume on the student-professor relationship and, of course, got absolutely nowhere. Several people came out and each got a total cold shoulder from the Turks.

Q: Were there any moves against our embassy by the Cypriot National Guard or anyone else?

GRANT: Not until the fatal move. Basically, what happened was, just to finish the larger story, then focus down, the thing that probably kept the situation from going into real chaos was that Ioannidis, the junta leader in Athens, did fall as a result of his miscalculation in Cyprus. And who was it that came in? The old fellow. An elder statesman came back, and he lined up his Cabinet, and he obviously said to them, "We're going to walk out of this room. The press is out there, and I'm going to say, 'We're not going to fight Turkey over Cyprus.' You people are all going to smile and nod." And that's what happened. He just took it on himself and had the stature to carry it off, to unilaterally bug out of what a lot of Greeks were chomping for, and that was another go at the Turks, which would have been disastrous, I think. That is what froze the situation again. It was a belated act of statesmanship at the last minute, by one leader.

We had never assumed -- as a matter of fact, our instructions to our Americans in Cyprus pointed out that we would not be the target of the first violence. Later on, somebody would start blaming us. That's what happened. After the first war, which was the inter-Greek war between the pro-Makarios and the pro-Ioannidis factions, that was resolved rather swiftly in favor of the Ioannidis faction, which put in this man Sampson. That led to the first Turkish invasion. As a matter of fact, after that Turkish invasion, having nothing better to do, I went around to all the Cabinet ministers and just had conversations with them to find out what they were thinking -- I mean, the ex-Makarios Cabinet members. Nobody was blaming the U.S.

But then the Turks made that second move, and the U.S. suddenly emerged as the scapegoat.

During a demonstration against the Embassy, demanding we do something to get the Turks out, a sniper got up on a building being completed nearby and shot blind into the ambassador's office and down the hall and -- by a horrible break -- managed to kill both the Ambassador and one of the local employees.

The chance that this would happen, that the anger would turn on us, we had always seen as very high, because the Cypriot Greeks simply would not -- we had stopped the Turks once before in 1964, I guess it was, or '65, and they thought we could do it again. I spent a lot of my time before this happened telling little stories about how we couldn't stop them, to try to get the Cypriot Greeks less confident that we were going to save their skins. One of the stories, I remember, concerned the Turks' decision simply to back out of their opium control agreement with us. They found it too expensive. The farmers were unhappy. I pointed out, "Here's something of tremendous importance to the United States, much more important than Cyprus to America -- the drug problem. We couldn't stop the Turks from growing opium, and you should take that as a lesson as to what we could do if the Turks decided to move against you. It had absolutely no effect on them.

Consequently, when they turned, they turned much more virulently. The erstwhile Foreign Minister, Christophides, when he came in to sign the condolence book for the Ambassador, started telling me -- down there in the lobby of the embassy -- how Rodger had been murdered by the CIA because he was too soft on the Greeks, and that it was all our fault that the war started, we had put the junta up to it. It was just an incredible reversal in a week. A week before he had had nothing to say about a U.S. role.

So there you are. You started by asking what was the importance of Cyprus, and that is the importance. The thing that shouldn't have happened did happen. The thing that kept it from being as bad as it could have been was the action by that old prime minister who came back and simply opted out of a war with Turkey.

Q: How well were you served at this point by the CIA? I say that because having been in Athens, which was well known as being really a CIA-dominated post at the time, had incredibly good relations with the rather obnoxious regime of [George] Papadopoulos, then Ioannidis came in thereafter. Were you kept abreast of what was developing? Or do you think the Agency was caught as flat-footed as everyone else by the developments there? Flat-footed is the wrong term. You knew what could happen.

GRANT: No, that's the point. We actually, as I say, in advance, sent a message saying this was going to happen. I think that the Agency people in Nicosia were excellent. We had no problem. Our relations were very good. I think there was a great deal of candor, and I think we saw things in very much the same light. The other thing to be said is that unlike China, you didn't need the Agency. Cyprus was so transparent, everybody loved to talk. Here's an angle. At the critical time -- now, Rodger Davies had been a Near Eastern man, and he had known some of the people, including the number two man in the foreign ministry, Veniamin who was, of course, my regular contact. Veniamin was having a party on July 2, his big annual sweep-up. Rodger Davies was not going to present his credentials until the fifth. I knew that they were sensitive to protocol. I went to Veniamin and said, "Here's what's happening. Rodger is coming in. What I'd like to do is

this: I'll hold the Fourth of July party as host, but I'll introduce Rodger to everybody at that time, if you don't mind, even though he will not have been formally introduced to the Archbishop yet."

Veniamin, having been asked, was as gracious as could be and said, "Of course. And also bring him to my reception on the second. I'd like to see him again."

And I did. As we left, Veniamin said to me, "We sent it." The point is, I knew exactly what he meant, and he knew I knew it. "It" was a letter that had been kicking around among the Archbishop's closest advisors, the one that insulted Ioannidis and said, "I'm going to run my show."

I said, "I hope you get away with it."

And he said, "It'll work." His thinking -- that of the Archbishop -- was that Ioannidis, restrained by the Turks, would not be able to trump the Archbishop's decision to take over more control of the National Guard. Again, assuming that Ioannidis would be rational, whereas Ioannidis had had his pride hurt. All of this we knew. I had seen texts of that letter. That's how transparent it was. In this case, we really did know it was going to happen.

Q: I might mention that Ioannidis was the chief of the Greek military police, to give you an idea of his background. But how about the Turkish side? Were you getting reports saying, "The Turks are going to go in. The Turks are loading ships, loading planes" or not?

GRANT: Yes, we were getting, I thought, quite adequate coverage of the physical evidence of movement, and we knew very well that the Turks had put plans into motion, but you never knew the intentions in this case. Were they doing this as a bluff to force the Greek hand or not? We had plenty of intelligence about what the Turks planned to do, but you always have enough on either side and enough uncertainty about a possible plant that you can never be 100% sure of any intelligence you get. In this particular case, there was one message that said, "The Turks are mobilizing and are using this Genghis Khan division. These guys are all over 6' tall, they all hate Greeks, they're all illiterate. They're savages." This was being leaked to the Greeks to scare the Greeks. It was so obvious that my question was: Is it being used to try to scare us into making bigger efforts to get the Greeks to back up? It turned out, in fact, that they went ahead.

I remember a few days beforehand in that interim, while we were waiting, a sort of silence, we knew about the movements of troops. The military attaché said, "I'll bet four to one that they come in." And I remember saying, "At four to one, I'll take the other side of it. But at five to two, I'll bet they'll come in." In other words, we were speculating, and that was the range. We all thought it was more than likely. He, by the way, didn't make a bet. [Laughter] He said, "No, I don't think I'll put any money on it." But that expectation was not because of good intelligence about Turkish intentions. We knew much more about how the Greeks felt. Even the Turks like [Rauf] Denktash, he didn't know what the Turks on the mainland were going to do. Denktash was the leading Turk on the island. The Turkish Ambassador, I'm pretty confident, didn't know.

But given our assumptions about the Turkish reaction to this whole behavior -- Ioannidis had pulled back enough to take Sampson, the madman, out, and put in the most reasonable Greek he

could find: Clerides, the one who had negotiated with the Turks before. At the last moment, they put him in as President. But that was too late to stop the machinery. We assumed that since the machinery was still rolling and the Turks were not asking for any information or beginning negotiations -- the Turks tend to move slowly and monolithically, and in this I could see something of the Chinese Communists -- so our guess was that they were for serious, that they wanted a chance to get at these guys. They were mad enough, and since they weren't putting out any feelers to see what Clerides might offer them, they were probably going to roll it.

So we were pretty much on that wavelength. We did get all the Americans out, all the dependents and all the people we could find, and this was pretty complete. In time. I'm rather proud of that. In other words, we were acting on the basis of an assumption which turned out right, in this case.

Q: When did you leave?

GRANT: Rodger had his own DCM coming, as is traditional, and I had already asked for and gotten another assignment. I wanted to get into environment and population issues, which I did, and I had a job there. Rodger said, "It looks like they've stopped," after the first Turkish wave. And they did, they paused for about eight or ten days, as I recall. My timing is weak now. So he said, "There's not much to do. We're just sitting here and watching the thing freeze. Why don't you go ahead out?" And I went out by British military air transport, and was flown back the same way two or three days later, when Rodger was shot. I was not on the island when he was shot. I was in Scotland taking a vacation.

ROBERT J. MCCLOSKEY
Ambassador
Cyprus (1973-1974)

Ambassador Robert J. McCloskey was born in Pennsylvania in 1922. His Foreign Service career included positions in Hong Kong and Washington, DC, and ambassadorships to Cyprus, The Netherlands, and Greece. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1989.

Q: How did your assignment to Cyprus, of all places, come about? You've been under the grill, and I can't think of a worse place to go.

MCCLOSKEY: I was not as satisfied as I wanted to be, and felt I was entitled to, with the assignment, but I took it gladly. I was determined to get out for awhile, and I got interested in the problem. Because first of all, two men who were long gone, called me and invited me to come and see them, George Ball, who had done a Cyprus tour in 1967 when he tried to mediate, and Cy Vance, whom I had known from earlier days when he was at the Pentagon. I suddenly got very much interested in the issue; however, my instructions were, on leaving: don't take the U.S. into the center of this Greek-Turkish thing again. You want, simply, for now, to be encouraging the two sides to continue their so-called inter-communal talks. But as it turned out, I wasn't there

all that long, but I will admit that I was not as satisfied as I hoped to be when I first went off.

Q: What was the situation during the time you were there in Cyprus? It's a complicated situation.

MCCLOSKEY: I think that the essential problem was that neither Makarios --

Q: By the way, you went there around May of 1973, I think.

MCCLOSKEY: Yes, you're right, in May.

Q: Well, you were confirmed in May.

MCCLOSKEY: The problem was with the leadership. The interlocutors, that is to say, Clerides on the Greek side, and Ralph Denktash on the Turkish side, knew what was necessary to make an agreement. They both grew up on the island. They both went separately to school in London, came back and found themselves the spokesmen for their two parties. The problem was that on the Turkish side, Ankara had very little interest in a settlement at the time, and was not prepared to do what would have been required to make a deal. Therefore, Denktash never had the confidence that he would be backed up by Ankara. In turn, Clerides suffered the same problem with Makarios who was still president of the republic. So the makings, the components, of what would have been, I think, a sound agreement could be identified, but could not be brought together because they would not have been supported by the higher authorities.

Q: Why did both Ankara and Makarios want to keep this thing going?

MCCLOSKEY: Makarios always fancied himself a player on a larger stage than just Cyprus. He was, as you know, a charter member of the enosis movement of the '50s. Cyprus was an international issue as long as there was tension. In the case of Ankara, I think it was the concessions that would have been required to make the deal. That's all it really could have been because I never felt that Cyprus, for most of the Turkish population, isn't as important an issue as it is for most of the Greek population. So concessions were the one thing in one capital and another thing in the other.

Q: What sort of signals were you getting from our embassy in Athens? Henry Tasca was the ambassador at that point. As far as what we might be doing and all, were you working in different directions, do you feel?

MCCLOSKEY: No, I don't think in different directions. I don't know how much of this you want to get into.

Q: I wouldn't mind getting into it. It is an important issue.

MCCLOSKEY: Well, Grivas, the Eoka leader was still on the island in those days. I one time asked Makarios, "What is it that Grivas wants, in addition, to enosis, enosis being the union of the island with Greece?" Makarios said, "He wants to kill me." Realizing that Grivas was a creature of the junta in Athens.

Q: This is the colonels and all.

MCCLOSKEY: Colonels, this obviously raised in my mind that Makarios better be careful, because to the extent he resists Grivas, he is resisting the Junta. And they've got all the cards in Athens. Sure enough, it wasn't the issue of Grivas that finally undid Makarios when he was overthrown. It was a different issue, but it was still the Junta who overthrew him.

Were Tasca and I working in concert? I can't say that we were. I never had all that much communication with Henry Tasca. I think there is enough of the history written since then that shows that it was as much the CIA in Athens who was speaking for the U.S. with the Junta principle, Ioannidis, particularly, that Tasca might have taken himself out of some of it. Indeed, when the crisis came, and Kissinger sent Sisco to both Ankara and Athens to try to get a cease fire on the island, he met with --

Q: This was July 15, 1974, thereafter.

MCCLOSKEY: Sisco succeeded in meeting with Ecevit in Ankara, but then when he got to Athens, he couldn't find anyone to meet with. I don't think he ever got to see Ioannidis, and Ioannidis was the guy with the power, with the authority. So the Athens scene was one that I never had any direct experience with, because by the time I got to Athens some years later, the democratic government had been in.

Q: I have to say here, I spent four years as consul general in Athens with Henry Tasca from 1970 to '74. I sat in the country team. I was not privy to all the policies, but the role of the CIA was disturbing to many of us there. I would raise issues of what would amount to issues of human rights, which were coming to me from the public who came in, and this would be discounted by the CIA who were working with the Greek CIA. It was a very uncomfortable situation, I have to say. Well, we will be coming back to Greece. But you left there in January, 1974, wasn't it?

MCCLOSKEY: Yes, it was a crazy period. I heard on the Voice of America one evening, as we were having dinner that Henry Kissinger had been named Secretary of State, and that Bill Rogers had resigned. The next day I got one of those messages, would I come back for consultation to San Clemente?

Q: This was Nixon's summer home.

MCCLOSKEY: I was one of four or five, anyhow, who were asked to come home on very short notice. Habib, Helms --

Q: Philip Habib was in Korea?

MCCLOSKEY: Habib was in Korea. Helms was in Iran, Dean Brown from Jordan, myself -- I'm remembering the names in part because we all went to a lousy Mexican restaurant one night at Habib's insistence. That would have been -- was it August? [Note: It was August of 1973-June 22, 1998.]

Q: Well, you left in January of '74.

MCCLOSKEY: Well, I'll get to that. I said, no, I would not come back to do the same job. That I wanted, however, to make the case for the appointment of a career officer, because I had already had intimations that Kissinger wanted to bring someone in from the news media. So, finally, got him to hold still, provided I gave him a name. I did, I proposed George Best. He said, "Who's George Best?" and I told him. He said, "Well, all right, but you have to come back here." So word was sent to George. I went back to Nicosia, and promised that I would come back again for one month in September. I came back on Labor Day. George, meanwhile, had come back from, I guess, he was still in Brussels.

We got started. Let's see, Kissinger went to New York for the usual round of meetings with foreign ministers coming for the general assembly in September, a practice that Rusk started many years ago. We were up there for something like two weeks and then came back down here, and then went back for one more week. This is now the first week in October, and that's when the war in the Middle East broke out.

Q: Yes, It is also called the October War.

MCCLOSKEY: This is a crazy arrangement. I am still on pay for the American ambassador to Cyprus, and I am announcing that war has broken out in the Middle East from the Waldorf Astoria in New York, at six o'clock in the morning, or some crazy thing. Then things went crazy, and I stayed here well into October, probably the end of October, which included going to Moscow, this was in connection with getting a cease fire in the Middle East, then to Peking, after that. So it was well on into October, by which time he had me against the wall. I said, "All right, I would come back, but I would not do the daily job any longer. We would have to find some other designation for it. I'd help in any way I could, but then he was also going to have to persuade my family."

So we went out again to the Middle East, because this occurred in Cairo, and I had my family come from Nicosia to Cairo. He met with them, by which time it was done, and I had agreed to return completely, but that I had to go back to Cyprus. I think, I went back finally on Thanksgiving and stayed through Christmas, and came back in January of 1974, as ambassador-at-large in which I would supervise the whole press relations business. I would take on some negotiations. Then he also wanted me to take on the congressional relations job, and I said, "No, I didn't want to do that." There was Linwood Holton in the job at that time, the former governor of Virginia. So I was appointed ambassador-at-large, with a kind of Rube Goldberg job description. However, within probably six months, maybe even less, Holton resigned, and I just thought I had better do it for the Department, if not for Henry Kissinger. Somebody had to do it.

Q: This is the congressional relations job.

MCCLOSKEY: Yes, then I did our military base negotiations with Spain at the same time. We were going to do them with Portugal and the revolution. Anyhow, I had a few meetings with Carlucci at the time. We were going to try to do the Azores and the Spanish at the same time. It

never worked out that way, but I did the Spanish one.

Q: You say you found yourself going out working on a cease fire in the Middle East. Then you went to China, working again on negotiations. What were you doing in these negotiations?

MCCLOSKEY: What was I doing?

Q: Yes.

MCCLOSKEY: I was serving, in part, as the spokesman for Henry Kissinger. I was lending a hand at drafting papers that were going into the substantive meetings that we were having. I was trying to persuade George Best to stick with it. It is not this bad all the time. I was playing, to some extent, a confidant to Kissinger, who kind of relishes that way of operating. He needs people, I guess, he certainly wants them, and maybe he needs them to bounce ideas off. It was a crazy, crazy period.

Q: How effective did you find Kissinger? In these interviews I'm doing, I am getting a mixed reaction. In some cases, absolutely brilliant; however, in dealing with Iran, as being a disaster. It's a mixed bag.

MCCLOSKEY: I'd say pretty much the same thing. He could be simply dazzling at times, with the presentation of an issue, the capacity for bringing people along. I speak now about other foreign ministers. I sat in Geneva, where it was a meeting with Gromyko, and the subject was nuclear weapons. In addition to having the broad sweep and context of an issue on something like that, he had all the arithmetic at the same time. He knew the warheads. He knew the launchers. He knew the missiles. At one point, he kept correcting Gromyko, who could never get it right, who when he wasn't being corrected by Kissinger, was being corrected by Dobrynin, who was sitting with him.

So you could have Henry Kissinger shape an outcome by the force of his intellect and ability to articulate. There were other times when he was just all thumbs. One example, if he wasn't all thumbs, he could be simply defiant. I go back to Cyprus, this is '74 and Makarios has been overthrown and the Turks have landed. I told him straight up that if the Junta goes through and names someone named Nikos Sampson to become the President, I said there is going to be trouble. Why? Because, I used the very word, he is a thug. And the Turks have experience with him, and they will not let this stand. By this time, this is a year later, this is July of 1984. George Best had given up. I, still trying to preserve the position, I got Bob Anderson to come back from wherever he was, in Africa, in some small country.

So I was agitating all one morning to have Anderson go to the briefing and say that -- if necessary wait for the question: Do you recognize this guy? -- and say we are suspending our recognition pending clarification, or something like that. Kissinger wouldn't permit it. So I lost the argument. And I think that was the beginning of some incoherence on the handling of the Cyprus problem, which would have been better, and I don't mean to sound as though had he taken my advice.

But another incident in the first week of August, when the Turks made the second move. Remember they came in, they occupied X amount, X percentage of territory, like 25%, and then in their second move they went to 40% of the territory. And the second move was so unjustified because the shooting was over, the threat, they had their population well protected. But they made the second move with an eye toward future negotiations. They would simply control that much more territory.

So there is a meeting in his office. What are we going to do? He went around the room, and I said, "I think that we should announce that from today we will suspend any further deliveries of U.S. military equipment to Turkey." Well, he exploded. I contend that that was the beginning of the administration losing control of policy, because it was followed by the congressionally imposed embargo on Turkey. And for how long, two years, we could not get that bloody thing lifted. We spent so much time, I was running congressional relations at the time. We had Ford meet. We had Kissinger meet. We had all kinds of things. We had breakfasts. We had lunches, and we had, who knows, what else.

Q: This is the discovery, that there is such a thing as a Greek lobby.

MCCLOSKEY: Well, Yes. It doesn't answer the question though, was there one before that, but we sure as hell know there was one after it. Well, you're right.

Q: I wonder, do you think we might move to The Netherlands now? Because there are many other things I would like to explore, and I hope there will be other interviews which will be more job specific. The Netherlands sounds like a much more pleasant assignment. If there is such a thing as a reward, this sounds like it. How did this come about?

MCCLOSKEY: Well, like so many of these things, there is a certain element of roulette. You start out with one. First, I was going to go to Israel. Then, Kenneth Keating got into it, and that was that. But that had gone to a point where Golda Meir was here for something, and I sat next to her at a luncheon, and she said, "When are you coming to Israel?"

So then, I forget, Sweden, no, well someplace, finally I was asked would I want to go to The Hague, because I had complained loudly enough that it was time again, and I had other personal reasons. So I was asked then, would I want to go to The Hague. I said, "Yes, I'll go, and I'll be very happy." I did go off quite happy. It was my first European assignment. The Dutch, whatever else you say about them, they are into everything.

Q: Then I would like to move to your assignment as ambassador to Greece. This was in 1978. Having touched the Cyprus issue, why you would want to indulge in masochism by going to Greece, I have a question. How did that come about?

MCCLOSKEY: I had said to a couple of people in Washington who asked me, that I was looking forward to an embassy with larger, heavier responsibilities. And Bill Schaefe, who had been assistant secretary for African affairs was nominated to go to go to Athens. At his hearing some

confusion in an exchange with Senator Joe Biden developed, and the Greek press ran this up in a quite distorted fashion. The subject was the Aegean and sovereignty over islands in the Aegean.

I was unaware of all of this, sitting, minding my own business in The Hague. But it got to a point where the Secretary of State, and presumably, the President said to themselves, it would be unfair to have Bill go to Athens. There are other ways to look at this question, as I am sure you would appreciate. In any case, it was off, and I knew nothing about this until I read in the International Herald Tribune that I was going to be nominated to go to Athens.

Q: Such is the instant communications of the Department of State.

MCCLOSKEY: I think it was three days later someone telephoned me and asked me if this was something I would want to do. I said all the right things about it's not the right way to communicate and I would think it over. I ultimately said yes, and then arranged to come to Washington to have a hearing and all of that.

Then something new entered the picture that I again was not aware of. Phil Habib was under doctor's orders to leave the under secretary for political affairs job. Evidently he had recommended that I, instead of going to Athens, come back into that job. I was unaware of any of this until I reached the United States, when I was in Philadelphia on route, and I was asked to hurry up and get down here. They wanted to talk to me, and I did get here. Before I even saw the Secretary of State I was called by Henry Kissinger who was somewhere, I think, in Mexico. He wanted me to know that he had -- whether he had been asked to make a recommendation or just made his own recommendation, I am not sure that I recall, if I knew.

In any case Cy Vance raised it with me when I saw him. I said, of course, I'll be interested in that, it's a senior position held by a career person. I was asked did I have any ideas as to how it should be run, and what level of influence it should have. I remember, very well, emphasizing that one of the responsibilities it seemed to me that job had, inherently, was to look after the interest of the career Foreign Service.

Then he said that he wanted to talk to me about Greece. It had happened that he had just been there. Because Athens was, I guess, without an ambassador, for something like six or seven months. The A(inaudible) had already been asked for and given, so that was well along and did I have a date for a hearing, and I said, "Yes, I have a date for a hearing." He said, "Well, I want to think all this over." I said, "You better let me know, because I can't change the date of the hearing. In fact, I pushed them to get me on this week." Because at the other end, I had already gotten an appointment to say farewell to the queen. That couldn't be changed.

As it turned out, he wanted to speak with David Newsom, whom he hadn't met. Out of that, the job, then, was offered to Newsom, and I was asked to go to Greece. I gladly went. I had my hearing, but I didn't even stay to be sworn in. I may be the only ambassador who was sworn in by a vice consul. When I learned that could be done under the regulations, I said I'm going to have to hurry back to The Hague. I had a young FSO-6 swear me in, and that was very fun, and so off I went, happily.

Q: *When did you go to Greece?*

MCCLOSKEY: I arrived in March of 1978.

Q: *What were the principal issues that you faced at that time?*

MCCLOSKEY: Trying to have Greece re-integrated into NATO was the most critical one. Because it foolishly withdrew itself, earlier on, out of anger, frustration. That was a principal subject. The status of the bases was always there, which, in turn, meant levels of military assistance from the United States was an issue.

It was during this period that the Greeks got themselves worked into this so-called seven-to-ten formula, which orders that Greece should receive seven dollars of military assistance for every ten dollars that Turkey receives. I tried vainly, and without success, to persuade the Greeks that this is foolish and could end up being a disservice to you at some point. You don't persuade Greeks very easily on any number of questions.

There were other matters that, I guess I'd would have to say, I put on the agenda. I felt that too much of the U.S.-Greece relationship was identified with the military issues. The status of the bases, and the levels of military assistance. While it wasn't a part of it, there was some connection, in many Greek minds, with the U.S. role in Greece historically, which I thought was the heaviest baggage that we all had to carry, and I think is still the case.

There was a time when nothing happened in Greece that the United States didn't either direct or have a hand in. We had American ambassadors there who behaved like viceroys in the country. We had American officers assigned to various government departments in the Greek government. Most Greeks simply accept that nothing happens there that the United States doesn't have the responsibility for, and surely, nothing that they perceive to be negative to their own interest happens that the U.S. doesn't have something to do with.

Opponents of the Junta are quite convinced that it was the United States that brought the Junta to power. They are quite convinced that it was the United States behind the Junta that overthrew Makarios in favor of the Turks on Cyprus. That begets all kinds of dreads and fears that affect the Greek psyche. We have ourselves to blame for it, for this unfortunate earlier period. Now it must be said that without U.S. help, Greece probably may not have gotten off its knees in the late 1940s after World War II, and as a result of its own civil war. I've always felt that we just didn't understand when it was time to let go of the levers of power, and that we were going to have to be more strict with the Greeks in the responsibility for foreign aid, when you still had foreign economic programs there. You don't have them now. And that the time would come when we were going to have to make a virtue of non-interference. I spent many, many hours arguing, I'm afraid, fruitlessly, with many Greeks about what the United States did not do. I had long meetings with Papandreou, who didn't come into power until after I --

Q: *This is Andreas Papandreou.*

MCCLOSKEY: Andreas, but he was the leader of the PASOK.

Q: *Was it the Pan Hellenic Socialist Union?*

MCCLOSKEY: Socialist union.

Q: *Socialist union, yes.*

MCCLOSKEY: When I got to Greece, the American embassy had a policy of having no contact with Papandreou or P(inaudible), and somehow or another had made virtue of this. I said, "I just don't think this makes a hell of a lot of sense. It's one thing that you disagree with the guy. You may not like him or his party, but it is the principal opposition, and I am going to go and see him."

So that made a number of people uncomfortable, but I did. He used it to his own advantage. I used to have these conversations with him, particularly after he would have said something egregious about the United States and Cyprus. I said to him, "There is nothing about Cyprus in this recent period that I don't know. I was either there or at the other end during the crisis. There are some things I will admit to you that I don't know about the 1967 period and the Junta taking power here. But I assure you I have tried to read everything available so that I can understand it. But when I tell you something about Cyprus, please take it to be the truth, varnished or unvarnished. I will, at the same time, question everything you say about the Junta period and all of that."

I went out of my way to see him and to establish contact with him where I would see him from time to time. I encouraged my wife to visit his wife as she did. I thought that whatever the issues, there was no reason not to have some civilized discourse with the man. Well, he later became Prime Minister, and he is still Prime Minister. I had the funny sense that we had some peculiar notions about how to conduct our relations with Greece.

Q: *It does.*

MCCLOSKEY: You were there before me.

Q: *Well, I was there before, and it was very much a dog in the manger. We don't talk to this. Somehow I have the feeling that we became almost Greek in our attitude. We had too many old hands. We had too many Greek Americans. My predecessor had been a Greek American, who, as a consul general, wouldn't deal with the communist problem. They were all damned to hell. Well, we had a law which allowed differentiation. He would not make it. This is a problem.*

MCCLOSKEY: It's a serious problem, and I don't know whether I should put this on the record or not -- turn it off for the moment. [Tape recorder turned off]

Q: *What do you think was the motivation behind Papandreou? He had been studied in the United States. Actually, we saved his life at the time of the '67 coup.*

MCCLOSKEY: There is a telegram I have seen that Phil Talbot sent back the day after

Papandreou was released from prison. He was imprisoned by the Junta. I'm a little vague on how long, but his wife has written about this, and others have written about it. Various people, I know, raised this high up in the U.S. government as with Lyndon Johnson. A number of imminent Americans intervened. In any case, he was finally released. He saw Talbot, evidently, the day after that. The telegram begins by attributing to Papandreou his, something like, everlasting gratitude.

Yet here is a man who made capital and still does on anti-American issues, more of which are fabricated than real. The current problem he has with embezzlement by a man who came from the United States and took over the bank of Crete and other enterprises. The stories are that the party, if not the Prime Minister, has benefited from all of this. Papandreou has now denounced as an American CIA plot against him, personally, and his party in a period just before elections, which are to occur again this year. You're getting to the heart of a very troubling question here, and it is an anti-Americanism in Greece that is profoundly disturbing to me.

Q: It's always been there, I think. It used to be anti-British, and when the British pulled out, we took it. This is, at least, my impression.

MCCLOSKEY: You're not far off, at all. There is still enough of it there, that we ought to be concerned about. Our diplomats should be very scrupulous about how they conduct themselves in Greece. There is a way to serve American interest very easily and appropriately, and to maintain good relations with Greeks and Greek government while you're doing it. That, I think, makes imminent good sense. I don't know how this latent anti-Americanism is going to be overcome, except that we will simply have to demonstrate that we are not manipulating Greece.

Q: Did Papandreou really believe this, or was this purely a way that he kept in power? Did he talk one way to you, and one way to the outside?

MCCLOSKEY: Yes, parenthesis, yes.

Q: Let me ask a question, again, it's one I asked myself when I was there. How important did you find -- the bases issue was obviously, a major issue -- but talking about dealing with a difficult group with the American military, were you able to get satisfactory answers that these bases, particularly three, the one in Neamakri, which is naval communications, the one at Athens airport, and then the one on Crete, that these were really essential. They are a burr under our saddle, in NATO relations and everything else, particularly with the Greeks.

MCCLOSKEY: You don't get what I would accept as an honest answer. You have to take into account a military mind set that says you've got to have redundancies. If the helicopter doesn't work, then you need to have a back up. It's an ingrained mind-set among military, at least ours, and perhaps all military. I once came back for consultation, and at the urging and insistence of the desk in the State Department, agreed to go and meet with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This was in 1980 and we were going to resume the base negotiations in September, and I would carry back our first draft to present to the Greek government. I tried to convince the Joint Chiefs, that day, that it would be in our interest to have a study undertaken to answer this very question. Which of these facilities are vital to us any longer, because they are becoming an awful burden to carry.

We have incidents of one kind or another directed against U.S. military there. While I was speaking, the Chief of Naval Operations dozed off. I'll leave my ego aside. I just walked out of the room infuriated, knowing that no such thing would ever be done. The Air Force chief, at the time, began to argue against it right in the room. I knew it was a hopeless case. As for the military that are with you on assignment, they justify their own assignment.

Q: You looked at it hard, and you were not convinced that these were as essential as they said?

MCCLOSKEY: Allowing that I don't understand every bit of technical wizardry that is performed at these places. I went to all of them more than once. I would test my own instincts against others of my country team. I was quite convinced that we certainly didn't need all that we had there, and we were simply asking for more trouble.

Indeed, I was hopeful, at one time, of at least having the main entrance to the (Inaudible) base moved off the highway. A couple of things had happened. One I remember, the station had given me information that there were photographs being made of the entrance by what I was told were Libyans, who had made their way into Athens. There were always little dust-ups outside that gate of one kind or another.

Q: This is the one by the main airport?

MCCLOSKEY: Yes, and the entrance is right on the main highway. But from a small thing like that, and I had some discussion of that during the negotiation which we finally got to. Which, then, the Greek government suspended because we couldn't, well that's another long story. Perhaps, I should say something about it here?

Q: Would you please?

MCCLOSKEY: The negotiation that I undertook in September of 1980 was a continuation of a negotiation that had not been completed in 1976, in which the United States had agreed to take certain steps by way of making an agreement at that time. The draft text that I took back then to reopen the negotiations in 1980 had written into it efforts to recapture some things that were agreed to be given up in the earlier round, that finished in 1976. I could see that we were heading for trouble right away because the other side, the Greek side, kept reminding me. But these are issues that were already agreed to by your side in the previous negotiation. I knew that, at the center of things, we were not going to be able to satisfy the Greek desire for the kind of military equipment and the amounts of money it wanted under FMS terms.

Q: FMS being?

MCCLOSKEY: Foreign military sales. We were not going to be able to reach up to where they were setting their sites, and that would be the heart of the agreement. We were only going to aggravate the thing by trying to recall concessions we had made, for example, the role of the senior American official at the Herakleion air base. Was the senior official at the base the Greek commander or the American commander? We had said in the earlier negotiation that it should be the Greek commander. Suddenly, things like that we were trying to take back. So I think the

negotiation was fated to have serious difficulty from the beginning.

In any case, what they were asking for in terms of military equipment and money was out of reach for the United States. I think, however, we did not give it our best shot. I was continually told that I couldn't offer another formulation. That this couldn't be done. This was a period of great austerity, and we were in base negotiations in various places around the world. I didn't have to be reminded of things like that, having done a successful negotiation with Spain just a couple of years before this.

Then it got even a bit tawdry toward the end when I was given a telephone call, and told that I could offer the Greek government X number of F-5 aircraft, and X quantity of spare parts. I found myself running out to the minister of defense's house in the middle of the night with my own handwriting of these items on a slip of paper. All of which was too little, too late, and the negotiation was never taken seriously enough in Washington. So when you hear a Greek, as you often will, say that we're taken for granted, I think there was some of that behind this negotiation that forecast it was not going to succeed.

WELLS STABLER
Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European Affairs
Washington, DC (1973-1974)

Ambassador Wells Stabler was born in Massachusetts in 1919. His Foreign Service career included positions in Palestine, Jordan, Italy, and France, and an ambassadorship to Spain. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1991.

STABLER: I think that is absolutely true and I think this was one of the things with Kissinger that if you stood your ground and believed you were right and were persuasive in your presentation and wouldn't permit yourself to be brow-beaten by him, he would listen to you and respect your judgment. This was what happened to Carlucci. He didn't go down under the first (onslaught?) from Kissinger who was very quick to put people down. He hadn't been in the Department terribly long and had not had before coming into the Department a very favorable view of Foreign Service people anyway. So I think one would say that there was no doubt that Carlucci was largely responsible for saving the day for us in Portugal.

That was in April/May/June period of 1974. Then in July of '74 ... to go back a bit, some time in the spring of 1974 Kissinger had decided that he didn't see why when he traveled through NATO areas he had to have sometimes an Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, sometimes the Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs, particularly when he went to Greece and Turkey. Why couldn't all these countries be under one Assistant Secretary? So in May, or perhaps June, of 1974 he decreed that in the future Greece, Turkey and Cyprus would become part of the Bureau of European Affairs. They fell to my lot as countries of Western Europe.

Then in July, 1974, the Greek military undertook a coup against Archbishop Makarios, the

President of Cyprus. The Greek colonels, of course, were involved. There was a strong body among the Greek military who thought that there should be a union between Cyprus and Greece, enosis and that Makarios was not furthering this aim and therefore should be deposed. In the morning hours, of whatever day in July it was, the Greek military staged this coup and Makarios was forced to flee.

Normally that would have been something that the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs would have been called upon to go to Kissinger's office and discuss the implications and possible policy steps. It just so happened that on that particular day Arthur Hartman had had a long standing engagement to meet and negotiate with a team from East Germany on the conditions for recognition of East Germany by the United States and the establishment of diplomatic relations. It was not something in which I had been involved and therefore he felt that he absolutely should do that. I, therefore, should be the one to deal with the Cyprus problem and go to see Kissinger. That actually was the first time that I had had any contact with Kissinger. This was the beginning of that long period of dealing with Cyprus, the relationship with Kissinger, and ultimately the appointment to Spain.

Q: I would like to continue with the situation that blew up in July of 1974 with Cyprus. European Affairs had just absorbed Greece and Turkey in April and all of a sudden you are faced with a major problem with two NATO allies pointing guns at each other. Could you describe how this hit you and some of the personnel in the Washington area when you heard about this Cyprus business?

STABLER: Yes. It was about in April of 1974 that Secretary Kissinger decided that he didn't see why he had to have two Assistant Secretaries traveling with him when he went to NATO conferences -- Greece and Turkey were under the Near Eastern Affairs. So he made a decision to transfer Greece, Turkey and Cyprus to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of European Affairs. Very few of us at that time in EUR had a great deal of knowledge of what was going on in Greece and Turkey, except as it related to NATO matters. The regional questions were, of course, not dealt with by the Bureau of European Affairs. So this was somewhat of a surprise. Assimilation of the officers handling Greek and Turkish affairs came into EUR and it fell to me as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs who mostly handled Western and Central European Affairs, to take on Greece, Turkey and Cyprus.

It was all relatively calm and no one thought a great deal about problems that might come about as a result of this. Although the reasons for the coup had been bubbling up for a number of years there was no particular crisis at the time. At any event, in July, 1974 the Greek military, with the Colonels in charge in Athens, decided that the time had come to carry out the policy of enosis which was uniting Cyprus with Greece. They mounted a coup in Nicosia which was aimed at Archbishop Makarios. He was forced to flee and a major crisis suddenly presented itself. This was putting the heat on as far as Greek and Turkish relations were concerned.

Normally in a situation of this sort the Assistant Secretary of European Affairs would have handled the matter directly with Kissinger who, of course, was much concerned about this as it related to two important NATO allies. But Arthur Hartman had had a long standing engagement to negotiate with a delegation from East Germany on the establishment of diplomatic relations

between the United States and East Germany. This delegation had come especially from East Germany for this. Arthur felt that he had to meet this particular engagement. It was not one that I as his principal deputy could have easily taken over because I had not been involved in the earlier discussions leading up to the negotiations.

So he then asked me to go up and deal with Cyprus with Kissinger, whom I hadn't dealt with before. I went up and from that day forward until I left EUR to get ready to go to Spain, I saw Kissinger many times a day, traveled with him as far as India to be with him to deal with the Cyprus question. He, of course, was very troubled by all of this, recognizing that this was going to upset the Turks and that we would soon have a Turkish reaction...which indeed we did. The Turkish army very shortly thereafter invaded the northern part of Cyprus and annexed that part of Cyprus that had predominantly Turkish population...as well as some areas that had a large Greek population. It was quite clear that this could lead to a very serious confrontation between Greeks and Turks not only on Cyprus but on the mainland as well.

So he set about trying to calm the waters and to restore some semblance of peace in the area. This was not an easy thing to do at all because the animosity between Greeks and Turks was such that it was almost impossible to get any moderation, plus the fact that we had the junta, the Colonels...

Q: Actually I think it was the Generals by that time. The Colonels had been overthrown by their Generals. It was still a pretty inept crew.

STABLER: I guess they were still called the Colonels...

In any event, this was a crisis that started in July and continued with great intensity throughout the summer and into the winter months. A great deal of effort was put in to this business, trying to appeal to the Greeks and then to the Turks to calm the situation down.

Now Secretary Kissinger had, as you remember, taught one time at Harvard and had a seminar for a variety of up and coming political leaders. He felt that this gave him a special bond. Prime Minister Etilim [ph] of Turkey had attended his seminar at Cambridge. Thus there was a relatively easy access channel. The Greek situation was really quite different, because it seems to me that sometime in the period from July to the fall, the Generals had been toppled.

Q: Yes, they were. The leader, although he never had the official name, was a man named Eonidi [ph] who was sort of the military policeman -- a very, very difficult character. During the summer, because the coup instigated by the Colonels had brought such a disaster on the Greek cause, the Colonels were put out and Karamanlis came out of exile and formed a government, a democratic government.

STABLER: Yes, I remember that because the access to Etilim was a very easy one, the access to Karamanlis was not an easy one. He didn't speak English and Kissinger had a predilection for calling these people on the telephone. Etilim he could talk with but Karamanlis he really couldn't. [Former King Constantine of Greece became a friend of ours when we were in Rome and he was in exile there. When I was in Spain he was the brother-in-law of King Carlos, whose

sister was Queen Sophia. I used to see him there from time to time. He always told me that he felt that Karamanlis had betrayed him. He had talked to Karamanlis when he was in exile in Paris and understood that if Karamanlis was ever restored he would bring about the restoration of the monarchy. He had expected a call from Karamanlis when he got back to Athens, which never came.]

Both the Greeks and Turks were very unbending in this whole thing. The situation was compounded later, after the July landing of the Turks, when the Turks felt threatened again and landed additional troops on Cyprus which then really tore things apart because the Greek lobby in Congress was extremely strong. There was no Turkish lobby but a strong Greek lobby with Paul Sarbanes of Maryland and John Brademas of Indiana and a number of others who were very, very active. They then started a campaign in Congress to cut off military aid to Turkey on the grounds that US equipment had been used for other than NATO purposes which would require specific consent of the United States government. The Turks felt that Kissinger had misled them and his relations with Congress over this became very intense.

As a result of all this, you may recall, an arms embargo was placed on Turkey -- this being '74 or early '75 -- and wasn't lift until the fall of 1978. This, of course, seriously hampered our relations with Turkey.

In any event, during this period, I was constantly in Kissinger's office. Of course, Art Hartman and others came into it too. There was Bob McCloskey who was special assistant to Kissinger at that time and was there a great deal of the time. Bill Casey, Under Secretary of Economic Affairs, was in and out.

Q: He later became the head of CIA.

STABLER: There were a number of people involved, but I really basically became the coordinator of the Cyprus situation.

Q: In my interviewing, I am picking up some of the people who were either the Turkish Desk Officer or the Greek Desk Officer or the Cyprus Desk Officer. One of the minor legends of the Foreign Service is the clash between Tom Boyatt [ph], who was a rather junior but a very outspoken officer who was the Cypriot Desk Officer, and Henry Kissinger. More than just that, I wonder if you could give an idea of Kissinger's reaction to this? Did he see this as an East-West problem that was screwing up the NATO works, or born in Europe did he see this as almost one of those tribal animosities or did he understand... How did he relate to the expertise in the field?

STABLER: I think his main concern at the outset was the fact that it was a clash between two NATO allies, thus disturbing the tranquility of the Eastern Mediterranean at a time when we were still thoroughly engaged in the business of the Soviet Union being our principal enemy. You have the Turks and to a lesser extent the Greeks, looking elsewhere than NATO and this was a concern to him. Basically the context of the East-West relationship became a serious matter. It didn't really have many overtones with respect to his other great interests -- the Middle East. It didn't spill over very much into the Arab-Israel problem. So it really was a question of these people not focusing on their principal responsibility and that was what we had to deal with.

Of course, the British were much involved too because of their own situation in Cyprus. They have a major air base there which was important. Various noises were made by the Greeks of possibly closing that in annoyance over the attitude of the British who were totally opposed to what the Greeks had done.

That is why he spent as much time as he did on it, trying to find a way to bring equilibrium back into the area and get the Greeks and Turks thinking about NATO and their responsibilities rather than fighting each other. This I think was his principal point.

There certainly was a clash with Tom Boyatt, but I honestly can't remember all the details now. Boyatt was ultimately removed. But there were a lot of people involved in the clash. It got to the point where Kissinger believed that Tasca was nothing more than a spokesman for the junta.

Q: Henry Tasca had been Ambassador there from about 1970-1974. He was sent by Nixon to try to work with the junta. He saw a lot of Papadopoulos, Pattakos, trying to work with them.

STABLER: But this became really something in which Kissinger believed -- that Tasca was in fact not a great deal more than the spokesman for the junta -- to the extent that there really was no communication between the Secretary of State and the Ambassador in Athens. It was done largely with Monty Sterns. When I was sent out to talk with (Ecevit?) in Ankara and the Foreign Minister or some other official in Athens, I stayed with Monty. I knew Tasca, we had been in Rome together, but I didn't see him at that point. He was hold up in the Residence and in effect I was sort of advised not to as he was on his way out Kissinger being determined to get rid of him as quickly as he possibly could and did. He sent Jack Kubisch there as the Ambassador. So Tasca, also, was one of those who fell in this situation.

Bob Dillon was the Turkish Officer and for whom I have the greatest admiration and liking. I worked very closely with Bob. It seems curious that I can't remember now who the Greek Desk Officer was at the time. But I just don't. I'm a little confused now because there was what they used to call Greek-Turkish Affairs...I don't know if there was an office and then separate desk officers or not. Bob Dillon certainly did Turkish Affairs and there must have been somebody else who did Greek Affairs. Ultimately Bob left and Bill Eagleton came in as the Office Director.

The fact was that I suppose I could say that even though I was Deputy Assistant Secretary, I in effect became the Desk Officers for Greece, Turkey and Cyprus at the time. It was curious. Kissinger had very strong views about all these things. He was apt to decide exactly how he wanted to play something and it often fell to me to put it into words for him, make changes that I thought should be done.

At the very outset, Joe Sisco, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, was dispatched almost immediately to the area as Kissinger's emissary to see what he could do to patch the thing up. He came back basically empty handed. Then in due course other emissaries were sent, including Art Hartman.

Q: I recall in one interview with Bob Dillon saying they sat in the plane in Ankara and they

didn't know where to go. Things were falling apart.

STABLER: Yes, I remember that. They weren't really quite sure what came next. That was put together almost immediately so it wasn't really clear what it was they were expected to do except to try to calm the situation down as quickly as possible.

I know that when Arthur Hartman went over on a mission and reported back what he had done, Kissinger went up in smoke because Hartman had apparently not said exactly what Kissinger had told him to say.

I was sent out and remember going one Sunday afternoon to a house on Nebraska Ave that belonged to Wiley Buchanan, who had been Chief of Protocol. He used to lend Kissinger his house in the summer when the Buchanans went up to their house in Newport. I went over there and we went over exactly what I was to say to Etgive and to the Greeks. I must say on the plane over I carefully noted down exactly what it was that he wanted me to say, which I did. I reported back practically verbatim what I had said, and of course what had been said to me. This made him happy because he felt his instructions had been carried out to the letter.

All of these things really...it was a constant sort of dialogue but with the attitude in Congress, which was really in favor of the Greek situation, and the Turks clearly having no intention of giving up their military occupation of a certain part of Cyprus, nothing really could be achieved. Certainly the government of Karamanlis was more disposed to reason than the junta, but the Turks were in occupation and by this time Makarios had been restored. Treledies [ph], who was the leader of the Greek community in Cyprus and Denktash, the leader of the Turkish community, would have talks. And there were talks in Geneva. There were talks everywhere. But no one could find any solution beyond basically what has now become the status quo. The Turks, of course, declared the independent Turkish Republic of Cyprus, which no one recognizes, except them.

We had great tragedies there because of the Cypriot population's view that we favor the Turks in some way. There would be demonstrations and you remember the tragic killing of Rodger Davies who was our Ambassador there.

Q: He was killed by Cypriot police, I think.

STABLER: I don't remember now exactly how that happened. It was one of those tragic things where the mob stormed the Embassy shooting and he was unfortunately a victim of it. I would guess that today the situation is largely what it was a number of years ago.

Q: A little of the thinking at the time. You had two mixed populations on the island, the Greeks and the Turks, and things weren't going well. They were shooting at each other and it was all mixed up and the fact that there had been essentially an exchange of population and there was a clear demarcation between what was under Turkish control and what was under Greek control. Was anyone saying, "Well, you know this is a bad spot to get over, but in the long run it is going to be a lot better than having these two people living cheek to jowl and really not being very nice to each other." Were you getting any of that?

STABLER: There was a certain feeling of *fait accompli* because with the Turkish army in northern Cyprus, no one believed that it would be possible to get the Turks to withdraw their army. One tried at the time to get the Turks to at least reduce the number of forces, but I don't think anybody really expected the Turks to give the whole thing up. There was some hope that possibly the communal negotiations between Clerides and Denktash might...this was really after Makarios because he wasn't disposed to be reasonable about anything. Their whole effort was to get the Turks off the island and get back to where they were before, which I think no one really felt was a viable possibility. But at that time, less thought was probably given to how this would evolve in the future. Of course it was not possible for the United States to take a position or appear to take a position which in effect accepted the status quo. That was something you couldn't even think about because with the bad blood between the Greeks and the Turks the effort was to try to find some formula that would in effect reduce the Turkish presence and hopefully through the communal negotiations reach a point with there could be perhaps a restoration of the Republic of Cyprus as before with greater autonomy for the Turkish population.

As you remember prior to the coup there was a Greek President of Cyprus and a Turkish Vice President. The Greeks were clearly in the majority. But there was some hope that somehow through these communal negotiations you could get an improved situation for the Turks and hopefully the Turkish army would go away.

Q: But in your heart of hearts though did you think anything would come of this? Was this something you really had to do but thought.... ?

STABLER: I think probably most of us at the time recognized that in a sense what the Turks had done would probably in the long run ease the situation because you then have a division between these two groups and less possibility in the long run of communal clashes. And that in fact is what has come about. Quite clearly when you are dealing with this sort of a problem you never can take the position...but somehow we have to get fully involved. So, no, I don't think anybody would put down on paper let's let this thing just hang out and take care of itself. The main thrust really of what Kissinger was trying to do was to try to reduce the level of animosity between Greece and Turkey as much as possible and, as I said before, let them get back to their main task. Although this was very complicated because the whole discussion all the time between the Greeks and Turks was about the air control area and what was Greek and what was Turkish, what islands would

Q: And mineral rights which still is going on today.

STABLER: Yes. President Bush is in Greece at the present moment and is facing violent demonstrations because the Greeks think we are more friends with the Turks than we are towards the Greeks.

Q: Another thing on this issue, I may be over dwelling, but I think this brings so many things together -- how we work. In one interview I did the interviewee spoke with Senator Javits, who was from New York, Jewish and an ardent proponent of Israel, telling him: "You think the Jewish

lobby is a problem in the United States, wait until the Greek lobby gets going because the Jewish concentration is in New York, California, and Florida, but there are Greeks spread out throughout the United States and also in positions of considerable political importance. Just wait until this gets aroused." I think this issue sort of proved the value of what had been said prior to this. Did the Greek lobby catch the Department of State by surprise as to how powerful it became? This was the first time it really became organized.

STABLER: I think it was a matter of some surprise to see the lobby as well organized as it was. I had this brought back to me once again when in 1978 after coming back from Spain. I was helping on the Hill in talking to Senators and Congressman about the importance of lifting the arms embargo against Turkey. I went to see the Congressman from Maryland, who died shortly thereafter, and talked to him about the importance of our relations with Turkey. He said, "I absolutely agree with you. I don't think Congress ought to be nickel and diming the State Department on all these things and getting involved in all the nitty gritty of day to day operations. I think the Turkish arms embargo should be lifted, but I intend to vote against it for the very simple reason that my main fund raiser in the State is a Greek-American and therefore there is no way that I can vote in favor of this matter even though I fully agree that it should be done." So again, that showed the power of the lobby even years after the intensity of the thing had died down. As I said earlier there was absolutely no Turkish lobby whatsoever. Consequently the Greek lobby did get Congress to do pretty much what they thought it should do and there was tremendous pressures on the State Department, the Secretary to take a more pro-Greek line.

I think it is to Kissinger's credit that he...although it caused him a lot of trouble because, as I said earlier, there were Members of Congress who believed that he had outright lied to them on the business of the original question of should we not impose arms embargo because all these US arms are going into Cyprus. I think there were many of us who felt that the Turks had enormously complicated our task. It was at least understandable, the first wave of invasion, because there was aggression in protecting their population in Cyprus. That could be argued, if you will, under the rubric of self defense. But then when some weeks later they sent in the second wave there was no real justification for so doing. That enormously complicated our task.

Q: Why did they do that?

STABLER: I think they did it because they wanted to consolidate their gains and to make it absolutely clear that they had no intention of giving up. I think this was actually done after the Colonels had been thrown out. I think they were concerned that the Greeks might try to launch some military operation.

Q: Well, there certainly were some noises about the Greek military talking about fighting there and sending in an expedition.

STABLER: They sent naval vessels and there was the famous episode where in the middle of the night...I was down in the Operations Center and there were all sorts of alarms and excursions about the Greek naval force and then the Turks announced with much pride that they had sunk a Greek destroyer. Then it turned out that they had sunk one of their own.

I think it was also part of the domestic problems in Turkey that was responsible for this. Their economic and the political situation was always in turmoil. The Prime Minister of Turkey and the army gained considerable popular support because they were defending the Turkish population in Cyprus.

So I don't think any of us felt that the second invasion was really necessary. They had frankly sent in enough in the first place to defend the population and the second invasion was just a grand stand display which caused us many problems.

In any event, I think from a personal point of view, I found it a fascinating experience being able to work as closely as I did with Kissinger and seeing what a difficult person he could be on these things. I found that those who permitted themselves to be brow beaten and simply accepted it, soon fell by the wayside. Those who stood up to him, but were not right sometimes in their advice, also fell by the wayside. Those who stood up to him and knew their dossier, fared pretty well.

Q: One of the points about Kissinger that is raised again and again is that he tended to do things by himself with foreign leaders and that those working to support him, such as you, often would find themselves dealing without quite knowing what the game was. Was this a problem in this case?

STABLER: I never felt that. I felt that I knew what he was doing because I often did it for him. I often was in the room and sometimes on the telephone listening in when he was talking to these foreign leaders. I wrote most of the messages, obviously not 100 percent, but most of them that he sent these people. And I went to the White House with him on some of these things. So I felt that on the whole I had fairly good knowledge of what he was doing.

Mine you, there were...Arthur Hartman and I had a very good relationship. For example, when I went on a trip with Kissinger to India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Iran, when we got to Rome where he was going to have talks with the Italians, Arthur Hartman came on board and I was finished, because at that point there wasn't room for both of us. But Arthur pretty much kept me abreast of what was going on and as the year wore on...I went over to London a few times to talk to the British about the problem... I never felt that Kissinger was trying to exclude me or that he was not keeping the Bureau of European Affairs through Arthur Hartman and myself, pretty much informed of what he was up to. He believed, I think at times erroneously, that his superior intelligence would easily win over some of these people. They just couldn't resist the force of his logic and therefore they would soon see that he was right and they were not. But, I think, at times we ignored some of the realities of the situation. But in each instance it was worth the try. You couldn't go wrong in putting forward your own point of view to these people.

Q: Sort of the other shoe. While this was going, one of our major concerns was that you didn't want to have two NATO allies fighting each other because NATO was the bulwark and here was the southern flank against the Soviet Union. You must have been monitoring very closely what the Soviet Union was doing. Did you get any feel that the Soviets were going to try to take advantage, or were they taking advantage of this?

STABLER: I don't recall any situation where the Soviets seemed to be a threatening factor in all this. Obviously there were Communists in Greece and some of this carried over into Cyprus I am sure, but I don't know that this was necessarily as a result of any Soviet doing. I can't recall now that this particular aspect entered into the equation in any important way. The real concern, of course, was that...and then there were alarms and excursions throughout this period of reports that the Turks were massing to invade Greece or that Greece was reinforcing their forces along the border and there soon would be problems. There were a lot of rumors in those days. I don't recall that there was any serious information at any time that the Turks and Greeks were about to clash.

Q: I remember I had left Greece within a week or two of the coup in Cyprus. At the country team meetings, the military attaché used to say that if the Greeks and Turks were at each other they will have ammunition for about one week and then they will basically run out. Turning away from this particular thing but talking about your role in dealing with Western Europe, were there any major problems that you had to deal with in the 1973-75 period -- West Germany, France?

STABLER: No. I think we have covered previously the coup in Portugal and I don't remember that there were any major problems that came up during that period.

Q: Those seem to be sort of on both flanks, the peripheral of NATO.

STABLER: You had the usual political turmoil in Italy which wasn't all that important really. There was always the question of Berlin, but I didn't get much involved in that. I just don't recall at the moment. It seems there was a period when I was fairly active on German Affairs. A fellow by the name of Jim Sutherland was at that time in charge of Germany, but I can't recall that there were any major problems such as the Cyprus problem.

Q: One last question on this European affairs business. How did you and people around you view the development of the Common Market. Was it seen as something that was going to go anywhere? Was there concern that this might prove to be a problem with our getting into the European market?

STABLER: At that period, I think we were still very much supporting the idea of a common market because we were trying to bring the Europeans more closely together...this went back to the Treaty of Rome, which I guess was in the middle 50s...hoping that this ultimately would lead to a European political community. I don't think there was any recognition or concern yet that the Europeans had reached the stage when they would basically threaten our economic situation. So I think it was viewed in political and economic terms as a desirable policy. There may have been some at the time who worried a little bit about what ultimately might be the economic consequences of all this, but this was certainly not an important element at that time.

Q: While the Cyprus thing was going on we were going through the Watergate trauma and the slow political demise of President Nixon. Did this have any impact on our operations? Henry Kissinger, obviously, was the number one man in foreign affairs and also, really in a way, almost a surrogate president.

STABLER: Yes, he was in a sense almost what you might call a prime minister. Curiously enough Watergate didn't impact on our operations really. Although when Nixon resigned we were extraordinarily busy for a couple of days writing up letters to heads of state for Ford to send saying, "plus ca change."

Q: But, you didn't have the feeling that things were at a standstill or anything?

STABLER: There wasn't really anything at a standstill because we continued to operate. Kissinger was running the thing as far as policy was concerned.

Q: Did you have the problem of trying to explain to Europeans who are very sophisticated what this Watergate thing was all about?

STABLER: Not particularly. I think the people abroad had more of a problem there because I think a lot of the people in Europe didn't understand what the fuss was all about. But I wouldn't say that Watergate really affected the conduct of foreign policy in any important way. Things went on. I don't recall that it diminished the importance of what we had to say on various subjects. Nixon resigned in August, 1974 and I made a number of my trips after that alone and with Kissinger. Things went on the same. It was curious. You might have thought that an upheaval of that sort would have created some troubles, but

JAMES ALAN WILLIAMS
Political Officer
Nicosia (1973-1975)

Mr. Williams was born in Wisconsin and raised in Virginia. After graduation from Princeton University, he joined the Foreign Service in 1965 and was posted to Ankara, Turkey. During his career Mr. Williams became a specialist in Greek/Turkish/Cyprus affairs and served as Special Coordinator for Cyprus, with the personal rank of Ambassador. His foreign assignments include Ankara, Nicosia, Bonn, Berlin and Athens, and he had several tours at the State Department in Washington. Mr. Williams was interviewed by Ray Ewing in 2003.

Q: But you went to Cyprus in what, the summer of 1973?

WILLIAMS: Summer of '73 we went there. I remember coming off the plane late at night from Frankfurt, there at the bottom were Mike Austrian who was my counterpart in the political section on the Turkish side, and Lindsay Grant the DCM and his wife Barry so it was a very nice welcome.

Q: Was David Popper still the ambassador?

WILLIAMS: No, he had moved on to Chile I think. At the time it was Bob McCloskey. He

didn't stay very long because Kissinger kept pulling him back to do special things and finally pulled him back for good before he went on to Greece. When Bob would be pulled back to Washington, his wife Ann would stay in Nicosia because the girls were going to school and I think Ann, his wife, enjoyed Nicosia very much. So we saw a lot of them. In fact, we still laugh about the story that our lift van of effects from America caught hoof and mouth disease when it got to Turkey. At least that's what the Greek customs authorities said. So the ship with our lift van which had stopped in Izmir was not allowed by the Cypriot authorities to land in Famagusta because they were worried about hoof and mouth disease. And no question about it there was hoof and mouth disease in Turkey and the island of Cyprus then as now had a very fine vital sanitary record. They were not about to jeopardize it by importing some pathogen from Turkey. But the idea that a lift van would have it was a bit far fetched. In the lift van were our clothes, our son's toys. It went back to Baltimore and sat in the harbor until it could be loaded on another freighter which brought it to Cyprus not by way of a Turkish port but by other ports. So we finally got our winter clothes as I recall in the first half of December. It gets cold in Cyprus before then and so I remember borrowing Bob McCloskey's sweaters. I think Ann borrowed a few things from Ann McCloskey, other members of the community lent our son some stuff until our real things would arrive. We knew they would get there eventually but it took a long time.

Q: Okay and you were the Greek language political officer. Were you the head of the political section?

WILLIAMS: No, that was one of the unfortunate aspects of wiring the assignment the way it had been done. Mike Austrian and I were the same rank exactly. I think we'd even been promoted the same year. But he was senior at post, had been there a year or more when I got there and should have been by right the head of the section. De facto he was. I deferred to him more often than not because he knew the island and the politics and the situation much better than I did. At least the first year or so. But because we were the same rank he was not formally made Joe Lorenz's successor until the next year when he got promoted and I didn't. So then it was fairly easy to do that, but at that point we had the other problem of the Turkish invasion, the murder of Rodger Davies and so forth. So who was in charge of the political section didn't really matter. But no, Mike and I were more or less yoked to the same harness. I covered the Greek side, he the Turkish side. There was some overlap because Mike was very able and had been there a while and he covered some of the Greek side, and I had been in Turkey and spoke some Turkish so I tried to meet some of the Turkish Cypriot folks as well. But the sense of the division of labor was as it is today: one covers the Turkish Cypriot side and one the Greek Cypriot side.

Q: Your role though as the Greek language political officer was primarily with the Greek Cypriots.

WILLIAMS: Exactly. All those parties. And new parties and deputies.

Q: Was that what you did primarily? Work with politicians, members of parliament, deputies, did a lot of reporting? Was there an economic officer in the embassy as well?

WILLIAMS: Yes, economic and commercial work was done by Jay Graham. Cristalla was one of his assistants. Chris Yakabedes. And they had a small commercial library so that was a

separate operation entirely. And I focused initially on the populations you mentioned to work on my Greek and to meet the people who were allegedly the movers and shakers in the Greek Cypriot community. I must say, on the Greek it was an effort because as you know Cypriots, Greek and Turkish in those days usually spoke the King's English and getting them to speak to you in Greek was a bit artificial. I had to insist in some cases. I became a bit of a pig about it because I really wanted to get my Greek under control. In some cases it worked, but most of them after a while were happy to play the game. Several contacts whom I used to see regularly were quite happy to speak Greek with me even though it was not the Greek they spoke on Cyprus of course. I spoke Athenian Greek. I frankly then and now cannot understand the Cypriot dialect. It's just too difficult and I never learned it. But they were happy to speak the Hah Greek with me whenever I came calling. So yes, I would call the political leaders, the newspaper publishers who were often the same thing. This was in the day when EOKA led by Grivas was trying to unhorse or assassinate Makarios. They didn't care which. That was a matter of considerable interest to Washington as well as the embassy and the agency was also involved so anybody who'd get a handle of EOKA presumably was contributing to the national interest. Kikis was able to get me a meeting once with Kikos Constantino who was one of the deputies of EOKA. Very presentable guy who was very happy to speak to me in Greek and we had a very pleasant conversation in somebody's apartment about Makarios and the island and so forth. But he didn't reveal any secrets. This was my first time as a political officer, reporting officer. I was really learning my trade. And it took a little bit longer than I thought it would. I would have become a very good one if summer of '74 had gone differently.

Q: Maybe we ought to begin talking about the summer of '74. Maybe you want to first describe in general what happened and then maybe talk about to what extent this was anticipated or what sort of warnings there were and what happened in the period leading up to July of '74.

WILLIAMS: There was in effect a civil war going on in Cyprus when we got there between the government, the duly elected legitimate government of Archbishop Makarios and the EOKA-B organization led by George Grivas the hero of EOKA, and supported very clearly by the military junta that was then running Athens, the government of Greece. If you look at the reporting files which I did when I was studying Greek that year at FSI and when I got to post, if you look at the very thick files of the political section, easily most of it has to do with incident reporting. Bombs in mailboxes, bombs at police stations. Assassination attempts on country roads. There was a lot of this type of activity, designed deliberately to upset the regime of Makarios, and perhaps to stimulate some broad grassroots move to throw him out. It never succeeded. It was amateurish; it was rarely fatal although people did die when these things went off. One of my contacts was the deputy minister of agriculture who got in a car one morning and turned on the ignition and blew his legs off and died soon thereafter in the hospital. Car bombs were favored, but usually they were not fatal. The bombs at the police stations and the mailboxes and so on made more noise than anything, but they were duly reported. And so there was a lot of this stuff going on, not just in Nicosia, but all over the island. Essentially that fight on the island reflected a fight between Makarios and the Athens junta over some basic issues involving Hellenism, or the interest of the Greek world. The junta was not used to taking sass from anybody, being a bunch of military colonels essentially, one general. And Makarios as an elected president was not used to taking orders from a junta. It was a basic incompatibility of personalities and institutions. This had been going on as I recall for about two years when it culminated in the summer of '74. I don't

remember exactly when Grivas was sent back to the island by the junta, or went back to the island and was supported by the junta, but it was sometime in the early '70s. There had been efforts by the junta to kill Makarios before the summer of '74. He was in a helicopter once taking off from some point in Nicosia and the helicopter came under fire. The pilot was killed, barely managed to land the helicopter, and Makarios walked away from it. When I was on the island in late '73 early '74 he was driving in his motorcade from the Pedieos to Nicosia and there was an ambush and some members of the motorcade were hit, he was not. But once again the effort had been to kill him. And there were other efforts of which we learned through intelligence sources and which thanks to very vigorous work by Ambassador Popper and others, we believe, were aborted because of our intervention. We told the Greeks we knew it and to back off, and for whatever reason they did. But after the Athens Polytechnic riots in November of '73 the Greek junta changed. The old guy who had been in charge since the coup of April '67 was thrown out, George Papadopoulos and succeeded by somebody who can best be described as a thug, Demetrius Ioannidis who was head of the Greek military police. Unlike Papadopoulos, Ioannidis was a much more secretive, remote personality who did not relish contact with foreigners and who hated Makarios apparently with a passion. So the level of violence directed by the junta against Makarios' regime ratcheted upwards significantly after Ioannidis took over. It has to be remembered that in those days the Greek government had major instruments of power on the island, first and foremost being the National Guard which is manned primarily by Greek Cypriot recruits, or draftees I forget which. But officered and commanded by people seconded from Athens from the regular Greek army. So the National Guard essentially was a Greek military arm on the island. That is indeed what the junta used to overthrow Makarios in July of '74. They also had the contingent, the LDIC under the London Zurich accords as the Turks do, but the Turks had nothing comparable to a national guard in those days. So as I recall, what happened, and this was reported by embassy Athens as well as by embassy Nicosia, the president of Greece was a former general named Gizikis who wrote Makarios a letter about things that Athens expected him to do in the interest of Hellenism and in the interest of following the dictates of the national center which is the euphemistic way that Athens described itself in those days. Athens was the national center. The phrase was the center decides and we execute. In other words we salute smartly and do whatever Athens tells us. And that was not the style of Archbishop Makarios, or indeed of many Greek Cypriots. Anyway, Makarios who was something of a high stakes gambler decided to publish the Gizikis letter, the demands, and his own reply which basically said I am an elected leader of Cypriot Hellenism and expect to be treated with more respect than you've shown me. And publishing those exchange of letters which he did in June apparently is what drove Ioannidis over the edge because the national guard launched a coup against Makarios in mid-July which was designed to kill him in the palace and seize the government. They succeeded in the second goal. They narrowly failed in the first. Makarios was able to escape through a tunnel from the presidential palace that went somewhere out back and hail a cab that took him to Paphos as I recall on the western side of the island. Took a few hours. And from there the British helicoptered him down to the sovereign base area from which he flew to London. But they did succeed in taking over the government, and the ministers of Makarios' regime were very quickly replaced with right wing types, EOKA-B types frankly most of whom I had never heard of and I think most of the people in the embassy had never heard of. They were essentially apolitical businessmen of some kind, not terribly successful, but reputable. But of a right wing persuasion considered to be sufficiently nationalist to be installed in those jobs. And the head of it all was of course the infamous Nikos Sampson who had made his bones by killing Turkish Cypriots and

Greek officers and civilians during the EOKA period and the early crises of the early '60s on the island.

Q: Killed some British too I think.

WILLIAMS: He did. He assassinated (British servicemen) and I think he was caught and supposed to hang, and then it all ended when independence came. He was a thug and a murderer, but for whatever reason, one of the great mistakes that Greece ever made, they installed Sampson as the president. This was the red flag that brought the Turks in. In that brief period between the coup and the Turkish invasion or peace operation as Ankara likes to call it, Mike Austrian and I did our best to remeet some of our contacts at the foreign ministry who were on the America desk and Costa Spilavakes was one and there were a couple of others. We went by the foreign ministry just to see if they were alive because they were doing a horrible amount of shooting downtown. I remember driving to the foreign ministry over a road that was literally covered with casings of bullets that had been fired by I guess the National Guard or the defenders, Greek Cypriot defenders against the national guard a day or two before. And we were very happy to find our contacts alive and well in the foreign ministry. Doing nothing because they didn't know what their status was, but they were there and so we saw them. We were later chastised by Lindsay for that, he was the DCM at the time, for doing something that conveyed recognition of the regime that we had not yet decided to recognize. That had not been our thought when we went to see these folks, so we were never chastised by Washington and the recognition issue was mooted by the Turkish invasion and the collapse of the junta installed government of Sampson.

Q: Wasn't there some contact either by the chargé or maybe by you with the foreign minister in this five day period or so, who I think was the brother of ambassador of Nicos Dimitriou.

WILLIAMS: Yeah, it was Dimis Dimitriou. I think Rodger Davies had become ambassador just a few days earlier. He had arrived I think in early July just in time for the July Fourth reception at that old building we used to use. We had a lovely garden reception for him on July Fourth. But he had just arrived, just off the plane. And the foreign minister was Dimis Dimitriou, the brother of the ambassador in Washington, and I forget if he called Ambassador Davies or Davies called him, but there was a contact. A pragmatic one. I don't recall what the agenda was. It may have involved the issue of recognition. I just don't remember.

Q: But we certainly didn't consider that it was in fact recognition at all.

WILLIAMS: No. Nor did Mike and I consider that calling on people who had been in a shot up building raised the recognition issue. It was not really on our radar. One that I did on my own that I was never reprimanded for or praised for either, I tried to meet some of these new ministers and their deputies in the week of calm. And surprisingly enough I was able to talk to several of them. They were uniformly men of course. Modest business backgrounds. Had some education. All violent opponents of Makarios. Not people you would call crazies, but they certainly weren't people you would call ministers either. They just were put in these jobs by the National Guard or the EOKA-B gang on the island. And they all disappeared as far as I know without prejudice after the violence that followed, maybe they fled the island because they certainly didn't have much future on the Greek Cypriot side after all that happened.

Q: You mentioned you had had some contact with Sampson during the period that the embassy was curious about EOKA-B. Did you see him in the subsequent period, or...?

WILLIAMS: No, after the Greek coup I never saw Sampson again. Earlier, I used to call on him fairly regularly. He was at the time the publisher of Mahi which was the Fox journalism if you will of Greek Cyprus at the time. It wasn't the most right wing, but it was sensationalist. He was one of my regular contacts, just as Nikos Koschish put out Agon, another right wing paper. There were lots of right wing papers on the island, all of which more or less opposed Makarios' policy. Makarios as a person, but not necessarily all of his policies. Sampson would usually be sitting at a huge desk when you went into his office with shelves that were lined with newspapers and magazines and books. I doubt he'd read many of them. But quite often, and I'm not joking, he would be looking at the centerfold of a Playboy magazine when you came in. I don't know if this was for my benefit as an American diplomat, or if that was his standard reading material. But he was totally unembarrassed about it, put it to the side, and then would talk rather freely about how he saw the political development within the Greek Cypriot community, or within Cyprus. All my contacts with Sampson were before the coup of July of '74 and none of them discussed the possibility of a coup nor of his involvement in it, so I was somewhat surprised when he was installed in that job. Even in the privacy of his office his hatred of Turkish Cypriots and his extreme Greek nationalism was quite manifest as it was in his speeches on the floor of the house which I used to listen to. Interestingly about Sampson is he had no formal education, poor fellow died a couple years ago, and his pronunciation of Greek would often be corrected by other Greeks in the house chamber, Savavache who would correct his emphasis or his choice of wording. So their contempt for his education was fairly clear.

Q: It was probably good Greek language practice for you to go to the debates and hear that discussion and recognize different dialects.

WILLIAMS: It was eye opening and totally uncompromising. The Greek Cypriots when they're speaking Greek for the record, as on the floor of the House, used in those days a fairly florid form of the language. Katharevousa only begins to capture what it was. It was tough going for somebody who'd had only 10 months at that point of training and had been on the island for about a year. You could eventually pick it up, but it was by no means simple, as easy to follow as the Greek that's now used in Greece. I think too in Cyprus, although I don't know how the minutes of the house were recorded.

Q: To what extent were you following, this is the period well before the coup in July. To what extent were you following the dialogue that was taking place between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities?

WILLIAMS: Very closely. Both Mike and I followed that as did the embassy. We would meet regularly with the UN (United Nations) Secretary General's special representative that was Osorio Tafafl for a long while and then it was somebody else. Usually Latin American diplomats with various supporting cast in the UN office and we would talk with the interlocutors Grays and Degtosh were their deputies, fairly regularly. All of us did. That was one of the main substantive focuses of the embassy's efforts in those years. The dialogue, what it was doing, when it would

resume, why it would quit, getting the dialogue going, discussing the content of it was a big part of what we did.

Q: Did you have the sense that they had made considerable progress in the period shortly before the coup, or do you remember much about the status at that point?

WILLIAMS: I don't remember the details, but my sense is they had made considerable progress on a lot of the technical issues of government before the coup. It appeared that before my arrival on the island they had covered a lot of the ground in a very productive way. A lot of issues involving local government, the villages, labors, and the responses the federal government had been I thought concluded successfully.

Q: One of the issues about this period when you were there that comes up occasionally is whether the United States had clear warning of the plotting that was going on to stage a coup d'etat and whether we chose perhaps not to do anything about it. And I've heard the suggestion fairly recently that the embassy in Athens didn't want to act on these warnings for various reasons including crying wolf too often. There had been a lot of talk in the air for a long period of time why at that time say in June or early July of '74 it didn't seem to them that much more imminent than any other time. And that the embassy in Nicosia was kind of comfortable with that posture at least in part because there was a feeling that if there was going to be a coup the most logical time I think was projected to be September of '74 when there would be a normal rotation of the Greek officers of the Cyprus national guard and that if that would be kind of a time when they could perhaps kick the old cadre and bring new people at the same time and they would have a considerably greater strength. Do you remember anything about all of that that makes any sense particularly?

WILLIAMS: I'm sure speculation of something like the troop rotation period was in our reporting both with the guard on the Turkish side which also rotated troops as well as with the Greek side. It's quite possible, although I don't remember it now, that we did predict that September would be a more likely time for a coup because of the rotation of the Greek contingent of that time. But all of what was happening in early '74 came against the background of several years of violence and sometimes alarmist reporting by embassy Nicosia about what had happened, what EOKA-B had done, what Grivas had done. It may well be that the cumulative effect of that was to make it more difficult for the policy makers to see what was really changing, what had really changed with the departure of Papadopoulos and the advent of Ioannidis. I don't recall a significant ratcheting up of the violence. I can't recall the episodes post-November of '73, but in retrospect it's very clear that there was a shift to a harder line in Athens and therefore on the part of the National Guard and the EOKA-B on the island after Ioannidis took over. I can't say for sure whether we yelled wolf too much or not. I do know there was some ominous comments. Every time you sent one of these cables in that reported a police station or a mailbox had been blown up you'd have a final paragraph as a comment, this is a typical reporting officer's trick, and there were only so many comments you can make on this type of stuff. After a period of time the reader's eyes begin to glaze over. I think for a while that if you look at the chron files of Nicosia, go into the office of southern European affairs and took at the chron files of Nicosia versus the chron files of Athens, Nicosia's chron files were surprisingly larger in some respects in that period because of all this incidental reporting which

in retrospect may not have contributed too much to the overall understanding in Washington of what was going on in the island, this chaff. I know there was a strong sense that our Ambassador Tasca in Athens was reluctant to get involved more with General Ioannidis than he already did, partly because of Ioannidis' position. He was in the background with his formal title of chief of military intelligence and Tasca was perhaps apocryphally saying I don't deal with cops, but for whatever reason there was this reluctance. And there was no smoking gun that I know of, or heard about, suggesting a coup was imminent until it really happened. We were so used to this constant peppering of violence by EOKA-B and so we didn't anticipate something big was coming until it really happened. I don't recall anybody predicting that in a timely way.

Q: You don't remember embassy Nicosia pressing hard in that particular period that something needed to be done?

WILLIAMS: I'm sure we pressed. I can't remember the specifics but I'm sure we pressed and when Rodger got there we probably continued pressing to have Washington lean harder on Greece to knock it off, because as far as we were concerned the only way to turn off greater violence was to persuade the junta in Athens to step down or step back. There was nothing we could do to Makarios that would reduce the scenario of great violence on the island. We certainly weren't going to counsel him to capitulate to what the junta was asking, and he didn't have in his own power the capability to turn it off. Athens did. And we always felt that, and I know we made recommendations, there was one notable cable that went out soon after Rodger got there making this comment that we really need to get Athens to step back or call off the dogs or tone it down, words to that effect. We didn't know what we were asking for concretely except that the tensions were getting a little higher. This was after the publication by Makarios of those letters which I remember using the phrase Makarios was challenging the self-esteem of Gizikis and by extension of Ioannidis by slapping them in the face by the publication of these letters. And to do that to assail the honor of these people that way, especially military people, is high stakes poker.

Q: And to do it publicly.

WILLIAMS: Yeah. That was gratuitous. But that was Makarios. He felt very strongly and...

Q: Did you meet with Makarios yourself?

WILLIAMS: Yes. Not privately of course. I only met him with a larger group twice. Once was when Rodger Davies presented credentials. I was introduced to him and I said in my best Katharevousa Greek, "Calimera makadiotata," which means good day your beatitude. And he'd been chatting in English with the American staff up till then. Rodger introduced us seriatim and I was about the fifth or sixth and he brightened and smiled and said, "Calimerasas". I saw him one other time at a ladies' function as I recall where I was just there as an observer. My wife was with a ladies' group and they were doing something and he was going down and talking to the ladies. He liked ladies as is well known, and he was as well known truly charismatic. There was something about his personality; he had the eyes, just the smarts that made him quite special.

Q: There were certainly times during the 1960s particularly where American officials were a little tired of Makarios and thought he was going to be the Cuba of the Mediterranean and so on.

At the time, the first year you were there, the embassy got along well with him and whatever attitude changed somewhat would you say? That had existed previously.

WILLIAMS: I never saw any of that attitude at the embassy in Nicosia. I remember it though, as I said earlier, the phrase Red Mack. He was perceived by some quarters as the Castro of the Mediterranean who dallied with socialists and third world types and Bandung countries and all that. And all of that's true, but he was also a genuine nationalist and leader of his people and took that role very, very seriously. I think the proposals that were made by us in the sixties to solve the Cyprus crisis, one of them involved moving the Greek Cypriots to the island of Chios or Samos as I recall. Totally misunderstood the nature of Hellenism and of Cypriot Hellenism in particular. There's just no way you can uproot a people that's been there millennia and make them feel happy. It was a total nonstarter. We had good will. We wanted to solve the problem as we saw which was a problem between our two NATO allies to keep them from going at each other's throats, but some of those proposals in retrospect were not fully baked. I was not there when Popper was there, but I read the chron file including the notice with what I know of McCloskey who was there off and on for his eight month tenure, with Lindsay when he was chargé, with Rodger Davies and his very brief tenure, the relations with Makarios and his government were very cordial. There was no badmouthing of the archbishop, will somebody rid me of this priest. There was none of that stuff in the country team or anywhere else. Perhaps that spirit had burned itself out.

Q: What of the themes of EOKA-B as it had been of EOKA in the fifties was of course enosis, the union of Cyprus with Greece. To what extent was that generally still supported in the Greek Cypriot political establishment that you had contact with?

WILLIAMS: Again, pre-July '74 there was profound support among many Greek Cypriots for enosis. It went far beyond the graffiti. When I was there all the walls were whitewashed and all the whitewash was defaced with usually blue slogans saying "Enosisi Monelisis", enosis the only solution. All these enosis Greek Cyprus slogans were all over. Now a small group of people could do that and no doubt did. But most of the Greek Cypriots that I talked to, former supreme court justice Fasiliades, Nikos Sampson, Cochis, even Clerides, if you asked them what they really wanted they would all say their first choice is enosis. And the realism would come when you'd say well what's really feasible here, and people like Clerides would say in those days, well we couldn't get it in London or Zurich and even though that's still our desire, this is also the public line of Makarios, we have to make this solution work. The London-Zurich solution which created the independence of the Republic of Cyprus. The answer to that from the right, and it was deeply felt, was that's a corrupt solution, unacceptable, a disgrace to Hellenism, and wrong. And the church was profoundly of that view, unanimously almost as far as I know it was unanimous. And almost all the center and right wing politicians I dealt with. AKEL the communist party was happy with the solution as it was. It was definitely not enosis in its rhetoric back then, but nobody, even AKEL as I recall in those days, would oppose enosis head on. It was an icon, a sacred thing for which people had sacrificed blood and treasure very recently. It was just something you didn't attack. But the commitment to it emotionally was real and profound, I thought. And the fear of it by the Turkish Cypriots was no less real and profound.

Q: Why don't we stop here Jim and pick up and finish more on Cyprus the next time.

We were in the middle of your assignment as political officer in Nicosia. You had had Greek language training before going to Cyprus, and that was a period from '73 to '75, and I think about the part we left off was the coup that took place against Archbishop Makarios on the 15th of July, 1974, a little over 30 years ago. So do you want to pick up from there?

WILLIAMS: As I recall it was early on a Monday morning when we had gathered for our daily staff meeting to go over what the local press was saying about us, about each other, about the Cyprus problem. We heard loud noises coming from the direction of the presidential palace downtown which was across the road from the foreign ministry. We quickly concluded things were seriously amiss down there and shortly had confirmation that a coup by the National Guard was underway. Needless to say we terminated our staff meeting and sent the first of several immediate messages back to Washington alerting the department and others to the fact that a coup was underway. We had followed for some time, and reported on, the growing tensions between the archbishop, President Makarios, and the Greek junta in Athens. It was essentially a civil war that started within the Greek community, within the community of Hellenism I should say between the demands of the Greek junta and the unwillingness of the democratically elected leader of the Cypriot people to knuckle under to the increasing demands from Athens. We had reported rather grimly the week before when Makarios sent his letter to President Phaedon Gizikis of Greece and essentially threw down the gauntlet saying he was a democratically elected of a historic people on the island of Cyprus and was not going to be treated like a satrap of a junta. Publishing that letter added insult to injury and we predicted at the time that would lead to further escalation of the already tense relations between Athens and Nicosia. Indeed it did.

Q: How much evidence did you have right away of the Greek army officers on the island of Cyprus involved with this, in support of this coup?

WILLIAMS: At the time, and to some extent that may still apply today, but certainly at that time, the national guard was officered entirely by officers sent from Athens and the commandant was seconded from the Greek army. So it was inconceivable that any significant unit of the National Guard could do anything, certainly like attacking the presidential palace, without the active leadership of the Greek officers from Athens. So once we concluded that the National Guard was involved in the attack on the presidential palace it was quite clear that this was the Athens junta at work through its officer corps on the island. As I recall the Greek brigade was also involved, the one that was stationed in under the London-Zurich agreements. I think the radio changed hands fairly quickly that morning, but within a few hours we had confirmation on the radio that the National Guard had liberated the island from Archbishop Makarios. A claim that was wildly inflated.

Q: There was a man named Nikos Sampson who I think you mentioned before who turned out to be the nominal leader of the coup makers. Did that become evident right away?

WILLIAMS: I think it was not until that evening, and my memory on the hours is a bit fuzzy, but I think it was that evening, maybe even the next morning that Sampson was installed on Cyprus in front of Cyprus TV cameras as the president of Cyprus. I had known Sampson in the course of my political reporting duties in the first year that I was on the island. He was at the time a

publisher of a rather sensationalist rag called *Mahi* which in Greek means “The Battle”. He had been a hero of the EOKA struggle who had distinguished himself by shooting British military and civilians in the back as I recall, and by also doing things against Turkish Cypriots. So he was a proven thug with a violent past, no particular education, I don’t know where his money came from to buy *Mahi*, but it didn’t take much to buy a newspaper on Cyprus in those days. But because of his reputation as a fierce Greek Cypriot nationalist, leader of the EOKA movement and someone who had boasted of what he had done against Turkish Cypriots in those earlier struggles installing Nikos Sampson as the president of Cyprus was very much like waving a red flag in front of the Turkish bull.

Q: And what happened to Archbishop Makarios in this initial period, and to what extent did you and the embassy have contact with him?

WILLIAMS: Well we had no contact with the archbishop that week, those first days I should say. Ambassador Davies had seen the archbishop I believe in the preceding week. He had only recently presented his credentials and I don’t think he had more than one other meeting with the archbishop before the coup occurred on 15 July. What happened to the archbishop was he was a workaholic as always. He had come down from his mountain retreat in the Troodos and was hard at work in the presidential palace that morning. I think he was receiving a delegation of boy scouts or scouts of some kind, and when the shooting started he hustled them out of the palace and they were able to get out unscathed. Then as the palace took heavier and heavier fire he was able to doff some of his garments of office and walk out of the palace through a trench in the back that got him and an aide off the property. They hailed a cab and were taken to Paphos as I recall, which then was only about three hours drive from Nicosia. And in Paphos they somehow established contact with the British who flew the archbishop and his companion or companions down to Akrotiri I guess where he was safe.

Q: Now you mentioned the Turkish Cypriots in terms of their reaction to what was transpiring. Did you have contact with them, the embassy did, or what were they doing?

WILLIAMS: The Turkish Cypriots were not involved, at least directly, in the ongoing struggle within the ranks of Cypriot Hellenism as we called it as between the Greek junta and Archbishop Makarios and the Greek Cypriot community. We had very good contacts and coverage through Mike Austrian my colleague who was the Turkish language officer. Very active, very well-connected. I had a few contacts, but I was the Greek language officer and pretty busy on the Greek side. Mike was in touch through his embassy locals who worked in the office out of northern Nicosia. By crossing the green line himself several times in those first days he was able to stay in touch with the Turkish Cypriots just to ascertain what they were doing, what their reaction was. Essentially they were hunkering down, fearing the worst because it was a very violent struggle with artillery, tracer bullets, this and that. But they were not taking part in the fighting, nor were they, in Nicosia at least, the target of any Greek or Greek Cypriot hostilities as far as I recall.

Q: You mentioned you were very busy on the Greek side. What sorts of things were you doing in terms of contacts? Were you in touch with Sampson and his people, or dealing with the Makarios government? What could you do?

WILLIAMS: When Makarios fled, first of all the junta tried to kill him, there was no question they tried to kill him. The presidential palace was reduced to a flaming ruin within a few hours of the frontal assault by the forces of the national guard. But unfortunately, for the junta at least, it was not a complete assault because they left the back escape hatch open and Makarios was able to escape. We really had no contact with him.

Q: Do you think that was intentional that they allowed him to get out?

WILLIAMS: I've heard that speculation. I've never believed it. I think it would have been much easier to kill him because they hated him so much. And as it was, if they had let him go deliberately they should have known they were going to create a martyr situation for themselves and a rallying point against them which is what happened.

Q: So it may have been a matter of inefficiency, just not total coverage?

WILLIAMS: I think it was inefficiency. He was quick, he was very agile, and he was very lucky. He had more than nine lives I think. Makarios had tremendous luck and by chance found a cab that was willing to take him to Paphos as he came out of the escape hatch behind the palace. I have to say I never saw that trench or that escape hatch. I didn't even know it was there because that was not something of which I would have been aware normally. But obviously he did. So as I say I think the junta definitely tried to kill him. Once Makarios was gone, the junta initially announced over the radio that he was dead, "Makarios ina necrosa," I remember that rhythmic announcement every hour on the hour for a day and a half or so, until it was conclusively proven by his own broadcast either from Paphos or Akrotiri, it must have been from Paphos, that he was not dead. And then they had to retract that statement, but they had then deposed his government. The ministers stopped coming to the office, but the bureaucracy stayed in place. So essentially my contacts in the foreign office and elsewhere remained. Some of them went to work and I saw some of them. Just as a humorous aside I should say the question of recognition of this Sampson government didn't really arise immediately from Washington. It was a very short-lived government in any case. I don't know what Washington was doing, but for us, for me and for Mike Austrian, my colleague, the issue was we had a bunch of contacts below the political level which had fled; the contacts were still in place, so why not see them. And Mike and I went down to see a colleague of ours in the foreign ministry, Costas Pilovakios who had been the regular career diplomat in charge of the so-called Cyprus problem in dealing with western diplomats. We simply went down to see Costas and I remember walking over the thousands and thousands of shell casings that the national guard had expended in shooting its way through the gates of the presidential palace and around the foreign ministry which had been heavily fortified by Makarios defenders. In any case, walking over with our shell casings, seeing the pock marks in the foreign ministry building, I think the presidential palace was still smoldering, but Costas Pilovakios was there in his office sipping coffee and looking very normal. So we went in for a chat just to tell him we were glad he was ok, to discuss what had happened from his perspective. Then we went back and we were roughly chastised by the deputy chief of mission, Lindsay Grant, who thought we had committed a grievous sin of implicitly conveying recognition of the new government by talking to Costas. To be fair, Lindsay had a point; he was a China hand with a deep background in the nuances of recognition and non-recognition policy. And we had received no authorization

from the embassy or Lindsay or certainly not from Washington to talk to Costas. But we took the chastisement to heart and did not see Costas again until as I recall the Sampson government was deposed, or quit.

Q: Did the embassy either Ambassador Davies or the DCM Lindsay Grant or you or Mike Austrian have contact with the new ministers? The Sampson appointed cabinet?

WILLIAMS: The ministers were announced very quickly after Sampson was installed in that ceremony on TV over which one of the defrocked bishops had presided, Bishop Chitian I believe. That's another story. The ministers were essentially unknown figures to us. We had no contact with them, certainly not at the political level. Many of them came out of the EOKA two movement which had been the sympathizers of the EOKA two movement. Many of them were businessmen. I don't recall they'd ever been to a July Fourth party or any other large function. And again in the absence of instructions or any counter-instructions, I set about to meet some of these folks in the next few days by calling on them in their office. Their offices were basically their private sector offices. They hadn't moved into the ministries yet. They hadn't taken charge of anything although they had been announced. As I say they seemed to be mainly from the private sector, businessmen of some kind. Fierce nationalists, Greek nationalists. EOKA enosis types. Hated Makarios. I'm not sure that their ties with Sampson were that close, but like him they had been installed by the junta for reasons that I never got into. So as far as I know the only contact, aside from possible contacts the agency might have had with its considerable assets in the south and the Greek Cypriot community, the only contact was the so-called ministers of the short lived Sampson government was me, essentially through courtesy calls on them in their office in the latter days of the week of July 15th.

Q: One of the ministers was as I recall the brother of the Cyprus ambassador to the United States.

WILLIAMS: Dimitriou. Let me amend what I said. He was in touch with his brother; it was Nicos Dimitriou and Dimis Dimitriou. I think Dimis was the minister wasn't he?

Q: Yes, and Nicos was the ambassador in Washington.

WILLIAMS: And through his brother, Dimis established contact with various levels in the State Department and I also think he talked directly with Ambassador Davies as the foreign minister. We had known Dimis Dimitriou. I had not, but he had been on our A-list I guess because of his status as a member of the Dimitriou family and a businessman. We were in touch with him. But the other ministers, at least the ones I met, have been ciphers before.

Q: Did you have any particular impressions of the ones that you called on?

WILLIAMS: No, just that they were professionals, young, strong nationalists. I had no sense of any great managerial ability or any sense of being members of a team. They had just been put into this job or had assumed this job after the coup and frankly seemed a little bit at loss how to make the best of it. Because as I say I did not call on any of them in the government offices but rather in their homes or at their private offices.

Q: When you say EOKA two is that the same thing as EOKA-B?

WILLIAMS: It is EOKA-B and I misspoke. It's EOKA-Beta, the second generation of the EOKA movement that Grivas founded and then...

Q: Do you want to say anything more about the role of the church in all of this, particularly in this period? Makarios was gone; he was the leader of the Church of Cyprus as well as the president of Cyprus.

WILLIAMS: He was the elected leader, the ethnarch of the Church of Cyprus, elected back in 1950 or '51 as I recall, and then subsequently elected several times to be president of the new Republic of Cyprus. A democratic sanctioned leader, definitely charismatic, highly intelligent, extremely lucky, sometimes a bit too clever perhaps. But he definitely controlled the Church of Cyprus. When I came to Cyprus in 1973, the church was in the middle of a schism. A number of the more conservative bishops had either been suborned by or become true believers in the role of Athens as the leader of Hellenism and they were trying to topple Makarios from his position as leader of the church. They convened a synod which under the rules of the Greek Orthodox Church they were able to do, and defrocked Makarios. This happened in the first half of '73 as I recall, before I got there. Makarios, not to be outdone, convened his own synod under the same rules and defrocked the three archbishops. These were Bishop Anthemos of Kition, Bishop Kyprianos of Kyrenia, and Bishop Gennadios of Paphos. Essentially he outmaneuvered these guys using their own rules, which were his rules. He was a member of the same church, and he had the better of it. It was quite a test of my FSI taught Greek to go through essentially ecclesiastical legalese and these documents where one side excommunicated the other. It was very clear, but I needed a lot of help to get through the translation. But the Greek Cypriot Orthodox church was clearly in the hands of Makarios after this happened. These three defrocked bishops remained defrocked, they had some local following, but no significant following among the archimandrites and abbots and others who led the church. Makarios ran the church as he ran the government, very effectively, and tolerated no opposition, certainly not opposition from leaders who were actually doing the work of the junta in Athens. So I don't recall what those defrocked bishops said if anything at the time of the coup. Certainly they would have had to welcome it since this was the national center by their lights acting against an archbishop whom they had tried to defrock. And I don't recall anything that the leaders of the Greek Cypriot Orthodox Church said in support of Makarios, but probably there were expressions from the pulpit and elsewhere since he had tremendous support among the Greek Cypriot people.

Q: Want to say anything at this point in this coup period from July 15th? Succeeding few days, about the American community, about your families, about the embassy, to the extent you were involved with things related to that?

WILLIAMS: Naturally we were all concerned because for several days in Nicosia and elsewhere on the island there was active fighting. We used to watch the tracer bullets at night from the balcony of our apartment which was just a few blocks from the embassy. We certainly took precautions by advising people to stay inside, curtail their outside activities, and just to keep their

heads down. I think we only had one casualty in the American community and that was accidental, where a piece of shrapnel from one of those missiles I guess wounded a young girl in the leg or the chest. It was not a life-threatening injury, but it was a serious one, and she was taken care of in the Nicosia hospital and then sent down to Akrotiri where the British had better facilities and also a more secure location. We were of course concerned for our families, but in the time before the Turkish intervention I don't recall that any of the families left the island although we certainly realized that was a real prospect that grew more imminent each day.

Q: The Turkish invasion took place on the 20th of July but presumably in the days before that there was fear that that was going to happen. Well-founded fear. Do you want to talk anything about that as far as you were involved? I know the State Department was doing various things, but I don't know to what extent you were involved on the island.

WILLIAMS: We were increasingly concerned with the installation of Sampson as the president of Cyprus by the Athens junta through the idea that the Turkish government would have to respond militarily to what it viewed as such a provocation. I think we said that in a number of cables back to Washington trying to lay it out that we had to really pull out all the stops to try to stop the Turkish invasion from happening. Joe Sisco was engaged actively in trying to do that as was the Secretary of State. Tom Boyatt said at one point, he may have said it to me in fact in the years nearly after this, that the embassy had not made a strong enough case in Washington with its cables to help him fight the fight in Washington. And he may be right. I can't recall what those cables said.

Q: Was that before the coup, or between the coup and the invasion?

WILLIAMS: No, I think it was the whole thing but it was also before the coup and after the coup before the invasion and then before the second phase too. I think Tom felt, and he was the very embattled and very diligent country director of Cyprus at the time, he just felt he had not gotten at critical times enough ammunition from the embassy. And I respect his point of view. I can't say whether it was right or wrong because I didn't have the Washington perspective at the time. We were trying to keep tabs on a lot of things. We talked about the concern for the families, the growing indications of a Turkish invasion, preparations by the junta and its national guard to defend against that invasion, and we wanted to make sure that Americans were hunkered down and not caught in the middle.

Q: To what extent in those few days between the coup and the invasion were there incidents of violence by Greek Cypriots directed at Turkish Cypriots? And to what extent did you know about that at the time?

WILLIAMS: There were a lot of rumors going around as always happens in Cyprus and the media and the press on both sides in both communities tended to fan those flames of depredations by the Greek Cypriots and Greeks against the Turkish Cypriot side and to some extent vice versa. I do not recall hearing of a specific case during that week. I do recall hearing after all this happened in the summer of '74 that the National Guard units outside of Nicosia had encircled several Turkish Cypriot enclaves. At the time, of course, the Turkish Cypriots were not concentrated in the northern part of the island as they are now. They were scattered in enclaves

all over the island in the large cities such as Famagusta, Morphou, Paphos, Nicosia, Larnaca and so forth. Some of those had enclaves as they were called had been hotbeds of resistance by the Turkish fighters, the TMT and other groups, during the earlier phases of the Cyprus struggle. The Cyprus problem. And some of those areas were, according to several reports I heard, from pretty good sources, encircled by the National Guard in that first week. That would have been a prudential step to take by any armed force under the circumstances, even though the Turkish Cypriots had not been involved in the coup. Given the past history on the island of military fighting between the two communities that would have been a prudential step to take. Whether or not the National Guard went further than that, I do not know. I never heard of such a case.

Q: And you don't recall knowing about it during that period from the fifteenth of July till the twentieth.

WILLIAMS: Not at all. My attention was elsewhere. I don't recall that Mike Austrian who covered that community as well as anybody on the island, reported it. I just don't remember.

Q: Anything else you want to recall about that period of the coup as opposed to the Turkish invasion? Those five days or so, week.

WILLIAMS: Well, it was a wild and I have to say exciting time. As a young diplomat I had never been involved in a coup before, or at least been spectator of a coup. I certainly wasn't involved in it. And I found reporting on it and moving around as we were able to do quite freely in Nicosia to be exhilarating. In retrospect some of that movement was probably a little foolhardy. It certainly was riskier than at the time I was willing to accept. But it was an exhilarating time and I enjoyed every minute of it.

Q: The United Nations peacekeeping force was on the island, I'm wondering to what extent you had contact with them, you and representatives, other diplomats, or was that pretty much done by the ambassador and DCM?

WILLIAMS: Well we all did. UNFICYP as it was called, the UN forces in Cyprus, was blanketed by the embassies of America, Britain, a few others as well. I had regular contacts in the UNFICYP civilian side. Our defense attaché knew their military side. The ambassador and DCM knew the special representative of the secretary general who at the time I think was Osorio Tafall. It may have been somebody else. But one of the representatives was in contact with our ambassador. But UNFICYP had no mandate to intervene in this kind of situation, and studiously and successfully tried to avoid having its units which were deployed all over the island get involved in any of the fighting.

Q: Were you involved to any considerable extent with the British?

WILLIAMS: I had regular contacts with the British high commission, yes, not the SPAs or others. From the first day I got there it was clear to me and I'd been so advised by others that the British high commission knew more about what was going on in the island than probably anybody. My counterpart initially was David Beattie who went on to a very distinguished career in the British foreign service. He had been a classicist at Oxford or Cambridge, understood the

Greeks, the Greek Cypriots, the British role in Cyprus, and was a wonderful source of information and support for me as I was getting my legs on the ground that first year. I also was a personal and professional colleague with Derek Day who also had a very distinguished career. Derek was the deputy high commissioner of the British high commission. So we were in close touch with them as to what was going on, what might happen, what we could do to head off a Turkish military response to the Greek coup of July 15th.

Q: Well that response came on the 20th of July, five days or so later. What do you remember about that from your perspective?

WILLIAMS: I remember it vividly. At the time, I was living and working in my office which was part of the complex that also contained the ambassador's residence. Our families had not yet been evacuated, my family, my wife Ann was pregnant at the time and threatening to miscarry. She was confined to bed at home. I was in constant touch with my family by phone, by walkie talkie and by walking down to see them. But most of my waking time and all of my sleeping time I spent those last few days in my office. And around 4:30 that morning of July 20, before first light, I got a call from Derek Day, the British deputy high commissioner who told me that Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit had just informed the British as co-guarantors of the London-Zurich Accords that the Turkish government was going to send a military force to Cyprus to undo what the Greek junta had done on July 15. It was quite clear and Derek's message did not require elaboration. The Turks were on the way is what it said. And when first light came about thirty minutes later the planes started coming overhead, we saw paratroops dropping, we heard antiaircraft fire, and we knew that the invasion was underway. We got our telegram message out soon after that phone call. Of course I informed the ambassador. We stayed of course in very close touch with the British embassy by phone because it was not safe to go out while the fighting was going on. I remember seeing all those parachutes coming down; it was like watching butterflies descend. Quite surreal. I'd never seen something like that before. Once in a while you'd see a parachute collapse and its occupant fall like a stone to the ground and you knew what had happened, but again it was just as if I was detached from it, watching it on a large, wide-angle screen.

Q: Was that particularly happening on the north side of Nicosia, the Turkish border?

WILLIAMS: The Turkish enclave of Nicosia was in the north and it sort of went up like a triangle toward the Kyrenia range, extended into the Kyrenia range as I recall, blocking the then only road over the Kyrenia range. One of the first concerns of the Turkish military was to strengthen the Turkish Cypriot presence, military capability in that enclave. So they paradropped a number of folks in while they were in the process of establishing a beach head on the northern shore at Kyrenia which was sort of due north from Nicosia. Needless to say, when that happened the fighting started early that morning, went on for several days. We had a number of people at our FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service) station with their families who were caught smack dab in the middle on the north coast, west of Kyrenia as I recall. They were either at Karavas in their houses up on the beach in their beach houses. By the grace of God they all survived. Scared to death in many cases, especially the children. We were able to get them out during one of the ceasefires or lulls in fighting under UN convoy in the next few days. But it was a harrowing time for them and for those of us who knew about them in Nicosia.

Q: They were taken from Karavas to Nicosia or to an airport to fly out or how did...?

WILLIAMS: I don't recall how they immediately went. We got them down first to Nicosia and made sure they were alright and put them in some kind of housing. Of course we had plenty of room for them in various houses. I think most of them were evacuated as soon as it was practical to do so. Probably from Akrotiri.

Q: Why don't we talk for a minute just about the evacuation. Your family went then too. How soon after July 20th was that possible?

WILLIAMS: The fighting essentially was over in the north about the 23rd or 24th as I recall. Since we had profound reasons to believe that was simply a lull, that it would break out again any time, we decided to conduct a general evacuation. I think it was ordered from Washington, I don't recall specifically. There were Americans all over the island, but essentially most of them were in Nicosia. By this point, late that first week of the invasion, we had gathered many of them in Nicosia from the northern shore. There were retired Americans up there. Most of the Americans up north were not hurt as I recall, just scared out of their wits and we got them all down to Nicosia. At the same time we gathered Americans from elsewhere, archaeologists who were working in Kyrenia or elsewhere, their families. And we organized what I would describe in a letter to Dana Davies as a wagon train of cars and various vehicles that gathered at the American embassy on the 24th, 25th I don't remember exactly, of July. With UN escort the convoy drove down on the old road to Akrotiri from which they were going to be taken off to the waiting U.S. ships offshore and evacuated. That went very smoothly. As I say the fighting had stopped at least over Nicosia by this point. The Americans were not harassed; the Greek Cypriots still reeling from the shock of what had happened had not focused on the Americans or the foreigners. Primarily Americans, but also some other foreigners were in that convoy. But the Greek Cypriots were benign or indifferent. They had their own concerns. Many evacuees said they spent a miserable night on a sandfly-infested beach in Akrotiri before they got on the offshore vessel, but that was a small price to pay. My wife and son did not evacuate because of Ann's medical condition. As I said earlier she was about to miscarry, her gynecologist or obstetrician made the case quite convincingly that she was certainly going to miscarry if she was subjected to the rigors of a rough trip down to Akrotiri and staying on the beach. So with great reluctance Ambassador Davies agreed that Ann and Ben could stay behind, but on condition that they move into the residence where his staff could better take care of them. He just did not want to have them staying in the house we had after the evacuation occurred.

Q: The ambassador's residence then and later was essentially an apartment above the offices, but above the chancery, in the compound.

WILLIAMS: Within the compound, within the secure perimeter. Ann and Ben, who was four at the time, moved in. They had a nice little guest room in the residence. I was able to go see them every so often because I could walk up the stairs or take the elevator up. The elevator was kind of cranky, sometimes it worked, sometimes it didn't. I was young and able to take the stairs pretty quickly, it was about a five floor walkup as I recall. It was a big adventure for Ben. He was a four year old and he brought his bow and arrow with him and he was shooting at the

planes that flew over, and for him it was a great adventure. Ann was confined to bed largely because of her medical condition, and was not happy about having to leave her house and her maid and all her stuff, but she recognized the wisdom of Rodger's decision and her own potential vulnerability in the house.

Q: She was essentially the only American family member that stayed, or were there a few others?

WILLIAMS: There may have been others. I think everybody else's family in the embassy at least, of the official community left by the time that convoy went south. Some may have gone before. But I think Ann and Ben were virtually the only members of that community who stayed behind after July 24.

Q: Anything else about the evacuation of the others? Were you involved with that or did the administrative officer handle it pretty much?

WILLIAMS: The others in the embassy, particularly the administrative officer, I guess that was Eddie Edwards, handled the logistics. Red Jessup the defense and army attaché handled the liaison with UNFICYP and with the Greek National Guard. Red had very good contacts throughout the military establishment of Cyprus. Turkish, Greek, Greek Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot, so forth. So others in the embassy did the liaison, did the organization. I was essentially a spectator saying goodbye to a lot of good friends whom I didn't expect to see again for a long while. Many of those folks went to Beirut which at the time was our safe haven. I guess almost all of them went to Beirut, at least initially. And then from there the expectation was that they would be able to come back to Cyprus fairly soon. That expectation did not pan out.

Q: The coup collapsed. Do you want to talk about that and how quickly that happened and to what extent you were involved with the Greek Cypriots who were involved on both sides?

WILLIAMS: The Sampson government just evaporated shortly after the Turkish invasion of July 20. I never saw again any of those civilian ministers on whom I had called the previous week. I don't think any of them, except perhaps the defense minister, had any role in defending the island against the Turkish forces that were invading. So essentially the Sampson government was a one week wonder. It came by the grace of the National Guard and Athens junta and it fell and departed just about as quickly. But the military side was another matter. That was well-organized. The National Guard, Greek officers, had fortified the northern part of the island to a fare-thee-well against the day when the Turks did come down in force. The Turks in the earlier phases of the Cypriot problem invaded somewhat with midnight landings, some overflights, some napalm in the early '60s and '64 I think. But the Greek Cypriots, and for that matter Athens knew that if the problem went on there was a high likelihood that the Turks would come in force. Against that contingency they had pillboxes well dug in and they were fierce fighters and they fought very well even though the Sampson government had disappeared. The military chain of command held and acquitted itself I'm told very well. Certainly the fighting was fierce and protracted for several days.

Q: Essentially it was all over by about the 24th of July?

WILLIAMS: The ceasefire was arranged by UNFICYP by that point. I think both sides were fairly worn out; the Greek Cypriots had killed a lot of Turks but had given up terrain in the north. Essentially the triangle that goes out from Nicosia to the northern shore on two sides. A lot of Greek Cypriots were becoming refugees in their own country and, Makarios liked to say, were fleeing the area for good reason. And the Turks having established several beachheads needed to consolidate their gain. So both sides had an interest in stopping the fighting. UNFICYP was material I think in arranging it. I think the diplomacy that we did, the British did with the Turks and Greeks also helped facilitate that, so I don't know when the ceasefire started. Probably about the 25th or 26th of July. Fighting stopped, but the refugees continued to move out of that area that the Turkish army was in the process of occupying.

Q: Why don't you go back to something you've said a couple of times. You called on several of the civilian ministers of the Nikos Sampson government after the coup. All the ministers? Two or three? Do you remember roughly?

WILLIAMS: There were only a few days to do this. I didn't know that at the time of course, and I was not trying to do every one of them in a short period of time, but I think I called probably on six, maybe seven. Not all of them. It was a full cabinet. They replaced every one as I recall of Makarios' ministers with their own person. I don't believe I called on all of them, that was my intention certainly.

Q: After July 20th as you say the coup kind of disappeared and those ministers were gone. Makarios was also gone. Do you want to talk about what happened and your experience with that part?

WILLIAMS: Makarios had been flown off the island by the British from their sovereign base area in Akrotiri to London a day or two after he had escaped from Nicosia, gone to Paphos and then come down to Akrotiri. There was the illegal government of Nikos Sampson installed by the junta which collapsed then soon after the invasion of July 20. And then the Cypriot constitution came into play. Glafkos Clerides who was the president of the house of representatives, very distinguished politician, lawyer, member of a very well-regarded family on the island, trained at the Inns of Court in London and so forth, by virtue of the constitution became the acting president of Cyprus in the absence of the archbishop. This was standard practice whenever the archbishop went overseas on a trip which he often did. Makarios liked to travel as president. Whenever the archbishop left the island, the president of the House of Representatives which was usually Clerides in those days became automatically the acting president with full powers until the archbishop returned. And this was the mechanism by which Clerides ascended to the presidency in the week of July 20; I don't recall exactly what day it was.

Q: And did Clerides then return the ministers that had served Makarios to office?

WILLIAMS: I believe the whole Makarios cabinet came back. Clerides had one or two very close associates he brought with him into the presidency because none of us knew at the time. The only significant contact whom I recall Clerides brought into office with him this time in contrast to what he had done before was Critolovas Cristoluhu who had been for years the head of the government printing office and an old EOKA fighter as well. Young man, but he'd been

an EOKA fighter in the old days. The original EOKA. And a very, very close friend as he is today of Glafkos Clerides. Cris whom I knew well from my own contacts first year moved into the office with Clerides. They couldn't work out of the presidential palace because it was a smoking ruin, or by this time just a ruin, so they worked out of the PIO's office where Cristoluhu was.

Q: And you saw him frequently in this period?

WILLIAMS: I saw Cris or talked to him almost every day. We were on a first name basis as happens often with Greeks and Greek Cypriots. It's not hard. He was very bright, very responsive, very close to Clerides. I'd say I had as good a conduit to the presidency as anybody in the embassy, except perhaps the ambassador at that time. And the ambassador of course saw and talked with Clerides as often as he needed to, bearing in mind that Clerides had his hands full with the demands of the growing refugee population, uncertainties of a breakout, what would occur, how it could be prevented, and the effort to consolidate or to reestablish a stable system on the island.

Q: When you say a breakout you mean the Turks going beyond this initial wedge they had established from Nicosia to the north coast.

WILLIAMS: The terms of the ceasefire as negotiated by UNFICYP called for a stabilization of the perimeter that the Turkish forces had established and no material change in the military situation of either side. The hope was to prevent the Turks from upgrading their capabilities, bringing in more material, and to keep the Greek side from doing the same on its part of the island. Needless to say that hope was in vain. The Turks wanted the breathing space the ceasefire offered in large part in order to restock their supplies and to build up for the next phase of a military operation, what the military calls a breakout. And there was a constant stream of reports from the embassy, from Mike Austrian who covered it somewhat from the civilian side, from Red Jessup who covered it on the military side, from UNFICYP and others, and screams of protest from the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots about the very blatant military buildup the Turks conducted through the port of Kyrenia for the next few weeks after the ceasefire went into effect.

Q: What was the attitude toward the United States in this period? How did you feel about it in the embassy?

WILLIAMS: I don't think any of us at the time received a particular threat because of local feelings about America. There was always the view that the United States could stop Turkey if it wanted to. We had unwittingly reinforced that view by successfully stopping Turkey from invading Cyprus a number of times. We had the Johnson letter in 1964 when we told the Turkish government of Ismet Inonu if you get your ass in a crack with the Soviet Union by virtue of invading Cyprus, don't expect NATO to bail you out. It succeeded but the Turks never forgave us or forgot that letter. In 1967 we did it again when President Johnson sent Cyrus Vance to mediate between Turkey and Greece over a possible war that was going to break out because of something the national guard had done under Grivas, had done against the Turkish Cypriot villages in the south. In the early 1970s we intervened less dramatically but still effectively behind the scenes to try to calm some of the more dangerous aspects of the confrontation

between the junta and Makarios. So we had done a lot and the Greek Cypriots knew that, and the Greeks knew that and the world knew that, to keep Turkey from invading Cyprus. It was not unreasonable therefore for Greek Cypriots and Greeks to expect in 1974 we would do the same thing. The fact that we were unable to do it despite Joe Sisco's and Henry Kissinger's efforts led many Greek Cypriots, and the irresponsible element especially, to conclude we hadn't tried hard enough and really didn't want to stop the Turks this time. And so there was a growing sentiment, although in the time of which we're speaking it wasn't yet dangerous, that the Americans were ultimately responsible for this by virtue of not having used the sixth fleet to interpose between Turkey and the island therefore stopping the invasion. We saw that in the paper, we heard it occasionally, but there were no demonstrations against us. Again, the Greek Cypriots in this first period after the invasion on July 20 were so preoccupied, understandably so, with their own concerns, their families, their properties, the uncertainties, the tragedies. The deaths, the rapes, the lootings, this sort of thing, that they really had not had time to focus on us. That came later.

Q: To what extent do you think in this early period was Glafkos Clerides in touch with Rauf Denktash the Turkish Cypriot leader. They had been the main negotiators in the period before the coup. I don't know if we talked before about how close they were to reaching an agreement, to what extent were you involved following that, or was that pretty much being done by others in the embassy.

WILLIAMS: Covered more by others than by me. I was somewhat involved because you couldn't in those days serve in the embassy in Nicosia without having some role in the Cyprus problem, in reporting. But no, they had come close a number of times to agreeing on the basic elements of the settlement that would put the Humpty Dumpty together again that had been created by the London-Zurich Accords. According to Clerides' memoirs at least, most times they failed because Makarios was just unwilling to make the leap of faith, to give up that much to the Turkish Cypriot side for his own reasons which we can get into if you want. Clerides and Denktash in those days had a healthy respect for each other. I think they always did. They had been colleagues at the bar, Clerides had been a defense attorney, Denktash had been Queen's Counsel. He had prosecuted, Clerides had defended. They were on the opposite side of issues that came into the British courts, but they knew each other as professionals and though of different ethnicity they respected each other. I have seen Denktash, for example, at receptions to which we used to invite them both before the coup, in the good old days so-called, speak fluent Greek with Clerides. He grew up speaking Greek as most Turkish Cypriots of his class did. I don't recall if Clerides speaks Turkish. He certainly knows some. But they got along well, they communicated well, even when the division came after '63. I don't remember specifically, but I'm very certain that Clerides reached out to Denktash through either intermediaries or phone call, or some way, after he became acting president in July of '74. Simply to try to reestablish the contact, reassure Denktash that he was going to do his best, and enlist Denktash's help in keeping his own wild men if possible under control. I don't know the substance of what they discussed, but I'm very certain that's what happened. With what effect I don't know.

Q: Ambassador Davies was very busy during this period with Clerides?

WILLIAMS: Indeed he was. With Clerides, with organizing the evacuation of the American community, at least presiding over it, and reassuring elements of the American community. That

summer we had, by virtue of a decision that emerged from a long process in the intelligence community in Washington, civilianized a large part of the NSA operations on the island. There were two stations near Nicosia, Neomilia in the east and Yerolakkos in the north, both are now in the Turkish zone of Cyprus. Those are well-known listening spots. NSA ran them with military personnel for years. When I first got there they were naval personnel, but for whatever reason the decision had been made, fatefully as it turned out, to civilianize those operations early in the summer of 1974. So what we had was a bunch of civilians and their families show up in June, July and they really had not even gotten to their apartments or their houses when the lid blew off. So they were particularly panicked. Most of these folks were not military, at least not then, they had not served overseas, and they had not been briefed on what might happen in Cyprus; they had no experience with evacuation. There was a lot of panic, understandably, among some members of that community. Ambassador Davies met a number of times with them trying to calm them down, to assure them that an evacuation plan was in place and we would take care of them, they would be protected. The girl who was injured, whom I mentioned on the last tape, was in that community and Rodger spent a lot of time with that as well as talking to the government in Cyprus and talking to Washington.

Q: And that community was evacuated pretty much?

WILLIAMS: All. And they never came back of course because the station ceased to operate.

Q: But the military, the navy operators had all left just before that summer. Did some people see that as anticipation of what was going to happen?

WILLIAMS: I don't recall anybody saying that, nor do I recall reading it. I used to read the Greek Cypriot press in all its turgid glory pretty carefully. I don't remember that sort of thing. The numbers didn't change. In fact, if anything, they may have increased because of all the dependents. We're talking about a fairly large population that came in. I remember them in the pool at the Hilton hotel. A lot of them, they were loud. Too American I thought. But very clearly American, and looking forward to a very nice tour on an island in the Mediterranean.

Q: Ok, well you'd been anticipating the second Turkish invasion, Turkish breakout as it's called. Do you want to talk a little bit more about the period leading up to that and what happened at that time?

WILLIAMS: As I recall there was a steady buildup of Turkish troops and material in the beachhead that had been established which essentially linked the northern part of the northern coast of Cyprus to the Turkish enclave in Nicosia. That buildup continued fairly steadily for several weeks after the fighting stopped with the first ceasefire. The refugee situation continued to grow because there was a large Greek Cypriot population that had not been able to get out of that area before the ceasefire went in place. Of course, many Greek Cypriots still hoped that their citrus groves, their houses, their churches, their graveyards would be spared, that they would get them back and so they didn't want to leave. But as it became clear the Turkish buildup was relentless, more and more the Greek Cypriots started leaving. There were depredations as well by the Turkish troops. Some rapes. Desecration of church property and so on. Word of that got around and of course it made the Greek Cypriot population even more nervous. Those who were

in the Karpas Peninsula, that long spit of land which is up toward the Gulf of Iskenderun, knew that if there was a breakout and Turkish troops moved east they would be likely cut off. So I think there was, even before the second breakout started in August, a movement by some Greek Cypriots in the Karpas Peninsula south, sort of preemptive evacuation lest they be cut off. So there were a lot of folks on the roads, a lot of uncertainty that we had to deal with, report on getting our own community out, which we did pretty much by the time of the convoy south to Akrotiri. There was a lot of diplomacy going on at this time in Geneva. We had the British convene the meeting of the guarantor powers in Geneva. Art Hartman was there; I think Joe Sisco was there. There was more shuttle diplomacy within Ankara and Athens trying to keep this thing from getting worse. Makarios was in London in direct contact with Clerides, with the Greek Diaspora.

Q: At some point he came to New York.

WILLIAMS: He did during the UN general assembly when there was a special debate. I think that was definitely after August. He did indeed. He was active in making statements against what the junta had done and then against what Turkey had done. It was a real mishmash. We in the embassy were trying to keep up with everything that was going on. But I think at the end of the day we really saw that buildup as unstoppable and for us it was just a question of when the breakout would occur. Red Jessup, the defense attaché, used to brief us regularly at the staff meeting about how it would likely go. Both east and west, because the lines as drawn in that ceasefire were not really tenable. Nor did they, as we later confirmed, accord with the plans of the Turkish general staff to establish a larger presence in the northern part of the island, contingency plans for when the time came.

Q: To what extent during this period between roughly July 25, 26 and the breakout in August, to what extent was there violence directed at some of the Turkish Cyprian enclaves or villages that were well away from this Turkish controlled area?

WILLIAMS: The National Guard as I mentioned earlier had ringed some of the enclaves to prevent violence from the Turkish Cypriot side. There may have been some concern about reprisals from the Greek Cypriot side. I don't know that to be the case. But you heard more and more reports about it. I was not involved in any of those. Mike Austrian covered them, but we started getting more reports and a lot of this was hearsay and rumor and magnification of hearsay and rumor. Really I can't recall specifically whether we ever confirmed there was any violence against the Turkish Cypriot enclaves outside the area of the Turkish establishment by the ceasefire. But I can say a lot of Turkish Cypriots were fearful of that, and I think there was a growing desire by some of the hotheads in the Greek Cypriot community for reprisals given what had been done to Hellenism, to their properties in the north.

Q: So why don't we come forward to the second Turkish intervention. That was on August 14.

WILLIAMS: It did not have for me the drama of the first one, because it had been so expected, much more so than the Turkish invasion of July 20th. Once the Turks established the beachhead and the buildup started and continued despite all our efforts to stop it, it was really just a question of when, and the when was we thought rather imminent. I don't recall how I got the word on

August 14.

Somehow we got word, and I think the breakout occurred up north rather than in Nicosia, so the first violence was not immediately visible from where we were in the embassy. But it happened, it lasted a very short while, probably no longer than the first phase because at this point the National Guard emplacements had been destroyed. The National Guard had not had time to build new emplacements surrounding the Turkish beachhead area established by the ceasefire, and as you know it's essentially a plain on both directions east and west. So the Turkish army had pretty easy going when it broke out in both directions. Many Greek Cypriot refugees had started moving, really started moving after the second phase began on August 14. There were huge numbers of refugees heading south, including from Famagusta and Verosha, the suburb of Famagusta in the east, and the Turkish army in some cases had to overcome local resistance which wasn't too hard. In other cases they moved into a vacuum of an area that was not even populated much less defended. So it was a fairly easy progression in military terms at least for the Turkish army to take what was then the northern third of the island.

Q: At what point was Nicosia airport taken? Or at least made inoperable.

WILLIAMS: Nicosia airport was rendered inoperable by the first invasion as I recall. I don't think any planes came in and out of that airport after July 20, mainly because the runways had been pitted. There were wrecks on them, planes parked on runways had been destroyed by the Turkish jets. Stuff had fallen on them; there were caverns and craters in the runways. So I think from that point on the airport was not used as an airport. UNFICYP of course had a large presence in the airport, including in the tower. They were able to watch a lot of the fighting, the skirmishing in both the first phase and the second phase from that vantage. But the only thing that flew out of the airport after July 20 was helicopters as far as I recall.

Q: After the breakout August 14th the attitude shifted right away toward the United States?

WILLIAMS: As I'd explained before there was a growing attitude that the United States was ultimately responsible for this because it had not stopped Turkey inasmuch as America had stopped Turkey before. It seemed quite clear to the Greeks that it had chosen this time not to stop Turkey. This was the basic logic that was used. It was not an illogical position, but it overlooked some of the realities of what we were dealing with in Ankara at the time. And in Athens at the time. When those huge swarms of refugees came south, these were numbers that dwarfed what had come in the wake of the first invasion. I don't recall how many Greek Cypriots were ultimately declared displaced persons in their own country, or refugees in their own country as Makarios called them. Several hundred thousand probably. A lot of them came to Nicosia and set up temporary camps there with relatives, just in tents, whatever. It was a time of great confusion.

Q: I think they claimed 200,000, although that may have been later on because some went...

WILLIAMS: That could well be because they had 500,000 or more as the total population and so that number could well be correct which is vast. It indicates the size of the problem with which Clerides had to grapple in terms of taking care of these people. It was almost too much for any government to handle. This exodus of refugees or displaced persons or whatever you call them,

concentrated in and around Nicosia. The first inkling I had that we really could be in trouble was when I went with the ambassador to see Clerides at the PIO office which was the office Clerides had chosen since there was no other place to go. The PIO office was a brick building on stilts as I recall. You parked under it. And there were huge numbers of civilians, refugees I guess, milling around when we drove up in the Cadillac with the flag flying. And they were not happy faces when they saw the car and the flag and us. There were shaken fists and gestures; I think one or two people hit the car. We had a police escort so we didn't think we were in any danger. It was becoming a mob, and it was clearly not friendly. So we got out, went in to see Clerides. I forget what the specific reason was for that call. I think we talked about the general security situation or the breakdown of security because of the refugees, the fact that the police force, what was left of it because of the coup and the fighting, was swamped, and what that might mean for security generally on the island. I don't recall specifically what we said, but we came back out and left. We got out of there as quickly as we could because the mob was getting bigger and as I said was just not friendly. Again, nobody was hurt, there were no rocks thrown or any other objects, but it was an ugly mood.

The second phase started on the 14th, this was probably 17th or 18th. It was several days before the 19th of August. We reported that, I think there was anecdotal evidence or anecdotal comment from others in the embassy who had seen or experienced similar things in smaller scale, but we didn't change our modus operandi on the island or in Nicosia really. We maintained our contacts, we traveled widely, I remember once Mike Austrian and I got in the car. We were both cowboys but I have to say Mike was more of one and I think he would quickly agree if he were still alive, God rest his soul. We got in the car, he was driving, and we decided to go and tour some of the suburbs in Nicosia that were affected by the fighting. We didn't cross any checkpoints, but we went up very close to them, looked around, and saw where the new points had been established and did a windshield tour of these areas and came back, and Mike did a quick report. But what we didn't notice until the general services officer or somebody pointed out, was that our car had acquired a new hole in the passenger door. It was a bullet hole. We hadn't heard the shot and we certainly had not been aware that a bullet - or some projectile with the diameter of a bullet - had hit the car, but it happened. As I say, there was a strange sense which psychologists could probably explain much better than I can, that we were invincible. We saw all this violence and tracer bullets and tanks and walked over shell casings and knew that people were dying, that refugees were being uprooted, that young women were being raped. All this and that. We saw it and yet, at least speaking for myself, did not think this was really going to happen to us. Because we were diplomats, we had this great commanding overview, we had immunity, we spoke the languages. And until August 19 that was right. We weren't being reckless in the sense of telling the mob to bring it on, but we were going out, pushing the envelope, doing what we thought was our job to go out and see and report.

Q: Were you the driver or the passenger on that trip?

WILLIAMS: I think Mike was the driver. He was a better driver than I was.

Q: It was on the passenger's side.

WILLIAMS: It was on the passenger's side, but again I don't recall how close it was to where I

was sitting, but it was too close for comfort. We continued to go out though. That hole, from whatever source, everybody thought it was a bullet, we never found the bullet though, didn't change our way of doing things.

Q: Did you go with Ambassador Davies on a number of his calls during this period, or was this kind of an unusual one with Clerides?

WILLIAMS: Lindsay Grant, the DCM, had left sometime after the first invasion, after the coup because his time was up. Another DCM had been chosen by Rodger, but had not yet arrived. We were without a DCM, but we had an acting DCM. I forget who that was. And Rodger assumed, quite reasonably, that since the projected gap was only a few weeks there was no reason to keep Lindsay from having his vacation to Scotland preparatory to his new job in Washington, so he let Lindsay go. And I was the Greek language officer and the logical one to go to the meetings with Clerides which of course were conducted in English. Clerides' English is better than mine. But Mike could have done it if I was tied up. There were several people who could have done that, but usually, from the few experiences we had in these weeks I often went with Rodger as the note taker. And I knew Cristobulu who was the chief of staff of Clerides which was a big plus too.

Q: And he was often in the meetings with Clerides?

WILLIAMS: Always.

Q: Okay, you want to come on to the 19th of August?

WILLIAMS: Well, the 19th of August we were in a staff meeting in the morning. It was a weekday. I distinctly remember at the staff meeting that it had been reported that there was going to be a demonstration of some kind. This was something that would routinely be reported if you knew about a demonstration. The police had told the RSO (Regional Security Officer) or something, somebody got word there was going to be a demonstration. And that was all that was said. We said oh yes, okay, that's fine.

Q: A demonstration at the embassy?

WILLIAMS: I don't recall that it was at the embassy. I think it was a demonstration away from the embassy, but the point was made that these were volatile times, get a demonstration together 10 blocks away they could come this way. I think somebody did connect those two dots. But we didn't spend any time talking about precautions or preparations. We had a plan, the Marines had certainly been briefed and trained and updated in their duties if something should happen. And until this point there had been as far as I know no overt attack, even by a rock throwing kid, against the compound where we were. Our cars and our houses had been evacuated by this point, were intact. There'd been no looting, no vandalism. Shaken fists perhaps and ugly gestures, but nothing else.

Q: The embassy at the time was surrounded by barbed wire wall? No.

WILLIAMS: We had the fence topped by barbed wire, I don't know if it was concertina or something else. But there was the iron picket fence and the barbed wire on top, and I think that went all the way around. Back in the back where the parking lot was there was a gate that was a little easier to get through. Essentially our strongest defense was in the front and on the sides. So again we're all working and living in this very tight place. I think coming back to something to which I alluded earlier, after the second invasion some of the Greek Cypriots including Milteades, Cristobulu, the PIO from Makarios and now Clerides, wound up for a while living in the compound. They were deathly afraid of what might happen to them if the Turks should get them. And they moved in. They sort of arrived at the gate with an aide or a family member. These weren't large numbers, but the ambassador made the decision to let them in, put them in some ground floor office somewhere which unfortunately had a telephone in it which they started using. So we had to restrict their phone privileges, establish rules of conduct for them while they were in this anomalous situation on the ground. So we had this population too. Cristobulu's one, there were a couple of them, maybe eight or 10 people, I don't remember. But not a large number. But still, an element of foreigners you had to be aware of since they weren't FSNs. They were there as refugees, but you know, whatever.. And I think they were there when the thing went down on the 19th of August. Johnny Cristafilis, an interesting anecdote, he had been the foreign minister of Makarios and again of Clerides. And as I recall, we had met him socially, very charming guy, like Clerides, London trained, a barrister, very distinguished, good family, married to a lovely woman from South Africa, Marvel, also Greek. He was foreign minister and he was scared to death when the Turks came to the island the first time. It was either after the first invasion or the second invasion when he was in his most panicky mode. I don't recall if Cristfidis called me at the embassy or not. He wanted help. He did not, however, unlike Cristabulu wind up as a refugee in the chancery, but he was scared and I think that was a genuine fear, a very understandable one given the history of Greeks and Turks in that part of the world. In any case, morning of August 19, sunny day, cloudless skies, as it almost always is in Cyprus, and I think it was around 9:30 or 10:00 I don't remember. There was a rumble you could hear, a large number of people. I'd only heard that once before in my life and that was when Ann and I were in Adana, Turkey at the consulate and the consulate was stoned by a mob. I think I mentioned that in an earlier session, 1966 that was. You never forget that once you hear it. And I heard it, and everybody else heard it. We thought the demonstration had been approved by the police or whomever some ways away. But it was a large mob. A large crowd. It wasn't a mob yet. I think the focus of the discussion was criticism of the Americans for what had happened to them, what had been done to them, what they had suffered. And somehow, and I don't know how because I wasn't there, the crowd started moving toward the embassy. At this point, I think it gained a lot of hangers-on and other elements who might not have been in the original demonstration at all. By the time it reached the embassy, which was in about 10 minutes, they were throwing rocks and other things at the chancery. So we immediately had the Marines and everybody else shove the wooden shutters so the glass would be protected, close the gate, get the teargas canisters ready, and prepare to stave off what we thought was going to be an unfettered demonstration, but that was about all.

Q: Stave off in the sense that they would actually come over the fence?

WILLIAMS: Keep them from coming over if they tried. The Marines had instructions on what to do. They could get over, it was possible to get over, but I don't recall that anybody did. Again, I

was inside as everybody else was, and not looking outside, or trying not to. The plan called us to gather in the central hallway. The ambassador's office was shuttered and he and his secretaries came in the central hallway. The rest of us were in the central hallway on the second floor. The FSNs were there. It was very crowded. The air conditioning held up for us, so it wasn't too hot, but it was a little sticky. And our offices which had been on either side of that hallway, particularly that was facing the front, were sort of exposed to the brunt of the mob's wrath we thought. At some point, shooting started. I remember hearing pops or whatever, but did not think anything of it because I didn't know what it was, and I'd never heard shots fired in anger. I don't know how many shots were fired. Several pierced the water tanks on the roof because they were leaking. Again, there was no central direction, put your hands down and put your hands behind your head and hunker down. We were milling around.

Q: Could you tell where the shots were being fired from?

WILLIAMS: I could not. It was in the context of a lot of roar. Rocks hitting the embassy. You could hear the rocks. Occasionally a shutter would crack and you'd hear glass break. We had no reason to think that we were going to be hurt, because we were in the central corridor, the shutters were shut, the windows were shut, the doors were shut, and we were in the safe area that had been declared as such. So at some point, I think before the popping started, I decided to go up on the roof of the ambassador's residence, the patio with bamboo screening on the inside of the metal gratings outside. And Mike and I, the two cowboys, went up to there to see what was going on. Better observation. We thought that might be useful since we couldn't look through the shutters because it was too dangerous and we weren't supposed to be in those rooms anyway. Nobody said we could not go up to the patio and look down. And we thought we'd be high enough there anyway. So I went up. The first thing I saw, looking over the balcony toward the mob, was it did not fill the whole area. At that time there was the street and a parking lot where various cars including mine were, and beyond that was an embassy guest house where we had lived for about six months when we first got to Cyprus. But the mob filled maybe half that area. I can't say how many. Several hundred, maybe more. I don't recall it was that huge. But I do recall seeing my car in flames. They torched the cars, and then I saw the gas tank explode and the back end raised and came down. I'd never seen that before. I actually thought it was kind of neat, even though at the time I didn't know how I was going to get around without a car. Once again, I'm looking at a mob now that is throwing rocks, attacking the embassy, torching the cars. And there was some popping. I still did not make the connection. Somebody must have been watching over me that day.

It was also on American TV by the way, my mother was watching that.

Q: Probably not wise in those days.

WILLIAMS: No. But she watched it that same day. Anyway, I thought that was pretty neat, I'd never seen a car blow up, and this was a mob. I'd done that in Adana, maybe a little bit larger, but that was it. So I went back to the backside of the balcony. There was another in the back area looking down on the parking lot behind the embassy. For some reason, there was no mob there, but the Marines had thrown out tear gas, I guess as a precautionary measure. Maybe that's why there was nobody there. But I do remember looking over that area and smelling this funny thing

and then taking a very deep breath to see what it was. It was C2 or whatever the agent they were using. Never been teargassed before, or since, but I went down on my hands and knees and was just totally disabled. It was very effective teargas. It had risen the four or five stories that were between, because it was deployed on the ground. And it came back up, got me. So at this point I'm crawling on my hands and knees, trying to get back to the staircase that goes down to a landing where there's a sink. I knew I could wash out my eyes and clear my mouth and just get control of myself. And as I was crawling back, whoever had the heavy artillery, the large caliber weapon down there, opened up on the patio. And I could actually hear the bamboo ripping as the bullets came through it. It was a huge roar. He must have sprayed the building, because it seemed like a train. It got louder and louder as it came right toward me and it went past me. I'm down on my hands and knees, the bullets are passing harmlessly overhead and ripping through that bamboo. Again, I haven't been hurt, but at this point I'm in the fetal position on the staircase trying to keep myself from getting hurt.

Q: Where was Mike Austrian?

WILLIAMS: I'll come to him. I didn't know where he was exactly, but he has an amusing story too. I get down to the landing, get my eyes clear so I can see and I can breathe, and I'm able to get back up, go back up to the patio to see where Mike is. There were also some Marines over there with teargas canisters. In fact, they may have been the ones that threw the teargas canister down, but I don't know that, the one that got me. But they did have teargas canisters to use for mob control. And Mike had asked while I was looking at my car or whatever if he could help. And the Marines said sure and handed him a canister of this stuff. I never used one but it apparently has a rip-off thing like a beer can.

Q: Grenade?

WILLIAMS: Something like that, but it rips off and the stuff comes out very quickly, and Mike was a strong guy but he was having trouble pulling off the release tab. So he put the canister between his legs and pulled it off at which point the full force of that agent virtually scalded his crotch and his front and his face. It was like a white brush had been painted over him. And he was in agony. He was also blinded. He was on his hands and knees, and the Marines, there were two Marines out there. They were so astounded they were laughing uproariously at this poor creature because nobody had ever done something that dumb before, even at Camp Lejeune, and they'd never seen that before. Neither had I. So I get up, my eyes are restored, I can breathe, I see Mike screaming and yelling, hopping around and clutching his groin in great pain, I take him by the scruff of the neck, down the steps to the basin, wash his face out, get him so he can now take care of himself, and get him taken care of.

Q: Do you think the shots were fired at the patio at the top of the residence because they had seen the Marines up there doing the teargas?

WILLIAMS: It's the same time the shots were fired at the ambassador's office. I think there were two shooters. There would have had to be because the ones that came in from the side, his office, were way over there, and this shot was up here. And I always thought, and my memory's a little hazy on some of this, but the rounds that came into the office of Ambassador Davies were

concentrated in the area of his office where his desk was. The rounds that came into the other side of the building where the residence was were concentrated on the patio and I think some at the window of his bedroom. I think that's right, though I'm not sure of it. So whether or not they fired at the patio because they saw a Marine or because they thought the ambassador was up there or because they saw me or whatever, I really don't know. But there were a lot of bullets that came up there. I always thought it was an effort to get the ambassador because of the way the bullets had come in. By sheer dumb luck they did get him. It was a blind bullet came in through the shutter, the glass and the partition in his office and came down into the corridor where he was standing and they shot him through the heart.

Q: He was in the central hall?

WILLIAMS: He was, and he was dead before he hit the ground. Another bullet came in and ripped off the top of the skull of Tony Varnava, a Maronite local in the admin section, and she was dead instantly. And a steel jacket of one of the bullets that came in landed up in the thigh of Jay Graham the economic officer. Those were the only casualties from the rounds. One of the older locals may have had a heart attack. Everybody else was intact but was scared to death.

Q: Tony Varnava had gone to Ambassador Davies' help?

WILLIAMS: She had. She had been very close to him and she saw him fall. I was not down there, but those who were say she saw him fall and bent down to catch him and as she did her head was ripped open by the bullet, so they both fell.

Q: You say the window that the shots came through had the partitions closed?

WILLIAMS: Yes, the windows were appropriately shuttered.

Q: Okay, we're continuing off the day of August 19, 1974.

WILLIAMS: So the bullets did not have to go through significant physical barriers to get to the Americans in the central corridor. I have no way of knowing whether the shooter or shooters knew that we would be huddled in that corridor as a safe place, but the wooden shutter over the window, the single pane of glass and the partition on the door of the wall of the office were not very thick. Of course, steel-jacketed rounds of that caliber. But it was a blind shot that got the ambassador, no question about that. Tony was an incidental casualty, God rest her soul, and Jay Graham was also unlucky with that minor wound in his thigh.

Q: The demonstration meanwhile was continuing although these people shooting were probably in another building?

WILLIAMS: They were not in another building; they were on the periphery of the crowd in both cases. One of them was wearing the uniform of a Greek Cypriot policeman as I recall, although the weapon he used was not in the standard arms of the Greek Cypriot police. They were in the crowd on the periphery, but not in adjacent buildings. There was some more shooting of handguns I guess. I think though, soon after the heavy stuff came in and killed the ambassador,

they couldn't know at that time they killed the ambassador, and hit the side where Mike and I and the Marines were, soon thereafter as I recall, maybe 20 or 30 minutes, time was really very strange as experienced in that day, the crowd started to disperse. Either its anger had been spent or the Greek Cypriot police had started to come in sufficient numbers to control it. Because what the Greek Cypriot authorities had approved as a demonstration had quickly gotten way out of hand and had to be stopped. I don't know who was calling, our phones were still intact, I don't know who called whom. I certainly was not calling anybody because I could still barely see, Mike wasn't. But somehow Clerides was alerted about the attack on the embassy, and Clerides and Cristobulu came. There was teargas in the front as well. It must have been all around the periphery because I remember Clerides came up those stairs wearing a gas mask as did Cristobulu. And he saw Rodger lying on the floor and I remember he ripped the gas mask off and his face was contorted in anguish. It was just unbelievable how grief stricken and surprised he was to see that. Because even though their association had been fairly brief since Rodger had arrived as ambassador, I think there was a lot of respect there. I don't think anybody thought that the tragic events of that summer were going to lead to the assassination, or the murder, of Ambassador Davies. So Clerides I think knelt down beside Rodger very briefly to assure himself that he was dead, and then because we were still in a very chaotic situation where even his security could not be guaranteed, he and his staff left to go back to the office. We of course had to tell Washington what had happened. We had to work with the Greek Cypriots to reestablish our security because we had no idea what was still out there waiting for us. I remember telling Cristobulu. Cris and I were talking about it that night. This was the night of the 19th of August. I told him we needed to have a lot more police security than we'd gotten. At this stage the Clerides government was supposed to give us everything we asked for, so I said give us everything. Give us fixed post, give us snipers on the roof against the mob, give us everything. I don't know what I specifically asked for. But it was yes sir, yes sir three bags full; they did give us tremendous presence around the chancery. There were no more demonstrations, certainly no more mobs against the embassy. And I don't really remember how long that protection lasted.

It took a long while for the teargas to disperse. Mike of course reeked of it because it was in his pores. He really had second degree burns that got better as you came up from the crotch toward the face. Fortunately it didn't start in his face or he would have been blinded. And having staff meetings with him in close quarters was no pleasant experience because he couldn't help it. Even after showering he still stank of C2.

Q: The two of you came down from the patio from the roof soon after the ambassador was hit?

WILLIAMS: Fairly soon. There was a tremendous confusion and walkie talkie chatter which Ann heard. I forgot to mention, a couple days before the 19th Ann had told Rodger she and Ben just wanted to go back to our house. There'd been no demonstrations at that point, the house was okay, and we thought Maria our maid would show up. With great reluctance, maybe it was the night before, Rodger let her go home. So Ann and Ben were not there when this happened, they were at home. But they were in radio or walkie talkie contact with us and they heard over that system this tremendous jumble of screams and yells and confusion. A British neighbor had called Ann and said that from her balcony she could see smoke coming from the American embassy and maybe Ann ought to find out what was going on. So when Ann tuned in the walkie talkie all she got was this confusion. Didn't know what had happened to any of us at that point.

So we came down fairly soon after Rodger... we heard the ambassador had been shot, we'd heard yells either on the radio from the Marines or something that the ambassador had been hit. So we went down, and there was this tremendous milling about and yells and screams, and teargas everywhere. And lying on the floor where he'd fallen was Rodger and next to him was Tony and Jay Graham was standing with a trickle of blood coming down his thigh and looking very shocked as many people were. Shell-shocked, literally, as to what had happened. I remember I knelt down to Rodger and I just said, "Oh, Mr. Ambassador," and I couldn't say anything else because he was clearly gone. I think it had gone right through his heart so there was no question about saving him.

Q: Besides Clerides coming, I assume a doctor came?

WILLIAMS: I don't recall medical personnel coming. We had some medically trained folk. EMT qualified, probably from the Marines and elsewhere who hustled Jay off to treatment and quickly realized that nothing could be done for Tony and Rodger. I don't remember any other medical people coming.

Q: Who was in charge of the embassy?

WILLIAMS: Well this was the awkward point and something I remembered for the rest of my career. We were officially without a DCM because Rodger had chosen not to designate an acting DCM. The reasonable expectation that the new DCM would be there in just a few weeks, so... it was a reasonable expectation at the time. But it was a difficult situation because in fact the senior Foreign Service person by rank was Eddie Edwards who had been very close to Tony Varnava and was himself shell-shocked and not able to think clearly as he himself I think would admit. At least in the first few days after August 19. But for whatever reason, Eddie is also African American, he felt very strongly and said so in this mini staff meeting we had in the vault where the air conditioning was not working, that he should be the chargé because he was the senior person in rank. And there was argument and discussion about that. It wasn't the finest hour for any of us, I don't think, but I finally decided that the only way to solve this was to agree that rank should prevail and that Mike or I would go with Eddie whenever he had to do business. So we basically voted that Eddie would be the chargé. I don't think all members of the country team accepted that. But it was such a confused time it really didn't matter almost, because we were all doing our own thing and in very close contact with Washington as well. So whenever Eddie had to go, we would have to go ask Clerides for something, this was before Dean Brown got there, there was only one or two meetings with Clerides, no more than that. Maybe just one. I went with Eddie. We prepped him, we had the list, he would ask for whatever we needed. Clerides of course would give it; there was no question about that. At one point somehow the victims were mentioned and Eddie briefly broke down because as I say he and Tony had been very, very close. But on the whole I thought, and I don't mean to sound condescending at all, he was an admin officer who had done admin work his whole career in the military and the Foreign Service; he had never done work of this kind, under these circumstances. Given what had happened I thought he did pretty well, and it was only a brief period and he had strong support from Mike, from me, from others. So it was a team that went to see Clerides and a team that dealt with the other officials of the UNFICYP and the Greek Cypriot government.

Q: Ambassador Davies did not have any family of his own at post?

WILLIAMS: He did. Dana is the daughter and John is her younger brother, and they had briefly come to post with Rodger and Ms. T the family cat. Rodger's wife had died tragically after a long struggle with brain cancer just that year. And so one of the reasons he wanted to go overseas and come to Cyprus was to get away from Washington and the intense environment he'd been working and living in there, and also get away from, I think, some of the memories of Sally and what she'd gone through in the last years of her life. And Nicosia was going to be a way for the family to replenish itself, just relax and recover a bit. And tragically it did not work out that way. So John and Dana had been in the convoy that went south to Akrotiri in late July and were in Beirut, and had to be told what had happened to their father on August 19th.

Q: Let me ask you about Ann and Ben at this point. They were back home, did they stay there?

WILLIAMS: No, they were there when it happened and Ann was very concerned about me of course and others in the embassy because she had no idea if any of us were alive or who had been shot. She knew somebody had been shot, but from the squawking over the walkie talkie it was just not clear. I was able to talk to her a few hours later, say I was alright, tell her briefly what had happened. And then she decided on her own that she and Ben were going to have to make some defensive preparations because there was no way of knowing if the mob would regroup and come after the houses. Some Greek Cypriots certainly knew we were in the house, but it was a low profile. Any case, Ann told Ben as a way of keeping him from worrying and to occupy his fertile four year old mind they were going to have to boil water and pour it on the heads of people who came to the house to try to do them harm. Ben thought that was a great plan so he and Ann put huge kettles of water on the stove, propane fired stove and they fired up all the burners, and the water was starting to simmer when there was a loud knock at the door downstairs. Somebody in a very English accent, sort of Cockney type accent asked to be let in. Ann and Ben had barricaded chairs. We had a house on stilts with a marble foyer and a walkup; they had barricaded chairs at the top of the staircase so it would prevent people from getting into them, at least quickly. But the water was only simmering, it wasn't boiling. So whoever it was, some guy said let us in and Ann said no we're not going to let you in, and back and forth. This is what she's told me, I was not there, but I've heard the story many times. And she told Ben to keep turning the flames up, give it more juice to get the water ready, because they thought it was a Greek Cypriot or somebody like that. And finally she asked, "Who are you people?" Because she knew there were several folks milling around down there. And he said, "We're Canadians." And she said, "What's the capital of Canada?" Putting them to the test, because if he was a Greek Cypriot he wouldn't know that. And then she thought, what is the capital of Canada? And there was some more comment, apparently this trooper, turned out to be an UNFICYP trooper made a comment to one of his mates that who is this nutcase? And he said it in such an idiomatic way that Ann said that can't be a Greek Cypriot and pushed the buzzer to let him in. As soon as the door opened when she pushed the buzzer from up top, these armed UNFICYP troops swarmed in with their rifles drawn and tried to come get the bad guys and they came up the stairs and moved the chairs and established that Ann and Ben were ok and they were not in any danger. And Ann said why are you here? And they said we've left our post and the only reason we're here is some crazy Greek Cypriot lady told us that you were being attacked and so we came to

help. And that crazy Greek Cypriot lady was Maria our maid who had fled the house when the embassy was stormed. Ann told her to leave. She wanted to stay but Ann said no, you better get out of here because if they come this way they could hurt you too. So Maria left, but on the way out was apparently able to flag down an UNFICYP patrol and divert them to the house with all kinds of stories. So the leader, these were Canadian UNFICYP troops and the leader of the group said we can't leave you here, but we can't take you with us either yet. So he said we'll take you to your neighbor. The neighbors lived across the driveway in another house like ours. And they'd been very good friends of ours and had sort of adopted Ben. They had no children of their own. He'd been a judge.

Q: British?

WILLIAMS: No, Greek Cypriot. Court trained, impeccable English. But they had lost vast citrus groves in Famagusta or somewhere and seen what had happened with themselves in great fury over what America had not done to stop this horrible desecration of their island. I'm drawing a blank on their surname. It was Laura and Antinoches. Anyway, Antinoches was not there when the UNFICYP troops took Ann and Ben over. Ann had about two minutes to pack what she needed so she took her passport, pictures, and family silver and Ben took his Matchbox cars in his little case and that was it. So the UNFICYP troops took them over to Gregoriades I think it was, over to their apartment, knocked on the door, Laura appears, and the UNFICYP captain says what they want to do, and Laura said something to the effect that the Bible says to forgive even worst enemy and in that spirit I will let them come in, at which point Ann's redheaded nature asserted itself and she said, "Like hell you will," and started to go back home. So the UNFICYP people literally shoved Ann and Ben into Laura's apartment, shut the door and left. And I won't bother you with all the ends and odds. They worked out a *modus vivendi*. Laura took Ben to bake cookies in the kitchen, left Ann alone so she wouldn't have to argue with her, just avoid her, and that was fine with Ann too. So they stayed there until sometime that evening. This would have been late morning on the 19th. So sometime late afternoon or evening an UNFICYP vehicle came to pick them up and took them from the apartment down to the officer's club which was on the airport road and that was within a secure perimeter. So this was preparatory to their being evacuated because at that point there was no question that they would have to be evacuated.

Q: And this was a UN officers' club?

WILLIAMS: UNFICYP. UN or Canadian. But it seemed that everybody was Canadian there from what I saw and what Ann said.

Q: In the Nicosia sector.

WILLIAMS: Yeah, on the way to the airport on the left, it was a big building on stilts as you went to the airport, and it was an officers' club and they put Ann in the bed of the commandant because that was the only bed they had there I think. And Ben was sort of adopted as a mascot by these young troops who took him around to all the slot machines, and over the course of the next five or six hours Ben played slot machines and won lots of money, and they told him, "Every time you win you have to stand the house for drinks, buy drinks for the house," which he did.

Around 12 or one that morning they brought him back to Ann, he was on some soldier's shoulders with two bags of coins, his winnings, and looking very bleary eyed from too much Coke, otherwise not much worse for the wear.

Q: How much of all of this does he remember?

WILLIAMS: He remembers it pretty well because he was almost five. A month later he was five. And it was exciting stuff for him. He had all these big brother playmates, the Marine guards and then his big brother playmates from all around, he had all these Canadian troops. And he won and could buy drinks for all his friends.

Q: Ann and Ben were eventually flown out then by helicopter?

WILLIAMS: We worked this out over phone calls with Washington that night; the president sent a plane to bring back the ambassador's body. It was the same plane that brought back the embassy staff from Beirut. That went to Beirut, picked up the kids and the other embassy staff who were still there, then came to Cyprus to Akrotiri to pick up the ambassador's body. Stopped to refuel, in Shannon and then back home. That was the plan, and through talking with Art Hartman who was at the time the Assistant Secretary of EUR, and somebody else, I convinced them to let Ann and Ben come on that plane and go all the way back to America. That was approved fairly quickly actually, didn't take too much argument. And the ambassador's body was prepared for flight at the Nicosia general hospital. The death certificate said he'd been killed by a stray bullet. Maybe that's forensically correct, but it was not correct. When the plane did go and pick up the two kids and the cat in Beirut, it came to Akrotiri and then the issue was to get Ann and Ben and the casket down to Akrotiri, so an UNFICYP helicopter was arranged. They brought Rodger's casket to the UNFICYP wherever the helipad was. I don't recall right now. I was there and went down to Akrotiri with them on that chopper. Ann was brought out on a stretcher. She was still bedridden. Ben came on his own. There were some troops. It was one of these very military helicopters so there was no door. It was very, very loud and there was some guy hanging on a cable looking out with a gun to make sure nobody was going to shoot the helicopter from down there on the ground, because we were flying fairly low. But we got to Akrotiri with no problem at all. So I had a short while to say goodbye to Ann. This was on the 20th of August. I said goodbye to her and Ben, knowing they were going to be flown back to the States. And I guess I came back to Nicosia by the same helicopter. I don't remember. Dean Brown had meanwhile arrived at Akrotiri. He was the one who Washington sent out to take charge of the embassy until more permanent leadership could be sent in.

Q: So Eddie Edwards was really in charge only for 24 hours or so.

WILLIAMS: Yes, it seemed longer than that at the time. Probably closer to 48 because I think he was still doing stuff. But yes, very short period of time.

Q: And Dean Brown was sent out to take charge of the embassy as you said. He was retired at the time?

WILLIAMS: No, I think he was undersecretary for management at the time. He came out as a

temporary ambassador on the 20th of August. Washington knew we had no DCM and I think it must have known we were having trouble cohering as a country team because there was no natural leader there. It was very wise that they sent out somebody like Dean Brown who took charge instantly, no question about that. And typed his own messages actually. Did his own thing. The old Foreign Service way.

Q: Roughly how long was he there?

WILLIAMS: Lindsay was ordered back out of Scotland. They found him in some fjord in Scotland fishing or something. Lindsay was a great naturalist and genuinely enjoyed it. Very good at it. They tracked him down in some remote area of northern Scotland, got him on a British military plane to come down to Akrotiri, and so roughly about the same time, I don't remember in what order he showed up. Again, on a TDY basis until a regular DCM could get there. That was the idea that Washington had. In the end, Lindsay and Dean Brown did not work together that long. I think what happened was that Dean Brown decided that Lindsay could leave fairly soon before the regular ambassador got out, because at that point we knew that Bill Crawford would be coming and Brown decided there was no point to hold Lindsay. So as I recall, Lindsay left to go take up his job in Washington. Brown stayed around until Crawford got there and then Crawford's DCM came in soon thereafter.

Q: Ambassador Bill Crawford had been previously the DCM in Nicosia, before you were there I think.

WILLIAMS: He was DCM before we were there. He and Ginger came back from Yemen where he was serving as ambassador several times in our first year there because they loved Cyprus, they had a beach house up in Kyrenia, Totlasu rather, and they had many, many friends on the island.

Q: Came back on leave during that period. Do you remember when he came back then as ambassador to Cyprus?

WILLIAMS: It would have been in September it seems to me, or October. Dean Brown was not there more than a few weeks as I recall. I don't precisely remember.

Q: Dean Brown's main mandate during that period was security...

WILLIAMS: Well, security, to get the embassy working again as a team, to establish good relations with the Clerides government. Just put things back together again, because it was perceived, I think correctly, that things needed putting back together in the embassy. And Dean Brown was a very tough and able guy who did that.

Q: And you continued to do your political...

WILLIAMS: Actually, I probably did more for Dean Brown than I'd done for Rodger, because I was in the fortunate position, as was Mike Austrian, of being well-versed in Cyprus at this point. Knowing the language of the Greeks' side, able to translate for him, and there were a lot of

communiqués and stuff that I translated for him. And being physically intact and mentally intact from what had happened on the 19th of August. Several folks had to be evacuated after that because they were not just shell-shocked, they were seriously troubled and it would have been cruel and unkind and unwise to keep them there in that condition. So Mike and I and Red Jessup and the station chief were the core group that stayed on. We by great luck kept our wits and our bodies intact and we had contacts so Dean Brown used us very, very heavily.

Q: He did not have any particular background in Cyprus. Obviously, very experienced senior officer.

WILLIAMS: Very experienced guy, no particular background in Cyprus though he did have experience in the Middle East I guess. Maybe he had gotten over to Cyprus at some point. I really don't know.

Q: He was in Jordan in 1970 wasn't he when Black September?

WILLIAMS: I think you're right. He was a joy to work for, a good leader in a difficult time. Dave Gremlin was another one; he was the PAO and had a lot of experience in Cyprus too. So Brown essentially had a cadre of five or six people who really knew the place, had their marbles, were unafraid and could advise him well. And he was very good about seeking advice.

Q: So Bill Crawford came, a new DCM came, who was that?

WILLIAMS: Fred Brown came down. I don't remember how Bill had picked Fred. Rodger's DCM never made it because that assignment was aborted. I don't even remember who it was, frankly. But Fred Brown came and he and Bill were a good team.

Q: You stayed there until summer of '75, a year later.

WILLIAMS: That's right. That's a somewhat sore point between my wife and me because Ann wanted to get me out of that hellhole as she described it often, after she was evacuated back to the States. She and Ben wound up living with my mother in Arlington for almost a year, and the expectation was for months and months that the families would come back very soon. Once the fighting stopped, the second round, the ceasefire lines were established and UNFICYP established the perimeter, the expectation was the families would start coming back fairly soon. As I recall they didn't start coming back until the first quarter, maybe the second quarter of '75. It took a long time.

Q: You had a daughter that was born.

WILLIAMS: Ann was pregnant, I went back in November to see how she and Ben were doing, to see mother and everything was fine. Then Laura, our daughter, was born on January 19, 1975 and I got back for that just a few hours before.

Coincidentally, the day Laura was born the headline story in the Post with pictures was of the next Greek Cypriot demonstration that attacked the embassy, and this time they torched the

place. They got into the back parking lot where the motor pool was, set fire to some of the lower offices and cars, nobody was hurt. Certainly nobody was shot, thank God, but it was an ugly reminder of how volatile the situation still was. I think that headline that greeted Ann when Laura was born sort of convinced her that she was never going back to the island with her children. I decided with great reluctance that I would curtail, because at this point I had about 18 months to go. I was on a three year assignment. The government invested a lot of money in training me for a year in Greek, so I asked to curtail to basically anyplace that came up. But pending that, I had to go back to the island. And I did. I must say, Crawford's reaction was interesting. He was not pleased, since understandably he didn't want to lose one of his key people in a difficult time. He thought it was unprofessional and told me so. And said he had thought about disciplining me, but decided not to. And having said that, we then had I thought a very good professional relationship for the rest of my tour there which was almost six months. When we encountered each other subsequently, we stayed friends even though he was very, very unhappy.

Q: So you came back out of Cyprus twice?

WILLIAMS: Yeah, in November and January. I was working to get another job somewhere, and I was sort of desperate to get anywhere out of Cyprus just so I could get the family together. It had to be an accompanied post, and what came up was an economic/commercial job in Bonn. that was the job I got, replacing Joe Winder in the summer of 1975 which meant that I was in Cyprus until roughly early July, after the July Fourth party and then left and flew to Frankfurt and met Ann and the children there and then we went up to Bonn.

ARTHUR A. HARTMAN
Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European Affairs
Washington, DC (1973-1977)

Arthur A. Hartman was born in New York in 1926. His Foreign Service career included positions in The United Kingdom, France, Vietnam, The Soviet Union, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by William Miller.

HARTMAN: I was to run European affairs and work out a relationship with Hal Sonnenfeldt who is the Counselor who was going to be advising him obviously also on that type of problem and particularly on the Soviet relationship. But Hall and I did work out a reasonable kind of working relationship and we've stayed fast friends although it was a situation where we could have been at each others throats.

Q: Hal's great interests would have been the Soviet Union, how did you handle that?

HARTMAN: It was Soviet but he got a lot into Western European affairs and we set up a group that he used to meet with and sometime I would meet with him and the group, and sometime he would meet alone with the group. I had so much to do and I can remember one particular incident. I had been back and been the Assistant Secretary for a couple of months and somebody

wandered into my office and I was preparing testimony or doing something else and half listening to this guy, the management part of the State Department. A month later Turkey went into Cyprus and I discovered that I had accepted Turkey, Cyprus, and Greece in the European bureau and it took practically my whole time for the next sixth months. It does show you that you ought to be more careful with bureaucratic deficients. That taught me a lot about politics in this country, I mean I learned more about AHEPA and the Greek - American groups and Senator Sarbanes who was then a Congressman and Brademas who was a Congressman and the difficulties that I had with them and one very emotional moment when the President of Greece said to me, "Can't you control the Greek - Americans." They were putting pressure on him and causing him difficulty in his politics with their rather extreme views on the subject. (Unable to determine) was just at wits end one time, he wanted to make some kind of a deal and he was being pressured by Greek - Americans coming over there and saying, "Under no circumstances should you allow this to happen." We got the votes on the Hill.

Q: It was more than the Greek - Americans they were Cypriots, there was a very powerful Cypriot lobby?

HARTMAN: Of course the Arch-Bishop was coming from Brooklyn he was quite a Cypriot. He was a remarkable character, one of the most remarkable men I think I've come across.

Q: Did you sit in any sessions with Makarios?

HARTMAN: Oh yes, and I indeed in the period before he came back to Cyprus we were sent to meet him in London. We had a long meeting with him in the Grosvenor House Hotel and the man was such a master of theater. I can remember he was dressed in full regalia with a large sort of pectoral cross and he conducted me to the elevator and he put himself so that my last vision of this man would be right in the center as he gave me a blessing as the doors closed. Absolutely amazing man, sort of halfway between scoundrel tactics and really a great politician.

WILLIAM B. MACOMBER, JR.
Ambassador
Turkey (1973-1977)

Ambassador William B. Macomber, Jr. was born in New York in 1921. His Foreign Service career included positions in Jordan and Washington, DC, and an ambassadorship to Turkey. He was interviewed by Roger Ernst on September 30, 1989.

Q: After you finished your difficult assignment as deputy under secretary for management, what happened next?

MACOMBER: I went to Turkey as ambassador.

Q: You were there during the Cyprus business?

MACOMBER: Yes. Two NATO countries, a very sad event. Fortunately the Greeks and Turks never got to fighting each other directly. The Turks fought the Cypriot Greeks. A very sad time. A chilling time, seeing a rational state, and Turkey is a rational state, seeing a war momentum build in that country and reach a point where there was no turning back.

Q: This is [July] 1974.

MACOMBER: Yes, 1974, and watching that momentum build I could not help thinking that this is the way that one day the big war will start. I hope not, but as I say, it was a chilling time. I also had the narcotics problem which was fortunately resolved. Turkey handled it very well. It has caused a lot of problems between our two countries, and we were very pleased with the way the problem was resolved. The Cyprus problem, however, developed almost immediately afterwards so we did not have much time to sit around and be happy about one thing before we were hit by another.

Q: And then from Turkey you came back again to Washington.

FRANK ATHANASON
Liaison Officer, NATO Headquarters
Athens, Greece (1974)

Colonel Athanason was born in Georgia and raised in Georgia, Florida and South Carolina. He was educated at the University of Washington the, Army War College and the Army Command and Staff College. After being commissioned Artillery Officer in the US Army, he was stationed during his career at several posts in Germany, where he experienced captivity by the East Germans in bizarre and frightening circumstances. Colonel Athanason served in both the Vietnam and Korean Wars. He also was posted in Athens, Greece at the time of military coups in both Greece and Cyprus. Colonel Athanason was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005.

Q: You were in Greece from when to when?

ATHANASON: That was summer of 1972 until summer of 1977 which was unusual because it's a two and a half year assignment. I stayed five years because at the end of my two and a half years, this chief of the army section, a MAG, we were home packing to come back to the States and the Cyprus situation happened.

Q: This was July of 1974.

ATHANASON: 1974. There was another colonel position at the Greek headquarters who was the liaison officer from NATO. That position was changing at the same time. The incumbent had already left and they were waiting for the replacement to come in. The Greeks refused to let him

come in the country because Greece pulled out of NATO temporarily. That left that office open which got NATO very upset. I was contacted to see if I would be willing to go over and sit in that office since I was leaving any way, until they could straighten the matter out. I went over there and stayed in that job for two and a half years.

Q: Let's talk about the first two and a half years. What was your job?

ATHANASON: Mainly we were advising the, first of all, our mission over there was to get equipment for the Greek armed forces. We were giving them surplus equipment on the grant aid program which they didn't pay for. It was usually used, outdated equipment that the United States didn't want anymore like destroyers, tanks, artillery pieces. When the junta came to us, especially the chief of the air force in the junta, they said, "From now on we don't want hand me downs. We want modern equipment and we're going to pay for it." So then we went from grant aid to military sales. The United States government assisted them by guaranteeing the debt.

They started ordering new equipment, which takes a long time to start coming in. That was our main job: to help them order the equipment, what equipment to order, send their people to the States to get trained like the F-15, in those days, the A-7s. We would send people to all U.S. schools. I would go out and visit military units and try to talk with the high command about what I saw and how they could improve them. I tried to get a better curriculum in their military academy, more academic than military. I tried to introduce some women into the military because they didn't have any. I tried to get them to give civilians some more authority that worked for the military like GS 12. That was foreign to them. They had civilians who had been working for them for years and he had absolutely no authority and no recognition. Those were the kinds of things that we had to do.

Q: What was your impression of the Greek military at the time?

ATHANASON: The first two and a half years, I dealt with the army mostly. Of course, my counterparts in the air force and navy, we would talk among ourselves... The army was about 250,000 strong. I would go visit the units. Some of them were first class with the best equipment they could get. Some of them were very mediocre because they didn't have the equipment for them. They had them in a less dangerous spot like way over on the west coast against the Albanians for example, or sitting on the Island of Crete versus sitting up on the Yugoslav border or the Bulgarian frontier or the Turkish frontier. They had their strongest forces on the Turkish border.

I don't know, they had old equipment, they took care of it. The discipline was good. They were still in the early stages of trying to take care of their soldiers. They didn't believe in nice barracks or hot water or any amenities. They paid them like three dollars a month per soldier. They did take care of their equipment real well. I think that with what they were expected to do they would have fought a good war. They were used to the terrain; they were living on the past glories with what they did against the Italians and with what the ancient Greeks did. They were sort of overblown with their own importance. The air force, whenever they came to the American schools, they did very well. The navy, always had a tradition of working with the British and

with the Americans. All in all, I would say that they were better than the Turkish forces, but so much smaller there was no match there.

Q: So this was a branch of NATO, but in reality it was sitting there waiting for the Turks to do something?

ATHANASON: The NATO countries earmarked certain units to NATO and kept certain units under their national control. When I was there, the Greeks had all of their units committed to NATO where the Turks did not. The Turks kept a whole army unit free from NATO poised to try to cross from Cyprus, waiting for somebody to make a mistake. Being that unit was not committed to NATO, it had the worst equipment, shortages, but it was there. It was there. Being able to speak the language, during the junta days, the officers were very, very open to discussing anything, politics or anything. After the junta fell, they tightened up. They wouldn't talk to you much. They had more freedom under the junta because they were all talking about the possibility of Turkey being an adversary. So, they kept an armored division poised on that right flank. They talked about Turkey. The Greek generals talked about Turkey the way I remembered the older generation of Greeks talking about Turkey when I was a kid. There was a deep rooted hatred from way back. I had a lot of experience working with Turks and I never heard that from them. They were ready to fight with them or against them.

Q: Were you giving them instructions or were you keeping an eye on the Greeks or directing their attention to Bulgaria?

ATHANASON: There was no question that they were doing a NATO mission. There was the headquarters in Salonika, it was the NATO headquarters. It acted as a field command post in case of war. There was another headquarters in Izmir, Turkey commanded by a four star U.S. general. He would take the Greek and Turkish forces under his command in case of war. They had Greeks and Turks on all those staffs and they had Turks and Greeks on the staffs in Naples. They all worked as a team. I don't know that they went out for a souvlaki together at night, but...

Q: I've talked to people who served in various places in Naples and they said that the Turks and Greeks officers always made sure they were sitting in the same place and wanted listening to the same things. That they seemed more concerned about what the other guy was doing... Where were you when Cyprus happened in 1974?

ATHANASON: I was still at the MAG in the process of packing. It was June. It was graduation day at the Greek naval academy. We went to that graduation. The cadets were all on the field, lined up and we were in the reviewing stand waiting and the time for the parade arrived and there was nothing happening. They were obviously waiting for someone. Fifteen or twenty minutes later this entourage arrived with motorcycles and sedans and there was General Gizikis who was then the President of Greece. I had met him earlier when he was a corps commander up at the Salonika. He came to the ceremony and they continued past the reviewing stand with his car and went to the far end of the parade field. He summoned the chiefs of the army, navy, and air force to come down and they had a pow wow. While they were down there talking, someone came and said, "Your office wants you on the phone. Come upstairs." I went there. They said, "Something happened in Cyprus. You've got to come back to the office."

So that's when we first heard about it. I talked to those three chiefs later and I said, "What did you guys go down there and talk about?" They said that General Gizikis told us there was a coup in Cyprus. The chief of the navy said that it caught [him] by complete surprise. The chief of the air force said that it was the first he'd ever heard of it. The army told me the same thing. Not the three together, they were separate conversations. All three denied that they knew anything about the coup in Cyprus until that very moment. I found out later that the army guy was lying, he knew about it. But, the other two still stuck with their stories. So, then there was a lot of excitement.

Since there was no representative of NATO, he'd already left the country, (they hadn't even talked about me holding down his seat yet), but I was asked to come over to the embassy. We were all standing out talking about what was going to happen and the ambassador was talking on the phone to Kissinger. You could hear him almost all the way down the hall, talking loudly. Then they called me in and said, "Get on the phone. You know those guys over there. Get on the phone and get the General Bonanos, who was head of the armed forces, (similar to our joint chiefs), to agree to declare Athens an open city. If the Turks will declare Izmir an open city...." Izmir was the only one they could have done any damage to. They had Ambassador Sisco flying back and forth. He needed time to negotiate. So, I told them I didn't think I was competent to do that over the telephone. I wasn't that well versed with the technical Greek language to talk about something as delicate as that. So he said, "Just go on over there and talk to him." So I went over and I sat in this general's office for several hours. My mission was to keep him from giving the go ahead to strike back. It was touch-and-go there.

Q: Did you get anywhere on the open cities?

ATHANASON: No. They wouldn't agree to that. He'd say, "What would you do?" I couldn't give him any advice. The only thing the Greeks could have done to bloody the Turks' nose right there would have been a surprise strike on Izmir. And then hope to hell we stopped the retaliation. But, they couldn't strike in Cyprus; they didn't have the means to go all the way there. I did find out later that the Greek navy chief ordered U.S. Ford diesel submarines to head for Cyprus and they were turned back half way there. They were very close to doing something, at least that was the impression of the Greek armed forces. The Greek officer corps I dealt with, even when I was a colonel they treated me as more than a colonel because I was the only guy they had to talk to. I got to know a lot of the Greek generals. There were two kinds of Greeks generals: the ones who had trained in the United States and most of them spoke English of course. Then, you had the ones that didn't speak English at all and there was a certain animosity between those two groups. Unfortunately, the chief of the armed forces was one in the group that didn't speak English at all. He was a real villager. He was a hard-headed type. When he gave me a response, when I tried to tell him the consequences of starting any action, what the Turks could do... He answered me by saying that I didn't really understand the Greeks. He said that they were 'willing to burn their house down to get rid of the bed bugs,' meaning that he didn't care what happened. He was ready to go.

Q: Did you get any feel Papadopoulos junta had been overthrown in November, 1973, I believe, around Thanksgiving time.

ATHANASON: It was four or five months before. I don't know exactly.

Q: I remember because I was off in Olympus. Had that changed the colonels' (who had taken over in 1967) were thrown out and a group of generals came in, did that make much of a difference?

ATHANASON: What generals took over? Ioannidis took over, but he kept most of the people in place. Papadopoulos was the only one who lost favor, but the rest sort of stayed in place.

Q: So there wasn't a real change.

ATHANASON: No.

Q: Was there concern about Ioannidis? He was sort of a mystery man.

ATHANASON: Frankly, Stu, I really don't believe our embassy or the CIA really knew what the hell was going on.

Q: I can't contradict you.

ATHANASON: I don't think they really knew what was going on.

Q: My impression was the CIA had been co-opted by the Greek Intelligence Service.

ATHANASON: There was a tendency in the embassy to kick names around as if you knew somebody and you were on the in with the Greeks. And, the same must have happened with the CIA. But, I had talked to a CIA official after this happened and we knew that there was some problem with Cyprus before it happened and it involved the bishop, Makarios getting upset with the Greeks having too much to do with controlling his national guard. The junta, mainly Ioannidis was upset with him for even questioning it.

They had him come to Athens to talk and just about that time, where the CIA really should have found out what the hell was going on, they really didn't find out. But, apparently they must have given him an ultimatum to knock it off. He wanted Greek (there was an agreement that there was only a certain amount of Greek forces that were supposed to have been in Cyprus, a battalion size), but they had infiltrated other people in there. I guess that's why Makarios wanted them out. They had too much influence. They gave him an ultimatum and I guess he didn't buy it. That's why a couple of weeks later the coup occurred. This CIA man said that they had wind that there were some problems. Someone was sent to talk to Ioannidis saying that the last thing we wanted was turmoil in that part of the Mediterranean because we had Watergate going on.

We heard that this problem was developing and we warned them to cool it down and he answered, "Do you think I'm crazy? Of course, I'm not going to cause any trouble." So, they seemed to have been satisfied that it was diffused. They caught them by surprise when it happened. The chief of the navy spoke English well, he was a graduate of the war college in

Rhode Island and even though I was army, I was a very good friend of his. I had gone to his house and he had come to my house. I had gone to his cottage out in the mountains. We had more of a friendly relationship than I had with the army people really. The army people were more crude.

He told me three years ago when I saw him (I hadn't seen him since I left Greece) that he smelled something happening, going on. He called Ioannidis in to his office and of course this guy was a three star admiral and Ioannidis was a brigadier general. He said Ioannidis came in with proper military courtesy and saluted and stood at attention. The admiral told him, "I hear some rumbling going on. We don't want any trouble. Tell me what's going on." He said at that point Ioannidis told him to go to hell, slammed stuff off his desk, threatened him, and turned around and walked out. He said it shocked him, he thought, 'he comes in here with proper demeanor and finally he goes out.' He also said, "by the way, you know, he was the man behind Papadopoulos from the beginning." That was the first time I'd ever heard that. His position was that Ioannidis was always the leader, but he never came out front until he got rid of Papadopoulos.

Q: He was military police, right?

ATHANASON: Yes.

Q: I tried to see him a couple of times about draft questions and I never could get in to see him.

ATHANASON: I had never heard that he was the chief from the beginning. I knew that he took over, but it's plausible.

Q: What happened? What were you observing when the Turks landed and things started to go bad for the Greeks?

ATHANASON: There was nothing we could do about it because I think President Ford was only in office like four days. When the new ambassador came over later, he said that (he got us all together and talked to us) the United States came closest to having a military coup than at any part of our history. I don't know what he meant by that, maybe figuratively speaking. Washington was pretty much paralyzed; they weren't going to take any action. Our action was for Sisco to go back and forth to try to prevent a war from starting. And the Turks, I think, may be thought they had accomplished their mission by landing in Kyrenia and probably were willing to stop there. I'm just guessing, speculating.

If things were going well in negotiations, but then there was a dead time where the colonels disappeared, there was no government in Greece, there was a vacuum there. Sisco couldn't talk to any body. The ambassador didn't have anybody to talk to. And finally this chief of navy stood up and said, "I'll be Greece, you speak with me." He became the government of Greece because he was the only guy with the balls to speak up.

Then they brought back Adamyalee, they brought Bavrouis out of the moth balls and they sent him to Geneva. The Greeks started dinking around and the Turks were getting impatient. They

didn't see they were making any progress and that's when they moved out and took the other thirty-five percent of the land. Some quick diplomacy at that point... maybe they would have stopped at Kyrenia. I don't know. I think they were just trying to make a point.

Q: Basically, Ioannidis and company lost complete support of the people.

ATHANASON: I joke with people and say that at that time Greece had a twenty million population, ten million that supported Ioannidis until he screwed up and then there were ten million against him the next day. If he would have succeeded, I think if Makarios could have been killed and they weren't stupid to put this guy Samson there and they would have put in a decent government right away, I think that Greece could have had embassies with Cyprus. If there had been some way to keep the Turks off their backs and Ioannidis would have been a hero. But, he failed. He became the villain. Greeks always want to be able to blame somebody else. And he took all the blame.

Q: The next two and a half years, how different were the armed forces?

ATHANASON: Because of the promotion system of Greeks, especially in the general officer ranks, you can never serve over somebody that you used to rank. So, the new government got busy promoting people down the line and cleansing the junta oriented people out of their armed services. If they went down the major general's list to promote somebody to three star and got to number eleven and promoted him, the other ten had to retire the next day. So that way you cleanse your political opponents. There was a period there where they brought people back from retirement. The head of the armed forces then became a guy that had been retired by the junta. Those that had been kicked out became popular again and were brought back. The ones that had tried to pull a coup in the navy were brought back. So there was this turmoil of changing the hierarchy of the armed forces. I don't know if that affected the troops any. At the top level, big shifts were made.

Q: Did you feel any change in the attitude towards us and towards Turkey?

ATHANASON: Well there was no big change against Turkey; they hated them to begin with. There was no big change there. This new group that came in was not gung ho, ready to go, and burn the tent to get rid of the bed bugs, they were a little bit more somber, but they got cool toward us. We were blamed for the junta, we were blamed for the Cyprus situation, and we were blamed for not stopping it. Like I said, none of the army officers I'd go visit were willing to have a political discussion with you. They were very careful. The attaches of all countries, it became more and more difficult for them to visit different areas of Greece. They became tighter. My counterpart that went to MAG, he couldn't visit the way I used to visit. There was a tightening up. Our embassy had all their eggs in one basket, Karamanlis. They thought that no one else could do the job but him. So they had to one 100 percent back him, behind him. These are my own opinions. I could be flat wrong. But, they wanted to be very politically correct. They didn't want any more criticism. Anything that happened, they would just swallow it. They allowed Karamanlis to use that opportunity to let anti-Americanism spread for his own benefit. As I said, the example I always use with Greeks is if Karamanlis was brought back from France and he had to swim across a river to get to Athens and the river was full of sharks then the Greeks threw a

piece of meat down at the far end of the river for all the sharks to go down there, and he swam across. That piece of meat was the United States. Some Greeks agree with that, some get in an argument with me.

Q: There were lots of demonstrations against our embassy during this period.

ATHANASON: But see that's easy to stir up in any country, especially in the youth, in the universities. Just like here in the United States during the Vietnam War. Anti-Americanism spread. It may have been there before, but during the junta they didn't dare express it. The junta treated us very, very well and very carefully because they needed us. This certainly kept us in high esteem even though we weren't very nice to them. We were cool.

Q: How about was the November 17th movement a problem when you were there?

ATHANASON: No they had the polytechnic uprising, that's where they took the name. They weren't in existence yet. I was well aware of the polytechnic problem where the students barred themselves into the university. Anarchy sort of prevailed. The Greek police lost complete control. They asked for the army to help them. I did talk with the chief of the army at the time (I was still in MAG at that time). I knew him very well. He agonized over sending these troops down there, he didn't want to. But, they had no choice. The troops went down there and according to the best I could find out; the tanks got down there and smashed the front gate down. Most of the students ran out the back end and they took control of the university. The left wing spin machine called it a massacre and I understand every year they have a celebration about the massacre of the students. I don't know if anybody could come up with any names of anybody that was killed during that so-called massacre. But, the Greeks like these myths about conspiracies. You'll hear it from educated Greeks and down the street think that thousands of kids were killed there, or hundreds. It depends on who's talking to you how many numbers.

ATHANASON: It was interesting to know people like that chief of the navy. Like I was saying, three years ago, Vickie and I were there and we happened to run into him. He rehashed it all over again. That's where the 17 November group started, based on that. I was told that I was on their list too and that I left at the right time.

Q: They killed the station chief and military attaché.

ATHANASON: They did catch a group of young men. Some of them were active duty military. They had burned about twenty-five American cars. I had had two cars of mine burned there (not personal cars, sedans). They had a trial (this was after the junta had fallen). One of the cars they burned, a personal car, was my secretary's at MAG. She was told that she should go there for the trial. She asked me if she should go and I said, "Yes." I went to the embassy and asked who from the embassy was going (she was afraid to go by herself). They told me no one. I said, "No one from the embassy is going to this trial. Don't you understand, this is a political trial? We should know what the hell is going on." They showed no interest. This is what used to get me upset with the embassy. I said, 'they don't know what the hell is going on. They don't want to ruffle anybody's feathers.' So, I went to the trial with her. Right at the beginning of the trial, it became very obvious that there were a lot of leftists in the room. They took control of the trial. The judge

couldn't bring order. They ran the judge out of the room. They were spitting on the witnesses, hollering. It was pandemonium. I was afraid we were going to have a problem. That's probably why the embassy didn't want to go. It became so obvious then that we were in for some rough future problems in Greece.

ROBERT S. DILLON
Director, Greek, Turkish, Cypriot, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near East Affairs
Washington, DC (1974)

Ambassador Robert S. Dillon was born in Illinois in 1929. His career in the Foreign Service included positions in Turkey, Italy, Venezuela, and Washington, DC, and an ambassadorship to Lebanon. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on May 17, 1990.

DILLON: I left the Office Directorship in Summer, 1974, just when the Cypriot National Guard, led by Greek officers, took over the government. When that happened, I had just moved to being acting Director for Greek-Turkish-Cypriot Affairs. Not only was this a new job, but it also came at the time when responsibility for these issues was being transferred from NEA, which understood them, to EUR, which had dealt with them only superficially. The organizational shift had been taken primarily to assuage the Greeks who wished to be perceived as Europeans and did not feel that they belonged in the Bureau of Near East Affairs. It was also because Henry Kissinger thought all NATO countries should be in the same bureau. From the day the coup took place -- July 15 -- I was swept up in trying to prevent the Greeks and the Turks from being foolish and in trying to obtain a cease fire. I went out to the area with Joe Sisco in a very unsuccessful trip; we bounced around. We were in Ecevit's (the Turkish Prime Minister) office at 4 o'clock in the morning, pleading with him not to invade Cyprus. He triumphantly announced to us that Turkish troops were landing on Cyprus at that very moment. We returned to the U.S. and then I almost immediately accompanied Bill Buffum to Geneva where we tried to arrange a cease fire between Greece and Turkey.

By the end of that trip, I was totally exhausted. I returned to the States just in time to pack up and leave for Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, where I had been assigned as DCM. I left the Cyprus crisis unsolved; it is still unsolved almost twenty years later.

Q: Before we pursue your career in Malaysia, I would like to ask about the Cyprus matter. As the issue developed, how did you find the attitude and reporting from our three involved posts: Nicosia, Athens and Ankara?

DILLON: Let me go back to tell a story as background. CIA had reported that Brigadier General Ioannidis (head of the Military Police), who had been part of the coup that had overthrown Papadopoulos the previous November, in a conversation he had had with one of CIA's employees, had stood up, knocked a few things off the table and had sworn that he would rid the world of the Communist, Archbishop Makarios, who was ruining Cyprus. The reporter was a Greek-American who had been a long time employee of CIA. The meeting was dutifully

reported through CIA channels. I was called by the branch chief at CIA headquarters asking me whether I had seen this report. I had not. So he said he wanted to come to the Department to discuss it with me. That was very unusual in itself. The CIA official added that he was convinced that the Greeks were prepared to overthrow Makarios. I agreed with his analysis.

I had two colleagues at the time: John Day, in charge of the Greek desk -- a very good officer with a lot of Greek experience -- and Tom Boyatt, who had had a lot of Cyprus experience. We immediately huddled. It was John Day who really understood the Greek situation. He pointed out that Ioannidis had sent us a message, giving us a little of time to see whether we would speak out on the coup. We decided to go to our boss and try to convince him that a message had to be sent back immediately putting the Greeks on notice that the U.S. would not countenance or accept the coup in Cyprus. The people in the European bureau, not having much background in this whole matter, showed a lot of skepticism and raised many questions both about the facts and the assumptions. The leadership of the EUR was very strong; Art Hartman, who is one of the best professionals that I ever met, was the Assistant Secretary. The Deputy Assistant Secretary in charge of our area was Wells Stabler, who was superb officer. Both were very uncertain about what to do. They didn't know us and as I said knew little of the background. So they passed the issue to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Joe Sisco. Joe, who had had some experience with Cyprus, came down and we drafted a cable to the Ambassadors. I wanted our message to be sent back through CIA channels to Ioannidis so that there would be no misunderstanding of our position. People objected. They said that the U.S. government doesn't communicate that way with foreign officials and we don't communicate through low level CIA officials. What a pompous position! It was sacrilege that we would even consider communicating with a one star general! Of course, the fact that he was the power behind the throne did not seem to impress the EUR people.

Finally, we sent a very general cable to Athens. All the important direct messages were deleted. All it said was that the U.S. Ambassador was to express to the Greek government our view that we were opposed to violence on Cyprus. What news! Could we have taken any other position? We argued that this was not nearly strong enough and that the Greeks would never "get the message". Joe tried to bolster our position by calling Elizabeth Brown, who was then Political Counselor in Athens. He asked her whether she had gotten our cable. She acknowledged receipt and said that she had carried out the Department's instructions. Joe turned to us indicating that the matter had been taken care of. It was quite clear from the conversation, which we could hear over the speaker phone, that Brown, who was a very good officer, did not have the faintest idea what Joe was talking about. She did not indicate that she had understood that the issue was a very serious one that required special attention and care.

John Day, in particular, was the political officer who had the best understanding of the Greek scene. I thought his insights and tactics were absolutely correct. Nevertheless, after this episode, his career did not prosper. It was a great mistake for us not to handle the matter in the way that John had recommended, namely to use the same CIA channel through which we had gotten Ioannidis' original message. The General had to be told directly that the U.S. had received his message and that we were unalterably opposed to any coup on Cyprus.

Immediately after the coup, we were told that Makarios was dead. Shortly thereafter, we

discovered that Makarios was not dead, but that he had escaped and that the British had evacuated him to Malta. Initially, the Turks indicated great concern about the coup and expressed themselves as supporting the legitimate government of the Archbishop. Tom Boyatt said at the time -- and he was absolutely right -- that there was only one solution; namely to return Makarios to Cyprus and reinstall him as the legitimate head of the government. A lot of Americans, and I was one of them, didn't like Makarios; he was a hypocrite, full of humbug, very much anti-West, but Boyatt was right. When I was asked whether the Turks would accept the return of Makarios, I said that I thought that if it were done quickly, they would accede. If time passed, then the Turks might well raise objections.

The issue of what we should do next was pushed up to the secretary, Henry Kissinger, who fancied himself an expert on these matters. He immediately developed some grand scheme. He had never liked Makarios and was happy to see him gone. He liked the situation and could only see us as unimaginative bureaucrats at lower levels who could not seize opportunities. He talked about a Clerides solution. (Clerides was the leader of the moderate Greek faction on Cyprus). Boyatt, who knew Cyprus, said that Clerides was a grand man, but he was not the solution. The saga continued and we did nothing to try to get Makarios back. Gradually, the Turkish position hardened and then it became clear that our job was to try to dissuade the Turks from invading the island. Tom Boyatt and I accompanied Joe Sisco on a trip to the area. I think I must have gone for a whole week without ever going to bed, while we shuttled back and forth between Greece and Turkey trying to persuade both to find a peaceful resolution to the crisis. I remember well the night we spent with Ecevit. I was the only one in the American delegation who knew him. I knew what he would do; he loved the opportunity presented him. He couldn't have cared less about the American position; he was going to invade Cyprus.

Bill Macomber was the Ambassador. He, Sisco, Boyatt and I and a couple of others met with Ecevit. It was after midnight. Turkish troops were already on ships. Ecevit, savoring every minute, said to Sisco that the Turks don't make the same mistake twice. In 1967 (the Vance Mission), the Americans had urged the Turks not to invade Cyprus and they hadn't. It had been a mistake and the Turks would not repeat it again. Bill Macomber made an impassioned plea, saying that Ecevit was known as humanitarian and a lot of other stuff. At about 2 a.m., Ecevit said that he would consult with his Cabinet, although he didn't want to raise our hopes and he would then let us know.

We returned to the Ambassador's house and waited there until about 4 a.m. when Ecevit called. He said that as he spoke, the Turkish troops were landing on Cyprus. We pleaded again although it was obviously useless. We then dashed off to the airport and boarded our airplane. Then we started arguing about where to go. It was now dawn. Should we go to Athens to ask the Greeks to cease and desist? (The Greek government was disintegrating at this point). Should we go to Spain and wait to see what happens next? I didn't have any good ideas except that I was certain that we should leave Ankara. While we were debating back and forth, we got a phone call from Washington, ordering us to Athens. Since we had failed to persuade the Turks not to invade, we were to try to persuade the Greeks not to intervene. Just as we finished the conversation, we were told by the Turkish authorities that we could not take off and that we had to stay put. In a burst of bravado, Joe Sisco turned to the pilot and said: "Take off! We are going to Athens". Even though the Turks had told us that the airport was closed, we ran down the runway and took off.

Fortunately, nothing happened and we got to Athens only to find that the Greeks had no government. So we had great difficulties finding anyone to talk to. I don't remember much about the conversations in Athens because, as the Turkish expert in the party, I was kept busy writing up what had happened in Ankara.

Q: It sounds like a serious miscalculation by the Department on Turkish attitudes. Did you ever get a chance to discuss that with Kissinger before the ill fated mission?

DILLON: Yes, once, just before departure. Tom Boyatt, Joe Sisco, myself and some others went to Kissinger's office. Eagleburger, then Kissinger's special assistant, was there. We were there to brief Henry and to discuss what we might do on this special mission. In fact, the meeting consisted of a lecture by Henry Kissinger on history which was totally irrelevant to the issue that we were to address. With a couple of exceptions -- Boyatt and I among them -- most of the other participants kept remarking: "Gee, Mr. Secretary, I never knew the history of the eastern Mediterranean, until I just heard you explain it" and other similar vacuous remarks. That is a slight exaggeration, but that was the tone of the conversation. Then at the end, Kissinger asked whether anyone had any questions. I asked a couple, which went essentially unanswered. I tried to use the questions as a way of showing that what we were about to do was not going to work. I thought that our only chance of getting the Turks' attention would have been to threaten to cut off aid. The Turks were never going to take us seriously unless we threatened to suspend aid immediately. I knew that that was the only language the Turks would understand. I was convinced that the Turks would invade without some very strong U.S. threat or action. Tom Boyatt, having watched my performance and having seen how unsuccessful it had been, just said: "I disagree with you, Mr. Secretary. This isn't going to work!". Kissinger just looked at him and turned away. Nothing further was said and we all got up and left the office, went to the airport and took off.

Q: I might just note here that when I went to the Senior Seminar shortly after the events that you have described, Tom Boyatt was in the same class and the word was that he had been assigned there by Kissinger just to get him out of the way.

DILLON: That doesn't surprise me. It was a bad show. One of the lessons to be drawn from it is that this was one of those cases in which the area experts knew whereof they spoke and their superiors didn't. John Day was never promoted again, in part because I think he had been right about so many things. As for Boyatt and myself, even though I think our careers were probably damaged by this episode, we both recovered and became Ambassadors. While Boyatt and I were running around with Joe Sisco, John Day was the only one left in Washington who knew anything about the area. So he was in constant controversy with senior officials, who knew far less than he did. I am convinced that it was this that cooked John's career. I thought that everything John said about Greek politics and their reactions and how we should handle them, was absolutely right. When it came to Cyprus, I thought Boyatt was right and I don't think I was totally wrong about my analysis of Turkey and its reactions.

Q: That is very interesting background to a continuing thorn in U.S. foreign relations. As you mentioned, when the Cyprus crisis sprung up in 1974, you were headed to Malaysia as the DCM. How did you get that assignment?

DILLON: Then I got a phone call from the Department, telling me that Ron Spiers had been named Ambassador to Turkey and had asked that I be assigned as his DCM. I agreed. Having said "Yes", then came the rest of the story, about which I had not asked. I would have to go to Ankara on direct transfer and immediately because Spiers could not get to Ankara for several months and Ambassador Macomber had to leave immediately. Don Bergus, who was then the DCM, had been nominated as Ambassador to The Sudan and would have to leave very soon. So the negotiations started because I wanted to return to the U.S. for personal reasons. It was pointed out to me that I had just been in the States for my father's funeral; what more time did I need? So in June, Sue and I and the two children who were still with us packed up, got on an airplane and flew directly to Tehran where we had to change planes. We spent a night and a morning in Tehran. This was June, 1977. Jack Miklos, the DCM, was kind enough to invite us to stay a few hours with him. That gave us the opportunity to see the famous American Embassy compound in Tehran. Bill Sullivan had just arrived as Ambassador and I had the opportunity to chat with him a little, mainly about Southeast Asia from where he had also just come (he had been our Ambassador in the Philippines). Then we went on to Ankara.

When we reached Ankara, we found Ambassador Macomber dying to leave. I spent 72 hours with him; he never stopped talking during that whole period. A lot of what he had to say was interesting and important, but it was exhausting. Bill is very hyper; I felt well briefed by the time he got finished. Bill left and I became Charge' for two-three months until Ron Spiers arrived. Spiers was new to the area. He was a politico-military expert. He had been Ambassador in the Bahamas and the DCM in London; so he had some overseas experience. He was essentially a Departmental type, but a very bright and very nice man. I liked him a lot. We had a comfortable relationship. It was different from Malaysia where as I have already mentioned, I did not get involved in substance very much because I was not the area expert that the Ambassador and the Chief of the Political Sections were. They really knew the country and I didn't. But in Ankara it was different; I was the country expert. So my role was somewhat different. While I functioned as the executive Officer -- the standard DCM role -- I was much more involved in politics.

Q: But isn't that a dangerous position to be in? That is to say, to be the Number 2 and yet have more knowledge and connections than the Ambassador?

DILLON: Yes, it is. The normal DCM position is the better one to be in, as was true in Kuala Lumpur. There we had an Ambassador who knew the country and the issues well, who had great charm and was well liked by the Malaysians. I did the "inside" work. That is the better situation. In Ankara, it didn't work that way; on the other hand, Spiers was such a good professional and a good manager (despite some of the criticisms that were made of his stewardship as Under Secretary for Management later on, especially some of his personnel policies) that we turned out to be happy combination. I did get involved in many substantive issues. I did try to exploit my contacts which were still numerous. After all, I had already served in Turkey for seven years. Ron himself was so secure as a person that he was not bothered at all that I knew Turkey so well. I could well imagine working for an Ambassador who would be upset by a situation in which the DCM was a well known figure in the country, but Ron was not at all. Furthermore, the Turks have a very strict sense of hierarchy. Whereas Americans might handle a situation as we had in Ankara badly, the Turks never would. They knew who the boss was and they behaved that way,

even though I knew many of the senior officials personally. I did exploit that personal relationship to a correct degree; it was essentially for information gathering purposes. I do not believe that Ron ever felt that I was trying to up-stage him; I certainly didn't and I think he recognized that. But as a general management principle, I would side with an Embassy organization which had an Ambassador who was the area expert and the DCM who was the manager. The Malaysian model was the correct one because it also had the Chief of the Political Section as another country expert. You need a couple of Section Chiefs who know the territory.

WALTER J. SILVA
Near Eastern Affairs, Cyprus Task Force
Washington, DC (1974)

Walter J. Silva was born in Massachusetts in 1925. After serving in the United States Army from 1943-1945 he received his bachelor's degree from Harvard University in 1949. His career has included positions in Dakar, Panama City, Maracaibo, Beirut, Thessaloniki, Athens, Rome, and Naples. Mr. Silva was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1995.

Q: This was around July 14th, I think. I left Greece on the first of July and it happened just after I got out of there.

SILVA: Well, I had not graduated, I still had three or four weeks to go, if I recall. I was notified that I was being pulled out to work on the Cyprus Task Force with a fellow named Kontos. It turned out that the deal was Kontos had the day shift and I was the director of the night shift. So we hardly ever met. And I spent three, four, five weeks there, whatever it was, it seemed interminable. I worked nights, which was terrible because Butts Macomber was in Ankara as Ambassador at the time, and his phone calls usually came during the night shift, my time.

Q: Your friend.

SILVA: He was in a constant state of outrage. Now, you remember after the initial invasion the Turks were slowed down, indeed stopped because the logistic problem couldn't be solved as easily as they thought it would be. They couldn't get enough in men and supplies across those narrow straights to supply the troops that were already over there. So they stalled for about a week or so, I don't remember exactly how long. Now, our Secretary of State at the time was one Henry Kissinger, and he was doing his usual shuttle diplomacy, running around solving the world's problems singlehandedly. I never saw him during this entire time, never saw him, because the task force was under the aegis of the EUR Bureau, so we dealt with the Secretary through the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau. At any rate, at one point it seemed to me that we could have cut off the invasion. Not reversed it, but stopped it and kept it from growing. So I did a memo. I don't think it ever went anywhere. But I did the memo and passed it on, and the suggestion was simple. Since Turkish policy was being handled, it seemed, entirely by the military, and the invasion and everything to do with the invasion was certainly the business of the military in Turkey, if they chose to stop they would stop. If they chose to go on they would go on, regardless of what the civilian government said it wanted to do. And I thought there was

only one way. We had to convince the military that it was not in their interest to continue the invasion. The suggestion was that we send the one man who I thought could talk to them and get them to go along with this and that was the then Commander of NATO, General Andy Goodpaster. He had a great relationship with those people--he had great relations with every chief of staff at NATO. And he could have, I think, convinced them that further encroachments would be unnecessary. They had made the point, they had landed troops. The troops were in Cyprus. We were not suggesting that they take them out. We would simply suggest that it was time to stop further movements and start talking. I think most of the people on the Task Force agreed that that would be worth trying. Not a guaranteed success, but worth trying. I don't think it ever got out of the Bureau, much less to Brother Kissinger. If it did, it would not have sold, I don't think, because it would have suggested that there was somebody else in the world who could handle one of our little problems. So you know what happened. The Turks continued to pour into Cyprus and eventually took over a large part of the island.

Q: You had been away a year. When had the Greek Desk move over to EUR?

SILVA: It was during that time, that year, early '74.

Q: What was your feeling about how EUR was handling this problem?

SILVA: It wasn't. The Secretary was handling it. They were a conduit, the soldiers who did what the Secretary wanted. They had very little input at all. In fact the Task Force had no input at all. Getting all the stuff into one central point for what purpose? I could never figure out what the hell was the purpose of this Task Force since it got all the information, all the reports and telegrams came there, the Agency reports, DIA reports, everything came there and that's it! You did a kind of daily report that went out, a telegram, of the activities that went on during the day, and that's it. To me it was a waste of time and money to operate that Task Force. As it usually is.

Q: It gives the appearance of doing something. We're on top it, we have a task Force. But was there the general feeling of the people there who were immersed in the problem on the Task Force that Henry Kissinger had taken it all upon himself, and also that he wasn't very good at what he was doing? Or not?

SILVA: I think there was a general feeling, except among the very youngest members, that we were not doing anything very useful. The large number of young officers (including some out of the FS-100 class at FSI) who had been seconded to the task force thought it was all very thrilling, to be that close to the problem. And by then, there was the image of Secretary Kissinger as the Lone Ranger, out there, without a mask, righting wrongs. Many saw him the way the press was handling him. You know, the press was always tongue-in-cheeking Henry Kissinger as the guy who's out there, superman, the shuttle diplomatist and all that sort of thing. And I think that affected people in the Department, certainly, who began to see him the same way. No use talking to him because he knows what he is going to do anyway.

Q: Did you get any impression about something that has turned into a sort of cottage industry, and that is Tom Boyatt as a rather junior officer on the Cyprus Desk going up against Kissinger, and did that all reflect on what you were doing at the time?

SILVA: Well, at the time I vaguely remember that whole situation. I don't remember so much going against... Tom was a bright young officer, he had a special relationship with Joseph Sisco, having been his special assistant or something before that, and been given the Cyprus Desk. But I never had the impression that as the Cyprus Desk officer he had a great deal of interest in Cyprus. I think it was mostly an interest in advancing. There was a junior officer assigned with him who was outstanding, and who, I forget his name, who later contracted one of those terrible diseases, those nervous disorders, while he was assigned to Cyprus.. Anyway, he did the work. The rest of it was a lot of "showboating".

Q: Did you get the feeling that there was a lot of posturing going on then?

SILVA: Oh, absolutely. It was posture and nothing behind it. It was such a small problem. There was a great deal of searching in the Department to find out what possible interest we had in whether Cyprus was divided between Greece and Turkey, whether it was united with Greece under the "enosis" plan or whether it all went with Turkey. In any of those scenarios Cyprus would be part of NATO and become a NATO stronghold, the head of the spear aimed at the heart of the Middle East sort of thing. I don't recall any strong feelings among those who had served in Greece, served in Cyprus or served in Turkey. They usually took the positions of their former hosts. There was some of that clientitis thing. But other than that it was hard to get anybody above the Desk level really excited. They were excited by the possibility that we could use Cyprus, that would be the thing. It would have been nice.

Q: Use Cyprus how?

SILVA: As a military forward base. That would have been very nice, you see, if we could replace the British there and have naval and air forces that close to our interests in the Middle East. But it didn't turn out that way. Independent Cyprus was not about to become a forward base for the Sixth Fleet.

Q: I have to reflect my own feeling. Having served in Greece myself, I did not develop a great affection for Greek politics. Was there any feeling that the Cyprus problem sort of solved itself.

SILVA: The Cypriots don't think that.

Q: Oh, I know. I went to a Cypriot meeting not long ago, and they talk about 25 years of tyranny. But from what I gather the Greeks weren't really very nice to the Turkish minority.

SILVA: Of course it was when the coup took place in Cyprus, maneuvered theoretically by the colonels in Athens, and the fear, very legitimate fear, I think, of Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots especially, that with the Greek Army involved in the coup in Cyprus that you'd end up with an invasion from Greece, and their own position would be substantially weakened. They'd be run out of the country. And that's why the Turks invaded. It's clear, I think it's all very logical, and why we thought it was strange I don't know. Of course it brought about the downfall of the colonels in Athens, which was a bit of pleasant serendipity, but nonetheless it left Cyprus with

the problem unresolved, with the Turks in control of large areas of the country and a lot of dispossessed Greek Cypriots wanting to go home.

Q: But in a way it sort of solved the problem. Well, anyway, you left there in the end of the summer of '74, and what happened then?

SILVA: Well, I got a couple of calls. A couple of people were going off to Embassies who wanted to know if I was interested in being a DCM to them. Both of these were old acquaintances from NEA who had been around the corner for a long time and they thought I might want to be a DCM. I think one of them was going to the Sudan, and that was not what I had in mind. Mary was just getting over an illness and that was not the right place for someone who needed access to medical care. So I turned him down. The other guy was going somewhere in the Middle East. He didn't want to see me. He said his wife wanted to interview my wife. And I said "No thank you." I didn't approve of that when it was legal, and it was no longer the way things were done in the Foreign Service. So I turned them both down. I forget who was the DG at that time...I think it was Harry Barnes. Anyway, he wanted to know if I would like to go to Rome. I thought that would be a very nice idea! So I asked him what I would be doing in Rome. He said there was only one job, and that was to be Counselor for Political-Military Affairs. I said okay, that sounded great, so we went to Rome.

FREDERICK Z. BROWN
Deputy Chief of Mission
Nicosia (1974-1976)

Frederick Z. Brown was born in Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania in 1928. He joined the Foreign Service in 1958. His career included positions in France, Thailand, The Soviet Union, Vietnam, and Cyprus. Mr. Brown was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

Q: You were on Cyprus from '74 to '76.

BROWN: I arrived in early September 1974 and I left in March of 1976.

Q: You were Deputy Chief of Mission. What were your main concerns.

BROWN: Initially my main concern was helping the ambassador who had just arrived there himself, to reconstruct the embassy personnel system which had been hurt, and morale, which had been pretty badly damaged by the events of the summer which included the coup that had deposed Archbishop and president Makarios; the attacks against the embassy; the invasion by Turkey of northern Cyprus; the splitting of the island in two, the murder of our ambassador plus one local employee, numerous menaces against American personnel. Our embassy was in a vulnerable position. You recall we had a Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) unit in the part of Cyprus ultimately controlled by Turkey. We also had a naval communications listening post there. There were a number of consequences there and a splitting of the island in

two that required a reorganization of the mission, and a realignment of personnel, lots of readjustments. Our local personnel were thoroughly shattered. Many of them had lived in the northern part of Cyprus which was now occupied by Turkey. All of them were loyal to the United States, but many of them were critical of our role. We had a very difficult foreign service organizational problem after that cataclysmic event.

Q: I want to ask a real nuts and bolts question. You say you went in to restore morale. How did you see you were going to do it and how did it work out?

BROWN: The first thing is personnel. I think I mentioned that Bill Crawford chose me in part because I did not have a deep Cyprus, Greece or Turkey background. The Deputy Chief of Mission that Rodger Davies had chosen to go out and join him was a Greek language officer. Bill Crawford felt that that was not appropriate in the new circumstances.

So the first thing we had to do was reorganize the personnel in the embassy. This meant moving out several of the employees who had been rather profoundly shaken by events. Seeing their ambassador with his head blown off, in effect. We changed a number of our political and economic officers. There was a change in the other agencies attached to the embassy. This took place over three to six months.

Second, we had to somehow regroup the local personnel. Assure them that we were going to stay on the island. That we were not going to leave. We had to spend a lot of time simply working with our employees.

Thirdly, we had to physically upgrade the embassy. To protect it against further attacks. And indeed there was another attack against the embassy in January of 1975. In which the first floor was invaded. One wing was set afire. Ten cars were burned in our courtyard. And our American personnel were retreating upstairs to the roof, to the vault. For either the last stand. Or for protection. Or evacuation by the U.N. peacekeeping contingent, when the Greek Cypriot mob broke into the building and almost killed us. We were eventually saved by the Canadian contingent of the UNFICYP military detachment on Cyprus.

This is by way of saying we had to do a lot in terms of physical protection of the embassy. We did not do enough initially. It was only six months later that the second threat became apparent.

So there was a lot of basic messing about just to straighten the mission out. There was also the addition of an AID component.

Of course Cyprus, prior to 1974 had been one of the most prosperous countries in Europe. The invasion of Turkey and the coup against Makarios, changed all that. There were three or four hundred thousand refugees created. So we had to add a AID component, disaster relief to the mission. I spent a lot of time working on that.

I guess the most important political activity that we engaged in was the attempt somehow, while Makarios was in exile, to bring the temporary government under Glafkos Clerides, who had taken over as president after the failure of the rightist coup, taken over as president of the

Republic of Cyprus, trying to find some way to bring about rapprochement between Greek Cyprus and Turkish Cyprus. I spent, and Ambassador Crawford, spent the majority of our time talking to the leaders of the legitimate government of Cyprus, Clerides, and the Turkish minority who were, 20 percent, across the green line in the northern part of Cyprus. The big activity then was, if you want, "peace making," rapprochement, political reconciliation -- it is very very difficult. It hasn't been done to this day. Look where we are today, sixteen years later. Cyprus is still divided. At the embassy we had to try to do all these things simultaneously.

Q: In your heart of hearts, did you think there was an answer?

BROWN: There was a window that was open, briefly, roughly between September 1974 through January 1975, when Makarios was out of the country and in exile. Clerides who was a more moderate man, was president, pro tem of the country. I think there was an opportunity if the Turks had shown more flexibility on certain key elements on a settlement on Cyprus. Having to do with the status of Famagusta and Varosha, the new town of Famagusta, where much of the Greek investment on the island was located in the form of luxury hotels, restaurants and fancy apartment buildings. In terms of what would happen to certain areas to the north of Nicosia. I'm trying to pull the names of these places out. The very rich citrus growing areas -- Morphou. And also the status of unaccounted for Greek Cypriots in the north who were assumed to have been murdered by the incoming Turkish army. We had a list of eight or ten very important political elements. Also the size of the international airport of Nicosia. Which is still closed, by the way.

There was a list of items on which I think progress could have been made. Which would have built confidence between the two sides that might have ended up in producing a federation of the Turkish area and the Greek area. Which would have been much better than what you have now, which is an island, totally split, with a defacto Turkish government comprising 20% of the population in the north, and the legitimate U.N.-recognized, U.S.-recognized Republic of Cyprus in the south, in the capital of Nicosia.

So there was a time, about three or four months, where we worked night and day, the U.N. Secretary General special representative, who soon became Perez De Cuellar, the current secretary general. At that time it was Weekman-Mumoz. I think there was a possibility as long as Makarios was out of the country.

Makarios came back and solidified Greek Cyprus, totally, as he had before, until the attempt to overthrow him. Solidified Greek Cyprus in a much more rigid fashion. Makarios was basically overthrown in July of 1974 because it appeared to the EOKA elements and the Greek colonels that Makarios was adopting a more tolerant line toward the Turk Cypriots. Ironically. So that was the reason for overthrowing him. That and the residual unification of Cyprus with the homeland of Greece. Basically abrogating the basic independence of Cyprus. But when Makarios came back he played a rigid rightest wicket which was adamantly opposed to any kind of concessions to the Turks.

Q: How was it to deal with the Turks?

BROWN: Yes, I used to see the Turks. We had to have a rather formal relationship with the

Turkish embassy. We had two kinds of contacts. One with the embassy in Nicosia which was beefed up with very high powered diplomats after the invasion. That was our formal meeting place to discuss political matters. The actual discussions of the Cyprus issue really took place in Ankara, in Washington, and at the U.N. and in London and in Geneva. So what we did was at a relatively low level.

Q: It was not going to be decided on Cyprus at this point.

BROWN: What we did was of a rather local formal nature. Our second source of contacts was with the provisional government of Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader. There we had to walk a very fine line because obviously the legitimate government of Cyprus, the Greek Cypriots, did not like the American embassy talking to Denktash. Getting across the green line into the Turkish area was a difficult matter. You had to go through phalanxes of armed men a la Beirut.

We also had contacts with the Turkish military, about thirty to forty thousand, in the north of Cyprus, who kept a rigid iron grip on that area. We used to go up there in order to show the American flag up there, to show that we were still interested in northern Cyprus. And to get access to American citizens -- Greek Cypriots American citizens. So we had a lot of contact with the Turkish side.

Q: What was the Turkish attitude towards the Americans?

BROWN: The Turks were using American tanks, they were wearing American boots, they were flying American airplanes. Of course you had at that time Congress cutting off military supply to Turkey as a result of the use of American military equipment that had been supplied under our FMS program for defense purposes.

I found the Turks very hard. Very unbending. And not in the mood to negotiate. We had to fight for every inch of ground. On consular access. On protection of American property. Not to mention the more political matters. The Turks were very very tough.

Q: Maybe splitting up is a lot better than trying to intermingle.

BROWN: That is a difficult question. There was a period in the Republic of Cyprus' history and it probably goes from 1970 to 1973, known as the golden age, in which the religious and ethnic tensions were at a low point. The way the Cypriots worked it out among themselves was that in the north and in the south there were both Greek minorities and Turkish minorities in the villages. And for the most part, in the villages, the Greeks and the Turks got along in that period. Even though there had been terrible pogroms in the 1960s. The British colonial government had used the Turks as the police against the Greek majority. This had left a bad taste. It goes back a long way.

In answer to your question, the attack against the American Embassy in January of 1975 was precipitated by the United Nations conveying of the remaining Turks on the southern part of the island to the north. After that was completed, 99.9% of all Turks were in the north and 99.9% of

all Greeks were in the south. The island was almost totally divided. With approximately 30% of the territory in the north belonging to the Turkish Cypriots and the remainder to the Greek Cypriots, with 3% of the island under the British sovereign bases.

Whether or not that is a better arrangement, only time will tell. My feeling is that Cyprus lost a priceless opportunity to have a binational society perhaps on the order of Canada. Of course Canada is not without its problems. But there is too much history on the island. Too much history. What you are seeing now is just a settling into the island which may last another ten or twenty years or three centuries. I don't know.

Q: How well did you feel you were supported from Washington?

BROWN: I have to say I had superb support. Isn't that terrible to say, that the Department supported us! I think we had excellent desk officers and an excellent executive director in Joan Clark, who was EUREX and who responded overnight to our requests. I made one egregious error administratively in not getting authorization to put up steel shutters. Almost overnight, after we had been attacked by this mob, almost killed, I just went out and ordered our administrative officer to do what was necessary with a local contractor overnight to put up metal shutters that would stop AK47 bullets. That meant an expensive operation and for one reason or another, I did not get the correct direct authorization from the Department to do that. I was covered. Nobody said, "Well Fred, you goofed. Come out." I could have blamed it on my admin officer but I was charge at the time and I didn't. It was my decision. So I had superb support. All the way along. In personnel. In logistics. In communications. They sent us TDY communicators from Europe. I really can't complain.

Q: In a crisis, it works often.

BROWN: But it depends on people. On Joan Clark and people like her. We could have had a hard-ass executive director who simply didn't see it.

When the embassy was attacked in January of 1975 again, I received a communication, a personal letter from the secretary, for the then president Clerides. I don't think Makarios was back then. It was a simple message.

"I have instructed Mr. Brown to tell you that if there is any further attack on the American embassy, if an American citizen or any Greek Cypriot employee of the American embassy, is harmed in any way, the United States will cease all activities having to do with Cyprus, will cut off negotiations and will have nothing further to do with the attempt to find a solution on Cyprus. Yours truly, Henry Kissinger."

So I went over in the clothing I was wearing. Full of stink and tear gas and a little bit of blood. I went over and called on the Foreign Minister and delivered this note. Just put it on the table and said, "This is what we have to say to you." That took care of it.

The message came when I needed it. It was given to me in a matter of hours.

Q: Was there the feeling that the Greek Cypriot government was tacitly behind this?

BROWN: Yes. My feeling is that they would not have permitted us to be killed. I do know that I was retreating up the stairway up to the vault area, with my two Greek Cypriot guards, my chief marine gunny who had a couple of shotguns, and our security officers. We had decided that if the mob came around the corner and up the stairways, we would fire. We had used all of our teargas.

The marines had not used their weapons. And don't forget. This is fairly early on in the era of attacks on American embassies. Cleo Noel had been killed in the Sudan and one or two other people. But basically this was early on in the era of attacks around the world. So we didn't have a lot of experience in how to handle it.

But the marines. I must compliment the marines. We had supreme marines all during my time there. Unlike the horror stories out of Moscow.

Q: Do you think they were particularly selected?

BROWN: We had well trained and well selected marines. I never had any problem with the marines. They were pretty much under my close supervision. We always had superb marines and very good security officers. The incipient problem that was brought to my attention before I went out there, with regard to the Central Intelligence Agency. I never had any problem with that. I was always given straight answers. I asked as to sources, methods, not to mention information. I didn't have any problems.

Q: Speaking of this. Our embassies at Ankara and Athens were also important. How did you feel being in the middle and the work of our embassies there?

BROWN: You realize that the Cyprus crisis was the cause of the overthrow of the Ioannidis, Papadopoulos' regime in Athens. The coups against Makarios was the cause for the downfall of Ioannidis regime, which had been in power seven years. Which was considered to be a plaything of the Nixon Administration and Johnson Administration before that.

So in Athens, you had a whole new ball game with the new president and a far more leftist regime which replaced Ioannidis. I felt that my relationship in Nicosia with Athens was fairly good and fairly easy. It was not so with Ankara.

In Ankara we had William Macomber as ambassador, who took a very protective attitude towards the Turkish government. Much of the disagreement which Embassy Nicosia had, was with Embassy Ankara, on what the Turks should do quickly with regard to cooling the situation. We were very much concerned that the Turkish forces were going to continue on to occupy the rest of Cyprus. There was a real fear about that. The whole thrust of diplomatic activity in July and August and into September, was to make sure that Turkey didn't occupy the whole damn island. Then we really would have had a mess. So in answer to your question we did have very different points of view with Bill Macomber in Ankara.

Q: You then came back and spent a year as deputy and acting spokesman for the Department of State.

BROWN: I was pulled out on a few days notice in March of 1976 and I came back and was deputy to Robert Funseth as spokesman. My title was Deputy Spokesman and Director of Press Relations in the State Department. This was the final nine months of the Ford Administration. I worked directly with Larry Eagleburger, with David Newsom and Phil Habib. Others very close to Kissinger. I also worked very closely with Secretary Kissinger himself. Day by day clearing guidances and that kind of thing. A very different kind of operation than the spokesman's job now. Very much under the thumb of the Secretary, day by day. And Kissinger being intensely concerned about his image with the media, everything we did was attuned to his personal whims. As represented by Larry Eagleburger, really.

PAUL F. GARDNER
Mutual Security Affairs Counselor
Ankara, Turkey (1974-1976)

Ambassador Paul F. Gardner was born in Texas in 1930. His career in the Foreign Service included positions in Indonesia, Turkey, Madagascar, Laos, Cambodia, New Guinea, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on November 4, 1991.

GARDNER: I went to Turkey as mutual security affairs counselor at the Embassy.

Q: This was from 1974-76. Was it a direct transfer?

GARDNER: No, I went on home leave and got caught by the Cyprus war.

Q: I was going to say...I had just left Athens the first of July of 1974. So what happened?

GARDNER: I was on my way to the post and was caught in Rome, which wasn't a bad place. There were no flights available because of the Cyprus war so I was stuck in Rome for several days. When I got to Turkey the situation was quite different than when my assignment was made. Obviously we had a problem over Cyprus and a problem with Congress and their decision to take some actions against the Turks. The Turks then renounced our mutual security agreement.

Well this gave me a lot of work to do because we had a large number of installations in Turkey and a large number of military personnel scattered all over Turkey and suddenly there they were without an agreement to cover them. The Turks claimed that Congress had broken the agreement. So my job was quite simply to negotiate an agreement with the Turks at a time when they were very angry with us. No Turks showed up to our Fourth of July party.

I also had to worry about what they might be doing to our installations. Theoretically they were closed down, but they let our personnel stay on, but theoretically they couldn't do any work. There were all sorts of little problems that would arise. Some people would take action against our posts, etc.

So between negotiating and trying to keep the status of the military and their safety in the country I was busy. It took me virtually the full two years. We did reach an agreement about six months before I left. I was scheduled to stay there another year but they called me up and asked me if I would come to Indonesia because they needed a political counselor there, so I left and went back to Indonesia.

Q: On this, did all of you in the Embassy feel that you were really negotiating on two sides...one with the Turks and the other with Congress?

GARDNER: Well, when you get into a negotiating condition like that you have many more sides than that. Obviously we had to negotiate an agreement...I was the head of the working group that was composed of a number of military, some people from Washington. I was the chairman of the working group which did most of the actual negotiating. We just left the toughest things -- the bracketed language including how much aid we were going to give them -- to be decided by a higher negotiating group. But I led the American side and there was a Department of Foreign Affairs person that led the Turkish group, which was also composed like my group of a lot of colonels. We had trouble with Defense, the Department and the White House, all three, and Congress. So you had to look four different ways.

There were some things that the Department and Defense disagreed on. Was it really necessary to fly our flag over the base? Couldn't we call it a Turkish base as long as it did the same thing? Things like this, because this would set precedents for other military negotiations. We knew this was going to set a tremendous precedent for all of our NATO agreements and our non-NATO agreements to boot. So we had a lot of people looking over our shoulders.

At the same time we had some very tough negotiators. Those Turks are very tough negotiators. I really respected them quite a bit. They really did their homework. They argued very cogently and stubbornly. Some of the stubbornest people you will ever meet. But very, very intelligent. They are really very, very good allies and we wanted to keep them as allies. This was our hope. There were times that we just didn't know whether they really wanted an agreement or not. The Turks were very good at keeping us guessing as to whether they really wanted an agreement or not.

Q: But they knew that you wanted an agreement?

GARDNER: They knew we wanted an agreement. They knew what was up with us. They knew that Greece was over on the other side. We had a strong feeling that they wanted us there. But we weren't absolutely sure because they were so angry. The Turks are highly nationalistic. We were not sure they wouldn't carry it to the point of actually getting rid of the base agreement.

Q: When you are saying this...okay they are very good negotiators, they knew their subject, etc., in some ways what difference does this make. I mean if you have two nations no matter how good negotiators you are...usually there are concerns, after all there is the Soviet Union, there is Greece...Do things fall into place no matter how good the negotiations are or not?

GARDNER: I think the Turks wanted to see if they could find something they could live with

and we just wondered if we could produce something they could live with under these circumstances. Obviously they weren't going to give up the relationship as a whole. There was no talk about them getting out of NATO, not with the Soviet Union next door. But what worried us was that we had an awful lot of intelligence gathering bases there. Also we had an Air Force base there which just figured recently in the Iraq crises, Jiarlik Air Force Base. We could have lost use of those things. We had far more in Turkey then we had in Greece, for example. And Turkey was geographically more important to us because of its borders along the Black Sea. Some of our installations were duplicated in Iran at that time, but you know what happened to Iran.

We tried to pretend that the facilities were not that valuable to us...satellites were taking over on this type of thing, etc, not fully meaning it, however, because they really were of some value still. The military was very dyed-in-the-wool about regulations and they had certain things about US bases. It was very hard to get Defense to change its attitude about these things.

Q: I have talked to people who have been involved in Portugal on the Azores negotiations, and particularly when you get back to the lawyers at the Department of Defense, they are very difficult.

GARDNER: Yes, it is very difficult. So a lot of our problems were with Defense, although we did work them out. Defense did give in many ways in the crucial areas like flags, etc. that I felt really didn't matter. We did finally get an agreement. The price tag on that agreement, was something the colonels and I (I was an FSO-2 career counselor at the time) couldn't decide. There were a few other things that could only be taken care of at the Cabinet level. So the negotiations moved up to the Ambassador with the Foreign Minister for the last part. I was aide to the Ambassador and that was a pure State Department thing because at that time there was only the Ambassador and me on our side...

Q: That Ambassador at that time was?

GARDNER: Macomber. Bill Macomber and me on one side and their Foreign Minister and my counterpart on the other side. So there were only four of us in this room. We felt it was necessary to take it down to that level for the last key points. I think we agreed virtually on everything except the amount, which was left open for the last stage of meetings with Kissinger in Washington. By that time it was clear, however, that there would be an agreement. We were quite comfortable that we had reached an agreement. Kissinger and his counterpart, in a few days here in Washington, arrived at the money amounts and negotiated the last clauses.

The agreement was not accepted by Congress, but that is another story and I was out of the picture by that time. It had to be renegotiated. I think Congress balked at the price. But by that time the government in Turkey had changed and we had a government in Turkey that was amenable and this reduced the pressure to a large degree. So when Congress did refuse to accept the agreement...As I recall it was never actually sent to Congress because there were clear messages from Congress that they wouldn't sign it. I may be wrong because by that time I was out of country. One way or the other it was learned that it wouldn't float with the Senate.

But by that time the regime had changed in Turkey and another negotiator did what changes were required and the Turks accepted them to get the large aid that was being offered.

Q: Well you left in 1976. By that time did you get the feeling that the situation in Cyprus was going to be there for some time and they were going to have to live with it?

GARDNER: I think the Turks made it pretty clear that they weren't going to leave the Turks on Cyprus to the Greeks. They made that quite clear. I personally never felt that there was an easy solution to this, unless they came to an agreement that would give the Turks a really large role in the governing of Cyprus. I wasn't involved in that side of things because I was completely tied up on the base negotiations.

One point I would like to make that really bothered me about working on things like this is the degree that lawyers do get involved in treaties. Of course this is very important from our point of view, because we are such a law abiding, "observe the letter of the law" society. The Lawyers wanted language to safeguard every possible situation in the future. One of these horrible contracts that our government tries to force on people from time to time. It makes you guarantee things for all sorts of contingencies which were not there and which I found quite stupid because no one pays attention to this kind of language.

So I did an airgram which the Department of State applauded, but which I am sure Defense did not applaud at all, in which I pointed out what the Turks had done under our other agreement. I said that everything that many of their acts you could consider violations. Then I pointed out why they had made these violations -- they were to be expected. Then I said, "You must take into consideration what they are going to do whether or not you have this language or not; you are stupid to try to put this language in to protect yourself. In many cases they are not going to accept it because it looks as if we are tying them up in knots." We tend to do this with every country, by the way. Our lawyers are really...

Q: I know. I have heard this in dealing with Morocco, etc.

GARDNER: But if you looked at our last agreement you could see that they had violated it all over the place, so why have language that you know is going to be violated from the beginning. That doesn't make any sense just to protect yourself. Of course you have to worry about Congress and other things.

Eventually we got the kind of agreement that was necessary and I was in charge of the first stage, the first document which later had to be changed.

Q: What was your impression of the Embassy when you arrived just after this catastrophe for American-Turkish relations? The invasion of Cyprus, which I considered well justified considering what the Greeks and the Greek-Cypriots had done. How was the Embassy responding to this diplomatic disaster?

GARDNER: Oh, well, we had a very forceful Ambassador and they responded the way he wanted them to do. I think he was quite effective. We had a very large military presence in there

that I worked with and many of them were quite good. I was really impressed with some of the military that I did work with. Especially at the colonel level. The ones on my team really did a good job. I found the general, as well, easy to work with. We had some good generals there. There were some exceptions, but that always occurs.

The hatches were battened down, obviously, because suddenly a friendly atmosphere turned unfriendly as far as the government was concerned. We had to host a Fourth of July party to which very few Turks came, but I had done that before. Otherwise, it was fine.

C. WILLIAM KONTOS
Director, Cyprus Task Force, Policy Planning Staff
Washington, DC (1974-1976)

C. William Kontos was born in Illinois in 1922. His career in the Foreign Service included positions in Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Pakistan, Lebanon, Sudan, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by Thomas Stern in February 1992.

KONTOS: I should mention that after my Jordanian Task Force experience, which had gone well, I was tapped again later for another Task Force. I became S/P's task force expert. This time, I was assigned as director of the Cyprus Task Force in 1974, which was a much bigger and longer one. That Task Force resulted from Makarios' attempt to ease Turkey out of the island. The Greeks and Turks almost went to war over that effort. The Colonels' government collapsed and was succeeded by a new regime. The Turks sent a sizeable contingent of troops into Cyprus and they drew a line of demarcation to separate the two communities. Many Greeks who lived then on the Turkish side were forced to leave their homes, creating a refugee problem. The Turks took about 40% of the land, although they were only 18% of the population. This was a much more intense experience than the Jordanian one. The Task Force was very large. There were a large number of American tourists stranded in Greece, Turkey and Cyprus who had to be evacuated. We had to brief U.N. officials and representatives of the EC. I worked very closely with Art Hartman, who was Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. That Bureau had, just a few weeks earlier taken over responsibility for Turkey, Greece and Cyprus, so that it didn't have much of an institutional memory or experience in this area. Art Hartman and Jim Lowenstein, his deputy, worked particularly closely with the Task Force. Phil Stoddard from INR, who was a specialist on the area worked closely with us as well. He was invaluable. NEA, which had been responsible for Turkey, assigned one of its officers, Peter Sutherland, to the Task Force. Dick Bowers was our Executive Officer. The group was large and of course we worked around the clock. We would change shifts every eight hours and I would spend a lot of time trying to be with each shift for at least a part of the time. The amount of cable traffic that had to be gone through was unbelievable. It stood in piles and piles. It was a major task just to read it, sort it, distribute it to the right places, and finally brief the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary (Jack Irwin) on the contents. The Cyprus Task Force lasted about six weeks.

Q: Before we leave this part of your career, tell us a little about S/P's role in the Department of State?

KONTOS: The functions of S/P have changed from time to time depending in major part on the relationship of the Director of the staff to the Secretary. Henry Kissinger and Winston Lord had a very close tie, of course. So that in addition to the normal functions of an S/P staff, we were also the speech writers. Lord would take the lead on drafting speeches, but some of us would be involved in the work depending on the subject. The S/P staff did not consider itself as the "devil's advocate". I did feel that Kissinger, not being very aware of such modalities as the chain of command, often turned to his confidante, Winston Lord, and asked him and S/P to do things that might normally be assigned to a bureau. That is how I became director of two Task Forces. In the Jordanian case, I happen to have had recent experience with Palestinians so that I did have a relevant background for that job. I guess I also had the reputation as a manager who could handle operational activities. When Cyprus came along, I had a track record, so that when the Secretary turned to Lord, he tapped me again.

Kissinger left a legacy on the Cyprus issue that has become controversial. He was accused by many people -- certainly the Greeks -- of having tilted towards Turkey and of not having pushed the Turks sufficiently to give up if not all, much of the territory they claimed and to withdraw their troops from the island. So his legacy is vexed and in Greece he earned considerable demerits for his handling of the Cyprus crisis. As I look back on it, however, I note that he avoided war and that although the Cyprus issue remains a complex and difficult matter, we continue to have the friendship and alliance of both Greece and Turkey. He perhaps could have been a little tougher at some stages. He made one comment that one of his principal problems was dealing with Archbishop Makarios, whom he described once as "being too large a man for such a small country". He thought the Archbishop needed a much larger stage on which to perform.

I don't want to suggest that the Task Force formulated policy. Kissinger did that. We brought the latest information to him, Irwin and Hartman so that policy could be formulated. Bill Macomber was our Ambassador in Turkey and Henry Tasca was our Ambassador to Greece. I was on the phone to both continually and I was a transmission belt. We assessed what was going on in the area. Lowenstein's job was to brief all the European Ambassadors in Washington. Hartman used what information and assessments we had to brief the Secretary. I used to brief Lord, sometimes also the Secretary, but that was Art's job primarily. It was, however, Kissinger who orchestrated the way we responded to the crisis. He would decide, for example, that he should call the President of Brazil. So he had to have a briefing paper on what he should say. He spoke frequently with the principals in Ankara, Athens and Cyprus.

Q: You seem to suggest that our role in the Cyprus crisis may have led to the development of policies that have stood since then.

KONTOS: Yes. Decisions made by Kissinger in a crisis moment have in effect become permanent U.S. policies. For example, his decision not to press the Turks too hard has stood the test of time, even though a number of us wished that he had pushed harder for a diminution of the Turkish armed forces on Cyprus. It is clear that the response to the crisis and subsequent events were orchestrated and shaped by Kissinger. He handled all the levers himself.

As far as my normal assignments -- economic development and the UN -- were concerned, although they were not high on the Secretary's priority list, there was a great deal of consternation and discussion in the UN on the "new economic order". Kissinger was dragged into this debate and had to be brought up to speed on economic issues, which he had heretofore disdained. There was an occasion when the President was going to address the UN on this "new economic order". Accusations had been made that the U.S. had somehow rigged the "old order" in a way that was counter-productive and inimical to the well-being and destiny of the Third World. There was a major confrontation in the U.N. which included attempts by certain U.N. members to reorganize the U.N. apparatus. The U.S. was on the defensive. Kissinger became involved in the damage limitation process and our efforts to try to turn the situation around so that our interests would not be undermined. He began an intensive study of economic issues. I would be called from time to time as one or another arose. I remember once that Kissinger was called upon to brief a half dozen Senators on the question of how we intended to handle the challenges from these Third World critics and how we intended to deal with the challenge of the "new economic order". Tom Enders had been conducting most of Henry's briefings (Economics 101). Kissinger characteristically mastered the subject matter and was able to deal with the Senators with ease. Kissinger always wanted *verbatim* notes of his meetings. Peter Rodman, who was Kissinger's personal assistant, had devised a system that would capture all of Kissinger's comments and keep them for posterity. I was not able to attend the meeting with the Senators (both Lord and Rodman did attend), but I saw the transcript of the meeting. Kissinger's performance was absolutely masterful. He had understood all he had been briefed on; he had absorbed the material and was able to outline it to his listeners in a clear and precise manner. It was a *tour de force* on economic issues which showed what a quick study he was. It was a very professional economic briefing.

Enders, Lord, and a couple of us were involved in this whole U.N. effort, along with Ambassador Moynihan. We wrote papers, drafted speeches, lobbied other nations. Moynihan was in Washington for a day and I was his escort officer. I took him around and had a liquid lunch with him. That was an exciting period.

The Cyprus Task Force had just been shut down and I had gone home for what I hoped to be my first good night's sleep. I didn't get home until after midnight, was planning to sleep late. At eight o'clock in the morning, the phone rang. It was my office announcing that the Secretary intended to visit the Task Force that morning and I should be in the office. I got dressed as fast as I have ever done, ran to my car, zoomed down to the Department just as the Secretary was finishing his tour. As he left, he did thank me warmly for my efforts on Cyprus. I had a couple of other meetings with Kissinger during which I was the note taker (Rodman couldn't be at all the meetings). Fortunately for me, Art Hartman also took notes because I could not possibly have recorded the full text of what was being said.

I was able to leave S/P with a good record of my activities. It was a very busy two years. I wrote a lot of memoranda, papers, and speeches on the issues I was following.

L. BRUCE LAINGEN

**Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European Affairs
Washington, DC (1974-1976)**

Ambassador Bruce Laingen was born in 1922. His Foreign Service career included positions in Iran and Washington, DC, and an ambassadorship to Malta. Ambassador Laingen was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on January 9, 1993.

Q: Did you get involved in Greece, Turkey and Cyprus?

LAINGEN: The Cyprus issue was still there at the time. Exactly where the Cyprus was at that point...?

Q: The invasion had taken place in July, 1974. Did you get involved in arms embargo in Turkey at all?

LAINGEN: Oh, yes, I remember the arms embargo in Turkey. With respect to Turkey I remember Sarbanes and John Brademas...

Q: These were two Greek Americans...

LAINGEN: Two Greek Americans, one in the Senate and one in the House, both of whom had had obvious concerns given their Greek constituencies and their Greek-American background over what was happening in Cyprus. And feeling very strongly about the Turkish invasion and carrying their anger and irritation and their legitimate concerns to the point of pushing the arms embargo against Turkey so strongly as to run into very frequent confrontations with the Department of State, and with the administration which felt, of course, that the Turkish arms embargo was prejudicial in terms of larger American interests affecting NATO.

That issue still prevails to this day in the sense that the Turks are still there. I can recall how frustrated I was then and have always been about the way in which the Turks have carried their presence in Cyprus to the point of having 24,000, as I recall the figure, troops in their part of Cyprus and never removing them. This is far more in terms of numbers and presence than conceivably would be required in any strategic sense, but in political terms determined to keep them there as evidence of their determination to keep the Greek Cypriots in their place.

I recall traveling in Cyprus at the time. This was...Ambassador Rodger Davies was murdered at the time in Cyprus. The exact date of that I don't recall. I had known another American Ambassador there in an earlier period when I was Greek and Cyprus Desk Officer...it was Tony Belcher, who has since died.

Q: Rodger Davies was assassinated on August 19, 1974 and William R. Crawford, Jr. replaced him and was there until 1978.

LAINGEN: I remember the terrible tragedy of the killing...it was not an assassination of Rodger Davies except that he fell victim to gunfire in the turmoil of the place at that time.

I saw a lot of the diplomats of the two countries, Greece and Turkey at that time, and in Cyprus. I always thought, myself, that one of the tragedies of peoples on the surface of the globe is that some of them are destined to live side by side, destined to forever have problems with each other, and the Greeks and the Turks are among them and the Pakistanis and the Indians are another pair. It seems impossible for them ever to come to any kind of accord that does not shortly fall apart. A small island like Cyprus, a terribly small place, but nonetheless has loomed so large because of the way in which peoples of two other countries look on it as an important place where emotions are greatly caught up. A lot like Kashmir between the Indians and the Pakistanis.

The Greeks and the Turks wisely concluded in 1960 with the Zurich Accord that perhaps the only solution was for them to both agree on some kind of independent status for the place. That worked for a time and still works in the sense that there are now two independent portions of the same formerly independent republic.

Kashmir having never reached that point and in my view today, 1992, the only solution for that tragedy...and it was very tragic in terms of the impact on the people of the place...the only solution for that is independence. Regrettably neither the Pakistanis nor the Indians as governments are prepared to see that happen, although increasingly, I think, there is evidence that peoples in both countries are prepared to move towards some kind of independent state themselves.

This is getting outside of where we have been, perhaps, but the Kashmir issue cannot help but be affected by the way in which self determination as a sentiment is today contributing to all kinds of political change. This is evident particularly in the former Soviet Union and also in Yugoslavia.

Q: Outside of Congressional pressure, how did we deal with Greece and Turkey? Did we have to watch the balance very carefully?

LAINGEN: Well, we had to watch it very carefully. Not least because of what you just indicated that there was an American domestic political interest involved, given the substantial Greek minority in this country. I have always said that one of the problems the Turks have in this country is that there aren't many Turkish restaurants, but there are a lot of Greek restaurants. And the sentiment among them is very strong and there is a natural American inclination to be supportive of the Greeks, not least, I guess, because they are Christians and how that affects public attitudes.

But I don't recall that there ever was a massive American public interest in the problems between the Greeks and the Turks, except to the degree to which the Greek-American community has been able to fuel that. Fuel is probably the wrong term. It is not meant to be critical, it is a natural consequence. I think for that reason there is also that feeling that the Greeks in that situation were a kind of minority, dealing with a larger country like Turkey. That the Greeks were the ones that we should be generally supporting.

For that matter I felt that way myself, believing and seeing how the Turks had so ruthlessly, forcibly involved themselves to protect a relatively small minority of people on the island. I guess I was instinctively naturally affected as well by what I hope is a majority feeling among most Americans that ethnic considerations should not affect American foreign policy...that the Greek-American minority should not have the degree of influence simply because they are Greek-American that it had in this particular case. It makes it difficult for people working on an issue in the Department of State to hold on to their objectivity, if you will, or their impartiality. There is this American domestic political influence or impact that one has to keep one's eye on over one's shoulder if nothing else. Of course the major one in American experience is the Jewish-American community.

Q: As regards Israel.

LAINGEN: Yes. The Greek-American community has never been as effective a force as has the Jewish-American community through PACs such as AIPAC, but given their relatively small numbers, the Greek-Americans have been remarkably successful in influencing American policy towards Greece, the Greek-Turkish issues and particularly the Cyprus issue.

Q: Did you get many delegations of Greek-Americans coming to see you?

LAINGEN: Oh yes, we saw them all the time including the Primate of the Orthodox Church in the United States, the Archbishop of the Orthodox Church of North and South America, who I think at the time was Jakovist in New York City, and still is. Jakovist is the Archbishop of that Church and I believe was in the seat at that point. I don't recall being hailed down to meet personally with Sarbanes and Brademas, but the fact of their strong interest in anything we did affecting Cyprus was very much in our minds all the time.

Q: It was a very interesting province or dioceses of your day because you had the Spain and Portugal emergencies, and the Greek-Turkey-Cyprus problem, and with Italy and one wondering about the various elections and how the Communists would come out.

JACK B. KUBISCH
Ambassador
Athens, Greece (1974-1977)

Ambassador Jack B. Kubisch was born in Missouri in 1920. His career in the Foreign Service included positions in France, Mexico, and Washington, DC, and an ambassadorship to Greece. He was interviewed by Henry Mattox in 1989.

Q: How did you choose Athens or how did Athens choose you?

KUBISCH: It turned out that in July of 1974, while I was Assistant Secretary, the then Greek military government endeavored to cooperate with Greek Cypriots on the Island of Cyprus, to overthrow the Government of President and Archbishop Makarios on Cyprus, to assassinate him,

and for a group of Greek Cypriots to take control of Cyprus and unite Cyprus with Greece. This led to a crisis and a near war between Greece and Turkey. It led to the fall of the military regime in Greece that had been there for seven years, and the reassignment of the American Ambassador in Greece, Ambassador Tasca, who had been so closely associated with the regime of the Greek colonels. When this happened, and a near war was about to break out, Kissinger and I were talking about it and I informed him that I knew a very prominent, perhaps the most prominent, civilian statesman in modern Greece, a man by the name of Constantine Karamanlis, who had been recalled to Greece in late July in 1974 to reassume the prime ministership of the country after he had been in voluntary exile for ten years in Paris.

Kissinger asked me if I had any interest in going to Greece as ambassador, and I said, "Yes, I would" in line with earlier conversations that we had had. I said, "I would welcome such an assignment." And he said that he would talk to the President about it. The matter dragged on for a couple of weeks because these were the final days and weeks of the Nixon Administration leading to President Nixon's resignation on Friday, August 9, 1974, almost at the height of the crisis between Greece and Turkey. Kissinger called me that day and said he had spoken to President Ford and President Ford was prepared to name me as ambassador to Greece and would I come to the White House. Nixon resigned at Noon on Friday, August 9th and about 5:00 p.m. that afternoon I was at the White House privately with our new President Ford and Secretary Kissinger talking about the Greek-Turkish problem.

President Ford, whom I had known fairly well as a congressman and as Vice President, called me by my first name, "Jack, Henry tells me that you're willing to go to Athens as our ambassador. Is that right?" And I said, "Yes, I would welcome the assignment." He said, "All right, that settles it. You can go."

Kissinger asked me to propose candidates to replace myself as Assistant Secretary of State: two from the Foreign Service, one in the State Department at the time and one abroad, and one not in the State Department or the Foreign Service. These were his requirements, give me three names of who you think your successor should be, which over the coming days I did, and he finally selected one.

But I should tell you that I think I was President Ford's first appointment after he became President because the request for agrément went out to the Greek Government over the weekend. The following Monday evening, I think it was August 12th, I was in the White House at a reception, or maybe it was the 13th, Tuesday the 13th because Ambassador Rodger Davies, our ambassador in Nicosia, Cyprus had been assassinated earlier that day, and there was a tremendous upheaval going on in Greece and in Cyprus, lots of problems. President Ford, very considerably I thought, to both my wife and me, came over and said, "Jack, I heard about Ambassador Davies in Cyprus being murdered earlier today. I know Athens is a very dangerous post. If you have second thoughts about going out there" he said, "I'd be willing to try and find somebody else to take the assignment." I said no and did go in September, 1974.

Q: You had known Karamanlis?

KUBISCH: I had known Karamanlis in Paris while he was in exile.

Q: In what capacity?

KUBISCH: In a democratic society or country it's very well advised for American officials and ambassadors and chargés and diplomats to maintain contacts with key leaders of opposition parties who may someday come back to power. So, for example, I used to meet with President, or at that time the head of the Socialist Party, Mitterrand in France, even though Pompidou was President of the country. And in that context, I was under instructions from time to time from Washington to meet with Constantine Karamanlis who had been Prime Minister of Greece and gone into voluntary exile. So from time to time I would send other officers from the embassy to go and discuss world matters with him and explain U.S. policies and just show him some courtesies. That's how I had come to know him.

Q: Take him to lunch?

KUBISCH: I don't think I ever had lunch with him in Paris.

Q: From April through September, 1974 in Greece there were, at least from time to time, mass demonstrations going on. Was that a problem when you arrived on the scene?

KUBISCH: It was a problem, the dimensions of which I cannot exaggerate. I'll tell you why. Actually the military regime in Greece continued until July 22, 1974 and that's when the demonstrations started. Greece and Turkey almost went to war. There was a great humiliation in Greece over what had happened in Cyprus, the fact that the Turks had landed there. There was a widespread feeling in Greece that all of the problems of Greece, the problems that Greece had with Turkey, the problems Greece had on Cyprus, the oppression and repression the people of Greece had suffered for seven years under the colonels, the Greek colonels, the military dictatorship, that the responsible party for all of this was the U.S. Government. And, as a result, they began tremendous demonstrations against the U.S. Embassy and against the United States Government.

It might be interesting to recall why they had this impression. My feeling when I arrived in Greece, as to why they felt this way, was because that for seven years, from 1967 to '74, the Greek Government was kind of a pariah among western democracies. The governments of Western Europe, the democratic governments, had virtually nothing to do with Greece during those seven years. No important leader of any country visited Greece while the colonels were in power during those seven years. But the exception was the United States. The Vice President of the United States, Spiro Agnew, made an official visit to Greece. The Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, made an official visit to Greece. The Secretary of Commerce, Maurice Stans, made an official visit to Greece. Our top NATO commanders and American military commanders repeatedly made important official visits to Greece during this military regime. And whenever they were there, the Greek Government, the military government, exploited these visits as fully as they could with newspapers, with stories, with photographs and everything. There came to be in the minds of the Greek people a feeling that the United States Government was the one friend these military leaders of Greece had and that the U.S. was only interested in Greece because of our military bases there and that the CIA basically was carrying to the Greek

military instructions as to what to do. Therefore, the Greek people felt that we were responsible for the disaster on Cyprus, for the Turkish troop landings on Cyprus, and for the major problems the country faced at that time.

On demonstrations I would just say that I've seen many demonstrations in my life. I saw the demonstrations in the 60s in Washington where 50,000 or 100,000 people would demonstrate. I saw them in Brazil in the early 60s when there were 100,000 people in the streets of Sao Paulo and Rio and Brasilia. And even during the Vietnam Peace Accords, our embassy in Paris was attacked several times by 10,000, 20,000 or 30,000 people in the Place de la Concorde. We were well protected by the French authorities, fortunately.

But I had never seen demonstrations of the kind that took place in Athens. There were demonstrations of 200,000, 300,000 or 400,000 people that gathered in the center of town all day long and then marched on the American Embassy, 200 to 300 abreast, marching by, using the worst, most obscene epithets in language, and trying to break into the embassy. They did succeed in breaking into the embassy once, tried to set it on fire and did over \$100,000 worth of damage. It was really a period of great turbulence in Greece and deep, bitter anti-American feelings.

Q: What year was this that they managed to break into the embassy?

KUBISCH: They broke into the embassy in late 1974, as I recall. I arrived in September of '74 and we had word that . . .

Q: That was the first year you were there?

KUBISCH: It was, yes.

Q: What protection did Karamanlis offer at that time?

KUBISCH: To the embassy?

Q: Yes.

KUBISCH: Well, the Greek authorities tried to protect the embassy. For example, on the day the mob broke in, or the evening they broke in, we knew there was going to be a big gathering downtown and a march against the embassy. So about 4:00 in the afternoon I sent everybody home, and I left the embassy with the security officer, the American security officer and the Marine guards, and several others. And as the groups came by, they marched by, they got to the embassy at about 8:00 in the evening. By prearrangement they burned an American flag as a signal and then stormed the embassy. There were a couple of hundred Greek police surrounding the embassy as a barricade, and I had given the Marines instructions not to draw a pistol and shoot anyone because they were looking for a martyr, the demonstrators, the leaders of the demonstration, to try and bring on even more anti-American sentiment in the country.

I had told the Marines not to draw their pistols or shoot anyone unless, as we used to say in the Navy in World War II, you were in the last extremity where they had you down, they were about

to do you terrible damage, then you could draw your pistol and shoot. And those Marines, we had twelve at the time in the Marine security guard, did a wonderful job. They fought off the people breaking into the embassy with brooms and fire extinguishers and chairs and so on. A lot of people were hurt. There were a lot of broken bones, broken arms, broken clavicles and so on. A lot of police were badly injured, but no one was killed.

Q: Let's see now, further into the violence at the embassy in Athens in late '74.

KUBISCH: I just wanted to say that I saw then, and this greatly influenced me as I endeavored to fashion U.S. posture and policy in Greece at the time, the terrible price the U.S. Government must pay when it associates itself so intimately, so publicly and so prominently with a repressive regime in another country. The damage to U.S. interests in that period and subsequently, in my view, flowed directly from unnecessary and short-sighted policies and actions during the previous several years.

So I decided that we would have to revamp our CIA station in Greece and its role there and follow a set of policies in the country, both publicly and behind the scenes, that would try and rectify what was a very severe and threatening situation to U.S. interests.

I might say further about that particular damage to the embassy, I was outraged when I saw all the damage that had been done, and I was determined it would never happen again. I didn't think it would happen, and the Greek authorities assured me they would not allow it to happen even once. The Minister of Defense, bless his heart, a man by the name of Averoff, came immediately to the embassy during the evening, this was about 10:00 in the evening, to express, on his behalf and on the part of Greek authorities, his great sadness and sorrow about this attack on our embassy and the damage done to it. And the Foreign Minister, Dimitri Bitsios, called me on the telephone. He has since passed away. He expressed his regret on the phone and said that the Greek Government would pay the expense of repairing the embassy, which they did.

This led, by the way, to a big issue between our embassy and Washington as to what should be done to prevent this in the future because the embassy building had been designed by a famous architect, Gropius. It was built on kind of a small hillside. It was kind of a modern-day building along the style of the Acropolis and the Parthenon on the Acropolis. It was a beautiful building with no fences or anything around it. I decided we were going to have to put a fence around the embassy. I hated to do it, but I decided we would have to put a fence around it. Some of the people in the embassy said, "Oh, the Greek people will never understand this. They'll think that this fence is going to be a barricade and symbolic of problems between Greece and the United States." But we did end up putting a fence around it, a very high fence with spikes on top and putting shrubbery around it to disguise it to make sure that no one was ever injured again by an attack on that embassy.

This was, of course, in '74, long before we had the kinds of security problems that subsequently became so serious to our diplomats and our establishments abroad.

Q: That one instance of the break-in at the embassy, did they get through to the inner sanctum, the code room?

KUBISCH: No, they did not. They broke into the section of the embassy that was closest to the main thoroughfare that went by the embassy and only on the ground floor. That was the consular section. They did a tremendous amount of damage in there, broke windows and furniture and tried to overturn file cabinets and set fire. They were only in the building for about 30 minutes before they were driven out. But they never got into any important classified area.

Q: The Greek police drove them out?

KUBISCH: The Greek police drove them out and many Greek police were badly injured during this melée.

Q: Were any marines injured?

KUBISCH: No marines were seriously injured, only minor injuries.

Q: At the time, '74 early '75, the anti-American demonstrations continued. Your frame of mind at the time, were you inclined to think that the CIA had played an inappropriate role and was playing an inappropriate role in Greece operating out of the American Embassy?

KUBISCH: Yes, I did. My view on this is not shared, I'm sure, by many key officials in the CIA. But, I think, to understand it one needs to recall there was a terrible bitter civil war in the late 40s. There was an underground in Greece, and the CIA during the 40s, 50s and 60s became active in having close collaboration, intimate collaboration, with many key Greek leaders. The CIA, to some extent, it seemed to me, operated semi-independently from the ambassador and the embassy. I was never really sure at the outset that I knew whom they were seeing and what they were doing. I wanted to bring the CIA station under my control. So I felt, rightly or wrongly, that CIA had never really modernized in Greece to the kind of CIA station that existed in the other countries of Western Europe that I was familiar with, and in the countries of Latin America. They were still sort of operating the way they had operated 15 or 20 years earlier, and this was no longer appropriate. So it was at that time that I felt we would have to change the station and change its activities and to bring it more closely under my control and supervision.

Q: You were not always entirely sure you were seeing everything that was being sent out?

KUBISCH: No, because their instructions were to show me those things which they felt, either in Washington or in the local station, that I needed to see. Now they were constantly reassuring me that I saw everything important and knew everything important they were doing except "sources and methods." Obviously, only those that need to, know who their agents are by name or the methods they used to acquire intelligence. There was no need for me to know the details of that.

Q: You were there for several years, and presumably you brought the agency under control. How did you go about it?

KUBISCH: Well, I made my views known both to the State Department and CIA in Washington by sending messages.

Q: *By cable?*

KUBISCH: By cable, written messages of what I felt needed to be done. I requested that the then station chief, who was a very competent officer, be replaced. At my request he was replaced. A man was proposed to me to become station chief in Athens, who had been the CIA station chief in Peru that I had known, a man by the name of Richard Welch. He had been an undergraduate at Harvard, a classics major, spoke Greek, and I knew him to be a very, very fine person that I could work with. So when he was proposed to become my station chief, I accepted him with great pleasure.

Q: *He was nominated in November and assassinated on the 23rd of December. At that time he was 46 years old. He was station chief and widely known locally as being CIA, even though he had been there only a short period of time. He was named as an agent in the English language Athens News on November 25th. Six others in the embassy were named. What was your reaction at the time? How did you cope or deal with that? Did you try to do anything about it?*

KUBISCH: It was a very serious problem. I was dismayed to learn that he had been identified even before his arrival in Greece. He had been identified also in a circular, I believe, that had been sent around to Greece and elsewhere where they kept track of CIA officers operating abroad in various U.S. embassies.

Q: *There was a publication called "Counter Spies" that was being put out by Philip Agee at the time which had named him apparently in January and June of that year.*

KUBISCH: I understand that's correct. He had been named. He was not really troubled by this. But I should say that the head of the CIA station in Greece had traditionally lived in a certain U.S. Government-owned residence.

Q: *The same is true of other posts.*

KUBISCH: Yes. We had in Greece some six or eight Government-owned residences, and the CIA station chief had lived in one. Needless to say, the Greek intelligence services and many Greeks who wanted to find out, and foreign intelligence services were able to identify the CIA station chief in Greece. It's not hard for them to identify him in almost any country of the world, I suppose. The difference in Greece was that it was highly publicized. So when he came to Greece, assigned to the political section ostensibly, my deputy chief of mission, Monty Stearns, and I had made arrangements for him to go into a different residence and to live in a different part of town, to try and help conceal who he was and to give him some cover.

I must say, that neither Welch nor his wife seemed to be at all concerned about this, not at all. After they looked at the house that we had selected for them before their arrival, and looked at other houses that were available, they finally decided to move into the same house that their predecessors had lived in, the CIA house. I reluctantly concurred in this and he moved in. As I recall, he was there for a few months in 1975 before his assassination. Seems to me he may have arrived in the summer of '75. I'm not positive. I don't remember the exact dates. But I know he

was one of my tennis buddies, and we played tennis a number of times, while he was there, as partners. I liked him very much.

He cooperated with me in revamping the CIA station and its wide, deep and, in my view, unnecessary extent of operations in Greece. He cooperated with me in accomplishing this over a period of a few months before his death. I think that was one of the great pities. His death was a great personal, as well as a professional, tragedy for me, even to this day. I'll never overcome it. He was a true friend of Greece, a friend of U.S.-Greece cooperation, and he was cooperating with me in trying to bring about the kinds of CIA operations in Greece that were more appropriate to the modern era, the modern times.

But, to stay with this a moment longer, I invited him to my house, the Ambassador's residence, for a Christmas party. I thought it was December 22nd, it might have been December 23rd. We were having a reception with Greek music, Greek food and Greek dancing and probably had 100 to 200 people there. A number of Greek officials were present and a lot of embassy staff and the children from the embassy and the children of Greek officials whom we knew, including Ministers of the Government, as part of my program to try and establish more cordial and cooperative working relationships between Greek authorities and American officials there.

He and his wife left our residence that evening about 9:00 or 10:00, they got in a car, drove just a few blocks to the house he was living in. His wife told me later that evening that as they drove by their house the lights were out in the driveway and on the front porch. Had they been in Guatemala, she said, where they had once served, they would not have stopped. They would have stepped on the accelerator and kept going if the lights were out until they got to the local police precinct or back to the embassy. But they just didn't think in Athens that there was any real severe threat to them.

They drove into their driveway and stopped. Across the street there was a small car with four people in it. Three of them got out. One came to each side of the Welch's car, made Mrs. Welch and Dick Welch get out. They asked him to put his hands up, in Greek. He spoke Greek. He apparently, as he was putting his hands up, asked them what they wanted. They fired three slugs from a .45 into his chest and killed him. They got in the car and sped off.

Q: Terrible story. I was in Cairo at the time, and we were rather deeply shocked there when we heard it as well. A year later there was a press report that a Greek security police chief was killed in December of 1976, a year later. A ballistic test indicated that the pistol that killed this police chief, former Greek police chief, was the same gun that killed Welch, and that the organization involved was something called the "Revolutionary Organization of 17 November." Do you recall that?

KUBISCH: Yes, I do. I think there have been several other assassinations in Greece that have been traced to that same weapon. It is a political statement, in part, I think. The November 17th group was a group that had been protesting the military regime between '67 and '74, and the military regime reacted very harshly on November 17th. I think it was in 1973. I'm not positive of that date. So they established an organization to retaliate and they used this weapon. This was a political statement by them, murdering the chief of the CIA and other key Greeks and others

who, for one reason or another, had been involved in oppressing Greek people or cooperating with American officials.

Q: In 1975, during your period of time there, in April, the U.S. and Greek governments jointly announced that the Sixth Fleet Base Agreement was going to be ended and that the U.S. air base at Athens Airport was going to be closed. What occasioned all of that?

KUBISCH: Well, when President Karamanlis came back as prime minister in July of '74, he took several steps in an effort to gain wide support among the Greek people. He announced Greece's withdrawal from the military command structure of NATO. Another was an announcement that Greece, the Greek Government, would insist on Americans withdrawing from military facilities in Greece and renegotiating any U.S. presence there. He took a number of steps that had a favorable reaction among the Greek people. So that announcement to which you refer had to do with the closing of American bases and plans to home port an American carrier and its support forces in Greece that had been underway for several years, a home port of a carrier group, battle group, in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Incidentally, Karamanlis told me once when we were talking about this and some of the steps he had taken in Greece, he said that many things had been written about him, Karamanlis, but there was one thing that was written about him of which he was more proud than anything else. And I said, "What was that, Mr. Prime Minister?" And he said, "De Gaulle had written in his memoirs that Constantine Karamanlis was the one man who could govern a nation of people who did not wish to be governed."

I should also mention that Karamanlis did not speak very good English. He spoke a little English. He spoke fair to poor French and, of course, Greek. Obviously, he was fluent in Greek, his native language. I went to Greece rather abruptly before I could really become competent in Greek. I studied it as much as I could before I left and every day with a tutor while I was there, and I began to acquire some facility in the language. But whenever Karamanlis and I were alone, we ended up speaking in all three languages, Greek, English and French as we were communicating with each other. In one way or another he would say, "Now, what you said was this and you meant that" and so on. In fact, at one point, I spent almost a day and a half with him alone, or virtually alone, as we dealt with another crisis in that part of the world which we might discuss at some point if you wish.

Q: Was that the Turkish question?

KUBISCH: Yes. It was a crisis between Greece and Turkey over the Aegean. I'd be glad to say a few words about this, if you wish, because I think it shows a role an ambassador can play in helping to avert a serious conflict and particularly this one, much of which has never been published. I can give you an insight into what really happened.

The fact is that there was a widespread movement in the United States to establish a Greek lobby in order to influence the American Government on policy toward Greece. The Greek Government itself was, of course, deeply involved with the Cyprus crisis, between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots and between Greece and Turkey. Perhaps even more serious, in the view of the

Greek Government, were the problems in the Aegean Sea between Greece and Turkey because very basic strategic, economic, military and political interests of the Greek people and the Greek Government were at stake there.

It was, as I recall, in the summer of 1976 that the Turkish Government began a program that the Greek Government and the Greek people thought threatened their vital interests. This almost led to a war between the two countries. The first time had been over Cyprus in '74. This was the second time, the summer of '76.

The issue was basically that the Turkish Government was going to send out a scientific exploration ship to study the bottom of the Aegean Sea for mineral and oil deposits because oil had been discovered in the northern Aegean Sea bed. The Greek people and the Greek Government said they would not allow this to happen. It went to a basic dispute between the two countries over who had the rights to resources in the sea bed in the Aegean.

The Turkish Government took the position that Asia Minor had a continental shelf that went out from Turkey under the Aegean and that the mineral and sea bed rights belonged to Turkey because it was on their continental shelf. The Greek Government took the position that Greece and its 3,000 islands, many of which are in the Aegean, had their own continental shelves, that Greece was an archipelagic state. As a matter of fact, the word archipelago has its origin in the Greek words "above the sea," "islands above the sea."

The Turkish Government said the islands were mere protuberances on the Turkish continental shelf. The Greek Government took the position that the islands had their own continental shelves around them and that if the Turkish Government sent this ship out, it was called the "Seismik", Greek naval vessels would intercept and take it under control and bring it back to a Greek port. The Turkish Government said if the Greek Government did that, they would be fired on and the Turkish Government would send ships out to protect the research vessel.

Over a period of some weeks, the issue got hotter and hotter, and tensions and emotions rose on both sides of the Aegean. When I would ask for instructions from Washington as to what we could do about this, the U.S. position was, well, we call on both parties to restrain their passions, to calm down and let the crisis pass and negotiate a solution -- basically, a hands-off posture. We didn't want to get involved in such a serious dispute between two prized and valued allies.

Q: Two NATO partners.

KUBISCH: Two NATO partners. It was becoming increasingly clear to me that if we didn't do anything, that if somebody didn't do something, the Greek Government had no choice but to send naval vessels to intercept the Turkish Seismik and that there could be gun fire and a conflict between the two countries.

In the meantime, I learned that Prime Minister Karamanlis was getting advice and recommendations from his own subordinates in his foreign ministry and his legal department that Greece's position was a sound, legal position based on the 1958 Law of the Sea Convention which Greece had signed but which Turkey had not.

In looking into it I disagreed. I thought he was getting bad advice, and I told him so. I told him that if he sent Greek naval vessels out to intercept the Seismik, the Turkish ship, that he would not have the support of the world community and Greece would be isolated. I told him that, in my opinion, he was getting bad advice. I did this without instructions and without authority.

Q: Under what circumstances? Did you call on him?

KUBISCH: I was seeing him on other matters during this period and told him then. To my surprise, one Friday afternoon about 4:00, he called me on the telephone and said, "Ambassador, I've arranged for a small boat to take me out for a little recreation this weekend. I'm leaving tomorrow morning at 11:00, Saturday morning, and I wonder if you and Mrs. Kubisch would care to join me. It will just be us and no one else there to speak of, no other foreign officials and no other government officials. I would like to talk to you." So I said, "Yes."

I went out with him at 11:00 on Saturday morning and we stayed out until late Sunday afternoon. During that time I talked to him at length about why I thought he was getting bad advice. It had to do with whether or not this research vessel would actually "penetrate" the sea bed and drill, or whether it would merely drag a cable and take some "soundings" of the sea bed, which it would be legally all right for it to do from the standpoint of scientific explorations.

As a result of this weekend with him privately, and without the authority of my own government in Washington, I think I changed his mind. I could be wrong. But, in any case, he went back and authorized a press campaign to tell the Greek people that Greece was wrong, that their position was not a sound position legally, and that they would lose the support of the world community if they attacked the Turkish vessel. As long as the Turkish vessel didn't touch the bottom but merely took sonar soundings and so on, this was perfectly all right. And the whole crisis subsided.

Q: During that period the Department distributed to posts abroad a great deal of information on Law of the Sea which, of course, had been hanging around for years, the negotiations. Is that how you managed to inform yourself so closely on this issue?

KUBISCH: Yes, exactly. Just from materials that were available in the embassy, although I may also have requested materials from Washington, copies of documents or interpretations, and so on. I don't remember at the moment.

Q: Did you inform the Department of what you had done?

KUBISCH: Subsequently. And, as I recall, I got a well-done message back from them.

Q: When was that exactly?

KUBISCH: As I recall, it was in about August of 1976.

Q: Well, that was an issue between two allies, valued allies, as you put it. At this time, '76, about

a year before you were to leave, was the bases question still the outstanding issue in the U.S., American relations at that time?

KUBISCH: It was one of the major problems. I'll just say one word more before we leave this problem between Greece and Turkey, and Cyprus, which is this. You may recall during this period, Henry, that the Congress had passed a law placing an embargo on arms shipments from the United States to Turkey until Turkey withdrew its military forces from Cyprus and changed its policy toward Cyprus. The Executive Branch of our Government under President Ford and Secretary Kissinger were, on the other hand, strongly in favor of shipping arms to Turkey. So the two policies were diametrically opposed. The Executive Branch of our Government felt that if we shipped arms to Turkey, we could maintain a cordial relationship with the Turks and could influence them more to moderate their policies on Cyprus.

The Congress, under great pressure from the Greek-American community and the so-called "Greek Lobby" in the United States, legislated the embargo and said that we weren't going to let Turkey have any arms or spare parts until they left Cyprus.

What became apparent to me then was the price we pay at times in our system of government with the separation of powers, which has so many benefits for us as a nation. In this case, for example, the policy being followed and advocated by the Executive Branch might have worked, the cooperation with Turkey and the supplying of arms, if it had gone forward. The policy of the Congress of withholding arms, embargoing arms and putting pressure on Turkey, might also have worked if that policy had been followed. But what was perfectly clear was that both policies could not work simultaneously. As a result, they tended to cancel out each other. They had the effect of paralyzing U.S. influence in the area; and we could not play, as a result, the role that the United States Government could have and should have played in bringing about a settlement of the Cyprus crisis.

Q: Well, without the benefit of hindsight particularly, what would have been your prescription then when you were there close to the scene and pretty well seized with the problem? What would you have suggested would have been the most useful way to work through the crisis at that time?

KUBISCH: The most useful way to work through the crisis would have been, in my view, to do what the Executive Branch generally wanted to do, to cooperate with the Turks -- they, after all, had 600,000 men under arms and had the longest border with the Soviet Union and were a staunch ally -- to work with them and cooperate with them in trying to bring about a more moderate and compromising position on their part to deal with the Greeks.

I think that could have been done, and most of the people I knew who were well informed of the situation at the time felt the same way. But to threaten the Turks the way we did and to publicly pressure them the way we did with Congressional legislation, although it satisfied some emotional concerns of many people, actually helped to thwart the accomplishment of our objectives in the region.

Q: Did you as Ambassador have any contacts with the so-called "Greek lobby"?

KUBISCH: Oh, constantly. They were always sending delegations to Athens. I was meeting with them. They are wonderful people. Archbishop Yakovos, who is the head of the Greek Orthodox Church in the Western Hemisphere and lives in New York, and is still the Archbishop there, came many times to Greece; and I dealt with him and through him, with others and through the Greek delegations that came. But the feeling on this issue was intense back in the United States among many Greek Americans. In fact, they felt that they helped bring about President Ford's defeat for reelection in 1976 because many of them had been Republicans and supporters of the Republican President and shifted their support to President Carter. They felt they played a major role in the defeat of Ford in 1976.

Q: Well, now on a bilateral problem, bases. It's a rather large subject. It goes on year after year during this period, does it not?

KUBISCH: Yes, it does. It still goes on to this day. I think the negotiations themselves, the bases and facilities they covered, have been well presented in a number of documents that are available to historians and students.

I think I would just like to make one major point about these. Prime Minister Karamanlis told me on a number of private occasions that there was no danger that the bases would ever be closed in Greece, that Greece's "vocation" was with the West and that Greece would remain a part of NATO and allied with the United States. But, he said, it would take time to repair the feelings of the Greek people against the United States. He said he knew how to handle that and to please trust him and work with him on it.

When the negotiations were first to begin concerning the bases, the Greek Government named an ambassador, an official of the Greek foreign ministry with the rank of ambassador, to head their negotiating team. At my recommendation, the U.S. Government named the DCM in our Embassy in Athens, Minister Stearns, as head of our negotiating team. And those negotiations went on for a year or so. Then Stearns was transferred to be our Ambassador to the Ivory Coast just when the negotiations were almost complete. I took them in hand myself for the final months and brought them to a conclusion, following which I left Greece in July, 1977.

I used my imminent departure from Greece as a means of bringing the negotiations to a conclusion. I said to the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Defense Minister of Greece, if I leave Greece without these negotiations completed and the documents initialed, you can be sure that my successor will want to reopen the whole thing, and all of this work we've been doing the last year and a half will be down the drain. It worked very well because we got the agreements just a few days before I was to depart and return to the United States, all the documents, the basic agreements, the annexes, the attachments, and many documents initialed.

Then later, as you know, Henry, I also became a Special Negotiator on the Spanish base negotiations. We have important base negotiations not only with Greece and Turkey and Spain, but the Philippines and many other countries. So I've now been in a position of dealing with important base negotiations in the different capacities: when my DCM underneath me headed them, when I did it myself as the Ambassador in the country, and when I went as a Special

Negotiator with the rank of Ambassador to another country. And I would just say that I am an unreconstructed advocate of having a Special Negotiator having the rank of Ambassador to head such negotiations. I could give all kinds of reasons for this.

I remember very well in Greece that when the DCM was handling the negotiations and an impasse developed between him and his Greek counterpart and the two delegations, I could go privately to the Minister of Defense in the Greek Government, or to the Prime Minister or the Foreign Minister and, on a first name basis, work out a compromise with them that could then be given back in the form of instructions to the negotiators and the negotiating teams to settle. It was a great channel I had. The moment my DCM left and I became the negotiator in Greece, I was on a par with the Ambassador in the Greek Foreign Ministry who was the head of the negotiating team on the Greek side. And whenever an impasse developed between us, I found that the Minister of Defense or the Foreign Minister or the Prime Minister would call us both into his office, the American Ambassador and the Greek Ambassador in charge of their negotiating team, and sort of knock our heads together, so to speak, until we came up with some kind of settlement or compromise. I had been pushed down in the hierarchy and had lost my private, behind the scenes, highest level channel.

At the same time, when I went to Spain as a Special Negotiator, I found that, coming from Washington, I could be a very effective and hard negotiator, knowing very well the views of all the military services in the United States and the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department and others. I could represent their views vigorously, leaving our Ambassador in Spain at the time to have his private channels available and to be the nice guy while I was the "heavy" leading the team from Washington.

Q: The good cop, bad cop.

KUBISCH: Yes, the good cop, bad cop technique.

Q: Did you find that you had adequate instructions from the Department in, let's say, these two negotiations, the Greek and Spanish base negotiations?

KUBISCH: Oh yes, because being a Special Negotiator, I would go back to Washington, in the case of the Spanish negotiation, meet with all the interested parties and leaders there, and help draft my own instructions which would then be sent out from Washington. Then I and my negotiating team would go to Spain, receive those instructions and carry them out. So it was very, very effective.

I must say that there is one high State Department official who does not share my view about Special Negotiators, or at least didn't a few years ago. That is Lawrence Eagleburger, who at the time came in as Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and has now just been named by Secretary Baker to be the new Deputy Secretary of State. Larry Eagleburger and I have been colleagues for many years and worked very closely together on a number of things, and I have very high regard for him both professionally and personally. But on this matter he and I disagree.

He believes, or believed at least a few years ago, that the resident American Ambassador should

conduct these kinds of base negotiations, not a Special Negotiator from Washington. And I have the feeling that he believed that in part because, I think, his only post as Ambassador abroad was in Yugoslavia; and in a country such as Yugoslavia, under Marshal Tito, and in the case of many such regimes, an American Ambassador is very much restricted in what he can do, where he can go, and how he spends his time. Therefore, he has the time available to do very complicated negotiations. But in a democratic society such as Greece, or Spain, or the Philippines, an American Ambassador is busy morning, noon and night, seven days a week, 52 weeks a year. These negotiations are very, very time consuming. They go on day after day after day and back at the embassy at night, writing reports and requesting new instructions by the opening of business the next morning and so on. Therefore, while I think he should oversee them closely and pitch in when needed, I don't think a resident Ambassador in a democratic society should be required personally to conduct negotiations such as these.

Q: Did you privately think, at that time, that the bases were necessary for the NATO defense structure?

KUBISCH: Well, based upon the framework at the time, the responsibilities the U.S. Government had undertaken and the missions we had in the Eastern Mediterranean, they were necessary. I had the feeling they were too large and too over-staffed, and they were certainly creating a number of problems in our bilateral relationships with the Greek Government and the Greek people. They could have been, and were, during my three years as Ambassador in Greece, curtailed somewhat. Whether or not the force structure is required, and the missions are appropriate today, and whether or not we can afford all the bases, and whether or not we should continue with them now, I think those are different questions.

Q: I want to wind up this particular tape, believe it or not, with a question that goes back to go back to Greek and Turkish relations again. The last six months or so that you were there, the last few months that you were in Athens, Clark Clifford came out.

KUBISCH: Yes, that's right.

Q: Do you recall any memories of that visit or personal impressions that you can leave with us?

KUBISCH: Yes, I do. Clark Clifford, I came to know him well during the course of that visit and saw him frequently when I was back in Washington later. I have also been his guest on several private occasions. In fact, he recommended me to the President for another very senior position abroad, one that I was not able to accept.

He came as a special emissary from President Carter to Greece to try, I think, to accomplish two things. First, as a kind of a temporizing measure effort on the part of the new Carter Administration in early 1977, to let the people of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, and the Greek American community in the United States, to let them know that the new administration of President Carter was seized with their problems, and was going to do something about them. Second, for Clifford himself, to try and find some way out of the impasse in which we found ourselves between Greece and Turkey with respect to the Cyprus problem.

So Clark Clifford came and traveled back and forth among the countries concerned. He stayed with me in our residence while he was there. He's a brilliant, charming, wonderful man, and there's no one I have ever seen come as a special emissary from a President, and I've seen a number of them, for whom I would have higher regard.

Q: You put him on a par with Harriman then, that kind of elder statesman?

KUBISCH: Yes, I would say so. In fact, I saw Harriman come on a special mission to Brazil in 1963 when I was there. And I have, as you know, a very high opinion of Harriman, too. But I have the feeling that Clifford did an even better job in a more difficult situation than Harriman did in Brazil at the time.

JAMES G. LOWENSTEIN
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European Affairs
Washington, DC (1974-1977)

Ambassador James G. Lowenstein was born in New Jersey in 1927. He entered the Foreign Service in 1950. His career included positions in France, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), and Yugoslavia, and an ambassadorship to Luxembourg. He was interviewed by Dennis Kux in 1994.

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, I came back into EUR as the number two deputy. Wells Stabler was the number one. I was given the multilateral responsibilities -- that is the offices of European Regional Affairs, Political Affairs and Economic Affairs. So I had NATO, EC, OECD, ECE, all that stuff, plus special assignments on the Yugoslav problem. Plus various other things that came up that weren't part of the multilateral stuff. I think I had WE at one point. Anyway, it didn't make any difference because Arthur was always handling whatever the number one crisis was and Wells very soon thereafter became totally immersed in the Cyprus problem. The Cyprus war erupted in July, 1974 and I remember I went up to Maine for a two-week vacation and I arrived in the evening at 7:00 on Friday night and the next morning I left at 7:00 AM and I never went back. I was originally on the Cyprus Task Force. Then it was decided that Wells should head it because one of the last reports that Dick and I had done was on Greece and there was too much baggage there for the Greeks to accept, so Wells was the head of the Task Force. But whenever he got tired, I went up and took his place and spelled him. So that summer between the war in Cyprus and Nixon's resignation and Ford being sworn in, was extremely hectic. I remember there were several times when I didn't get to bed or out of the building for 48 hours.

Q: What do you have to say about the Cyprus situation?

LOWENSTEIN: My recollection, I didn't have anything to do with policy, I was totally involved in mechanics. I remember all this time on the Task Force what I was doing was getting messages from Sisco or Arthur and making sure that they got to the right person at the right time and making sure that the answers got back and that they were cleared and that they were right. I just never got into the substance of the thing. It was totally procedural. There was a lot of protection

of American citizens stuff, lots of inquiries, lots of disorganization. It was an organizational job and one of the first task forces set up under this system after Kissinger became Secretary. I just never had anything to do with policy. So I can't comment on that.

I will tell one joke because I think it should be preserved for posterity. This joke was told to me by John Brademas, who was then a congressman. He and Paul Sarbanes, who was then a congressman, had gone out on an inspection trip and when they were landing somewhere, and I think it was in Cyprus, the plane blew a tire and veered off the runway. They were evacuated by chute. There was some danger that the plane would burst into flames but didn't. So when they got back they met with Kissinger and Brademas and Sarbanes told him the story. When they finished the story, Kissinger wagged his finger at them and said, "Remember, Brademas, that was only a warning."

I really don't remember the policy implications, except that Kissinger's attitude was, "Well, they are sort of all unreasonable and we have done the best we can and that is the way it is going to be." Of course, it did have one good result, it got the colonels out of power.

I went to Cyprus last summer for a week, and I must say I was amazed to see that this situation has been frozen in time and that people are living on both sides of the wall looking at their former residences and haven't been able to visit those residences for 20 years now.

Then there was Nixon's departure. That was a very wild night. The day before the resignation became public, Kissinger called all the assistant secretaries and I think all the deputy assistant secretaries...anyway, I was there, so it must have been all the deputy assistant secretaries...to tell us what was going to happen so that we could get started on the messages. I remember he made one of his famous "this is a test of the discipline of the Foreign Service whether they can keep this to themselves, etc." I think that was done. So that was another wild night because all these messages had to go out to chiefs of state saying that the American policy would remain exactly as before, blab, blab, blab, the usual stuff.

WILLIAM R. CRAWFORD, JR.

Ambassador Cyprus (1974-1978)

Ambassador William R. Crawford, Jr. was born in Pennsylvania in 1928. His Foreign Service career included positions in Cyprus, Yemen, Romania, and Washington DC. He was interviewed by William Moss on March 12, 1991.

Q: Now we come to the events that caused your sudden assignment as ambassador to Cyprus. For somebody who is not too conversant with this, you might just give somewhat of a summary of what brought about the assignment.

CRAWFORD: I touched on this earlier. I think two things. First of all, there had been the cataclysmic events in the summer of 1974 in Cyprus, in which the junta had made its final

desperate effort to unseat Makarios, had very nearly killed him, but he escaped with his life. I remember I was in the Department, having just talked to Secretary Kissinger about going to Syria. He said, "Particularly at the wish of NEA, your own bureau, you will be going back to Yemen. You're free to go on your summer vacation."

The day I was leaving the Department happened to be the day that the Greeks moved against Makarios. A couple of senior U.S. officials remembered my Cyprus experience and called to ask my thoughts on the Makarios course of events.

The then-Assistant Secretary for IO [International Organization Affairs] was one call, and the other was from the National Security Council. My first response was to ask if Makarios had escaped alive. They told me the newest reports indicated he might have.

I said, "He's a cat with nine lives, and if he has escaped he will be back, because he's beloved by the Greeks and a master politician. Who have the Greeks put in his place?"

"Somebody called Nicos Sampson."

I said, "You mean that paranoid killer?" If anything more were needed, that would discredit the Greek effort, and I explained that he was a discredited paranoid killer.

Q: Could you give some background? It's an important factor that they put this man in there.

CRAWFORD: The junta had, I believe, gone to a couple of other "respectable" Cypriot political leaders, who had turned them down and said, "We're all loyal Greeks, but we don't approve of your apparently impending action against our president, and we're not going to be a party to this."

Nicos Sampson had been a newspaper photographer and later newspaper editor/owner in the 1960's, just a plain despicable man whose claim to fame in history was that he carried in his newspaper during the period of the fight against the British pictures of a British woman and child blown up or shot in the back, lying bleeding to death on a Nicosia street. The common story was that it was Sampson who had shot them in the back and then stepped up to photograph them and give it more publicity. This was the view that the Cypriots had of him -- cheap, unintelligent, ambitious, a killer, a thug. Most sensible Cypriots and foreigners refused, even before this, to have anything to do with him. In Cyprus, as deputy chief of mission from the 1968 to 1972 period, I had refused his invitation to come to his house, he was such a despicable person. The British obviously felt that way and so did many Greek Cypriots. I pointed out to my interlocutors on the telephone that the fact that Sampson was the only man the junta had found to play their game means their effort was discredited from the start and I doubted Sampson would last.

They said, "Who will take his place?"

I said, "In the absence of the Archbishop, probably Glafkos Clerides, the Speaker of the House, a fine man who is in the constitutional position to step in as acting president. The next thing that's going to happen is that Turkey is going to invade, and nothing that we do will stop them. We

stopped them twice before, and this time they're going to view this as such a serious disruption of the status quo, that under their treaty rights they will almost certainly invade Cyprus. We won't be able to stop them."

Question: "How much of Cyprus do they want to take? All of Cyprus?"

I said, "No. They'll go for the northern third, which is enough to establish strategic control over the island. Finally, one gratuitous comment, and that is look for the early fall of the junta, because Greeks cannot, in their pride, stomach a government which has so seriously misbehaved and jeopardized Greece's reputation around the world. So look for the early fall of the government in Athens. Is there anything that I could usefully do in this evolving situation?"

"We'll check with the Secretary." The answer came back the following day, as a matter of fact, "Thank you very much. We've got it under control. The Secretary thanks you, but you're free to go on your vacation."

I did. I went off to hike in Norway sometime in August, and had hardly started when the Norwegian police found me on top of a fiord and flew me back into the capital, where I was told by our ambassador that I was to return to Washington instantly at the Secretary's request. Our ambassador told me of Ambassador Davies' assassination in Nicosia and speculated that this was the reason for the pre-emptory summons. On my wilderness hike, of course, I had heard nothing of what had happened in Cyprus after checking out of the Department.

Q: This is Rodger Davies, who was shot on August 19, 1974.

CRAWFORD: And it was August 19 that the Norwegian police tracked me down. I flew back. I think the fact that Kissinger had seen me just a few weeks before in relation to Syria was relevant, as well as my four years previous experience in Cyprus.

Q: It was such a fast-breaking situation, I assume, that the idea was to get somebody in place right away.

CRAWFORD: Yes. President Ford and the Secretary prevailed on Congress to treat Senate confirmation as an emergency. From start to finish, from notification to the Senate to confirmation, took about two hours. I was sworn in, and I was off in just a few days, arriving in Cyprus as I recall on August 27. By that time the civilian airports in Cyprus were closed off because of the fighting. The only way to get into Cyprus was to fly into the British sovereign base area. So I flew to England, and the RAF took me into the British sovereign bases. I came, so to speak, by the back door.

Dean Brown had been out there for a few days holding the fort after Rodger's death. I believe I arrived exactly ten days after Rodger was killed.

Q: What was the situation when you were there? What did you find that you had to do -- instructions from Washington? What was the situation you had to deal with?

CRAWFORD: It's curious that there really were not any instructions from Washington. In the case of my assignment in Yemen, you could say there were. Secretary of State Rogers had said, "I want to help these people and establish an effective American presence." I certainly never received any instructions from Dr. Kissinger, except to go out there and get there in a hurry. So I think it really was more than anything how I came to conceive of what I should be doing. Nobody ever told me. I suspect that's true more often than not.

Q: In the interviews I've been doing, in a fast-breaking situation, the person in the field essentially writes his or her own instructions, unless there's some doubt about their competence. So with all the modern communication and technology, when the chips are down, the reliance is in the person in the field.

CRAWFORD: On the plane crossing the Atlantic, I decided that the first thing I had to do was get back into effective communication with the leaders on both sides.

Q: You are speaking about Turkish and Greek leaders, or were there more leaders than that? What about Makarios?

CRAWFORD: Makarios was in London, and the acting president of Cyprus was Clerides. In a sense, the first policy thing I did, although I in no way thought of it as making policy, which produced immediate grumbles from Dr. Kissinger, was in my brief remarks on being sworn in by the Deputy Secretary. I spoke of an island whose very independence and unity were threatened unless remedial measures were taken soon to prevent a permanent division of the island, to get the communities back into negotiation, to terminate the foreign military presence, etc. Word came down through Arthur Hartman, the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, that the Secretary had rather blown up about his new ambassador in Cyprus making policy before he even arrived on the island. I said, "It's simply a statement of fact. The island is now divided, and unless somebody does something, it's going to stay divided. I wasn't trying to make policy, Arthur."

He said, "Well, the Secretary is angry."

So I said, "By the way, Arthur, I'm going to stop and call on Makarios in London." Arthur looked troubled. I guess he realized more than I did at that point the extent to which the Secretary -- this does not give credence to those who think the United States was involved in the effort to overthrow Makarios; we absolutely were not -- but it was perfectly true that the Secretary of State did not like Archbishop Makarios, and vice versa.

Q: This is almost endemic. There would be a long line of those. I'm told he was a very difficult man.

CRAWFORD: The Secretary of State or the Archbishop?

Q: (Laughs) I think both, but particularly Makarios.

CRAWFORD: I actually rather liked him. He was very cagey. There was no pious virtue about

him despite his chosen profession. He had tremendous sagacity as a politician: very wily and very tough. But you had to admire that. He was shrewd. As Dr. Kissinger once venomously said to him in my presence, "Your Beatitude, we don't have any problem with you, except you're too big for your island." (Laughs)

So when I repeated that I intended to call on the Archbishop, he said, "The Secretary would not like that."

I said, "I'm sorry, I've already been asked by the Archbishop's entourage to make sure that I stop in on my way out. Although he is not currently the president of Cyprus, he will again be. Clerides is only the acting president. I really have no choice." So I did call on Makarios. I'm very glad I did, because it helped pull back on the suspicion, which Makarios really had, that the United States had not only supported the junta, but also its effort to remove him. So it helped to get me off on a better foot. At least I didn't have Makarios and his supporters against me.

Q: The Secretary of State, again through an intermediary, basically says, "Don't see him," and you say, "I have to see him."

CRAWFORD: Because I knew the situation on Cyprus, that Makarios would return.

Q: But I'm really talking about here in the Department of State. When you were told it wouldn't be a good idea, you said, "It really is a good idea," and then there was no further opposition? Or did you go directly against instructions?

CRAWFORD: It was not a direct instruction. Arthur shrugged and said, "I'll tell the Secretary that the horse is out of the barn door, you've already been asked by the Archbishop's entourage to make sure that you call. It would then be a clear insult not to do so." I emphasized that from my point of view, not to mention my safety, it really had to be done. And I'm glad I did, because that was a calculation.

We had just had an ambassador who got killed by ultra-Greek nationalists and who were still very, very angry over the failure of the attempted coup. Makarios already felt that we were responsible for what had happened. When I got to Cyprus, it was the ultra-nationalists, the EOKA types advocating union between Cyprus and mainland Greece, and EOKA-B, the second EOKA movement (the first having been back in the 1960's under General Grivas) who were certain to be implacably hostile. It was they who had killed Davies. If in addition to this group, other Makarios' supporters, who constituted the overwhelming majority of the Greek Cypriots and truly adored him as a leader -- if they were against me, I would just be zero in effectiveness. Not only a question of physical survival. I wanted to make sure that the word got sent back from Makarios in London to his supporters on the island that I was okay and fair and could perhaps be helpful.

Then arriving in Cyprus, fortunately I had a very close, friendly relationship with the acting president, Glafkos Clerides from previous service. Fortunately also, the same was true in his own-by-then sector of Cyprus, of Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader. The first thing I did was to insist on and gradually gain freedom of movement. Remember by then, Northern Cyprus,

one-third, or a little less, was controlled by the Turkish mainland Army. They gave lip service to the idea that Rauf Denktash was the leader of Turkish Cyprus, but in fact, he was entirely dependent on the mainland Turks and very much restricted in his own movements by them. The Turkish military who wanted none of the messiness that might have gone with an independent local leader.

So I went to the Turkish ambassador. There were two or three telephone lines across the line. The first full afternoon I was there, within 18 hours of my arrival, I got on one of those lines. Ambassador Asaf Inhan had been the Turkish ambassador when I left two years before. After greetings, I told him that within 48 hours I proposed to come across the line.

He said, "Bill, I'm glad you're back, but I think that would be most inconvenient and probably not possible."

I said, "First of all, in conducting its military operation, Turkey has announced that it is not trying to destroy the unity of Cyprus, nor the independence of Cyprus. As far as I'm concerned, I am the American ambassador to Cyprus in all of its parts, and I must have freedom of movement. There's an additional reason beyond policy. I have a lot of American citizens in the north whose welfare, under American law, is my responsibility. They have just been through a war and many of them are in trouble. I must be free to visit them." So he sighed.

I called him later again to say that we would be arriving at the checkpoint two days hence at 4:00 in the afternoon. I knew he had to check it out with the controlling Turkish mainland military.

The next message from the Turkish ambassador was that I had to have a visa.

I said, "A visa to go to all parts of a single country to which I am accredited?" So I got them to drop that.

When we got to the checkpoint as we had said we would two days later, there was an escort. I said, "I don't have to be escorted. I know my way."

The Turkish military said, "Call it an interpreter." So I had a jeep full of "interpreters" with machine guns at 16 checkpoints from there out to the northern coast. The Turks were still very much on a wartime footing, shoved guns in your face and so on.

I did establish the principle of freedom of movement, albeit very limited at first. I was able to drive out to the northern coastal city of Kyrenia, called on my American citizens there, which is where most of them happened to be, and bit by bit to extend that every weekend, to expand the area along the coast the military would allow me to visit.

I was able to convince the leadership on both sides that my freedom of movement was in their interest. To the Greek Cypriot government, which is the only one we recognized, and is still, I was able to say, "Surely, for the sake of the ultimate reunification of the island, it is useful for you to have me insist on this principle of freedom of movement in all parts of the island. Furthermore, I can perhaps see things going on of which you're unaware that may be of interest."

Remembering that we were accused by Greeks of having caused the attempt on Makarios and subsequent Turkish invasion, they swallowed and said, "All right, we trust you. We understand why you're doing it, and we'll try to explain to people why you're going to cross that line. We'll try to explain so you don't get shot when you come back."

To the Turkish Cypriots, I offered the chance, and ultimately gave them, some voice to the outside world other than the Turkish mainland military with which Rauf Denktash was very restive. He had very early in his career been in exile from Cyprus in Turkey, where he was kept pretty well under lock and key and had written a book against mainland Turkish policies over the years in northern Cyprus. So while there was a semblance of Turkish unity, the reality was that Denktash welcomed contact with the outside world and the American ambassador, because it gave him a little more elbow room. At first, after the invasion, he had no freedom of movement outside his own "capital" of Nicosia. When I insisted on it, as happened on a couple of occasions, he was able to say, "Your insistence has enabled me to say that, of course, I must escort you." So it got him and the community moving in areas that the Turkish mainland military had not allowed him.

Then the rest of the diplomatic corps, the British, French, and Germans in Nicosia, who had in truth been cowering on the Greek side for fear of incurring the government's anger, not knowing how to deal with the situation, followed suit. It became the established way for all missions to deal with the confused situation in which there were two declared administrations, only one of which was recognized.

It was not very pleasant living. There were no dependents. Early on, we had to make changes in the embassy staff, because people were pretty demoralized. They'd seen their ambassador killed, gone through a war, and had a very rough time. We removed some, brought back others who had previous Cyprus experience.

Q: Who was your DCM?

CRAWFORD: Frederick Z. Brown, who had been with consul general in Danang. He was wonderful, not familiar with Cyprus, but it didn't matter. I had that familiarity and we had a Turkish language officer who knew Cyprus, and a couple of others whose experience went way back. We had no dependents, and I flew in with two American bodyguards who stayed with me the whole first year. They lived in the Residence. Because Rodger Davies had been killed by shooting through a window, I was never allowed near an open window. The windows were blocked off with sheets of steel, so it was very hard to tell when it was daytime or nighttime. I got out very little. When I did, it was always accompanied by two extra cars of Cypriot police, all armed fore and aft. In the car there was so much bulletproofing, I couldn't see out of my own window. And a great deal of hostility. The Greek Cypriots, by and large, people I had known socially in the earlier period, few of them came forward to offer anything. Those who did knew they were risking their lives or, at minimum, violent criticism. I was enormously grateful to the brave few who did.

Q: What did they feel towards the United States?

CRAWFORD: That we had caused the whole thing that had happened to them, the loss of their island, the Turkish invasion, the near-killing of their beloved president. They felt, to a large extent, that Dr. Kissinger personally was the cause of it, because he was the personification to them of the maligned U.S. influence. They felt that in his previous position in the National Security Council, he had unique authority to control the actions of CIA as well as the overt side of the U.S. foreign policy. They were convinced that we regarded Makarios as a dangerous Communist, and therefore supported the junta against democracy in Greece and against Makarios.

Q: How about the ones that supported the junta in Cyprus? How did they feel towards the United States?

CRAWFORD: They had killed Rodger Davies because they felt they had been betrayed. They had been assured by the junta representatives from mainland Greece that this whole thing had been approved by the United States, and they felt that it couldn't be motherland Greece that had made this ghastly mistake; it must have been the manipulations of the United States which had caused the whole thing to go awry, and had intentionally created a situation which would permit Turkey to invade.

Q: It's interesting. I had just left Greece, but before that, everything that happened in Greece, whether inclement weather to anything that was detrimental to the Greeks, was considered to be a machination on the part of the United States. There was this wonderful self-delusion that "We never do anything wrong; it's always somebody else." I suppose 50 years before, it was the British. Now it was the United States.

CRAWFORD: Absolutely.

Q: It's the exact play in Greece with the Greeks.

CRAWFORD: It was not the Greek ambassador that was killed; it was the American ambassador.

Q: Yes. I always found this incredible. In many ways, I've often felt that as we divide the world up, Greece should be put in the Middle East, where at least the thought processes are more, you might say, Middle Eastern than European.

Did you have any dealings with Sampson? Was he still running things?

CRAWFORD: Sampson had indeed gotten discredited in just a few days and had been run out of town. He wasn't even in Cyprus at that point. I had no dealings with him whatsoever. Clerides was acting president by the time I got there, an old and good friend.

Q: Did he remain a good friend? Were you able to deal with him?

CRAWFORD: Oh, yes, very close.

Q: What did the Greeks want from you?

CRAWFORD: Massive amounts of American aid, pressure to remove Turkish troops from their island, get Turkey to pull out. In short, an instant solution; our insistence with Turkey that all the Greek Cypriot refugees, of whom there were about 100,000 or one in every five Greek Cypriots who had been displaced from their home, that they return to their homes in the Turkish-occupied area, the Turkish troops removed, and the status quo be resumed, which was clearly impossible.

I sound throughout this as if I blame the junta. In a specific sense, yes. But in fact, there was a very long history of Greek Cypriot maltreatment of the Turks, so this has antecedents going way, way back.

After arrival, I set about trying to help the whole process of U.N.-sponsored negotiations between the two, to help the special representative of the United Nations, who is now, by the way, the Secretary General of the United Nations, Perez de Cuellar. In reality, the United States had more authority than the Secretary General's special representative, because we had more influence with Greek and Turkey and with the two communities in Cyprus.

Over the four years that I was there, we tried in countless different ways to nibble away at the intractable situation, intractable because Turkey had achieved, in 1974, what it had long wanted, and that was to move Cyprus out of a waffley area of Greek-Turkish influence and irrevocably into a zone of Turkish military hegemony. They just never liked the idea that this island thirty miles off their shores might suddenly become hostile and cut them off to the south. The Turkish ambassador expressed it to me in just those terms. He said, "Turkey is an imperial power and a continental power. That we are unnaturally prevented from breathing to the north and the east by the presence of the Soviet Union makes it all the more important that we be able to breathe to the south and to the west. 1974 solved the southern dimension. It remains to solve the western dimension."

Q: This is an unclassified interview. How effective did you find the CIA when you were there this second time? Were they helpful?

CRAWFORD: By that time (fall 1974) I think they were a bit embarrassed. They had been closely identified with the junta and therefore with its mistakes, even though, as I used to try to persuade my Cypriot friends, American errors were errors of omission, not commission. They had been too prone to believe the colonels when they told them that nothing was going to happen. So by the time I was ambassador there, I got nothing but absolute collaboration, cooperation, and support from Agency representatives. In fact, I was in a position to pretty well insist on the kind of representation I wanted and, in fact, on the officers who would represent the Agency at that time, and did so insist.

Q: How about the desk? Maybe it was slightly before your time, but Henry Kissinger had forced out the desk officer, Tom Boyatt. Was that during your time?

CRAWFORD: No, that was when I was in Yemen. Partly because, I gather, Boyatt had been calling signals about what Greece was up to and presenting the arguments very forcefully. I don't

know whether Kissinger forced him out or not, because he certainly went on to have a successful career.

Q: He was moved, all of a sudden, rather rapidly over to the Senior Seminar. I joined him.

Did you find, as time went on, that you were getting good, solid support from the Department of State?

CRAWFORD: Absolutely, all the way up to Secretary Kissinger, about whom Cyprus stories are legion. I'd like to think that I got along with him quite well. I could deal with him, with humor, and he seriously wanted a Cyprus solution, no question about that. He felt the whole Cyprus thing threatened to be a real blot on his reputation in history, and he really did want it resolved if it possibly could be in his time as Secretary. So he gave me every possible support.

The enmity between Makarios and Kissinger was very real. Though Makarios dealt fairly with me, he kept letting his newspapers blame and continue to blame Kissinger for everything that happened. I reported all this. Kissinger finally, quite rightly, could accept this no longer, saying, on the one hand, to the Archbishop/president of Cyprus, who had by that time returned, "You ask for our help in solving this. You ask for aid. On the other hand, you are against us in every one of your controlled newspapers. You can't have it both ways." So after the worst of these, I was recalled. This was maybe in the middle of 1975, 1976, really at my own suggestion. It was the only way we could show Makarios we were serious about not accepting continued insults. So I was recalled very quickly and sat in Washington for two or three weeks.

Then I said, "We've made the point. I think we should find some way of getting me back to Cyprus." The then Under Secretary, Philip Habib, asked if I had any ideas.

I suggested that I draft a strong letter from the Secretary to the Archbishop, and that to the letter be added an oral message from the Secretary that I would be charged with carrying back, to say, "You can't have it both ways. If there's any more of this violence and insults to the United States and criticism of the American role, we will terminate that role and let the Cyprus situation stew in its own juices." I went back; the dual messages worked, the inspired insults stopped; and I picked up my job again.

Q: What were we doing outside of showing our good intentions?

CRAWFORD: By that time, we had established full freedom of movement. For another, we had a massive aid program. This, of course, gets into the whole business of the friends of Greece in Congress and out of Congress.

Here I digress a bit. The day I was approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I went down with Secretary Kissinger, who was giving classified testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. This would have been sometime before I left, the 26th or something like that, of August 1974. I went with Secretary Kissinger, who told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee how we saw the situation, what he intended to do, and he introduced me and asked for the committee's earliest possible approval.

After the Secretary had spoken, Senator [Jacob] Javits of New York spoke. A truly remarkable man, I might say. I am paraphrasing somewhat, but he said something like this: "Mr. Secretary, everything that you've said to us this morning sounds appropriate to the circumstances and we think you're on the right course. We support you. But just a word of advice. Rightly or wrongly, I am regarded by some as the leader of what is known as the Jewish lobby in Congress with which you have occasionally taken issue over policy. Whether that is or is not correct, let me just talk to you for a minute about some realities of American politics. Jewish influence in the United States is concentrated in a few key cities -- New York, Los Angeles, Chicago. Greek influence in this country is everywhere. There isn't a sheriff, a small town mayor, a state governor, highway commissioner, who hasn't to some extent become indebted to Greek American support, financial support and votes, whether Republican or Democratic. Greeks in the United States have an organization which links them, called AHEPA, the society for the preservation of Hellenic culture. It has never been a political organization; it's essentially cultural to preserve the sense of Hellenism and so on. Greek Americans have never exercised national political influence. Their interest is in the liquor licenses, the highway contracts, restaurant licenses, and so on, to protect their own local position. They've never before exercised this essentially tremendous weight on a national level."

"But the Cyprus issue has galvanized them as they have never been galvanized before, and they have a structure through which to bring political influence to bear on the national level. If from time to time, Dr. Kissinger, you have had reason in your mind to take issue with the Jewish lobby, just wait til the Greek lobby hits you." (Laughs)

Indeed, it hit him. When the Greeks got behind Carter's campaign, as an alternative to Ford-Kissinger, as you recall, leaders of the Greek community in this country passed the word to the leaders of Greek Cyprus that, "When our man Carter gets in, we will make sure that anybody who has had anything to do with Cyprus during this disastrous period is eliminated." They specifically said there would be a clean sweep of our ambassadors in Athens, Ankara, and Cyprus. The Secretary of State, of course, would be changed. They said that first. And the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Arthur Hartman. "We will promise you there will be a complete change of characters." Indeed, within weeks of Carter coming in, they got the change in Athens, got the change in Ankara. Arthur Hartman went off with dignity to be ambassador to France, but they got him out. They did fulfill their promise on that. A couple of other semi-subordinate officials, the Director for Southern European Affairs and so on, were moved. I was, in effect, told by my Greek Cypriot friends that the "Greek lobby" had assured the Cypriot leadership: "Crawford's next."

Then an interesting, wonderful thing happened, which was reported back to me by the Greek Cypriots, particularly the Greek Cypriot foreign minister, an old friend. He reported these conversations with the constant flow of American Greek principals to the island. So the foreign minister said, "Bill, they've told us that they're going to get rid of you. What would you like to do?" I replied that, "If there's something useful I can do here, I'd like to do it, to help put this island back together again."

So the Greek Cypriots went back to their Greek American friends and said, "If you insist on this,

as condition for aid to Cyprus, if you think it's got to be done, fine. But we think that Crawford knows the island, is fair, and we'd just as soon have him stay," including, by the way, Archbishop Makarios.

When I got back, for instance, with that angry message from Kissinger, that was just before Carter came in, Makarios spoke to me. He had this benign, lovely look, with his big tall hat. He said, "Mr. Ambassador, isn't it true that under your system, ambassadors submit their resignations when a new President comes in?"

I said, "Yes, your Beatitude, it is."

He said, "Wouldn't that be in your case, also, as a career officer, that you would submit your resignation?"

I said, "Yes, your Beatitude."

He said, "What are your wishes?" Meaning he was angry at Kissinger, furious, too, at my bearing this angry message: seething.

I said, "Your Beatitude, if the time has come when I can no longer serve the cause of peace in Cyprus, I'll be happy to go. If there's still something to be of use based on my knowledge of the island and experience here, I would prefer to stay." He just smiled very faintly, having made the point that he could remove Kissinger's envoy at will. And I stayed for another three years.

Q: You are using the term "beatitude" reminds me again of another one of the interviews. It may have been Douglas Dillon or George Ball. He found himself pushed to the corner by Makarios, found himself saying, "Jesus Christ, your Beatitude, you can't do that," or something.

CRAWFORD: That was probably George Ball. He undertook a mediatory mission to Cyprus in the 1960's. There's a resonance to that later on, too, on one of Makarios' visits to Washington after all of these events. I think he was coming in from London. I was called to be back for the visit. I went up to talk to the Secretary before Makarios' arrival, and Dr. Kissinger said, "Bill, what do I call him?"

I said, "Your Beatitude."

So we went downstairs to the front entrance. Dripping with cynicism and dislike, Dr. Kissinger greeted the Archbishop when the limousine pulled up at the door. "Your Beatitude, I'm so glad to welcome you to Washington, your Beatitude." We went upstairs, and Makarios was sitting there resting his hands on his scepter symbol of office and his lovely hat and all the rest, and that's when Kissinger just started right off saying, "Your Beatitude, I want you to know that we have great respect for you, your Beatitude. It is only, your Beatitude, that we feel you're too big for your island. Of course, if you chose, you could, I suppose, be president or prime minister of Greece whenever it suited you. I suppose the one thing that would unify all those Greek politicians, your Beatitude, would be the prospect that you would come in to be president of Greece or prime minister. Now, on the other hand, if, your Beatitude, you were General

Secretary of the Soviet Union, that would give us real problems to have such an adversary, your Beatitude." The meeting got nowhere, obviously.

Then as we were going down the elevator, all crushed in there with the Archbishop and his bodyguard, Secretary Kissinger and his bodyguard, me, into an elevator that ordinarily holds five, the Secretary said to the Archbishop, "Your Beatitude, when I'm with you, I really quite feel that I like you."

The Archbishop looked at him benignly and said, "Dr. Kissinger, it lasts for just about five minutes after we've parted, doesn't it?"

Q: Makarios died rather shortly thereafter, in 1977.

CRAWFORD: Yes. Then you get to other things. The Carter Administration did come in. Carter, in fulfillment of his campaign promises, appointed Clark Clifford as special emissary. We had been chipping away at various aspects of the aid problem. Aid was not a problem. In fact, it was a problem unusually in the reverse; we had more aid money voted by the Greek lobby in Congress than we could ethically utilize. I did not endear myself to the leaders of the Greek lobby, John Brademas and Paul Sarbanes, by reporting exactly that, that this was unconscionable, when there was so much poverty in the world, to be spending this amount of money in Cyprus. But they had that kind of political authority and it went through. Despite the best efforts of Kissinger and my own efforts, we really hadn't gotten anywhere against the intransigent realities on the ground, and still haven't, by the way.

President Carter appointed Clark Clifford to be his special emissary to try to resolve it. Clifford is a brilliant negotiator, a very wise man. I think, as the result of the first major mission to Athens, Ankara, and Cyprus, he was really starting to make a dent, basically saying to Makarios, "You can never get everything back. You've got to do some giving in constitutional terms, not ceding land to Turkey or anything like that, but you've got to be more flexible in negotiations than you ever have been in the past, and realize that Turkish Cypriots, for example, are going to have to have a zone which they can call their own. With our help, perhaps, you can get a federal umbrella over the whole thing so eventually you can reunite it. You can probably get the percentage area of Cyprus that the Turkish Cypriots control down from the present 38 to something under 30, but you're going to have to give. Otherwise, we can't be helpful." That's not by any means exact, but that's roughly the kind of realism that he was advocating to Makarios.

It was tough negotiating between two strong men, but we all felt that Clifford was starting to get somewhere and that Makarios was starting to move. Then he had first one, then a second heart attack, and died. He was followed by a leader, Kyprianou, without anything like the stature to carry off that kind of thing. It takes a strong man to be able to cut his losses, and Kyprianou was not that.

Q: On April 12, 1976, I notice that 2,000 to 3,000 Cypriots tried to storm the embassy. What was behind this?

CRAWFORD: They did several times. There were two main attacks. One was when I was back

on consultation, and Fred Brown was chargé. Another was when I was there, and I have forgotten the date. They were still very, very angry with the United States. After all, there were 100,000 refugees in and around Nicosia, who fled from the Turkish zone of occupation. They were dislocated, homeless people, though we were rapidly housing them with this most generous per capita aid program anywhere in the world, including Israel at that point. They were a lot of bitter, desperately angry people. Students could be very easily whipped up, and that's what happened. They were students whipped up by professional agitators. They had already burned down a chunk of the American embassy at the time that they killed Rodger Davies. They burned down a little bit more when Fred Brown was in charge. They tried a third time, and that was the last.

By then, we were better organized with tear gas in place, more levels of local defense. Kissinger at that point had given his warning to Makarios, "If anything more happens to our embassy, we're going to pull out." The previous violence had certainly been condoned, indeed if not instigated, by Makarios. So the warnings had taken some hold. The students were still agitated and tried again to burn the embassy, but by that time, we not only had a great deal of cooperation from the U.N. forces, with the Canadian chief of staff for the U.N. forces in quietly positioned -- not quite in U.N. terms "legal," but de facto active Canadian-American friendship -- had stationed his troops in side streets, ready to move a couple of personnel carriers, ready to move in if something really got out of hand. Furthermore, the mainland Greeks by then had seen that it was not in their interest. They controlled the Greek Cypriot Army and national guard, and it was not in their interest to let things out of control.

Q: By this time, of course, the colonels were long gone.

CRAWFORD: It was a totally different situation.

Q: There was Karamanlis and a democratic Greek government.

CRAWFORD: Our ambassador in Athens went to Karamanlis and said, "We have disturbing reports about what might happen tonight." I believe I'm right in this. Jack Kubisch had talked to the Greek government, and they had sent instructions to the Greek general commanding the Cyprus forces, "Don't let anything get out of hand." So there were pretty nervous-making waves of student attacks on the embassy to try to burn it down, but it was controlled, and they ran out of zip before we ran out of tear gas.

Q: Looking back on this, what would you say was the effect of your time as chief of mission at a very difficult time? What would you call your accomplishments?

CRAWFORD: First of all, we were able to establish freedom of movement in a situation in which the U.S. was excluded from dealing with one-third of the island and its leadership. The aid money, though it was excessive, was spent as wisely as could possibly have been the case. A lot was done for displaced persons, but, at our insistence, for basic economic development and improvement on both sides of the line. We got Greek Cypriot approval, believe it or not, for spending money on depressed Turkish communities, as well, because Turkish Cypriots had been displaced in the whole process of population transfer. So we spent money in proportion to the

population ratio, 80-20, on the Turkish side, with Greek Cypriot approval. The aid money was spent fairly and effectively on doing a lot of good things that needed doing, more than probably needed doing in some cases.

We established a role for the United States as the effective communicator and purveyor of ideas which might lead toward a solution of the problem, any aspect of the problem or its entirety. We made it clear that our role would be more behind the scenes, that it was our preference and certainly in the interest of the parties to keep the U.N. peacemaking presence out in front. Everybody came to see that that was a logical way of approaching it, because we were so neurotically identified in different ways by our two allies, that we couldn't play the neutral role. Witness the Greek influence in the American political process by that time.

We were able, on arrival, to establish effective working relationships with leaders on both sides, despite grievances and hatreds and all the rest, largely buffered by the friendships that we'd carried over from previous experience. Over time, the extent of animosity began to ebb, and more and more of a genuine friendship began to be restored to replace this real hatred which had existed certainly from 1974. It was palpable. Several attempts were reported to have been made on my life, and there was no question about it, it was a very unpleasant atmosphere. We were regarded as the betrayer of Greek Cyprus. By 1978, that was no longer true. We were looked to as the power de facto, and the only power that could really do anything in a final sense to develop a solution. So it was a very different atmosphere when I left.

Q: This may be more in an editorial note than a question, but sometimes it's said by those who don't understand the trade of diplomacy that with modern communications, you really don't need someone in the field; you can practically do everything by telegram, it's just a matter of communication. I would think that what you've just said here shows the idiocy of doing away with someone who is there and who is intimately concerned.

CRAWFORD: Yes, I think that's absolutely true. Immodestly or modestly, whichever, I think I was the right choice to go back in, because I had a documented record of friendship with both communities, an impartiality, and was able to build on that. I had had four years of recent experience on the island, and many friendships, and built on those. If it had been somebody else who didn't have that kind of relationship, it would have been a far harder task.

Q: You could hit the ground running.

CRAWFORD: Talking to our military attaché about a month after I arrived, he said, "If you don't mind my saying so, Mr. Ambassador, I thought you were out of your mind when, within 24 hours after arrival, you started wanting to cross the line, wanting to talk to the Turkish Cypriot leadership. I just couldn't understand what you were up to, but now I see it. It worked. You established working relationships within a few days at all levels, on both sides."

EDWARD L. LEE II
Regional Security Officer

Nicosia (1975-1977)

Mr. Lee was born and raised in Michigan, educated at Delta College and American University. After seven years service with the US Marine Corp, he joined the State Department as Agent in the Office of Security. Mr. Lee's entire career in the Foreign Service was devoted to Security matters in Washington and in diplomatic posts throughout the world. His postings as Regional Security Officer include Cyprus, South Korea, Thailand and Panama. Mr. Lee was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

Q: Today is June 28, 1999. We're up to Cyprus in 1974. How did you get that assignment? What did you expect?

LEE: That assignment was very interesting and in retrospect of all the posts that I had, Cyprus was probably the most interesting. At the time that I was being assigned to Cyprus, just a few months earlier, the Turks had invaded Cyprus in July of 1974 when a Greek-backed coup conspiracy failed, and the Turks decided to invade Cyprus for the idea of partitioning one third of the island for the Turkish Cypriot community. The coup took place in July of 1974. A month later, Cyprus itself was still in political turmoil. Our ambassador in Nicosia was killed during a very extensive small arms attack against the embassy. Ambassador Davies was killed alongside a Foreign Service national employee. That was a political tragedy in many respects. One has to look at Cyprus the way it was then. The government was in disarray. There was the left against the right. People who were for Makarios, the president, who was also the archbishop... The politics of Cyprus despite its small size is very complicated. The long and the short of it was that after Ambassador Davies was killed, we began to realize that this really was a very difficult situation not only for the U.S. but for the United Nations, which had a peacekeeping force there since 1960. The embassy had been pared down because of constant violent riots. The embassy had been broken into by protestors. The post at that time before I got there had burned most of its classified holdings because of having to evacuate people and go through various emergency situations. So, in March of 1975, at that time, I was working in the training office of the Office of Security, now called the Diplomatic Security Service. I just happened to be in the right place at the right time. Because of my military experience, I filled the good bill to be the person to go to Cyprus because the embassy had been under a lot of physical attacks. Two, I was available. So, I was sort of conscripted to go to Cyprus, which was rather interesting. I had never been an RSO before and we had very little training at the time. What skills I did have from my military experience actually served me quite well. When I arrived in Cyprus, the only thing that I found in the large file safe that was in my office was a tennis racket left for me by the previous RSO who I was overlapping with. At that time, the ambassador, William Crawford, was the chief of mission. Because of the threats against Davies, we had a very massive security detail on Ambassador Crawford. In the time that I was there, that level of effort worked quite well. We were able to either neutralize any threats that occurred or prevent them from happening.

Q: You were there from '75 to when?

LEE: From March of '75 to October of 1977.

Q: When you arrived there, what was the morale of the embassy? What did it consist of?

LEE: The embassy was very small. We had a Marine security guard detachment of 13, which was large for most detachments. The combined staff of the embassy other than the Marines was about 20 employees and then some families, although many families had been evacuated and chose not to return. The post was very small, but at that time, it had enormous political significance because of the coup, because of the Turkish invasion. As a side note, it was interesting that in 1995, I was asked by the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs to conduct an investigation in Cyprus in an attempt to find out what happened to a number of Americans who disappeared during the Turkish invasion. I was able to relive my previous Cyprus incarnation in looking at that issue. Lo and behold, we did find remains. The investigation was pressured by the Greek lobby in the U.S. Their thought was that we would find out that many of these Americans had been taken to Turkey, which was not the case at all. This young boy, Andrew Kaskas, had been murdered during the invasion and put in a shallow grave. I was very lucky in being able to cultivate the right sources to find out where his body actually was. Even today in 1999, the Cyprus issue is still very much unsettled. The island is still partitioned. Tensions are just as great as they ever had been.

Q: And we have a very large Greek lobby that wants us to do something, which is essentially get the Turks out.

LEE: Exactly.

Q: When you got there, Bill Crawford had been there for a while. How did he operate?

LEE: Bill Crawford was an interesting person. He was intelligent. He was very skilled in the ways of the Middle East and even though our embassy in Cyprus is sort of handled under the European Bureau, it's really a Middle Eastern country. Bill Crawford had been the DCM in Lebanon prior to that. He had been serving in the Middle East a great deal. He knew the Middle East well. He was an interesting man from the standpoint that it was a small post, he was somewhat of a micromanager. He was driven by the need to control things. I say that as an observation, not necessarily as a criticism. He was respected by a lot of his contacts and counterparts in the Cypriot government, also in the Turkish Cypriot community. He often traveled to the Turkish sector on weekends and that kind of thing mainly to sort of relax because of the threat that confronted him in the Greek sector. He found his assignment there frustrating, as has every other chief of mission who has been there since. No American diplomat at the chief of mission level has ever been able to really budge either the Turks or the Greeks on either side.

Q: What were you told about the security situation when you got there? How did you deal with it? Did it change?

LEE: The previous RSO because of the attack on Ambassador Davies had put into place a good number of additional defenses. When the embassy was broken into about the time the coup took place, they got into the building. They destroyed a lot of things. My job when I went out there, I was basically told, "Keep the ambassador alive. Keep as little classified as possible. Prevent anybody from getting into the embassy." During that period of time, I developed a reputation as

being a very innovative person from the standpoint of making sure those things didn't happen. I'll give you a good example. The embassy was in an old apartment building. It was a terrible looking building, all concrete, colored in a golden color. It had a fenced perimeter that was not terribly high. So, the first thing I did, I basically ordered up tens of thousands of dollars of concertina wire. It looked terrible, but it did prevent people from getting into the compound, which would have given them access to the building. The time that I was there, most of '75 and most of '76, we had violent demonstrations at the embassy probably every week. At no time did we ever let anybody into the building. However, there was one case where on a number of demonstrations, people would throw rugs over the concertina, get on the top of a car and then come over the fence that way. They loved to be able to pull the American flag down and burn it. We were going through a lot of flags. I looked at that flagpole and said, "You know, there's got to be something here that we can do to prevent the flags from being burned." It's sort of interesting that, here we are in 1999, I'm talking about 1974, and we have the U.S. Congress looking at legislation to outlaw and ban the burning of American flags. Overseas, it's sort of a symbolic thing that extremist groups do to vent their criticism or their feelings toward the U.S. But getting back to the flagpole, I've always been a person that looks at a situation and tries to analyze what needs to be done and figures out a plan on how to carry it out. It was a very high flagpole, at least 60 feet. What often would happen, protestors would get into the compound and would literally shimmy up the flagpole until they could reach the flag even after we had somehow pulled the lanyard away from the flagpole and secured it to the top of the building. We had one particularly violent demonstration one day. Usually when we had these really violent demonstrations, we knew about it through intelligence and we would send most staff home. The Marine guards and I and other components of the security apparatus would be there. Earlier that week, I had gotten somebody from General Services in the Administrative Section to get a very tall ladder and to go up toward the top of the flagpole and put grease completely on the flagpole so if someone was successful in getting up the flagpole, once they got to the top, they would reach this grease and slide down. I figured that was going to prevent our losing one more flag. Then at one point we had a very violent demonstration. There was an awful lot of teargas that had been dispensed. The Cypriot police at that time did not have a supply of teargas, so we had an enormous supply. We were having support flights from the military coming in sometimes every two weeks bringing in large quantities of teargas. During some demonstrations, we would dispense two or three hundred canisters, which is an awful lot. I was on the roof with a protective vest on. I remember it like it was yesterday. A couple of demonstrators had gotten over the fence despite the barbed wire. I saw this guy begin to short of shimmy up the flagpole. This guy was very good. He kept getting father and farther and farther. He got to where the grease was and it was not working. There was not enough there to actually enable him to slide. I said to myself, "He's going to actually get that flag." I was on the roof and I had a shotgun in my hand, but I had the adaptor for a teargas canister. You put the adapter on the end of a barrel and then you push a canister into this apparatus. I figured, well, if I were to shoot this at him, I wouldn't hurt or kill him, but it's definitely going to disrupt him from his plan to get the U.S. flag. So, I put a canister in the adapter and aimed and shot. It hit him right in the back and it really did jolt him to the point that he literally slid down the whole pole. We took a little bit of criticism in the local press, which was always very anti-U.S. Somebody had made a statement later that "At least they didn't get the American flag." It was an interesting vignette during a period of a lot of political unrest.

Q: Who was demonstrating against us?

LEE: There was a leftist leader named Lesarides who actually in 1999 is still in the House of Representatives in the Republic of Cyprus. He has become less radical, less militant. Essentially, you had a couple of groups that were against the U.S. One was the left, which represented Lesarides. Then you had the right, which represented EOKA-B, which was a radical violent element that really endeavored over the early years of independence to oust the Turks, deny them as much as they could be from the standpoint of social welfare-

Q: They were behind the coup, weren't they?

LEE: EOKA-B was behind-

Q: Samson and all that.

LEE: Samson was connected to Lesarides. Just in the course of a couple of months, you had a couple of different governments. Henry Kissinger in a way regretted that he hadn't focused on Cyprus more directly than he had. If he had done that, things might have turned out much differently. But in essence, the protestors were literally anyone that had an ax to grind against the U.S., including law abiding Cypriots. They pretty much believed what they were being told by the government and what they were being told by the government had a couple of different spins on it. We were very fortunate in that the embassy had extremely good relations with the Canadian police unit of the United Nations. During many severe protests, the UN came to our assistance. They would bring in their APCs and would help us out quite a bit. We owed a lot to the Canadians in particular and also the Swiss and others. Many of the demonstrations were very violent. They never got into the building again, but there were people hurt. There was an awful lot of teargas that was dispersed. Sometimes we had a hard time working with the Cypriot police because they were still citizens of Cyprus. To give you an example of just how deep many of these feelings went, I had a very good police contact who was a chief superintendent, which if you look at the British police system, on which the Cypriot police system is modeled, is pretty much that kind of system. This guy was a chief superintendent. He probably was the fourth or fifth most senior police official in the Cyprus police force. This was a guy that I had had in my home. I had been to his home for dinner. Despite that friendship, whenever he got an opportunity, he would tell me that after the Turks had bombed and attacked the island in July of '74, he recalls walking into fields and seeing "USA" on various shell casings, suggesting that all these bad things happened to Cyprus because the U.S. had sold military equipment and accessories to Turkey, which at that time was affiliated with NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and a big U.S. ally from the standpoint of the Cold War. So, the feelings did run very deep. Cypriots generally are very ethnocentric. They're very harsh on the U.S. generally. Many Cypriots that were also U.S. citizens were some of the most critical. Many of them would go to the States or if they were born in the States, they would return to Cyprus. On one hand, they would wrap themselves in the flag because they're different than their Cypriot counterparts. On the other, they were very critical of the United States. That whole period was very difficult politically and just historically. Here we are in 1999 and we still have no solution to the Cyprus problem.

Q: Were we ever considering pulling out of Cyprus during this time?

LEE: We never did. We evacuated our post a couple of times. Many people were evacuated to Athens. Many were evacuated to Beirut. After the Beirut hostilities began in '75 and Beirut was no longer an evacuation safe haven, it was surprising that both – and I think you'd have to look at U.S. foreign policy from the standpoint of closing posts – we never left when we had problems in Beirut. We never closed our embassy in Cyprus. Here we are in 1999 and we're closing posts every time somebody rattles a saber. In many respects, just in the last week, we have closed temporarily a number of our embassies in Africa. Independently, I would say it's a capitulation to terrorists. If you're closing the door and shutting down business because of the threat of terrorism, the threat of terrorism is always going to be there and there has to be a price for citizenship.

Q: Particularly in a situation such as Cyprus, where it really wasn't the individual terrorists, but it was government policy or the government was doing anything about it to allow this to happen. We had things to give to the Cypriots, including visas and support, and just to shut it down would have sent a very strong message that, "You're on your own."

LEE: Right. The embassy on balance did a very good job from the standpoint of American services and consular support during a very difficult situation. You had people in the embassy, political officers, the consul, a number of other people that were literally going all over the island while this was happening, ferreting out Americans that needed to be either evacuated or provided information or consular services. From that standpoint, the post did very well. On the other hand, we literally were under siege most of the time. We were asking for the UN's help a good bit of the time. It was a very high threat environment for a number of years.

Q: You are the security officer. One can concentrate on the ambassador and concentrate on the defense of the embassy, but you've got people – consular officers, political officers, and all – going out and doing their business. How did one protect them?

LEE: We were very lucky. That's the short answer. Cypriots by nature are not the kind of people that would hurt someone else. They're a very peace-loving people and yet very emotional. The violence that we have seen in Cyprus during that period, apart from the murder of Ambassador Davies, was more the building, the embassy, it being a symbolic target. Apart from the ambassador, we never really had any personal security concerns. Traditionally, Cyprus has always been a very safe country. I left my wallet in my car one day. It was parked in the driveway of my home. I left it on the seat. It had \$100-150 in it. It was completely fine. Robbery and theft and that kind of thing is something the Cypriots don't do. They do get violent. They do vent their emotional frustration when it comes to political issues. That would apply even to this day.

Q: It's practice that the government of Cyprus – and this stands for the Greek side because our embassy is on the Greek side – is responsible for the security of the embassy. You weren't getting it. I would think there would be a point where we would be talking to the Greek Cypriots and saying, "If you can't do this, say so and that's it. We'll either leave or take our own measures."

LEE: I guess Henry Kissinger and Ambassador Bill Crawford had made a decision that no matter

what, we weren't going to pull out. I know that Crawford had gone to the Cypriots on a number of occasions requesting a more diligent level of protection when we got these demonstrations. I think to a degree, the Cypriot government was cosponsoring a program of "We're going to let these demonstrations totally disrupt the function of the embassy, but we aren't going to let them get into the building again." The police really did very little when we had these demonstrations. They would dispense the teargas for us. We would throw the teargas from the roof. We did keep people out. I found it as an RSO phenomenal that we would continue to hunker down and experience all of this chaos. We were fortunate that we had the UN. They literally saved us from serious problems a number of times. To this day, I really question whether we did the right thing politically. I think probably if most consular services had been fulfilled – and they were fulfilled in July and August of '74 – closure of the embassy or pulling the ambassador or doing other things might have been things that we could have done to get the message across to Republic of Cyprus.

Q: How did you protect the ambassador?

LEE: Ambassador Crawford would go to the Turkish sector just about every weekend. When he was in the Greek sector, he would be in a limousine, ballistic resistant, protected. We would have a lead car and a follow car. We would do an advance. It was almost as if he were a head of state. He really had an extremely high level of personal safety. The emphasis on that was because, after Ambassador Davies' murder, Henry Kissinger made it very clear to all concerned that we couldn't run the risk of losing another ambassador in Cyprus for all kinds of reasons apart from a moral obligation to people in the Foreign Service. We were very lucky in that we didn't have any future incidents. Crawford was a difficult person to work with in a lot of different ways. He drank a good bit. He had a lot of experience. He was not terribly supportive of the security function, something that RSOs have to deal with. There are other idiosyncrasies that ambassadors have. Some are very good. Some are very supportive. Some are not. The very fact that in the early to mid-'80s, there was a total review of the way in which security service was provided to embassies suggests that many chiefs of missions were not being fully supportive. Quite often, money that had been appropriated for security programs were used for other things. What we saw in the mid-late '80s was a program that we were going to make chief of missions legally responsible for the welfare and safety of their posts, that if there was a serious incident, it would be investigated by a board of inquiry. This was an infrastructure we had not had before. In many respects, we learned a lot during that period. On the other hand, there were a lot of things that were done in this new effort that really were impractical. There was a lot of money wasted. Here we are in 1999. We've had two other embassies blown up in Kenya and in Tanzania and we're sort of doing the same thing all over again. We're going to spend a lot of money, but on balance, we aren't really going to protect people any better.

Q: What about homes?

LEE: The housing that we had in Cyprus was excellent. Even to this day, it's a post where Foreign Service people live a very nice life. Most live in single family homes. They're very spacious, very large. We never had a problem with residential security, although I'd like to share with you a couple of interesting cases. It would have been in October of '75 that because of the threats against official Americans in Cyprus, we were constantly telling people to be very careful

of pipe bombs. There had been a history of them being used in Cyprus. Because of the anti-U.S. feelings, we said to people usually every couple of weeks, "Look at your car. Is there anything strange? Look underneath it. Is anything hanging off?" We really were very successful in getting people to take that seriously. One morning, I was having a piece of toast and a cup of coffee in my house. I went outside and sort of bent down and looked under the car. I had an old Austin Healy sports car. It had a back seat that we used for our two children, who were very young at the time. I looked under the car and lo and behold there was a pipe bomb affixed to the exhaust pipe. I said, "Wow, that's pretty incredible." If I had gotten in the car and driven, because there was a mercury switch attached to the pipe bomb, it would have detonated. I was in a unique situation in that the CIA did not have official representation in Cyprus at the time, so I was the bag man for the intelligence community. When people looked at who was the intelligence representative in Cyprus, it was me. So, I came under some different kind of threats than at a normal post. In most places, intelligence representatives are declared to the host government. In this case, that was not the case. I called the police. They came. The bomb disposal group rendered the bomb safe and I took the morning off.

There was another thing that happened that was fascinating. Cyprus at the time was a haven for a lot of Europeans, particularly from Eastern Europe, either coming for vacation or cultural performances and things like that. There was a group of Czech musicians that had come to do a performance at the national theater. This was in 1975/'76. The Cold War between the East and the West was doing quite well from a conflict standpoint. What often would happen, Eastern Europeans would come to Cyprus and then defect. Either they would be handled as legitimate intelligence defectors or they would be turned over to the UN High Commission for Refugee Affairs and eventually funneled into another country like Canada, Australia, or what have you. We got a defector who came into the embassy. He was Czech. He was a musician. Because of the policies and procedures we had at the time, we sort of put him on ice in the embassy for a number of hours. Then because of my perception by some people of being the intelligence representative, we got him into a hotel and we had a couple of people keep an eye on him. We eventually turned him over to the UN. They got him to Athens. But two days after we had him processed and he left, I went home for lunch. We had a young woman that was sort of our cook and nanny for our two children before they went to school. I went in the back door from the back of the house, where the garage was, and I saw a coin laying right there by the door. It looked like a penny. I picked it up and looked at it and I realized, "This is not a penny at all. It's a Czech coin." I think it was probably a very subtle message to me that the Czech embassy was keeping a very close eye on me. As a result of that coin being left, we had security technicians come in and check the house to make sure that nothing had been left behind, like a listening device. For about two months, there would be another coin just simply as a reminder. But those were a couple of interesting...

Q: How about access to the embassy? I imagine there would have been a lot of Cypriots who wanted to go to the United States. There is a large Greek Cypriot community in the U.S. How did that work?

LEE: By the time that I got there, March/April of '75, most of the Greek Cypriots that were intending to leave either temporarily or permanently had already been processed. Many of them, particularly the wealthy Cypriots, and most Cypriots are wealthy, probably wealthier than many

Americans, considering the fact that it's an island, just about everybody owns property and that property is worth an awful lot of money, most Cypriots that were at that point not wanting to leave or trying to leave remained with the idea that either the United States or someone would come in, make this whole thing go away, the Turks would be ousted, and they would have their island back. The big influx in terms of the Consular Section was really from the Lebanese. We had on an average day beginning probably in mid to late '75/'76, we'd get 20-30 Lebanese a day that had left Beirut because of the increasing hostilities and now had taken up temporary residence in Cyprus and now either wanted to go to the States or to apply for something, either claiming a U.S. connection for a passport or visa or what have you. So, we had a lot of Lebanese coming in. At that time and even to this day, Cyprus is a big transient point for extremists, particularly Palestinian terrorists, things like that. We had a guy come in with a briefcase full of money. I think he had paid for a consular service with some of this U.S. currency. I had given the entire Consular Staff a briefing on counterfeit currency sometime prior to that. The guy was still there. He was waiting for processing. The consular assistant called me and said she had a very suspicious bill. I went down and spoke to her. It was very counterfeit, there was no question about it. This guy had a whole briefcase full of it. I approached him and said I needed to talk to him. I took him into another office. I said, "I'm going to confiscate all of your money." I think he had gotten it in Beirut with the idea of passing it on to another party for an exchange of money. We then processed that money. It was about \$400,000. We sent it up to the Secret Service in Paris. That was a feather in my cap in terms of taking a lot of counterfeit money off the market. Unfortunately, this guy was not happy about this at all. He almost became violent. We simply said, "You can leave the embassy. The consular function is fine, but we're not going to let you walk out the door with all this money." He began to shout and scream and finally went away.

Q: What about travel to the Turkish side? Did you work on security arrangements with the Turks?

LEE: Not much. That's a very good question. Ambassador Crawford and I disagreed on a lot of things. One of them was the fact that when he went to the Turkish side, he would have no security at all. I made the point to him that if there was a threat on the Greek side, there was a threat on the Turkish side. His position was that there was no threat on the Turkish side, the Turkish Cypriots were probably more benevolent toward the U.S. at that standpoint than were the Greek Cypriots. At least the Turkish Cypriots weren't anti-U.S., whereas the Greek Cypriots were. Invariably, this monstrous detail that we had on the Greek side would escort him to the Green Line and then he would get into an unprotected sedan, an Audi, and then he would be on his own when he was in the Turkish sector. People that had an official passport or a diplomatic passport that were assigned to the embassy could go to the Turkish sector at any time. People actually enjoyed going over there. It was a much calmer environment. There was less worry about anti-Americanism and that kind of thing. It was really quite comfortable. The embassy at that time had an embassy house on the northern coast near Kyrenia, a very picturesque harbor area. Many people did go over there on the weekends simply to sort of unwind and relax.

There was a bit of a scandal that unfolded during the time I was there. When the Turks came in – and you have to remember that there really were two periods where the Turks came into Cyprus – one was in July and one was in August – the second time, the Greek Cypriots realized that these guys were really serious. The first coup was really more just on the coast. The second coup,

which took place in August, they literally went into villages... They were very close to Nicosia. Because of the religious foundation of Greek Cypriots, they would have a lot of nice things in their homes. Historically, some of the most valuable icons on the Greek Orthodox side have come from Cyprus. There was an awful lot of looting of homes that had been abandoned, Greek Cypriots that left their homes in Morphou or the port area of Famagusta, Kyrenia, other places within the north and they left to go to be with family in the south. There were regular allegations that many of the UN, other diplomats, had gone into homes and- (end of tape)

By the time I got there, a lot of this had been over, but you would constantly hear reports at dinner parties and receptions and that kind of thing that this official or that official or this diplomat or that diplomat had some very expensive and priceless icons that they had taken from Greek homes. We had probably bigger fish to fry. If our level of sophistication of misconduct at that time was as good as it is now, we would have gone after some of these people. But the government was still in disarray. A lot of people just simply didn't care. I can imagine that if I was a Greek Cypriot and I had had to abandon my home and someone had come in and someone had taken all my stuff, I'd be pretty angry.

Q: What about the care and feeding of the Marine Corps detachment?

LEE: We had a good Marine security guard detachment. They were very energetic, very responsive. We had drills all the time for attacks on the embassy and that kind of thing. They were a very integral part of the embassy community. The Marines and the rest of the post socialized a great deal. The Marine house was a place where most people gravitated to on the weekends, where movies were shown. At that particular juncture, people didn't have video recorders and many of them did not have televisions that would provide any kind of videotapes. So, people did watch movies at the Marine house. That was a social center. But the Marines did extremely well, particularly under duress. In a lot of these demonstrations, they showed considerable restraint in not discharging their weapons. We were very lucky.

Q: With any Marine Corps detachment, these are usually unmarried young men and sex becomes a normal problem. But when you have a strong leftist and a strong rightist movement who are trying to do all sorts of things, I would think that this would be a particular problem for you for trying to keep them from getting either coopted or in dangerous situations.

LEE: We never had a problem with that, surprisingly. The left or the right never took advantage of the Marines. At that time, the Soviet presence was very keen. The Soviets were using a lot of travel agencies in Cyprus as front organizations. But the Marines, there were clubs, discotheques, available. A number of Marines that were posted in Cyprus at that time married Greek Cypriot young women. Of course, there are all kinds of old protocols in terms of the way in which that works from the standpoint of the ceremony and the engagement. An engagement usually brings with it sleeping privileges. Families take these things very seriously. There had been one case where a Marine had reneged on an engagement and that caused a lot of consternation from a social standpoint. But by and large, we had a great Marine detachment. There wasn't any co-opting that we were aware of. Because the post was so small, there was a lot of good dialogue between the entire post and so the Marines were never sort of put out on a shelf and left to their own devices. They were involved. They were invited to people's homes. They were almost like

other parts of the family.

Q: Did you usually have warnings of these demonstrations?

LEE: One problem we had, there was a large technical school two blocks from the embassy. The leftist elements within the country used this technical school as their cannon fodder. We would get wind of the fact that - we had some people in the police that were constantly patrolling the city and whenever they would see young boys, 12-14, with a lot of bottles and they were buying gas in local gas stations, we knew that a demonstration was about to hit. They would make up all these Molotov's. They would make them up in cases and throw them at the building. But quite often, we had good intelligence connections. On a personal level, the person in charge of the Central Information Service, the Cypriot intelligence service. They gave us a lot of information, were very good at it. Occasionally, there would be a demonstration that would get cooked up very quickly and you could hear it for probably blocks. Quite often, there would be as many as 5-10,000. They literally swarmed around the outer perimeter of the embassy. You'd think that everybody in the country was participating. They really took their politics very seriously and very emotionally.

Q: By the time you left there in October of '77, how were things going? Did you see a change?

LEE: Going much better. The demonstrations had pretty much ended. Many of the Cypriots at that time were reconciling themselves to the fact that there is not going to be an immediate solution, they aren't going to be going back to their homes. Crime was never a problem. We were beginning to develop a normality within the post. We were keeping records, documents. It was beginning to function like a regular post. Nevertheless, we did have threats. One interesting thing that I did work on when I was there was the investigation of the murder of Jack Welch, who had been the station chief of the CIA in Athens. It was believed that there was an EOKA-B connection to that murder. We worked on that for a good bit of the time that I was there, never developed any evidence to that effect. Of course, the November 17th group was blamed for that killing and no one has ever been arrested in conjunction with that murder.

Q: In fact, there have been several other murders, too, of which the November 17th group has been linked.

LEE: Yes.

Getting back to your question, the post was becoming very normal. People were doing things that they weren't doing before. Threats, demonstrations, had ended. At that point, I almost got bored some days. I wasn't constantly gearing up for another demonstration.

ROBERT J. WOZNIAK
USIA Headquarters; Greece-Turkey-Cyprus Desk Officer
Washington (1975-1976)

Mr. Wozniak was born in Michigan and educated at the University of Chicago, William College and the University of Indiana. After service in the U.S. Navy in WWII, he joined the United States Information Agency (USIA) in 1963. His service included several assignments at USIA Headquarters in Washington, D.C. as well as postings abroad as Public Affairs Officer (or Deputy) in Athens, Nicosia, Damascus, and Rabat. Mr. Wozniak was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in 2001.

Q: And in the period, '75-'76, when you were desk officer for Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus at USIA, you were primarily again backstopping the three public affairs officers.

WOZNIAK: That is right. It was a standard USIA Washington desk officer assignment to support the posts and make sure their requirements are being met etc.

Q: It was certainly a period when our relations with all three countries were very complicated. A lot of things were happening after the Turkish intervention in Cyprus, the change of government in Greece, the Turkish arms embargo. Do you remember anything about those kinds of issues or not?

WOZNIAK: Not really.

Q: Then you say you went to Arabic language study. Where did you do that?

WOZNIAK: In Washington. Again about halfway through my second year in Washington at the Greece-Turkey-Cyprus desk, the director called me in and said another one of those crazy stories. An officer that had been assigned to go to Istanbul as branch PAO was not going to go. Would I consider going immediately? It was a job that I always had coveted and I was sorely tempted, but it was just the wrong time for many reasons, family reasons. I said that I would think about it over the weekend. On Monday he called me and asked, "Had I thought about it?" I said, "Yes, I can't do it." And another high flying USIA officer, ultimately later an ambassador leaned over his desk and said, "Bob, it is in the national interest," and I burst out laughing, and he never forgave me for that. So immediately I knew I was in trouble with him. I went immediately to see the director of our NEA office, a wonderful guy who said I should talk to him if I ever wanted back in the area. He agreed to send me to Damascus the following year if I would do a year of Arabic, and that is how that happened.

Q: This was I guess before the days of open assignments when you could express wants and preferences.

WOZNIAK: That's right. Well I told you that the old boy network used to work in USIA. I don't know if it still does, but it always worked to my advantage. I must say I was not one of its critics.

JAMES H. MORTON
Cyprus Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1975-1976)

**Director, Greek Affairs
Washington, DC (1976-1978)**

James H. Morton was raised in Illinois and graduated from Monmouth College and the University of Chicago. He joined the Foreign Service in 1964. His career included positions in Luxembourg, Greece, Switzerland, New Zealand, and Washington, DC. Mr. Morton was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1993.

MORTON: Very true and I was. You know when Bill Hall and Joan Clark cooked up this assignment for me, not that I went kicking and screaming to leave Switzerland, but I realized already that I was not becoming a specialist, that I was not establishing credentials with any particular bureau. As a matter of fact I curtailed my tour, I was supposed to be there three years but I said I wanted out and to get back into my speciality, political reporting. Because I had some friends in the Bureau that was when I was selected as Cyprus Desk officer. Then I became the Greek Desk officer and then the Director of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus.

Q: Why don't we stop at this point and pick up later because we want to go into your Washington assignment in more detail.

MORTON: Yes, there is some fascinating things about the Greek lobby in Washington.

Q: Today is October 21, 1993 and we are still in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Jim, first I would like to start this off with dates. You left Bern and you went to the Cyprus desk when?

MORTON: The fall of 1975.

Q: And how long were you on that?

MORTON: I was on the Cyprus for a year and then moved up and made Director of Greek Affairs.

Q: Did you take this job with a certain amount of trepidation because Tom Boyatt, I know, about a year before had gotten really in a...it worked out in a way well for him careerwise, but at that point it wasn't sure that it really had. He had gotten into quite a head to head with Henry Kissinger.

MORTON: Yes, very true. Not so much the sense of trepidation. The context is interesting in that it was about a year after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus.

Q: Which was on something like July 14, 1974.

MORTON: At that time there had been a bureaucratic reorganization of the geographical divisions in the State Department. Greek, Turkey and Cyprus were given to EUR, an unwanted stepchild to say the least. They were never comfortable with it. I heard, and I think it was true,

that when the invasion occurred that literally the file cabinets were being wheeled along the corridors by the movers to the new offices.

To get to your question, I looked at it as a great challenge. I had served in Greece as we talked earlier in this interview. Before I left Switzerland I had the opportunity to visit Cyprus...the Department funded my travel there. I was at that time blissfully ignorant of many of the things that were problems for Tom Boyatt. By the way, I served with Tom at my first post so I knew Tom.

Q: Would you talk a bit about what you saw? I have an interview with Bill Crawford, but would you talk about your impression of seeing people going around with flack jackets on, etc.

MORTON: And also Rodger Davies had been killed there. Again I am a little unsure of sequence of events, but I think Rodger Davies had been killed no more than a year before and Bill Crawford had come down there.

Yes, I flew over but had not been to Cyprus before. I remember driving past buildings that had been blown out. Of course we had to fly into Larnaca, the old RAF strip in the south of the island in an old Viscount turboprop plane because all of Cyprus Air's jet fleet had been more or less caught on the runway of the Nicosia airport and it was closed, and I think it is still closed to this day. The place was still kind of in a shambles from that. There were, of course, the famous green line that divided the place. We also traveled around. We were able to go into the Turkish section and up to what was called Kyrenia at the time, a beautiful part of Cyprus. But it was a pretty tense place at that particular point in time.

Q: First impressions can be very important. What were you getting from Bill Crawford as far as was there somebody at fault...I'm talking about Greeks, or Turks?

MORTON: I think, and I had previously served in Greece, basically the feeling amongst most officers serving in Cyprus, and it wasn't a large embassy, was that the Greek Cypriot community had brought it on themselves. The distribution of population was such that small isolated pockets of Turkish Cypriots kind of sprinkled around the larger Greek sea within the island of Cyprus. We heard stories of how for fun on a Sunday Greek Cypriots would jump in their car and ride through villages and fire and even shoot and kill women and children in these pockets. The Turks were totally vulnerable. Finally because of all sorts of events...the coup, Nicos Sampson and a lot of stuff that has been recorded elsewhere...the Turks had just had it. I feel personally, and I can say it now more than I could say it then, that they were fully justified in coming in to protect their brethren.

Q: I have to say, as an outsider, but I have been consul general in Athens and left the first of July, just a couple of days before this happened, from what I have heard the Greeks, as they had done in 1923, had blown it.

MORTON: Absolutely. The Turkish behavior later on and their unwillingness to negotiate, maybe you could be critical of, but I think they had no other choice but to come in and protect their brethren down there. Of course, you could never say that to a Greek.

Q: When you got to Washington, what was the situation as far as we were concerned in Washington and what were the problems that you were handling?

MORTON: First it was the Cyprus Desk for a year and then the Greek Desk for a year but I never really left the Cyprus problem and when on the Cyprus Desk you deal with Greek issues, so the two blended together. And, of course, it was an unusual office because we also had Turkey in there. Geographically it was nice, but here were these sworn enemies, so the desk officers would pounce on each other with daggers or something. This never happened by the way, I think because the both of us were able to see...

Q: Who was the other Desk Officer?

MORTON: At that time it was a guy named Harmon Kirby. When I first came back as Cyprus Desk Officer, a guy named John Day was doing the Greek stuff. John had served in Greece and was well thought of by them.

The situation was that when you got back there we had a lobby in Washington that has often been described as the second strongest lobby in the United States, and that's after the phenomenal Jewish lobby. The Greeks had 8 million strong. The thing about the Greeks...immigration patterns are interesting and I did some studies later on...when Greeks came to America they weren't like Ukrainians and others, and massed in areas like Cleveland or Detroit and dominated an industry, the Greeks opened restaurants and little businesses and since they didn't want to get in competition with their cousin, Petros, they would move on to the next town 50 miles down the railroad line. So Greeks were uniformly spread around the country. So when we would be working this issue, when we would be either with the Cyprus issue or later on the lifting of the Turkish arms embargo, we were dealing with a lobby. We were dealing with a situation where every congressman in the United States had Greek constituents who in their own way were very good at applying pressure. The Greek Orthodox priest would preach sermons on Sunday to write your congressman and that kind of thing. What you found was an incredibly one-sided view of the world, both working the Cyprus settlement and also working on the Turkish arms embargo, the views toward Turkey, because the numbers were thus: There were something like 8 million Greek Americans, and because of all sorts of reasons, Turks did not immigrate to the United States in large numbers, so there were less than a million Turkish Americans. There were something like 100,000 Greek Cypriot Americans and something like 30,000 Turkish Americans. So everything was weighted against us from that stand point. We all know the effect of lobbies in Washington.

Q: You had been moved over to European Affairs and obviously there was a certain amount of distaste among Europeanists.

MORTON: They didn't want to have anything to do with us. Among other things we brought a lot of bureaucratic problems and kept them late at the office because the Greeks and Turks were always fighting. Bruce Laingen was up there as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State under Art Hartman. I wandered up there with telegrams and things probably eight in the evening and Bruce would be sitting there knowing I was coming, and if he had just his normal European

clientele, he would have gone home at 6. But the Greeks and the Turks kept everybody up late. That was just the way it was.

Q: What were you trying to do in this context with your other colleagues?

MORTON: First of all we had continual inquiries from the Congress of the United States. There was something like 12 Congressman who were either Greek Americans or had a strong association. One was John Brademas who was a Greek American. Not many people knew that, it was kind of an odd name. And there were others. There was constant pressure.

The pressure during the first year when I was on the Cyprus Desk was to push the Turks...one of the main things they captured the town of Famagusta, which was the second largest town and a kind of wealthy, resort town on the eastern part of Cyprus...to turn Famagusta back and withdraw their troops.

Congress passed a law that the State Department would every six months write a report on progress of the resolution of the Cyprus problem. It fell to me to write this report and the trouble is that there was never any progress on this. So every six months it was my duty to kind of fabricate a report or to write something that this thing is happening or that thing is happening. But any negotiation almost immediately was aborted because the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots didn't even want to talk to each other. We had a guy up north named Rauf Denktash and, of course, down south we had Makarios. So there are hard lines on both side of the issue.

We essentially worked very hard to try to foster these talks. By "we" I mean the State Department. We would prepare position papers and try to get the Turks to come to the table; Denktash came to visit, that kind of thing. But I think all of us working on this knew it was hopeless. The Turks had done their thing and they were going to dig in and stay a while. The big issue, of course, was would northern Cyprus declare a unilateral declaration of independence.

Q: Separation seems to be a much better solution even though it is rough at the beginning than trying to get these people to live together. Certainly the Greeks were not very good neighbors. Was there the feeling that okay it has gone this way and no way in the world are we going to get these people to co-mingle again? What was your feeling?

MORTON: Oh, absolutely true. Let me tell you a little vignette that went on when I took over the Greek Desk about a year later. One of the first things that I did was to open the New York Times and there on the front page was a little girl marching in an epiphany Day celebration in New York. She was a beautiful eight-year-old with a frilly lace dress and had one of these sandwich boards hung over her that said, "Kill the Turks." So this was kind of a sobering reminder of the fact that they have hated each other for centuries. I would agree with what you say that anybody working with this issue knew that you could never put Humpty Dumpty back together again. Cyprus would never return to what it was before. The Turks would never put people back in these vulnerable positions, especially after the animosities created by this war. And so consequently we in many ways played the game of trying to foster negotiations even though we knew what we had defacto was a fait accompli and that ten years from now, which is now as we sit, the situation would be the same on the ground and indeed it is.

Q: Were you ever looking at it that maybe we should separate Famagusta or something to make the Turks...in other words to give something to the Turks to try to assuage people? Was there any feel that you should do anything?

MORTON: Yeah, I think that was a feeling but the Turks would have none of it. They had just had it. I think it got mixed up in internal Turkish politics where they couldn't be seen giving anything away, unfortunately, as many of these things do. Frankly they seemed to relish their position on the ground and they were going to lord it over the Greeks for quite some time. So there was a sense of hopelessness.

Q: Tell me about some of your relations with Congress?

MORTON: This was a high profile issue and I, first Cyprus and then Greek Desk Officer, was in contact...by the way, not only were there 12 Congresspersons of some connection in Greek ancestry or real strong interest in Greece, none of Turkish, of course, but a great number of staff members with Greek names. There were a lot up there.

Q: It is an interesting phenomena if you look at it. Greek Americans very much parallel in slightly smaller numbers, Jewish Americans into the professions, into politics, disproportionate to their actual number.

MORTON: Absolutely, and there were some powerful staff members who just gave us a hard row to hoe. They were on the phone all the time; they were after information; they would come over; they would ask us to come up; they often times were very unpleasant. I can remember a couple of times some of them losing their temper with me when I would say, "Let me tell you how the Turks feel," and suddenly it was as if I was telling them my opinion and I was qualifying it. It was extremely, extremely difficult dealing with them.

And then, I don't want to jump ahead, but we did get to the point where, of course, you know the Congress slapped an arms embargo...

Q: Was that while you were on the desk?

MORTON: It went on shortly after the invasion so it was in place when I came on the desk. Then the move to lift the arms embargo came after I was there. Then, because it was official US policy, even though I was the Greek Desk officer, I spent a lot of my waking hours along with others lobbying with Congressmen to overturn the arms embargo on a NATO ally. And Steve Solarz, by the way, was the leading proponent of this. Steve I thought saw the US interest in this kind of thing. Turkey was very distressed but it said it had acted in the interests of its citizens. It was at that time that I was branded a traitor in the Greek and Cypriot embassies because I was seen up on the Hill lobbying to lift this arms embargo. They were not able to make the distinction between my activities as acting in the interest of our government. They thought I should be loyal to their side.

Q: We are talking about ethnic politics in the United States. I think it is a very interesting

phenomenon because you get people who come at this...the other great one, of course, on the matter of Israel. But people who are brought up often religion is involved and all, and they don't see what are American interests and goals.

MORTON: As a matter of fact, a couple of stories. I had a professor from Wayne State University in Detroit come in to see me. He told me he was third generation, but he was Greek. I was explaining to him how the Turks saw the situation and he exploded in my office saying I shouldn't be in a position like I am in and that sort of thing. I know how strong the Jewish lobby is, but I don't think there is any other ethnic group like the Greeks who maintain their ties so strongly to the homeland and who are unable even as second and third generation to take on and see the American interests. They still see it through Greek eyes. It is very interesting that second generation families still would send their sons home to get a bride in the villages in the Greek hills.

Q: And the religion is so tied into it.

MORTON: Exactly. As I said earlier, we would get letters like crazy because the Greek Orthodox priests were just preaching anti-Turkish statements, write your Congressman don't let them lift the arms embargo, etc.

It is amazing, there should be a book some day written on the Greek lobby as there has been on the Israeli lobby because it is phenomenally strong organization. Some people have said that it is right up there with the Israelis. There was a guy from Treasury, Eugene Rossides, another one, and they just had a network. These guys are from American families, but boom. As I mentioned the other day, the only guy, one of the few people, who saw things Greek objectively, was Nick Veliotis. In fact, Nick was kind of the other way, very critical.

Q: We were trying to lift the arms embargo. Turkey was a NATO ally holding a very important stretch of territory whereas Greece frankly didn't. What were you getting from the Europeanists? How were you dealing with this problem?

MORTON: Well, my recollection is that just about everybody saw the wisdom that we had to lift the arms embargo on Turkey. And they saw the Greeks as being totally unreasonable. But everybody knows the Greeks and therefore found it understandable. So the Europeanists, a phrase you used, felt that the most important thing was NATO. Turkey was the anchor over there. We had to right this wrong that was done in an emotional reaction by the US Congress, spearheaded by Greek American legislators. I don't think I heard of anybody who wasn't a Greek who didn't think that we had to lift the arms embargo against Turkey, against a NATO ally. This was the Cold War factor.

Q: Were you getting any nervousness on the part of saying you are really weakening NATO, at that time?

MORTON: Absolutely. Some people saw the worse case scenario that Turkey would pull out, say that is it, we are out of here. Most people said we could do without Greece, but we can't do without Turkey. It was as simple as that, a black and white situation.

Q: Were you getting any feelers that the Soviets were playing the game of trying to make the Turks...?

MORTON: That's a good question. I think we saw evidence that the Soviets were happy to stir the pot and continue this kind of squabble within NATO. I can't recall any vivid examples of that, but that was happening at the time. Clearly they were happy with that situation.

Q: Then you went to the Greek Desk. Was there any change? You moved in 1976 and how long were you there?

MORTON: Two years. Yeah, I started doing bilateral things with Greece, but again much of it was Cyprus. Everything evolved around Cyprus during that time. But then we got into the election of Andreas Papandreou. It is almost noteworthy that while I have been on this trip he has been reelected.

Q: I know. October, 1993 and he is back again.

MORTON: And it boggles the mind. Nonetheless, back then what I then devoted much of my energies to was staffing out and being part of the renegotiation of Greek bases.

Q: You know, one of the things that used to bother me when I was in Greece was the bases which had become such a burden. The Greeks used them for all sorts of pressure. We had a few airfields and a number of communications sites. What were you getting as to the importance of these bases and how were we looking at them at that time?

MORTON: Well, it depended on who you talked to. I have used this example when we discuss negotiations in training foreign diplomats, that often times the real adversary is not the other government you face across the table, but within your own government at home when you hammer out common negotiating positions. I think, very honestly, although no one would ever agree with me and no one would ever admit it at the time, but the State Department, if it had its way, would have just as soon seen those bases go. For one thing it would have cleared up the bilateral problems with it. We have Andreas Papandreou who made an election commitment to do it, although we knew... I predicted at one time that when he left government that American bases would still be there, and, of course, they still are there. I am not one to say how strategic they were at one time, but I think we could have reduced greatly our presence there, if not our entire presence...I mean we had stuff in Crete, Soudha Bay, Naiamatre communications, and on and on and on. But that was Cold War and you had the Pentagon dictating policy on these bases at that time. They said that all of these things were necessary and consequently we got into this long, protracted negotiations with Greece which in many ways the Pentagon wanted no result and I think in many ways, Andreas Papandreou wanted no result. So both parties in the negotiations were going to the table just for the appearance of negotiating, but none wanted any progress. So it dragged out forever.

There was no real resolve. The only thing that happened was something they called streamlining or Hellenization of the bases...they took the American flag down and put the Greek flag up and a

few gestures like that. And everything went on its only merry way as it had gone before.

Q: How about Andreas Papandreou. When you arrived on the Desk, Karamanlis was the President. He was sort of a central figure, highly respected. What was your view of the politics of Greece at that time and the way they developed?

MORTON: I think that the individual Greek is the most political animal I have ever seen in my life. I have never been anywhere and I have never read anything, they live, eat and breath politics. A Greek is only truly happy in a situation of near or total anarchy. They just love to get into it. Consequently the Greek political system is always kind of flowing back and forth more so than most political systems. There is always continuing scandal in the Greek government. The only way to get anything done is through payoffs and that sort of thing. So one thing you know about Greek politics, and this is not too unusual from other places, is that it's going to be constant debate, raucous, shifting alliances back and forth, shifting of parties back and forth.

Q: Andreas Papandreou came back when? Were you on the Greek Desk at that time?

MORTON: Yes. Andreas Papandreou came back in 1976, I think, just about the time I was getting to the Desk. He was a demagogue, no doubt about it. He was a reaction against what had happened with the coup and then Karamanlis with the colonels. You know it is very difficult to describe. Greece was just ready for one of its love affairs with a leftist government and Andreas, of course, had come back from the University of Minnesota where he had been a economics professor. Early on I think he provided a reasonably good government for the Greeks. He started, of course, some nationalization and that sort of thing.

Q: Did we learn to kind of live with him?

MORTON: Not a lot of people learned to live with him, but I think we knew he was a fact of life. A lot of people were very uncomfortable with him. When he came in a lot of people said this was the end of the bases and that sort of thing. But others, and I count myself amongst them, thought he was a very pragmatic politician and knew that those bases were more important to Greece than they perhaps were to the United States. But he had to play it out politically for the man in the street.

So, yes, we were never comfortable with him, "we" the United States, but what are you going to do. Greece was perceived as being strategic.

Q: Our embassy was very controversial before, I was part of that country team with Henry Tasca and all very close to the colonels, at least the feeling was that. What was your feeling when you were on the Desk, and also maybe spilled over from the Cyprus times, about how we were dealing with the government, particularly in reports from the embassy and all that?

MORTON: I was usually in daily telephone contact with the political counselor and the DCM.

Q: Who were they?

MORTON: George Barbis was the political counselor and my main contact.

Q: He would be a Greek American.

MORTON: Yes he was. That is another issue we have talked about. You know at that time I think the criticism was that the embassy had not done enough to cultivate contacts in the opposition, which was PASOK, Andreas Papandreou's organization. Consequently when Andreas was in, it was felt that the embassy had no real connection with the government. I think over time there were some officers there...a guy named Towny Freeman, for one...who were reasonably successful in establishing a contact. But it was a very uneasy relationship during that time. There was a guy there named Montegale Sterns who was ambassador.

Our feeling back there was that the embassy was kind of out in right field.

Q: Was there concern that there were too many people in the embassy, and particularly in the military and CIA, who were still close to the right, mainly because of a lot of the Greek American connections?

MORTON: Yes, I think that is right. Papandreou and company really held them off as well. It was not for lack of trying. Well, yes, but aren't most American embassies that way?

Q: The tendency is there. But there, of course, it is important, other places it is not very important.

MORTON: But it is kind of the way we would gravitate to.

Q: Since things involved the Turks so much, how were your relations with the Turkish Desk? You were both the stepsons in the European Bureau, nobody wanted you. You were sort of the urchins who had to be brought in to be nice to.

MORTON: That was not a problem because everybody in the office, I have to say it, was sympathetic to the Turkish side. This was a product of the Cyprus issue. Consequently, within the office there was no real division at that time. I lobbied very hard along with the rest of my colleagues in the office to try to lift the Turkish arms embargo, which was successful. So that was not a problem.

Q: What about the Turkish arms issue? You say you lobbied to lift it. How does one lobby to try to get something done in Congress when there is so much specific opposition to it?

MORTON: That is one of the activities that I have been involved in in my career that I was personally fascinated with and got intrigued with. I did a demographic study where Greek Americans lived in the United States. I had Census Bureau data from the last census. I was amazed to find out during this exercise how precise Census data is. They can tell you congressional districts, how many of what ethnic groups are in that district, it was just amazing. We went after the hard ones targeting something like 150 of the congressional districts that had the highest percentage of Greek Americans. Then we wrote off some as hopeless because of the

high percentage. We then started calling for appointments and going to see Congressmen who may be hearing from Greek Orthodox priests and telling them that there is another side to the issue. That American national interests require that this Turkish arms embargo be lifted. I think sometimes we did some good.

I remember distinctly going to see the Representative at Large from Nevada, they only had one Congressman. He said to me, "Everything you said makes eminently good sense and I agree with you. My problem is that I fly home and when I get off the plane in Las Vegas there are eight Greek restaurant owners who come up and buttonhole me and give me all sorts of hell. I just wish I had some Turks in the district to offset them." He was talking about eight people. This was the kind of disproportionate influence the Greeks had.

Essentially that was what we did. We made call after call after call and spread the gospel that this was in the US interest. Yes they were going to get some flack from their Greek American counterparts, because, we would present them the figures, there are no Turkish Americans in your district. We know that you are going to be better off if you vote for the Greek side, but it is not probably going to be an issue that is going to cause your reelection or defeat in the next election. So it was just doing our homework and slogging around the Hill. I spent probably the better part of three months most of my time, four hours a day up on the Hill just being a lobbyist.

Q: How were you received by Congressmen? Did they look upon you as a la-di-da Foreign Service officer?

MORTON: In some way, yeah. And often we had trouble getting access and spoke to staff a lot. But sometimes we were able to get through. Sometimes I think they said, "My God, they really feel strongly about this, come back and see my Congressman at such and such a time." Solarz in some ways was orchestrating it. Steve Solarz threw a wonderful party at his suburban Virginia house when this was all over and we all felt like we had worked our tails off. Everyone had contributed. We were never sure of the outcome because of the Greek lobby and people like Brademas and others..at that time Sarbanes, who I regard as one of our better Senators, but on this issue...

Q: There is a mind set there that you can't penetrate.

MORTON: You cannot penetrate it and people who I admire on practically every philosophical level, on this one, blinders. I can still get in trouble with Sarbanes. I like what he stands for but he was one of the Congressman...

But that was a fascinating exercise and one which I think the State Department functioned beautifully as part of a team.

Q: Who was Secretary of State then?

MORTON: Cyrus Vance.

Q: This is a new Democratic administration. Were you finding support at the time?

MORTON: I think with this issue there was good support.

Q: Vance, of course, is really very familiar with it. He had been a principal figure in the negotiations.

MORTON: So he knew it well. I think Vance had had it up to here with the Greeks as well...I am pointing to my throat. I never got terribly close to him. I used to write the reports that he would sign and send to Congress. And I will tell you a little aside here. I worked in the Secretariat and you know how careful they are about any piece of paper, no errors and all that sort of thing. I finished one of my every six months reports on Cyprus and proofed it and it was all typed out with the cover letter which the Secretary would sign transmitting it to Congress. It went up to the Secretariat and probably, I'll bet, 50 different people looked at this piece of paper and finally I heard that the Secretary had signed it and it had gone to Congress. About two weeks later I got the comeback copy and was just sending it to my secretary to put it in the file when I looked down and there was the Cyrus Vance signature, but underneath his name was not spelled Cyrus Vance, it was spelled Cyprus Vance. Nobody had seen it. It went to Congress like that. The secretary had been typing the word Cyprus so often that she got to Cyrus and typed Cyprus. I marked it for filing and hoped no one would notice it.

Q: So you finished there in 1978?

MORTON: Yes, 1978.

Q: Were there any other issues with Greece that you would like to mention?

MORTON: There was another interesting story. During that time Jack Kubisch was Ambassador. William Schaufele, who had been Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs was nominated as Ambassador. I, as Greek Desk Officer, had the task, and it was a pleasant one because he was a wonderful guy, of briefing him along with a whole bunch of other people. We prepared him for his Congressional hearings. Bill Schaufele was the kind of guy you could tell was uncomfortable because we would say things like, "You really shouldn't get into that area," or "If they ask something about this you shouldn't go any farther than this." We tried to give him a feel for the Greek/Turkish sensitivities and how one misplaced word could land you in all kinds of trouble. He said, "Okay. I appreciate what you are telling me."

So he went up and went to his hearing and he did reasonably well. Toward the end there was a question, I can't remember from whom...it was an open hearing and of course there were Greek journalists in the background...they got into this issue of the seabed and drilling for oil.

Q: Oh, yes. You have all these islands and who has control over them, etc. The Greeks go ballistic over this.

MORTON: Yes, and there are all these islands nestling up near Turkish territory, Lesbos being one. He got into that issue and I, to this day I can't remember exactly what it was he said, but it was something that sent the Greeks through the respective bulkhead. I remember getting back

with him after the hearing and the head of the office saying to me, "You have just lost us our Ambassador. He is not going." His name was Nelson Lesky and I said, "Nelson, you always exaggerate. It is bad, but no problem."

Boy, was I wrong. Two days later the Greek Ambassador comes in and even though they had already given him agrément they declared him non grata. And that was because it had created a storm out there and they didn't feel that somebody who would say something like that, which they perceived as being pro-Turkish, could come out there and work. Again the Greek lobby at work. He would have been a great ambassador. The Greeks should have been flattered to have had a man of his calibre.

Q: One time while in Greece I mentioned to an American who was talking about something that happened and I said, "Well, you know Balkan justice isn't the same as all other kinds of justice." And that got in the front pages of the Greek pages. I thought I was done. The Greeks take these things very seriously.

MORTON: One vignette before we leave this fascinating time. I was in the middle of a busy workday on the Cyprus Desk. The phone rang and I suddenly lifted the receiver and someone was saying, "Congressional Research Service," and I am thinking that I am talking to an ally here, we are all in government. They started talking about the Cyprus situation. Finally this person said, "Well, what do you really think?" Of course I was attuned to the press and all that kind of stuff and said, "Well, on background (I went on background even though I thought I was dealing with the Congressional Research Service and I thought they were doing some research for a Senator or something), if you are asking me, I tell you that there is going to be a deadlock and the two sides are going to settle in and that sort of thing."

Two days later the Hartford Courant, of all papers, printed something a Greek stringer had picked up from the person I had spoken to. It mentioned a high level State Department official...when they want it to have impact, they will make a low bureaucrat like myself a high level official...had said that it would take this and that for a final Cyprus settlement. There was an election in Cyprus and the story got over there and pretty soon they were talking about the Morton Factor. It just spreads like wildfire. You know what it is like in that part of the world.

I have to say that I got a call from Art Hartman, who was Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and a guy who didn't like to work on this subject being more interested in the Soviet Union, etc. His secretary said, "Mr. Hartman would like to see you." I knew what it was all about and I went up with my tail between my legs. He smiled, sat down and said, "I agree with everything that you said, Jim. You are right on about the Cyprus thing. But we are not going to say that to anybody else anymore are we Jim?" He laughed and dismissed me. But it lasted for a couple of weeks.

Q: And it is a very upsetting thing to know how vulnerable one can be, and if you don't get support...

MORTON: I have to say that one of the things in my career I like to be frank to people and I always thought I knew when I could trust them. But there were just times...I hated to be a robot

and just spew forth the government line. That was what Schaufele was like as well and that is why he got his proverbial tit in a ringer.

Q: You left in 1978 and what did you do?

MORTON: Well, oddly enough and happily enough, I was selected as a Congressional Fellow, so I went up to the Congress for a year. I don't know if you know about that program but one of the things you do is to get to wander around and knock on the door of a Congressman and get a job.

GEORGE M. BARBIS
Political Officer
Athens, Greece (1975-1979)

Mr. Barbis was born in California and raised there and in Greece. He graduated from the University of California and served in the US Army in WWII. In 1954 he entered the Foreign Service and was posted to Teheran, Iran as Economic Officer. His other overseas assignments included postings in Thailand, Korea, France, Belgium and Greece, primarily in the Political and Economic fields. Mr. Barbis served on the US Delegation to the United Nations (1973-1975). His Washington assignments involved him in Southeast Asia matters and the US military. Mr. Barbis is a graduate of the National War College. Mr. Barbis was interviewed by Mr. Raymond C. Ewing in 1996.

Q: What was the situation in Greece at that time?

BARBIS: This was some six months after the fall of the junta, after the Cyprus tragedy, as the Greeks saw it and a period of great resentment [against] the United States because we were blamed for allowing what happened to happen. We were blamed for what the Colonels did, that we egged them into it, which was nonsense, but more importantly that the Turks invaded Cyprus and we didn't stop it. My going to Athens was in a way not an easy decision, especially after the events on Cyprus because of my Greek background. In fact, when Ambassador Kubisch interviewed me for the job, he put that question to me. Will the fact that you have an association with this country affect your performance? I had to tell him very firmly that I was born in this country and always considered myself an American and although I had pride in my parents' heritage and a certain affection for Greece, especially since I had lived there as a boy, certainly that would not be a factor in how I performed as a representative of the US government. And he accepted that.

I also saw by going there under these difficult conditions, because we were aware of the anti-American feeling that resulted from the years of junta rule and the Cyprus situation, as someone who spoke the language, had lived there, who knew the Greek character and what Greeks were like that I could make a contribution that some other officers would not necessarily be able to make. And, although there had been a practice not to assign officers with a family relationship to

that country, we were getting over that fortunately. The one drawback in my going to Greece was that in the Greek eyes, a Greek-American was always considered CIA because the CIA did use Greek-Americans and it became known. But, I think I was probably the first substantive Greek American officer the embassy had had, although the administrative counselor was a Greek-American from Brooklyn when I went to Athens, but I don't think we had had any other Greek-Americans. I think there had been someone right after the war in Thessaloniki and he was too biased towards the Greeks and that gave a bad name to Greek-Americans. This had happened in other countries too, so the Department had an unwritten policy of not sending hyphenated Americans to the country from which their parents or maybe themselves had come initially. As I said we have gotten away from that now and is no longer a factor. In my case I never had the feeling that Ambassador Kubisch or Monty Stearns, the DCM, or any of my colleagues at the embassy saw me as a partisan of the Greeks or as a covert mole or whatever.

In fact, and I will come to this later perhaps, when an editor whose magazine was publishing a story that I was the CIA station chief contacted an American journalist to check that with her, she said that this guy was as American as apple pie, you are out of your mind and stupid if you print that story. This was after the station chief had been assassinated. The Greeks who are very conspiratorial types in any case, it is sort of built into their culture, are always looking for something like that. So, it was a story that was widely believed, but by people who didn't know me. Anybody who knew me I don't think felt that way. But this journalist told this guy she knew me, knew my office and was in it all the time and knew very well I was what I was said to be. So, that was a negative thing, trying to sell that story on the basis I was of Greek descent. But my main point, I guess, is that I felt that I was in a unique position during that difficult time in US-Greek relations to make a positive contribution. And, I did get a superior honor award for that almost four year assignment, which suggested that maybe I did accomplish what I personally had hoped to accomplish.

I will give you another anecdote to show you the climate and my position being Greek-American. I remember at one of the first dinners that my wife and I were invited to at the DCM's house meeting for the first time the minister of commerce of Greece, John Butois, who himself was married to Mary, a Greek-American from Chicago. He quite openly was unhappy with US policy over Cyprus but also attacked Greek-Americans as representing the US government. John and I became good friends subsequently. But he was very insulting at that first encounter. I think maybe he told all of this to my wife. But on another occasion he said something to Ambassador Kubisch. "Why do you have this Greek-American on your staff?" Kubisch rose to my defense and said, "He is not a Greek-American, he is an American and represents the US government." So, I did have that kind of support. I only mention it to show you that in the minds of many Greeks it was otherwise.

At the same time, many Greeks, especially in the government, accepted me for who I was and treated me that way, although they always preferred to speak to me in Greek. I remember the foreign minister before he became prime minister. [He] had great affection for me for some unknown reason, used to call me the eagle which in Greece is the highest praise you can give a young person. I didn't feel I was that talented but I was accepted in the diplomatic community and in government circles as a sincere, hardworking representative of the American embassy.

Q: George, we were just talking about how the Greeks saw what happened in Cyprus in 1974 and the US role or failure to play a role as a betrayal from the country that had given all this support and assistance and had been so involved in Greece in the post-war period.

BARBIS: Exactly. And this was personalized very directly with the Secretary of State. One of the first things we saw in Athens when we got there in January of 1975 were effigies of Kissinger hanging from telephone poles and signs, "Murderer, wanted dead or live." And, to this day, most Greeks have very strong feelings against Mr. Kissinger because they blame him.

The Turkish invasion of Cyprus was not the first time that Greece and Turkey had come close to conflict and they actually did in Cyprus because the Greeks sent some troops there. There were some Greek troops there all ready, but the Greeks also reinforced those troops. So, there were clashes involving Greeks and Turks on Cyprus. But, when this had happened previously, I guess the best example is when President Johnson was president and the Turks were getting ready to attack the Greeks...and I should introduce here that it is not just Cyprus that was an issue between them, perhaps from a self interest point of view even more important was the whole question of the continental shelf and the Aegean, rights thereto and etc., but we can come to that later. But, in this previous occasion when war threatened, we intervened directly and in effect dictated to the Turks, "You better not do it," and they backed off. This time, when the President sent a letter to Prime Minister Ecevit, the Turks in effect said, "We listened to President Johnson, but now we are going to do it our way." And, their way was to send in troops and to divide the island as it remains today. The Greeks have always seen this as a violation of international law, the UN Charter, and have never understood how and why, despite repeated Security Council resolutions, etc. that the world community has allowed the division and the occupation, as they see it, of northern Cyprus by the Turks to continue.

CARL EDWARD DILLERY
Deputy Chief of Mission
Nicosia (1976-1978)

Deputy Director, Southern European Affairs
Washington, DC (1978-1982)

Ambassador Carl Edward Dillery was born in Seattle, Washington. He received a bachelor's degree from Seattle Pacific University and a master's degree from George Washington University. He joined the Foreign Service in 1955. His career included positions in Japan, Belgium, Vietnam, The United Kingdom, and Cyprus, and an ambassadorship to Fiji. Ambassador Dillery was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1994.

Q: Then you move from this congenial area to something quite different.

DILLERY: Actually I might just tell a little anecdote about that. It was in August 1974 and you will remember that our Ambassador, Rodger Davies, was killed in Cyprus. That was the time

when the Turks came into Cyprus. The Greeks would call it invading and the Turks would call it arrival of a peace force. It started in July, 1974. This caused the split of the island, which was a very sad occasion. When Davies was killed, they took emergency action to find a new ambassador. They settled on a former Cyprus DCM, William Crawford, who was then Ambassador to Yemen. He was actually on vacation some place and they dragged him back.

Q: He was climbing the mountains of Norway or something like that.

DILLERY: Right. So they quickly got him in route. Dean Brown had gone out to be temporary ambassador. They brought Crawford to London and the Brits...it had been a British colony and they were still an importance presence there and part of the peacekeeping force. The embassy officer who watched over Cyprus in those days was the Middle East watcher, George Lambrakis. He was on vacation in August when the killing took place. I happened to have the office next door to Lambrakis so I took care of Ambassador Crawford for a couple of days and went around with him.

In late 1975, or maybe even January, 1976, there was a Chief of Mission conference in London and when Crawford came at that time his DCM was leaving and because of those two days exposure, he asked if I would like to come to Cyprus and be DCM. I was very flattered and agreed to go. That is the story of how I got there. It really wasn't because I knew anything about Cyprus.

Q: You were in Cyprus from 1976-78. What was the situation on Cyprus when you got there?

DILLERY: Well, it was still very tense. There were lots of refugees and a lot of tent refugee cities. So there were a lot of people who were really certainly emotionally, if not physically, suffering still on the Greek side. The Turkish side was still kind of wild. They had appropriated more territory than they could...not than they could manage, but it was unpopulated and still kind of wild westy there. But the Greek Cypriot and the Greek American community were all still reeling from this situation and very, very frustrated and angry and very much feeling that the United States could have prevented the Turkish landings. What almost bugged the Greek side more than anything else was that when the Turks landed in 1974, they kind of took a...just to give you a little picture, the island, if you take off the panhandle is about a hundred miles wide and fifty miles deep. The panhandle extends out another hundred miles to the northeast. In July, the Turks took a narrow wedge from the town of Kyrenia on the North Coast down to the center of the island including part of Nicosia. In August, the Turks carried out a "second invasion" in which they fanned out and took the northern thirty six or thirty seven percent of the island. Before that they had less than twenty percent. They said they did this as a security measure. The second attack and the fact that nobody stopped that caused another wave of anti-Americanism. That was when Davies was killed.

By the time we arrived in 1976 it was still a very, very intense situation. In fact, I had to go a few months earlier than I had planned because Ambassador Crawford said please come in May because I have been invited to a Cypriot dinner party and it is the first time since 1974 that I have. It is important for you to meet these people and by the way I wouldn't be invited by a lot of people, but these are the moderate people who are willing to begin to have commerce with us

again. So there was a very, very strong sense of anti-Americanism. It was aimed at the US government. Kissinger was a very bad word there. They felt his policies towards Greece had caused the Cyprus tragedy because it had all happened in the wake of the colonels takeover in Greece.

Most Greeks and Greek Cypriots felt that our pro-Greek Colonels policy had started the whole thing going years before. But we had supported that right wing Greek Government, opposed the leftish (or at least neutralist) Makarios in Cyprus and then we hadn't done anything to stop the Turkish Forces in 1974, and all those things. The Turkish Cypriots were less angry with us. They were happy enough with the status quo but they were worried that we were trying to push them back into a smaller piece of territory and trying to get them to move into some accommodate with the Greeks that would amount to concessions on their part, which, by the way, they should make.

So it was a very difficult situation in both places. Each side was wanting to convince you of the rightness of their cause. Every conversation was the same and the US always was to blame. For outsiders it was very hard because every conversation turns to the Cyprus issue with both sides having "right" on their side and can't understand how an outsider cannot support them. Of course, it also is almost the Middle East where the "friend of my enemy is my enemy". So they cannot conceive how you can have a good relationship with both sides. It was a fascinating diplomatic situation because the island was small enough and the players were few enough that you felt that you could have a personal impact on the situation. We could serve as message carriers between the two sides and as advocates for a settlement that would have to be satisfactory to both sides, meaning that both would have to give some concessions...it is like Bosnia right now...they will only have an agreement when they are both ready. How can we help them to get ready.

Q: What was your impression of the Greek Cypriots?

DILLERY: What do you mean by impression?

Q: Could you deal rationally with them?

DILLERY: Yes. First of all the Greek Cypriots are a very, warm, able people who are very kind and generous. You have to remember that Cyprus has been invaded by waves of people over the years and always has been a place where one force or another has been sweeping through from the Egyptians and Phoenicians and the Crusaders. And then, of course, it is a very big trading center. So they are very adept people, very good negotiators, and business people. They are very well educated with a very high literacy rate. As a group a very articulate and bright people. At this time, of course, very frustrated. And they are also very nice and very friendly. It is one of the few places where I felt that I had real friends, even though I wasn't always recommending to them things that they wanted to do all the time. It was a great place for that.

With a Turkish Cypriot, particularly, you had to be very careful about attributing anything good to the other side. Neither side could see anything good in the other. The Turkish Cypriots would hark back to the point when they felt persecuted by the Greek Cypriots before the 1974 events

and the Greek Cypriots saw all the things that happened in 1974. So, in both cases they felt very wronged. The northern part of the island where the Turks were is the most beautiful part. So there was a tremendous amount of pain there for the Greek Cypriots; you had to be sensitive to that. You could only push them so far, and that wasn't too far. The Turkish Cypriots still, and the people who did it...the "President" of the Turkish side, Rauf Denktash, had actually been sentenced to death some years before with the support of the person who became President of the Greek Cypriot side when they captured him once. Denktash got away or I think there was an intervention by the British and he wasn't killed.

Q: Was this Denktash?

DILLERY: Yes, and he is still there, of course. So these are strong personal problems. But as to being wonderful people to talk to, you could. They wanted to talk about the subject so you just had to be careful in your presentation and keep making it clear that you understood where they were coming and that you were sympathetic to their plight but that the important thing for them to do was to realize that no matter what the background was, they had to come to a situation where they could agree with the other side. So you had to develop some sort of formula which really meant that both sides would have to give up on something.

Q: I had been in Greece as consul general in Athens in 1970-74 and left just before this happened. With the Greeks, when you got on the subject of the Turks, all of a sudden you moved into an area of almost irrationality. It is a tribal conflict of great magnitude. My feeling was, in this case the Cypriots had asked for it putting in an impossible regime with this guy Sampson so what I gather was that you really had to be careful not to go back to where things happened, let's talk about the future.

DILLERY: I think you had to. When they talked about their pain of past history, you had to not discount that, because if you just brushed it aside...it was sort what you hear about Bosnia when they asked somebody why are you angry at the Moslems and they said that in 1387 they did this to my family. Memories go back a long way.

A couple of examples. Best friends who lost their homes in the north from the Greek side. Kyrenia is probably the prettiest little town and that became a Turkish Cypriot town. Many of our friends had homes there. The mayor of Kyrenia was a good friend. One of our friends' great passion was walking in the Troodos mountain range that was in the north and enjoying the birds and plants, now had no access to it. There were lots of family tragedies where people disappeared and have never been found. There were questions about MIAs just like we have. So there were some really strong feelings on that side.

On the Turkish side the "Minister" of Foreign Affairs who had been educated in the United States was a perfectly reasonable guy in every respect and yet his sister had died because of the fact that she in having a difficult childbirth had been prevented from going to a Greek hospital that was the only one in her town. On her way to the next town to get to a Turkish hospital she died. This was in the days before the war.

So, I think you had to be sympathetic and try to understand the depth of these feelings and not in

any way underestimate their importance, but at the same time to try to work with them, to say that we know you can't put all this behind you, but on the other hand to get something that is going to work you have got to a certain degree do that. You can't tell them not to do it, because they can't.

Q: Did you have a problem in that the Greek lobby in the United States, including Senators and Congressmen, could only see one side? It was not a balanced group but had a lot of clout. Was this a problem?

DILLERY: Well, that certainly was an issue. It is a domestic political issue. In fact, looking back on the relationship of Cyprus to domestic politics in America, as I came to know a little bit more about it, one of the interesting things to me was that it appeared that the Cyprus tragedy of 1974 had brought the Greek American community together in a way that even the takeover in Greece by the colonels hadn't. A passion for solution of the Cyprus problem formed the glue of their whole national community. It was the one issue on which they could all coalesce.

Q: Like Israel for the Jews.

DILLERY: That is right. So even if they had no direct familial connection with Cyprus, it was that central point for them. They didn't like the policy and were really unhappy with Mr. Kissinger. With the Greek American community he was seen as an evil if not misguided person. They attributed much of this problem to him. That he was thinking in geo-strategic terms, NATO and Turkey and all.

By the way, in the Greek- Turkish thing it also important to know that a large part of the Greek American community are sort of a diaspora who came from Anatolia, from Smyrna and Constantinople, etc. in 1923 or so. So a large part of the Greek American community's sense of the Turks goes back to that. All of this played a role. Yes, that was clearly something that had to be taken into account.

This issue you are raising of how do you deal with this sort of situation...by the way Crawford had done a great thing because in 1974 when he got there the Turkish Cypriots were making noises like they weren't going to allow, they were going to have a total break, no crossing of what was called the Green Line" that separated the two communities. Crawford insisted that he was the ambassador to all of Cyprus and that no one had said that the northern part of Cyprus was not Cyprus. So he began to cross which gave all of the rest of the diplomats courage to do this. So what little opening there was in the situation, he really accomplished.

Q: We have an oral history that I did with him and he talks about it being a very tense situation and this was a very brave thing to do.

DILLERY: Yes, it really was. My basic approach to handling this problem of how to deal with these two sides that just had this terrible angry, frustration and hate of each other, was to try to be a person who really cared about Cyprus and all kinds of Cypriots and to recognize that they were all suffering. To make sure I didn't approach them as sort of a wise person who knew better than they did. To try to say, "You guys know a lot more about this than I do, and I really understand

what you are saying, but maybe I am somebody you can bounce things off of." Almost like a therapist for both sides. I was really pleased as a DCM because I still had Greek Cypriot friends and yet...Mr. Denktash gave a farewell party which was a little bit unusual for DCMs. At it he said, "There was this couple (my wife and myself) that were very quiet and we never knew exactly what they were thinking." I was pleased to know that I had been able to appear to be unbiased to both sides, at least I hope I was because that had the additional advantage of being true.

It was a fascinating diplomatic and human...maybe I should put the human first because I think the fact that there was a place that was so personalized that you had to really care about the people.

Q: What was our policy?

DILLERY: We had a strong policy which was to support the United Nations which was continually negotiating with both sides to see if you could move on a broad front. That is to say to try to construct some kind of general agreement that would be acceptable to both sides to...remember we are still talking about Cyprus as a unity and so there was talk about federation. So to try on the one front to move towards some description of that federation or on the second front to try to find individual things in which you could cooperate. We used every device that we could to do that, to bring them together. The most modest and most successful one was a joint sewer system for Nicosia, which is split between the two sides. That is an AID program which worked out and actually crosses both sides. So that was our strong policy.

And then to work with both the Greek government and the Turkish government to try to get them to support that policy and make them recognize that they also had actions that they would have to take that would be necessary...now, the Greek position was that all Turkish military had to leave and the Turks wouldn't do that. So there were a lot of details on this. But that was basically our policy.

Q: You haven't talked much about the Turkish side. There is so much concentration on the Greek side because this is sort of the business area and all that. In traveling around, did you have any feel for how the Turks were doing?

DILLERY: Remember that the population was about 750,000, or something like that, of which less than 20 percent were Turkish Cypriots. So the Turks were a minority. The Turkish Cypriots were enjoying the freedom of not being hassled they felt for the first time they could remember. And they were determined not to have a situation under which they would once again fall under what they saw as an oppressive Greek Cypriot majority. But remember that because of this small number, they had to figure out whether they were viable, which was part of the problem. And, of course, partly because they had always been farmers and never encouraged to be in business, and probably couldn't have competed anyway. They were basically really people of the land.

Everything was much less organized there. They didn't have title to land...the Turkish Cypriots never took the step of granting title during my time. They would give certificates which allowed the use of land and facilities, but not title to it. So they had a lot of legal problems to deal with.

They were still very worried. They felt that if the Turkish military left, the situation would revert to exactly what it was before. The Turks did bring in some settlers from Turkey to add to the number of Turkish ethnics hoping they would be a little balancing factor. That was a great cause of pain to the Greek Cypriots, of course, and the Turkish Cypriots didn't like them either. So the project didn't work out very well because most of the newcomers were even less sophisticated than the Turkish Cypriots. So it was a very unsettled situation with lots of vacant houses and not much activity and lots of black market things going on and exchanges, etc. It was a much more wild Westy than the Greek Cypriot part. The Turkish Cypriots, themselves, were struggling...probably the main emotion was breathing a sigh of relief, and concern that they could keep what they had.

Q: When you left there, was it your feeling that a Greek area and Turkish area would be the future of the island?

DILLERY: Yes, that there would be an area where there would be more Turks than Greeks and an area where there would be a lot more Greeks than Turks. I think certainly for the foreseeable future the Turkish side would never accept a situation in which there would be a major influx of Greek Cypriots...that they would feel that there had to be some area, a district, which would be essentially effectively governed by a Turkish Cypriot body. I think they foresee the possibility of having Greek Cypriots in that area, but certainly not a majority and probably far less than a majority. I don't foresee any solution that would not encompass that kind of entity.

Q: What about the reporting you would get from our embassies in Athens and Ankara? You were sort of sitting betwixt and between two interested parties.

DILLERY: We did a lot of sharing with them and their reports were very important. Obviously the Greek internal politics were very important...not because one side was any stronger or weaker on Cyprus necessarily, but their of approach to it was important. Also important was reporting on Greek-Turkish relationships. The Greeks have a big problem with the Turks on the Aegean Sea involving the territorial limits, continental limits of Turkey, air incursion by the Turks into Greek air space, etc.

The military was very, very dominant in Turkey in those days in Turkish politics. Demirel was the prime minister. An interesting and important factor was the impact Denktash had on domestic Turkish politics. What was the leverage ratio between the Turkish government and the Turkish Cypriots? One was that it was kind of imbalanced, although the Greeks felt that if we could tell the Turks to tell the Turkish Cypriots to get with it, they would, because they were so dependent on the military. The other side to the coin was that any sign of giving up on Turkish Cyprus would have been a bad thing for the Turkish government. So obviously things that were happening there were of interest and the relative level of the military role in the government was important. All of this we watched with interest.

Q: Did you have American Congressmen or women coming out, particularly from Greek constituencies?

DILLERY: Yes, we had them quite a bit. There were a lot of Greek Americans who came.

Q: Was this a hard thing? We were supposed to represent a balanced view and a realistic view. We had Henry Kissinger there and we have other fish to fry then just this tribal dispute, but if you tried to explain it to a true believer, I would think this would put you into a difficult position.

DILLERY: You know, the policy of the United States government was not supported by the Greek American community and we were representatives of the policy of the US government. But they were very nice, I must say in this sense they did not usually...it depended on how you presented it, but in most cases with me they never put it on me personally. They understood that I was a spokesman for the policy. Again, I think the importance of having them know that you understand where they are coming from, even though you have to defend a policy and the policy is not likely to be changed, it is a matter of them understanding that you at least know where they are coming from. The thing you don't want to say to them is, "This is all wrong, your position is wrong." That goes nowhere.

So, what you have to do is try to explain the policy in a positive way. Tension was inevitable because they did not believe the policy was right and nothing that you would say to support it could possibly convince them that was the case.

Q: Was Bill Crawford the ambassador the whole time you were there?

DILLERY: No, Galen Stone came at the very end of our tour. I was in charge for about nine months. We were a little bit angry with the Cypriots over something to do with the negotiations and Crawford was gone for seven months or so from late 1976 to 1977. He came back and then left in the spring of 1978 and I left in July, 1978. He was there, but I went over to get the agrément for Stone, and I got him organized. But I didn't stay long enough to get to know him real well.

Q: How was Bill Crawford as an ambassador?

DILLERY: He was terrific. He had so much experience there, he had been DCM there, and knew the Arab world very well. He knew the Mediterranean personality very well. He was a real activist. He wasn't passive, but in the nicest way he prodded his friends on both sides always towards agreement and trying to find openings to put them that they had to move towards agreement. He was really responsible for a good bit of the positive things that took place.

Q: You left there in 1978 and came back to EUR where you served for four years.

DILLERY: That's correct. I was deputy director of Southern European Affairs which is Greece, Turkey and Cyprus for the first year, 1978-79. Ray Ewing was director. He had just moved from the deputy position into the director slot. Nelson Ledsky, with whom I am having lunch today had been the director and moved up to being Deputy Assistant Secretary in H. From 1979-82, I was director of the Office of Southern European Affairs. So I concentrated the whole time on that area.

We became more active during that period. Matthew Nimetz was the Counselor of the

Department and it was during that time that we really essentially constructed a draft agreement -- it might have even been called the Nimetz Plan -- that was presented through the UN to the two sides. There was a lot of work on trying to come up with a description of what both areas might look like in terms of territory. The problem was that everybody felt that the Turks would have to give up some land...land for peace, I suppose you would call it in the Arab-Israeli context. The Greeks felt the Turks had 40 percent of the island and we thought it was more like 36 or 37 percent of the island. But we felt that whatever the case was the Turkish part after the agreement would have to be something that started with a 2, lower than 30 percent.

We had a wonderful man, John Lund, a geographer, who was our Defense Attach ...he was later head of the Defense Mapping Agency. He studied the island for military features -- high ground, etc. -- for traditional places that were sacred to one side or another, for farm areas and irrigation, etc., and drew a line on the map that would come out 29 percent -- the final result may well look like his map although the Turkish Cypriots have now agreed in principle to an area with less than 29 percent of the total.

We also worked on a governmental framework that would be one of exquisite and multi-layered checks and balances that would protect Greek Cypriot authority and yet allow some sort of concept of a unified country in a federal way. The bottom line of this, if you read it all the way to the bottom, you would see that after 20 levels of appeal, that the majority would have the final word but hopefully you would come to an agreement somewhere as you worked your way through these constitutional things of different houses...it was a very complex thing. Anyway, that was the proposal we worked on with the UN, but we were the big drafters. It got some discussion, it didn't get too much further. But it is still close to the kind of thing that the Secretary General is working on right now. So my job was that.

We also had at that time sharp Greek Turkish differences over the Aegean. At times it looked like they might even come to hostilities over the air activities of the Turks in Greek air space. There was a problem at the Athens flight information region...it covered part of Turkey. There were oil possibilities in the Aegean and the Turks were beginning to do some preliminary looks at that. So, many, many bilateral problems that we had to deal with.

And then, our own relationships were difficult. We had AID programs. That was when the ten to seven ratio began. We have a ratio of ten for Turkey and seven for Greece, which has been maintained through the years for military assistance. That was always a problem. Of course we had an assistance program for Cyprus. As Cyprus began to recover on both sides from the war, the economic justification became less but we still kept it. We managed that program and tried to design individual projects. Those were the main issues we worked on.

Q: You were there for two administrations, the Carter Administration and the Reagan Administration. Were these issues very peripheral to both administrations?

DILLERY: No, I think it was pretty central. Basically the policy did not change. Remember that Larry Eagleburger was the Assistant Secretary at the beginning of the Reagan Administration. He had been closely associated with Kissinger so essentially we just carried on with the policy staying the same.

Carter had actually sent Clifford out to the area immediately upon his inauguration and I was in Cyprus when that occurred in 1977. Clifford's job was to see what could be done to help the situation to carry out one of President Carter's campaign promises. That was the reason, thinking back on it, that we took the more active role in trying to come up with that agreement. However, the basic policy did not change from Carter to Kissinger, and when Eagleburger came in it again didn't change. So really we were pretty steady in our policy the whole time.

Q: When drawing up this sort of exquisite plan, were you able to consult with the Turks and the Cypriots or did we have to do this on our own?

DILLERY: Oh, no, we consulted with them on a regular basis. In fact, Reggie Bartholomew became the negotiator for a while. Richard Haas was also a special Cyprus negotiator. At the end of my time the concept of the special Cyprus negotiator came into being. It may have happened while I was in my next job because I continued to work on Cyprus into 1982. One of the interesting relationships was that we had to re-negotiate our base agreement with the Greeks during that time and Ambassador Bartholomew also was the negotiator for that, so we worked together during that time.

Q: Was Andreas Papandreou in at that time?

DILLERY: He came in during that period. That, of course, was a very interesting period for us because he had used anti-Americanism as part of his campaign area. As you know he was quite left. In fact, there was a question of whether we would be able to keep the bases under him. So that is why it was a very tricky negotiation and Ambassador Bartholomew did very well on that. Working with Papandreou was in many respects more difficult than working with his predecessors. Who was it when you were there?

Q: When I was there it was the colonels, Papadopoulos.

DILLERY: Then he went out. I remember that when Papandreou won the election we had done a good thing because we had a letter from the President to both Prime Ministerial possibilities...you know, and we were able to send the letter to the winner the day after the election. We thought that letter helped to make our relationship with Papandreou positive.

Then, of course, really more important to us from a strategic point of view, after Papandreou came in...remember it was about that time that Turkish Prime Minister Ozal came in as well and was trying to foster some sort of rapprochement between Turkey and Greece. They were doing that themselves. It was hard for Papandreou, but they did. Ozal was a real revolutionary in Turkey because he started to break down the statist approach to the economy and to try to have more free enterprise and free market. So lots of things were going on in both Greece and Turkey during this period. So, our normal complement of bilateral business with them was heavy because of assistant programs, NATO issues, etc. It was a very busy desk.

Q: Back to Greece again. The base agreements were always an issue. The Greeks used it in those days to beat us over the head. Was this beginning to make us wonderful if we shouldn't just

get out of there?

DILLERY: One thought of that, but the decision in those days, remembering it was still Cold War days, was that those bases were vital. Remember we had the Russian Mediterranean fleet and we needed to counter that. So Crete -- our base at Iraklion -- was very important. The Athens airport was a transit point for...not only that, of course, it was so important to everything in the Middle East because it was a transit point for all kinds of things that we sent up to Saudi Arabia and other places like that. They knew that we needed them.

But perhaps the most sensitive base was Hellinikon -- collocated with Athens International Airport. The visible presence of U.S. aircraft in the main airport of Greece obviously was a very sensitive issue. Now we have moved out of Hellinikon and we are getting rid of most of the facilities there. So I think we will even be out of Crete soon.

Q: What was in it for the Greeks?

DILLERY: Of course the bases were related to the military assistance program and they were part of NATO. Also the presence of the United States could be seen as a deterrent to any Turkish aggressiveness, even though we had facilities in Turkey too. We had Incirlik, later used for the Gulf War there and a NATO facility at Izmir. But it was a balancing thing. It added to their leverage on us because we needed those facilities; it gave them some sense of security and provided part of the basis for military assistance. There were a lot of reasons why it was useful to them.

Q: Did we have any great problems with the Turks? Had the arms embargo been lifted by then?

DILLERY: The arms embargo was actually on for a good part of the time I was on the desk. That was the big problem that we had with them. They were pressing for the elimination of that and I think it probably came near the end of my tour. They were much more resistant to pressure on them about Cyprus and about a Greek rapprochement. The Greeks, of course, were resistant too, but the Turks were one level harsher. And yet, it was another case of mutual dependency where we needed them and they needed us. You have to remember that there was a great feeling of dichotomy both in Turkey and in Greece in the sense that both sides felt that Congress was more responsive to Greek concerns and the Administration was more responsive to Turkish concerns. Some of that continued through the Kissinger period and even, perhaps, during the Vance period. Turkey by this time as the flank of NATO always had that strategic value that meant that you could not alienate Turkey. So the relationship was testy with both of them but in slightly different ways.

Q: Did the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December, 1979 change things at all? All of a sudden that flank got more tender.

DILLERY: I don't think so. Our attention was never focused on that. It may have added a bit of weight to the importance of Turkey being the outpost of NATO on that flank, but basically that wasn't a factor. The main thing was the triangular relationship. We hoped the economies of both would be good and we would have governments that would be friendly. Human rights were

always a problem with Turkey because of the Kurdish situation. There were lots of bilateral issues, but the main international thing was that relationship among the three and trying to smooth it out on all sides of the triangle. But not so much with the Soviets.

Q: In those days, of course, the Soviets were considered a major threat.

DILLERY: Oh yes. They were ten feet tall. And also Turkey was being careful about alienating any of their Muslim partners.

RAYMOND C. EWING
Deputy Director, Southern European Affairs
Washington, DC (1976-1979)

Ambassador Raymond C. Ewing was born in Ohio on September 7, 1936. His Foreign Service career included positions in Japan, Austria, Italy, Switzerland, and Washington, DC. Ambassador Ewing was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on November 29, 1993.

EWING: I took over as Deputy Director in September, 1976. Then, as Director, in December, 1977. At the beginning of the Carter administration, I was Deputy Director. In the State Department Southern European Affairs concern Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, three countries that came to the European Bureau from the Near Eastern Bureau in 1974. It's one office. At that time we had two desk officers for Turkey, two for Greece, and one for Cyprus. We had a junior officer who handled special projects on issues which cut across the region.

Q: This was your first, professional exposure to this intractable problem of Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. What was your impression when you came to the office? How did you see the situation?

EWING: I really had the chance to watch the area closely for a year before I came into the office, when I was working for Assistant Secretary Hartman. I think that roughly one-third of his time that year [1975-76] was probably devoted to those three countries. So I was aware of all of the developments during that year. I didn't know that I was going to go into that office until shortly before the time when I actually [assumed those duties]. I never felt particularly defensive about my lack of prior, professional experience. I thought that if I had served, say, in Turkey, and then tried to come into that job, I would have been perceived within the State Department and probably by the Embassies concerned as more comfortable, more familiar, and perhaps even biased for or against the Turkish position. By coming in fresh I didn't have that problem. I felt that having some background in economic affairs was probably useful, because economic issues -- especially with regard to Turkey -- became very important in that period. Primarily, it was a problem of diplomacy -- trying to encourage a dialogue, problem-solving, and conflict resolution -- rather than necessarily knowing everything about the history of Greece, Turkey, or Cyprus.

Q: How did you find dealing with the various Embassies of these countries? Was this a problem? Were they always looking at you as if to say, "You're either with us or against us."

EWING: I think that the Embassies in Washington were always trying to influence us or to get us on their side. But I think that they recognized -- and this was an advantage of having all three countries in one office -- that they really couldn't do that. That really couldn't be expected from us. Their objective, I think, was primarily to make sure that we understood their position -- not necessarily agreeing with it or buying it, hook, line, and sinker. We had good relations with all three of the Embassies concerned. Lines of communication were fairly open, and relations with the three Embassies in Washington were fairly good.

Q: What were the main issues that you were dealing with at this time?

EWING: Really, there were three issues: first, the Cyprus problem, primarily left over from 1974; secondly, bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey...

Q: You mean our bilateral relations?

EWING: Our bilateral relations with Greece and Turkey, primarily related to our forces, our bases in both countries, assistance levels, and the relationship of assistance levels [between the two countries]; and, thirdly, the problems between them, relating to the Aegean Sea and other issues they had between them -- including the minorities in both countries.

Q: Taking the last point first, regarding the Aegean Sea, this involves the definition of territorial waters and all that. If the Greeks get their way, they basically blocked off the Aegean to anyone else -- particularly the Turks. Did we see any way out of this problem or was this so emotional that there wasn't much that you could do?

EWING: We certainly didn't have our own plan or our own solution to those issues, because they were so emotional and complex. The main thing that we tried to do was to encourage the process of addressing the issues, either through negotiations or through some judicial approach, the International Court of Justice or otherwise. But there it was more of a matter of watching them, because we really saw that they had the potential for major conflict between two NATO allies. We studied these problems, we analyzed them, and Clark Clifford looked at them when he undertook his mission to the area. However, we never really took the initiative to put forward a plan, or anything like that.

Q: What was the Clark Clifford mission, and how did it work out?

EWING: I mentioned before our hope that he would take a fresh look at this whole complex of issues. To some extent this mission came out of the presidential campaign of 1976, when Jimmy Carter had made some promises and commitments, particularly to Greek-American voters, which, he thought, ought to be given priority attention when he entered office. One of his early actions was to ask Clark Clifford to undertake a mission to look into these serious problems. He didn't have to wait for Senate confirmation. He went a matter of weeks after the inauguration in 1977 to pay a visit to all three countries.

Q: Did you brief him before he went?

EWING: As I said, I was Deputy Director of the office at the time. The Director of the office was Nelson Ledsky, who accompanied Clark Clifford on the trip, along with Matthew Nimetz, who was Counselor of the Department, a close associate of Cyrus Vance who was quickly given responsibility on the Seventh Floor of the State Department for Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus matters. We were involved in a number of briefing sessions with Clifford, both before he went and when he came back. He continued to have this role as a kind of special envoy for the region for a couple of years. I continued periodically to meet with him, usually over at his law office, to keep him informed and abreast of developments, although he certainly pulled back and did not continue to play a really active role after 1977-78.

Q: On his initial trip, was he able to break any ground?

EWING: I think that he broke some ground in terms of U. S. policy and the Carter administration posture by a couple of things. One, he recognized that a restoration of the relationship with Turkey was very important. If we couldn't really solve the Cyprus problem or really improve relations greatly with Greece -- the arms embargo with Turkey was in effect...

Q: This was imposed by Congress, due mainly to domestic Greek-American pressure.

EWING: Well, there was a strong feeling on the part of many people in Congress that Turkey had invaded Cyprus in 1974, had misbehaved, and the United States shouldn't continue as a major arms supplier. Therefore, they felt, we should cut off this relationship and so Congress enacted the arms embargo in 1975 over strong opposition from the Ford Administration. Clark Clifford felt, after he went there, that we needed to restore that relationship with Turkey in order to deal with the other issues of the region. I think that that was an important development. Now, initially, we put the emphasis on approving a defense cooperation agreement, which was negotiated when Secretary Kissinger was in office and which called for, I think, \$1.0 billion in security assistance over four years, as a means of restoring that relationship. Later on, in the following year (1978), the administration decided that the way to proceed was to get the embargo lifted and then go ahead separately with an assistance relationship, rather than using the approval of the defense cooperation agreement and its \$1.0 billion of assistance to break the embargo.

Q: How did you view the communications between [our Embassies] in Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia as far as local bias was concerned?

EWING: I think that our Embassies in all three countries did tend, at times, to take on some of the color of their respective places of assignment. However, I don't think that "localitis" or "clientitis" was anywhere near some other situations which I've been aware of over the years. In 1976-77 our Embassies [in Turkey and Greece] had very strong Ambassadors -- Bill Macomber and Jack Kubisch, respectively. They recognized that, whatever the solution to the problems of the region at that particular time, there was no way we could ignore the legitimate interests and objectives of the other countries. You couldn't solve the problems of Greece alone or Turkey alone. You had to take the whole region into account. I think that one of the things I remember is that some of the harshest criticism of positions taken by the Greek Government came out of our Embassy in Athens. To some extent that was true in Ankara as well.

Q: Did you ever run afoul of Bill Macomber's temper?

EWING: Bill Macomber tended to raise his voice so that one wondered sometimes if it were really necessary to use the telephone to talk to you in Washington. He had some strong views and certainly expressed them vividly. But I liked him, and we got along well. He was in Turkey and had a very difficult time shortly after the embargo and the events of 1974. This was a time of frustration and concern, but I think he, of all people, recognized that it was very important to communicate effectively with the State Department's Bureau of European Affairs and try to get us on his side. He understood that yelling at us or blowing up wasn't the way to do that.

Q: Who was our Ambassador to Cyprus during most of this time?

EWING: Bill Crawford was Ambassador to Cyprus. He had a very strong background in Cyprus. He had served previously as DCM there. So he really knew his way around, knew all of the parties, and knew the fine points of the issues.

Q: That was also a dangerous time there, wasn't it?

EWING: Well, Ambassador Rodger Davies was assassinated there. "Killed" is probably a better word than "assassinated," in view of the way it happened in 1974. So Bill Crawford had a security detail of Cypriot policemen who went with him everywhere. It was a very difficult time for his wife and his daughter, who were also with him at the post. I think that virtually all Greek Cypriots were mortified at what had happened to Ambassador Davies. Certainly, the Cypriot Government was determined that there wouldn't be any such threat again to the American Ambassador, from anybody in Cyprus. So this may have been a safer period of time than it seemed at the time because the Cypriot political situation quieted down fairly quickly, with the division of the country and with the fact that the Right Wing in Cyprus, if you will, was at fault in staging the coup d'etat against Archbishop Makarios. So, in a sense, things were calmer during this period than they had been in an earlier period.

Q: I don't think that we're repeating at this point, because we had a little trouble with the tape before, but could you talk about dealing with Congress and the "Greek lobby"?

EWING: Yes. Obviously, Congress had an enormous interest in the Cyprus issue but also in relations between Greece and Turkey because in 1975 it had enacted the arms embargo on Turkey. The group primarily interested in this was, of course, the "Greek lobby." This included people like Senator Paul Sarbanes, who had been a member of the House of Representatives in 1975, John Brademas, and some others. But there were still others in the Congress who were very active, informed, and interested, particularly as the Carter administration took a clear stand in 1978 and sought a lifting of the embargo. Some were Democrats but some were Republicans who were concerned about the cohesion of NATO and the role of Turkey and Greece in the alliance. These included people like Senator Tower, Senator McGovern, Congressman Solarz, and Congressman Lee Hamilton. They ranged across the political spectrum. They took a less emotional or intense initial interest than some of the members of the so-called "Greek lobby" but came to be very well informed and were eventually among the supporters of the Carter

administration [in its efforts] to lift the embargo on Turkey.

Q: Were human rights a particular problem for you? I was thinking particularly of Turkey but probably, to a certain extent, of Cyprus.

EWING: In the Carter administration human rights, of course, became a much more significant foreign policy priority than they had been previously. There were issues relating to human rights in Turkey, in terms of how prisoners were treated, problems with the Greek Orthodox Church in Istanbul, Armenian issues -- that certainly was something that we spent a lot of time and energy on. In Cyprus there was the missing persons issue, going back to 1974 and previously. This was something that we were interested in, together with other countries and the United Nations. That was the primary issue in...

Q: What was the missing persons issue?

EWING: As far as the Greek Cypriots were concerned, a number of them were missing, following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. They were civilians. They either had been killed, taken to Turkey, or moved to northern Cyprus. Nothing had been heard from them, and nobody knew where they were. There were a few American citizens who were Greek Cypriots by origin, who also were on the list of the missing. As far as the Turkish Cypriots were concerned, they also had a list -- not quite as long but still a substantial list. These were Turkish Cypriots who had disappeared during the earlier period, particularly from 1963 to 1974 when there were inter-communal difficulties. According to the Turkish Cypriot authorities, these people had not been heard from and had never been accounted for. So they both had lists, and that issue has never been fully resolved.

Q: So the assumption is that these people are dead?

EWING: The assumption is that they are dead, for the most part.

Q: A final note on this question, and I think we might stop at that point. What was their view of the Soviet threat, and how did this influence our policy in that area?

EWING: As far as Greece and Turkey were concerned, we saw them as important members of NATO, the key to the NATO southern flank, providing protection, if you will, for the eastern Mediterranean, where we had a major fleet. We considered that Turkey had an important role to play in bottling up the Soviet Navy and controlling the [Turkish] straits -- the Dardanelles -- to prevent the Soviet fleet from breaking out [into the Mediterranean]. As far as Greece was concerned, they were also neighbors of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Both countries [Greece and Turkey] played an important role with respect to U. S. bases. They provided a means of supplying the U. S. fleet. We had important installations in both countries that were aimed at the Soviet Union, both from an intelligence and defense point of view.

Q: Were we considering at that time with the Pentagon the problem of a diminution of our presence in Greece, because it was such a political issue?

EWING: At that time we really weren't. Our military presence wasn't that large. As I recall, we sought to ensure that everything there was useful or essential to us, but this presence became an issue later on, during the Papandreou Government. At that time...

Q: Karamanlis was the Prime Minister [of Greece], wasn't he?

EWING: It was Karamanlis. You know, the Greeks had mixed feelings about the United States and the role we played with regard to Cyprus. They had negative feelings in this respect. However, they also recognized that if they were to ask that the U. S. presence be eliminated or even reduced, that would make Turkey even more important to us and our presence in Turkey [would become] even more valuable than it already was. So that was certainly something on their minds.

GEOFFREY W. CHAPMAN
Cyprus Desk Officer
Washington, D.C. (1977-1979)

Geoffrey W. Chapman was born in England in 1942. He received a B.A. from Bowdoin College, an M.A. and a PhD from Princeton, and served as a captain in the U.S. Army from 1968 to 1970. After entering the Foreign Service in 1971, his assignments abroad included Berlin, Moscow, Bonn, and London. Mr. Chapman was interviewed in 2005 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

CHAPMAN: I was then recruited to be the Cyprus Desk officer.

Q: Oh boy!

CHAPMAN: That was an eventful and exciting two years.

Q: You were on the Cyprus desk from when to when?

CHAPMAN: From mid-77 to mid-79.

Q: What was the situation on Cyprus?

CHAPMAN: This was just three years after the Turkish invasion of 74.

Q: July of 1974.

CHAPMAN: One of the key issues in my first year on the desk was the lifting of the embargo that Congress had imposed on arms sales to Turkey as a result of the invasion on Cyprus. The Turks made it clear they would not cooperate on Cyprus at all until that embargo was lifted, and the embargo was hurting bilateral relations with Turkey and undermining the security of NATO's southern flank. So the Carter Administration, which had come into office with a pledge

to the Greek-American community to work to resolve the Cyprus dispute, decided to press Congress to lift the embargo. But to accomplish this we had to demonstrate a certain amount of progress on Cyprus, which was not easy to do at that juncture. Vance had named Matt Nimetz, then counselor of the Department, to be his spear carrier on Cyprus. Much of the time I worked directly for him rather than for the assistant secretary in EUR, traveling with him literally countless times to consult with UN officials in New York. Formally speaking, Cyprus was an issue for the UN rather than the U.S. directly, and we had to keep it within that framework even though people recognized that the U.S. was the prime motive power. So Matt Nimetz would be in frequent contact with Waldheim and Brian Urquhart, the undersecretary for political affairs, to exchange ideas and try to get things moving. Makarios died literally as I came onto the desk. So my first task was to prepare all kinds of briefing papers for the U.S. delegation to Makarios' funeral, on subjects that at that point I knew precious little about. Makarios had been such a forceful and authoritative figure in Cyprus, and unfortunately his successor was a very cautious politician who simply did not have the clout or the daring to take any bold initiatives to try and resolve the Cyprus issue. This made it very hard to come up with any progress that would justify the lifting of the embargo or prove that correct after the fact.

Q: This is the embargo of arms to Turkey?

CHAPMAN: Yes. The resolution to lift the embargo passed by the narrowest of margins in the House, by just one or two votes as I recall. Obviously the Greek-American community and its supporters on the Hill were adamantly opposed. I remember getting lectured to by Sarbanes and Congressman Brademas of Indiana.

Q: Yes. Indiana. Both of Greek, Greek-Americans.

CHAPMAN: They were the key figures. During my second year on the desk, in recognition of the fact the embargo had been lifted, we got more involved in the substance of the Cyprus issue. While respecting the UN role, we came up with our plan for a Cyprus settlement in the fall of '78 – labeling this a set of ideas rather than a plan as such. I worked intensively on this under Matt Nimetz's guidance, and we then tried to sell it to the various parties concerned. We went up to New York to meet, separately, with the president of the Cyprus House of Representatives – in lieu of President Kyprianou – and the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, Rauf Denktash.

Q: I would think Tashnu is the other one.

CHAPMAN: Denktash later proclaimed himself president of the TRNC [Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus], but as of 1978 the Turkish Cypriots had not formally declared themselves an independent entity. The Greek Cypriots were initially non-committal as to our plan, hoping that Denktash would reject it and thus spare them criticism. As it turned out, Denktash rejected the plan out of hand, noting that he felt much like Churchill who, after hearing the news of a severe military defeat, called for a tall glass of Scotch to revive him. The Turkish Ambassador to the UN had invited us to lunch with Denktash afterwards, and given Denktash's reaction to our plan it turned out to be a glum affair. We were at a Japanese restaurant, the sort where you sit on the floor with your legs under a low table. Denktash, a former wrestler, was a very rotund individual, and after lunch he couldn't get up from under the table, so Nimetz, the Turkish Ambassador and

I had to grab him by the arms and the neck and pull him up and out. Ultimately our plan didn't resolve anything, although it perhaps injected a number of new ideas into the process. I recall a UN secretariat official telling me some five or six years later that this was the best plan he thought anybody could come up with for a bizonal, bicomunal Cyprus. Personally I felt it fascinating to get directly and deeply involved in something like this, helping write a constitution for another country and contributing to overcoming decades of mutual hostility. And it was quite an experience to be with Nimetz while he tried to sell presidents and foreign ministers on these ideas.

Q: One can make a career out of this, this along with the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. This is something that is a life-long engagement. How did you find the Greek lobby, Greek constituency here in Washington? I mean, they must have been all over you, weren't they?

CHAPMAN: Oh yes. Their basic view was that we were pro-Turkish and had no understanding or recognition of all that the Greek Cypriots had suffered. We certainly did recognize what thousands of Greek Cypriots had gone through in losing their homes and properties and being forced to live in refugee camps. My recollection is that the Greek-American community was not helpful at all in terms of trying to come up with any kind of solution that might be acceptable to both sides. In many ways they were more hard-line than the Greek Cypriots themselves in refusing to budge from maximal demands. They insisted that we should not be dealing with the Turkish Cypriots, but only with the Turks in Ankara. They saw the Turks as controlling what was going on in Turkish Cyprus and argued that if we put real pressure on the Turks they would relent and let the Greek Cypriots come back to their properties and everything would be fine. That to my mind was a major underestimation of how important Cyprus was for Turkey in terms of protecting the interests of their kinsmen on the island and of how obstinate the Turks can be when they really dig themselves in and how they don't want to be seen as responding to overt American pressure.

Q: I never really got involved except on the periphery of seeing the emotions there. I was Consul General in Athens in 1970-74. In fact, I left early July '74. Anybody who looks at this as an American sort of objectively can see that the Turkish Cypriots had a real cause. When there was this coup and Sampson and others were put in the prisons. The real thugs. The Greeks had really been nasty to the Turks. There was a subservient peasantry and all that. So that the Turkish response of coming in was if you were a Turk was quite justified. The Greeks I've seen afterwards seem to forget all that. I mean they start as though all of a sudden the Turks jumped on Cyprus for no particular cause.

CHAPMAN: Yes, you're right that lots of Greek-Americans believed that the crisis began in 1974, ignoring all that had happened since 1963. And they recognized that there had been a coup against Makarios on the part of more extreme Greek Cypriots that produced anxiety among the Turkish Cypriots. But they argued that that was no justification for the Turkish invasion, particularly the second phase of it that brought about extensive loss of Greek Cypriot properties and occupation by the Turkish army. You're right, there had been some very real problems almost from the time of Cypriot independence in 1960, where the minority Turkish Cypriots suffered discrimination, which often turned to violence, at the hands of the Greek Cypriot majority. Under British rule the Turkish Cypriots had been scattered over much of the island, but

in the sixties they tended to congregate in certain areas, some in the north and some in the south, where they would be safer living together. But these incidents of internal conflict continued to happen throughout the sixties, with a major crisis in 1967. A lot of the EOKA extremists who had fought against British rule now turned their attentions on the Turkish Cypriots. Many of them, like Nikos Sampson, were real thugs. I remember Clerides, who was later president of Cyprus, telling the story that he had Sampson as a next-door neighbor and that one day while out gardening wearing a white shirt Sampson had come over to him and said, quite out of the blue, "Whenever I see a white shirt, I see blood and blood spreading."

Q: He won notoriety for a killing of a British woman, or something. He was an assassin.

CHAPMAN: Yes, that's what he was.

Q: How did you find the Greek government at the time? They had ousted the colonels. Could they even maneuver or do anything at that point? Or were emotions so raw that there was nothing that they could do?

CHAPMAN: My recollection is that we engaged them, both here and in Athens. They would argue the Greek Cypriot view point strongly, but would keep their distance from the issue. They wanted to see Cyprus as essentially a Greek Cypriot-Turkish dispute that they were not directly party to, although they generally backed the Greek Cypriots strongly. This tied in with the notion that the Turkish Cypriots were not an entity on their own but rather subservient to Turkey. The Greeks were ready to help somewhat, but not in any big way.

Q: How much support did you get from the European Bureau? Did they look upon you as the disreputable cousins or something like that. Two NATO allies getting involved.

CHAPMAN: Well, we were an integral part of the European Bureau, and George Vest, the assistant secretary at the time, was actively engaged. He probably saw the Cypriot Ambassador as often as Nimetz did. Obviously this was a difficult issue for the bureau to handle with two members of NATO, although the real issues that divided Greece and Turkey were not Cyprus [end of tape]

Q: This is tape two, side one with Geoffrey Chapman. Yes.

CHAPMAN: Yes, as I was saying, the real issues between the Greeks and the Turks in that time were less Cyprus itself than Aegean issues -- overflights, demarcation lines in the Aegean, military incidents that had brought direct friction between the two countries. And this from the NATO standpoint was the real operational issue, how to get Greek and Turkish military forces to train together and to be interoperable in support of NATO missions when they were at loggerheads over demarcation, aerial and naval incidents, aircraft straying over the border, buzzing incidents, that sort of thing.

Q: Well, I take it you left there in, left that job in when?

CHAPMAN: It would have been the summer of 1979.

Q: I take it you had not solved, you personally, had not solved the Cyprus problem.

CHAPMAN: We thought we had the solution but neither party would buy it.

Q: What was, I mean, what was the shape of the solution?

CHAPMAN: The basis for an agreement was that there had to be two separated communities. I think realistically the Greek Cypriots would have agreed to that as well, that the experience of living together had not worked out so they had to live separately. The issues boiled down to basically a constitution and territory. The territorial issue was the more straightforward, in terms of arriving at a percentage of the total island territory that the Greek Cypriots would occupy and a percentage the Turkish Cypriots would occupy, taking into account particular areas or locales that were of especial importance to one side or the other. It was a matter of the Turkish Cypriots yielding territory, the question being just how much. This was, in principle at least, a resolvable issue, moving the boundary here a bit and there a bit. A complicating factor was the Greek Cypriot demand for retention and free access to properties Greek Cypriots formerly owned in the north. The constitutional issue was more difficult: we proposed a confederal structure where many local powers and responsibilities would have resided with the two communities and the common government would have been responsible for foreign affairs, defense and the like. In essence, the Turkish Cypriots wanted less of a central government and more local control, and greater representation in the central government than their proportion of the overall population would in theory allow. The Greek Cypriots wanted a more robust central government that would mirror their majority status in the island as a whole so they could effectively control developments in the island. We came up with a formula that sought to split these differences, with a national assembly largely proportionally elected, a rotating presidency, and adequate protection for minority rights.

One argument we tried to make to the Greek Cypriots all along was why not let some system like this come into being; over time, being economically stronger, better educated, more populous, they would come to dominate the affairs of Cyprus, certainly economically. Why bother, why haggle, why hassle over all the fine details of the constitution if over the long run you will clearly dominate the country? But they didn't buy that. They were so hung up on restoring the status quo ante. The Greek Cypriot government was of course under heavy pressure from the refugee organizations, representing Greek Cypriots who had been forced out of their homes in the north and would settle for nothing less than returning to them. A lot of these refugees quite deliberately refused to integrate with the rest of Greek Cyprus, which they could easily have done, and instead maintained a refugee status. The U.S. taxpayer funded quite luxurious housing for them; they by no means lived in what one normally would conceive to be refugee camps. The refugees were a very powerful lobby and no Greek Cypriot president or other leading politician could afford to ignore them, and their demands were absolute. So Greek Cypriot flexibility and ability to compromise was circumscribed from the word go.

Q: Well, working on an issue like this feels sort of like an academic exercise, an interesting challenge, or did you- I mean, I think it would be hard to keep one's drive when you're up against a bunch of stubborn people that's not going to give.

CHAPMAN: Well, I was only in the job for only two years. I don't think I could have stood it much longer than that. It was an intellectual challenge to come up with a scheme that you would think was palatable to both but also very much a negotiating job trying to sell this. There ere both sides to the job, and the marriage of the two was what made it so appealing to me.

Q: So then in '79 you left?

CHAPMAN: Yes.

ROBERT S. DILLON
Deputy Chief of Mission
Ankara, Turkey (1977-1980)

Ambassador Robert S. Dillon was born in Chicago, Illinois in 1929. He received an bachelor's degree from Duke University in 1951 and joined the State Department in 1956. His career included positions in Venezuela, Turkey, Malaysia, and Egypt, and an ambassadorship to Lebanon. Ambassador Dillon was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

Q: During the 1977-80, what were the major issues the Embassy had to deal with?

DILLON: First of all there was the opium poppy problem. Turkey was a major supplier of these narcotics. One other major problem concerned the embargo that the U.S. Congress had placed on assistance to Turkey as the result of the 1974 Cyprus invasion. Another issue that created tension between the two governments related to the Americans still in jail. Although that issue may not have been as important in terms of our national interests as the Cyprus one, nevertheless these imprisonments were very sensitive because many Congressmen became involved as the relatives put pressure on their representatives and senators to take some action. Every American prisoner had two Senators and one Representative; their relatives had other representation. I was always amazed by the number of requests for information and action we used to receive from Congress.

Ron Spiers felt very strongly that the embargo had to be lifted. He felt that the U.S. could not pursue its other interests in Turkey without that action. After he had been in Ankara for six-eight months, he decided to return to Washington to see what he could do about changing Congressional views. He did not have confidence that the people in the Department, who were responsible for Congressional relations, were putting enough effort into the lifting of the embargo. Ron was superb in handling Congress. He had a nice direct, no nonsense style; he didn't pester or hector -- no histrionics or flamboyance. He was very credible. He told me later that he had personally talked to two hundred Congressmen and Senators -- an extraordinary number. So I had extended periods of being Charge' in Turkey while my Ambassador was in Washington lobbying. I thoroughly enjoyed being Charge'. It is a pretty good situation; if you want to, you can duck a situation -- "The Ambassador is not here and this has to wait until he returns". On the other hand, if you want to make a difference on a certain issue, you can insert

yourself. It is not a bad situation to find oneself in. So I had long periods of being Charge' and it helped me to learn a lot about being the senior official at an Embassy.

On the question of the embargo, I was the lead officer at the Embassy while Ron was in Washington. The lifting of the sanctions required some actions on the part of the Turks and I was responsible for conducting negotiations with them on this issue. They were not easy to deal with. While Macomber was still Ambassador, the Administration had been defeated in Congress on the issue, despite making a major effort. I am convinced that what finally got the embargo lifted was the result of Ron's efforts -- and those of some others -- another vote had been scheduled in Congress. Key members had been convinced to vote for the lifting of the embargo, but there was still strong opposition from some powerful members such as Sarbanes and Brademas. It was strange because on other issues, Sarbanes and his group tended to vote in favor of our positions. I am a great admirer of Sarbanes, except on issues that related to the Greek-Turkey conflict where I think he was inflexible. A conversation with Sarbanes on a Greek-Turkey issue is more like a grilling; I had had several of those inquisitions. Ron was more successful in handling Sarbanes.

In any case, as Congress was heading for another vote, the Greek and Cyprus governments became very concerned about the potential Congressional decision. They wanted to insure that the embargo remained in effect. Kyprianou, then the President of Cyprus, announced that he would fly to Washington to personally oppose the lifting of the embargo. He had been encouraged to do so by some of his Greek-American friends. Spiers immediately recognized that this would work in our favor; I also recognized that in the first place, it is a high risk game for foreigners to go to Washington to lobby on their own behalf (The Israelis seem to do it and get away with it, but not many others find it a successful strategy) and in the second place, Kyprianou was an obnoxious bore. He was totally lacking in charm; when charm was passed out, most Greeks got a lot of it; Kyprianou none. I am not sure whose idea it was to encourage Kyprianou to go to Washington, but it was certainly welcomed by Ron and those of us who wanted to have the embargo lifted. We were delighted by the prospect of Kyprianou's visit. We wanted his allies to encourage him to go; we felt he could do more for us than we could do for ourselves. I am absolutely convinced that he turned all the "fence sitters" in our favor. It became very clear to the Congressmen that he was unreasonable, emotional and irrational. Many of them suddenly became aware that the Turks who lived on Cyprus might have had a reasonable case and may have had a legitimate reason to separate themselves from the Greek-Cypriot government. So in a very close vote, the embargo was lifted. Ron returned to Ankara where by this time he had been Ambassador for about eighteen months.

He then went to work on some other issues, including negotiations on a treaty for prisoners' exchanges. I participated in that, although the real negotiators were teams of Washington staffers. That treaty allowed prisoners in the respective countries to complete their term back in their home country. It was essentially a fig-leaf which permitted the Turks to release the American prisoners they held which had become such a great international political liability to them. By this time, the whole issue had become a Turkish domestic issue. Every true Turkish patriot was primed to stand up and scream about Turkish sovereignty and about favoritism for American prisoners. The anti-American stand was supported strongly by those who resented the pressure we were placing on the Turkish government on the poppy growing issue. The two issues became somehow engaged in people's minds and in many cases, one became an excuse for

inaction on the other.

In any case, all the Americans were let out of jail. I remember going down to the Adana jail where there were just three left. These were kids who had been foolish, stupid, had behaved arrogantly -- had done all the wrong things. They had matured in prison. The Adana jail is a terrible prison, perhaps no worse than some American jails, but it is not a place where you or anyone close to you would want to spend any time. It was divided politically between left and right. There were a lot of local terrorists in this jail. Many of the prisoners belonged either to a right wing or a left wing group and had to be kept separated. The three Americans had to occupy neutral territory. I went into the jail and talked to them. They were brave and dignified. I hadn't realized how sentimental a person I really was. When it came time for me to leave, they were very composed and amazingly cheerful and wanted me to understand that they appreciated the efforts of the U.S. government. When I heard that, I started to cry. I stood in that miserable prison, tears streaming down my cheeks. Eventually, the three were released and I think they have had a productive lives. Although this issue of the prisoners didn't sound like a big deal, as a matter of fact, it was.

Q: It was a big deal. In fact, in some ways, that is what we Americans are all about. American interests aren't always about that we have enough oil, but we do care about protecting our fellow Americans, even if they have behaved stupidly.

DILLON: These kids obviously had "sinned" but they had paid. I think, interestingly enough, they were also rehabilitated. When I saw them they were probably in their late twenties, having been in jail for a few years; they were no longer the silly, "hippy" types that they were when they were originally apprehended.

Q: Let me ask you to discuss the Kurdish problem during this period. Was the phrase "Mountain Turk" used to describe the Kurds?

DILLON: I never heard it used in Turkey although some Turks claimed it was the government's official term. I think some American journalists described the Kurds that way in sort of a sardonic fashion. But I never heard the phrase in Turkey. The Kurds were discussed in Turkish circles, even though some found it difficult to mention the subject. Interestingly enough, politicians had no reservations at all about telling you what they thought of the Kurds. Turkish politicians have one thing in common with Americans: a tremendous sensitivity to ethnic politics and the need to balance electoral lists representative of all ethnic groups. So every politician was keenly aware of the ethnic break-down of his own province. Starting from the early '60s, I never found any inhibition -- with the exception of the Foreign Ministry perhaps -- in discussing the ethnic issues -- Kurds and other minorities. You quickly found yourself talking about Cherkez, to a much lesser degree, Azeris, Alawites. The word "minority" had a special meaning and was used in connection with the Lausanne Treaty when Christian -- Greek and Armenian -- minorities were specifically listed in the Treaty. So to a Turkish government official particularly, the word "minority" didn't have the generalized meaning that it has to us. It meant those specific groups listed in the Treaty to whom the government owed certain obligations. But this issue was not very important in Turkey and the role of the small Christian minorities was seldomly raised. Perhaps one heard the role of a "minority" discussed in Istanbul because they were interwoven

with the history of the city, but in Ankara, weeks would go by without a mention of these minorities because people just didn't think about them.

But the Kurds were different. There are two levels at which discussions of Kurds took place: 1) the problems in Eastern Turkey with tribal Kurds; 2) politicians especially would also talk about the hundreds of thousands of integrated Kurds in Turkish cities -- Istanbul and Ankara being the main locations. So if you talked to politicians or, on rare occasion to policemen, they would tell you which neighborhoods were Kurdish. Most outsiders would not have known because the Kurds in these neighborhoods spoke Turkish, were Sunni Muslims and were not subjected to any obvious discrimination. Indeed all government organizations had Kurds in them. Now it is generally acknowledged that at least 20% of the Turkish population is Kurdish. When I was in Turkey, 10% was the figure being used, even though there were people in the American Embassy who felt that the number was far larger than 10%. You have to remember that the period of the late '70s was politically very violent culminating in September 1980 with a military crack-down. For the few years preceding that, there was a lot of political violence, terrorism -- a lot of left-right combat. That was very disturbing to the Turks who are rather conservative and law and order oriented. It is interesting to note that the only widespread violence was political in origin; there were some other kinds of violence, but none with the fervor and extent of political one.

The violence was always explained in ideological terms. There were people who called themselves Maoists. Plain ordinary communists were considered almost conservative. During this period, any idea that some Turks were inspired in any way by the Soviet example is nonsense. Whatever revolutionary appeal Soviet communism may have had in the '60s, was gone by the late '70s. By this time, no one was interested in the Soviet experiment; it was clearly irrelevant. These were Turkish revolutionaries, although people were misled by the use they made of Marxist vocabulary and symbolism. I am not trying to denigrate "Marxism", but its use in Turkey in the late '70s was just plain misleading. They had to talk about "revolution", but it did not have the same significance of years earlier.

But back to the Kurds. There were a large number of Kurds in Turkey's leftist groups. I suppose the motivation was nationalistic as well as ideological. I can remember some of the famous and bloody incidents, in Istanbul in particular, although not exclusively. There were some gangs of younger men that police were looking for. It was noticeable that, although the papers never referred to them as Kurds, their nicknames were such as "Kochero" -- meaning "eagle" in Kurdish. Many of the nicknames ended in "o" which suggested Kurdish origin. There was also an incident in an Istanbul suburb when the police surrounded an apartment building in which some of these young men were holed up. The police commented that the young people were talking a "foreign" language, which was actually Kurdish. But in general, the Turks were correct and smart in not generalizing about revolution and Kurdishness, even though, as I said, a lot of the young men belonging to revolutionary groups were Kurdish.

Q: That sounds somewhat akin to the United States where much of the leftist and Marxist leadership came from Jewish ranks, but it is not mentioned because we don't want something going. Is that a parallel analogy?

DILLON: Maybe. The interesting aspect is that it was certainly widely understood because it was not as if someone had to go around telling everybody that it was dangerous to mix ethnic issues and ideology. An awful lot of Turks seemed to understand it. There was no direct censorship on the issue but in newspaper accounts, there almost never was any identification of national origin of leftists. It was clearly very dangerous to link Kurds and leftists. It was especially true that no one wanted to call attention to the fact that among the integrated Kurds, who were, for the lack of a better phrase, "loyal Turkish citizens", were some leftist revolutionaries. No one wanted to raise that specter. The Turkish policy for a long time had been one of assimilation, which as I get older, I don't find a bad policy. In Turkish life, I believe, there is absolutely no barrier to Kurds who speak Turkish and who are Sunni Muslims. If you don't speak Turkish or if you speak it with such a thick eastern accent that no one can understand or if for some reason you are a member of a religious minority -- i.e. non Sunni Muslims -- then there were barriers to moving up in society. They were not written, but they existed. But the integrated Kurds didn't have those problems and I don't believe that most Turks viewed Kurds in western Turkey as subversive or enemies.

Q: Did the terrorism stem from the University or did it have its source elsewhere?

DILLON: I thought that it might have started around the Universities. To say that it came out of the Universities would not be accurate, but around the Universities there were a lot of poor young men living in miserable conditions. Turkish Universities are like European Universities; they are nothing like American Universities. They were large, urban, impersonal institutions with little or no campus life. In the cities, there were large dormitories which are not connected with the Universities. So you get a large concentration of students, particularly young activist males, who live in these dormitories. The dormitories became factional headquarters; they became segregated and battle grounds between the leftists and the rightists. The rightists were almost 99% pure Turks; the leftists were more mixed, but a lot of them were Kurds. Then there was a large middle group of students who were trying to avoid the factional fighting altogether. The parents of course were very worried and encouraged their children not to live in these dormitories. Within the Universities, there were radical professors who promoted their ideology. I don't think one can clearly paint the professors as espousing violence, but Maoist philosophy had a radical chic in those days. They were influenced by Europeans as always. If you want to know what is going on in Turkey's ideological spectrum, go to Paris and you will see Turkey a few years hence. A few years before my period in Turkey, there was a well advertised Paris student scene. The Turkish professors had an exposure to that leftist student drive and over a period of time, brought it to Turkey. It was chic in Europe for many years to be anti-American; that also spread to Turkey. That period has fortunately passed and we are no longer the issue we used to be. Our overwhelming presence, at least in the eyes of many young Turks, contributed to this. So the leftist movement became enmeshed with anti-Americanism. In 1979 and 1980, Americans became direct targets. During my last year in Turkey, something like eight Americans were killed. They were either G.I.s or civilians who worked for the military. There were murders in both Istanbul and Ankara; that was very disturbing to all of us.

Q: Did you feel that the Turkish government had some control over the situation or did you feel somewhat isolated?

DILLON: I didn't really feel either of those. It was clear that the Turkish government did not have control of the situation. The government was alternating between Demirel and Ecevit. They detested each other; could never cooperate. So in effect Turkey had weak governments with Ecevit heading leftist governments and Demirel heading up rightist ones. Neither man was an extremist, particularly Demirel was essentially a centrist. Ecevit is not an extreme leftist, but somewhat of a romantic and very much influenced by what he saw as a European social-democratic movement.

The government was paralyzed. Police and security forces were "rightists", if one can use such term. That was a point that the left made over and over again. It was a pattern that happened in other places. You don't tend to find leftist police forces in most countries. In Istanbul particular, you could claim that the Laz dominated the police force. The Laz also dominated the criminal class. They were all rightists. The government, as I said, was paralyzed. There was no good way to deal with terrorism. What you had were young men, who were not from traditionally lower-classes -- some of very humble origins, some not -- and therefore very difficult to pin point. We had some of the same syndrome in Turkey as we have in the United States. Huge waves of protests when the police beat up the children of middle class citizens. We had Turkish families genuinely very upset and concerned about violence. They were concerned about safety, but on the other hand were also very critical of the security forces. The government was not very effective in handling this situation. There may have been people in Washington who thought that the Turkish leftist movement was inspired and supported from outside the borders. That was nonsense. None of us in the country believed that at all. We were convinced that these movements were very much home grown. There was no scintilla of evidence that the Iranians, the Arabs or anyone else were involved. It was the Turks and the Kurds. The government, as I said, handled the situation badly. A lot of traditional police methods do not work. The police would be given a name, would apprehend the individual immediately and beat him badly. Then they would get other names and follow the same procedure. That would generate other names and so went the process. In a few days, they would have a large number of young men locked up. They had no time for careful investigation to separate the wheat from the chaff.

The Turks, by this time, had gotten the idea that the Jews were important politically in the United States and undoubtedly exaggerated that perception, but they always made a point about the very special position that the Sephardic Jews had in Turkey. I am not sure that at the popular level, people cared much one way or another. There was not much anti-Semitism in Turkey; it was not like Europe where you have that traditional, Christian-based anti-Jewishness. In Turkey, the only symptoms I observed were Turks pandering to what they believed to be a foreigner's view. You can say that of the Arab world as well. You occasionally get people who assume that because you are an American Protestant, that you must to some degree be anti-Jewish, which is nonsense. It was a kind of pandering statement. But I don't think anti-Jewishness is deeply rooted in the Turkish culture.

At another level, the Turks -- and we are seeing that today as the newspapers celebrate the 500th anniversary of the large Sephardic migration from Spain and Portugal to Turkey -- make a big thing about the Jews among them. That, of course, is for western consumption, but I don't think I ever witnessed anything that suggested that the Sephardic Jews were suffering from discrimination.

I am sorry to say that if any minority suffered from discrimination, it was the Greeks. I have been very annoyed over the years by the constant Greek obsession with the Turks. Whenever I would go to Greece, people would ask me how I could live in that "savage country". I didn't like that. On the other hand Istanbul Greeks did suffer from discrimination.

The honeymoon between the Turks and the Americans ended in the late 50s. From then on, Americans were scape-goated and blamed for all kinds of things. The Turks became very suspicious of Americans. The Cyprus affair really galvanized this feeling. There was a tremendous animus against Greeks whenever something was going on Cyprus. There is a free, popular press in Turkey and even though there were some taboos -- e.g. discussing Kurds, critical treatment of Ataturk -- and therefore some self-censorship, there was no inhibition on the discussion of Greeks. Huriyet, a major newspaper with a circulation of over a million readers by the time I left Turkey, which was commercially very successful with offset presses and color picture, would beat the Cyprus-Greece problem to death. Even the more intellectual newspapers, like the Cumhuriyet and Milliyet would take the same approach. They would also treat the Cyprus issue in very xenophobic terms. The composition of the staff on those papers were important elements in Turkish political life. Sami Kohen, who is still the foreign writer of Milliyet, and a stringer for major American newspapers -- in fact, I see his byline a lot in the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, but he writes for others as well, goes often by the name of Sam Cohen and he is a Sephardic Jew. Abdi I Pekci, who was murdered by a Turkish rightist, was the premier Turkish newsman of his time, was a donme and a very Turkish nationalist in addition. The minority picture in Turkey is complex and multi-level.

The Turks should have done years ago the things for the Kurds that they say they are willing to do now in cultural and economic matters. It may be too late, but if they had done them thirty years ago, they might have been successful. Now they are willing to let people speak Kurdish and are discussing letting Kurds have some cultural identity, but it may be too late.

The other minorities are interesting, but politically insignificant; the Turkish record is not bad on minority treatment. When one says that, one is immediately tagged as an "apologist", but in fact their record is not bad. They used the old "Millet" system which worked for many years, although towards the end it was far from perfect. In effect, the Turks left people in the hands of their own religious authorities. That was one of the reasons why in the early days, the Turks were welcomed as liberators and why many, many people converted to Islam. It was not because the Turks were holding knives to their throats, but because they wanted to get away from their own authorities. Surely there a large number of people in modern Turkey who, although Sunni Muslims, are the descendants of Greek and Armenian ancestors, who voluntarily converted to Islam. Christians sometimes like to believe that the conversions were forced, but in fact they weren't; it may have happened occasionally, but not as a rule. The Arabs converted people forcefully sometimes, but that was not the Turkish style.

RONALD I. SPIERS
Ambassador

Ankara, Turkey (1977-1980)

Ambassador Ronald I. Spiers was born in New Jersey in 1925. His career included positions in The United Kingdom, The Bahamas, and Washington, DC, and ambassadorships to Turkey and Pakistan. He was interviewed by Thomas Stern on June 3, 1992.

Q: Auten set the standard for service to U.S. Congressmen throughout Europe. She was known to all American Embassies on the Continent. In 1977, you were appointed as U.S. Ambassador to Turkey. How did that come about?

SPIERS: One day while serving in London, I was called by Bill Galloway, who was a special assistant to Dick Moose, who had been a neighbor of ours in Hollin Hills (Fairfax County, VA). We had been living, before going to London, on a short cul-de-sac in Hollin Hills; Tom Pickering lived right across the street from us and Moose was next to him. I had known Dick from his earlier stint in the State Department; in 1977 he was the Deputy Under Secretary for Management in the Carter administration. I didn't ask to be reassigned; I was quite happy in London. I had been in London almost three years and it was time to think of another assignment. In any case, Galloway called and asked what I wanted to do next. He thought I could have my pick of posts. I mentioned a few; Turkey was not in that list -- Greece may have been.

The next Washington call came from Phil Habib, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, who said that the White House had approved my assignment to Turkey. I know that that call came before the Carter visit because during the visit, Carter asked me what I was going to do next and I had to tell him that he had recently nominated me to go to Turkey as his "personal representative" i.e. Ambassador. Carter said: "Oh, yes, that is right. I remember that!".

I didn't know much about Turkey and I guess I was somewhat disappointed. As I said, I would have liked to go to Greece or something similar. But as it turned out, my Turkey assignment was the high point of my career in many respects. I think that originally I was supposed to go to Iran. David Aaron had mentioned that possibility when he came to London with Mondale. I told him that I would prefer not to go there. I didn't have any sympathy for the Shah and in any case, I was a NATO expert and thought that I should be assigned to a country that was part of that coalition. I suspect, although I never had any confirmation, that David, upon his return to Washington, mentioned my concerns and had my prospective assignment changed to Turkey. In retrospect, I am more than delighted with that change. I would have been in Iran during the Shah's fall, as Bill Sullivan was.

We returned to the States with my family remaining in Vermont, while I went to Washington for a week or ten days of briefings. We didn't have much time because there was still no Ambassador in London and the post couldn't be left open for too long. Then we returned to London, stayed there to break in the new Ambassador -- the new DCM, Ed Streater, had not yet arrived -- and went through the usual farewell routines and then on to Ankara. My main background in Turkish matters came from my EUR/RPM and PM days. That was very little.

Q: What did you expect to find in Ankara and how were those expectations met?

SPIERS: I didn't know what to expect because I knew so little. I had worked with Turkish officials. The senior official in the Foreign Ministry when I arrived in Ankara was an old friend - Sukru Elekdag -- who later became the Turkish Ambassador in Washington. I knew him when he had been head of NATO affairs for the Turkish Foreign Office in the mid 60s. I got to know him well as I did many of the officials in charge of NATO affairs in the various Foreign Ministries of NATO countries.

So I had some friends, but I didn't really know what to expect. I didn't speak Turkish; I had only visited there once as Director of PM; I didn't know anything about the country beyond the NATO relationships, e.g. the internal political situation, the economic conditions, etc.

I found an absolutely fascinating country filled with great people. I loved the Turks. It is a country that has had about twelve civilizations moving across its surface, with each leaving its mark. Turkey was the location of a lot of places that I thought were in fact in Greece.

When I arrived the U.S.-Turkish relations were in very bad shape because of the arms embargo which Congress had imposed after the Cyprus invasion. I believe that in fact many in Congress were motivated by the desire to embarrass Kissinger rather than just to punish Turkey. Kissinger had had a close relationship with the Turks; he liked them very much. Before going to Ankara, I went to see Henry and he told me that I was going to one of the most important places in the world. He thought that the administration had made a great assignment and that I was very lucky. I asked him a lot of questions about various Turkish personalities whom he knew well.

Al Haig, whom I had known from EUR/RPM and PM days was then Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). He also regarded Turkey as one of the most vital links in Western defense. Turkey was the eastern flank of NATO, bordering on the Soviet Union. We had a lot of important listening posts -- intelligence facilities -- there. From Turkey, we monitored Soviet nuclear tests. The whole southern part of the Soviet Union was covered by devices located in Sinop, Karamursel and Diyarbakir. All of these were very important military facilities. We had an important air base at Incirlik. The commander of the NATO south east flank was stationed in Izmir where the U.S. had a substantial military contingent.

My challenge was to get relationships back to a more friendly basis. The relations, despite all of our military presence and the importance of Turkey, were at a stand still. The Turks, in retaliation for the embargo, had closed all the PXs. Our military stayed, but it was not a pleasant situation. Demirel was the Prime Minister then; he recently became that again. I just saw him in New York a few weeks ago. The internal politics were on a see-saw. Ecevit and Demirel would trade-off the Prime Ministership. They disliked each other personally. Whatever one of them did when in office, the other would undo when he succeeded. It was a very unstable political situation with the political extremes -- both right and left -- at war with each other. It was very difficult security situation; eight Americans were killed during my tour by Turkish terrorism, mostly left wingers from the revolutionary group Devsol, which was quite anti-American. About five thousand Turks were being killed every year in political shoot outs. A right wing group would drive by a left wing coffee house and throw some fire power into it, killing some and the next day the left would retaliate in similar fashion. These outbreaks of political violence lasted

throughout my tour.

Our relationship with Ecevit was interesting. He was the Prime Minister for most of my tour. He had been a journalist, an intellectual. We got along pretty well primarily because he was a devotee of T.S. Eliot -- he had translated a lot of Eliot's works into Turkish -- and I happen to know by heart a considerable amount of Eliot's poetry. So that built a good base for a relationship. In general, Ecevit was very suspicious of the American government. This stemmed from a leftist, socialist ideological background. He was also anti-military. He spoke excellent English, having lived in the U.S. as a student and journalist. Nevertheless, the U.S.-Turkish relationships had tensions.

The Congress was a major problem. We used to have a number of Congressional delegations visit; I used to believe they left with a better understanding of the situation. But there were two Greek-American members of Congress that were a real stumbling block: Paul Sarbanes and John Brademas. I had only seen Pat Leahy and Bob Stafford, the two Senators from Vermont before I left for Turkey. As I mentioned earlier, I wasn't in Washington very long between London and Ankara. During my briefings in Washington the Greek "lobby" may have been described to me, but at that time I didn't really have an appreciation for its political heft; that I didn't find out about that until I had been in Turkey for a while.

I had known both Sarbanes and Brademas before. Both had been Rhodes scholars; both visited London relatively frequently. Whenever they came to London, they would have dinner with me. I introduced them to a number of important Britishers; that I think helped them look at me favorably. But once I became engaged in Turkish affairs, we were on opposite sides of the fence. I considered the embargo as pure impediment to good U.S.-Turkey relations without having a scintilla of effect on Turkey's Cyprus policy. It just hardened the Turkish position and I said so. They were unhappy. They called me on the carpet. I had to return to Washington and they, in effect, threatened to have me fired. It is interesting to note that after I left Turkish matters, we all became friends again. I saw Sarbanes often when I was Under Secretary for Management and when I was Director for Intelligence and Research. I saw Brademas often when he became President of NYU and I was at the UN.

It has been suggested that they were motivated by anti-Kissinger feelings, but I think they were just spokesmen for the American-Greek community. That made them strong opponents of Turkey. Of course, in some ways, the Turks are their own worst enemies. They are not very adept at handling Congressional relations. They are not very nimble politically; they are not very subtle; they are heavy-footed, deliberate and lumbering. They have very little understanding of the American system. I became good friends with the Turkish military. I left Turkey as a minor hero among the military. The Chief of Staff later became President, so that my contacts were very useful. I sought them out and cultivated them carefully.

Q: Let me pursue that effort a little because I think it is somewhat unusual in the Foreign Service. What led you to cultivate a foreign military establishment?

SPIERS: I did that in Turkey, Great Britain and Pakistan. I had worked with the American military a lot, I liked them and so I gravitated to those connections. In Turkey and Pakistan, of

course, they were very important in the political arena. The President of Turkey was a former admiral. I suspect that my predecessors had not made the same approaches as I did. I think the Turkish military appreciated my efforts. The week I left, the four Chiefs of Staff -- Army, Navy, Air Force and Gendarmerie -- gave a dinner for me which I was told was unprecedented. It was noted as such in the Turkish newspapers. One of these officers was Kenan Evren, whom I saw again when I was in Pakistan, by which time he had become President of Turkey. As is customary, all Ambassadors go to the airport to meet an arriving Chief of State. When he got to me, he showed great surprise and threw his arms around me. President Zia looked at me with new respect. It was very amusing.

Q: Lets' talk a little about Cyprus. What was that situation in the 1977-80 period?

SPIERS: The Turks are not very flexible, but they were helped at the time by the fact that Cyprus was also governed by inflexible leader, Kyprianou, who was probably the greatest obstacle to conciliation. That protected the Turks from themselves; they didn't need to overcome their own inflexibility. At the beginning of the crisis the Turks probably had a very defensible position. There had been a coup in Cyprus which overthrew Makarios; that was engineered by the Greek military who undoubtedly wanted to incorporate the island with Greece. In some respects, Cyprus is much like North Ireland -- very difficult to solve; the problems are confessional and cultural. The Turks are a minority on an island forty miles off their own coast. The Greeks are a majority, but separated widely from the metropole. The Turks are the poor; they have been badly treated for a long time by the majority. That situation rankled. The Turkish Cypriots are much like the North Ireland Catholics -- the dispossessed, the poor, the despised minority. But the Turks, in their usual way, are not very agile in dealing with the issue.

We urged genuine negotiations, but most people realized that the obstacle at the time was Kyprianou, the Cypriot President. So the Turks couldn't be solely or even primarily responsible for the deadlock, but I did what I could to urge that reasonable negotiations be undertaken. For the Turks, the "Law of the Sea" negotiation was a much more important issue at the time in their relationships with Greece. I didn't constantly raise the Cyprus issue; Washington didn't expect that and it would have been counter-productive. Cyprus was a major issue and I followed it closely in Ankara; when I had an opportunity, I would urge negotiations, but never in a heavy handed manner. I tried to explain to the Turks the American political system in which they were at a disadvantage because there was little Turkish influence in Congress, nor was there a very vocal American-Turkish lobby. There had been a large number of Turkish immigrants, but most had been assimilated and had lost that fervor for their former homeland that Greek-Americans tend to display. I tried to point out these realities, but the situation was just not ripe for negotiations.

Today, the obstacle to a solution is Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot, much more than the Greeks. Nevertheless, I think today's situation is ripe for negotiations. But the Turks are very heavy handed, stubborn, suspicious of the Greeks. On the other hand, they are much more straight forward than the Greeks, more loyal and reliable. The Greeks can run circles around them in the public relations arena; they are faster, quicker, they appear much more flexible. The Turks sense this difference and that makes it much harder to deal with them on the Cyprus question.

The issue loomed large when I was in Turkey. The Turks hated the Greeks; they had a love-hate relationship with us. In 1964, Johnson had sent a letter to Ecevit which the Turks read as a threat. They read it to say that if the Soviets attacked, the NATO accords would not be called into effect because the crisis was related to Cyprus and not to an East-West issue. It was a mistake to send that letter, given the existing political situation and the cultural chasm. It generated a very bad relationship between the U.S. and Turkey which was still very much in evidence when I got to Ankara three years later.

As I mentioned earlier, fortunately I knew a few people in the Foreign Office. It was lucky that I knew something about T.S. Eliot. It was lucky that I had an affinity for the military, which very soon came to accept me as an active opponent of the embargo. When I came home on leave, I spent almost every day for two months working the Hill. I must have talked to about 250 Congressmen. I know I changed fifty votes and eventually the embargo was lifted by a very, very close vote. The Turks appreciated my efforts.

Sarbanes and his colleagues represent a strong ethnic nationalist affinity. Their position was not entirely unreasonable. Even Sarbanes will admit that the original Turkish invasion in 1974 was probably justified, but then a truce was declared, which the Turks broke by occupying additional territory to consolidate their position. That Sarbanes finds unreasonable and I must say, even without the pro-Greek bias that Sarbanes has, that his position has merit. Strangely enough, one of my best friends in Ankara happened to be the Greek Ambassador -- George Papoulias -- who later became the acting Foreign Minister for the Greek government. I think that the Greek Ambassador in Ankara reported to Athens which reported to Washington, including Congress, that I was not anti-Greek.

Q: Do you see an eventual settlement of the Greek-Turkish dispute?

SPIERS: It has to come sometime. The tensions are deep rooted in history. Greece was part of the Ottoman empire and then revolted against it in 1822 after a costly war. Greece and Turkey were on opposite sides during World War I, and Greece invaded Anatolia after the Axis' defeat. Greece took a lot of islands in the Dodecanese which were very close to Turkish shores. They were taken over by the Italians during World War II, but after the end of that war, reverted to Greek control. The "Law of the Sea" is a major issue because the Turks feel their access to the Aegean Sea is unacceptably restricted because the Greeks have declared unilaterally a ten-mile zone around all of their islands, which effectively hampers Turkish access to both the sea and some of their ports. Then there are the cultural differences to which I alluded earlier. The Turks have something of an inferiority complex vis-a-vis the Greeks. So we are facing a set of difficult and complex issues, many of which have long historical roots. But there is no reason why they can't be resolved.

The real tragedy is that after World War I, Ataturk and Venizelos met and arranged for a transfer of populations. But that arrangement did not apply to Cyprus because at that time Cyprus was a British protectorate and therefore could not be part of any Turkish-Greek deal. The Cyprus problem is a real one; as I said, it is much like Northern Ireland and much like the present problems in the former Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia lies across the fault line between the former

Ottoman Empire and the Holy Roman Empire, which creates all sorts of cultural and religious divisions. Cyprus has a Muslim North and a Christian South, with the latter being richer than the former. The Greeks have emphasized business in their history; the Turks have leaned toward the military. That explains to a considerable extent the economic gap between the two. But the issues between them are not unresolvable.

Q: Did you while in Ankara keep in constant communication with the U.S. Ambassador in Athens? Did you try to coordinate strategy?

SPIERS: We were always in touch with our Athens Embassy. We kept each other informed. Unfortunately, we couldn't visit each other; we probably would have had to go to Frankfurt in order to get to either capital. I didn't have even a chance to go to Cyprus until after I left Turkey. Galen Stone was our Ambassador in Nicosia and we tried to keep in touch with him. There had been a history of antagonism between the two American Embassies and I would have none of that while I was in Ankara.

Q: The embargo was lifted in 1978. How did that change your role?

SPIERS: It immediately made it easier for the Americans in Turkey. The PXs and the Commissaries opened giving us all access to a new supply line. The relationships between the Turkish and U.S. military reopened. The Turks became eligible again for military assistance. This was very helpful because the Turks had always felt that they had gotten the short end of the stick from NATO in terms of military hardware especially since they were the nation with the longest common border with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, they felt, and appropriately so, that they did more for NATO than any other country by hosting so many military and intelligence facilities. They were very loyal to NATO, but felt unappreciated. The Turks have been given short shrift by the European Community; they have gotten a very cold shoulder. The Turks feel this discrimination very keenly.

Our embargo certainly had an impact on Turkish military preparedness. When the embargo was lifted, we had to face the question of the level of assistance. I had spent a lot of time with the military, as I have mentioned, both Turkish and American. We had a large military assistance office. I worked very closely with our military planners who had office in the Turkish General Staff headquarters. The Turkish requirements were so great that we couldn't possibly have met them. In addition to all the other issues, we were also stuck with the McNaughton commitments that I described earlier. As I said, I think his promises were made without reference to Washington; he may have added that "the administration would make its his best efforts", but those footnotes are seldom heard by the other side. The "McNaughton commitment" made our job very difficult because the Turks always said that we were not doing enough for them; we would point out to the high level of our assistance, but in fact, their needs were so high that even a doubling or tripling of our assistance would probably not have met the requirements that NATO's planners had established. The Germans also provide assistance. I used to meet with their Ambassador; he had been previously the German Ambassador to the Soviet Union and earlier to NATO.

The perceived "shortfalls" were a constant source of tensions. Intellectually, the Turks may have

understood the mechanics of the U.S. government, but not emotionally; that is true for many countries. They feel that if the President of the United States really wanted something done, he could ensure it is done. They can not accept the concept of divided powers, of checks and balances. Even the British have a hard time understanding a Presidential system. So when an American President is not able to obtain Congressional support, he is perceived as not really having wanted to do so; the failure is due to the lack of personal commitment and not a systemic problem as it is often.

Q: Did you have to face the issue of the relationship of the Greek assistance program to the Turkish one?

SPIERS: That was not as much of a problem in the late 70's as it is today. In those days, the issue was a Congressional matter; the administration opposed the 7:10 ratio, so that that ratio was a sense of Congress and not law. It was a relationship that the administration had not accepted; later the Executive Branch may have gotten used to it because it is certainly in effect now. Of course, the Turks also opposed the concept.

Military assistance was the major aid effort still in being when I was Ambassador. The old aid program had been phased out; the only economic assistance still left was what was called "security assistance" which was essentially a budget support program. It was useful to us because any assistance program is useful to achieve political objectives. I spent a lot of time on Turkish economic issue, particularly in the Ecevit period. He was essentially a socialist. The Turks are well-organized and hard-working, but were hampered by statist economic ideas. As a matter of fact, Turkey is a fertile soil for foreign investment because the returns will be good. But they did have a lot of quasi-socialist rhetoric and formulas. Some Turks were convinced that our embargo was really an economic one, promoted by the Greek lobby to strangle them. I used to tell them that they couldn't blame the U.S. for their crazy economic policies. One of the pillars of Ataturkism was "statism" -- state owned industries. Such policy may have been defensible in Ataturk's time, but by the end of the 70s, the Turks had pushed the concept so far that many of their industries were totally non-competitive. Their products were not marketable overseas. They had an import substitution policy which could not be justified on economic grounds. I cooperated with the IMF and the World Bank to try to get those institutions to push the Turks towards more sensible economic policies, which they finally accepted under Demirel. I used to talk to the military about their country's economic policies. When the military executed their coup in September, 1980 -- shortly after my departure -- Evren became the head of government and he instituted a more sensible economic policy with a much greater emphasis on the free market, which is what Turkey needed.

Security assistance was not very useful in changing the government's economic policies. It was helpful in our relationships with the military. What would have been more helpful than anything else would have been the removal of U.S. tariffs on Turkish textiles and the abandonment of the multi-fiber agreements. Those are actions that are often much more economically useful than aid. Some Turks complain about our protectionist policies and we didn't have a very good answer to their charges. They would point out that they had proceeded with economic reforms of the kind that we had urged on them and which made them competitive and then we raised the tariff barriers so that they had difficulties selling their wares in the U.S. market. What made the matter

even more egregious was that the Turkish exports were really minuscule in the total textile picture.

Q: You earlier mentioned the physical security problems in Turkey. Was the left-right conflict also a barrier to economic development?

SPIERS: Of course. It had to interfere with development. It was destabilizing; it was a barrier to foreign investment. Fortunately, most of the conflict had abated although periodically there was some resurgence. There are some sympathies for Muslim fundamentalism. You have to understand that Turkey is stratified. The older generation spoke German; the middle generation spoke French; and the youngest generation spoke English. So German is now disappearing, but at the time of Ataturk, the German relationship through World War I was very strong. In addition to this generational gap, there were strong ideological differences, with a pure revolutionary sentiment being felt by part of the population. That in part caused the domestic violence. Turkey has some elements of a tribal society. Vengeance is a very Turkish sentiment. If someone kills a member of your family, you are duty bound to kill someone in the family of the aggressor. Tensions spiral upwards.

GEORGE S. VEST
Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European Affairs
Washington, DC (1977-1978)

Ambassador George S. Vest was born in Virginia in 1918. His career in the Foreign Service included positions in Bermuda, Ecuador, Canada, and Belgium, and an ambassadorship to the European Communities and Director General of the Foreign Service. This interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

Q: During that period, was there any other particular moments or areas of major concern?

VEST: In the earlier stages, we had Greece, Turkey. We had to resume -- this was almost more politics in our country than over there -- we had to resume the sale and delivery of arms to Turkey. We had stopped it because of the Cyprus situation.

Q: That was the Cyprus situation in July of '74?

VEST: Yes. And we went to the Senate. It was approved. I met sort of steadily with Sarbanes and Brademas and the other Greek-American people on the Hill.

Q: It's interesting how powerful the Greek lobby is. I mean, one always thinks of the Israeli and Jewish lobby, but the Greek is probably, well, second.

VEST: It's second. I mean, I've had a lot of personal experience with each.

Q: Each being the congressional...

VEST: The Jewish-American lobbies -- and without any question, the most powerful lobby in political terms inside our country -- but I think equally there's no question the Greek- American lobby, much, much smaller, much more pointed in its concerns, is the next most effective. They are absolutely fantastically well organized and able.

Q: Why did we want to resume arms shipments to Turkey?

VEST: You had the case of a NATO ally who, really, whose armaments were frankly beginning to be out of date, limited. You know, the armed forces were getting to be genuinely in a bad way. And as a NATO ally, you had two things. You were, one, having an increasingly, poorly armed ally; and second, you were creating increasing strains inside a society, which is a rather shallow, western-oriented society where the military represented a major component factor. And so, in NATO terms, there was a very, very strong desire to help, go ahead and modernize the Turkish military.

Q: Looking at it from both the NATO and the European...

VEST: It wasn't having any affect on the Cyprus situation.

Q: Looking at the Greek-Turkish business from the point of view of European affairs -- American view of European affairs -- and NATO, how important did we find Greece in this? Greece, in a way, seems to spend most of its time pointed towards Turkey rather than Bulgaria or something like that. Was Greece something we almost would discount and were more concerned about Turkey from a military support of NATO point of view?

VEST: You can never discount either one of them. Geographically, they are both in extraordinary...

Q: You were saying that Greece points at Turkey, and Turkey points at Greece, too.

VEST: And both are absolutely delicate pieces of real estate in relation to the eastern Mediterranean and the Soviet world, so you constantly have to try to have them do something that is constructive and to have them point less at each other. And that has been the role of these two countries inside NATO ever since they joined. There's never been any major difference in this kind of approach on their part. And it still is.

Q: How did you deal with this? Was this something that you spent a lot of time on?

VEST: The only thing I can say is I dealt with it by virtue of the fact that I was good friends with the diplomatic people on both sides. And we were constantly negotiating on Cyprus, trying to get the sides to come together in Cyprus and to get the Turks, who were part of it, to work with us, and there never was that opportune moment where the parties involved, all of them, really were ready, because the Greek Cypriots never really wanted to settle, as far as from my point of view.

I had the good fortune that key people in the Greek foreign office were people I had known, and the equivalent of assistant secretary for political military affairs in the Turkish foreign office, one of the most powerful at that time because he was the one the military trusted, he was someone I had known as a junior officer when I started in NATO. He was their most recent ambassador here, Ambassador Elekdag. He and I had known each other since we were very junior officers, so I could always really speak very, very candidly and openly and work with them.

You did your best to soft-pedal the differences, to restrain them, and to remind them that they had this other concern they needed to watch, as well. There are only moments when Greeks and Turks are really ready to do things together, and you have to capitalize on those moments. Now none of those moments honestly came in the four years that I was assistant secretary for European affairs. A little later, when Ozal more recently was made head of the Turkish Government, you hit one of those moments and they've had a much better rapport. Not a rapport, but a relationship, in more recent years. Otherwise, it's very difficult always.

RICHARD E. THOMPSON
Diplomatic Courier
Frankfurt, Germany (1977-1982)

Mr. Johnson, a Californian, was educated at the University of Southern California, the University of Madrid, Spain and Occidental College. Joining the Department of State as a Diplomatic Courier, his career took him to diplomatic courier centers in Washington DC; Frankfurt, Germany; and Bangkok, from which he serviced US Embassies throughout the world, collecting and delivering diplomatic pouches. His later assignments in Washington were of a senior managerial nature.

Q: But I do remember that you came to Cyprus, maybe several times while I was there, at least once. But I don't remember why you would have come to Cyprus... to serve the embassy in Nicosia as opposed to using that as a dropping off point, there were flights from Larnaca to places like Baghdad and Damascus.

I was testing your memory a little bit about what kind of shuttles you did out of Larnaca in Cyprus because I was there at the time and I remember we had a nice get-together one time. We had known each other, I guess it doesn't hurt to mention back in Occidental College back in 1956-57. It was good to see you there, Dick. I was wondering if you could remember whether Larnaca, Cyprus had in some way come to replace Beirut Airport a little bit?

THOMPSON: Yes, it had, and for a period of time we made shuttles out of there to Cairo, to Damascus, perhaps to Amman, I'm not sure but we maintained a large presence there, we had as you recall a pretty good sized vault. We would shuttle in and out of Nicosia for some time. This was sort of a sub-hub of the Athens hub.

Q: As I recall, all the places you mentioned were certainly very accessible from Larnaca airport

at the time. Baghdad, also, I think we would have had an embassy there in this period. I'm not sure about Tehran.

THOMPSON: We used Cyprus Airlines and they were perfect for us because they would go and come back... oh Tel Aviv, we went to Tel Aviv as well from Nicosia on a shuttle.

GALEN L. STONE
Ambassador
Cyprus (1978-1981)

Ambassador Galen L. Stone grew up in Massachusetts. After attending Harvard University and serving in the U.S. Army, he joined the Foreign Service. His career included positions in Germany, France, India, Vietnam, Laos, Austria, and Washington, DC, and an ambassadorship to Cyprus. He was interviewed on April 15, 1988 by Malcolm Thompson.

Q: *When did you become Ambassador to Cyprus in Nicosia? Was that your next assignment?*

STONE: Yes, that was my next and last assignment. I recall being asked to come to London. This was during the Carter Administration in late 1977. The new czar on non-proliferation was Gerald Smith. I go knowing that I should come to London and meet him at the American Embassy there. Kingman Brewster was the Ambassador in London at the time, and very kindly invited me to stay at his residence. I walked around Regents park at least twenty times with Gerald Smith while he tried to persuade me that I should remain on in Vienna. He did tell me that I was under consideration for another Ambassadorial post, but I had no idea whatsoever what that post might be. I really felt that by that time that there really wasn't too much more that I could do at the International Atomic Energy Agency. The dealings with such a host of other countries made progress terribly difficult and frustrating and the upshot was that I eventually was appointed as Ambassador to Cyprus.

We arrived in Cyprus in late March of 1978 almost on the day that President Carter announced the lifting of the arms embargo against Turkey. This announcement was greeted with a series of protest rallies and demonstrations against the U.S. Embassy. The Greek Cypriots and the Greeks did not wish the United States to resume arms deliveries to Turkey, and at one point armored cars from the Cyprus National Guard were deployed around the Embassy building for our protection. It so happened that in Cyprus the Chancery building and the Ambassador's residence were one and the same and we lived on the third and fourth floors and the Chancery was on the first and second floors. It was like being the skipper of a ship, we entertained on the top decks and then went down to the boiler room to do the work. I was somewhat concerned on arrival that President Kyprianou might delay receiving my letters on credence, but he didn't. I did have to stand and listen to some-what of a tongue lashing, which I didn't appreciate at all. However, having begun my tour when our relations were at an absolute nadir, I had the satisfaction of feeling that we had almost nowhere to go but up. My assignment in Cyprus was certainly a fascinating one, because even though our government and all the other governments of the

world, with the exception of Turkey, recognized the Greek Cypriot administration as the government of the Republic of Cyprus, I was expected to deal with the Turkish Cypriot, "so-called government" as well. I did this by dealing on a personal basis with the head of that government, Mr. Rauf Denktash who called himself "President of the Turkish State of North Cyprus." His government was recognized only by the government of Turkey. What one said on one side of the so-called "green line," which divided Greek and Turkish Cyprus had a one hundred and eighty degree different effect that it did on the other. So it was very important to watch every word I uttered that might be reflected in any kind of public media, because of course the Turks were reading the Greek language papers and vice versa. The Ambassadors on the islands were being watched like hawks by both sides to try and determine where their sympathies really lay. Having started at a very low ebb, I found the assignment there extremely satisfying. This was partly because I was in the relatively unique position of having a very clear idea of what my government wanted in Cyprus. What we least wanted was to have a further flare-up between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, or between Greece and Turkey both of whom are our allies within NATO.

I was able to take steps on my own, which in other times and places would have required be to go back to Washington and ask for instructions before doing what I wanted. For example, the Greek Cypriot National Guard, which was totally officered by career Greek army officers from Greece, got the bee in their bonnet to harden all the out posts facing the Turkish forces. They started pouring concrete and reinforcing all of their military outposts which was very offensive to the Turkish army which was deployed where they could see what was going on. In order to keep things on an even keel, (and I must say that I worked quite closely with the U.N. In this regard,) I passed the word to the Minister of Justice, with the understanding that the word would be further passed onto the President, that if any further hostilities broke out as a result of this Greek Cypriot action, I would have to report to Washington that it had been brought on by the Greek Cypriots themselves. Within twenty four hours the efforts at hardening their outposts ceased!

Q: At his time the Turks had already invaded the northern part of Cyprus and occupied a considerable amount up to the so-called green line?

STONE: That's right. That particular event had taken place in the summer of 1974 and that was when my predecessor once removed, Rodger Davies had been assassinated by a bullet fired by a Greek Cypriot right into the embassy premises and down a corridor to where he was standing. This made life for the Ambassador in Cyprus somewhat different from what it had habitually been, in that I lived with a seven man personal body guard every where I went. Of course that unfortunately has become all too common now-a-days, with the amount of terrorism that we are experiencing.

Q: Were you able to travel for example, to the coastal area facing Turkey? As you know I spent many years in Turkey and was a Turkish language officer. I also visited Cyprus during the time in the early sixties when Toby Belcher was Consul General and he had a lovely house at Kyrenia, I believe, overlooking the water. I wondered whether that part of the island was available to you at all?

STONE: Yes it was. Because of the fact that I was expected to deal with the Turkish Cypriots as

well as with the Greek Cypriots, I had to have a way of doing that. The government did rent a house, and I think that it was the same house that Toby had lived in, and they were able to continue renting it because it had been Turkish owned. We could not have used a house that was owned by a Greek Cypriot and occupied by the Turks. This house was put at my disposal and this house become my weekend escape. We would regularly go up there because we could wave good bye to our Greek Cypriot body guards at the green line, go through the U.N. lines and then proceed on our own and do our own thing so to speak in the north.

We got a lot of business done with Turkish Cypriots at relatively small social affairs. I used to climb Mount Kornos with the so-called Foreign Minister Kenan Atakol, who is today called the Foreign Minister of the Turkish State of North Cyprus. Both he and his wife were graduates of Penn State University and extremely personable people, and we had a very easy business and social relationship with them.

Q: I am very familiar with the Turkish position and if you were to discuss this with the Turks, they would go back to the London Agreements of 1960 which gave independence to Cyprus and which very clearly delineated the authority that the Turks would have, which amounted to a veto authority. The Turks would tell you that Makarios violated this agreement in many respects. Makarios would have probably answered that the agreement was impossible and that you couldn't have a government where a minority had a right of veto. Legalistically, the Turks would always hang to that agreement as a justification for their later actions. How would you comment on that agreement?

STONE: Well I think that the Turks have a good legal case. They are a guarantor power of the original 1960 agreements, and it was on that basis that they moved into Cyprus in the early summer off 1974. At the time as you recall the Colonels were ruling Greece and they got the bee in their bonnet to get rid of Makarios, because by that time Makarios had become convinced that Cyprus' future lay in being an independent entity and not as a part of Greece. Makarios had initially been a supporter of Enosis but he later came to feel that Cyprus should not be a part of Greece, that it should be an independent entity. The Colonels plotted to get rid of him and of course you know that Makarios had to flee for his life and they installed a man named Nikos Sampson as a puppet. The Turks, after consulting with the British, and learning that the British were not going to intervene, then decided to move on their own.

I think that it's hard to fault the Turks for that action. Where they perhaps can be faulted, is in the steps that they later took. Of course as a result of the initial Turkish invasion which resulted in, let's say some twenty percent of the North of the island being occupied by regular forces from Turkey; the U.N. immediately called for a cease-fire and negotiations began in Lausanne. Well, those negotiations had been going for about three weeks or so when the Turks suddenly without warning moved out and took over considerably more terrain, so that today they in fact control roughly thirty six percent of the surface of the island. Four percent of the island is now under U.N. control with a U.N. military force that has been there since 1964 and, I must say doing a very commendable job of keeping the peace between the two protagonists.

Q: The Turkish rebuttal; and I am being sort of the Devil's advocate here, would be that as far as partition goes the island being eighty percent more or less Greek Cypriot to twenty percent

Turkish Cypriot - the Greeks of course would say if they were to agree to any kind of a partition, that the Turks should have twenty percent of the land area. The Turks on the other hand say that it should be according to land ownership. Since most of the Turkish population are peasants and have land and fields, whereas the Greeks are congregated in the cities like Nicosia and the villages. On the land ownership issue, it comes out much nearer one-third Turkish and two-thirds Greek! So that's another Gordian knot where it all depends on how you look at it.

STONE: Well, of course, before these events of 1974, the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots were scattered all over the island and they were living cheek by jowl. After the 1963 events when Makarios over-ruled the Turks and the Turkish representatives withdrew from the Parliament, the Turks were more or less forced into enclaves in their own particular areas because the Greek Cypriots who controlled the surrounding area required permits for them to move from one place to another. So they were really economically deprived in many ways, and were in many cases given jobs as laborers, whereas the Greek Cypriots, who tend to be natural entrepreneurs anyway, had obtained more of the higher paying jobs.

After this, as you recall in 1975 there was an agreement reached for an exchange of population. At that point all of the Turks within the Greek Cypriot area were moved to the North and vice versa. In fact, whole villages, whole Turkish villages were moved into what had been Greek villages in the North, and they kept the entire population together so as to give them some sense of stability when they moved with their friends and associates and people that they knew. By and large this worked rather effectively in terms of the town administration, because the history in Cyprus, as you probably know, is one of a tremendous importance being attached to the town from which one comes.

Cyprus in the pre World War Two era was considered to be one of the most crime-free areas on the face of the earth. This was because an individual who committed a crime not only dishonored himself and his family, but he dishonored his village as well. The attitude of hospitality amongst the Cypriots was also something we found very remarkable. The common greeting is "kopiaste," which means "come and share my meal," and this was literally what they meant, and still do today in some of the outlying villages. Of course this has now disappeared almost entirely in the cities and the populated areas.

Q: I note from the newspapers recently that the Turks and Greeks are talking about this, Ankara and Athens, and relations seem to be a bit better. Do you see this sort of a partition as being permanent as you look ahead?

STONE: No, I don't see it as being a permanent partition in the sense of two separate and independent political entities, because I just think that there are too many mini-states in this world. The groundwork has been pretty well plowed, in fact it's been gone over time and time again, to reestablish Cyprus as a federated state. I think there will be two parts to the federation, there will be a Turkish part and there will be a Greek part. There will be a considerable amount of autonomy left to each part. Each part will have its own police force and its own educational system. In the north it will be predominantly Muslim, the south Greek Orthodox.

I think that there can be a loose federation which would have at the center, common currency,

common foreign policy, some shared defense arrangement which could run the island. This area has been gone over and over, under the auspices of the United Nations Special Representative who has served on Cyprus ever since 1964 -a civilian representative of the United Nations Secretary General. The present United Nations Secretary General, Javier Perez de Cuellar served on Cyprus himself for two and a half to three years and thought when he became the Secretary General that this would be a relatively easy problem for him to resolve. He brought Mr. Kyprianou and Mr. Denktash to New York and thought that he was going to have them sign an agreement which would resolve this issue, or at least be a step in that direction, but Mr. Kyprianou refused to sign it.

I have never seen the document which he asked them to sign, but I am under the impression that the U.N. had tried to be even-handed. I must say my Greek Cypriot friends, whose judgement I respect, do feel that the Secretary General did present a document that tended to be more favorable to the Turkish Cypriot cause and they rather supported the fact that Mr. Kyprianou did not sign it. I felt all along that as long as My Kyprianou and Mr. Denktash were the principles in charge of their respective communities, that there would not be a solution, because both of these men have personally lived through all of the tragedy that has gone on, and know of all the evil deeds which one side has done to the other. So there is a tremendous tendency on their part to look backward rather than to look forward.

With the recent election of a new President in the Greek part of Cyprus, George Vassiliou who is very intelligent and has a very agile mind, I believe that the chances of some agreement are considerably enhanced. You have to realize that he has to bring along his Greek Cypriot population in whatever he does. Therefore, I am not surprised that the initial reports make it sound as though there is hardly any change whatsoever in the Greek Cypriot position.

Q: I would agree, and also I would say that if the influence of Ankara and Athens can be minimized, it would all be in the interest of a permanent settlement. In other words, if the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots can be more or less left alone to settle their own problems, then I think they are more likely to work out a solution. This is because I feel that Ankara and Athens have never played a very constructive role on either side. What do you think?

STONE: They haven't up until now, but I think it is encouraging that Mr. Ozel and Mr. Papandreou seem to be making some progress in terms of their own problems between Greece and Turkey directly. I believe that to bring about a solution in Cyprus there has got to be a willingness on their part to support whatever can be done, and perhaps to nudge their respective sides into an agreement. I wouldn't rule out that it may be important to involve them in supporting a solution to the problem.

Q: Well of course they have to agree. Would you have any comments on U.S. policy towards Cyprus? Do you think there is anything else that we should have done, could have done, or should not have done?

STONE: I don't really have any comments on policy during the time that I was there. One could argue a lot about U.S. policy during the period that Turkey invaded North Cyprus in 1974. In all fairness, we have to remember what was happening in the U.S. at that time, as that was the very

summer that we were going through Watergate, which was preoccupying the attention of the senior officials of the U.S. government. The U.S. had been instrumental on two previous occasions in dissuading the Turks from invading Cyprus. Once Cyrus Vance was directly involved in that and there could well have been a Turkish invasion of Cyprus, - but were successful in dissuading Turkey from moving. Because of our success that time, we were blamed by the Greek Cypriots for not having prevented Turkey from invading in 1974. We were accused by the Greek Cypriots of being more or less responsible for the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. However, in reality they should have looked toward their motherland, (if you want to call it that), Greece, as being the cause of the problem. Naturally they didn't want to place the blame on Greece as they found it far easier to place the blame on the United States. This is so often the case in foreign countries.

The thing that has always struck me in my service around the world is how much people look at the world through their own particular perspective and see their own country as being the cockpit of world politics. This was just as true of the Cypriots as it was of the Indians. The Cypriots felt that the most important problem that the world faced, was the Cyprus problem!

JAMES ALAN WILLIAMS
Cyprus Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1979)

Mr. Williams was born in Wisconsin and raised in Virginia. After graduation from Princeton University, he joined the Foreign Service in 1965 and was posted to Ankara, Turkey. During his career Mr. Williams became a specialist in Greek/Turkish/Cyprus affairs and served as Special Coordinator for Cyprus, with the personal rank of Ambassador. His foreign assignments include Ankara, Nicosia, Bonn, Berlin and Athens, and he had several tours at the State Department in Washington. Mr. Williams was interviewed by Ray Ewing in 2003.

WILLIAMS: I was assigned to be the Cyprus desk officer in EUR/SE, the Office of Southern European Affairs. Ed Dillery was in charge of it and Bob Pugh, later Geoff Ogden was the deputy. There were two Turkish desk officers, two Greek desk officers, and one Cyprus desk officer, two people in the front office of SC and then several secretaries. This was my first real experience working in the Department of State below the seventh floor. Up on the seventh floor I'd done essentially staff work, asking others for something, telling others what to do, but I'd never really done what I would call serious work at the country officer level. And as I had served in Cyprus I knew quite a bit about it at that time and it was not hard to pick up the portfolio for Cyprus and EUR/SE. One of the first issues we had to deal with was whether to allow into the United States for medical treatment Nicos Sampson who had been installed by the junta as the president of Cyprus when Makarios had escaped by the skin of his teeth and with his life in 1974. Sampson at the time the request was pending was suffering from a horribly debilitating disease which is caused by parasites that get into your system and cause enormous benign tumors in all parts of the body including the vital organs, the heart and so forth. It was not so much disfiguring as disabling and very painful, and it does sooner or later lead to death. So we

apparently had some treatment or treatment centers in America that could handle this disease and his other ailments. And as I recall, Kyprianou the president of Cyprus, asked us to let him in. I wrote a memo to George Vest, this was the first thing I ever wrote I think for SE. Basically saying that we don't owe anybody this favor, that Sampson could get treatment in France where he was staying or somewhere else. He was kind of a Flying Dutchman at that point. He hadn't yet been allowed to go back to Cyprus, he was clearly sick, but just as clearly there were other treatment centers available, so my recommendation was no. Ed signed it off, it went up. I don't recall what the final decision was, but this experience on the desk brought me into very close contact with members of the Cyprus embassy. Some of them I saw later when they were in Bonn, Andreas Nicolaides was briefly in the embassy in Washington but went later to Bonn as ambassador.

Q: He was in Washington quite a while.

WILLIAMS: Came back as ambassador to Washington, then he was ambassador in Bonn, and I saw him in Bonn when I was passing through once or twice as coordinator. I enjoy working with the Cyprus embassy folk. To some extent I dealt with the Greek and Turkish embassy although not quite so much for obvious reasons, but just learning how the bureaucracy works in terms of the budget cycle, in terms of the aid requests, in terms of the importance and the power of the domestic groups that are concerned with Cyprus and Greece. Everything from AHEPA to the Pan-Cypriot Federation and the other groups that were around at the time. We saw them all and quite a bit of some of them. I think I only spent about five months on the Cyprus desk. It was a busy time. The Kyprianou/Sampson issue sticks out in my mind as the main thing. There were probably some others.

DAVID T. JONES
Cyprus Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1980-1982)

David T. Jones was born in Pennsylvania in 1941. He received a B.A. and an M.A. from the University of Pennsylvania and served as a first lieutenant in the U.S. Army overseas from 1964-1966. Upon entering the Foreign Service in 1968, his postings abroad included Paris, Brussels, Geneva, and Ottawa. Mr. Jones was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

Q: In the summer of 1980, where did you go?

JONES: I ended my assignment at NATO and went to the Cyprus desk. This was an assignment that had turned up almost at the last minute. I didn't get the assignment until May. There had been various other assignments that had looked as if they were possibilities or more like actualities and didn't turn out to be that way. It was probably the influence of Allan Holmes that got me the job as the Cyprus desk officer over an individual who would have been the initial choice of the Southern European office director. So, I became the Cyprus desk officer in the summer of 1980.

Q: You did that until when?

JONES: Until the summer of 1982. It was a standard two-year desk officer assignment.

Q: This was one of the points of contention in the world at that time. What was the situation vis a vis Cyprus when you arrived there? I'm sure this had been off to one side and was one of those "minor annoyances" when you were in NATO.

JONES: Yes. This was a constant neuralgic problem at NATO. The Greeks and Turks simply could not come to an agreement on virtually anything, but by and large we were able to keep the problem confined. It started far, far back in history. You can start centuries ago, but you can really start in 1974.

Q: July 14th 1974.

JONES: Yes. The Turkish troops moved in to Northern Cyprus and occupied a very substantial portion of the country.

Q: After a Greek effort to take over the island themselves.

JONES: A very hard-line right-wing leader, Nikos Sampson, who would have been supported by what was then also a Greek military dictatorship. During the same period, the island had been only very tenuously under control for many years. There had been decades of rioting, decades of essentially Greek Cypriot pressure on Turkish Cypriots who were a minority of the population. During the period from the late '60s through the early '70s, the Turkish Cypriots were pretty much pushed out of any political influence within the Cypriot government and very marginalized in Cypriot society. It was a period in which, really I would say, the Greek Cypriots had overwhelming control of the island, its economy, the society, and the like. It was just that when the Greek Cypriot right-wing leader attempted what was a coup that the Turkish government landed troops to prevent it from happening, and you had a vast refugee flow which now would be called "ethnic cleansing" at the end of which there were virtually no Greek Cypriots in the northern half of the island and no Turkish Cypriots in the southern part of the island. In 1980, this was still a relatively fresh circumstance. There had been a steady assortment of peace plan proposals of one sort or another designed to end this separation and generate a new government, create a new governing structure of one sort or another, secure the withdrawal of the Turkish military forces, and mend the breach between the Greek government and the Turkish government. These bilateral relations, while never particularly good, had gotten particularly bad since 1974 to the extent where it was impossible to reach agreement on things like the Defense Planning Questionnaire at NATO, which gives NATO authorization for force deployments and circumstances for each country's armed services. You had endless arguments over where Greek and Turkish forces could legally be placed, whether there would be any implicit recognition of these forces if they were included in a NATO document with the Turks always claiming that their forces on such and such islands were NATO-committed and the Greeks contending that these islands were not Turkish island but Greek islands. It's been a situation that had never been resolved.

Q: Was the Turkish military arms embargo still on when you were there?

JONES: The arms embargo had been lifted by Carter. At this point, you also had the Turkish military coup in October of 1980. At that juncture, where there had been tremendous societal upset, rioting, terrorism, and great turmoil within Turkey, the military moved to throw out the civilian government and impose order, which they did quite effectively. We as a government had no real objection to this. I think we said a few *pro forma* things about the role of democracy and the need to have free elections and things of that nature. But neither the Carter government at the time nor the subsequent Haig-Secretary of State-Reagan government had any real problem with the fact that the Turkish government had moved in this manner to secure order. There was always the concern that a destabilized Turkey could go communist.

Q: What was the feeling when you took it over? You hadn't been dealing with it before. From our point of view, okay, we had to make noises, particularly because of the Greek lobby and all, but essentially it was pretty much a done deal. The Turks were on this side to the north and the Greek Cypriots on that side. Efforts made to allow the two groups to get back together again were something you had to do politically, but it just wasn't going to happen at least in the near future. How did you feel about it?

JONES: I used to say years later that you had to change Cyprus desk officers at least every two years. Otherwise, you got to the situation where your officer had seen it all, knew that nothing would ever work, and refused to believe that anything could work. Therefore, you needed a new Cyprus desk officer every other year who would come in with a fresh view, new hope, new inspiration, and an effort to resolve the problem. No, in 1980, there was still a feeling that something could be done partly because at that juncture people looked at the Middle East and said, "Oh, my God, we will never, ever, ever be able to solve the Arab-Israeli problem. We just can't. The Arab-Israeli problem is impossible. Is there anything easier?" Then they looked at Cyprus and said, "That looks easy in comparison." Cyprus is an easy problem. It's something that any student in Political Science 101 could sit down and draw up an equitable, honest, fair, workable Cyprus agreement. The only problem is that it would have to be accepted by the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, neither one of whom would trust each other under any circumstances. They had just had too long, too hard, too difficult a communal relationship where the problems were so intense, the rioting was so frequent, the unease certainly on the part of the Turkish Cypriots so intense that any kind of an agreement that could be sold to the Turkish Cypriots would have to have included a kind of guarantees and almost admissions of guilt on the part of the Greek Cypriots for their actions in previous years. This proved to be impossible for any Greek Cypriot government to accept.

When I say that we were hopeful about solving it, indeed we were hopeful. We had made two years earlier a relatively serious proposal, the details of which now escape me, but it had atmospherics which people thought had been a proposal that if the Cypriots – and these are the Cypriots talking – had been a little less doctrinaire on it that it was an agreement that fell into the possibilities for being worked out. That's the way that people were still looking at the Cyprus problem. You had a man at the head of the Southern European Office, Ed Dillery, who had been the deputy chief of mission in Cyprus. He never left me with the impression that this was an

impossible problem that we were just going through the motions on it. I, on the other hand, coming to this with absolutely no knowledge of it, said at the very beginning, "Well, we give so much in the way of military support to the Turks, we ought to be able to put real pressure on them." Ed was very polite to me in saying, in effect, "Well, Dave, it's not quite that easy." I listened to him, but it took me some while to understand why it was not so easy, that the Turks were people willing to cut off their nose to spite their face, and we had larger equities in dealing with the Turks, for example, how we were going to retain a Turkish bulwark in the Middle East, in a very unpleasant neighborhood, and particularly maintain defense against the Russians. Damaging the Turks economically, militarily, and consequently politically for the benefit of the Cypriots didn't seem to have a great deal of logic behind it. You might be making a major effort to sacrifice a "whale" in order to save a "sardine" or to benefit a sardine. It didn't mean that people were not interested in benefiting the sardine. Nor was it just something that ambitious people who looked at the Cyprus problem looked at it and said, "Well, there is a Nobel Peace Prize for the person that can solve it." In comparison to the Middle East, it was a lot more solvable a problem because the logic of it looked so clear, that you really ought to be able to construct a bicameral legislature with guaranteed seats and guaranteed this and that, a continued United Nations presence, and a good deal of economic assistance to each side to buy an agreement. This was what people were attempting to do. This is what I was involved in for about two years. One level of this was an exercise stimulated by the British with us and through the United Nations. We had the British come to us and say, "We think there is a window of opportunity this year." This was in late 1980. This was based on who happened to be in power at which time. They said that they, the British, would not hesitate to put a lot of pressure on the Cypriots to come to some sort of agreement if we, the Americans, would put a comparable amount of pressure on Ankara to tell the Turkish Cypriots that they had to agree.

At that point, there was a newly appointed Special Representative of the Secretary General for Cyprus. He was a former Argentine foreign minister named Gobbi. This man was indeed vigorous, energetic, intelligent, and dynamic. He started going to shuttle back and forth to Cyprus to offer various proposals under various circumstances, efforts to create patterns of land management that would result in reductions. Proposals included the amount of ground that the Turkish Cypriots and Turkish forces had seized and perhaps bring a captured city that was an absolutely magnificent potential tourist spot called Famagusta back into service. This was at a time when the hotels that had been abandoned still had the possibilities of being rehabilitated, brought back into life relatively quickly. It had only been six years since they had been abandoned. While they had been damaged and there had been deterioration, the feeling was that there was an incentive of hundreds of millions of dollars in property that could be brought back into use. The thought was that perhaps the Greek Cypriots would be willing to make certain concessions to the Turkish Cypriots if the first thing that they did was withdraw from this particular city, which wasn't really being used at that point either. It was abandoned and was cordoned off with barbed wire, guards, and the rest of a security infrastructure. Gobbi went back and forth and was incredibly vigorous and innovative in this manner. We thought he was quite credible. We discussed his efforts with one of the leading political appointee figures in the UN, Brian Urquhart. We were talking enthusiastically about the prospects for what Gobbi was trying to do. I'll never forget his line: "Yes, I, too, think Gobbi can walk on water, but I wish he would start at the shallow end."

What happened is that after a more than substantial amount of effort on the part of Gobbi and indications of progress and then indications of less progress, it just kept going without a great deal of anything happening. We then had a change of administrations. With the change of administration at the end of 1980, beginning of 1981, Al Haig was in. You had Larry Eagleburger, who was P at this point. Eagleburger had a long professional association with Reg Bartholomew, who was his deputy or his colleague at Defense and elsewhere in different positions within the Department of State or at the NSC. At the end of 1980 with the termination of the Carter administration, Bartholomew was removed from director of the PM Bureau and as a result head of the NATO Special Consultative Group. He was replaced. But the question then was, what were they going to do with Bartholomew. He was retrieved from studying German, where he had been studying it, while sitting in the Foreign Service Institute and waiting to do something. Eagleburger had gone forth looking, ostensibly on Haig's behalf, for a "very special person" to be the Cyprus negotiator. Various names had floated up and batted down. Finally, Bartholomew's name came to the fore. Bartholomew became nominated as the Special Cyprus Representative. This was an interesting appointment. Then I became Bartholomew's support person for this entire exercise. I remember telling Bartholomew that I was not all of PM, that I was not all of EUR, but I was all he had. Bartholomew proved to perform very adroitly in this position against the expectations of almost everyone that saw him get the job. Bartholomew had no background in the area, and his reputation had been one of an individual who always tried to get an agreement, pushed extremely hard to get agreements, and was extremely active in so doing. As a result we expected that he would create trouble rather than resolve trouble. But instead Bartholomew appreciated the limits of the possible and recognized that the Special Cyprus Representative was indeed more of a place-holding exercise to respond to Greek-American and Cypriot-American concerns and that he would do his best to find out what could be done and do that whenever possible. But he did not try to generate negotiations, agreement for its own sake, or just to generate dust in order to say that he was in command of the whirlwind. What he did for a period of about a year was to travel regularly to the United Nations, travel to London, travel to Cyprus, and talk to the senior people on all sides attempting to find whether there was any leeway for serious negotiations, and whether there was any prospects of arrangements that would fall into an acceptable category. I went along on all of these meetings and saw a number of these people and came to the conclusion that there was simply too intense a level of suspicion, that the Turkish Cypriots in particular, led by Raul Denktash, who was their "president," was probably the smartest person in the group, and he realized that the Turkish Cypriot community was significantly weaker than the Greek Cypriot community in virtually every way – socially, politically, and economically – and that an integrated Cyprus would mean within a relatively short period of time a Cyprus that was completely dominated by the Greek Cypriots. As a result, he always found ways, reasons, and rationales to make sure that progress was as limited as it could be. The Greek Cypriots, who would have had to make a deal to which no one could say "no" in the way of making a tremendous offer, an offer that was so obviously so generously designed to heal the differences, they might have been able to reach across Denktash to make this type of an agreement. The Greek Cypriots weren't willing to make that kind of an offer, at least partially because they continued to hold the moral high ground. Their country was the one that had been invaded. It was the Turks who were holding the occupying force. It was the Greek Cypriots who continued to have all level of international recognition. It was they who could take the issue to the United Nations on a year-to-year basis and get a resolution denouncing Turkey and Turkish action. It was they who were prospering

economically and they who would have to make the admissions and give up substantial elements of their own power and authority to get an agreement that would reunite Cyprus. In my view, they never thought it was worthwhile. It was far more pleasant to be able to belabor the terrible Turks than it was to make the hard compromises that would have been necessary to reach agreement.

Q: What about Clerides, who was the other Siamese twin? Denktash and Clerides had been dancing around forever on that small island.

JONES: At the time, Clerides was in opposition. It was Kyprianou. None of these people ever die or go away. They are all still there. Kyprianou, Clerides, Rolandis, and Denktash have been the major figures in Cyprus politics for about 35 years.

Q: They all went to high school together or something like that.

JONES: There is the intimidation that they all know each other perhaps too well. The only one of the Cypriot leaders who was prominent in the 1960s who had died is Makarios. But all the rest of them continue now, older and older, to play exactly the same kind of games with one another. They used to say about Kyprianou that he could only have one toilet facility in his home because if he had two, he would have terrible accidents because he was never able to make a decision.

Kyprianou at the time was also apparently having a variety of mental cum physical problems. As a consequence, no one found him particularly reliable as an interlocutor. They just didn't think that they would be able to get agreement out of Kyprianou. You were also at the point where Andreas Papandreou was about to return to power in Greece. As a consequence, it was harder and harder to reach agreement or any expectation that there would be agreement between the Greeks and Turks that would make it possible to come to an overall agreement on Cyprus.

Q: How did you find Congress? I went to a meeting one time of American Greek Cypriots. They had the usual run of congressmen and senators of Greek ancestry talking about "25 years of Turkish tyranny on Cyprus." That was the title of the thing. They seemed to be completely oblivious to the fact of what precipitated this whole thing. That was the attempt to take over the whole island. How did you find dealing with Congress? Was this just a burden?

JONES: Congress was certainly part of the equation. I have said a number of times that if there were as many Turkish-Americans in the United States as there are Greek-Americans in the United States, we would probably have a more balanced policy on Greek-Turkish-Cypriot relations. But as a consequence of the Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus, you had a situation in Congress that initially had led to the embargo on arms to Turkey, something that was worked out only very slowly over a number of years, when we found that we simply couldn't influence the Turks and we were damaging our own relations not only with the Turks but making it easier for the Soviets during this period. But one of the things that I was involved in was still another sop to Congress. Every 60 days, the Department of State had to prepare a report on Cyprus. Every 60 days, your Cyprus desk officer ground out a report talking about addressing what issues had come up and how we were working to resolve this problem. It became pretty formulaic at some juncture. But nevertheless, this was something that in its inception, which was

close to the time when I was on the desk, was being addressed reasonably seriously as something that we had promised to Congress and were producing. We were also still giving economic assistance to Cyprus, which in all reasonable terms of what was required for a country's development, Cyprus had no need for it at all. It was a relatively nominal sum. I remember about \$15 million. It was nickels and dimes, but first it was supposed to be directed to relief for the refugees. But when you went and saw the level at which the "refugees" were living at the end of six years, they weren't living badly at all. These were not people who were living in tents or anything of that nature. Finally, they moved to create a scholarship fund that was designed and has been designed and it may still be going on – I'm not sure – to use the money that was involved in this funding - or perhaps it was half of it - to generate a scholarship fund that would bring Cypriots to study in the United States.

Q: Anything for Turkish students?

JONES: This was Cypriot students at large. I assume that there was at least the option that Turkish Cypriot students could apply. I think there were some that did. I don't think it was run through the U.S. government. I remember it being run through something like the Fulbright Commission on Cyprus, something of this nature.

Another thing I was involved with was missing persons activities. During 1974 and during the Turkish occupation of the North, a number of people disappeared. One of these was a young American Cypriot who had disappeared. So, we spent a great deal of time pressing for information on these people. They also slowly created a set of intercommunal talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in order to address the issue of missing persons. This, too, was about as convoluted and disputational as you can imagine – over which lists would be exchanges under what circumstances, what information would be provided about people, how you would talk about the cases. There were Turkish Cypriots missing as well as Greek Cypriots missing.

Q: By that time, I assume that everyone was assuming that these people were all dead.

JONES: Let's say everyone who didn't have a vested personal interest in it or a political reason to keep the issue alive. The leader of the Turkish Cypriots had declared them missing Turkish Cypriots all dead in order, he said, that the families could get on with their lives. But for the Greek Cypriots, it was a different case. The fact that there were missing people always generated reports in the same way that our POWs have generated reports for the last 25 years. They would find or hear some intimation of somebody that was being held in a Turkish prison – never in Turkish Cyprus; there would be reports that they were holding some poor Greek Cypriot. As a consequence, you had regular – I won't say "orchestrated" because it's unfair to say that someone's grief is orchestrated, but I might also suggest individuals whose husband's, father's, son's, brother's were missing were exploited by propaganda in Greek Cyprus to keep the issue of Turkish barbarity and excess and the "terrible Turk" as alive as it possibly could be. At that point, you could hypothesize at the six, seven year mark vaguely that one or two of these younger people might somehow still be alive. You couldn't automatically discount the fact that, well, here is a report. The report says that somebody says, or somebody heard, or somebody saw, or somebody listened to an individual who said they were somebody of that nation. So, among other things, we talked to the Turkish Cypriots about this, particularly about the American Greek

Cypriots. We were told bluntly that Denktash himself had gone looking to try to resolve some of these specific issues. He was told and told us that there wasn't going to be any answer, no answer that would be satisfactory to us. In effect, implicitly he told us that they were indeed all dead. But this did not mean that you were not going to have these extended discussions and intercommunal talks. Of course, the next spinoff would be, "Well, if they're dead, if you think they're dead, or if you believe they're dead, where are they? We want the bodies back." Then, of course, where would the bodies be and under what circumstances would they have died? Would this provide additional opportunity to charge the Turks with atrocities of one sort or another? For that matter, there were people that just threw up their hands in confusion. They said that some of these people were undoubtedly killed during the coup, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. They didn't know what happened to them. Were they killed? Were they buried secretly somewhere? Was somebody particularly outrageous or obnoxious? Did they haul them away from their Northern Cyprus homes and push them into a ravine and shoot them full of holes? It's certainly possible. What you're talking about was significantly fewer than 100 people. I remember 25-75. It didn't mean that the individual tragedy wasn't as vital as if it were 775 or 75,000. But nevertheless, in absolute terms, the numbers of missing people were really pretty low. But that didn't mean that the intensity of the discussion was not very, very high.

Q: After your two years of doing this and you've run out of every option you could think of with these implacable antagonists, what did you do?

JONES: I moved on with Bartholomew. He became the Greek base negotiator. I'd like a chance to review my own diaries a little bit more so I can have a better chance to give you a more complete sense of it. The issues involved were that we had an old longstanding agreement with the Greeks on our defense and economic cooperation. This was an agreement that was virtually not able to be cancelled. It was tied to Greek participation in NATO and it was, as a consequence, an agreement that was very satisfactory for the United States. We did not care whether it was changed or not as a consequence. But with a Papandreou government, there was a fresh impetus on the part of the Greeks to force a new agreement with us. At the same time prior to that, there had been regular efforts on our part with previous Greek governments to have a revised DECA [Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement]. But the pre-Papandreou government, a conservative government-

Q: Karamanlis?

JONES: Karamanlis was the president at the time. They were never able to decide whether the revised Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and Defense Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) with the United States was supposed to be a new agreement or was supposed to be a device to win reelection for them. In other words, a device that would show that they had gotten the better of the Americans. This had to be a deal to show they had gotten tremendous benefit from the Americans. That they had gotten a deal that would balance off the perception that the Americans favored Turks over Greeks and, therefore, would justify the reelection of the conservative government in Greece. Well, there was an extended set of negotiations around 1980 led by the ambassador on the spot, McCloskey, with a support team that was essentially led out of the embassy. This support team struggled heroically with the Greeks for months and months and eventually failed. The effort failed.

JOHN NIX
Political Officer
Nicosia (1981-1983)

John Nix was born in Alabama in 1938. He attended the U.S. Military Academy and served in the U.S. Army from 1960 to 1971 as a major overseas. Upon entering the Foreign Service in 1971, his assignments abroad have included Nairobi, Moscow, Nicosia, Athens and Berlin. Mr. Nix was interviewed in 1994 by Raymond Ewing.

Q: Let's talk a little bit more about the International Organization Bureau. You said there you were an officer responsible for East Asia and Cyprus.

NIX: And peacekeeping. I also had international peacekeeping in those days. Now they have an entire office. In those days, they had one mid-grade officer. I represented the State Department in international peacekeeping meetings and conferences around the world, including the first-ever African peacekeeping conference in Lagos in 1979. The East Asia account was also very busy, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia (Kampuchea at that time) occurring in successive Christmas weeks. I served for a year on the "Kampuchea Working Group" under Tom Barnes, working to find a humane solution for the thousands of refugees fleeing Kampuchea.

Q: I know the one question always involving the International Organization Bureau, IO, was the relationship with the U.S. mission to the United Nations in New York. People there actually participated in Security Council meetings, General Assembly sessions and so on. How did you find that relationship at that time? Who was the ambassador to the United Nations?

NIX: It was Andrew Young. Also during that period, Ambassador Young resigned and Don McHenry took over. We had excellent relations with the New York staff at the working level, at my level. There was a wonderful relationship with the staff up there. We were on the phone every day, on the fax every day. It was just like working in the same office. We had a direct fax line. You didn't even have to dial them up. If they had a document they needed to send to us, they would send it to us right away. There might have been some tensions at the higher level that I was not aware of. I'm sure there probably were. There always is in that situation. But as far as doing the job I had to do, I couldn't have asked for better colleagues.

Q: You had to work so closely with the geographic bureaus, the East Asian Bureau.

NIX: Yes. It was a question of making sure that you were known and that you had credibility with the people there. You didn't lose sight of the fact that normally the major interest of the United States in that particular area was projected through the geographic bureau and not through IO. Of course, you had to keep in mind that most of the time in IO, we were supporting or trying to at least cooperate with whatever ongoing foreign policy initiatives the geographic bureau was

undertaking. I definitely kept that uppermost in my mind. I think it worked pretty well. I had excellent relations with EAP administrators and, I think, with EUR, the office you directed. We were working very closely.

Q: Certainly as far as Cyprus was concerned in that period and before and long after, too, the role of the United Nations was really very important. Not only the United Nations peacekeeping force in Cyprus, but the Secretary General, his special representative. Do you remember who the special representative was in the time you were there?

NIX: At the time I was in UNP, we were between special representatives.

Q: But Javier Perez de Cuellar had been there before.

NIX: He had been there, but at the time, he was working on Cyprus in his capacity as an Under Secretary General in New York. He actually did come down to Washington a couple of times, to discuss Cyprus. He always had an intense interest. Of course, we all thought, when he became Secretary General, that it would be a great opportunity to make progress on Cyprus. Through no fault of his, it just didn't work out. I guess the major things that happened during that period though was something you were really involved in. It was our initiative on Cyprus in '78 when the United States, probably for the first and last time, tried to play a major direct role in resolving the Cyprus problem, under then Counselor to the Department, Matthew Nimitz.

Q: Secretary Haig, I think, had Matthew Nimitz's function and role very much in mind when, I think, he was the first one to actually appoint a special Cyprus coordinator with that title.

NIX: Ambassador Bartholomew.

Q: Right. But I think that they [came] directly from Secretary Haig. I was told and had the impression that that's what he had in mind. Certainly at the time that Nimitz was playing that role, Haig was the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and Nimitz worked very closely with him, not so much about Cyprus, but about Greece and Turkey. Haig was very aware that Nimitz spent a lot of energy on Cyprus' role. He had that in mind. Of course, Clark Clifford also played a role under President Carter. The other area to mention always on the Cyprus issue is the domestic political, congressional aspect. I think that's another reason that Haig wanted to have somebody that he trusted that had some seniority in the State Department. He could divert attention to Cyprus so that he didn't have to do it and have to answer too many questions.

NIX: One of the major things we had to focus on in UNP was making sure the mandate for the UN force was renewed each six months without any undue controversy or any negative aspects creeping in. We were also trying to get more nations to contribute to the cost of the UN security force. It was very important to us, in principle, to get the other permanent members of the Security Council more involved. I must say we were never fully successful in that. But it was always a major effort that required a lot of cooperation between UNP and EUR/SE.

Q: And the mission in New York. The funding of the UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus, UNFICYP in that period was on a voluntary basis. So, it did involve arm twisting and trying to

persuade others that this was a worthwhile activity.

NIX: The United States was by far the major supporter. We had, I guess, in fairly recent years there, established the principle that we wouldn't pay more than, I think, 28% of the overall UN budget. But we were paying a much higher percentage for the UN force in Cyprus, which was a little difficult with Congress whenever we had to go down and ask for the money in the peacekeeping budget.

Q: Of course, the countries that contributed troops were not always reimbursed for the cost that they incurred. So, in a sense, some of them were pretty substantial.

NIX: As you know, the stalwart troop contributors were Great Britain, Canada, Austria, Denmark, and Sweden. Over the years now, just about everybody's gone home but Great Britain and Austria, mainly because of the financial pressure of eating the cost of the involvement there.

Q: There is, of course, demand from other parts of the world for United Nations peacekeeping troops. I would think a country like Canada has had to respond more often.

NIX: Finland had the same problem, I remember, when they pulled out of UNFICYP. Sweden as well.

Q: I think we've pretty well summarized that period in Washington of about five years - or was it closer to six years by the time you finished?

NIX: About five and a half. I came back in the summer of 1975 and I eventually left Washington in December of 1980.

Q: You went then to Nicosia as political officer after how much Greek language training?

NIX: I had three months. A tragic series of circumstances curtailed my training because the son of an officer named William Shepherd in Greece had died suddenly. His tour was curtailed. The then-political officer in Cyprus, Jesse Lewis, was immediately pulled out to replace him in Athens. I was sort of given the choice by the ambassador in Cyprus to come now or he'd find somebody else. So, I broke out of training and went ahead. I reported in in January of 1981.

Q: Three months of Greek is...

NIX: I got my 2/2 in three months. I felt that I was well grounded enough to continue instruction after I arrived at post, which I did. I got up to a 3/3 in short order.

In Cyprus, as you remember, normally Greek is not absolutely essential for the conduct of your duties on a day to day basis. Occasionally it's needed. It's not needed as badly as it is in Greece.

Q: Because so many people do speak English. There is even some English language newspapers.

NIX: There are, yes. There is an English language news service, which covers most of the

political events.

Q: Let's back up just a minute. I want you to describe your job in Nicosia. What were some of the main issues and concerns or responsibilities at the time that you were there?

NIX: The most interesting thing about the job in Nicosia proceeds from the fact that it is a divided island. Approximately 80% of the people are Greek Cypriot and live in the southern part of the island. The other 20% are Turkish Cypriot and live in the northern part of the island, which also has a fairly large complement of Turkish troops. The island is physically divided along this ethnic line by the UN demilitarized zone, which we referred to earlier.

The political section was rather small. There were only two State officers: The chief, myself, normally being a Greek-language political officer and the other officer being a Turkish language political officer. Basically, the challenge is to cover both communities, to get good political coverage, to try to predict what's happening. It's also to realize that we have diplomatic relations with the recognized government of Cyprus, which is in the Greek part of Nicosia, but to balance this so that you don't allow it either to color your reporting or somehow to inhibit your contacts in the North. During the time I was there, we had a sincere belief that we could help to solve the Cyprus problem. We participated in a number of efforts in conjunction with the United Nations Special Representative, Ambassador Gobi, to try to come up with a solution which would be accepted by the parties. As a former colony, the UK still has a very, very prominent role in Cyprus. It really boiled down normally to the American ambassador, the British High Commissioner, and the Special Representative of the Secretary General getting together and trying to work out something which could be presented to the two parties, which would in turn be workable and acceptable. This had to be done very discreetly. The Political Section supported the ambassador in laying the groundwork for these efforts. We worked with our counterparts in the UN and on the British Commissioner staff to come up with ideas, float concepts, devise schemes that in turn could be considered in Washington, London and New York and possibly presented to the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

In addition, of course, we had a number of issues that were of concern to the United States. There was the issue of missing persons after the 1974 events, which included nine American citizens. This was still of great concern to the American Congress and to the people of the United States, because some of these people might possibly still be alive. Time was flying by, and we wanted to try to find out exactly what had happened to them. There was the issue of what to do with the \$15 million which was routinely provided every year by Congress for assistance to the Cypriots. Under Ambassador Ewing, we came up with a very novel approach to that problem, which even today is one of the centerpieces of our relationship with the island of Cyprus.

Q: The scholarship program.

NIX: Yes. The Cyprus-American scholarship program. It is unique in history.

Q: Probably, we should give your first ambassador credit for the idea that...

NIX: Galen Stone?

Q: Yes. It was his idea.

NIX: Unfortunately, he and I didn't overlap very long. I just never had an opportunity really to discuss it with him. But I know it didn't go anywhere until you came on board. I know it was a hard sell. Anytime you come up with something new that no one has done before, it's awfully hard to get everybody in the U.S. government and in the host government to agree. There were even skeptics and detractors continuing in the first few years. There probably still are today. But I think it's been a wonderful program. It certainly has been a very constructive way to spend the money on an item which is in the long-term best interest of both the United States and the Cypriots.

Q: You mentioned that as the chief of the Political Section and the Greek language political officer, your primary responsibility was on the Greek side of Cyprus. To what extent did you also have contacts and get to know some of the political figures on the Turkish side during this period?

NIX: I did get to know the so-called Foreign Minister at the time. We became close friends. I got to know quite a few of the businessmen in the north through social contacts more than anything else. I got to know quite a number of the officers in the Turkish embassy, who even today are still some of my diplomatic friends. There was quite a bit of intercourse. I did not feel inhibited or restricted in my contacts at all. Being a little more senior than the Turkish language political officer, sometimes in a structured society like that, I was accepted a bit more readily than my colleague. On the other hand, one thing that was interesting is that even today, I don't think I've ever received any overt negative reaction to the fact that I studied Greek, which was interesting. I thought I would.

Q: From the Turkish.

NIX: From the Turkish Cypriots. Sometimes they do ask, "Do you speak Greek?" "Yes." "Do you speak Turkish?" "Unfortunately, no." If you don't go on to show any kind of bias, they usually accept you immediately as a well-meaning colleague.

Q: How about on the Greek side? Discuss briefly what the political situation was and then the kind of contacts that you were able to have with the government, members of parliament, members of the assembly, political figures in general.

NIX: The Cypriot political party situation is interesting because even though it's a very advanced European-style society, it has a longstanding strong communist party. This goes back many, many years. It became a very well-organized, very strong party that was able to portray itself both as a party which would take care of its members, and also as a party which did not threaten the democracy of Cyprus so that others, even non-communists in Cyprus, did not necessarily perceive the party as a threat to their democracy, to their economic society and way of life. It escaped any sort of strong, adverse reaction from the other political parties. Parenthetically, one of the very interesting things about the communist party was that it was always strongly in favor of a negotiated settlement to the Cyprus problem. So, even though we didn't deal with them on a very close basis, we found a lot of times that we basically had the same objectives, albeit for very

different reasons. We wanted to solve the Cyprus problem to strengthen NATO. The communists wanted to solve the Cyprus problem because they wanted the island to become a demilitarized, non-aligned power in its own right without any influence at all from Greece and Turkey, who were NATO powers. So that was one segment of the electorate. The communists have basically controlled about a third of the electorate in most elections, which makes it very difficult to ignore them.

Q: And you had some contact with them?

NIX: I had some contact. It was fairly restricted. There was one fellow in the communist hierarchy, about number three, a fellow named Dinos Constantinou, who was designated by the party to maintain contacts with us. There was also a communist newspaper, Haravghi, which had an editor who was able to talk freely with western diplomats. Interestingly, these 2 individuals, along with the party's youth leader, later broke with AKEL and formed a splinter "Euro-Communist" party which supported Gorbachev's "Glasnost" policy. AKEL itself, almost alone among the communist parties of Europe, staunchly maintained its Stalinist views and policies.

Beyond that you had basically three other parties. One was a small radical socialist party. It has been led for many, many years by a gentleman by the name of Vassos Lyssarides. Then there were two conservative parties, which basically had the same political philosophy, but were split because of adherence to the long-time leaders of the two parties, two gentlemen named Glafkos Clerides, currently President of Cyprus, and Spyros Kyprianou. During the years we're discussing, Spyros Kyprianou was President of Cyprus. Kyprianou had been installed as President of the House of Representatives under Makarios. When Makarios died suddenly, he took over in the constitutional succession and then managed to build his support to a point where he was able to win the subsequent two elections in his own right. Glafkos Clerides, who is now President of Cyprus, was the leader of the other conservative party. He had broken with Makarios ostensibly over differing approaches to a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem, but probably really over personality conflicts and the succession question. I'm sure he felt that he should have been anointed as the successor to Makarios. I think Makarios was reluctant to do that, possibly because of resentment about the role Clerides played when Makarios fled the island during the 1974 coup attempt. At any rate, that was the basic constellation of political forces on the Greek Cypriot side. Four major parties. All except AKEL were more or less grouped around the personality of a strong leader. To emphasize that point, these three people are still the leaders of their parties today, even as we sit here.

Q: You mentioned that Glafkos Clerides is currently President of Cyprus. At that time, he was leader of a party in opposition. I think you had quite a bit of contact with him and with other of his lieutenants in the party. I asked you about whether you anticipated that the Soviet Union would break up. This is not quite of the same magnitude of question, but would you have anticipated in that period that Clerides would ever be elected President of Cyprus?

NIX: No, I honestly didn't. I thought that there were too many people who actively resented, even hated, him. One has to go back in history on a small island like Cyprus. At the time of the national guard coup in 1974 against Makarios, Clerides, as President of the Parliament, rightfully took over power when Makarios was forced to flee the island, and restored democracy. But many people felt that he held power too long. He was always accused unjustly of having tried to usurp

power. I didn't think the communists would ever support Clerides, and that's a third of the electorate. I certainly believed that another 20% or so would always remember his opposition, if you put it that way, to Makarios, and that would keep him out of power. In effect, in order to be elected, Clerides had first to forge a political alliance with a person that he has bitterly opposed for years, ex-President Kyprianou. Even then he won by only 1,900 votes, so it was a very narrow thing.

Q: I seem to remember at the time, the issue was exactly the way you describe it. Also, the question was, who would succeed Clerides as leader of the party. He had had a full career. He was a distinguished person. At some point, it seemed likely that he would retire from party leadership.

NIX: The person that, I guess, was more or less designated, even in those days, was a man named John Matsis, who now is the President of the House of Representatives. He is very well thought of in Cyprus. His brother was one of the heroes of the resistance against the British in the '50s.

Q: You mentioned contact with the Turkish embassy and the British High Commission. Did you have contact with the Greek embassy as well?

NIX: Yes, we have some very good relations there. As a matter of fact, my counterpart in the Greek embassy at that time is now the Greek ambassador to Cyprus. I saw him a year or so ago when I visited there. We had a very distinguished ambassador there from Greece, if you remember, Ambassador Zacharakis, who went on to become the Greek ambassador to NATO, to the UN, and to the United States. Cyprus has always been a very high priority post for Greece, for obvious reasons. They've sent some good people over there. We did try to work together.

Q: In the recent period in Cyprus, there has been quite a bit of attention to defense systems and anti-air missiles and so on. Was there much interest in the defense aspect at the time that you were first in Nicosia?

NIX: In Cyprus, I don't believe that I perceived a great interest. I mean, that was really, very frankly, very shortly after the 1974 events. My perception was that people really did not believe that there was much point in trying to build up the defenses. They really believed that they didn't have the resources to make a credible defense, and wanted to concentrate on a negotiated solution. I think the way the situation has changed now is, the memory of the '74 events has dimmed in a lot of people, and the fact is that those people who are still working on the Cyprus problem are just becoming frustrated at the inability over this lengthy period of time to make any progress. Maybe I can say they are lashing out a little bit in desperation, trying to do something to shake up the situation.

Q: Yes, that's essentially the way I recall that period. I think there was also another factor. I think you've sort of alluded to it. That is that there was a belief on the Greek part of Cyprus that what Turkey had done in 1974, invade the island, occupy a substantial part of it, could easily be repeated. That was always kind of the underlying fear, that the situation would become such that Turkey would do even more than they had done already.

NIX: The focus really in those days was the UN resolutions, make sure the international bodies are strongly behind returning to the status quo ante bellum, and work with the non-aligned movement. Cyprus was one of the founding members of the non-aligned movement under Makarios. It was something of an article of faith among all political parties that working with the non-aligned and passing UN resolutions repeatedly could have an effect on the resolution of the problem. That was the focus of Cypriot diplomatic efforts when we were there. They were not as rich in those days as they are today. I don't think they could probably afford to spend quite as much on defense as they appear to be ready to spend today. The Greeks were not, for whatever reason, ready to provide quite the degree of assistance in those days. One has to keep in mind the geographic realities. Cyprus is not militarily supportable from Greece.

Q: *It's a long way away.*

NIX: It's too far away. It's absolutely impossible to support a defense of Cyprus from Greece. So, one's left basically with building bases on the island. Of course, those are long-term, expensive propositions which are open to diplomatic reaction and even to military reaction if Turkey became sufficiently upset.

Q: *Cyprus is very close to Turkey and all that that implies.*

NIX: Less than 100 miles away.

Q: *Within sight.*

NIX: Exactly!

Q: *The other land area that Cyprus is within sight of on a very clear day is Lebanon.*

NIX: Oh, yes, Lebanon.

Q: *I think we're just about to finish this tape, so maybe we'll make that the first topic of our next conversation.*

NIX: It certainly deserves talking about because that's one aspect of our policy where Cyprus has played a key role even in the days when you and I were there, and continues to play a key role today.

Q: *Thank you, John.*

This is March 5, 1997. We're doing the second interview with John Nix. John, when we finished the other day, we were talking about your assignment to Nicosia as political officer from 1981-1983. I think we pretty well covered your involvement with all of the ins and outs of the innercommunal situation in Cyprus. One thing that did happen, of course, during the period in which you were there in 1982 was the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and Beirut. Was the American embassy in Nicosia, in Cyprus, involved with things relating to Beirut during the period that you

were there? If so, what was your involvement?

NIX: I certainly did become heavily involved in the summer of 1982. As a matter of fact, the embassy had been involved to a certain extent in supporting the embassy in Beirut ever since the Lebanese civil war broke out. Just to sketch again briefly, there were lengthy periods when the Beirut airport was closed for various reasons. During those periods, the only real connection to the outside world for Beirut was two choices. One was over water to Cyprus. Another was over land to Damascus. So, for that reason, there had always been a certain role for the embassy in Cyprus to provide logistical support and to facilitate various kinds of traffic to and from Lebanon for the embassy. But in 1982, as I remember, the situation... We were looking forward in Cyprus (at least I was) to a nice, quiet summer. Cyprus normally has quiet summers. It's very, very hot there and most of the people go away on vacation and so on and so forth. Our DCM, Jim Tull, was taking a long vacation that summer back in the States. I had been appointed acting DCM by Ambassador Ewing. Suddenly, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon took place. We had not been following on a day to day basis the political situation, so it took us a bit by surprise. At any rate, the Israeli invasion proceeded to a point where it appeared as if the Israelis were going to overrun Beirut. Most of the Palestinian fighters had been pushed back and cornered in Beirut. The United States got heavily involved in this in an effort to mediate the situation through the Habib mission. As I said before, there was really no way to get in and out of Beirut except through Cyprus. A transportation line was set up whereby Ambassador Habib and his top assistant, Ambassador Draper, would fly to Cyprus by fixed wing aircraft and then be flown by a U.S. military helicopter from Cyprus to Beirut. Our initial involvement was in supporting this transportation line and making sure that the Habib mission got all the support it needed in going to and from Lebanon in a manner that would be conducive to helping them in any way we could.

The helicopters were originally coming from ships at sea. We decided that it would be much more appropriate to have the helicopters stationed in Cyprus. That's another story, but we eventually prevailed upon the Cyprus and British governments to allow us to station helicopters in the British sovereign bases in Cyprus to help ferry people back and forth as needed.

Q: I think originally, John, they were at Larnaca.

NIX: Yes, they were originally in Larnaca, you're absolutely correct. They were moved to the sovereign base areas due to security considerations. At any rate, that was one involvement. But the other involvement came about when, in fact, the Habib mission was successful in negotiating an armistice whereby the Israeli government agreed not to overrun the city of Beirut if the PLO fighters could and would be evacuated from the city. This presented a practical problem. There was really no possibility of doing it by air. We in Cyprus were asked by the Department of State to investigate the possibilities of evacuating the PLO fighters by ship to Cyprus. Ambassador Ewing sent me down to the coast of Cyprus to see if I could find anyone who would be both willing and able to take on this rather herculean task. At the same time, of course, we were working on the diplomatic front with the government of Cyprus to try to secure their acquiescence in allowing the PLO fighters to transit the territory of the government of Cyprus en route to various Arab countries which had agreed to provide sanctuary.

Q: I don't think there was ever any consideration of the PLO fighters actually staying in Cyprus.

I don't think they wanted to do that, nor probably did the government of Cyprus want that.

NIX: As I remember it, the government of Cyprus made it clear that they were holding us directly responsible to ensure that the PLO fighters passed through quickly and without any incident. To cut a long story short, I went up and down the coast of Cyprus, checked the ports, and finally found an individual whom, I think, ambassador Ewing and I both feel was rather remarkable, a gentleman named Takis Solomonides. He happened to be the French consul in Limassol and in those days was the only Cypriot who owned his own shipping line. Most of the other shipping lines were owned by Greek ship owners.

Q: They used the Cyprus flag as a (inaudible) flag.

NIX: Exactly. They used Cyprus as a flag of convenience. But Mr. Solomonides impressed me right away as a man of his word and someone we could depend on. We so informed the Department of State and recommended that we contract with him to perform this job. He took it on. For about two weeks, he had three ships sailing day and night. They continually ferried heavily armed PLO fighters from Beirut to Cyprus. Later on in the stage of this exercise, they actually took some of the fighters directly from Lebanon to Tunisia and to Yemen. It was a remarkable operation on his part. We provided, let's say, the moral and financial support. Obviously, he ran into a lot of obstacles. He would call me and then we would relay the problem either to the embassy in Lebanon or to the Habib negotiating team or to the State Department and try to work out a solution to whatever problem had come up.

Q: I don't want to leave anybody with the impression that these ships of Solomonides were big ships or grand vessels. I happened to take a trip to Greece on the Sol Phryne before all this happened. It would probably best be described as a fairly aged ferry boat.

NIX: Very aged. You're exactly right. Believe it or not, we did get some complaints from the Palestinian fighters about the conditions on these ships. So, that must be an indicator that they were even worse than the conditions they were suffering in Beirut. But Solomonides never flagged in his determination to do the job. He carried it through right to the end. I think he deserved a great vote of thanks from the United States government for doing this job when no one else really was willing to take it on.

Q: I recall that I think there was one other incident that I think you were involved with, John. It happened over a weekend when one of his vessels coming out of Beirut or preparing to leave Beirut was discovered to have boarded or loaded a number of vehicles. Do you remember that?

NIX: I remember that vividly. According to the terms of the negotiated armistice agreement, the PLO fighters were allowed to board ship carrying their personal arms, but not any other kind of military equipment. One group overrode the port authorities and went on board ship with its vehicles. The Israeli government, via Ambassador Sam Lewis, notified the U.S. government that if these vehicles were not unloaded and placed either in American or Israeli control, there would be a danger that the armistice agreement would collapse. In fact, they refused to allow any further loading of PLO fighters in Beirut until this crisis was resolved. As Ambassador Ewing mentioned, it happened over a weekend. He and I got together in the embassy and tried to decide

what we could do. Actually, after a day of back and forth with the Department and the government of Cyprus, the final resolution came about, I remember, very late on Saturday evening. We managed to contact the Cypriot Foreign Minister, Nikos Rolandis, and his assistant, a man who is now the Director General of the Cypriot Foreign Ministry, Alecos Shambos, who at the time were having dinner with the PLO spokesman in a place called "Charlie's Bar" in Cyprus. We discussed this problem on the phone with them. They, fortunately, having access to a PLO authority at the time, managed to give us their acquiescence in having these vehicles offloaded in Cyprus. This would not have been possible, unless they had been able to discuss it with the PLO at the same time they were discussing it with us. They were very sensitive to their relationship with the PLO in those days. So, at any rate, we did succeed in getting these vehicles offloaded in Cyprus. They were technically placed under U.S. control in the sense that the government of Cyprus agreed not to do anything at all with the vehicles unless we gave our approval. To my knowledge, those vehicles are still sitting in Cyprus to this day. This is probably one of the most iron clad verbal agreements in history. It's never been able to be broken by either side.

Q: One reason for that perhaps is that the vehicles which were Land Rovers, four wheel drive vehicles, that kind of car, were not in very good shape at the time (in 1982). As I recall, at least one of them or a couple of them had to be pushed off the ferry boat when it arrived. We're talking about maybe 20 or so.

NIX: Roughly 20.

Q: You can imagine what they're like today, 15 years later after sitting, I think, in the open in sunny, dusty Cyprus.

NIX: They're sitting in the open in a so-called bonded parking lot in the customs area of Limassol Port. But I think that certainly typifies the difficulty of dealing with political issues in that part of the world. Even though the substance of the issue appears intrinsically resolvable, the sensitivities on both sides make it almost impossible to come to a realistic solution. At any rate, the end result was that, we in the embassy in Cyprus received accolades for keeping the Habib mission and the armistice agreement from foundering. The whole operation proceeded to its conclusion and the armistice agreement did, in fact, take effect as you and I were fortunate enough to see later on when we were invited to come to Beirut to drive through the Green Line and see first hand how it had been broken up.

Q: You were with me, I think. We had lunch.

NIX: We had lunch together. The ambassador invited us to lunch at the residence there. We were first taken to the aircraft carrier Independence as an expression of gratitude from the fleet for the support we had provided to the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean during their operations in Lebanon.

Q: That support, at least partly, was through the provision or through the opportunity for some Navy helicopters to be located in Larnaca Airport to supply mail.

NIX: Absolutely. The carrier onboard delivery, or COD, aircraft, flew regularly in and out of

Larnaca to pick up the mail, and all sorts of provisions. We were very careful to make sure that we coordinated thoroughly with the Cypriot government on our requests for these flights. I have to give credit to Nikos Rolandis, who was the Cypriot Foreign Minister at the time, a very intelligent man who had a well-developed view of Cyprus' position in the world community. He was particularly sensitive to the need to have Cyprus play a responsible role in crises like this. So, he was a very responsive and positive collaborator for the embassy in working out all these arrangements.

Q: Of course, part of the interest of the Cyprus government in the situation was because it was in its very close neighborhood. Beirut is very close. They obviously have lots of interaction with the various Lebanese elements.

NIX: That's true. As I think you mentioned in our first session, after the Lebanese civil war broke out, many Lebanese, as well as the regional financial operations, which had previously been operating out of Beirut, moved to Cyprus. Cyprus did benefit in some respects from the infusion of capital from Beirut and from infusion of the capital which might have gone to Beirut if the situation had been different. But having said all that, I go back to one of my earlier points. The government of Cyprus definitely wanted to help us as much as it could in fulfilling this armistice agreement. Due to its geographic and political position, however, Cyprus was also very sensitive to the needs and wants of the other political forces, in particular, the PLO. It would not have been possible to cooperate when we did if we hadn't been able to find a middle way which would be acceptable to both sides.

Q: There was an Israeli embassy in Nicosia headed by an ambassador. They had flights to Tel Aviv. Their relationship was perhaps not as close and cordial as it was with the PLO because Cyprus was a leader of the non-aligned movement and saw support for the Palestinians as part of their general effort to get international support for themselves on the Cyprus issue.

NIX: That's an interesting point. As I remember, in those days, Cyprus may have been the only country in the world with full diplomatic relations with both Israel and the PLO. Obviously, both those countries accepted that status because they thought it was in their own best interest.

Q: John, you completed your first assignment to Cyprus in 1983. Is there anything else we should say about that first period that you were there?

NIX: No, I think we pretty well summed up the major points. At the time I left, I remember, we were quite hopeful that we were reaching some progress toward a resolution of the Cyprus problem. We had Ambassador Gobi then as the special representative to the Secretary General, an extremely intelligent and hardworking individual who had come up with a whole series of what we thought were very positive proposals to resolve the situation. I left Cyprus hopeful that the situation could be resolved.

Q: I think you were involved with several visitors from the United States who in one way or another were expressing, demonstrating, United States interest in Cyprus. Do you recall any of those?

NIX: Well, I can recall several of them. Starting from the top, we had Senator Percy out for two weeks once at the time when he was Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He attracted a great deal of attention. He came out for several reasons. He wanted to visit Lebanon, which he did. We were still the only way to get into and out of Lebanon. He had a great interest in establishing a bicomunal university in Nicosia. He met with both sides and actually made a proposal that if the two communities would agree to establish a bicomunal university in the Green Line area of Nicosia, he would commit to raise a million dollars to help fund of the university. He talked at length with both sides about that. But he had to go away disappointed, as so many of us have over the years in trying to reach an agreement. At the time, of course, he hadn't given up hope. It's only later that we can look back and see that the effort did in fact fail.

Q: Then he was defeated in the election not too long afterwards.

NIX: We also hosted a huge delegation headed by Lee Hamilton, who at the time was Chairman of the House Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. He went to Lebanon, but also he was very interested in Cyprus. We conducted him around to meetings with both the President of Cyprus and Mr. Denktash. We had a real heavy stream of visitors coming through. I'm sure they were all interested in Cyprus, but many of them came because that was the only way to get into Lebanon. I remember Senator Tsongas came through en route to Lebanon.

Q: I recall Senator Tsongas saying to me once earlier - I asked him if he would like to visit Cyprus or would think about it. He said, "Well, probably not because I think I know what the situation there is. I don't want to create problems for myself or for you or for anybody." But because he wanted to go to Beirut and was very concerned about the situation there and the only way to get there was through Cyprus, he did come. His flight was delayed. He wound up having to spend the night. So, he got to see a little bit of Cyprus. I think the Foreign Minister at the time gave him breakfast the next morning before his flight to Beirut. All of this may have happened after you were there. I'm not sure. I remember that it happened on a weekend and he was accompanied by about four staff people. I think it was an important opportunity for him, even though he might not have planned it or looked forward to it. I think it was helpful to him.

NIX: One of the aspects of handling high level visitors was that our policy, which of course was the policy of the United States government, was that official visitors should in fact visit with the heads of both communities if they came to Cyprus. Otherwise, it tended to compromise our role as an impartial arbitrator in the efforts to resolve the Cyprus dispute. This, of course, placed a little pressure on some visitors who didn't feel that they really could go into the northern part of Cyprus and meet with Mr. Denktash.

Q: The reason we took that position was that we thought it was important that people have a perspective from both points of view and not go away with only one dimension.

NIX: Exactly.

RAYMOND C. EWING

**Ambassador
Cyprus (1981-1984)**

Ambassador Raymond C. Ewing was born in Ohio on September 7, 1936. His career in the Foreign Service included positions in Japan, Austria, Italy, Switzerland, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on November 29, 1993.

Q: Today is December 3, 1993. Ray, we got you out of Southern Europe and European affairs. How did you get your next assignment? How did that come about?

EWING: After I left the Office of Southern European Affairs in the summer of 1979, I went into the Senior Seminar at the Foreign Service Institute and was very much looking forward to that opportunity to look at a number of U. S. domestic as well as international issues and to have time to reflect on them. I very much enjoyed this stimulating experience. I was on a trip with other members of the seminar to Florida and Puerto Rico when I received a phone call in Miami from George Vest, who was the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. He asked me to come back and be a Deputy Assistant Secretary, which I did. As it turned out, I served in this capacity from April, 1980, to June, 1981. Early in 1981, after the elections, when the Reagan administration came in, Lawrence Eagleburger was appointed Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. He decided early on, before he got to know any of us, that he would keep only the senior Deputy Assistant Secretary, Allen Holmes. He indicated that he would try to be helpful to the rest of us in obtaining an onward assignment. I really give him credit for pushing my nomination as Ambassador to Cyprus. As it turned out, that worked out, and I was nominated, confirmed, and went to Cyprus in October, 1981.

Q: So you were in Cyprus from 1981 to 1984? I think I mentioned this before, but with Larry Eagleburger in EUR, I take it that things went fairly smoothly as far as the Reagan administration was concerned. In ARA, I understand, there was "blood in the corridors." The change of administration did not involve a friendly takeover [in this area]. However, I take it that in the area of European affairs there wasn't much of a problem.

EWING: I think that, on the whole, that's right. There was perhaps some tension [in the bureau] because the new administration was regarded as following a very "hard line" toward the Soviet Union. During the transition period there were some people who came to the State Department to ask some very sharp, harsh, and challenging questions. However, in the area that I was responsible for at the time, which was Central Europe, including Germany; Southern Europe, including Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus; and Canada, there really wasn't much tension and controversy. Larry Eagleburger, of course, was a professional who was well known in the Department. He did not stay long in EUR before moving up to be Under Secretary for Political Affairs. I was succeeded as Deputy Assistant Secretary by Tom Niles, who had been Director of Central European Affairs, so he had worked directly with me. It was really a very smooth transition as far as EUR was concerned. It was nothing like ARA at that time.

Q: How did you prepare yourself for the confirmation process?

EWING: Of course, I'd been working on Cyprus, essentially since 1976, with a few interruptions. I'd been to the island three times, first in 1976, then in 1977, and again in 1978. I had worked on a Cyprus plan which the Department developed in 1978. I had met, really, with all of the key figures, either in Cyprus itself or in New York or Washington: President Kyprianou; Rauf Denktash, leader of the Turkish Cypriots; the Foreign Minister; the communal negotiators; and so on. So in a sense it didn't take a lot of homework or detailed preparations to get ready. However, I did some specific things. Of course, I spent a lot of time on the Hill, meeting not only with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee but also some other Senators who, I knew, were interested in Cyprus, plus some people in the House of Representatives. I tried to see and talk with all of the former Ambassadors who were still living and was able to see all but one or two of them. I did some reading which I had never had time to do before. Since I had left EUR around July 1, [1981], and my confirmation hearing was not held until, I think, August, [1981], I really had a little bit of time that summer to try and get ready and be prepared. Of course, I went around and talked to people in other Washington agencies.

Q: Given the efforts of the "Greek lobby" in the United States, was Cyprus as much of an issue then, as it had been previously, or was it less sensitive then, in 1981?

EWING: I would say that it was less sensitive. The "Greek lobby," and the Greek-American community generally, I think, at that particular point, was somewhat disillusioned with the role of the United States Government. They had had very high hopes and expectations when the Carter administration came in. President Carter made some promises during the campaign. I would say that a fairly strong, diplomatic effort was made by the United States during the Carter administration, which essentially had produced very little, as far as Cyprus was concerned. I think that, as the Reagan administration came in, the Greek-American community did not expect very much. They were somewhat angry and frustrated about that but they didn't try to extract promises or commitments from either candidate which they [the candidates] couldn't carry through on. I think that the interest and concern about Cyprus was as great as ever, but the expectation that something was going to be achieved -- or that the United States could do something -- was somewhat less at that point.

Q: Were there any Senators who felt very strongly and who, you thought, were going to "keep an eye on you" and what was happening?

EWING: Senator Paul Sarbanes had been very much involved [in the Cyprus issue], initially as a member of the House of Representatives, and then as a Senator, throughout the last part of the 1970's. He continued to be very interested. I always made a point, when I came back from Cyprus, of going and talking with him. He was well informed, thoughtful, and considerate, as far as I was concerned. Sometimes he would say some things publicly that were a little different from what he would say privately, but he was probably the most vocal and active member of the Committee on Foreign Relations. Senator Paul Tsongas was also a member [of the Committee] at that time and was present during my confirmation hearing. I don't think that Senator Paul Sarbanes was even there. Senator Tsongas asked me a question about whether I knew how to speak Greek. I said that I didn't, and I didn't know Turkish, either, but I intended to study both while I was in Cyprus. Of course, I pointed out that in Cyprus, a former British colony where English was the official language, English was very widely known -- in Cyprus even more so

than in Greece. Those were the two Senators who were the most interested and active. Some of the others, including Senator Pell; Senator Lugar, then the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee...

Q: Yes, it was a Republican controlled Senate at that time.

EWING: Senator Lugar was interested. There was a university in Indiana -- actually the university with which he had been affiliated between the time he was Mayor of Indianapolis and was elected to the Senate -- which had a program in Cyprus. I talked to him about that, and we kept in touch during the time that I was there.

Q: You arrived in Cyprus in...

EWING: I arrived in Cyprus in October, 1981.

Q: What was the situation on the ground when you arrived there, in political and economic terms?

EWING: The geographic situation was as it had been since 1974 -- and as it is today, in 1993. That is, the Government of Cyprus, which was controlled by Greek Cypriots, controlled the southern part of the island up to a demilitarized zone, which was essentially controlled by the United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP), a peacekeeping unit. The Turkish Cypriots controlled the northern part of the island. In 1981 the Turks referred to themselves as "The Turkish Federated State of Cyprus." Their view, as they expressed it, was that, eventually, there would be a "Greek Federated State of Cyprus," and the two could have some kind of federation arrangement with each other. The Turks had therefore gone ahead and organized themselves in that way.

Economically, Greek Cyprus, the southern part of the island, had already begun to recover pretty well from the extreme disruption and other dislocations which occurred in 1974, when perhaps as many as 200,000 refugees moved within the island. Hotels were being built on the coast in places like Aya Napa, Larnaca, Limassol, and Paphos. But in many ways what had really stimulated the economic recovery was the civil war in Lebanon, which is only about 100 miles or so away. Beirut is that close. Many Lebanese, as the civil war began in the late 1970's, moved to Cyprus, perhaps to have a safe place for members of their families. They bought apartments, invested in real estate, and then, in some cases, moved some of their business activities there, as did some international companies. The troubles and travails of Lebanon -- and Beirut in particular -- were certainly to the benefit of Cyprus at that juncture.

Turkish Cyprus -- the northern part of the island -- was fairly stagnant economically. There was agriculture but very little in the way of industrial activity. None of the positive, "spill over" effect of the Lebanese civil war had come to northern Cyprus. It [Turkish Cyprus] was very dependent economically on Turkey and on the support it received from Turkey, both in terms of the Turkish troop presence but, more importantly, in many ways, the government budget support that it received. People from the outside often said that the economic disparity was so great that it would be an incentive to a settlement. I think that the problem was that Turkish Cyprus was

doing as well at that juncture as mainland Turkey. But the Turkish Cypriots tended to compare themselves with the Greek Cypriots, with whom they had very little interaction economically, rather than with the peasants of Anatolia. They could see buildings going up in the Greek side of Nicosia, but it didn't really have any particular impact on them or their standard of living.

Q: One is always enjoined not to make comparisons between populations or people, but the point is that any rational being will see that one group of people makes much more of a success with its situation than another group. Did you see any dynamics of change within the Greek Cypriot side, as opposed to the Turkish Cypriot side while this was happening?

EWING: It's hard to be categorical about that, because there are certainly some very able Turkish Cypriot businessmen, lawyers, and so on. But I think, in general, that they did not have the same base to begin with, in the sense of educated people or people with entrepreneurial skill and talent. And I suppose that they didn't have as many advantages from outside the island. Turkey, at that particular time, was not a great success, either. I might just go back, for a minute, to my time in Washington. The Turkish economy was a matter of great concern to us at the State Department in the late 1970's. There was a lot of violence in the country, but there was also rather sluggish economic growth. The Turkish workers in Germany were one of the main sources of foreign exchange. There was not a lot happening in Turkey itself in terms of exports or economic growth. One of the good things that happened late in the 1970's was the appointment, initially as Minister for Planning, of Turgut Ozal. Later, he became Prime Minister and then, eventually, President. When the Turkish military took over the government in September, 1980, one of the very good things that they did was to keep Ozal in a position where he was responsible for the economic recovery. And then, slowly during the 1980's, that program began to take hold and have an impact. But in 1981 Turkey wasn't doing very well, and Turkish Cyprus wasn't, either.

Q: One of the most vicious groups promoting civil unrest -- ranking up with the IRA [Irish Republican Army] -- was the "EOKAB", or whatever it was. There seemed to be offshoots of this group engaging in terrorism. I recall that in 1972 a Greek Cypriot set off a bomb near our Embassy when I was there. Luckily, it killed him and not us. Were there bombing and small scale raids going back and forth between the two sides in Cyprus?

EWING: No, there was really none of that going on during the time that I was there. Really, there has been very little of that since 1974. At that time Sampson and some of the other EOKA B elements were involved in an attempted coup d'etat against Archbishop Makarios. Essentially, they were completely discredited, and the whole notion of Enosis, or union with Greece, was really not something that people thought about or talked about. The last gasp of Enosis, as far as I could see, was in 1974. It failed. Whatever you want to say about the Turkish intervention in or invasion of Cyprus, even some of the sharpest critics of that action will acknowledge that Turkey was provoked by the threats that Sampson represented against Makarios and against the Turkish Cypriot community. So during the time that I was there, there was almost no threat or tension or interaction between the two communities -- and certainly no terrorism. There were a couple of border incidents or incidents in the demilitarized zone. Somebody would stray across [the line], somebody would be cleaning a rifle which would go off, or someone would get bored and take a shot [at somebody]. But it was almost more of a matter of sloppiness or laziness than anything more definite than that.

As far as the Greek [Cypriot] side was concerned, they certainly perceived a threat from the Turkish [Cypriot] side. At one point when I was there, there was a fair amount of tension when threats and actions against Turkish diplomats around the world were made by a group of Armenian extremists. The Armenian community in Cyprus -- and the Greek community as well - were afraid that Turkey might think that there was a soft, easy target in the Armenian community in Cyprus and would come across the line with the idea of retaliating or getting even. But that didn't happen, either. So, in general, the island itself and the line [of separation] were very calm, peaceful, and free of tension.

Q: This is very interesting because, when you consider how much Enosis, and all of the terrorist activity it generated at one time, [caused], here was the greatest provocation you could have, with the Greeks losing their predominance throughout Cyprus...

EWING: In a sense both sides feared each other. The Greek side feared that Turkey would try to take over the whole island. Cyprus was close to the Turkish mainland. Greece was preoccupied at that time with its own problems and could not be expected to come and help. And the Turkish side, which was a minority on the island itself, knew that the Greek Cypriots were economically thriving, doing well, and purchasing arms. They used to fear that the Greek Cypriots would try to take over the whole island. But at the real and practical level, very little of that was happening on a day to day basis.

As I said before, I think that Enosis was really dead at that time. On the other hand, there is no question that the influence of the Greek Government and Greece in general was very great in Cyprus. That is certainly where the Greek Cypriots looked for the only support they could count on, both in the United Nations and in the world, generally. There were lots of investments and connections in both directions. The Greek Ambassador in Cyprus certainly had an influence that was far greater than that of any of the other ambassadors. Whenever the time came for a major decision or a meeting was coming up, the President of Cyprus would go to Athens, and, often, other [Greek Cypriot] political leaders would touch base with their friends and associates there [in Greece] as well. Prime Minister Papandreou came to Cyprus while I was there, and that was seen as a major step, because that hadn't happened before. Usually, it had been the other way around. There is no question that the Nicosia-Athens axis is very important. But in terms of Enosis or union [with Greece] most Greek Cypriots that I talked to valued their independence. They recognized that if they were part of Greece, they would be more or less forgotten, as a small element away out to the East. They wouldn't have accepted unification with Greece at that time, even though it was an important issue in the 1950's, 1960's, and early 1970's.

Q: During the time you were in Cyprus, what were American interests there?

EWING: American interests primarily related to a resolution or settlement of the Cyprus problem, for several reasons. One, because of the impact that issue had on our relations with two important NATO allies, Greece and Turkey. But also because of our concern for the people of Cyprus. We certainly didn't want to see another event like 1974, when a number of people were killed or dislocated, and the whole situation was put in jeopardy. We worked, as best we could, to encourage the two communities to resolve the Cyprus problem. Our policy during that period,

as well as before and after, was primarily to rely on the communities and to encourage the United Nations, the Secretary General, and his Special Representative in Cyprus to take initiatives and to look for opportunities and openings to move ahead.

We did have some other interests, of course in Cyprus. It is a very important, geographic area, very close to the Middle East and to Turkey. It was [also] close to the Soviet Union. One of the things that happened while I was in Cyprus, which I had not fully anticipated, occurred after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. During the summer of 1982 we were involved on the periphery of it. We helped to arrange for ferry boats for the evacuation of the PLO forces from Beirut. I remember getting phone calls on a Sunday when, contrary to the understanding and agreement, the PLO had put, I think, 20 Land Rovers on one of the ferry boats. It was understood that they wouldn't take their heavy weapons or their vehicles out of Beirut. By the time anyone realized what was happening, they were already on the boat, and [the PLO] wouldn't take them off. This got high level people involved on a Sunday, including the [U. S.] Secretary of Defense and senior officials of the Israeli Government. I think that Secretary Weinberger was on a "talk show," and there was a minor flap. It was finally agreed that the ferry boat -- it was a Cypriot registered boat, as I recall -- would come to Limassol and offload the 20 vehicles. We had to arrange to put them into storage. Then everybody conveniently forgot about them. Later on, the question came up about what to do with them. The Israelis still didn't want the PLO to have them, and the PLO still considered them their property. In fact, they were old and beat up. I think that one or two of them even had to be pushed off the ferry boat. By then they'd been sitting in a locked, parking lot in Limassol for a year, open to the sun, dust, and everything. They were worthless. I don't know whatever exactly happened to them.

That was a minor aspect of the Lebanon situation. But a more significant matter, perhaps, was that for the better part of the next year and a half or so the only way, or the best way, for Americans to get to Beirut was by helicopter from Larnaca [Cyprus]. This connection came up in an odd way. Early in the fall of 1982 I received a message from the [U. S.] Navy Headquarters in Naples, saying that during the early period the [U. S.] Marines were in Beirut one problem was that they couldn't get any mail. This was a morale problem during those first few months. You may remember that the Marines were pulled out of Beirut after the PLO left Lebanon and then were reintroduced right after the massacres at the Shatila and Sabra refugee camps. It was after that second deployment [of the Marines to Beirut] that I was asked whether I thought that there was any way for Cyprus to be used [to base] a helicopter to take mail into Beirut. I thought, "Well, that sounds like a great idea. Why not?" Since Cyprus is a place where you could get things decided very quickly, I made an appointment and went over and saw the Foreign Minister that morning. I said, "This question has come up, and you're interested in peace in Lebanon. You know why our forces are there -- to try and stabilize the situation. We're not asking you to send forces yourselves or do anything more difficult, but what would you think about having a couple of helicopters and a few people at the civilian airport in Larnaca which could take U. S. mail to the Marines there?" The Foreign Minister said, "Well, that sounds like a good idea. Let me talk to the President, and I'll get back to you." Within an hour, after I had returned to the Embassy, I received a phone call and was told that this arrangement would be fine. I communicated that to Naples, and they were delighted. It was only later that the State Department heard about this.

It later turned into quite an operation and continued for years and years after I left Cyprus. At the

time we were using this service not only to support the Marines in Beirut but also the U. S. Fleet that was offshore Cyprus for months at a time. I remember once standing there [at the airport in Larnaca] with the Soviet Ambassador, waiting for the arrival or departure of some head of state. A U.S. C-5, an enormous aircraft, landed at Larnaca. He just looked at it, because Cyprus took pride at being a neutral country. Here was a leading member of the Non-Aligned Movement...

Q: A C-5 is as big as they come.

EWING: Can't get any bigger. Anyway, it was an important arrangement. Various officials came to Cyprus that way. Secretary of Defense Weinberger came, Vice President Bush was there at one point, as were many members of Congress. It gave us a few headaches in terms of logistical support but also an opportunity for them to see at least a tiny bit of Cyprus. Sometimes a senior Cypriot Government official would come down to Larnaca to receive a high level visitor.

Q: I might mention as an aside that I've just finished an interview with Terry McNamara, our Deputy Chief of Mission in Beirut, a little later in this period. He said that during the nastiest times in Beirut this was the way we got our people out and in during the terrorist gang fighting that was going on in Beirut.

EWING: Yes, it was really essential. It allowed us to keep our Embassy open [in Beirut]. I think that you can argue whether that was a good idea or not. But the helicopters were vital to assure access to the Embassy in Beirut. And even in the periods that were sort of calm -- the interludes between the fighting and tension, and there were some brief periods -- we continued to think that the helicopter flights were the most secure. It was much better to use them than to use the ferry boats, which also operated from Larnaca to both East and West Beirut.

In the late fall of 1982 I was invited out to visit one of the U. S. Navy ships -- I think it was the USS John F. Kennedy.

Q: An aircraft carrier.

EWING: Yes. This was for briefings and to see what we were helping and supporting. I took along the Minister of Defense of Cyprus, on another occasion, it was a fairly quiet time, so they flew me to another ship just off the [Lebanese] coast from Beirut and then into the [Beirut] airport. I was taken around to see what the Marines were doing and then to the Embassy, where I met with Ambassador Bob Dillon and had lunch at his residence. They took me back to the airport and flew me, by fixed wing aircraft, back to Cyprus. It gave me at least a chance to see Beirut.

Q: After all is said and done about how we wanted to see everything get back to normal, I take it that our relations were preponderantly with the Greeks. Our Embassy was located in Greek [Cypriot] territory, this was where decisions were made, and all that. Is it fair to say that or not?

EWING: Yes. The United States had its diplomatic relationship with the Government of Cyprus, which was the government representing the Republic of Cyprus abroad. I was accredited as United States Ambassador to that government, and our Embassy certainly had relationships with

all of that government's departments.

Q: And all of which were essentially in Greek [Cypriot] territory, staffed by Greek Cypriots?

EWING: Yes. That was in Nicosia, in Greek Nicosia. However, we also recognized that the Turkish Cypriots needed to be a party to any settlement of the Cyprus problem. The Turkish Cypriots were there in Cyprus to stay. They were obviously very close to an important ally, a friend of the United States -- Turkey. Therefore, as United States Ambassador, I felt that it was appropriate that I should have contact with some key Turkish Cypriots. So I would regularly see Rauf Denktash, the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community. I would also see the negotiator in the inter-communal talks for the Turkish Cypriot community. And I would meet regularly with the representative of Turkey -- the Turkish Ambassador, who was not accredited to the Republic of Cyprus. He never came across to the Greek side and stayed on the Turkish side. I would go and meet with him, frequently. I would also see other Turkish Cypriots, including ministers and officials of their so-called "Government" on a social basis, including at a residence that the U. S. Embassy [in Ankara] rented for us, just outside of Kyrenia.

Q: This was essentially the "capital" [of Turkish Cyprus]?

EWING: No, their "capital," and you have to put it in quotation marks, was on the Turkish side of Nicosia. Kyrenia is a port. It was the seaport for hydrofoils and ferry boats -- to Turkey. It is one of the more famous resorts in the northern part of Cyprus, Famagusta being the other one, in the eastern part of the island [also in Turkish Cyprus]. We had a house in Kyrenia. We would go there on weekends. It was delightful to be in a very quiet and beautiful place, but it was also a place where we could invite Turkish Cypriots to come for receptions, to see a movie, or whatever. Congressman Solarz once was there. He and Denktash had a meeting on the porch of our residence there. So those were the contacts which we had with the Turkish Cypriots. Now, other officers of the Embassy also had some contacts below the ministerial level. We had a political officer in our Embassy who spoke Turkish. He had a number of contacts with political party figures and others. We also had a small office in the Turkish part of Nicosia, staffed by Foreign Service Nationals who had been with the Embassy for a long time. There was a total of three of them. They would arrange appointments for us with Turkish Cypriot officials. Whatever we had to do with them, they would arrange it. I think that one of them was a part-time librarian and we kept a small collection of books and university catalogues at the office. But we also had some other programs for Cyprus which were of benefit to the Turkish Cypriots, as well as to the Greek Cypriots. We had an assistance program. A share of that program was administered through the U. N. High Commissioner for Refugees for the benefit of the Turkish Cypriots. While I was there, we also started, with the strong support of Congress, "The Cyprus-American Scholarship Program" for college and university study in the United States. Some of those scholarships went to Turkish Cypriots as well. They also had an opportunity to compete for Fulbright Scholarships.

Q: As happens in other, divided countries, did you have a problem with people watching you closely to ensure that you didn't do this or that? This isn't exactly like Israel dealing with the Palestinians, but did you have to be very careful about the balance between scholarship awards to the two Cypriot communities? Or were people more relaxed?

EWING: No, I think that people were watching us constantly, all the time. Anything that appeared in the newspapers was read intently by the other side. So we had to exercise a certain discretion. If I'd spent all of my time on the Greek side and never gone to the Turkish side, I think that the Turks would have regarded me as totally one-sided in my activities. Or, if I'd neglected the Greek side and gone around and done things on the Turkish side, beyond what I said before were our policy contacts, that would have created a problem as well. In 1983 Denktash [the Turkish Cypriot leader] declared the independence of his state. He called it "The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus." This was somewhat of a surprise, although we had thought of it as a possibility. We weren't sure that Turkey would allow him to do it. Fairly soon after that, after some argument and discussion with Washington, we essentially took the posture that this action didn't mean a thing and that we weren't going to recognize it. In fact, no other countries in the world recognized this new status, other than Turkey, of course. I would continue to meet with Denktash as the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community but not as the president of "The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus." In fact, I went to see him fairly soon after their declaration. There were some people who thought it was too soon. But it seemed fairly important to me to do this quickly to get across the idea that nothing had changed and that he was still the leader of [the Turkish Cypriot] community. However, we were not going to accept that this new step had any particular political significance. We were essentially going to ignore it. I think that this was the right thing to do. But, as I say, some people on the Greek Cypriot side and some people in Washington felt that it was, perhaps, premature to do that.

Q: Did Denktash get into a position of saying that unless you see me as the president of my republic, I won't see you or anything like that? You can get into such a situation.

EWING: Oh, yes, he could certainly have made it difficult for himself. On the other hand, I think that he realized that there was value in contact, that if the American Ambassador was willing to come and listen to him -- even though without acknowledging the title and status that he'd like to have -- there were advantages in that. He knew that we would report and seriously take into account his point of view. Of course, the other thing was that the United States was giving far more help and assistance to the Turkish Cypriots than anybody else in the world (other than Turkey), and it was to his advantage not to be 100% dependent on

Turkey, but to be able to say to Turkey, "Well, others are taking me seriously, paying attention to me and giving our area help." It was obviously to his advantage, as well, with other diplomats and with the United Nations. When I saw him the first time, I told him, "I am going to have to make clear that I am not calling on you as president of 'The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.'" He replied, "Well, you do what you want." He didn't argue with me about that or say that he never could see me again.

Q: Did you make clear to the other side, the Greek Cypriots, that this was what you were doing?

EWING: I did. They weren't too happy with it, because they thought that it was too soon. But we made it clear to them that this was the basis on which it had been done.

Q: What is your impression of Denktash and Kyprianou?

EWING: Well, neither one liked each other at all or had much respect for each other. I always thought that there were two Greek Cypriots whom Denktash knew, respected, and could, perhaps, have worked with. One was Archbishop Makarios, and the other was, of course, Clerides. In fact, one of the agreements going back to 1977 was between Makarios and Denktash. I don't think that Denktash particularly liked or admired Makarios, but he did respect his position, political background, and so on. As far as Clerides was concerned, he and Denktash had similar backgrounds. They were roughly the same age and were both lawyers. They had known each other and negotiated together for a long time. I think that Denktash saw Clerides as a practical person who was more interested in trying to solve an issue than to make points, and so on. But I don't think that Denktash had much respect for Kyprianou [He didn't respect him], and, certainly, Kyprianou didn't think much of Denktash. By that time they had had one or two meetings together, but most people didn't see much point in trying to work out a high level meeting. That probably wasn't going to get very far.

Q: How about your impression of these two? Did you have problems with either of them?

EWING: Well, I had problems with both of them, I guess, to some extent. I always thought that Denktash could posture and parade with the best of them, especially in a larger group. When I met him, one on one, over a cup of coffee, I thought that he was a different person from what he was in public. I think that he believed that he had accomplished a lot. He had more or less what he wanted -- control of his area. His people and he had a certain position and stature. Maybe the rest of the world didn't pay much attention to it, but they felt secure and able to run things themselves. I think that they thought that in any kind of settlement or arrangement with the Greek Cypriots, the Greek Cypriots would probably come out ahead, because they were clever, capable, and effective. [He felt that] they weren't to be trusted. On the other hand Kyprianou sort of spoke the same way. He had the high ground, in terms of international support, recognition, and prestige. And to give up on the idea of a unified Cyprus, with the Greek Cypriots in charge, clearly, would have been a loss, even though the [Greek Cypriots] would have gained in getting some additional territory, perhaps allowing refugees to go back, and getting an opportunity to do business throughout the whole island. Just that idea of giving up their goal, their ideal, was something that gave them very little incentive really to negotiate.

Q: Were there any particular developments between them during the time you were there?

EWING: There was very little, really. The establishment of "The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" was a setback. We spent a lot of our time with the UN Special Representative. During most of the time that I was there he was Hugo Gobbi, from Argentina. We [tried] to find a formula to get talks going, or to resume the talks that had taken place intermittently in the past. There were a few, occasional meetings, but really there wasn't a lot of progress or development.

There was some effort made to find "confidence building measures" or efforts to bridge some of the difficulties. The United Nations Development Program [UNDP] tried to do a few things with both communities in Nicosia in particular, relating, for example, to sewer and water supply systems. As far as the United States was concerned, we talked a little bit before about the Reagan administration wanting to make some kind of an effort -- although maybe not having the same

priority, as far as Cyprus was concerned. Secretary of State Haig recognized that during the Carter administration a lot of the things that the State Department had done, such as [assigning] primary responsibility for Cyprus to a high level officer, (Counselor Nimetz) gave a certain visibility to our efforts. This made it possible for the Secretary of State to avoid spending a lot of time on Cyprus. As much as anybody, Secretary Haig arranged to have a special Cyprus coordinator appointed. That was done before I went to Cyprus. The first person to fill this position was Reginald Bartholomew. He was connected to the Office of Southern European Affairs but could also deal at higher levels as well. Bartholomew recognized that not very much was likely to happen and that, if he were to come to Cyprus, that would give the impression that we were preparing to take an initiative or involve ourselves to an extent that we really did not want to do. So he never came to Cyprus as Special Cyprus Coordinator during the time I was there. The first time I saw him in Cyprus -- although we had known each other before, and I actually met with him in Greece on one occasion just after he gave up this position and became a negotiator on our bases in Greece. He visited Cyprus when he was Ambassador to Lebanon to attend a meeting at my residence with Don Rumsfeld, who had just taken up the position of Middle East negotiator and wanted to meet quietly with Bartholomew and our Ambassador to Israel and Syria.

Later on, other Cyprus special coordinators did visit Cyprus. I don't think that the problem of a perception that we were prepared to launch major Cyprus initiatives was, in fact, a real difficulty.

Q: While you were there, did you find that your part of Cyprus was a hotbed of Israeli- PLO "games"? Was this a problem for you? I'm talking about a few assassinations and things like that?

EWING: Let me answer that but first take issue with your saying, "My" part of Cyprus. I considered that all of Cyprus was part of my responsibilities.

Q: All right. Point taken.

EWING: That was the basis on which we traveled in northern Cyprus, because we considered all of Cyprus was our area of responsibility, even though the government's control only extended to a part of Cyprus. All of Cyprus was part of the Republic of Cyprus except for the British Sovereign Base Areas. We could travel there as well.

However, as to your question about Israeli and Palestinian activities, this only pertained to Greek Cyprus, because I don't think that either Israelis or Palestinians were ever very active in northern Cyprus, to my knowledge. Because of Cyprus' geographic location and the ease of travel to all parts of the Middle East and North Africa, it was certainly a place where Israelis, Palestinians, Libyans, and Arabs of all kinds were present and active, engaging in business, [holding] meetings, and doing various things. In terms of activities directed against diplomatic offices, I don't remember very much happening. I know that the Israeli Embassy was attacked with a bomb not long after I left. One of the things, I think, worth keeping in mind is the fact that Israel had an Ambassador to Cyprus. Israel had diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level, which was not the case with either Greece or Turkey at the time. Israel was [represented] there. Cyprus Airways flew three flights a week to Tel Aviv, as well as to Baghdad, Damascus, and Cairo. The Libyans

were active there. Their airline office was bombed. It was just a few blocks down from our chancery, which was also our residence. So we were always very aware [of the situation].

We talked before about tensions between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In terms of security for the Embassy and security in general there was certainly a greater threat from outside the island than from activity within the island. Since the killing of Ambassador Rodger Davies in 1974 the Cypriot Government had provided a full-time security detail to United States Ambassadors. When I arrived in 1981, I was met by a seven-member detail of Greek Cypriot policemen who went with me everywhere I went outside of the Embassy in Greek Cyprus. When I went across to Turkish Cyprus, they would accompany me to the United Nations checkpoint, and we would go beyond that point on our own. In my view at the time the only real reason for continuing with this arrangement was the history of the problem but, more importantly, the possibility of something happening from outside Cyprus. Eventually, after I'd been there a year or so, I realized that this protection was really a bit much and that, if I did something purely spontaneously, like taking my daughter to school or to the Marine House to see a movie or to do a baby sitting job -- or even, say, on Sunday morning, to go to the North -- it probably wasn't necessary to have a security detail with me. I eased up a bit. I felt much more comfortable and I tell you that my children really felt much better. It had been a bit intimidating for them, especially with all of the weapons around.

Q: How did you find the Embassy staff while you were there?

EWING: It was a fairly small staff. I suppose, by [the usual] American Embassy standards, it would have been called a medium sized Embassy. We had about 40 Americans, including our Marine Security Guard detail. There were people there with the FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, who were monitoring primarily [regional] radio stations in the Middle East region. We had a few people there with the United States Information Service; a couple of political officers, one speaking Greek and the other speaking Turkish; an economic/commercial officer who, in many ways, was one of the busiest in the Embassy because, not only did he do economic reporting and assist the increasingly active U.S. business community and support the possibility of promoting the export of U. S. goods and services, he also was the only point of contact with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees concerning our aid program which, oddly enough, was running at about \$15 million per year -- without AID [Agency for International Development] actually being present on the island. We had, of course, a security officer. It was a highly competent staff with great ability and dedication. I think that they enjoyed Cyprus. The local people were very nice, and I think that most of us found friends both on the Greek Cypriot as well as the Turkish Cypriot side. We enjoyed the archeological activity. There was something there called "The Cyprus-American Archeological Research Institute" which supported various "digs" on the Greek Cypriot side. We had a chance to visit most of those during the time that I was there.

The other thing that was happening, as I think I said before, was the economic burgeoning of Greek Cyprus, which was all to the good, because it was raising income levels. It was also overwhelming, as hotels were built along this beautiful coastline, not always with full regard for the environmental impact.

Q: You left Cyprus in 1984 and came back to Washington. Could you talk about your next job, how you got it, and what you were doing?

EWING: There was kind of an interval there. I didn't have an onward assignment when I came back from Cyprus, except on a short-term basis. I was asked to head the United States Delegation to the meeting of the Group on Mediterranean Scientific and Cultural Cooperation, under the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe -- CSCE. This meeting took place in Venice in late October, 1984. In preparing for that conference I paid visits to Brussels (NATO Headquarters), London, Tel Aviv, and Rome. That pretty well took me through the fall. Then I was asked to be a negotiator on a new Status of Forces agreement in Greece. I spent some time preparing for that negotiation in Washington, with the Defense Department and other interested agencies. It fairly quickly became apparent that the Greek Government under Prime Minister Papandreou really wasn't ready for any such negotiation and that the negotiations were very unlikely to take place. I think that, with some reluctance, the American Embassy in Athens agreed with that assessment. They wanted to have a negotiator ready, but the Greeks turned the idea down. It was clear that nothing really was going to happen.

I asked the European Bureau if they would be willing to keep me on "stand by" in case the Greek negotiations got under way and let me go over and study French at the Foreign Service Institute. They were agreeable, so I studied French for about 16 weeks. Near the end of that time Stephen Low, who was the Director of the Foreign Service Institute, came down to the French class one day and asked if I'd be interested in being the Dean of the School of Language Studies at the FSI. Not having a better offer at the time and thinking that it would be kind of interesting and a chance to manage a fairly active program, I agreed to do that. I started that in the summer of 1985. Between my French studies and the FSI assignment, the Under Secretary for Management asked me to head up a committee studying all mid-level training in the State Department. There had been a course for mid-level officers, six months in duration, that was wildly unpopular. They asked us to take a look at that and mid-level training in general. We made a series of recommendations, including dropping that course immediately. We came up with a concept of what we called a "Continuum of Mid-Level Training," under which we would have a series of shorter, more focused assignment or job specific training to substitute for the mid-career course, and that was generally accepted.

JAMES L. TULL
Deputy Chief of Mission
Nicosia (1981-1984)

James L. Tull was born in Iowa. After serving in the US Navy from 1951-1955 he received his bachelor's degree and his master's degree at the University of Colorado. His career included positions in Colombia, England, Uruguay, Dominican Republic, Cyprus, and Costa Rica. Mr. Tull was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in May 2001.

Q: Where did you go at the end of your tour in Santo Domingo in 1981?

TULL: I left the Dominican Republic in July without an onward assignment. In the course of my consultations in Washington, I ran across Ray Ewing. He had just been named as ambassador to Cyprus and was looking for a DCM. Events took their course.

Q: I should emphasize that I had known you before when you were deputy director in the European bureau's executive office.

TULL: Yes, and during my tour there you had been director of the office of southern European affairs, then deputy assistant secretary in the bureau.

Q: So, we had known each other before. And as someone who had never served as a deputy chief of mission, I thought that I probably ought to have a DCM who knew a little bit about what that job was all about.

TULL: I recall when we first talked about this, I told you, "Ray, I don't know anything about Cyprus at all." After all the years you spent on Greece-Turkey-Cyprus problems, you replied something to the effect that you really weren't looking for another Cyprus expert! So we arrived in Nicosia in September 1981 while Jack Eaves was in charge.

Q: It was October when we arrived. And you did get to know something about Cyprus over the next three years.

TULL: Yes, it was impossible to live and work on that little island for any time and not come to know quite a bit about the "national problem," as some Greek Cypriots called it. Basically, a serious NATO problem, arising out of the collision of Greek and Turkish national interests which finally resulted in the 1974 Turkish invasion and the division of the island. For me, it was a refreshing issue- at last, I didn't have to deal with development economics and all its social and political problems which are so central in Latin American countries.

Q: But we still had an AID assistance program although it was an unusual one.

TULL: Really unique in my experience. Partially run by our single economic officer but basically administered by the representative of the UN high commissioner for refugees because he had easy access to both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities.

Q: But there was a very strong internal political rationale in the U.S. for the program, as well as a foreign policy justification in demonstrating our continuing interest in the Cyprus issue.

TULL: True, but I have always felt that the fifteen million dollars which Congress appropriated every year with no request from the Administration was a kind of payoff to powerful Greek lobby groups on the Hill, such as AHEPA (American Hellenic Educational Foundation) and others. I recall that while you were on home leave in 1983, we finally succeeded after years of trying, in getting a congressional delegation to come out and see what their fifteen million a year in refugee aid was buying. And it was an important group- Chairman "Doc" Long of Maryland and his house appropriations subcommittee. We took him to several projects in Larnaca which

had been constructed with U.S. funds for the Greek Cypriot refugees from the 1974 invasion, including a hospital and housing project. Apartments at the latter were large and well-appointed. Long asked our Greek Cypriot guide what monthly rent was charged on the largest of these; the guide looked surprised and said, "They're for refugees so of course they are free." It was Long's turn to be surprised and several times in the next couple of days he mused about "...those free apartments we built which are a heck of a lot better than the places my constituents in Baltimore live in."

Q: Why don't you mention some of the other significant issues with which we had to deal?

TULL: Of course there was the Fulbright program which Dan Howard, head of USIS, had a major role in guiding. It was, I believe, the only remaining bicomunal activity left on the island, at least one of the very few.

Q: And it was funded under this fifteen million dollar refugee assistance grant – the Cyprus-American Scholarship Program- as well as from the traditional Fulbright program. The two were combined to some extent.

TULL: It was one of those rare occasions when both the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots voluntarily sat down together- on "neutral ground" at the old Ledra Hotel- and actually worked out something with an agreed result. It says something about both communities that the opportunity for scholarships for their children overcame, in this one instance, their mutual suspicions and hatred of each other. But far more important was our work with the special representative of the UN secretary general who was working on behalf of the SYG (Secretary General) to promote a peaceful reuniting of the two communities, separated along the Green Line since the civil war and Turkish invasion of 1974.

Q: Yes, it was Hugo Gobbi, an Argentine from their diplomatic service who had most recently been Argentine ambassador to Spain. I think you knew him well, but you also knew his deputy, Jim Holger.

TULL: Yes, Jim was a Chilean who had left their diplomatic service when General Pinochet took power. He was my opposite number in Ambassador Gobbi's office, so he and I were particularly close. When democracy was re-established in Chile, he resumed his career and I believe went on to become Chilean ambassador to the Soviet Union.

Q: Shall we also say anything about our relations with the British high commission? We spent a fair amount of time with them, partly because the United Kingdom has a long and special relationship with Cyprus historically, first as its colonial ruler and then with independence as a guarantor power. The United Kingdom also retains two major military sovereign base areas on the southern coast at Akrotiri and Dhekelia.

TULL: I can't recall any other time in my career when we were so close in our working relationship with another mission as we were with High Commissioner John Wilberforce and his deputy David Dain. David and I literally worked out of each other's files and I doubt that either Washington or London had any idea how closely we coordinated and cooperated. And of course

it was our exchanges with Hugo and Jim on a very quiet basis which made it all possible.

Q: Can you recall any signs of progress in this dispute that might have taken place in the period that you were there, 1981-1984?

TULL: Sadly, no. I have no information on the current state of play between the two communities, but I doubt that they are any closer today than the day you and I arrived. This was after all a civil war of the most savage and brutal kind, topped by foreign invasion. The leaders now on the scene went through all of that and if it's possible for any of them to forgive, I doubt that a single one can now forget.

Q: Why don't you say a few words about the structure of our embassy in Nicosia? Among other things we had a defense office and attache.

TULL: First of all, it was a very small mission. We had a Greek-language officer who was in charge of the political section plus a Turkish-language officer; a single economic officer and sole consular officer and two Americans in the administrative section, an administrative officer, and general services officer. Our accounting was basically handled by Cypriot employees. I've mentioned we had an American head of USIS. Our largest single American component might have been in the office of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). FBIS is essentially an unclassified radio monitoring service and with Cyprus' position next to the Middle East, it was an important listening post for the USG. And of course our defense attaché's office headed at that time by LTC (Lieutenant Colonel) Dick McCall. He had the unenviable task of trying to handle both the Greek and the Turkish languages. His grasp of the latter appeared to cause a bit of mirth among Turkish military officers, but Dick was no fool and made certain that he ended every speech in Turkish with, "And we must never forget the words of the immortal Attaturk, 'Peace at home, peace in the world!'" This invariably evoked cheers and applause.

Q: I think we also ought to mention security. Roger Davies, our ambassador in 1974, had been assassinated and our regional security officer had important responsibilities for the protection of all of us.

TULL: Yes, our security problems were not of the direct kind that I saw at my next two posts, but rather more of an offshore variety. Cyprus had the reputation as a "neutral" area in the Middle East, so all sides seem to show up here. I remember one rumor that had several members of the Japanese Red Army holed up here for awhile!

Q: We also had a small office on the Turkish Cypriot side of Nicosia.

TULL: Yes, we had three Turkish Cypriot employees representing us in that community. They performed some limited consular and information services for us, as well as a large amount of contact and representational duties in their community. The senior of these who was in charge was Doghan Taskan, who set up this small office in the garage behind his home in Nicosia. Doghan knew everyone on the Turkish Cypriot side from "President" Rauf Denktash on down; he was the one we would go to first on any matter involving his community.

Q: He did a daily summary of the Turkish press and worked closely with our Turkish- language

political officer at the embassy. He also had one of the few direct telephone connections across the Green Line, which divided the communities.

TULL: Yes. I believe all or most other lines went through Denktash's office. As an example of the work Doghan did for us, we faced numerous complaints from both the Greek Cypriots and pro-Greek lobby groups at home about alleged enormous poppy fields in the Turkish-controlled area and significant drug activities there. Unfortunately, our DEA (Drug Enforcement Agency) officer was of Greek ethnic origin which made contact nearly impossible. But finally after a great deal of delicate negotiation, Doghan succeeded in arranging a meeting for me and the DEA officer with in effect the narcotics control officer of the Turkish army in Cyprus. Our meeting was perfectly friendly and it at least enabled us to assure all concerned that we were in productive contact with the relevant Turkish authorities.

Q: In Cyprus, our narcotics interest was party on the island our also in Lebanon and Greece.

TULL: Cyprus was more important as a potential transshipment point from Syria and the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon than as a growing area. At the time we were there, I don't believe there was much flowing through, although we always suspected there might be more than we guessed.

Q: When the Israelis invaded Beirut in 1982, there were lots of things that impacted us in Cyprus- the evacuation of the PLO to Tunis, the earlier bombings of our embassy and then the marines, plus the two evacuations of Americans from there, too. What do you recall of that period?

TULL: I don't think I'll ever forget how the British reacted to the attack on our marine contingent. Even before we could request it, they had a medical transport plane in Beirut with doctors and emergency personnel. They loaded it to the gills and brought all the wounded back to the Princess Anne hospital at their Akrotiri sovereign base area. I think all of this happened before our own evacuation to Germany could take place. We lost only one marine from that group. I always felt it was a marvelous thing for them to have done. The evacuations of Americans from Beirut were unusual because they were basically handled in the port of Larnaca by our wives and kids and embassy employees receiving the refugees. And then Larnaca airport or at least a part of it became our helicopter staging area in and out of Beirut when its airport was shut down.

Q: Do you remember much about the arrangements we had to make for those helicopters to move back and forth? It went on for some time.

TULL: Naturally, it could only have been done with the full cooperation of the GOC. But sensitive to their neutral, "non-aligned" status, I recall them making clear to you that it had to be done quietly and without undue attention. And amazingly it was- we had a full ground crew to service our group of about a dozen aircraft under pretty close scrutiny by the Cypriots, and brought it all off without major incident.

Q: One of the things that has developed since we were there is that the current Greek Cypriot president is Glafkos Clerides, who in our time was an opposition leader in the Parliament of

some structure and influence, but still on the outs with everyone in the government.

TULL: Interestingly, he was the only Greek Cypriot that I can recall who Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash ever spoke well of. He once told me, “Glafkos is a man I can trust. He is a man of his word and I could work with him.” I don’t think he was, but they do go back a long ways together, to their days as student lawyers at Greys Inn in London. Glafkos, for his part, claimed that Denktash couldn’t hold his beer and that often he would have to carry him back to his digs after a night of pubbing.

Q: You met with Denktash yourself on a number of occasions when I was tied up or away. Why don’t you talk a bit more about your appreciation of him and also how you worked on the Turkish Cypriot side of Cyprus?

TULL: The vice president of Uruguay, a man of Lebanese descent, named Alberto Abdala, is the only politician I have known even remotely similar to Rauf Denktash in cleverness, deviousness, and crafty skills. I was never quite certain of his goals or who he trusted. He was his own party and it was the majority one in his community. With Louis XIV, he too could say, “I am the state.” He had several times been elected president of the Turkish Cypriot community, but he could go no higher, so I never believed he would be a willing partner to anything but the weakest possible confederation of the two communities which he would co-head. Personally, I found him agreeable and affable and delighted with jokes at others expenses.

Much of my official dealings in the north were with Denktash’s “foreign minister,” Kenan Atakol, a youngish, well-schooled, and highly intelligent lawyer who I found unfailingly friendly and helpful. Another major force in that community was Turkey, with whose ambassador and embassy we enjoyed cordial relations and with whose army of about 35,000 we had little contact.

Q: When Denktash and the Turkish Cypriots declared the independence of their community as the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” do you recall whether or not that was a surprise for us?

TULL: Yes, there is no way around it, this particular timing was a surprise. We had no advance warning of any kind, although it was a move Denktash had been threatening for some time, claiming “We might have to do this to be taken seriously by others.” When we told him the USG would not recognize any such “state,” he would shrug and reply, “Well, you refused to recognize Communist China for twenty-five years, but eventually you came around. We are prepared to wait you out, too.”

Q: After that, the United States condemned this action, supported a resolution in the U.S. Security Council deploring it, and discouraged other countries from recognizing it. But on the island of Cyprus, we took the position that nothing had changed.

TULL: And really nothing had. Turkey of course recognized the new “TRNC” (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) while everyone else ignored it; the border across the Green Line reopened within a day, and life went on as before. The Greek Cypriots were naturally very upset and I think they would have liked us to be more so too. But our feeling was that we still had

business to do with the Turkish Cypriots and that we also had not given up on Ambassador Gobbi's intercommunal talks and hopes for some progress toward settlement.

Q: Maybe we should say a few words about our physical facilities and our thinking about a future new building.

TULL: We basically had our main offices and your residence in two decrepit old three-story apartment buildings which were still standing only because they were leaning on each other for support. It was a GSO's nightmare. Toward the end of our tours, the Kiko Monastery of the Cypriot Orthodox Church agreed to give us a long-term lease on a several-acre olive grove behind their abbey in Nicosia's western suburb. You remember the lease signing ceremony at your residence. The abbot and his officials each signed, then reached in their cassocks and pulled out a piece of a seal- I recall it was in seven pieces. The abbot then put them together in some kind of a screw handle, inked and sealed the document, then unscrewed the pieces, and returned each to its owner. I take it this made the lease legal in the sight of God as well as man!

Q: Anything else about Cyprus? You enjoyed your time there?

TULL: Very much so. It was one of our most comfortable and enjoyable tours.

Q: And you learned a lot more about the Cyprus issue and intercommunal negotiations there than you ever probably expected to.

TULL: Yes indeed, but there was sadness, too. I wish we, or someone, could somehow do more to help them reunite than we've found possible so far. But the horrors of civil war won't fade for many years- some, it seems, are trying to prevent this from ever happening. You'll recall the priest who headed the Greek Cypriot refugee organization, Papa Cristophoru. He never lost an opportunity to keep the bloody wounds of remembrance open and flowing among those in his community who had lost family or loved ones; for his part, Denktash never failed to encourage visitors to stop by a small house near his office which had been converted into something called "The Museum of Savagery." There one sad large black and white atrocity photos of Turkish Cypriot babies bayoneted and torn to shreds, women grossly abused and murdered, and piles of males machine gunned and butchered. That remains an enormous impediment to any reunion of the Cypriots.

CHRISTIAN A. CHAPMAN
Special Assistant to Secretary of State on Cyprus
Washington, DC (1982-1983)

Christian A. Chapman was born in France in 1921. His career in the Foreign Service included positions in Lebanon, Iran, Vietnam, Laos, Luxembourg, Belgium, France, Cyprus, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on March 3, 1990.

Q: Then your last assignment was Special Assistant on Cyprus. You were there from '82-'83. Could you tell me what you were doing and what was your impression.

CHAPMAN: The history of that position was that General Haig became involved in the Turkish-Greek confrontation when he was SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander-Europe). He became active in trying to deal with a very difficult and ugly problem. He carried over that interest when he became Secretary of State and created this position, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Cyprus. Reginald Bartholomew was the first and I took over from him. I eventually went to Cyprus to meet the cast of characters there. Called on Kyprianou and Denktash. The former was formally President of Cyprus, but in reality of Greek Cyprus only, and the latter was head of the Turkish Cypriot community. I also met with a variety of other officials on both sides of the dividing line. I came away convinced that there was nothing we could do. The problem for the administration was that there was that the strong Greek American community is always actively pressing Congress to have the government do something. Like reducing military assistance to Turkey. And the Administration considered Turkey as an absolutely vital ally in the eastern Mediterranean.

The reason I felt that nothing could be done was that Kyprianou and Denktash as heads of their communities were probably in a better position than they could possibly have in a united Cyprus. Both would lose some of the power that they had, and I just didn't see that they were men of the dimension who would want to diminish their power or prestige by reaching a compromise even one in the interest of the country. I felt that the best thing the US could do was to do nothing. But politically here, it was very difficult to do nothing.

Q: Were we doing much? Was it just a charade?

CHAPMAN: It wasn't a charade. We had an ambassador and we tried to get both sides to come to terms and we strongly supported the UN Secretary General who took a very active role in searching for a settlement, and had a permanent representative in Cyprus.. And things have not changed much in all these years: just last week Greek and Turkish Cypriots were in New York working with the Secretary General. The Secretary General had a personal representative on Cyprus. But there was just no movement then and not much that I can see even today, seven years later. I thought that the United States would be best served by getting completely out of it so that both sides would not use us as a crutch, as a way of trying to get at the other side. With the Greeks putting pressure on us to put pressure on the Turks and vice versa.

RICHARD W. BOEHM
Ambassador
Cyprus (1984-1987)

Ambassador Richard W. Boehm was born in New York in 1926. He served in the U.S. Army during World War II and joined the Foreign Service in 1954. His career included positions in Japan, Germany, Luxembourg, Nepal, Turkey, Thailand, and Washington, DC, and ambassadorships to Cyprus and Oman. This

interview was conducted in 1994 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: Today is September 6, 1994. Well, Dick, let's pick up where we left off. There you were in the Board of Examiners, sort of the Siberia of the State Department. How did your name pop up [for an ambassadorship]?

BOEHM: How it popped up I don't know, Stuart, or how they focused on me. The time came to appoint an ambassador to Cyprus, and my name was among those being considered. Actually, I was on the road. I think I was either in Boston or Chicago doing these oral examinations when I was phoned from Washington by the Under Secretary for Management. He said, "We've picked you to be the State Department's nominee for Ambassador to Cyprus." Of course, you know what that means. It means that the nomination goes to the White House. Beside the State Department nominee, you might have a number of other nominees coming from elsewhere, political or otherwise. So that was the first step. Of course, I'd served for six years in Turkey at that point [1984]. Knowing the ins and outs of the Cyprus situation, which might have been a plus, was also a minus when you came from that kind of background.

Q: Particularly when you're thinking about the Greek Lobby.

BOEHM: The Greek Lobby and the Government of Cyprus itself, the only Cyprus that we recognized. Cyprus had already been partitioned. But the only government we recognized for all of Cyprus was the Greek Cypriot government in Nicosia. So I wasn't sure how this was going to play. I assumed -- and rightly, as it turned out -- that I would be suspect among the Greeks, both the Greek Lobby in Washington and the Greek Cypriot government. I pointed this out to the Under Secretary when he phoned me. I said, "Was the panel that picked me as the Department's nominee aware of the fact that I've spent six years in Turkey -- two tours?" He said, "Yes, they were. It bothered some of them, but I took the position that no career Foreign Service Officer should in any way be penalized or impeded in his career by virtue of his previous service. And that seemed to convince them." So I said, "Okay, then."

The nomination went forward to the White House, and my name was chosen as the one to be sent to the Senate. Of course, that's the next step in the process. All of this was happening around April or May. My name went to the Senate. Then I had the usual, cliff hanging situation in which you're not sure [of the outcome]. This was an election year.

Q: This was 1984?

BOEHM: It was 1984. You don't know whether the Senate is going to get around to taking action on these nominations or not, before the elections. But in due course, as I recall, in August the Senate decided to go ahead and have the hearings for a certain number of ambassadors.

Well, I was in close touch with the Department's Congressional liaison people to see what might be coming up at the hearings -- or when they would take place, exactly. I found that our Bureau of Congressional Relations then, as always, was not very competent. They didn't seem to know very much but they finally called me and gave me about two days' notice of the hearings. They said, "There will be four of you." (That is, four nominees for four different embassies.) "There

will be one member of the [Senate Foreign Relations] Committee present. Each one of you will be asked one question, and that will be it. It's really a pro forma hearing."

So on the appointed day I went [to the Committee chambers]. I looked around for the other three who were supposed to be there. And they weren't there. I was the only nominee there. I looked for the one Senator who was going to be in the chair. I saw five or six [members of the Committee] there. The whole Greek Lobby had turned up. They kept me there for an hour. They asked me very difficult questions. Difficult in the sense, not that I didn't know the answers, but in the sense that the answers, which would reflect either an historic event or U. S. Government or administration policy, were unlikely to be well received by the Committee or by Cyprus itself.

Of course, this is an old, familiar problem. I was certainly not the first [ambassadorial nominee] to encounter open Senatorial confirmation hearings for ambassadors -- especially those who are going to countries where there is some kind of delicate problem. [Nominees may be compelled] to discuss questions which may create big problems for them when they arrive at the post. I had that possibility very much in mind during these hearings and was trying to avoid making statements that would jeopardize my ability to function, once I got to Cyprus, with either the Greek or Turkish Cypriots. (We dealt with the Turkish Cypriots as a community, not as a state.) The Committee wasn't in a mood to let me get away with that. They wanted to get clear, firm statements of a kind which I preferred not to make. They displayed signs of peevishness. I might say that Senator Tsongas in particular indulged himself in outbursts, saying how fed up he was with these nominees who come up here. [He said that] all they want to do is to get away as easily as possible, without saying anything. He was perfectly right. [Laughter] That was a play for the crowd, so you sort of ignore that.

However, as I said, it was tough, but I got through the hour. I was forced to defend the administration's policy of giving military assistance to Turkey. I put this in the NATO context which, it struck me, was perfectly understandable, but it didn't go down well in Cyprus. A day or two later the Embassy in Nicosia sent a telegram to the Department, as they normally would, of course, reporting on the local press play, because the Cypriot newspapers had covered the hearings. They had people there.

The press play was this: The editorials in most of the [Greek] Cypriot newspapers demanded that the government withdraw its agrément to my appointment. [Laughter] Well, the Government of Cyprus did not withdraw its agrément. So, in due course, I went to Cyprus. But I knew, of course, that I was going to have to work very hard to overcome the impression of bias on one side or the other.

There was a curious aftermath of the hearings. One of the Senators present [at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings] that day was Senator Sarbanes.

Q: He's of Greek background from Maryland.

BOEHM: Yes, a Greek-American. A good man and one I like and admire and on whom I had called before the hearings. He of course joined with the others in asking me some difficult questions. By the way, the Republicans then had a majority in the Senate. The chairman of the

Committee was Senator Lugar. He was the only Republican there. Everybody else was a Democrat, including the Greek Lobby.

That evening I was invited to a reception at the Greek Embassy in Washington. The Greek Ambassador was an old friend of mine who had been Greek Ambassador in Ankara during my three year stay there. He had seen me in a Turkish context and still didn't consider me to be untouchable. Well, I arrived at the Greek Embassy and was chatting with the Greek Ambassador in the receiving line, when in walks Senator Sarbanes. He walked up to me and said, "Why didn't you tell me that you were a friend of George Papoulias?" George Papoulias was the Greek Ambassador to the United States. I said, "I didn't see what that had to do with anything, Senator." [Laughter] The implication on his part was that, if he had known that, he would have taken it easier on me.

Then Senator Sarbanes said a very surprising thing. He took me aside and said, "You know, Bill Schaefele was not our fault." You may not know the history of Bill Schaefele.

Q: *No, I don't.*

BOEHM: Very few people probably remember. Bill Schaefele was nominated to be Ambassador to Greece. During the hearings [before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee] somebody had asked him about the Dodecanese Islands, which are the Greek islands which lie right off the coast of Turkey. One of them is sort of a plug in the mouth of every Turkish port. Schaefele had -- probably unwisely -- referred to them as an "accident of history." This infuriated the Greeks, and the government in Athens actually withdrew its agrément for Ambassador Schaefele, who never went to Athens. He went instead to Poland, which was not a bad outcome. But Senator Sarbanes was still feeling some guilt about this. He was on a guilt trip and he wanted me to know that it was the State Department's clarifying statement issued to explain Schaefele's remark that irretrievably had torn it. So Senator Sarbanes put the blame on the Department of State.

I thought it was a kind of funny thing to say, but the simple fact is that, as I said before, those Congressional hearings, it seems to me, can be very damaging to the functioning of our ambassadors. The least thing that we ought to do would be to hold them in executive session [i.e., closed hearings], if a delicate situation exists.

So anyway I was confirmed and went to Cyprus.

Q: *You served in Cyprus from 1984 to 1987?*

BOEHM: That's correct.

Q: *Before you went to Cyprus, you had obviously prepared yourself. You read the cables and you talked to various people, including members of Congress. What were American interests and concerns in Cyprus at that time, as you saw them before you went out?*

BOEHM: Of course, as I said, I had spent six years in the region in Turkey and had been a Cyprus-watcher. I was aware of the issues involved in Cyprus. The principal issue for us, of

course, was the impact of the Cyprus problem, as it was always referred to, on Greek-Turkish relations and, therefore, on the harmonious operation of NATO. That was our big concern and that was the one, of course, which I had had to refer to when I testified before the Committee about U.S. military assistance to Turkey. Then, of course, there were other concerns. There was an issue of a few Americans who had been in Cyprus at the time of the Turkish military intervention in 1974. They had disappeared and were still missing -- unaccounted for and presumably dead, but their families, in some cases, had not reached that conclusion. They could not or would not accept that conclusion. So there was a question regarding the whereabouts of certain American citizens.

Those were our interests, really. There was the NATO consideration and Greek-Turkish relations and their impact on NATO. I should mention that there are a large number of Cypriot-Americans who fall under the rubric of Greek-Americans. A lot of Greek-Americans in fact are Cypriot-Americans. You have the same kind of interest you have in any country where there is a large and active, hyphenated-American population.

Q: But Greek-Americans are probably better connected, as witnessed by the fact that two Senators out of the 100 in the Senate are Greek-American, plus the fact that there are a lot of Greek-American members of the House of Representatives.

BOEHM: Not just the Greek-American Senators but other Senators who have Greek-American constituencies,. This is the situation with quite a few others.

Q: When you went to Cyprus, was there any feeling that it was up to the United States to get the Turks out of the island and turn it back basically to Greek rule?

BOEHM: There was some history there, again, in the NATO context, of what the U.S. should, could, or would do about the Cyprus problem. It wasn't a new problem in 1974 when the Turks sent their troops in. It had been going on for 10 years before that. After Cyprus became independent in 1960, the trouble between Greek and Turkish Cypriots started almost immediately. This had led to fighting in the early 1960's. The UN had gone in at that point. There was a UN peacekeeping force there. Then you had the 1974 events. The U.S. provided a good part of the funding for the UN peacekeeping force. Although we didn't have troops there ourselves, we were paying a lot of the freight. Then, because the U.S. is the leader of NATO, it always gets involved in things of this kind. We were seeking to foster a solution to the Cyprus problem. But at the time and for some time before I went out there, the U.S. did not wish to play the leading role as negotiator, mediator, arbitrator, or conciliator. The UN was the chosen instrument to do this. It happened that at the time I went to Cyprus the Secretary General of the United Nations was Perez De Cuellar, a Peruvian who, in an earlier incarnation, had been the special representative to Cyprus of a previous Secretary General of the UN. He was very familiar with the Cyprus problem and became personally involved in trying to foster a solution. This was a good development. It was a plus for us because we could support the efforts of the UN Secretary General, rather than trying to propose and broker solutions of our own. This was also a good development because it was pretty clear that there wasn't going to be a solution. The positions of the two sides were too far apart. Therefore, it was very convenient to have the Secretary General of the UN out there doing the job. Whenever we were asked to make a

pronouncement on this issue, we would simply say, "We support the efforts of the UN Secretary General."

Of course, behind the scenes that support could take a rather active form. We were very active in talking to the government of Cyprus -- that is, the Greek Cypriots -- and the Turkish Cypriot community. We referred to the Turkish Cypriots and their part of Cyprus as a community and not as a government or as a state. We dealt with them and their leader, Rauf Denktash, a very deft politician and skillful diplomat. He had been involved in the Cyprus issue for a long time. Since the very beginning of the troubles on Cyprus he had been very much involved and for quite some time he had been the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community.

We referred to him as "His Excellency, Mr. Denktash." [Laughter] Washington had come up with that term as an acceptable form of address. He accepted that. He would have liked to have us call him "Mr. President," but we didn't.

So, we'd lean on both sides and tell them, "Look, the Secretary General has made a reasonable, sensible proposal which is the best you're ever going to get, so take it." Which they did not.

Q: Did you have any instructions from Secretary of State George Shultz or anyone else? Did you have any particular list of things to do, other than the normal, ambassadorial kind of thing?

BOEHM: My instructions were all very general. I knew what my instructions were. I don't recall that I received anything that might be called instructions and signed Shultz. Our policy there was very clear. I knew how the Embassy was to play its role -- which was as I just described it, supporting the efforts of the United Nations Secretary General. There were a lot of things that nobody can instruct you on because you don't foresee them. That's why they try to find an experienced, seasoned career officer to send into dicey situations.

Q: Could you describe our Embassy in Nicosia and how it operated?

BOEHM: First, let me describe the Embassy physically. The Embassy was housed in what had formerly been two adjacent apartment buildings, each one three or four stories high. They had previously been connected by a kind of Bridge of Sighs that had been constructed to enable the Ambassador, who lived at the top of one of the two buildings, to go back and forth without getting wet, if it was raining. One whole building and the lower half of the other building were the chancery. The upper half of the other building was the Ambassador's residence. It was a perfectly functional building. It wasn't grand and didn't look like much, but it worked well. The interior of the building was functional, from the representational point of view. You could certainly use it. There was a decent diningroom and a large livingroom. You couldn't get hundreds of people into it for a reception, but it was all right and served the purpose.

When I went out there, the architectural plans had already been completed to build a new chancery and residence. In fact, during my first year in Cyprus the architects came out and showed us the plans, which were ready to go. I thought that they were very good. They asked our comments on it. We could say, "Well, if you have a large reception, say, where are we going to put the cars that people come in?" We had a chance to comment in that way. The architects took

account of them and made some modifications to the plans to accommodate our practical or common-sense approach, based on experience.

I thought that just maybe I might get to live in that new building. Then, as time went by, I thought that I might get to break the ground on the new building. But I didn't get to do either of those things. They kept changing the plans because of security considerations. It's really ridiculous. They kept deciding that they had to do more or something different. Then somebody else would stick an oar in.

It finally was built. I haven't seen it, in fact. It would have been pretty splendid, I think. It was built on a large plot of ground that belonged to Kykko Monastery, a large Greek Orthodox establishment. They had a large plot of ground in Nicosia, although the monastery itself was located elsewhere in Cyprus. They gave us or sold us what I think was a 99-year lease. One corner of this large lot was big enough for a big Embassy, right across the street from the new Soviet Embassy, which was built quickly.

The Soviets proceeded differently. They decided to build an Embassy. They got a piece of ground. Whether they picked it because it was across the street from our Embassy or not, I don't know. Then they brought in their own work crew and built it very quickly while we were still fiddling around with our plans. Up went the new Soviet Embassy.

Otherwise, the American Embassy had the usual personnel and spectrum of Washington agencies represented. We had a Military Attaché office, and USIS was there, of course, and others. As usual, the other agencies, when you added them all up, considerably outnumbered the State Department contingent. The total number of official Americans assigned there was around 40 or 50. Then we had, of course, the full array of local employees, who were Greek Cypriots.

We had an office on the Turkish side. There was a Turkish Cypriot man, who had been the senior local employee before Cyprus was split. Once the split came, he couldn't stay on the Greek side. He was over on the Turkish side, where he ran this little office. He was really a useful person because he was our only resident presence over there. The Ambassador also had a beach house on the North coast of Cyprus, in the Turkish sector. It was very useful. We couldn't call on people who called themselves officials of the Turkish Cypriot government in their offices, because this would have been taken as a form of recognition of their status. The only person that we could call on was "His Excellency, Mr. Denktash." We didn't call on Turkish Cypriot ministers. We'd given Denktash the title of "leader of the Turkish Cypriot community." We called on him in that capacity. We couldn't call on the others because the only title that they had was "Minister of this" or "Minister of that."

But we wanted to see them, particularly the one who styled himself Foreign Minister. The way we would do it was to go up to the Turkish side on the weekend or during the week. Cyprus is only a small island. You could drive from the Embassy in Nicosia to the beach house in Kyrenia or the beach house in, say, an hour and a half. You could have the Turkish Cypriots up there for lunch or dinner, you could spend the night or a weekend. They'd come and you could talk to them that way. So the beach house really served a useful purpose. I understand that we don't have it any more. I don't know why. I think that that's really too bad. The office was a leased

property. It wasn't owned by the U.S. From time to time the owner acted as if he wanted to get it back. It's possible that he took it back at some point. I don't know whether we gave it up voluntarily. But if we gave it up voluntarily, it was a mistake, unless we replaced it with an equivalent.

So that was the Embassy, then. It was a good Embassy, I would say. We had some good American Foreign Service Officers there. It was a mix. Obviously, not everybody was as good as everybody else, but as things went, I would say that it was above average in its performance. I was fortunate enough to have a superb DCM there.

Q: Who was that?

BOEHM: Tom Carolan, a Middle East hand. His previous post had been Cairo. He had spent virtually his entire career in the Arab world. He was an Arabist who wanted a change, and I was lucky enough to get him. I didn't know him before. The personnel people gave me 10 names and said, "Look them over. If you don't like them, we'll give you more names." I picked him on the basis of his paper record and never made a better choice in my life. He was superb.

Q: What was the political situation in Cyprus when you arrived there?

BOEHM: When I say "Cyprus," you should take it to mean the Greek Cypriot government. When I want to include the Turks, I'll say so. When I talk about Embassy functions and contacts in Cyprus, I'll mean the only government that we recognized as such -- the Greek Cypriots.

It's a mix of a parliamentary democracy and a presidential system. They have a President and they have a Parliament. To some degree the President has the same powers as an American President, but in this mixed system Parliament has a role which makes it somewhat different from our own system. The President was the leader of what you might call the conservative party. That wasn't its name, but basically it was a Right wing party. You had a couple of opposition parties, one of them led by the man who is best known outside of Cyprus, Glafkos Clerides. He had briefly been acting President when Archbishop Makarios had to flee the country, after the Greeks colonels moved in. Clerides was the principal opposition leader, and you had a couple of other parties as well.

They had elections while I was there. Then there was another election just after I left. Clerides had never been able to get himself elected. Although in the elections his party always got a plurality of votes, he couldn't get a majority, and you ended up with a parliamentary coalition, which would then elect somebody else. Clerides finally made it in the second election after I left Cyprus.

Q: But while you were there, he was not President.

BOEHM: He was not. It was always Kyprianou while I was there. Right after I left, an independent figure, George Vassiliou, who hadn't been a politician but had entered politics fairly late, was elected President. I had known him quite well in his capacity as a businessman. He had asked me, during that electoral campaign which took place shortly before I left Cyprus, what

needed to be done to settle the Cyprus problem. I told him how it could be settled and also told him that both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders who reached such a settlement would be subject to the fate of classical Greeks and would be banished immediately and never be able to return to Cyprus, because it would involve concessions that neither community would accept. If the people accepted the settlement, they'd punish the leaders who reached it. I told him that.

So this independent, George Vassiliou, was the next President. When he came up for reelection, Clerides was elected. That was about two years ago. Glafkos Clerides finally made it, after trying repeatedly. He was probably the most distinguished man in Greek Cyprus and the one who, in my experience, had the best understanding of the Cyprus problem. He understood very well what it would take to get a settlement. However, as we see, he has been politically unable to do it.

Q: Going back to that time, what do you think a settlement of the Cyprus would have involved and how could you reach it?

BOEHM: The question is what kind of concessions would be required from one side or the other. To achieve something that could be called a unified Cyprus, which was the object sought, it was clear to me that the Turkish Cypriots were going to have to give up territory. They then held -- and still hold -- something like 37% of the territory, but their population is considerably less than that in percentage terms. The Turkish Cypriots will have to give back territory and make some kind of settlement that will involve some kind of compensation to the Greek Cypriots for what they lost when they were driven out of northern Cyprus. And there will also have to be some compensation for Turkish Cypriots who were driven out of southern Cyprus. There would have to be some kind of nominal offset arrangement for these two groups.

The Greek Cypriots are going to have to give up the notion of majority rule of all of Cyprus. They are going to have to accept a large degree of autonomy in a Turkish part of Cyprus. This would be referred to as a federal solution, a kind of federation. But everybody was worried -- the Greek Cypriots in particular -- about whether this would really be a federation or not. They became involved in the semantics of the issue and said, "Well, are you sure that it isn't a confederation?" They didn't want a confederation. That sounded too loose to them. They wanted a firmer arrangement. I would say to them, "Knock it off. Call it a federation and stop worrying about whether it's a federation or a confederation. It's a matter of what you get. So call it whatever makes it pleasing to you and then go for it." So that was it.

This was a problem that was not ready for a solution because the parties concerned were not ready for a solution. The Greek Cypriots were unwilling to accept the notion that a non-Greek, Turkish community, could actually occupy one part of the island and pretty much run it by itself. But those were the only terms on which the Turkish Cypriots would have accepted a settlement. So that was the situation.

Q: Did you have a feeling yourself and internally within the Embassy that this was it? In other words, during your time there, you would do what you could. If a break came, you would take advantage of it, but basically both sides had learned to live with the existing situation, and the United States had learned to live with it. The main thing was not to make it any worse. Was that your view and that of the Embassy?

BOEHM: I'm not sure that I would have thought of putting it that way, although I'm not prepared to say that that's a wrong description of our views. You always hoped that common sense might prevail, that reality would assert itself, and that the two sides would see the desirability of a settlement. From the Turkish Cypriot point of view -- and I stressed this in my conversations with them, there would have been considerable putative economic benefits from a settlement. It would have enabled them to cooperate and live harmoniously with the Greek side.

There was a great disparity between the standards of living and the economies there. The Turkish side was struggling. It was poor and needed subsidies from Turkey to survive. The Greek side was booming and prosperous. One could see the Turkish side benefitting greatly in economic terms from a better relationship with the Greek side. So there was that inducement. Of course, that consideration didn't weigh with the Greek Cypriots because economically they didn't need the Turkish part of Cyprus.

You always felt that there were various kinds of reality. The Greek Cypriots might come to understand that they couldn't run the whole territory as a Greek island and that they would have to acknowledge the fact that there was a Turkish community, that it then held more than one-third of the island, and that they would have to allow it to function with some degree of autonomy if they wanted to have a settlement. This might have involved a Greek President and a Turkish Vice-President and that kind of thing. But the Greeks weren't prepared to accept that.

They tended to take a long, long historic view of Cyprus, a quasi-religious or mystical view. The Greeks do this. You were a Consul General in Greece and you know that they tend to think in terms of Marathon and Thermopylae when they discuss current politics. When I talked to the Greek Ambassador in Cyprus, who had a sort of pro-consular role in Cyprus, before long you'd end up talking about Thermopylae and 3,000 years of history. The Greeks feel that they are the heirs of that history, and they continue to refer to it. Given that, reality didn't have a chance to break through that veneer of history, emotion, and religion.

One of the chief antagonists of any kind of negotiated settlement was Archbishop Makarios' successor, the Archbishop of Cyprus, who was a very, very hard liner -- maybe the hardest liner of any prominent person in Cyprus. He took the view -- and would say this to you if you referred to the Turkish Cypriot community in a discussion with him -- that there isn't any Turkish Cypriot community. He would say that they are all basically Greeks who were forcibly converted [to Islam] and that there are no Turks in Cyprus.

Q: We used to get this, I understand, from the early Israeli governments -- Golda Meir and others -- who would say, "There are no Palestinians."

BOEHM: I can't speak to that but I can tell you that as far as the Archbishop was concerned, there were no Turkish Cypriots.

Q: By the time you got to Cyprus did ordinary Greeks see any possibility that the status quo ante bellum could be reestablished. This would involve a mixed community of Turks coming back to southern Cyprus and Greeks going [to the northern part of Cyprus] and have a sort of spotted

community around?

BOEHM: No. Nobody was talking about that. That was not an idea that was being discussed.

Q: What did you get from "His Excellency, Mr. Denktash"? How did you find him?

BOEHM: I enjoyed my encounters with him. He has a very sharp mind. He was, in every sense, worthy and impressive in conversation and was a great sparring partner. It was very hard to stump him in a discussion. One of the things that we were working on, of course, was confidence-building measures. When I first got to Cyprus, the UN Secretary General had just come out with a new proposal which involved an overall solution. The idea was that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. You discuss issues one by one, but if you reached a conclusion on one particular issue, it would not be considered settled until everything else was settled. It was hoped that this would enable the two sides to make a concession here because they expected to get one there. But if they didn't get a concession there, then the one that they had just made wouldn't count.

The question was whether that was the most likely way to succeed -- an overall plan providing a final and overall settlement. Or should you start with some confidence building measures and then undertake what confidence-building measures are supposed to do if they work. Then you go on and try to solve other issues. I hadn't been there long when I concluded that confidence-building measures had the best prospects of success. I so informed Washington, but Washington, in effect, told me to sit down and shut up because they were committed to the Secretary General's overall approach. Eventually, this didn't work.

These confidence-building measures were usually the same. They kept cropping up again and again. One of them had to do with a place called Varosha, a seaside resort and a southern suburb of Famagusta. Famagusta was on the very border of the Turkish occupied part of Cyprus. It was right there on the border between Turkish and Greek Cyprus, on the east coast of the island. Famagusta is a very famous old city, and Varosha was in the southern part of it. Since 1974, when the Turks moved into Cyprus, Varosha had been closed off by a fence. It had previously been totally Greek occupied. It had a series of high-rise apartments. Perhaps not all that high -- maybe 10 to 12 stories. They were beach apartments occupied only by Greek Cypriots. There were no Turks in Varosha. After partition, it was a dead area. It was fenced off. Nobody was there, and nothing was being done. The buildings were beginning to crumble. The Greeks wanted to get back to Varosha. Since it was contiguous to Greek Cyprus, it would have been easy enough to do. Geographically speaking, the border lay between Varosha and downtown Famagusta. So Varosha was one of the confidence-building measures.

That would be something that the Turks would give, in return for the opening of the Nicosia airport, which was on the Green Line that divided Greek and Turkish Cyprus and was not being used at all. It could be opened up, and Turkish Cypriots could be given access to it. Perhaps trade could be reestablished in that area, and there could be other incentives of that kind.

These were confidence-building measures, and they're still being discussed. I don't have access any more to official cable traffic but I read in the newspapers recently, during the past month or

so -- that the Secretary General seemed to be on the brink of actually getting some of these confidence-building measures under way. Maybe it has happened.

Q: What sort of response were you getting from the Turks? Were they looking toward the United States?

BOEHM: Well, I think that basically they were looking to us not to press them too hard, to get off their back, as it were. We had an assistance program in Cyprus, about \$15 million a year. It was a very odd, sui generis arrangement. It was divided up between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the basis of population, which meant, roughly, four parts for the Greeks to one part for the Turks. It was administered by the Cyprus Red Cross, the President of which was -- and had been for many years -- a Greek Cypriot, a very brilliant, woman lawyer. The Vice President [of the Cyprus Red Cross] continued to be -- and had been for many years -- a Turkish Cypriot doctor. The aid was sent through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. This was a legal device which made it possible to have this strange arrangement. [The UNHCR] funneled the aid to the Cyprus Red Cross, which divided it between the Greeks and Turks on the basis of projects which were carried out.

We always hoped that we could use this aid to promote relations between Greek and Turkish Cyprus. The place to do that was Nicosia, because Nicosia was the capital of Greek Cyprus. It was also the capital of Turkish Cyprus. Northern Nicosia was where the Turks had set up their capital. And it's one city. So obviously you've got urban and municipal problems which cannot be separated. You've got sewer systems and sanitation problems. If an epidemic starts, it's going to cross borders. So there was a hopeful prospect of getting some cooperation. And in fact it worked that way. The sewer system was laid down. It crossed the border. It required coordination. The Greek and Turkish Cypriot mayors would get together and coordinate this service. So we tried, as I said, to use this money to do a little bit to help get cooperation between the two of them. I saw a possible project, a marvelous program. The bees of Cyprus -- and Cyprus is agricultural -- came down with some kind of disease. It was necessary to address this question of a bee disease -- to research it and try to do something about it. Bees, like other creatures that fly, pay no attention to Green Lines or anything else like that. They fly back and forth. They fertilize your orange grove and my orange grove. If they get sick and die, neither orange grove is going to continue. The bees came down with a bee disease. We thought that we could get some money to get some joint research going on to deal with this disease, but neither side would buy it. [Laughter] They didn't want it. The two communities weren't at all enthusiastic about these joint projects, which we were trying to press. We were looking for something which we could stick a label on and say, "This is a joint project." The sewer system is fine. That worked.

Now that aid program was \$15 million annually. It was hard to justify that amount of money, because Cyprus is not broke. It's not a poor country. It just barely qualified as a Third World country in terms of assistance. So while I was there, the State Department was asking Congress for \$5 million for Cyprus. Congress always upped the figure to \$15 million. As far as I know, they still do. This is the Greek Lobby in operation. All of this \$15 million is marvelous for an ambassador to have available -- \$15 million in assistance to spread around. We'd have to approve the projects, or look at them and vet them. Basically, it was the Greeks and Turks that decided

them. They came up with good projects. I must say that the money was well spent, but it really didn't achieve much of the purpose of getting them to work together. Then \$5 million of the \$15 million went for educational grants -- can you imagine that? -- to colleges and universities in the United States. \$5 million for a total population of maybe 750,000 to 800,000 people. There weren't that many students. We had \$5 million available. It originally amounted to \$10 million. We gradually cut it down to \$7.5 million, and it leveled off at \$5 million -- because we ran out of students to give the money to. We would have had to lower the standards to include people with a low IQ if we'd continued to put in that much money.

Your original question was, "What kind of handle did we have on the Turks?" or what leverage could we apply to the Turks? There was the fact that we treated them fairly well, in a legalistic sense. We didn't recognize the Turkish community as a state. The question would be, "How could they travel," for example? We would put a visa on a piece of paper for them. We wouldn't stamp a visa in their Turkish Cypriot passports, but we'd give them visas. We were giving them assistance. They were included in the scholarship program. They understood that. There were times when we had a distinguished visitor, a Senator or a Congressman. We would arrange a lunch with Mr. Denktash. He would decide to take that occasion to complain how the United States discriminated against the Turkish Cypriots, by which he meant not recognizing them as a state. Annoyed by that kind of comment, I'd say, "Wait a minute. Why don't you tell him about all the things we are doing for the Turkish Cypriots -- the scholarships, the visas," and so forth. And he would back off, because he knew that these things were of value.

Sometimes it turned out that you could really use this. It was fascinating.

Q: Could you talk a little bit about the Turkish side of the island and how it operated? Here were people who were considered to be closer to the soil, more a group of peasants, or maybe I'm wrong.

BOEHM: Well, you are wrong. The Turkish Cypriots, as you suggested a few minutes ago, were Cypriots, along with the Greek Cypriots. They lived in a unified Cyprus, up until 1963 or 1964. In 1967 a whole series of events occurred which tended to isolate them, but for hundreds of years they had lived, mixed in with the Greeks. Both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots were rather sophisticated. They tended to be educated -- in general, better educated than people in either of the mother countries. The Cypriots were at a higher educational level, in general. There was a tradition of speaking English. Until the split came, they had gotten along very well, living near each other. Some of the older Turkish Cypriots would worry -- even those who were adamantly opposed to making major concessions to the Greeks -- that their kids didn't know Greek kids. There was no exchange. They were separated.

The older Turkish Cypriots felt that this situation, over the long term, was bad. They themselves had grown up with Greeks. They had gone to school with Greeks. Many of the officials on both sides had gone to law school in London. They knew each other from their days in law school. Many of them had gone to Gray's Inn, which seemed to be the Mecca of Cyprus law students, whether Greek or Turkish. They had these old connections. Both Cypriot groups were, I would say, above the average level for other countries. They traveled a lot. They went to London and to the United States. They moved around. They were relatively sophisticated people.

The Turkish Cypriot economy was, as I said, in fairly bad shape. It was agrarian. Of course, there were semi-literate peasants on both sides, but more on the Turkish side. They grew primarily citrus fruit and garden vegetables, but the economy on the Turkish side was rather poor. The soil was being exhausted. There was a big problem related to the salinization of the orange groves. Morphou was the center of the orange country in northern Cyprus. The land was turning salty. Too much water was being taken out of the ground. So it was getting poorer. There was a little light industry, but not much. Then there were subsidies -- grants from Turkey. These were budgetary subsidies. The economy of Turkish Cyprus functioned like the economy of virtually any country, in terms of how it worked, except for the subsidies.

I don't think that there was anything particularly remarkable about the Turkish Cypriot economy, except that the squeeze is now on, in terms of their ability to export. A lot of their foreign exchange came from exports to England. The British were under heavy pressure from the Greeks not to buy Turkish Cypriot products, which the Greek Cypriots regarded as stolen property, because a lot of it was produced on land which had been Greek and from which the Greeks had been driven out. Likewise, the tourist hotels in northern Cyprus had all been Greek owned before. The Greek Cypriots took the view that anybody who stayed in one of those hotels was purchasing stolen property. The British had been ignoring this, but just recently I read that, apparently, in the Council of Europe and in London as well, the Greeks seem to have made some headway here.

Q: The Greeks, being in the European Community, as opposed to the Turks, who are not in the European Community.

BOEHM: That's right, but I'm talking now about the Council of Europe which, of course, includes more than the European Community. If the Turkish Cypriots are unable to export, they're going to have a problem, because a good deal of their income came from selling to the British. If that market, in fact, has been cut off, this will be another problem for the Turkish Cypriots. So a lot depends on the willingness of Turkey to continue to subsidize Turkish Cyprus and keep it up to snuff. Otherwise, the Turkish Cypriots are going to be in serious economic trouble.

Q: I went to a recent meeting of Greek Cypriots in the U.S. on 25 Years of Tyranny in Cyprus. It was a very emotional meeting. One of the issues that they mentioned was that the Turks were putting a lot of colonists in Cyprus. Let's talk about the time that you were there, 1984 to 1987.

BOEHM: You couldn't get confirmation of the numbers. The Greek Cypriots tended to exaggerate the number of Turkish settlers -- you can call them colonists. They were mainland Turkish settlers. The Turkish Cypriots and Turkey tended to downplay the numbers, so that you would say that the number was somewhere between the lowest figure given by the Turkish side and the high claim on the Greek side. In any case, the number was considerable, because if you start with a population of 120,000 to 140,000 Turkish Cypriots and you add anywhere from 30,000 to 60,000 mainland Turkish settlers, depending on whose estimate you were using, that represents a pretty sizeable proportion. This was always a source of great concern on the Greek side, because they saw that northern Cyprus was becoming more and more "Turkified" and more

and more "Turkish mainlandized" -- and more and more Greek properties were under threat from the Turks coming into Cyprus. But I could never get a good figure on that. We made the best estimate that we could, which was a rough stab at it. The Turks, as I said, tended to minimize this. At least some of these people were Turkish soldiers, who had served in Cyprus. The Turks still have quite a few troops there, and they rotate them. However, as has been the case historically with many countries, when a man's term of service was up, if he wanted to stay there, he'd be given a plot of land and an allowance to help him get started. Then he could bring his family or marry a local girl, and stay. So some of these settlers -- I don't know whether it was a lot or only a few -- were Turkish soldiers. We don't have any accurate figures on them because the Turks don't want to give accurate figures. They'd be better off if they did, because it would tend to minimize the exaggerated claims of the Greek side. Quite a few of the Turkish settlers were in that category -- mustered out soldiers who chose to stay on in Cyprus.

Q: What was happening? Were you monitoring the situation to see whether the Turks were settling in for a long stay? The Turks had almost 40% of the island.

BOEHM: One of our objectives was to get the Turks to keep cutting down on the number of their troops. You couldn't ask them to pull them all out, right away, because they'd laugh at you if you did. First of all, in terms of numbers, there was a problem finding out just how many Turkish troops there were in Cyprus. We would estimate, say, 28,000. There was a Turkish Ambassador on the Turkish side. He would say, "Oh, no, it's nowhere near that." We'd say, "Well, what do you need all of these people for? Nobody's threatening them, militarily, so why not cut this force down? If it's 28,000 or whatever it is, why not cut it down to 15,000 or 18,000? That should be enough for any imaginable purpose." The Turks would draw the force down a little bit, and then there would be a political scare, and they would build the force back up again. There, again, it was hard to get reliable figures. We talked to the Turks about it and tried to get them to hold their forces down.

Q: Was the land in the northern part of the island, which had been Greek, taken over and used or settled?

BOEHM: Some of it was and some of it wasn't. It was never entirely clear to me just how much property in northern Cyprus had been Greek owned which was then included in Turkish Cyprus. How much was actually being used and how much was just sealed off and left fallow? You saw lots of buildings in Turkish Cyprus which were half or three-quarters finished, including houses that had been under construction in 1974. They had been left just standing there. Nothing had been done to them. They were just there. Those were indications that the Turkish Cypriots were not actively exploiting Greek property. On the other hand you had things like the hotel up in Kyrenia, a Greek owned hotel which had been pressed into service by the Turks. They were using it as a tourist hotel. The Greeks took a very stern view of this and said, "If you use that, you're buying stolen property." Some property undoubtedly was being used by the Turks.

Q: From what you're saying I gather that it wasn't too easy for you or your officers to go around and see what has happened to this or that property. You weren't trying to get any estimate or getting names and locations of property from Greeks and finding out what had happened to them.

BOEHM: We did, but this was done on an informal basis. We were not asked by the Greek Cypriot government to do anything about that kind of property. Churches were something else. But a Greek Cypriot friend who knew that we went to northern Cyprus or went to Kyrenia, where he had a house, might say, "The next time you're in Kyrenia, would you mind taking a look at my house? I'd like to know how it's doing." He'd give you the address and a description of how to recognize the house -- for example, it was overlooking the port of Kyrenia. We'd look at it and tell him that it looks all right. [Laughter] Yes, you did get informal requests of that kind. However, the Government of Cyprus didn't ask about that kind of thing.

There was a special problem with churches. Cyprus, like every Greek place, is covered with churches. There were some beautiful old Greek Orthodox churches in northern Cyprus. Some of them had very valuable, even priceless mosaics or frescoes. The Greeks were very much worried that some of these things were disappearing. They thought that they were being smuggled out and sold to museums, along with icons and statuary. That was a matter of official concern. Again, the Greeks really didn't ask us to do anything about it. They concentrated on making sure that the world knew that these acts of vandalism and these rip-offs were going on, as they described it. Secondly, nobody could buy these works of art. There was a famous case of an American woman who bought some Greek Cypriot religious object which had been on the Turkish side. She had to give it back and lost \$2 million in the process.

Q: Did you and your officers ever make an effort to go around to these churches as sightseers but at the same time show that these were not abandoned places, or anything like that?

BOEHM: Yes, of course. All of us went from time to time -- sometimes fairly often -- to northern Cyprus on weekends or holidays. Actually, I didn't specifically send people out to make a survey of Greek Orthodox churches in Turkish Cyprus. However, people from the Embassy would go out on the weekends to visit them. Many of them were well worth visiting. When they came back, they would report on what they had seen -- whether the church and its frescoes were falling apart, whether it was being maintained, or that kind of thing. So we had a kind of feel for how these things were.

Q: I was wondering whether the American presence -- and the presence of the British and other Western representatives -- made some kind of impact on the activities of the Turks.

BOEHM: That is a matter for speculation. What would the Turks have done if nobody had been looking? Turkey itself might be an example of how the Turkish Cypriots would act. Turkey sees not only the cultural but also the economic value of the antiquities with which it is loaded to the point of almost sinking into the sea, in terms of tourism. The Turkish Cypriots are no less sophisticated in that regard. I think that they would preserve what is valuable. Probably, they wouldn't pay too much attention to the Greek Orthodox churches, but at the same time I think that they would recognize that there was a potential value there. At least, they would recognize that they shouldn't actively destroy these works of religious art.

Q: You did not have something equivalent to what, at other times, Islamic fundamentalists did -- going around and...

BOEHM: Not at the time that I was in Cyprus. At an earlier period, probably at the time of the 1974 invasion of Cyprus, if I may use that word, headstones in Greek cemeteries in northern Cyprus were knocked over, curiously enough. There was a Greek cemetery near Kyrenia. Contiguous to it and behind it was a British cemetery. You would go up through the Greek cemetery through a gate -- which was always open -- to the British cemetery. Most of the headstones in the Greek cemetery had been knocked over or broken. This was probably done at the time that the Turks came into northern Cyprus in 1974 -- perhaps by Turkish military people. At the time I was in Cyprus, this wasn't going on.

Then, of course, there were some magnificent, classical Greek remains up there in northern Cyprus which we would visit. They were maintained, as I say, as tourist attractions. Probably, the Greek Cypriots would disagree with what I am saying and would make charges against the Turkish Cypriots. However, my impression is that they were not actively destroying or damaging these things. On the other hand, and to the contrary, to the extent that these things were potentially valuable from the touristic point of view, they were more or less maintained. The Turkish Cypriots had very limited resources, so they couldn't do very much.

Q: What about the problem of the five missing Americans? We're still talking about missing Americans from the Korean War. This has been a major political issue in connection with the Vietnam situation.

BOEHM: It's still there. The most famous case was that of a young man named Andrew Kasapis. It was a very sad case. Kasapis was a young American kid, born in the United States. His parents had come from Cyprus, but they were also American citizens. He was a college student. In the summer of 1974 he had gone to Cyprus to visit relatives -- sort of finding his roots. He just had the bad luck to be there when the Turkish troops came sweeping in. He was reportedly taken away by Turkish soldiers, subsequently disappeared, and was never seen again. The question is, "What happened to Andrew Kasapis?" That was 20 years ago. There was one report from another Greek Cypriot who had been taken to Turkey at that time and put in jail there. Eventually, he was released. He claimed to have heard, while in jail, from an adjacent cell, somebody shouting, "My name is Andrew Kasapis. Tell people I'm here." When you read the full documentation available, it's hard to see how he could have been sure what he heard. But you had this claim. Other circumstantial evidence suggested that Andrew Kasapis had been killed, that he was dead and had been buried in some unmarked grave. A lot of people were killed at that time -- both Greeks and Turks. Sometimes, they were buried in mass graves.

But this was a live issue. Mr. Kasapis [Andrew's father] is determined to pursue this matter. Understandably, he continues to hope that his son may be alive and that the Turks are still holding him. However, he believes that with the passage of time the Turks are afraid to release him, because of the opprobrium they would incur if they did. It's a tragic situation. Mr. Kasapis has a lot of support in this from the Greek Lobby and from Greek organizations, the most significant of which is called AHEPA -- the American Hellenic Educational something or other.

Q: Probably Protective Association.

BOEHM: AHEPA is a powerful interest group.

Q: *Philanthropic, I think.*

BOEHM: Philanthropic -- that's right. So this case remains alive. I did discuss it several times with the Turkish Cypriots and with Denktash, asking them to make another effort to find out what happened. I said, "There must be people around who would know something about this." The Turkish Cypriots, of course, didn't like to talk about this case. Their response to this kind of representation would be, "Yes, there are 2,500 missing Greek Cypriots, including your Americans. What about the 1,600 missing Turkish Cypriots? Nobody ever talks about that. So don't bother us about it, unless you're prepared to show equal concern for the missing Turkish Cypriots." So it was hard to engage them on this subject. They didn't want to talk about it. I would insist on Denktash's discussing it and urge him to try to resolve this case. He finally agreed that he would. The Turkish Cypriots then located a couple of former soldiers whose units had been in that area. They were prepared to say that they had seen Andrew Kasapis being taken off by other soldiers. They said, as I recall, that they had heard some shots, and the other soldiers returned without Andrew. This would be circumstantial evidence, that Andrew had been killed by persons no longer traceable.

That's the way I recall it, Stuart. I want to say right now, for the record, that when I am discussing specific incidents of this kind which happened some time ago, I have no documentation with me, and I could be getting some of my facts a little bit wrong. I want to make that clear that on this, and other occasions as well, I wouldn't want to be pinned down to making misstatements. I might not have this absolutely correct. But that's the general tenor of my recollections.

Q: *Were you offering to send in graves registration people and all of that?*

BOEHM: I think that either we did or somebody offered to send in special investigators. I don't recall that. If we did make that proposal, I don't think that the Turkish Cypriots agreed to it. Anyhow, Denktash did as much as he could to try to get this case off the table, but it is not off the table. Only a few weeks ago I saw the name of Andrew Kasapis again. His father is still...

Q: *It was mentioned by a Greek-American member of Congress from Florida.*

BOEHM: That's right. That's what it was.

Q: *What was your view and what were you getting from [the American Embassy in] Athens? The Greeks started this whole process. I was in Athens at the time in 1974. Before that, the Greeks were sending troops in and messing around. Let's stick to the time you were in Cyprus, 1984-1987. How did you view what the Greeks on the mainland were doing? Andreas Papandreou was...*

BOEHM: Andreas came into office during my tour in Cyprus. We lived through the Greek election campaign when Andreas was elected and became Prime Minister. Everybody was wondering how this was going to play in Cyprus. Certainly, in terms of his public presentation,

Andreas was even more militant than his predecessors. He visited Cyprus. It was the first time that a Greek Prime Minister had visited Cyprus for a long, long time. He came over to Cyprus. He never talked about Enosis, of course, but it was very clear that as far as he was concerned, Pan-Hellenism was his bag. When he looked around the Mediterranean and the Aegean, all he could see was Greece, Greek civilization, and the Greek Orthodox religion. So Cyprus, in his view, was part of a vast, Pan-Hellenic civilization. As I recall it, he never mentioned this in a political sense. He didn't talk about Enosis, which would have been a political union between Cyprus and Greece. But people probably thought that, in the back of his mind, he wouldn't mind Enosis, if an opportunity came up to achieve it. [Laughter]

His election was kind of a setback for hopes that there might be some solution to this, but the atmospherics weren't right for it. Andreas Papandreou was spoiling for a fight with the Turks. He didn't want good relations with Turkey. He wanted bad relations with Turkey, and Cyprus was part of that whole conflict. He was interested in other things: air space, the islands, the continental shelf, and the whole bag of difficulties between Greece and Turkey. This was fine with Papandreou. He wanted to lean on the Turks.

Q: Was this just talk? I'm not talking about the Greek Cypriots but the mainland Greeks. They were putting officers into Cyprus. Was there any of this kind of messing around?

BOEHM: Yes, they were there. The Cypriot armed forces were under Greek control -- I mean, under the control of Greeks from the mainland. There was a mainland Greek general in Cyprus. Then there was a small contingent -- actually Greek, not Greek Cypriot. Just as there was a Turkish contingent, provided for under the London and Paris agreements under which Cyprus gained its independence from the British. So the mainland Greeks were very much involved, and I use the term "Pro-Consul" advisedly in talking about the Greek Ambassador in Nicosia. The Greek Ambassador in Nicosia had a status that was quite different from the rest of us ambassadors. He was consulted, and his views were regarded with great seriousness, when it came to how the Greek Cypriots were going to play this or that foreign policy issue. He didn't meddle too much in Greek Cypriot internal affairs, but he was expected to appear on patriotic occasions. He would be received as a powerful personage, like the Emperor Constantine.

Q: How about on foreign policy? Did you find yourself going around with a shopping list before every UN General Assembly session? How did you find them?

BOEHM: Yes, of course we did that, as every other American Embassy did. We received the same instructions that every other Embassy received, with a list of what were considered to be the important issues. We'd go over these with the Greek Cypriots. I should have mentioned -- I didn't mean to avoid this question, but you asked me about our interests in Cyprus. I neglected to mention the location of Cyprus near Lebanon and Israel.

We don't have any military bases in Cyprus. The British still have what are called Sovereign Base Areas in two locations in Cyprus. They belong to the British. This is legally British sovereign territory, under the agreements that gave Cyprus its independence.

Q: Like Guantánamo Bay.

BOEHM: Except that it's not held under a 99-year lease. These are permanent British base areas -- as long as it lasts. Some day the British will probably give them up. But they've got these two areas now. It's sovereign British territory, not leased, as Guantanamo Bay is. From time to time we've been able to use those British bases for purposes with which the British have agreed, involving the movement of U. S. military personnel. And, of course, we've been able to use Cyprus' own civilian airport, when Lebanon got to be a big problem and when our Embassy in Lebanon was living under a state of siege and didn't have access to Beirut International Airport. When we had to support the Embassy in Beirut by helicopter from outside, Cyprus was the place from which we did it. We used the Cyprus commercial airport. We didn't use the British bases for this purpose. So that took negotiations with the Greek Cypriots. And they were very cooperative. We found that when such emergencies come along and you had something that had to be done quickly -- staging military or other aircraft through Nicosia -- the Cypriot government would cooperate very well and very promptly. They would respond quickly.

Q: How did the Cypriot Government behave on UN votes? Where did Cyprus stand?

BOEHM: Cyprus tended to view UN votes as it did everything else: in terms of the Cyprus problem and whether the countries involved which had an interest in this issue or that issue would support Cyprus. Cyprus is a member of the [British] Commonwealth, like other former British colonies and dominions. When Cyprus came up on the Commonwealth agenda -- and it is always on the agenda at all of these international meetings -- Cyprus tended to swap its votes on "your" issue if you vote for Cyprus on "our" issue. There were plenty of issues on which we and the Cypriots did not agree. Where there was no such involvement, the Cypriots tended to vote like most civilized Western countries.

Q: What about the Soviets? This was still several years before the sudden fall of the Soviet empire. Cyprus was an important area as a way to get between two allies, Greece and Turkey on the flank of NATO. What were the Soviets doing in Cyprus?

BOEHM: They had an embassy there, and it was one of the larger missions -- not huge, but fairly large. When I arrived in Cyprus, the Soviet ambassador had been there for 12 years. He was Dean of the Diplomatic Corps. He was an old-fashioned type of Soviet ambassador. He didn't speak Greek or English or Turkish. He wasn't out and around. He wasn't a bustling type of ambassador. He had been there forever, as I said. He was perfectly amiable. He would smile, but not very much. He was a very stern and withdrawn type.

We were witnessing a strange change about this time. All of a sudden, all of those old-style Soviet ambassadors disappeared and were replaced by these young, bright, English-speaking people. That happened in Cyprus. This old ambassador disappeared, and in came a new guy, who was about 35 years old. He was very bright, amiable, and fun to be with. He used to go to all of the parties. He spoke excellent English. He chatted people up. A total revolution.

The Russians looked at Cyprus as a soft spot in NATO. This was fine with them, but they weren't doing much. There was a Cypriot Communist Party. The Soviets would help the Communist Party, but this never became a serious threat.

Q: Speaking of the Communist Party, the Cypriot Communists at one point were considered one of the more dangerous groups around. I'm talking about shooting people and so forth. One of our Ambassadors to Cyprus, Rodger Davies, was assassinated. How did you feel about the situation by the time you got there?

BOEHM: Well, there was a great preoccupation with security.

Q: It was Cypriot policemen, wasn't it?

BOEHM: I don't know whether they were policemen, but it was said to be known who they were. For one reason or another -- and I'm not sure what the reason is -- they've never been brought to justice. Right after Rodger Davies was shot -- and he'd only been in Cyprus for about a month, poor Rodger -- another ambassador was temporarily sent in, and then he was replaced. The Government of Cyprus, partly in an effort to atone for what had been done, assigned six Cyprus cops as bodyguards for the American Ambassador. When I arrived there 10 years later, they were still assigned there -- all six of them, and they were the same guys. They had been doing this for 10 years. They were marvelous guys. I got to know them very well, because they were with me for three years.

Q: All the time? Even when you went into Turkish territory?

BOEHM: No, they couldn't go there. Sometimes I'd go up to Turkish Cyprus to be by himself. Luckily, they were fine men, very amiable and efficient. They tried not to be too obtrusive, but, like any group of six people, they had different personalities. Some of them were more obtrusive than others. I had them, and there was an obsession with security. But by the time I got to Cyprus the threat was not from the Cypriot communists or any other Cypriots. It was from Arab terrorists. There were Lebanese and other terrorists running around and shooting each other, and it was a question of how much protection I needed.

I found this very heavy security somewhat oppressive. I had been there three months when I concluded that maybe we did not need all these bodyguards. So one day I was at the airport, seeing off President Kyprianou, who was going off to New York for one of his periodic trips for a meeting with the UN Secretary General. The chief of police was also present. He said, "How are things going?" I said, "Fine. By the way, I've been wondering whether I really need all this security." His eyes lit up. It was costing him six cops, you see, and it had been going on for 10 years. He said, "Really?" He almost began to drool at the prospect of getting his cops back. So I began to think that maybe I had been a little hasty. I said that I had been thinking about this. I said that if I decided to take the matter further, I would get back to him.

Well, I was really thinking about it. Before I could do anything about it -- I would probably have had to get Washington's agreement -- there was a terrorist incident. Somebody was shot three blocks away from the Embassy. I knew then that the game was up and I dropped the idea. So I had these six cops throughout my stay there. I got to know them very, very well.

Q: Did you get involved at all in the Lebanese hostage business, since you were close at hand?

BOEHM: Yes, we were very much involved in the support operation, which was conducted out of Embassy Nicosia. Everything was moved through Cyprus. If, for example, the American Ambassador in Beirut wanted to leave Lebanon, he would be helicoptered over to Cyprus. I would have him come up and spend the night at my residence. Then he would go on his way the next day by commercial flight. Supplies and everything for the Embassy in Beirut went through Cyprus. So we had a Beirut support operation in Cyprus. We had to get additional people, some of whom, at least, were on the payroll of Embassy Beirut, which would have to pay to conduct this support operation. This involved primarily airplanes and coordination with the U.S. Air Force, plus the Government of Cyprus and Nicosia airport.

Q: Did you have a command post set up or anything like that?

BOEHM: We had people who spent their day down at the airport. One more thought on this subject. The question was, "Who's running things here, anyway?" Naturally, the U.S. military -- in this case EUCOM, the European Command, which was carrying out this Beirut support operation and, occasionally, other, ad hoc operations -- wanted to have its own communications with the people down at the airport. I said, "No, everything has to go through and be controlled by the Embassy. You communicate with us, and we'll communicate with the airport." We had a big struggle over this.

I was making a trip to Europe anyway and I went to Stuttgart and called on the "DCINC," as he is known -- the Deputy Commander in Chief of the European Command, who actually commands the operation, because the Commander is also the NATO commander and spends his time doing that in Belgium. The DCINC actually commanded EUCOM, and he happened to be a National War College classmate of mine -- Dick Lawson, an Air Force four-star general. I went to Stuttgart while in Europe and went to see him. I spent the night at his house, and we argued this thing out.

He wanted to have his own communications. I explained why I didn't want him to have that. He finally agreed to do it the way I wanted to do it, reserving the right to reopen the question if it didn't work to his satisfaction.

Q: What was the issue?

BOEHM: The issue was whether or not the military command in Germany could communicate directly with the military people at the airport in Cyprus or whether they would communicate with the Embassy, and we would do the rest. I felt that it was essential to keep control over these operations. I didn't want people coming in and free lancing. That's been my consistent view everywhere.

Q: And it happens. You can get by for a while, and all of a sudden, something happens.

BOEHM: You're in a foreign country, and we [in the Embassy] know how to get things done in the way which will make it possible for us to continue to operate. I've seen this happen repeatedly, because I had a lot of political-military experience. If you let the military decide

themselves how and when to do things, they wind up shooting themselves in the foot in a foreign country. They don't take sufficient account of the need to respect the sovereignty of a country and to arrange things in a certain way so that the foreign country continues to find their presence acceptable. An Embassy knows how to do that. Our military -- through no fault of their own because, after all, that's not what they're trained for -- often don't know how to do it. It's a matter of getting the job done.

Q: It's not a matter of ego or prestige.

BOEHM: No. It's a matter, it seems to me, of asserting the proper role of the Department of State in dealing with foreign governments. Those were the principles and practical aspects of what I was trying to do.

Q: You left Cyprus in 1987. What did you do next?

BOEHM: When the time came for me to leave Cyprus, I was asked by the Department what I wanted to do next. I said that I'd like to have another embassy. They said, "Well, you can't have one right now -- maybe in a year. What would you like to do for a year, pending a possible embassy?" I said, "Well, I'd like to do something that I haven't done before." This was an exchange with George Vest, who was then Director General of the Foreign Service. George, of course, was a very cultivated man. His style was beautiful and witty. George said, "Well, it's going to be a choice between the Elysian Fields and the Augean Stables." From then on he would slug his messages "Elysian Fields," and I would slug mine, the "Augean Stables." He came back and said, "Well, look, I know that you said that you don't want to do anything that you've done before, but you've done everything. You've been on the Board of Examiners, you've been an inspector, and a diplomat in residence. Would you consider, even though you've done it before, the position of diplomat in residence at Howard University in Washington?" That was fine. I replied, "This is the only position of diplomat in residence that I would consider, and, yes, I would accept it." So I spent the year 1987 to 1988 as diplomat in residence at Howard.

ROBERT V. KEELEY
Ambassador
Athens, Greece (1985-1989)

Robert V. Keeley was born in 1929 in Lebanon of American parents, his father was a Foreign Service officer. As a Foreign Service officer he was posted to Jordan, Mali, Greece, Uganda, Cambodia, and was ambassador to Mauritius, Zimbabwe and Greece. The interview was done by Thomas Stern in 1991.

Q: Were there some difficult moments during your tour related to the Greek-Turkish tensions?

KEELEY: Yes, there were. It was almost constant. The relationship seemed to be deteriorating. That struck me particularly, because historically I could go back far enough to remember when Greek-Turkish relations were very good. I refer to the immediate post-World War II period. As I

mentioned earlier, the Greeks at that time were more concerned about their Northern borders, not their Eastern. But by the mid-80s, the relationship had deteriorated as a result of Cyprus and other issues, such as the Aegean Sea. We became heavily engaged in the relationship when war between the two seemed possible, if not inevitable. That was in March 1987.

The tension at that time arose over a very dicey issue: the potential nationalization of the foreign petroleum exploration and production consortium in the northern Aegean Sea. The company that was doing the work was primarily Canadian owned, but also had two American investor partners and that made the problem of direct concern to us. This company had a concession near the island of Thasos. At a certain point in time, part of the concession was about to expire if the company didn't proceed to exploit it, and the company announced that it would begin to drill. The area of the concession was in dispute between Greece and Turkey, the continental shelf in that area. The Turks had threatened before that if there were to be any drilling that would be a cause for intervention to stop it. The history of the dispute and the concession is very complex. The Greek government threatened to nationalize the company to prevent the drilling.

We, by necessity, jumped in with both feet, trying to work out a compromise between the petroleum company and the Greek government. That intervention was eventually successful. I played a much greater role in that than anyone has realized because the Minister of Industry, Sakis Peponis, was a friend of mine from my previous tour in Greece and I kind of traded on that friendship (he was the official who had announced the potential nationalization of the company). We realized that the Greeks had arrived at that position because the company was about to act in ways contrary to Greek national interests and that might have started a war between the Turks and the Greeks. So the Greeks wanted to gain enough control over the company to enable them to make the final decision on where and when drilling would begin. From our point of view, the Greek action would have been expropriation, which had roused the ire of stockholders and may have provoked some U.S. sanctions.

After a lot of negotiations with the Minister, we agreed that the issue should be turned over to two mediators. Part of the problem, which went unspoken on my part, was that my friend, the Minister, did not get along at all with the Canadian company representative; they were just oil and water; they could barely speak to each other. So we hoped that if each could have a representative, that might make it easier to reach a resolution. The Greeks appointed George Koumandos, another old friend, who was a constitutional lawyer and a professor at the law school. He was also a friend of the Minister. The Canadian company chose Bill Vanden Heuvel, a former American Ambassador who had at one time headed our mission to the U.N. office in Geneva. He was a New York lawyer. The two mediators met numerous times. I sent Vanden Heuvel innumerable messages through the State Department. The negotiations took many, many months, but eventually they fashioned a compromise which settled the issue. Some additional shares were given to the Greek government; the company got its concession renewed.

But in the middle of all this, a terrible misunderstanding between the Greeks and the Turks arose. It was mostly the fault of John Kapsis, whom I mentioned earlier. As I have said, at one stage during this prolonged period, the company announced that it would begin drilling; the Greeks said "No;" the Turks threatened to take action. The Turks sent a ship carrying sonar equipment called the "Piri Reis" into the Aegean. In an earlier crisis they had used a ship named the

"Sismik." The exploration was about to take place in the contested area. Within 48 hours, everyone was frantic; the Greeks put their military on alert and sent their planes to the islands. It looked like war was coming. I immediately engaged myself in the issue, under instructions from the Department, though I didn't need any instructions to do what I did. I raced around town; I talked to Kapsis; I talked to various Ministers; I talked to the Canadian Ambassador about what the company was doing; I even talked to the Turkish Ambassador.

All of that resulted in my being able to figure out that the tensions had arisen from a complete misunderstanding stemming from a meeting that had taken place between the Turkish Ambassador, Akiman, and Kapsis, the Deputy Foreign Minister. The Turkish Ambassador had reported to Ankara after the meeting that Kapsis had allegedly said that the Greeks would drill where and when they damn pleased and the Turks had nothing to say about it. This was understood in Ankara as a blatant threat by the Greek government to take unilateral action, which led the Turks to believe that the Greek government was ordering the Canadian-led consortium to drill. The facts, of course, were the exact opposite; the Greeks were ordering the company not to drill. But Kapsis, who was notoriously hot-tempered about Turkey (his family had fled from Asia Minor in the 1922 debacle), was blustering and telling off the Turks via their Ambassador in Athens. So there was a complete misunderstanding about the true state of affairs.

At 3 a.m. I was awakened by a call from the State Department, telling me that war was imminent and that I should do something. Somehow, I got Kapsis on the phone; he was actually in his office at that hour. I had earlier reported to Washington what the Turkish Ambassador and Kapsis had separately told me. I told Kapsis, under instructions, what the Turkish Ambassador had reported to Ankara and explained that that was why the Turks were being aggressive. I pointed out that I thought that was not what Kapsis had probably meant to say and that therefore he should call the Turkish Ambassador and straighten things out. He did that and by 6 a.m. the misunderstanding was straightened out. We didn't get a lot of credit for our intervention, but it was a good illustration of the kind of matter you get involved in. Fortunately, Mr. Ozal, the Turkish President, then the Prime Minister, is a very level headed man. He certainly didn't want war; the Greeks considered him bellicose, but I thought he handled that situation very well. He happened to be in London at the time of this particular episode. We were able to contact him there and talk to him. He finally issued a statement on the critical evening that if the Greeks didn't drill, then the Turks would not need to take any action. That statement calmed the situation entirely. The Greeks called down their alert and the relationship returned to its normal level, hostile but at least peaceful.

That was the most critical moment during my tour. The rest of the time the Greek-Turkish relationship was marked by a lot of rhetoric, which seemed to get worse every month, until the "Davos process" started, at which time we really took a back seat.

JOHN NIX
Deputy Chief of Mission
Nicosia (1987-1990)

John Nix was born in Alabama in 1938. He attended the U.S. Military Academy and served in the U.S. Army from 1960 to 1971 as a major overseas. Upon entering the Foreign Service in 1971, his assignments abroad have included Nairobi, Moscow, Nicosia, Athens and Berlin. Mr. Nix was interviewed in 1994 by Raymond Ewing.

Q: What did you do in Nicosia this time?

NIX: I was paneled as DCM in Nicosia. I went over to replace, as it turned out, the then ambassador, Dick Bohm, because our nominated ambassador, Bill Perrin, had not been confirmed. The DCM had already departed. Ambassador Bohm and I had a week overlap. He left. I looked around and there I was, just me. Very few others were around. No DCM under me, of course. No admin. officer. No consular officer. One political officer because the senior political officer had just resigned to get married. That was it. We had the presidential election coming up in a month or so. Of course, we were still responsible for the ongoing day to day support of Lebanon, which had greatly expanded since my previous tour in Cyprus. So, it was a challenge. I really enjoyed it. I must say, you get intensely involved in every aspect of running an embassy when you have a situation like that.

Q: Let's talk first about Lebanon for a second. The situation there, you say, was even more demanding on Embassy Nicosia, but it was not so much supporting the U.S. military as supporting the embassy, is that correct?

NIX: Supporting the embassy, yes. We were doing just about everything for them when I arrived. We were getting the mail. We were getting provisions for them. When I arrived, they were basically confined to their embassy compound. They had almost no freedom to move around in Lebanon. By that time, we had a fairly large detachment of U.S. Army helicopters stationed at the British sovereign base areas and they were going over three or four times a week, flying over to Lebanon to take people in, supplies in, bring people out, bring out whatever needed to be brought out.

Q: And they had been moved to the British base at Akrotiri, presumably because of security concerns?

NIX: Yes. That did not take place while I was there, but I understand there were some threats which were perceived as serious enough to get the British and the Cypriot government to agree to let the helicopters be stationed on the British bases.

Q: I assume that before too long, you got a political officer and a consular officer and an admin. officer?

NIX: You'd be surprised. It took a year. The admin. officer came after two months, but the political officer didn't come until the next assignment cycle the next summer, and neither did the consular officer.

Q: And the ambassador?

NIX: The ambassador didn't either. He came a year later.

Q: *When he was finally confirmed.*

NIX: It took him a year to get confirmed. He arrived, in June of 1988.

Q: *Of course, there was an election coming up.*

NIX: The election in Cyprus was an exciting period. That was in November of '87. When I arrived, I found the political situation intriguing. It had changed so much since I had left four years earlier, but in another respect, so little. Cyprus is small enough so that a person, just based on his personal stature, has the potential to rise in national politics quickly. Nowhere was this proven in a better way than in George Vassiliou, who quickly seemed to have become the favorite in the race for President of Cyprus. I had known George very well in my previous tour. He was always a very cogent commentator on politics and very disparaging, let's say, of the current political situation in Cyprus. But I never discerned his political aspirations at that time.

Q: *Because at that time, that earlier period, he was not involved in politics at all. He was a businessman.*

NIX: He was a businessman. I'll say a word about his background, which I think is really interesting. George's parents were both communist doctors who were on the Greek communist side during the civil war in Greece. They were Cypriots, but they were there to fight with the communists. When the communists were defeated and withdrew into Yugoslavia, George eventually was brought back to Cyprus by a very circuitous route through Rhodes and Turkey. He grew up in Limassol. He was actually expelled from school in Limassol because he refused to swear the standard oath of allegiance to Greece because of the Enosis connotations. That was back in the '50s, when the rebellion against the British was taking place. So, George left Cyprus to study abroad. He went to secondary school in Budapest and to this day speaks fluent Hungarian. He also studied in Switzerland, at university. I mention this to raise the question, how could a person like this, with this type of background, appeal to a westernized community like the Greek Cypriots? The way he did it, I think, was that he came back and became a huge success. He became a millionaire businessman. He became a pollster, a public opinion consultant. He had a lot of business contracts throughout the Middle East. He became very wealthy. He built one of the most beautiful modern office buildings in Nicosia. He was a local legend. But again, what was interesting in the Cypriot political context is, even though he became a successful businessman and apparently left behind his leftist youth, the first thing that happened that launched him on the path to the presidency was that AKEL, the Communist Party of Cyprus, announced that they were choosing him as their political candidate.

Q: *Even though he was not a member of AKEL.*

NIX: As far as I know, he was not a member, but I guess just because of his family lineage and so forth. AKEL had always supported Kyprianou, but they had broken and become very distant in the latter stages of this Kyprianou administration.

Q: AKEL also had always, I think, supported a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus question, certainly didn't want to see either Greek Cyprus come in closer to Greece or a partition arrangement (Cyprus somehow becoming part of NATO).

NIX: That's true, but another interesting thing about AKEL was that they had always made concerted efforts to be on the winning side. They had always supported Makarios and they supported Kyprianou. Now, suddenly, we found them supporting a candidate out of left field. Even today, I still think that was a great risk on their part. I don't think there is any way... You could go back to those days and just like trying to find someone who predicted the Wall would fall. But I don't think many would have predicted that George Vassiliou was going to win that election when he originally signed up with AKEL.

Q: How did he manage to do that? AKEL doesn't have that many votes.

NIX: No, they don't have that many. It was a narrow thing. Cyprus has the "two Sunday" electoral system. On the first Sunday, all of the recognized candidates run, and on the second Sunday, a week later, the two leading candidates, the two who achieved the highest percentages in the first round, have runoff election. The big task is to get into the runoff. The magic number, is about 32-33% of the vote. If you can get that many...

Q: To finish either first or second.

NIX: Yes. The major contenders again were the well-known names of Glafkos Clerides, Vassos Lyssarides, Spyros Kyprianou, and now George Vassiliou. During that period, Kyprianou had a heart attack. He couldn't campaign. Basically, he came back-

Q: He was then the incumbent President.

NIX: He was the incumbent President. Basically, he came back just in time to make a speech at a major rally in Nicosia just before the election. But there were some doubts about his health. I think that had an impact. Another thing was, I have to say, maybe I had a small impact. George Vassiliou did not have a good reputation here in the United States because of the fact that AKEL was supporting him. I arranged a trip for him to the United States at his request. I managed to get some appointments for him in the State Department and at the NSC. He also called on influential Senators and Congressmen.

Q: This was before the-

NIX: Before the election. Towny Friedman helped me out a lot on this because he was the Office Director in EUR/SE at the time. The point was, we just felt that George was looking for a negotiated settlement to the Cyprus problem. We weren't taking sides in the election. But we felt it was unfair to rule him out just because he was being supported by AKEL. He was being criticized unfairly at the time by his opponents as a person who, if he were elected with AKEL support, would not be able to deal with the United States, would not be able to deal with the West, would not have good relations with the EU. So, we proved that this was not true. I also ensured that whenever we had visitors from the United States (Congressmen and so forth), and a

lot of them came in that brief two month period, I always managed to convince them to go see Vassiliou. A lot of them didn't want to do it. One, because they hadn't heard of him. Two, if they had heard of him, they had heard he was a communist stooge. He was a very good communicator. I think when he met with these people, he convinced everybody he met with that he was a serious, middle of the road politician.

Q: I remember one of the last things I did when I left Cyprus in 1984 was to go with him to tour his not yet finished office building. I certainly also could see in him a good friend and a person that I felt at the time was interested in a practical approach and realized that cooperation in some way with the Turkish community had to be part of Cyprus' future if it was ever to come back together in some way. But I also share your view of that period. I would not have predicted that he would be in politics or certainly an elected President of Cyprus. You mentioned this two round system. Who was the other one who came out of the first round?

NIX: The first round was very, very close. Clerides always makes it into the second round because he has stable conservative support. It was a given that he was going to get in. The battle was really between Vassiliou and Kyprianou. Vassiliou just edged out Kyprianou by the narrowest of margins. It was a tremendous upset that he did make it into the second round.

Q: And then did Kyprianou support him or did Kyprianou's voters support him in the second round?

NIX: Kyprianou maintained that he was not taking a position. But we don't know what went on behind the scenes. The way the percentages broke down in the runoff, it appeared that most of Kyprianou's voters went to Vassiliou. As I've told you before, the real battle in the first round is to get into the second round. Vassiliou knew that he wasn't running against Clerides. He couldn't get any votes from Clerides. He ran against Kyprianou. His criticisms, his, if you will, denigrating comments and so forth throughout the campaign were all directed at Kyprianou. Most of his critical comments were directed at the point that "Kyprianou has been President for all these years and how much progress do we have toward resolving the Cyprus problem? None. I will do it." He promised the people of Cyprus that "I will have a new approach. I will establish a new relationship with Denktash." I had confidence in Vassiliou. The British High Commission felt the same way. I thought that the best hope for negotiating a settlement to the Cyprus problem would have to come from Vassiliou. It's not that I ruled out Clerides. I just didn't think Clerides had a chance to win.

Q: Kyprianou had been President for about 10 years since succeeding Makarios in '77.

NIX: Yes, he had been President then until '87.

Q: Were there any former Kyprianou supporters, significant figures, who supported Vassiliou in the second round?

NIX: A distinguished politician named Christodoulos Veniamin, who had been the Minister of Interior and Defense for Kyprianou, swung over to Vassiliou. He had already broken with Kyprianou and left the Ministry. Vassiliou laughingly told me many times, "My little troika, we

meet every morning to plan strategy. It's me, Veniamin, and the leader of AKEL (Papaioanou at the time)." But many other distinguished people rallied to him, like Nikos Rolandis, who I mentioned earlier had been the Foreign Minister of Cyprus.

Q: Who had broken with Kyprianou some years before.

NIX: Yes, he had broken with Kyprianou in '83.

Q: What about the business community?

NIX: The business community, I think, pretty much supported whomever they had supported before. I don't think they saw a great difference from the business standpoint in Kyprianou, Vassiliou, and Clerides. They had nothing against Vassiliou. They saw him as a successful member of their community. I think they gave him a fair shake. He made overtures to the business community. He promised that he would do more to help the business community.

Q: So, George Vassiliou was elected.

NIX: He was elected, very narrowly. Let me just mention that between the two Sundays, Vassiliou made a deal with Lyssarides, an adamant rejectionist of a negotiated settlement, in order to get the support that he needed to win the runoff. They signed a document which basically committed Vassiliou to what I would say was a continuation of the Kyprianou policy, more or less, on the Cyprus question. I had managed to get the State Department to give me a pre-approved letter of communications from the President to Vassiliou. At about midnight, I went down to his modest home in Nicosia, and knocked on his door. He answered the door personally, and I gave him the congratulatory letter from President Reagan.

Q: So, what happened? He didn't solve the Cyprus problem because of this agreement with Lyssarides?

NIX: I can't really say. He certainly got off on a bad footing because of that. Denktash-

Q: At what point was that known, before the second round?

NIX: It was in the paper. Lyssarides made it clear. He made sure that it would be published. It got Vassiliou off on the wrong foot with Mr. Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot community leader. I just think the chemistry was bad between the two of them from the beginning.

Q: Unlike Kyprianou or even more so, Clerides, Denktash, the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, had never known George Vassiliou before. He was probably as surprised by his emergence as ruler.

NIX: I think you're right. He was certainly expecting either to continue to deal with Kyprianou or to deal with Clerides, not with an unknown quantity, as it were. He was probably a little cautious in the first few meetings because he didn't know what to expect from Vassiliou.

Q: They were of different generations, of different orientations in the sense that Vassiliou was not a barrister, a lawyer, as some others are.

NIX: Clerides, Kyprianou and Denktash are all lawyers who studied in England. Denktash was a Queen's Counselor (QC) under the British.

Q: So, you continued to be chargé d'affaires for some period of time.

NIX: For that year, yes.

Q: After the election.

NIX: That's right. We tried to take advantage of the atmosphere surrounding the election to help promote some progress toward a Cyprus settlement. But I have to say that it didn't get anywhere. There were a couple of times when we thought we were on the verge. The UN had a series of proposals, I remember once, which Denktash's closest advisor told me they would accept. Then when Denktash saw them on the table, he turned them down.

Q: The proposals were actually presented to both sides by the United Nations representatives?

NIX: Both sides. The Greek Cypriots accepted them, but Mr. Denktash turned them down. But some other exciting things happened these times. We got involved heavily in those days in counterterrorism and counternarcotics activities in the embassy. We were handling a lot of regional activities. During this period, the terrorist Fawaz Younis was lured out of Lebanon into Cyprus and thence onto a yacht which carried him outside of Cypriot territorial waters. Another yacht was there with U.S. FBI agents on it. They arrested Younis and then delivered him to a U.S. aircraft carrier. He was put on a U.S. plane, flown back to the United States through international air space, tried in the United States, convicted, and is still in jail here today. That was a groundbreaking case in those days. I think he was the first terrorist that we were able actually to seize abroad and get back to the United States without on the way coming afoul of some kind of diplomatic or evidentiary problems. It took an awful lot of planning.

Then, of course, the drug problem was really hitting the Eastern Mediterranean in those days. We had some regional responsibility- (end of tape)

Q: Today is the fifth of March. I'm Ray Ewing. John, we were just starting to talk a little bit about the anti-narcotics work of the embassy in Nicosia.

NIX: Through the Chief of the DEA office in the Embassy, we managed to get exceedingly close cooperation going with the Cypriot police force in this area. As a matter of fact, the person who at that time was his counterpart in Counternarcotics is now the chief of police in Cyprus. I'm glad to see we didn't hurt his career! At any rate, we tried to use Cyprus as a hub to try to interdict the narcotics traffic in the eastern Mediterranean.

We found that a lot of interesting things were going on in those days. For example, in Northern Cyprus, a narcotics pipeline had been set up leading from Pakistan to London. DEA managed to get a trafficker who was using that pipeline rather regularly to come from Pakistan to Northern Cyprus. Then, his contact, who was in fact an agent for the Embassy DEA chief, invited him out to dinner. The British Forces took away the signs which warned in the North that you were leaving the Turkish Cypriot section and going into the British bases. The DEA agent brought the trafficker into the British base to an officers' club near Famagusta. They had dinner. After leaving, they parted company. Our contact said to the trafficker, "You can find your way back all right, right?" "I'll take a taxi." By the time he got back to the road, the warning signs were back up and he was arrested and tried by the British, since he was also wanted in Britain and those bases are considered sovereign British territory.

Q: Let me come back to President Vassiliou for a minute. I seem to recall that I attended an event here in Washington (I don't remember exactly when it was.). It was in conjunction with his first official visit here. Do you remember when that was? You didn't come back yourself for that?
NIX: No, I didn't come back.

Q: But you had access to him, not just immediately after the election?

NIX: Oh, yes. As you well know, the Cypriot government is a fairly informal organization. A lot of people do have access to the President. I always felt I had good access, even before I was chargé, if I needed it. It's not the kind of place where you have to go through many, many barriers before you reach the President. Any time I had a visitor or anyone of that nature that would like to see the President, I can never remember being turned down. Whenever I wanted to go see him after he had had a National Council meeting or something of that nature to find out what the latest situation was, he always made time for me. He was very open.

Q: Eventually, Ambassador Perrin did get confirmed and came to Nicosia. That was when?

NIX: That was summer of '88. I would just mentioned parenthetically, before that happened, we had several visits by our Special Cyprus Coordinator. Nelson Ledsky had taken that job over. Jim Wilkinson made one visit, maybe two, in his capacity as Special Cyprus Coordinator when I first arrived. Then Nelson took it over. Nelson was the engine driving us as we supported the UN proposals that I mentioned. When he came, of course, that was a major production. I remember one night, they were arriving late, so Vassiliou invited Nelson, Towny Friedman and myself to a private dinner with his Foreign Minister, George Iacovu. The five of us sat there for about three or four hours, having dinner and just talking about what could be done. He was very informal. You could sit and talk with him for hours about the Cyprus question.

Q: But the bottom line was...

NIX: The bottom line was that political realities won out in the end. Vassiliou tried to build consensus. He was not able to build consensus, but he was able to convince Kyprianou and Lyssarides.

Q: What sort of relationship in the time that you were there did President Vassiliou have with

Glafkos Clerides, his opponent in the '87 election and then the man who would eventually succeed him?

NIX: In the beginning, they were very close. Both of them told me so. Vassiliou wouldn't consider approving something that had to do with the Cyprus question without first vetting it with Clerides, who was at the palace on a regular basis. Vassiliou would bounce ideas off Clerides and Glafkos would tell him what his opinions were. It was no secret. Glafkos did this even though he still was smarting a little bit at having been defeated by a "young upstart" like him in the election. In the sense that the man is the President, I'm a loyal Cypriot, I'll do what I can, he went down and gave him his advice freely and tried to help in a positive way, at least during my period there. Of course, that all changed when they got into the next electoral campaign.

Q: You were there about three years and left in December of 1990. Ambassador Perrin was there for not very long.

NIX: He was there for one year. He was already in bad health when he arrived. He was suffering from kidney failure. That had, of course, occasioned a host of other problems. He seemed to rally for a while after he arrived. He did get involved very, very deeply in the Cyprus problem. He figured, I think rightly, that if he could make a contribution, it would be in trying to help solve the Cyprus problem. That's the way he saw his mission. So, he developed a very close relationship with Vassiliou. He really worked hard on developing a close relationship with Denktash and did. They were on very good terms by the time he left. The other leaders, I think, all the ministers, he worked very closely with them and tried to help promote a Cyprus settlement. For whatever progress we made in that year, I'm sure he was a major contributor. He admitted up front when he talked to these people that he didn't know a lot about the eastern Mediterranean, he didn't know a lot about Cyprus, but that he would listen and give everyone a fair hearing. Denktash said right away, "Well, that's all I want, somebody who will listen and give me a fair hearing." And he did.

Q: As you say, he did leave after about a year, which would have been the summer of '89.

NIX: He stayed there almost exactly a year.

Q: Did another ambassador come right away?

NIX: No, unfortunately, Ambassador Lamb had a problem getting confirmed also. So, I was there then until the end of my tour as chargé.

Q: You were there the rest of your time in Cyprus?

NIX: Yes.

Q: What else is there to say about that period?

NIX: The only thing that really stands out in my mind is, in the last year, the Lebanon support

issue. We had to evacuate and close the embassy in Beirut.

Q: *(Inaudible) before.*

NIX: Not in my experience. This was a hasty evacuation. Our mission was to get the helicopters in without any advance notice, no warning whatsoever. As a matter of fact, the military didn't even want us to request approval from the Cypriot government because they were so afraid that that would leak.

Q: *Where were the helicopters coming from at that time?*

NIX: The helicopters were on the British base. Everybody was extracted from the embassy, the entire staff, in one flight. Not a shot was fired. They were all brought directly back to the British bases and then quickly shuffled over to Larnaca and put on planes back to the United States. Well, most of them, not all. Some of them remained in Cyprus, which I'll mention in a minute.

Q: *So, at that point, the embassy in Beirut was essentially closed down?*

NIX: As a matter of fact, they left it in the charge of one of the senior local employees. They established a Beirut embassy in exile in our embassy in Cyprus. From that time until the time I left, we had a very significant presence in the embassy from the embassy in Beirut. The security conditions did not allow them to return during the time I was there.

Q: *Not including the ambassador?*

NIX: No, the ambassador stayed for a week or two and then he eventually was moved back to the United States. The DCM, the admin. officer, communicators, a secretary, and a support officer stayed in Nicosia.

Q: *But they were under your authority or your responsibility?*

NIX: More or less. We tried to be gentlemanly about it. They never caused me any problems. I knew what my mission was. My mission was to support Beirut. We didn't get a lot of credit from EUR for doing that. But in the broader sense, I thought the embassy had a very important mission to support Beirut.

Q: *Their interest in the embassy of Nicosia was solely to keep in touch with (inaudible) to take care of...*

NIX: Yes, they had to keep in touch. They got regular reports. They had cellular telephones. They did a lot of work from there. For a long time, we had one of their political officers in our embassy. He used the phone to call people in Beirut, the cellular telephone. Everybody in Beirut had cellular phones. You have to remember, the point was, "We're only out temporarily." The idea of keeping people in Cyprus and finding out on a day to day basis what the situation was in Lebanon was to go back in as soon as possible. It was not a situation where we were just sitting back here relaxed, waiting to see what happened. They wanted to know in detail what the

situation was so that the people in Washington could decide "Yes" or "No." The decision was a very close call, but they finally decided not to reopen. The State Department, I'm sure, was in favor of reopening.

Q: Although we did reopen later on.

NIX: Eventually, after my time, yes. But even during those days, if it had been up to the State Department, we would have been reopened by Christmas.

Q: Let me ask you one other question about Cyprus, coming back away from Beirut for a minute. I know, since the time I left, which was 1983, the economy of Greek Cyprus has developed continually in areas of particular interest to American business. Was there a lot of that going on at the time you were there?

NIX: There was a lot of tourism development. I think it actually got overdeveloped, frankly. I really do. It's a very competitive industry, as we all know. The Cypriot product, if you will, has certain attractions, but in certain areas, it can't compete with the many other islands that are available in the Mediterranean. So, I think what happened is, it did get overdeveloped. There has been a little slump.

Q: What about banking?

NIX: Banking was developing very rapidly while I was there. There was a real boom in offshore company formation. There were whole law firms in Cyprus which specialized in nothing but forming offshore corporations. As we learn now, there has been a lot of money flowing out of the former Yugoslavia and Russia into Cypriot banks. I don't know if that was already happening in those days. Probably to a certain extent, but not to the extent it is today. They would like to make themselves a banking center. They have an excellent communications system. Cyprus has one of the best telephone systems, one of the best international communications systems, of any country in the Mediterranean. So, they have a lot of things going for them. Several U.S. companies have set up regional operations there. Pepsico, for example, had a big operation there. They covered the Middle East out of there. The advantage, as I said, was the communications system, the fact that from Cyprus, you could fly direct to almost any Middle East country. That's a rare thing, very rare. So, there are a lot of business advantages to Cyprus. I think they've made the most of it. They are very prosperous. They have one of the highest GNPs in the Mediterranean, one of the highest per capita incomes - much higher than Greece, for example.

Q: In short, of the three years that you were in Nicosia, from '87 to '90, you were the chief of mission about 2/3 of the time.

NIX: Two years, yes.

Q: You were there at a period when a lot of interesting things were going on both in terms of Cyprus politics...

NIX: I never got bored. There was always plenty of work and interesting work.

Q: *The embassy was very shorthanded.*

NIX: The first year, it was very shorthanded. I'll never forget that year. It had had a wonderful staff up until that summer and they just left. Everybody left and there was no one there. There were a lot of vacuums to be filled.

Q: *You could be spread very thin.*

NIX: Yes. But that's one of those times when your adrenaline level is pumping high and you don't really mind. I never left Cyprus for that year, not even for a day. I was in the embassy, I think, every day for that year.

Q: *Cyprus can be a small place.*

NIX: Yes, it can.

NELSON C. LEDSKY
Ambassador, Cyprus Coordinator
Washington, DC (1989-1992)

Ambassador Ledsky was born in Cleveland, Ohio and was educated at Case Western Reserve University and Columbia University. After serving in the US Army, he joined the Foreign Service in 1957, serving in Georgetown, Guyana; Enugu, Nigeria; Bonn and Berlin, Germany and in the State Department in Washington. In his various assignments he was closely involved in matters concerning the status of Berlin and West Germany as well as on the persistent Greece-Turkey conflict over Cyprus. Among his other assignments, the Ambassador served on the Department's Policy Planning Staff. Ambassador Ledsky was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 2003.

LEDSKY: Jim Wilkinson was leaving the job of Cyprus coordinator. I think the Department really wanted to abolish the job; it didn't fit its normal organizational pattern. But then Friedman, who was the country director for Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, came to me and said that he didn't want the job abolished but that he had no candidate to fill it. He asked whether I would be interested. I first said that I was most reluctant but he persisted and then after a month or so, I finally gave in and accepted it. During the intervening month, I was looking around for a good assignment, but nothing seemed available. There were a couple of possibilities. George Vest had me on a list of potential ambassadorial candidates for Oman, but that didn't fly. George was then the director general and I talked to him on a couple of occasions. He tried to find me something, but nothing exciting really came up.

Finally, I agreed to become the Cyprus coordinator. I had an interview with Ray Seitz, who was about to become assistant secretary for European affairs. I had known Ray for some years. So he

and Friedman went to work to try to get me this job, which was to be part of the Seventh Floor organization. I understood that it took some effort to get me approved. I don't think anyone really wanted me. However since all of the principals were new, none of them knew me or vice-versa. They certainly didn't want the job to continue. My guess is that no one else was interested in the job so that in the end it was mine – by default if nothing else. White House approval was required, particularly since I would be given ambassadorial rank. However, I was told that pending White House approval, I should start the job.

I got a little office across from Seitz's office. I started in and stayed until I retired in October, 1992. During those three years, I also did a couple of jobs for Seitz unrelated to Cyprus.

Q: Did you finally get an ambassadorial rank?

LEDSKY: Yes. I did have a hearing in the Senate and did get confirmed. I had to pay my respects to Sarbanes and a couple of other senators. The hearing was not entirely smooth because I had to answer questions on Cyprus and my own past record on this thorny issue. In the end, as I said, I was confirmed, but Cyprus – even in 1989 – roused some passions. Sarbanes was a friend and that helped; he was pleased that I had been nominated, although he did raise some awkward questions in his usual probing manner. He got me to promise to do certain things, but it all came out alright.

Q: In your role of coordinator, to whom did you report?

LEDSKY: Essentially, nobody. I was appointed by the president and as such, I think I was the president's special coordinator for Cyprus. In practical terms, I worked most closely with the assistant secretary for European affairs. I looked on myself as a deputy to Ray Seitz. I never dealt with the secretary or the deputy secretary, but through and with Ray, we discussed Cyprus with the undersecretary for political affairs, who at the time was Larry Eagleburger. But essentially, I was a lone operator and had very little to do with the Seventh Floor. Most of my contacts were probably with the Greece, Turkey and Cyprus country director.

The political situation on Cyprus was frozen. A new government had been installed, headed by George Vassiliou. The negotiations between the Greek and Turkish sides had completely broken down and there was almost no dialogue at all. Nothing had moved since the negotiations of the mid-1980s, which I described earlier. Those had culminated in meetings in New York with the UN secretary general. Although the meetings did not produce any positive results, an outline of a potential agreement was drafted, which was first initialed by the Turkish Cypriots, but rejected by the Greek Cypriots. When the latter finally decided to also initial the framework agreement, the Turkish Cypriots withdrew their approval, thereby collapsing the whole process. This all happen before Wilkinson was appointed special coordinator. Between 1986 and 1989, there was practically no movement in reaching any kind of agreement between the two sides on the island.

I started almost where I had left off in 1976. Essentially, time had stood still. During the period I was not working on Cyprus, Spyros Kyprianou was the president of Cyprus. His term ended in January 1989. History judged him as a recalcitrant, uninterested in reaching any agreement with the Turkish Cypriots, who were also hardly forthcoming. There was some activity in Cyprus

managed by the UN representative but he had had only a modicum of success. There had been some discussions between Denktash, the Turkish leader, and the Greek side, but nothing resulted from them.

Q: What were the issues?

LEDSKY: They had not changed from the mid 1970s, and probably from earlier even. Foremost was the question of security for both populations: what it would be and how it was to be provided. Troops would be required, which raised the question of whose troops would be stationed where on the island. Security questions also encompassed the defense of the island: who would be responsible and how it was to be provided.

The next question concerned the line to be drawn on the island between the two nationalities. That issue raised questions concerning the refugees: how they would be handled and compensated, and which would be allowed to return to their ancestral homes and which would be permanently displaced.

These were the same issues that I worked on in the 1970s. Twenty years later, nothing had changed, and I might add, these are the same issues being confronted today.

Q: Let's start with the defense-security issue. What were the key questions?

LEDSKY: Since 1974, the Turks had stationed a large military force in northern Cyprus. The Greeks had a small contingent on the southern end of the island. The Greek Cypriots had their own armed forces in the south and the Turkish Cypriots had a small army in the north. The British occupied two small parts of Cyprus, where they had bases. The defense of Cyprus was guaranteed in 1960 by a treaty signed by the Greeks, Turks and British, which allowed any of those parties to intervene militarily in the security of Cyprus was threatened. That was and had been the security situation over a thirty year period.

Q: How about the territorial question?

LEDSKY: The Greeks were about 80% of the island's population. During the 1974 invasion, the Turks occupied about 38% of the island – a far greater percentage than its population percentage would suggest. Obviously, the Greeks view this as entirely unfair and demand a portion of the Turkish occupied territory be remanded to them.

Q: Compensation?

LEDSKY: The Turks essentially took all of the properties which were in their part of the island. There are a few exceptions to that, tiny pockets of houses still occupied by Greek Cypriots. But essentially, all the Greek Cypriots were ousted from Turkish-occupied territory and became refugees. Conversely, the Greek Cypriots ousted all the Turkish Cypriots who used to live in their part of Cyprus, thereby creating more refugees. The Greeks want to return to their former homes or at least want compensation, and the Turkish Cypriots want compensation for their lost properties in the south.

There are other issues as well. Since 1974, the Turks have brought “settlers” from Turkey to the island. The Greeks want these people sent back to their homeland. That is an added complication to the refugee issue but by no means the only one.

Q: Tell us a little about Greek-Turkish relations as they pertained to the Cyprus problem?

LEDSKY: One has to go back a long way. For a Greek government, Cyprus has always been a burden. The Cyprus nationalist movement developed in the 1950s and 1960s; its objective was and is *enosis* (union with the motherland – Greece). There are people in Greece who would like to see an annexation of the island. This view was very strong during the 1950s and 1960s. It began to fade after 1974 but today is still an unmentioned undercurrent of Greek Cypriot policies. I think many in Athens view Cyprus even today as a part of Greece. It belongs to the Greek world, in their view.

The Turks, on the other hand, see Cyprus as another island that lies off their shore. They don't see it as necessarily an integral part of Turkey, but certainly not part of Greece either. Cyprus is one of the islands that lie off Turkish shores, which are perceived to be part of Turkey's security system. These islands have been held over centuries by foreign powers who used their off-shore presence as a way to influence Turkish policies. The islands are perceived by the Turks as potential daggers to be used against the mainland. The alleged presence of oil is only a problem in the case of islands in the Aegean Sea and is a separate issue. The basic issue concerning Cyprus and the other off-shore islands is a security one.

This is the problem stated in the most extreme terms. On the one hand, the issue is one of nationalism and on the other, one of security, that is, the islands did not have to be part of Turkey, but had to be in none-threatening hands to satisfy both elements is difficult indeed.

There is another Cyprus issue that needs resolution and that involves the constitution and the governmental structure that flows from it. The question is how to structure a new Cypriot government that is viewed by both sides as fair. The present constitution that was written and approved in 1960; it provided for a very minor version of power-sharing. The Greek Cypriots controlled most matters; that was not enough for them and they tried to change the constitution in 1963, which led to the first Cyprus crisis when the Turkish Cypriots revolted, disrupting the established order. Therefore, the question became how to re-establish an orderly constitutional process. The Greek Cypriots wanted a process based on population while the Turkish Cypriots wanted equality of treatment for both communities. That issue has played out in different ways over the course of the last four decades.

None of the issues have been resolved. Some say that the [inaudible] Plan solves all of the problems. That is not a generally accepted view. It is true that the Plan deals with all four issues and includes some resolutions, but the two sides on Cyprus are still haggling over the details.

Unlike many other parts of the world, religion *per se* did not play a role in the Greek-Turkish rivalries. It is true that the Greek Orthodox Church plays a major role in the affairs of the island, but the Turks are essentially secular, so that religious fervor does not really play a role.

Q: When you became the coordinator in 1989, what other agencies had any interest in your work?

LEDSKY: None. When I first started on the job, a fellow by the name of Nicks was the chargé. Bob Lamb was eventually was appointed ambassador to Cyprus. DoD had no interest in the Cyprus issue; their interest was focused on using the British air bases and overflight rights. What was happening on the ground outside the bases was of no interest to them.

Congress showed some interest. George Stephanopoulos was Chairman Ed Feighan's aide on this issue. He used to be in contact with me periodically. I always had a good relationship with Feighan, in part because he too was from Cleveland. Senators Brademas and Olympia Snow, and some Congressmen showed some interest, but the rest of the Washington establishments showed no interest in the subject at all. I was on my own. I think by 1989, most of the people who had earlier been interested in Cyprus had pretty much given up any hope of a resolution; as long as matters were quiet on the ground, no one really cared.

I should modify my comment a little. President Bush did show interest in Cyprus and I went to the White House on a couple of occasions when foreign visitors came to see him. Then I would send briefing papers and attend some of the meetings.

Q: Did you feel that during your tour as coordinator, some progress was made?

LEDSKY: I think so. When I took over, the political situation on the island was stalemated. The UN had appointed a very good mediator, who was from Argentina. He began to shuttle between the two sides in 1989 and developed what he called a "Food for Thought" paper, which analyzed the status of the four stumbling blocks in outline form. He used this paper as a device to get both sides to agree on a framework document. He found an ally in the new president of Cyprus, George Vassiliou. I also found him committed to getting the issues resolved. During the course of 1989, the UN representative put this paper together; I helped him formulate the issues and worked with him on drafting the paper. No one took credit for writing it; it had no fingerprints on it.

The paper outlined approaches that might be taken to the four major sticking points. I took the paper to Ankara, in part because it was very difficult physically for the UN representative to get from Cyprus to Turkey. The U.S. government assisted the UN in bringing this paper to the attention of the Turkish foreign office. I made a series of visits to Ankara, starting in 1989. It took repeated efforts, but we slowly began to marshal support for the concepts outlined in the paper in the Turkish foreign ministry. Then in 1989, 1990 and 1991, we tried to convene a series of meetings, which would bring Denktash and Vassiliou together in New York. We finally did bring them together to discuss a document which was based on the "Food for Thought" paper. We called that document "A set of ideas." This document, which was written, rewritten and refined during the 1990-91 period, was submitted to the UN Security Council in the summer of 1992; it was to serve as the basis for negotiations between the two sides.

It was a very intricate process, which is hard to describe in full detail because it was very much a

step-by-step process. Full credit for progress made must be given first of all to the UN secretary general, Javier Perez de Cuellar of Peru. He was quite knowledgeable about the Cyprus issues, having been the UN special representative in Cyprus during the 1980s. He knew all the intricacies of the situation, as well as all of the players. He was doggedly determined to bring the two sides to the bargaining table to conclude an agreement. The other hero was the UN special representative, Ambassador [inaudible] and his associates, who worked tirelessly in New York and Nicosia. One of these was Gustave Feissel, who became a close friend. It was the UN group, together with the U.S. team – Tony Friedman and myself, who were the movers of the process. Some credit must also be given to a few officials in the Turkish Foreign Office who were committed to getting a peace settlement, but faced formidable obstacles in the form of the foreign minister and Turkish political leaders.

The Security Council approved the document. The UN secretary general met with Vassiliou and Denktash in New York to discuss it. The document subsequently went through further refinements and elaborations, but the solutions proposed in it are the same as are contained in the Annan agreement, which is on the table today. Today's version is more complete, more comprehensive, and improved, but doesn't deviate much from the solutions proposed in the 1992 draft, which was based on a paper put together in 1989. So you can see that the outlines of a settlement were proposed 15 year ago and that in the intervening period, there were refinements and elaborations, but no major substantive revisions.

The current version does not suggest resolutions to all of the issues, but for most of them. The document provides for a weak central government and two constituent strong regional governments – one run by the Greek Cypriots and one by the Turkish Cypriots. There would be a rotating presidency. It includes a complicated formula for choosing the method to construct the central parliament. All the functions of a government are divided between the central and the regional administrations. A map is attached which divides the island between the Greek and Turkish sides – it reduces the present Turkish holdings by 4 or 5% and gives that territory to the Greeks. Concerning the settlement issue, the paper provides that there be applications and selection based on certain criteria which are spelled out. It would allow a few Greeks to return to their former homesteads; the rest would be compensated for their losses. There is no mention in the paper of settlers – that is, those who made new shelters after being pushed out of their former homes.

On the military side, the paper provides for security guarantees by Greece, Turkey and Great Britain. It also calls for a reduction of Greek and Turkish forces now stationed on the island to be implemented over a period until both sides have 5 or 7 thousand contingents on the island. As you can see, the paper was quite comprehensive, but managed to suggest remedies for all of the outstanding issues in twenty-five pages, as compared to the present document, which is about 100 pages long. That just shows you what happens when a paper is allowed to be worked on for 12 years!! In any case, we do have a paper, which can be used as the final agreement.

Q: Why wasn't an agreement reached when the paper was first issued?

LEDSKY: As I said, we started with the paper drafted by the UN representative. The Turks denounced it almost immediately, because they said that since they had no participation in the

drafting of the document, they couldn't possibly subscribe to it. They objected to the alleged emphasis on security and the reduction of forces on the island. I should note that while the political leadership in Turkey was denouncing the document, their Foreign Office officials were still working on it and showed interest in further negotiations. I think the political leadership did not want to be seen as having anything to do with settlement of the Cyprus issue as long as Denktash was opposed to it. Denktash and his political partners in Ankara were primarily, if not solely, interested in establishing an independent entity in northern Cyprus – run for and by the Turks.

It is quite astounding how Denktash has been able to manipulate the Turkish government so that he always has its support. Those governments seem not to have paid any attention to their domestic constituencies. Those governments have never wanted or been able to cross Denktash; what he wants, he gets. There is no doubt that he has a following in Turkey; I don't know how strong it is, but there is no question that he has great influence in Ankara on Cyprus matters. Today there may be some movement away from his policy monopoly, but I can't tell you how far nor how fast that change will be. After all, he has held sway for forty years. However, I think the new government now in Ankara may be taking a different tack, and I am hopeful that some accord can be reached in 2004, something I would never have predicted earlier. Denktash himself may be losing some of his grip on Turkish Cypriot politics; there is a new generation of politicians that may be more forthcoming. The lure of Cyprus joining the European Union has considerable attraction to many Turkish Cypriots and that may be enough to bring a new day to the Cyprus stalemate.

Q: You have met Denktash. How would you describe his views?

LEDSKY: He just doesn't trust the Greeks because he was brought up in an era of strong anti-Greek feeling in Turkey. He will not believe that the Greeks do not have some ulterior design on the island, perhaps even *enosis*. He sees all of the issues through this prejudiced prism. When I have talked to him, he continually cites what he believes happened in Crete at the end of the 19th century. He will tell you that the Turks at the time held a lot of Crete and were forced by the Greeks to leave the island. It is his version of history, which he will never change. He has no doubt that the Greeks will repeat that history in Cyprus, because he firmly believes that the Greeks want to possess all of the island off their shores. That view blocks Denktash from considering any kind of deal, because he believes that once the Greeks get some agreement, that is the beginning of the "slippery road," which will eventually lead to *enosis* for the whole island. Every diversion from the status quo is the first step to Greek annexation of Cyprus, in Denktash's view. It is a completely "black and white" view, which leaves no room for any kind of settlement – except perhaps an independent entity in northern Cyprus. So Denktash has said "No" to all proposals up to now; he just cannot get over his innate fear of a Greek take-over of Cyprus.

I am giving you a thumbnail sketch of events that took place over a 15 year period. It is a very complex picture and I would not wish to minimize that through my brief summary. There has been movement on both sides, especially the Greek Cypriot one. During my four years as coordinator, Vassiliou moved in the right direction; he and his supporters wanted an end to the issue so that Cyprus could return to normalcy and have an opportunity to develop economically

with the return of foreign investments. Economic growth would not occur without political stability. Vassiliou recognized that the Turks were 20% of the population and that therefore had to be given their share of the island and political power. He was not interested in his government running the whole island. He hoped he could deal with someone on the Turkish side, who would be willing to enter into a bargain fair to both sides. Such a bargain would be seen by the world as an end to a continuing crisis, which in return would encourage foreigners to invest in Cyprus, as I said earlier. This was a very pragmatic approach. From my acquaintance with him, I would say that he was not anti-Turkish in any way; he had witnessed an era during which the two sides have lived together amicably and saw no reason why such a period of history could not return. The Greeks were willing to give the Turks their autonomy, just as long as the feud would come to an end.

The Turkish Cypriot population has slowly come around to the view that they must make a deal. Denktash did not win the last election – he didn't really lose it either. I guess one would describe it as a stalemate. But, in any case, it showed that his influence was diminishing.

Q: Are you now optimistic that an agreement can be reached?

LEDSKY: Not in the short run. In the longer term, I think the two sides will reach some accommodation. I think the feud is coming to an end, but precisely when that will happen I cannot tell you. All the signs are much more positive than they were ten or twenty years ago. The basic paper, from which an agreement will be reached, was begun in 1989, although its seeds go back to even the 1970s. There will be an agreement; Denktash will not be a factor sooner or later and the Turkish Cypriots will come to the table and sign an agreement. I think when that day comes, everybody will blame Denktash for the 40 years of delay and difficulties and the Europeans will take credit for inducing an agreement through their offer of membership in the EU. As often happens in situations of this kind, historians will come up with a variety of rationales for why it took so long to reach an agreement. I believe that it should not have taken so long; the issues should have been resolved by the mid 1970s.

I need to add a caveat to what I just said. I think there will be a negotiated solution. Whether that will also lead to peace on the island, I cannot say. I don't think the agreement now being negotiated will actually work. I don't think the country of Cyprus is a viable entity as it is currently envisaged by the draft agreement. This agreement does not provide for a workable solution; it provides for a solution, which over time will probably not be sustainable. Changes will have to be negotiated or imposed. I think, for example, that the Greek Cypriots will eventually take over the whole island. Denktash's fears may be realized. I think it is possible, perhaps even likely, that the agreement as presently constituted will fall apart, two or three or five years after it has been assigned. The governmental system now being envisaged is intrinsically unworkable.

I think it is possible that the two communities will clash again. Cyprus is a good illustration of an ethnic tension to which there is no good or permanent solution. Human beings can cobble something together; in fact, we have done just that. But that does not guarantee a peaceful future. Stability on the island could last forty or fifty years, but the situation is intrinsically unstable, almost guaranteed to break out in ethnic tensions once again. Cyprus is an example of many

similar situations around the world, where ethnic divisions are almost permanent and not subject to long-term settlements. It could be resolved if all the Turks or all the Greeks left the island, but you can't count on anything so drastic occurring. It is just very difficult, if not impossible, to maintain stability and peace when a small piece of territory is occupied by an ethnic majority of 80% and a minority of 20%. There are many comparable situations in the world, such as the Caucasus, Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia, which continue to be unresolved. I don't know whether any of them can be resolved or whether they will continue to fester undeterred by the displeasure of the world community. The most likely solution is that one ethnic group absorbs the other. But that is not foreseen as a solution in Cyprus or anywhere else in the world. It is an issue which needs to be addressed by the world community for it is the source of instability in too many places.

Q: During your tour, did you feel that the U.S. government was as fully engaged in the Cyprus issue as it might have been?

LEDSKY: No, of course not. It did practically nothing. It should have been more active. I think that had it been so, we could have reached a settlement. We had influence on both sides that we did not use. Had I had a free hand, I would have been much more active. I think that description was true even after I left the coordinator job. Whether additional U.S. efforts would have been worth it, is another question. I believe we should have been more active, but I recognize that I had a very narrow view of the world. When you work on a problem, you believe that there is no more important one in the world.

Q: That brings us up to 1991, when you went to work on the problem of the status of U.S. forces in Germany. How did that assignment fall to you?

LEDSKY: I was sitting peacefully in my office one day on the sixth floor. The Berlin Wall was falling, but I was still concentrating on Cyprus. A series of meetings were held at about this time in EUR concerning the end of the division between East and West Germany which would have required an end to the four power occupation rights in Germany. I was invited to some of those discussion. In retrospect, I see that I played my usual dissenting role, the minority view, trying to bring sanity to a chaotic environment. Philip [inaudible], who now is a member of the 9/11 Commission, was a junior officer at the time and involved in these discussions. He was then the junior member of the German desk and was the note taker for these meetings. Eventually, Condi Rice wrote a book on German reunification, based in part on these notes. My name is mentioned in that book – as a small footnote – for my frequent and indiscriminate argumentation against the conventional wisdom.

As a result of those discussions, (the four plus two, i.e., Great Britain, the U.S., France, Russia and the two Germanies) negotiations were initiated. They took place in Germany. I had very little to do with them, except occasionally I was permitted to participate in the discussions about what might just have happened or was about to happen in these negotiations. On a couple of occasions, I was invited to go to Europe, to sit in the back row of the conference room and act as an advisor to the American delegation. On a couple of occasions, Ray Seitz was ill and unable to attend; then Jim Dobbins took the chair as the head of the U.S. delegation. I can't say that I had a major role in these negotiations; even the word 'minor' might be overstating the case, but I was

present at several international meetings, as well as at meetings of the U.S. side.

In essence, I played a very small role in all of these deliberations. As the talks came to an end, the Germans again raised the question of whether U.S. forces could go into what had been East Germany. This issue had been an element of the four plus two talks, but no conclusions had been reached. The Germans asked that the "Status of Forces" agreement which had established rules for the disposition and behavior of American troops in West Germany be renegotiated. Ray Seitz, at some stage, asked me to go to Bonn to explore with the German government what it had in mind. I did do that. A couple of other State people and I went to the Foreign Ministry, which had requested that a formal negotiation be initiated to amend the existing "Status of Forces" agreement. This was the beginning of a long drawn-out affair. Bob Kimmitt was our ambassador at the time, and we discussed the Germans' request.

So the talks began. Somehow, the Embassy and the Department agreed that a special negotiator be appointed for these discussions. It was agreed that someone who knew Germany was required; that person would have to periodically go to Bonn to participate in what was foreseen as a long, protracted negotiation. Ray asked me whether I would be interested. Cyprus was not really keeping me very busy and I was somewhat bored, so I told him that I would conduct the negotiations. The negotiation actually became a multi-lateral one since it involved the British, the Canadians, the French, the Belgians and the Dutch, all of whom had military forces stationed in West Germany. All of the countries had a special representative, who would come from the capital to participate in the negotiations, which lasted for about a year. We would meet for two or three days and then adjourn for consultations with our governments.

ALFRED H. MOSES
Special Presidential Envoy for the Cyprus Conflict
(1997-2000)

Ambassador Moses was born and raised in Baltimore, Maryland. He was educated at Dartmouth College, Princeton University and the Georgetown University Law School. After service in the US Navy, Mr. Moses joined the Washington, D.C. Law firm Covington and Burling, where he dealt with matters concerning Middle East and Romanian Affairs. Prior to being named Ambassador to Romania in 1994, Mr. Moses served as Special Counsel to President Carter. He subsequently became Special Presidential Envoy for the Cyprus Conflict. Ambassador Moses was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005.

Q: Today is 24 August 2005. Now we are going to talk about Cyprus. How did you get involved in Cyprus?

MOSES: I was serving as American ambassador to Romania when my name was proposed to be Special Presidential Envoy for the Cyprus Conflict. This was in '97. I believe my name was proposed by Marc Grossman who was then the incoming Assistant Secretary of State for

European Affairs. It moved right along. I met with Madeleine Albright, and she in effect told me that I would be the Special Envoy.

Q: Well what...

MOSES: This was in '97. It didn't happen. Dick Holbrook swooped in. He had been offered the job, or certainly was the leading candidate, but said he could not do it because he was writing his book on Dayton. He visited with me in Bucharest and told me the same thing. In fact, he said that I would be the Special Envoy. What he didn't tell me was he had already changed his mind, and wanted the job.

Q: So what happened?

MOSES: He became Special Envoy and I returned to my law practice. Two years later Dick was nominated to be the U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN. So the position was open again. For the second time, Marc Grossman put my name forward. Thought was given to others such as Lee Hamilton. I understand that Madeleine decided that Lee wasn't forceful enough. There was also talk of George Mitchell. I think he turned it down. Tom Miller, who was serving as Cyprus Coordinator and later became U.S. ambassador to Bosnia and then to Greece supported me and persuaded Dick to support me. With Dick's support, and Marc's support, Madeleine eventually agreed. I think she had been looking for a bigger name.

Q: Well let me say I am familiar. I never served in Cyprus, but I was consul general in Greece for four years. I left Greece just before the whole mess started where they put Samson in and the Turks came in and all. But why would you as a successful lawyer here in Washington, want to get into that can of worms?

MOSES: That is a good question. You could ask the same question about why did I want to be ambassador to Romania.

Q: Well Romania can be fun.

MOSES: If Romania is fun, Cyprus was a challenge. I like challenges, public service and being involved. It was a perfect fit for me. I did not have to give up my law practice. I served without compensation. The Government paid my expenses but I was not otherwise compensated. I thought the issues were ripe for resolution. I had no hesitation taking the job or any doubt that I was qualified to do it.

Q: Well what dealings had you had with Cyprus, the American Greek community, the Greek Community and the Turkish?

MOSES: Zero.

Q: Zero. Probably just as well.

MOSES: It didn't take very long to get on top of it. The Cyprus problem has a complicated

history. But if you get mired in the history, you never come up with a solution. I didn't sense I was at a disadvantage because of my lack of familiarity with the issues on the ground or not having had relationships with either the Turkish-American community or the American Greek community. In a relatively short time I was able to develop good relations with both of them, very good with the Greek Foreign Minister, George Papandreou. We remain good friends. I think my dealings in Ankara, with the Government of Turkey, were equally good. I pushed very hard. Everything I said was not well received, but the personal relationships were not affected. I was not exactly wheeling-dealing on my own. I conferred with just about everyone in town, seeking advice on Cyprus. I met with Dennis Ross, the U.S. Middle East negotiator, to learn from his experiences. Tom Pickering, then Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, was a constant font of ideas, as was my friend, Marc Grossman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. Marc knew an enormous amount about the region, particularly Turkey where he had served as DCM and then ambassador. Sandy Berger, the President's National Security Advisor, was particularly helpful and generous with his time. He was probably the most creative in coming up with fresh ideas. I also met with the Washington think-tank people and from time to time brought together previous ambassadors and others having special expertise in the region such as Mort Abramowitz, former ambassador to Turkey, and Nelson Ledsky who had represented the United States in the negotiations on the 1992 Set of Ideas. I also met regularly on the Hill with Senator Paul Sarbanes and Congressman Ben Gilman, Chairman of the House International Relations Committee, both of whom had a strong interest in Cyprus, mainly from the Greek perspective. Paul, whom I had worked with on other issues, was the most forceful and respected voice on the Hill on Cyprus issues. But there were others as well. Mike Dukakis called me from time to time, as did John Brademas, the former president of NYU and longtime congressman from Indiana, who also had strong ties to the American Greek community. In a word, just about everybody who cared about Cyprus was on my call list.

Q: Who was it?

MOSES: Farouk Logoglu was Turkey's principal representative. Farouk and I remained friends later during his four years as Turkey's ambassador to the United States. Even though I didn't do what they wanted on all the issues, I also got along well with the Greek American community -- certainly with their leadership, two individuals, Andy Athens whom I have known for years, and Andy Manatos. I met regularly with Andy Manatos, less frequently with Andy Athens because he was in Chicago. I met occasionally with representatives for the Greek American community, as many as 30 to 100 at a time.

Q: Could you sort of compare your feeling about, I mean the two major political, you might say ethnic groups in the United States are the Greek American group and the Jewish American group. How did you feel, you know having dealt with the Greek-Americans, they have some real blind spots in my mind.

MOSES: They do. I dealt extensively with the Jewish American community when I was in the White House. The American Greek community is a cake-walk compared with the American Jewish community which had a far more activist, energetic and stronger leadership. By comparison, the American Greek community seemed almost languid, repeating the same mantra

year after year. The issue was not life or death, survival or extinction in Greek eyes, but correcting an historic wrong for which the Greek Cypriots were not wholly blameless.

Q: Well I suppose the Greek-American community only had one real issue.

MOSES: That was Cyprus. But one or two organizations. The Jewish community in the United States has Israel and a lot of other issues as well. As the saying goes, there are more Jewish organizations than American Jews, and their views are all over the lot, from hard-liners to peaceniks. Much more difficult. And it was harder still because I was Jewish. Those that didn't agree with me saw me as a traitor, a turncoat or whatever.

Q: Of course you were in a way, I am not sure how things stood at the time you took over, but you know the separate issue seemed to revolve around two men who I think went to school together, Clerides and Denktash.

MOSES: No, they didn't go to school together. Clerides is older than Denktash, but, under the British, they had both practiced law on Cyprus. Clerides was a defense counsel; Denktash represented the Queen. He was a prosecutor. Clerides had studied law at the Inns of Court in London. Denktash's legal education was on Cyprus, not London. He was less of a Britishphile than Clerides. Clerides served in the British Army in the Second World War. So there were differences, but they had known each other a long time. They would refer to each other as "my friend Rauf" or "my friend Glafkos." But they weren't really friends. They had very different views. Later, President Clinton told President Sezer of Turkey that the Cyprus problem was a problem between Clerides and Denktash. He said, "If those people disappeared, the problem would go away." There was some truth to it. Denktash was more than just suspicious. He was opposed to a resolution other than on his own terms, and they changed constantly. His goal was a separate Turkish Cypriot state. Clerides was much more flexible, more forthcoming, easier to deal with -- not entirely reliable, in the sense that he was not able to deliver without first having to test the political waters, even among his own political leadership, whom he brought to the negotiations from time to time.

Q: Well what were the issues as you saw them? Why were we in it, and what were we trying to do?

MOSES: The division on Cyprus had the potential to spill into warfare. Turkey and Greece were both members of NATO, and the Cyprus Conflict could have destabilized the Eastern Mediterranean. Our interest was to prevent this from happening. There was also a political imperative, or near imperative. The Greek-American community was pushing very hard in the Congress and with the Administration to resolve the issue. They saw the Turkish intervention in '74 as an invasion of Cyprus, and saw Turkey as the party at fault, rarely acknowledging that it came about in reaction to a Greek Cypriot movement to unify Cyprus with Greece. The government in Athens was a right wing junta. George Grivas and other Greek Cypriots were chomping for unification. Bishop Makarios had been deposed as Cyprus's president. There was chaos and the Turkish Cypriots feared, I think wrongly, but there was real fear, that they would be annihilated by the Greek Cypriots. People like Rauf Denktash saw it as the opportunity for Turkish forces to intervene, divide the island and set up a separate Turkish state, which is what

he had wanted all along. So that was the situation. There had been talks at various times since '74, in Switzerland and elsewhere, largely UN supported, that didn't result in movement. Denktash kept raising the stakes. Initially, the talks were about reunification without conditions. Later Denktash insisted that reunification be based on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. Then Denktash moved from "federation" to "federated" with two autonomous member states, a Greek Cypriot member state and a Turkish Cypriot member state, which meant to him that before negotiating an agreement on reunification, there had to be recognition of the legitimacy and sovereignty of the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus, that had been declared in '83 and recognized only by Turkey.

The issues were territory, property, security and governmental structures. Over the years, various ideas had been floated. The last meaningful negotiations had taken place in '92, when the parties came close to agreement on a "Set of Ideas." But the momentum created ended when Clerides became president of Cyprus. During the election campaign, he had opposed the Set of Ideas. I think he later regretted this, and his regret was an impelling force in his resolve to settle the matter while he was still in office. I served from September '99 to January 2001, some 17 months. During this period, we made considerable progress. We persuaded Denktash and Clerides to come to New York to begin the negotiations. This was a major breakthrough. These were proximity talks. The two didn't negotiate directly but through the UN negotiator, Alvaro de Soto, who in turn met daily with me, my British counterpart and our respective teams. This process finally evolved in the spring of 2004 as the Annan Plan submitted for referendum, approved by the Turkish Cypriots and turned down by the Greek Cypriots, a turnabout from what had been expected a year, or even six months, before. Turkey supported the Annan Plan, as did the government in Athens. But the Cypriot government on the island which was then headed by President Papandreou opposed it. The vote was 70 percent opposed on the Greek side, 65 percent in favor on the Turkish side.

I had a central role in getting the talks started in '99. I spent an entire night on the telephone urging Clerides, who was in Durban at a Commonwealth Conference, to agree to a statement that had been negotiated a couple of months before with the Turkish Government as the basis for convening the talks. After I read to him a statement I wrote on the spot whereby President Clinton assured him that the talks would be conducted on a basis consistent with previous UN resolutions, he finally agreed. The day before on a telephone call with Secretary Albright and me, he had agreed to come to New York for the talks, but then changed his mind. So I had to start over again on a Saturday night. I was able to persuade Clerides in the end. It was important that the two sides be seen as engaging in at least proximity talks so that the Cyprus Conflict would not be an excuse for the EU to delay further the beginning of accession talks with Turkey. The EU breakthrough occurred in December 1999 at the Helsinki EU Summit Communiqué. The official communiqué called for the resolution of the Cypriot issue, but it did not make it a condition precedent to Turkey's beginning accession talks.

I met with Denktash and Clerides for ten days in December in New York leading up to the EU Summit in Helsinki and again in February in Geneva. We were scheduled to meet again that spring in Geneva, but Clerides had an operation for colon cancer. This delayed the talks until September in New York. We later had another long session in Geneva in November 2000, my last. We had come up with two initiatives, both of which I authored and promoted. One was

intended to deal with Denktash's insistence that there be prior recognition of the sovereignty of the TRNC as a condition to moving to meaningful negotiations on a final agreement. I came up with language for Secretary General Annan to use which was to the effect that the parties would be equal in the negotiations, and that any final resolution would take into account the equal status of the parties. Denktash saw that as an enormous victory. It was really intended to move Denktash off his position on recognition of TRNC's sovereignty. He played it as a big win, whereupon Clerides played it as a big loss, and withdrew from the talks. I had to hold his hand, literally, in his suite in the Waldorf Towers, before he announced he would continue the proximity talks.

After the round in New York, we concluded that the talks were going nowhere. As a result, I initiated the proposal that the Secretary General set forth his ideas of what a final settlement might look like. We dubbed this the "Clinton Proposal." The senior Director for European Affairs in the National Security Council, Tony Blinken, and I wrote the briefing paper for Clinton. He was supposed to deliver it to Kofi Annan at a dinner in New York where they would be sitting next to each other. The President said he had delivered it to Annan who had indicated it was acceptable and he would proceed. However, Annan told me when we met in Geneva in November that the President never raised the issue with him. So who knows? We nevertheless decided to treat it as the "Clinton Proposal." It was fleshed out by De Soto and his team, then presented by Annan to the parties the third week in November in Geneva. A few days later the Turkish Cypriot side withdrew from the talks with the blessing of the Turkish National Security Council. The Clinton Proposal was the excuse Denktash had been looking for to withdraw from talks that were putting unwanted pressure on him. Denktash went to Ankara to make his case. Both Prime Minister Ecevit and Foreign Minister Cem supported him, so the talks ended. We certainly knew a Turkish walk-out was a possibility but were willing to take the risk. If the Turkish Cypriots were going to walk out in response to the Secretary General's 20 or 25-point paper setting forth what a final agreement might look like, we were not going to make progress in the talks anyway. So we bearded the lion in his den. The Turkish side came back later, but that was after I was no longer the presidential envoy. There was no successor, which I believe was a mistake, but the incoming Bush Administration downgraded the talks.

Q: Were you concerned all the time that no matter what you came up with, that political passions were so inflamed, particularly on the Greek side of the island, that no matter what you came up with, it wasn't going to fly?

MOSES: No, never. If I had thought that, I would not have taken the job. I was always hopeful, not optimistic, but hopeful. There was passion on both sides. It was necessary for the parties to get beyond passion. They still haven't and that remains the problem. There are ways of dealing with the emotional aspects. I so recommended to the State Department this week.

Q: Well the situation really, it just isn't resolved yet.

MOSES: No, it is not resolved. And what is important in my view and should be important in our government's view is that the Cyprus Conflict may block Turkey's EU accession. As I see it, there is no point in going back to the Annan Plan which, as it finally evolved, was enormously complicated. I think the Annan Plan should be put aside to give the parties time for their relations

to evolve on the ground through the movement of people and goods. We will not defuse the problem by going back to the Annan Plan.

Q: What role did the Greek government play in all this?

MOSES: No direct role. Foreign Minister Papandreou was supportive of what I was trying to do. Athens was not nearly as hard-line as the Greek Cypriots. George's larger strategy called for a rapprochement with Turkey generally. Cyprus was an important part of this as were certain Aegean islands Turkey occupied and air and ship traffic in the Aegean. In Papandreou's view, a stable, democratic Turkey fully at peace with Greece, a member not just of NATO but also of the EU, was first and foremost in Greece's interest. We were trying to do that. This would protect Greece's eastern flank. It would benefit both countries if their relations were fully normalized economically and politically. Turkey is an enormous market. Greeks are good business people. There is a lot of business to be done in Turkey and beyond. A stable pro-Western Turkey would be an important link to influence Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and beyond.

THOMAS G. WESTON
Special Coordinator for Cyprus
Washington, DC (1999-2004)

Ambassador Weston was born and raised in Michigan and educated at Michigan State University and in France. Entering the Foreign Service in 1969, he was posted first in Zaire, after which he began assignments in the Bureau of European Affairs and abroad. His posts include Zaire, Germany, Belgium and Canada. Ambassador Weston was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005.

Q: Well Tom, I am a little disappointed. You went out there and I didn't see you come back with peace in the Middle East.

WESTON: I know it's one of my great regrets in life. I was talking about an hour ago to the new UN envoy to the Middle East peace process who was my counterpart on Cyprus with the UN, a very close friend, and he is back in Laayoune, in Western Sahara.

Q: Oh boy, well then what did you do? We are talking 2000 about?

WESTON: I was supposed to go on to do a third inspection, you know that's the cycle, you do three a year and it was going to be Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The Inspector General got a call from EUR, could I be released for a special project in EUR? The special project at that time was we had a whole series of summits coming up with Europe. One was the G-7, G-8 and the other was U.S.-EU and the third was the establishment of the stability pact for the Balkans, that turned out to be ministerial not summit level, but we had these two summits.

Germany was in the presidency of the G-8 then; it was also the presidency of the EU. We are talking spring of '99 and they wanted me to go out as something called a Summit Coordinator,

this was drawing on Germany, all my work with the EU in the past and the G-8 and basically manage these summits which was a job which periodically occurs in the Bureau of European Affairs. This was the first time it had been done, but it was this strange link with Germany. They asked if I would do it and then I got a call from the Inspector General asking me. They hadn't asked me actually ahead of time which is kind of strange. I said okay, sure, I know all these folks and Germany and the EU and the G-8. Pickering, of course, was one of the sherpas here so I suspect that he had some role here as well.

I went off and spent the next several months basically between Washington, Cologne and Bonn doing summitry. More than anything else it's spending hours, and hours, and hours negotiating lengthy, lengthy documents on every issue before the American foreign policy establishment, G-8, G-7, USEU and then this other additional separate exercise for the stability of the Balkans. I can't remember the actual dates but both of the actual summits took place in what would have been early June from what I can remember. I was many months doing that.

Q: Were there any major issues that this...

WESTON: For a lot of people it was every major issue on the foreign policy agenda. The real issues that we had to spend a lot of time with were some economic issues related to trade, that was on the U.S.-EU side of things. We had a big issue dealing with Chernobyl and Russian nuclear power, which was part of G-7, G-8, but all the money from it was coming from U.S.-EU. A lot of hours were devoted to dealing with nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union; a lot of Europeans were trying to make these unsafe nuclear civilian nuclear reactors safe in the wake of Chernobyl. That was a big money issue between the United States and Europe. It led to a new initiative on Cyprus, in both the G-8 and U.S.-EU, and the establishment of the stability pact for the Balkans. That was a mechanism in which you held out the prospect of integration in the Balkans, economic and political leading to ultimate integration with the European Union. A long term prospect of membership as an instrument to implement the Dayton Agreements, foster democratization where it needed to be fostered, foster compliance with the court in The Hague, promote economic development and all those good things. That was the big, big agreement that spring related to the Balkans.

Q: After that what happened?

WESTON: What happened was at the ministerial to establish this stability pact for the Balkans. I was there because I had been preparing this stuff. I'm sitting there with the Secretary of State and I think it was the Azerbaijani Foreign Minister who gave a speech to which we were listening very attentively, but we were just chatting and reminiscing about when we had first worked together which was back in 19...

Q: Madeleine Albright.

WESTON: Madeleine Albright, on the lifting of the Turkish arms embargo which had been put in place in Cyprus, so we were just reminiscing. At any rate we finished up with that activity, and I was coming back and basically the idea was EUR was going to find a chief of mission job for me. This was now in the next cycle and I was one of the candidates for Germany. It was

never going to happen because it was never going to be a career appointee but none the less it was an exercise because of my background and so on, Germany.

There had been along with a dozen other things this new Cyprus Initiative coming out of the G-8 and then the U.S.-EU Summit. At that time you had two envoys on Cyprus, one was Dick Holbrooke, who was called a special presidential envoy. He was basically in the job while waiting to be confirmed to go to New York as Permrep in New York. The other was Tom Miller, who was special coordinator on Cyprus. Miller was leaving to become our ambassador in Sarajevo. At the last minute this other officer who was scheduled to replace him left the Foreign Service, went with a private corporation, retired. So here we had this new initiative on Cyprus and basically no one to carry it out except Holbrooke who was on his way, ostensibly getting confirmed, he didn't actually get confirmed until I think September or something. So they needed a Special Coordinator for Cyprus to do this. As luck would have it, we had just had this conversation so my name came to the forefront; I got a call, would I do this. I agreed to do it. It must have been June/July, it was before early July but I made the transition and took on this new job, Special Coordinator for Cyprus. I had to do it because we then got the Security Council Resolution in early July to implement an initiative from the G-8 and U.S.-EU which was a new mandate from the Secretary General to undertake new negotiations on Cyprus associated with a positive decision by the European Union to give candidacy to Turkey at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, so it was all linked together. Here was an EU type so it seemed the logical thing to do, so I started before July because I did the Security Council Resolution in July. So it was June I made the transition to the Special Coordinator for Cyprus which I continued doing for the remainder of my career in the Foreign Service.

Q: That was from when to when?

WESTON: I only left that job last August, so August of 2004, so five years. Now there were several things happening during that period. My name went forward as the Department candidate for a chief of mission job in Europe which, would have had me leaving the job, but none all of the jobs went political.

Q: Today is May 19, 2005; we are doing five years of Cyprus. You ended up with island fever or something?

WESTON: Well, that is a long time.

Q: From when to when?

WESTON: I started doing it in the late spring of '99 until August of this past year, August 2004.

Q: Okay, tell me first, what was the job and then describe in '99 when you took it over, what was the Cyprus situation? First, what was the job?

WESTON: The job changed during those years. This job, Special Coordinator for Cyprus, has

existed, it has been mandated by law since the '80s. But there's been some kind of a special Cyprus envoy on and off certainly since the '70s, and periodically back into the '60s including a lot of very eminent types like Dean Acheson and George Ball and Cy Vance and so on. In the Clinton Administration the Special Cyprus Coordinator job was supplemented with something called the Special Presidential Envoy on Cyprus. The first of whom was someone named Batey who wasn't there very long. By the summer of '99 the Special Presidential Envoy was Dick Holbrooke, and the Special Cyprus Coordinator was Tom Miller, so you really had two people doing Cyprus. That situation continued for two of those years in essence, the remainder of the Clinton Administration.

What happened is that Holbrooke had then been this special Cyprus envoy, special presidential envoy, basically to give him a link, a job with the Department, a plane ticket through the Balkans, however you want to describe it. He had done very little with it. He had made a couple of trips out, quite unsuccessful, but not done much with it. Miller, who was basically a Greek specialist had had several tours in Athens and so on, had acted as his deputy and worked away on it but not much happened until this series of events that we described earlier which led to this new initiative in the summer of '99 on Cyprus. I came on as the SCC (Special Cyprus Coordinator) replacing Miller, who went off to Bosnia. Holbrooke was leaving to go up to the UN, finally getting confirmed after almost a year, confirmed to be Permrep to the UN. That initial summer I was really the only one working on Cyprus until the fall when a successor to Holbrooke was named, Al Moses. Moses then acted as the Special Presidential Envoy for the remainder of the Clinton Administration; about a year and a half.

Q: He was ambassador to Romania.

WESTON: To Romania exactly. Then when the Administration changed, which would have been 2001 roughly, the inauguration, the new Bush Administration, more importantly the Secretary of State decided to do away with as many special envoys as possible. So there was kind of a cleaning out of all these special envoys. They did not do away with the Special Coordinator for Cyprus in large part because it was mandated in law and secondarily because of the political backing for it.

Q: Basically a slot for Yugoslavia.

WESTON, Yes, exactly, they did away with the special presidential envoy position. For about half of this period I was the only one doing Cyprus. This changed the nature of it quite a bit and I continued on doing that until August of 2004, which is related to the events that took place in Cyprus. That was the job, and the chemistry of it.

Initially the whole effort on getting a new Cyprus Initiative going was intimately tied in with the candidacy of Turkey in the EU. That actually happened with a positive decision on candidacy for Turkey in the EU at the Helsinki Summit in '99, and the commencement of proximity talks on Cyprus following the mandate of the Secretary General the previous June or July, whatever. Initially all of the activity was in actually getting the talks started. Al Moses during this time was doing all of this basically pro bono while he kept up his law office and so on. He came basically in and out of it a lot, whereas I was the continuity, doing it every day. The talks started as

proximity talks alternating between Geneva and New York. We basically were there supporting the Secretary General's efforts ostensibly, but what we were really doing was diplomacy with Turkey in particular during these proximity talks. They lasted roughly a year.

An awful lot had been done on the Cyprus issue before, by the UN but this was all aimed at finally getting a settlement. In the proximity talks, basically the outline of what would come to be known as the Annan Plan was developed. In particular the very complicated scheme for dealing with properties which were lost by the Greek Cypriots or Turkish Cypriots during the period around '74 was resolved. It is an incredibly complicated scheme and one on which even though it was ultimately the product of the United Nations, they were the drafters of it, Al Moses, who is a very good lawyer among other things, played a very strong role when actually coming up with ideas on how to do this very complicated thing. I would say the other thing that happened in that period was the development of the so-called security regime which came to be incorporated into the Annan Plan. This was seen to be fairly easy to come up with because of the very forthcoming attitudes of the then Greek Cypriot negotiator, Glafcos Clerides. That was the main activity during these proximity talks. The proximity talks then ultimately broke down because of Denktash.

Q: Denktash?

WESTON: Denktash.

Q: When you say Clerides and Denktash, I mean they've been going at it for...

WESTON: A long time.

Q: A long time.

WESTON: With a very interesting personal history between them. Clerides basically having saved Denktash's life and that of his family once but they have been going at it a long, long time. Clerides had come to the conclusion, these were two very elderly gentlemen who had been going at it for a long time, but he had come to the conclusion that it really was time to get a settlement. I think he had come to a personal conclusion that he had been wrong in torpedoing the last real possibility of a settlement, which was called a Set of Ideas, in the early '90s. He had basically run for president of Cyprus on a platform in opposition to this particular settlement which I think he regretted later. He really was working very hard to get a settlement, and consequently he was the one who would keep coming up with ideas and compromises in these proximity talks for the UN to work with. Denktash at this time was stonewalling, eventually to the point of walking out, and the proximity talks collapsed.

I think the important part in these proximity talks was the development of what turned out to be the basic property settlement. It was an incredibly complex piece of legal work, and the security regime for what would eventually become the Annan Plan. We then went through a relatively fallow period which pretty much coincided with the change in administrations.

Q: What administration?

WESTON: Our U.S. administration. What happened then remember is we did away with the special presidential envoy leaving only me doing it. So it was a different kind of role, when you are basically the only one in the American government who is really doing it and everyone defers to you which is I guess good in some ways but not so good in other ways. We went through a very difficult period in which Turkey very much wanted to get the process started again but was dealing with a very difficult situation with Denktash who was very intransigent and didn't want to. Turkey for its own reasons focused on its path to the EU, its relationship with Greece and so on. We went through a period of backdoor diplomacy with Turkey in particular to try and devise ways to return to talks and continue to develop this plan. I'd have secret meetings with my Turkish counterpart and we would both meet in Frankfurt and run over to the Turkish consulate and try and put together things. This was very difficult for Turkey because it was working to some extent against the perceived position of Denktash who was quite intransigent. We succeeded in getting talks started again. Those talks basically alternated between proximity and direct talks but basically became the presentation of positions by the two sides. The Greek Cypriot side, meaning Clerides, would continually put forward ideas to move the process forward which were compromises. In fact certainly compromises from traditional positions and Denktash would put forward well defined, well known positions and he wasn't moving. That left the UN in the position of acting as to some extent an arbitrator. The Secretary General and his Special Envoy, who throughout this period was Alvaro Desoto, a Peruvian diplomat who had done a lot of work with the UN in the past on Central America, brokered the peace agreement there, human rights in Burma, has just been appointed the Middle East negotiator now for the UN. It left the Secretary General, the special adviser on Cyprus, Alvaro Desoto, that team and all of us supporting this effort. We were trying to merge these two to take advantage of these openings which were clearly coming from the Greek Cypriot side and develop positions which would ultimately be part of a comprehensive settlement plan, so-called Annan Plan. These positions would always obviously contain compromises or suggestions from Clerides tempered in many instances to make them more palatable to the Turkish Cypriot side if not to Denktash himself. It would be a mistake to think of this as a traditional negotiation, these two sides coming to an agreement. What was really happening is the UN pulling, and those of us who were supporting the effort, pulling out of the two sides respective positions and then merging them to come up with a plan that somehow the two sides could ultimately agree on. The other two key elements of the comprehensive settlement plan were developed: one was the system of government for a new Cyprus, one which basically assured the political equality of the two communities and a territorial settlement. The Turkish Cypriots or the Turkish army, depending on which formulation you choose to use, having control of far more territory on the island than would be justified by their population. They had about 38 percent of the territory, their population was about 18 percent. It was very clear when the Turkish took their action in '74 that they took relatively more territory to be in a better bargaining position. This territorial adjustment was a big part of it. That was always going to be the ceding of territory occupied by the Turkish side to the Greek Cypriot side. That is what went on during this period. As luck would have it, ultimately Denktash walked out again, much to the dismay of Turkey but Turkey felt it had no choice except to support him.

We then went through another period of trying to lure Denktash back to the talks and so on which wasn't very successful. This eventually evolved into a decision by the Secretary General

and those who supported him that he should forge ahead with a comprehensive settlement plan and present it to the two sides for negotiation. The idea was if you had a comprehensive settlement plan which gave something to both sides, a lot of the compromises in it having been suggested through the negotiations up to this point, that you had a better chance moving toward a settlement. A methodology was developed to put forward this plan to the two sides which was going to happen in the fall of 2003. It was actually delayed a bit because Turkey was facing elections. The idea was it would not be very good to put this forward immediately before the elections as it might have an adverse impact. It was delayed a little bit but in essence Turkey had its elections and changed its government and wiped out a whole class of political figures that fall, and the Annan Plan was then put forward shortly thereafter, so-called the Annan I Plan. You end up with an Annan V eventually of this sort. This Annan I Plan was for all intensive purposes except for maybe a couple of relatively small elements the settlement plan which persisted through this whole process.

There were some other developments going on including most importantly the change in government in Turkey and the great weight that the new government put on Turkey's acceding to the EU and its realization that the Cyprus problem had to be solved, if that was going to ultimately happen. I said 2003; it was actually 2002, the fall of 2002.

There was a growth in sentiment among Turkish Cypriots which could only be described as pro-settlement. They could see that Cyprus was going into the EU and they didn't want to be left behind. There was growing sentiment that Denktash's tactics in negotiations were going to result in a situation where they did not enter the EU, Turkish Cypriots. There was a real change which was taken advantage of by some political forces in Cyprus in particular the fellow who is now the president the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Talat, as well as a couple of others to foster this pro-settlement feeling among Turkish Cypriots. This meshed of course very well with the positions of the new Turkish government to really try and solve this problem. The Annan Plan was put forward in the fall of 2002 with a view to getting agreement on it or something very close to it in time for the Copenhagen European Council of 2002. At that time a decision was to be taken, one, on the accession of new members of the European Union which included Cyprus, and a date set for that accession, as well as an evaluation of Turkey's candidacy. There was hope of setting a date for the beginning of the negotiations for Turkey as well, Copenhagen 2002. Of course, as we had done in all of these things, the attempt was to use the leverage of those decisions as a means of fostering an agreement on Cyprus. So we all found ourselves in Copenhagen. In what was really unusual, we had the whole European Council going on and this separate Cyprus activity. It resulted in a situation in which for the first time I had been working with the EU for a long time, but it was the first time I know of where you had an American diplomat sitting and working out of the foreign ministry of the presidency country of the EU during the European Council which was the case in Copenhagen. These things were so intimately related it was very unusual; we always talk about the United States having too much influence in the European Union.

Q: It does bring up a question Tom, that is, the cold war is over, Cyprus is essentially a European problem, accession to the EU and all that, why were you and your colleagues as Americans messing around with it?

WESTON: First of all it was not an EU problem; it was a UN problem because all parties agreed that the only way to get to a solution was with the UN. The Greek Cypriots because they had several Security Council resolutions which backed up their positions and negotiations, the Turks because they were not in the EU, nor likely to be for a while, and would only accept the UN as a figure. It may well have been an EU problem in terms of needing a lot of EU support which was the case to get a settlement, but it was a UN problem. You can argue about it or describe it in a lot of different ways: whether it's because of the interest of the United States in ultimately solving this problem which divided two allies, the pressures of the Hellenic-American lobby, our role as a Security Council member, are a good part of it. I was willing to personally devote the time, the resources to keep doing this and was able to do it in a UN context and a EU context as an American diplomat which was quite unusual. We have never managed to bring that kind of American voice into EU deliberations on this before. Whether we should have or not is a separate question, but those are some of the factors that played a role. We were doing it very much in support of the Secretary General's effort. That was important in itself. This was a time when support for the Secretary General and the United Nations, remember we are now moving into the Bush administration and deliberations on Iraq and everything else, instances of support for the Secretary General and the United Nations by the United States were few and far between as well as cooperative working relationships with the European Union. Apart from the Cyprus issue I saw a value in this activity in terms of the U.S. approach to the United Nations and U.S.-EU relations as well. The Cyprus issue could have separated the United States even more than it was already separated from those two institutions.

Q: I don't want to interrupt your story here, I was just wondering, you must have had people like Senator Sarbanes and others of Greek extraction or those who owe their election to the very powerful Greek lobby breathing down your neck all the time.

WESTON: I met with Senator Sarbanes continually. I met with the Hellenic caucus continually. I met with Hellenic-American organizations. I did the same with the Turkish caucus and so on, much weaker, but that's the part of doing this job. I would say throughout this period a lot of it was because of Glafcos Clerides being the negotiator on the Cypriot side and support of Greece for the process this was not a terribly difficult thing to do during that period of time, but it was an important part of the activity, the domestic politics of the United States.

Q: How did you find in doing this with Denktash there must have been a great temptation to try to flank him or get over to...

WESTON: Well that's exactly what we did, that's part of the story. He is no longer the president of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and by this time he was no longer even a negotiator, but that's kind of a little ahead of where we are in the story.

Q: Continue.

WESTON: But that's exactly what was done. At any rate, at Copenhagen in 2002 we got to the point where we had an Annan Plan on the table. By then it was Annan II. It had a couple of revisions presented at Copenhagen to try to get agreement by the two sides. I think Clerides came to Copenhagen prepared to agree to this plan, if the Turkish Cypriot side agreed, which

meant if Turkey could induce the Turkish Cypriot side to agree. Clerides was never tested in that because what actually happened, Erdogan was not yet prime minister of Turkey. Although he was leader of the party which had won the elections, the prime minister was actually Abdul Gul, now the foreign minister, because Erdogan was still banned from having a seat in parliament because of a felony conviction in the past which had to be overturned in court and they had to have a parliamentary election. He eventually became prime minister but he was clearly the decision maker but very new to this issue and to dealing with it in a European context and to dealing with Turkish Cypriots. He was also not prime minister yet and I think there was an issue about how to manage this issue with the Turkish military, the TGS (Turkish General Staff). Denktash took advantage of this and instead of coming himself to Copenhagen to negotiate this settlement he sent his so-called Foreign Minister Taksin Erturuglu who was a complete rejectionist, always had been, and in Copenhagen did nothing but sit in a room, agreed to nothing, and that's what Turkey was presented with at Copenhagen. We are talking about a 48-hour period of time to get this done. Turkey could not manage to bring the Turkish Cypriot side along and hence did not feel it could move on its own.

There was a complicating factor. That was the decision of the European Council which ended up as a decision to not name the date when accession negotiations would start for Turkey. Instead they took a decision to take a decision on a date in December of 2004 if all so-called Copenhagen political criteria had been met by Turkey, then it would decide to start accession negotiations promptly which it eventually did do. But that was the decision at Copenhagen, which was less than what Turkey wanted hence less perhaps than an incentive for going the extra mile, moving enough to get a Cyprus settlement. In essence, the strategy to get a settlement at the Copenhagen European Council coinciding with the Copenhagen European Council was not unprecedented if you remember the Helsinki European Council where the two were associated again, and that also failed. At that time my British counterpart Sir David Hannay left the scene, well no, he actually stayed on until a couple months later but was about ready to leave the scene; I'll phrase it that way.

When you have a failure in diplomacy, you pick up the pieces and decide on your new strategy, right? Right! In working closely with the UN the strategy was developed that we had come so close to this agreement -- even though I think the assessment of the Secretary General was that it was unlikely that there would ever be agreement. There was perhaps another way of doing things. That was by getting this settlement put into effect through referendum on the two sides. There had always been the idea that you would legitimize an agreed settlement through a referendum to establish the new Cyprus, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot referenda, the thinking which we were intimately involved with the Secretary General was that maybe we had to turn this into a way to an agreement, putting it to a referendum. A strategy was developed to make a few more revisions in the Annan Plan because you couldn't have exactly the same thing, and to try to move towards a decision not to get agreement between the two sides -- to a settlement itself but to get the agreement of the two sides to put a comprehensive settlement, the Annan Plan by now Annan III, to separate simultaneous referenda. We worked with that and I in particular in my role was very much working with Turkey to get agreement to this. It, of course, flew directly in the face of Denktash who had always insisted any settlement had to be one he agreed to. But, of course, the dynamic had changed in Turkey and among the Turkish Cypriots, so there was some prospect that you could move in this direction.

An associated event, however, was that Cyprus was facing presidential elections. There is much detail here I'm leaving out but in essence Glafcos Clerides, who had been such a positive force in these talks, by then for three and a half years, was defeated by Tassos Papadopoulos who won the election with the support of AKEL (Progressive Party of the Working People of Cyprus). We had a change in the government of Cyprus and hence in the Greek Cypriot negotiator. Now this all came together in a very narrow period of time along with another key event which was a vote in the Turkish parliament which was the vote on whether or not Turkey would allow American forces to deploy to Iraq through Turkey. This was defeated in the Turkish parliament. The details of that are very interesting. All of this was going on, a change in the Greek Cypriot government hence a new negotiator, a vote in the Turkish parliament and Turkey maneuvering to find a way around Denktash. The week after the elections in Cyprus and the week before the vote in the Turkish parliament I went to Ankara. I met with Erdogan. We planned out this new strategy. It was to summon the two leaders to The Hague. The Secretary General just happened to be in The Hague for the opening of the International Criminal Court. This was another instance in which I as an American found myself in an unusual situation. The policy of the administration was totally against the International Criminal Court but we had the Cyprus meeting in the same building, so what can you do? Basically Erdogan agreed to a methodology that they would be summoned to The Hague and the attempt would be made to get them to agree to referenda. Not to agree to the settlement plan but agree to put it to referenda and that Turkey would support that and would support it vis- a-vis Denktash. This was pretty spectacular stuff actually for Turkey to take that sort of position. My meeting with Erdogan was followed the same day in fact by the Secretary General who met with him and heard exactly the same thing and we then headed to Nicosia where the Secretary General presented the revised Annan Plan, Annan III, to the two sides and asked them to meet with him in The Hague two weeks later to agree to put this plan to referenda. He presented it to the two sides and that was all done. Three days after doing that the vote took place in the Turkish parliament.

Q: This is the vote on Iraq?

WESTON: On Iraq, totally unrelated to Cyprus but very related to the position of Erdogan, the prime minister, his relationship with the military in Turkey for which Cyprus was an issue. The vote was defeated basically I think, it passed in the majority but it needed basically a super majority and it lost by three votes in an almost 600 person assembly. You will find a lot of explanations for this round because it was such a significant vote from the point of view of the United States. Obviously it changed our whole strategy for the invasion. I think what happened was really quite simple and that was inexperience in parliamentary management on the part of Erdogan.

Q: It was a party that had never been in power?

WESTON: It had never been in power. It was not a public vote and it was not made clear to the members of AK that party discipline was expected which was another way of saying either you vote the right way or you're not going to be a candidate for parliament next time, which is how this works in Turkey. At any rate, the next vote on Iraq, which was a year later taken by Turkey, ready to transit through Incirlik and things like that, a U.S. air base in Iran. Erdogan made sure it

was a public vote, had scheduled a meeting of the Party Congress to choose the candidates for the next parliament the week afterwards. It was very clear, you vote, forcing party discipline but that was not the case so it was defeated. I think it led to a situation internally in Turkey, what I mean is Erdogan was faced with a terrible situation vis-a-vis the United States. It was obviously a real question about parliamentary management and his skill to be the prime minister of Turkey and real questions about his relationship with the military, always a key question with Turkey. When that vote took place it was quite clear that we had a problem and of course we were only ten days away from The Hague at that point. So I got on a plane to Ankara and continuing my support of the Secretary General's role on all of this and had another meeting with Erdogan. Remember, these two meetings with Erdogan are roughly ten days apart and it was a totally changed situation. Instead of reaching agreement on this methodology in The Hague, it was I can't take this on now, Denktash is going to thwart me, he has support of the military, you know, a totally different situation so clearly we had a big problem. But, the Secretary General had already gone ahead and had given the plan revision. The meeting in The Hague was scheduled but we had some concerns about what Papadopoulos would be doing. During this time Papadopoulos was inaugurated as president of Cyprus. This was the week before going to The Hague. I was actually in Nicosia, I remember the day before his inauguration. I was paying a farewell call on Clerides and he came in and joined the meeting I was having with Clerides and we had a discussion, I will call it that, of what to do with The Hague. But at that time Papadopoulos was very much sticking with anything Clerides had agreed to, he was going to support, he was not going to back away from it, he was not behaving like a rejectionist at all. But this was immediately after his inauguration, not that long after his election.

We had all these meetings and we were clearly heading to The Hague in a situation in which it was pretty clear that Denktash would not agree to put this to referendum; and Turkey would not be in position to force him to do so. We showed up in The Hague and I was having meetings with Desoto all the time trying to develop other strategies. We came up with some. We got to The Hague, we had 19 straight hours in negotiations through the night. The Secretary General had a cold, I mean, it was just awful, and we tried a lot of different strategies -- if we couldn't get an agreement on putting it to a referendum, can we get agreement on at least making preparations for referendum. We got nowhere. Denktash said, "No, no, no, no". Turkey not being in a position to do anything. At one time it was actually kind of amusing I went down to talk to my Turkish counterpart, the under secretary from the foreign ministry, and I said, "We have to do something this is just going to fail utterly and it is not going to be to anyone's benefit particularly for Turkey". He said, "You go talk to Denktash, I can't get anywhere". So he sent me in to talk to Denktash for Turkey, which was kind of an unusual role. Nineteen hours, the whole thing failed. At the end the Secretary General put out a press statement that in essence this process was at an end. He would go back and make a report to the Security Council and point out who was responsible for the failure and the Security Council could decide what to do. It was at that point then my British colleague then left the whole process, Sir David Hannay. We were left with what then to do to carry on, once again, as it happened in Copenhagen, we had failed again and so we pick up the pieces.

Picking up the pieces this time involved the Secretary General doing a report to the Security Council on the whole history of the negotiations. He said that they had failed because of Denktash, and Turkey's inability to do anything about him, and having that report endorsed in a

resolution by the Security Council. This had the effect of the Security Council putting its stamp of approval on the Annan Plan as the settlement plan. I'd worked on resolutions in the Security Council off and on again over the years. This was the hardest, because even though on the substance there wasn't that much dispute in the Security Council, it was in the wake of the repeated failure by the United States to get its second resolution passed before invading Iraq. The atmosphere in the Security Council was absolutely poisonous, there was a resolution in the Security Council co-introduced by the United States and the United Kingdom. It was very difficult because of the mood in the Security Council, but ultimately we were successful, we got a resolution, 15 votes in favor, unanimous in the Security Council which endorsed the report of the Secretary General. Now the importance of that is that it put Turkey in a very bad position and Denktash in a worse position in terms of their aspirations for the EU. At the same time this indicated that the Security Council really thought the Annan Plan was fair and balanced and it gave us the material we needed to make another go.

The next go after getting this resolution in the Security Council took place in a series of conversations which I was doing, because the Secretary General was very distraught with all that had happened with Turkey and the Greek Cypriots. With Turkey I had a whole series of discussions in Ankara about this. The United States being the biggest supporter of Turkey acceding to the EU, "we have got to solve this problem, we have got to get past this," so on and so forth, and it's going to take some Turkish initiative now and it is going to take Turkey taking on Denktash. At the same time I was trying to convince Papadopoulos, using what I was using with Turkey, which was trying to come up with some Turkish initiative for a Cyprus settlement and working basically against Denktash to convince Papadopoulos that he should take some initiative so that he was not left in a position where Turkey was taking all the initiatives. I ended up being very successful with Turkey and only marginally successful with Papadopoulos; marginally successful in that Papadopoulos eventually sent a letter to the Secretary General expressing his agreement that we had to have a new initiative, he really wanted a settlement and so on. This turned out to be very important for the new initiative and that was to set up a kind of negotiation, if you will, another attempt to get a settlement to referendum. This was based on bringing the parties to New York, not only the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots but also the Greeks and the Turks and the UK as the other guarantor power on Cyprus. We were there assisting, the United States assisting the Secretary General.

In February of 2004, the strategy was to bring everyone to New York and Turkey would put forward some ideas for how to reach a settlement. Those ideas would then be brokered by the Secretary General in an effort to get agreement on all sides. We had indications of support by Greece for this strategy. I should tell you we were also going through this period with elections in Greece. So, at the time we were in New York we had one government in Greece, Papandreou, and by the time we completed this strategy we had another government, but I will get into that. But, we had indications from both the sitting government and the prospective new government in Greece of support for this and so we went ahead. The idea was everyone would run to New York and we once again had all night meetings and trying to hammer out an agreement. Turkey did put forward two basic big compromises which it would have been very hard for Papadopoulos to refuse. He was ready to refuse but at the last minute Papandreou was solicited to convince him that he couldn't refuse. This resulted in an agreement on Friday, February 13, I remember it because it was Friday the 13th, among all parties with the Secretary General. The two parties

would go back to the island and attempt to negotiate whatever changes they wanted to the Annan Plan. They would complete all the necessary drafting of laws, some 9,000 pages of laws which would make the new Cyprus function from day one. They agreed to do that and they also agreed in the event they were not able to reach an agreement that they would convene with the Secretary General outside of Cyprus, it turned out to be in Burgenstock, Switzerland, and attempt to reach agreement on a plan with the assistance of Greece and Turkey and that, in the event they were still not able to reach an agreement, that they would have the Secretary General finalize the plan to be put to referendum. The agreement in February was the agreement we had sought in The Hague, that something was going to be put to referendum of the two communities which was very painful for Papadopoulos to accept. We had a very, very difficult meeting on that. I had a very interesting meeting with Denktash.

Q: Why was he so concerned about the referendum?

WESTON: He did not want to accept this plan that he had never agreed to. He actually campaigned against the plan in the referendum even though he had agreed to doing this under pressure from Greece, remember. At any rate, this was all agreed; the Secretary General announced it and the parties went back to Cyprus. Remember, Denktash was clearly only doing this because Turkey said he had to do it. I had a meeting with Denktash after it was done where I complimented him on his statesmanship, because he had been, or was, in the process of being pushed aside and overruled by Turkey, which had never happened to him before. Nonetheless I went and congratulated him on his statesmanship and he managed to grit his teeth and not throw me out of the room.

The two parties went back to the island. The two leaders, Papadopoulos and Denktash got nowhere, not a big surprise. What did happen is a whole series of technical committees convened to draft these laws and the fact of the matter is these 9,000 pages of laws were drafted in about six weeks. I mean there were drafts that had been prepared ahead of time but actually getting through this work it is kind of remarkable. There was competition on a national anthem, a national flag for the new Cyprus, and all kinds of things like that. That all went very well but there was no real movement on the part of either Papadopoulos or Denktash. Then we went to the second stage of the February agreement which was to convene in Switzerland. Now, this was, of course, the Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, the UN, Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom as the guarantor power. The United States had been playing a particular role so we were there too, but we actually acted as a part of the British delegation because there was no real role for the United States as United States technically. For the first time after 1776 we rejoined Great Britain, which was fine. Everyone showed up on this snowy mountain top. For these people coming from the Eastern Mediterranean there was ten feet of snow and they're all falling on ice and no one had an overcoat. They had a terrible snowstorm and it's a mountaintop in Switzerland. Everyone was there including the prime ministers of Greece and Turkey who then were having separate meetings, since the government had changed in Greece the week before. Even though Karamanlis had spent time with Erdogan in the past in a new democracy this was the first time they were meeting with Karamanlis as prime minister. We went through several days of attempting to reach agreements. A bit more was done on the plan but we got to the end of the period which had been agreed to in February and it was quite clear that the Secretary General would have to finalize the plan. So it was down to about a solid 24 hours, around the clock,

finalizing the plan which became Annan V and was presented to the two parties as we left Switzerland, with the agreement which had been reached in February to put this plan to referendum. Everyone returned to the island. I should also point out that Denktash did not come to Switzerland. In his stead Talat and his son Seder Denktash, the so-called foreign minister, Talat having by then become prime minister of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. But they came fully empowered by the Turkish Cypriot Community Leader Denktash to negotiate, come to an agreement. At least in terms of the negotiations that was the first time where Denktash was actually out completely, had been sidelined completely.

The Turkish Cypriots started a very active campaign for a yes vote on this agreement. Rauf Denktash expressed his misgivings about it but it was quite clear that the pro-settlement forces were going to pass this. Turkey made statement after statement, did everything it could to elicit support for the agreement. Ultimately Greece, though in a lukewarm way, did give its formal endorsement advocating a yes vote in the referendum, but Papadopoulos, who had been expected to wait to have all of the various political parties in Cyprus give their views before taking a position, went back and gave a very nationalistic, xenophobic anti-Turkish speech about this whole agreement urging a no vote, much to the, I don't know if surprise is the right word, chagrin, for all kinds of other people. That was met with, I remember, Günter Verheugen, who is the Commissioner for Enlargement of the EU, put out a statement that Papadopoulos had betrayed the European Union, just as Cyprus is supposed to be entering the European Union. There were investigations started in the European Parliament about some of his activities related to the referendum, whether they were undemocratic, just the whole European Union and of course Greece had endorsed this and called for a Yes vote but he called for a No vote. He took other measures. For instance, Desoto, Special Advisor for the UN, was not allowed on Cypriot television to explain the agreement or anything else. The referendum took place on April 24th just before Cyprus was entering the European Union, was passed two to one by the Turkish Cypriots, was defeated three to one by the Greek Cypriots so it did not come into effect. Cyprus went ahead and entered the European Union a week later as a divided island without a settlement.

Once again a failure, but a totally different sort of failure this time. Everyone blaming Papadopoulos and the Greek Cypriots for the failure to get a settlement, the Secretary General, the European Union that it was just joining. Greece was very muted in its criticism. They said this is a decision that the Greek Cypriots would have to abide by. But it was a complete change from the situation of Denktash being the obstructionist, and Turkey which was very good. Of course Turkey was facing the decision in December of 2004 to get a date for accession negotiations and had to be in the position of doing everything it could to get a Cyprus settlement.

We went back to New York and the Secretary General drafted another report for the Security Council's consideration. There were a lot of other things going on here during this referendum period. We had a veto of a resolution to establish a peace keeping force by Russia, no doubt at Greek Cypriot behest, a veto in which the fourteen other members of the Security Council voted for it. We had a Donor's Conference in which the United States came up in a four day period with \$400 million in assistance to implement a settlement as well as others but at any rate, the long and the short of it is in the wake of the referenda we went back to New York.

The Secretary General drafted another report making very clear that he no longer was convinced that the Greek Cypriots actually wanted a settlement. They'd always said they wanted a bicomunal, bizonal federation by referendum. That's what they had been presented with and they had rejected it overwhelmingly for whatever reason -- whether it was Papadopoulos or they didn't like being called into question whether they really wanted a settlement. He did not believe he could continue his efforts, and the good offices mission under these circumstances if one side clearly didn't want settlement. The Secretary General basically did three things in his report. He noted that Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots had obviously done everything possible to get a settlement. He cited the agreements in New York and the Turkish initiatives which was very favorable in terms of Turkey and the EU. He also left a door open to the Greek Cypriots by including language in his report which said something like "If I can be convinced that there is a willingness on the part of both sides to get a settlement, meaning the Greek Cypriots, I will resume the good offices mission. But in order to be convinced of that I have to know the actual language, with clarity and finality, what the Greek Cypriots found wrong with this settlement." But, he left an opening in other words, he said that he would support or advocate with the Security Council measures to take account of the concerns of the Greek Cypriots if they could be articulated. The third thing he did was to call for an end to the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots. You know that the Turkish Cypriots were not recognized, they were subject to a whole series of restrictions, so-called embargos. They aren't really that but that's the term which is commonly used. He advocated that any of these which weren't really necessary, should be lifted to end their isolation; they had clearly demonstrated themselves to be in favor of the settlement moving toward the EU.

We then went to try and get this once again approved in a Security Council resolution and were thwarted in that basically by Russia at the behest of the Greek Cypriots. It was very critical of the Greek Cypriots but it was quite clear we could not get a resolution through, so we used the occasion of a vote on UNFORCYP (United Nations Forces in Cyprus), the renewal of the UN peace-keeping force on Cyprus, to reinforce, well, several members of the Security Council used that occasion to reinforce their support for the report of the Secretary General and these three things he had advocated, the United States most strongly but there were others, the UK, Romania, Pakistan and others endorsing it. But we could not get a resolution through the Security Council because of Russia, clearly at Greek Cypriot behest. It has always astonished me and I to this day can't figure out why a power which styles itself as a great power does the bidding of Nicosia whenever it's asked without question, but that's a whole separate subject of conversation, meaning Russia.

At any rate, we got all these statements out in the Security Council and we started to, we the United States, to take actions to carry out at least an end of the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots. We developed a series of policies, went through a deputies committee meeting and all of that sort of thing to do a whole series of things for Turkish Cypriots. I was very careful to be talking to the more moderate members of the Hellenic-American Committee and the Hellenic-Caucus, like Senator Sarbanes, all of these things we were doing and they related to an assistance package of some \$31 million we put through, some symbolic acts and so on. All of which turned out to be opposed by the Greek Cypriots but by the time they got their act together we had put these through. It was quite clear having been through Copenhagen and The Hague and Switzerland and these referendums, I decided there was not going to be a Cyprus settlement any time soon and I

was going to leave. So, that August after tidying up this work in New York, I left the account.

Q: Something that troubles me is that, looking at the situation today, and even the situation later, I mean prior to this, in a way the Turks were acting on a presumption that seemed very problematic and that is the ability to get into the European Union, I mean, for example right now the French have stated that they are going to take a referendum on it.

WESTON: Well, they have added it to their constitution.

Q: Yeah and the French are already ready to vote down the EU constitution, in other words referenda allow for people to be bloody minded.

WESTON: (agreeing)

Q: And the Turks are just not, I mean they are not European and there are a lot of Europeans who don't like Turkish workers at all and there are a lot of things that...

WESTON: You know apart from Cyprus I've been working on Turkey acceding to the EU for a long, long time both with Turkey and with the member states of the European Union. I know this is very difficult and there is no certainty that Turkey will ever be a member of the EU. I think that they should be and they certainly are not going to be a member of the EU that exists now because the EU is not going to be the same EU by the time they ever, if and when they do get membership.

Nonetheless, the prospect of membership has been incredibly important for Turkey: obviously in terms of the reform process in Turkey, in terms of stabilizing its economy, in terms of moving on the Cyprus issue which is fairly minor compared with what's happened in Turkey with the prospect of entry into the EU. I think it's also been very beneficial for the member states of the European Union and for Europe as a whole. It's brought to the fore the question of if Turkey isn't European anymore, neither is Germany which has some three to four million Turks in it, nor is France which has some seventeen percent of its population is Muslim right now. So it brought these questions to the fore in a way that I think led to a very beneficial debate within Europe. There are all kinds of reasons why Europeans oppose Turkish membership, cheap labor, if they have the current system of common agricultural policy, all kinds of reasons, but I think what has happened in this process is the whole question of Islam in Europe, not completely by any means, it's still a problem with the CU in Germany and with all kind of anti-immigration forces in Scandinavia, the Netherlands, France. To some extent this whole prospect of Turkey being European, meaning being part of the EU, has led to a increasing realization by Europeans of who they really are which are not homogenous little societies of Volksdeutsch (German people) or whatever they thought they were. Whether or not Turkey ever becomes a member of the EU, I think the process, or the prospect of it has been very beneficial for Turkey, I think it's been very beneficial to Europe as a whole and hence to the United States ultimately which is of course our interest in the affair.

Q: Tom you've had a, I mean this is long hard work but a unique position. Could you comment a bit on watching the European Union system and the United Nation system, I won't say collide

but cooperate, try to get something done because you look at the EU and it is very easy to look at and say this place may be a good customs movement but as far as having a common foreign policy or something like that it just doesn't seem to be in the cards and the United Nations has got so many different interests that it there are a lot of issues not going to go anywhere but you saw these things coincide on a really very small, essentially rather minor area...

WESTON: Right, on Cyprus.

Q: But at the same time it's one that has been rankling for a long time.

WESTON: But one in which you did have a common EU foreign policy on Cyprus, or at least until Cyprus joined the EU. You had very strong and coherent U.S.-European cooperation within the United Nations and with the Secretary General. There of course is the problem of Russia, but I'm not sure what your question is because I take a different view of the EU. I think it is a very dynamic and vibrant organization which is quite creative.

Q: I mean this is what I want you to, this is just...

WESTON: But it takes a lot of work. It takes especially a country like the United States. It takes a tremendous amount of patient diplomacy which means talking to a whole series of institutions and people over an extended period of time building relationships, building a capacity to influence and be influenced by these various institutions in terms of developing coherent and common policies because that's how they are more effective. We were able to do that and sustained it.

Q: You were doing this at a time when we had an Administration that was dumping on the UN.

WESTON: And the EU. That's right.

Q: And the Iraq war going on and everybody, I mean really ranking Bush next to Stalin and Hitler, I think Bush would, I'm not sure if you would call it a popularity contest, I mean, President Bush was not one of the figures popular in a lot of these places. How did that affect you?

WESTON: It made what I was doing, I mentioned this earlier, keeping at least one area where we could really conduct diplomacy in cooperative efforts with the EU and with the United Nations, the United States could do it working well. There was at least some, albeit minor, minor issue, although Turkey in the EU is not a minor issue, Cyprus may be but Turkey in the EU is not. We could keep something going. I mentioned already, going to the Security Council and getting a resolution supportive of the Secretary General led by the United Nations was very important, I think, at this point of time after Iraq and our problems there. But it was lonely out there. I can remember one time that Havia Salata, our representative for foreign policy, this was during the Greek presidency of the European Union and he and George Papandreou were in a meeting. It was one of the usual ministerial level meetings with Powell, the Secretary of State going all through all these things, the U.S.-EU relationship and Salata came out with, because they were having difficulties in all of these different things said, "You know we need," he

actually said to Powell my name, “we need Tom Weston working on this stuff. He’s the most effective diplomat in dealing between the United States and the EU”. Then Papandreou agreed with him in the meeting even though they weren’t talking about Cyprus. It was lonely. There weren’t a lot of relationships going on and the same was unfortunately true with the UN in terms of policies where the United States was actually using the UN to foster its policy interests successfully.

Q: Do you think there was another factor going here. Things are so abysmal at that time because of Iraq and the attitude of the Bush administration. Do you think that other parties, for God’s sake, let’s find someplace where we can all, I mean, let’s show a little light over in this corner...

WESTON: Absolutely.

Q: And everybody would be kind of nice to Tom Weston.

WESTON: Absolutely, and this was both sides of the Atlantic, in Washington too, and it was, you know, this is one thing and let’s highlight it. It comes out if you go through a kind of U.S. – EU communiqués at these very summits during this period in time you will see that we are really cooperating strongly on the Cyprus issue and it was seized upon as an example in the UN. Absolutely.

Q: These things coincide, right now we are talking of the fact that the United States and France got together...

WESTON: On Lebanon.

Q: To get Syrians out of Lebanon and I think everyone is delighted because we are looking for some place we should show that it’s not this confrontation. Did you ever sit down and have a serious talk with the Russians and find out what the hell they were doing?

WESTON: Oh I had a lot of serious talks. Remember at the time, for instance, of the veto. We were trying to get the Security Council resolution passed before the referendum which established the follow-on UN force on the island. The reason we were trying to get it passed before the referendum is Papadopoulos was saying, “Look, this will never be implemented, this agreement, so don’t vote for it.” The idea was if you could get the Security Council and the United Nations to start implementing the settlement by establishing the force that would be a sign that it indeed would be implemented. That was the reason we were trying to do it. As I say, the foreign minister of Russia by this time was Lavrov who had been their permrep in New York whom I had met on numerous occasions on Cyprus before he became foreign minister. We had all kinds of talks. Russia had a special envoy on Cyprus this whole time who is a contact. I was in Moscow a couple different times they would come to Washington for talks and so on, so we were talking to them. The only way I can explain Russian behavior here is its traditional Russian behavior. Russia has traditionally supported the Greek Cypriots. This goes back to getting a foothold in the Mediterranean and all kinds of things like that, anti-Turkish, but I think most recently it is Cyprus as a member state of the European Union may be able to do friendly things for Russia on visas or something like that. Now there are a lot of other factors at play here.

Cyprus for a long time was the destination for an awful lot of Russian mafia money. All of those connect; I think that's far less the case now because of changes and Cypriot banking laws.

Q: When you say the mafia you are talking about, these are sort of basically robber baron types who are...

WESTON: Well, including a lot of the Russian political elite as well, robber barons though they may be. To really understand how all of these things play a role, but I think it was very interesting when we were trying to get this resolution. Especially in the face of 14 positive votes from the entire rest of the Security Council, how do you explain it? I think the explanation is in some of these traditional relationships with Cyprus, including the financial one. I think part of it is Lavrov personally, the Russian foreign minister, feels that on the Cyprus issue maybe Russia as a member of the Security Council has not been treated as the great power that it is. He will say the whole Annan Plan was written by the Americans, for instance, or the UK which is not the case but he will say things like that. I think it reflects his history as the Russian permrep in New York, dealing with the Security Council. Whether there are some darker reasons I mean, is someone on the take here or not? I don't know, but it is very hard to explain the absolute obedience of Russia to doing whatever Nicosia wants it to do. I mean it is very difficult to explain.

Q: Well looking at it today, you've got Cyprus in the European Union, and you've got this hunk of thirty percent or something like that, 38 percent of territory and Cyprus which is under Turkish sway. What's going to happen?

WESTON: Well, first of all I think you got to move off Cyprus. We are in a situation where insofar as you can remove this as an issue affecting Turkey's prospects in Europe, that's important whatever happens on the island of Cyprus. What's going to happen on Cyprus? I think that there is not going to be a settlement as long as Papadopoulos is the president of the Republic of Cyprus. I think he will continue to do whatever he can within the EU as an EU member to thwart Turkey's relationship with the European Union as a negotiating tool to get what he wants on Cyprus. The only settlement I think he would be willing to accept is one of majority rule, minority rights, that is Hellenization of the island which is not something which I think Turkish Cypriots or Turkey would ever accept, nor should they. I think where we are right now is with each passing period we are moving more and more towards ultimately either a change in the politics among the Greek Cypriots. This would be more than Papadopoulos leaving the scene. Remember, you had a vote of three to one in the referendum against a settlement, a bicomunal/bizonal federation settlement, so I think that absent a change in the politics of Greek Cypriots and their attitudes, which I do not necessarily believe will ever happen. If there were a change, then I think you might have a chance for settlement. The longer you go on after having had this referendum and the obvious refusal of Greek Cypriots to accept what they said they always wanted in a settlement, I think you are inevitably driven in the direction of partition of the island and I think the way that the situation will change over time is that you have this Turkish Cypriot part of Cyprus sitting there with the European Union trying to develop a relationship with it despite Cyprus being a member state. You will have more and more de facto partition which ultimately could translate into the Turkish Cypriots becoming part of the European Union as a different entity. The legal status right now is all of Cyprus is a member of the European

Union and that the difference with the North is that technically the *acquis communautaire* is suspended, the body of the EU law, so you can imagine somehow the European Union trying to find a way to apply the *acquis communautaire* in the North thereby bringing the benefits of European Union membership to the Turkish Cypriots without a settlement. I think that would be thwarted by Papadopoulos as a member state in the European Union but I'm not sure about his successor.

Q: Is there any possibility that it might become sort of an Andorra or a haven for putting your money there or...

WESTON: Not really, because the Turkish Cypriots are trying to adapt all of their laws so they are consistent with European Union law anyway. You do this in financial services and Andorra is no longer a place where you can keep your money. Lichtenstein is but...

Q: Is this going to become sort of a pustule sign of sort of a Mediterranean...

WESTON: I think more likely it will move toward taking advantage of the European Union without being in the European Union. You have an example on the island now. The two British sovereign base areas are not technically part of the European Union even though the UK is. Remember they are UK sovereign territory but they are not part of the European Union yet the whole *acquis communautaire* applies in both of them so it's the same status as the Isle of Man and Jersey and Guernsey. You work out these strange arrangements and I think that's probably where it is headed.

Q: You've got to have a passport how does that work in Turkey's case?

WESTON: A lot of Turkish Cypriots have been applying for Republic of Cyprus passports, thousands and thousands and that works particularly well. They've got a European Union passport and they can go and work in Germany or anywhere else. That, of course, does not deal with the so-called settlers, because the Republic of Cyprus will not issue a passport to someone they do not consider a Cypriot citizen, they will to Turkish Cypriots but they will not to Anatolian Turks. About half the problem is taken care of but not the whole.

End of Reader